

ful, and I believe it will result in the work being done more expeditiously.

The CHAIRMAN. You will pardon me while I give you the benefit of my opinion with reference to it. If the President decides this is very necessary there will be no question in the world, I do not think, about getting the money for the installation of this pipe line across the State of Florida. It may be a long time before all of the dredging that is provided for can be done. It may be years before it is all completed, but in a short time it can be put in such condition that operation can begin in a very few months.

Mr. BUCKMAN. Those are the very words of amendment that I suggested—that the work across Florida should be begun at once.

The CHAIRMAN. The suggestions have to come from somebody besides this committee; to come from the Navy and the War Departments.

Mr. SMITH. This is about as far as we can go.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BUCKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think I have gone as far with the suggestion as I can. I leave it with the committee as my suggestion; and I am content with that.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the clerk to be kind enough to give one of these documents to each member of the committee. I merely want to refer to one or two pages in it. It is Senate Document No. 198, of the Seventy-sixth Congress, third session, entitled "Defense Coordination of the Panama and Florida Canals."

The only reason I am calling this to your attention at this time is merely to demonstrate that there is no real necessity, there was no real necessity for our finding ourselves in the situation that we now find ourselves with respect to transportation.

Will you refer to page 28 of this document, please, which was published in April 1940? On page 28 you will find a summary or analysis, which sets forth with reasonable accuracy, as events have turned out, exactly what our oil position would be in the summer of 1942.

If you will look over the left-hand column, opposite item 28, you will see that there was a predicted shortage of oil, without reference to tanker sinkings, but only with reference to the allocation of tankers for war purposes, there would be a shortage by the summer of 44.4 percent. I submit that is not very far wrong. And this was a matter of public knowledge in April 1940, and was placed in the record in this present form by the chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate.

I ask you now to turn to page 34 of this document. Table 34 is the table entitled "Probable Destruction of United States Merchant Ships on Consolidated Routes 1, 2, 2A, 3, and 4 by Enemy Effort, and Reduction Thereof by the Use of the Florida Canal."

You will find these routes on the map attached to this report, but it is not necessary now to refer to it in detail except to say that it shows the routes covering all traffic in the Western Hemisphere, to and from the Gulf to the Atlantic seaboard; the Atlantic to the Pacific seaboard, and from points on the Atlantic and Pacific in the United States to both seaboard in South America; in other words, the traffic which has been subjected to submarine attack.

If you will look down on this page 34, about half way down you will see there is developed the probable number of ships—sinking of ships