pp. 4-5: McCarthy talks about President Reagan's gifted speech writers who used some clever, Hollywood scriptwriting type of phrases in his speeches. Gannon then brings into focus the use of poetry in political speeches by citing Kennedy who said, "If more politicians knew poetry and more poets knew politics, I am convinced the world would be a little better place in which to live." McCarthy does not accept that concept, but feels it would not hurt to have politicians who could write poetry, such as Lincoln. pp. 5-6: McCarthy then turns to Kennedy's brief term in office and gives some general criticisms, such as creating "an attitude of anticipation and of hope." But because he was in office for only three years, according to McCarthy, it is difficult to say what might have been accomplished with these kinds of historical questions. He states that Kennedy's Alliance for Progress--the Latin American foreign policy program--was "dampened down by the Cuban" situation. McCarthy praises Kennedy's contribution to Civil Rights enforcement and handling the economy and cites one of his economists, Walter Heller, but the president's greatest failure was in foreign policy. p. 7: Continuing with Kennedy's foreign policy, McCarthy discusses the nuclear build-up and Kennedy using the phrase "missile gap." The gap, however, was in America's favor, McCarthy says, but the president ordered another 1,000 missiles. And that, McCarthy states, was the beginning of the great leap forward into a nuclear arms race--in the Kennedy Administration. The Bay of Pigs also put pressure on the Russians to build up their arsenal and the humiliation also led to Khrushchev's ouster. McCarthy feels that the erection of the Berlin Wall was a Kennedy defeat because early on he could have warned the Russians that the U.S. would send tanks to Berlin. McCarthy does not believe the Russians would have fired on the tanks. p. 8: McCarthy talks about the conspiratorial theories surrounding the Kennedy assassination, saying that he does not think there is evidence of a conspiracy. McCarthy believes that placing Earl Warren at the head of this commission was a "serious mistake": Warren's integrity as chief justice would not be protected; the entire Supreme Court would be prejudiced; and the honor and integrity of the Senate and House would be in jeopardy because President Johnson also appointed two senators and two representatives to serve on the commission. McCarthy says the pressure was on the seven-member commission to rush through the findings. pp. 8-9: McCarthy claims that the Kennedy assassination had a deeper impact than earlier assassinations and assassination attempts because the president was young and the deed did not reflect "any kind of political motivation." He cites the assassination of Robert Kennedy, attempts on Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan's lives--all of which do not seem to be politically related. McCarthy concludes by recalling where he was upon hearing about the Kennedy assassination: On Friday, November 22, 1963, McCarthy says he was at a restaurant around noon near the Capitol when someone called him. He immediately walked back to the Senate floor.