jury should have the power to determine the
 law and the fact. Thereafter the Act of March
 10, 1904 (Laws of Porto Rico 1904, p. 130),
 expressly repealed all reference to trials for libel
 in the Jury Act.

 The effect of the Penal Code of
 Procedure, as construed by the Supreme
 Court of Porto Rico, and of the Act of March 10,
 1904, repealing the jury act as to libel cases,
 was a statutory denial of the right of jury trial in
 such cases. A demand for a jury trial in this
 case, therefore, drew in question the validity of
 the statutes upon which the court relied in
 denying the demand. This necessarily leads to
 the conclusion that these cases are in the same
 class as those which come to this court by writ
 of error under section 237, as amended by the
 Act of 1916, and that jurisdiction by writ of error
 exists.

 [3] Was the issue properly saved in the
 record by the defendant? We think it was. The
 demand for a jury trial, the statute to the
 contrary notwithstanding, was made at the trial.
 It was renewed in the assignments of error in
 the Porto Rican Supreme Court and here.
 Those assignments did not mention the
 statutes whose validity was involved, but
 merely averred that the defendant had been
 denied his right as an American citizen under
 the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
 While this is informal, we think that it is sufficient
 when the record discloses the real nature of
 the controversy and the specification of the
 assignment leaves no doubt that it is directed
 to that controversy.

 [4] We have now to inquire whether that
 part of the Sixth Amendment to the
 Constitution, which requires that in all criminal
 prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
 to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
 of the state and district wherein the crime shall
 have been committed, which district shall have
 been previously ascertained by law, applies to
 Porto Rico. Another provision on the subject is
 in article 3 of the Constitution providing that the
 trial of all crimes, except in cases of
 impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial
 shall be held in the state where the said crimes
 shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any state, the trial shall be at
such place or places as the Congress may by


 law have directed. The Seventh Amendment of
 the Constitution provides that in suits at
 common law, when the value in controversy
 shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
 jury shall be preserved. It is well settled that
 these provisions for jury trial in criminal and civil
 cases apply to the Territories of the United
 States. Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437, 460, 13
 L. Ed. 761; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
 145, 167, 25 L. Ed. 244; Callan v. Wilson, 127
 U. S. 540, 556, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301, 32 L. Ed. 223;
 American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S.
 464, 17 Sup. Ct. 618, 41 L. Ed. 1079;
 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 347, 18
 Sup. Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061; Capital Traction
 Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L.
 Ed. 873; Black v. Jackson, 177 U. S. 349, 20
 Sup. Ct. 648, 44 L. Ed. 801; Rasmussen v.
 United States, 197 U. S. 516, 528, 25 Sup. Ct.
 514, 49 L. Ed. 862; Gurvich v. United States,
 198 U. S. 581, 25 Sup. Ct. 803, 49 L. Ed.
 1172. But it is just as clearly settled that they do
 not apply to territory belonging to the United
 States which has not been incorporated into
 the Union. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197,
 23 Sup. Ct. 787, 47 L. Ed. 1016; Dorr v. United
 States, 195 U. S. 138, 145, 24 Sup. Ct. 808,
 49 L. Ed. 128, 1 Ann. Cas. 697. It was further
 settled in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 21
 Sup. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088, and confirmed
 by Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 24
 Sup. Ct. 808, 49 L. Ed. 128, 1 Ann. Cas. 697,
 that neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico was
 territory which had been incorporated in the
 Union or become a part of the United States, as
 distinguished from merely belonging to it; and
 that the acts giving temporary governments to
the Philippines, 32 Stat. 691 (Comp. St.
 3804 et seq.), and to Porto Rico, 31 Stat. 77
(Comp. St. 3748 et seq.), had no such effect.
The Insular Cases revealed much diversity of
opinion in this Court as to the constitutional
status of the territory acquired by the Treaty of
Paris ending the Spanish War, but the Dorr
Case shows that the opinion of Mr. Justice
White of the majority, in Downes v. Bidwell, has
become the settled law of the court. The
conclusion of this court in the Dorr Case, 195
U. S. 149, 24 Sup. Ct. 813, 49 L. Ed. 128, 1
Ann. Cas. 697, was as follows:

 "We conclude that the power to govern territory,
implied in the right to acquire it, and given to
Congress in the Constitution in article 4, 3, to