highly mechanized farming methods, there is going to be the continued need for a government price support policy to attain self-sufficiency in rice and barley. Thus, this growing tension between attaining the goal of national self-sufficiency and that of economic efficiency will likely continue for many years.

G. Sustaining and Replicating Agricultural Research

Sustaining the agricultural research system in Korea will be subject to three basic stresses if economic conditions internally and abroad continue to cause concern to the Korean leadership. First, Government budgets are controlled by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) under the Deputy Prime Minister. A few economic rationalists in the EPB view rice and other grain production as uneconomic, for it is apparent Korea could import at least double the rice it produces for the same cost. More politically sophisticated views have prevailed and the rice support price, which politically would be difficult to lower, may keep rising, though more slowly than inflation, thus creating the illusion of support without its actuality. Agricultural research budgets, the second stress, as well as civil service research salaries (the third stress) may not rise fast enough to prevent some exodus to academia. There is little doubt, however, that in spite of these potential problems the agricultural research program is well-established and will continue. AID did not create it and AID did not dramatically affect it, but AID did assist its growth.

The agricultural research program does not need to be replicated in Korea. It already pervades the society. The question of replicability abroad poses different issues. Any agricultural research project should either be predicated upon, or have as components of the project, a variety of other elements without which it will either fail or prove to be an interesting, but essentially sterile, experiment. Most important is an effective extension service, but without pricing policies encouraging farmers, some rural infrastructure and communications, farm credit, and an overarching national policy encouraging agricultural research and its use, such a program is unlikely to succeed. It is fair to say that a similar project initiated in Korea in the mid-1950s probably would have failed. The Korean agricultural research model will be difficult to replicate in the Third World.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Office of Rural Development is the nexus of agricultural change in Korea. An efficient and pervasive governmental organization, it gains much of its effectiveness through its capacity to plan and execute agricultural research, its dissemination of experimental findings through a ubiquitous guidance (extension) system, training, cooperation with the Sae-maul Movement, and its links in both research and training to the academic community at all levels. Its organizational coordination of research and extension at the top of the bureaucracy gives it the capacity to guide rural change.