if it were returning to Sinaloa all the way from Chicago. Likewise, the second party has an

incentive to avoid travelling empty from Chicago-to-Nogales, but would have more incentive if

it were moving the entire Chicago-to-Sinaloa distance. In an abstract world with perfect

information and no costs for transferring cargos between carriers (i.e., interlining), the total

incentive to avoid empty movements along the route from Chicago-to-Sinaloa would be the

same, regardless of the number of carriers. However, in the real world there are significant

costs related to finding loads and to coordinating and effecting inter-carrier cargo transfers. As

such, the consolidation responsibility for the total movement by one party lowers the costs of

seeking and securing complementary movements.

 There is some evidence that the parties are changing their thinking in anticipation of the

expanded haulage rights under NAFTA. Several Mexican producers indicated that they intended

to take advantage of complementary movements of vehicles delivering their products into the

U.S. and Canada to become importers of perishables for sale in the Mexican market. They

described the proximity of their U.S. consumption markets to areas producing deciduous fruits,

meats, and dairy products and their proximity to the Valley of Mexico. They also noted that

they were experienced sellers of produce in their domestic market, and that importing would

allow them to capitalize further on this expertise. Likewise, Mexican carriers planning to

operate into the U.S. indicated the importance of securing southbound loadings in order to be

competitive.

 For perishables, more freight moves northbound than southbound. Therefore, enhanced

incentives to secure complementary loadings of perishables most favor U.S. exporters."8 As

there are costs involved in repositioning vehicles to pickup cargos, U.S. producers located