particular interests in our own or in foreign lands.
Even this court, with its tremendous power, must
heed the mandate of the Constitution. No one in
official station, to whatever department of the
government he belongs, can disobey its
Commands without violating the obligation of the
oath he has taken. By whomsoever and wherever
power is exercised in the name and under the
authority of the United States, or of any branch of
its government, the validity or invalidity of that which
is done must be determined by the Constitution.

 In De Lima v. Bidwell, just decided, 181 U.S.
 -, ante, 743, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743, we have held
 that, upon the ratification of the treaty with Spain,
 Porto Rico ceased to be a foreign country and
 became a domestic territory of the United States.
 We have said in that case that from 1803 to the
 present time there was not a shred of authority,
 except a dictum in one case, "for holding that a
 district ceded to and in possession of the United
 States remains for any purpose a foreign territory;"
 that territory so acquired cannot be "domestic for
 one purpose and foreign for another;" and that any
 judgment to the contrary would be "pure judicial
 legislation," for which there was no warrant in the
 Constitution or in the powers conferred upon this
 court. Although, as we have just decided, Porto
 Rico ceased, after the ratification of the treaty with
 Spain, to be a foreign country within the meaning of
 the tariff act, and became a domestic country,- "a
 territory of the United States,"-it is said that if
 Congress so wills it may be controlled and
 governed outside of the Constitution and by the
 exertion of the powers which other nations have
 been accustomed to exercise with respect to
 territories acquired by them; in other words, we may
 solve the question of the power of Congress under
 the Constitution by referring to the powers that may
 be exercised by other nations. I cannot assent to
 this view. I reject altogether the theory that
 Congress, in its discretion, can exclude the
 Constitution from a domestic territory of the United
 States, acquired, and which could only have been
 acquired, in virtue of the Constitution. I cannot
 agree that it is a domestic territory of the United
 States for the purpose of preventing the
 application of the tariff act imposing duties upon
 imports from foreign countries, but not a part of the
 United States for the purpose of enforcing the
 constitutional requirement that allduties, imposts,
 and excises imposed by Congress "shall be
 uniform throughout the United States." How Porto
 Rico can be a domestic territory of the United


States, as distinctly held in De Lima v. Bidwell, and
yet, as is now held, not embraced by the words
"throughout the United States," is more than I can
understand.

 We heard much in argument about the
"expanding future of our country." It was said that
the United States is to become what is called a
"world power;" and that if this government intends
to keep abreast of the times and be equal to the
great destiny that awaits the American people, it
must be allowed to exert all the power that other
nations are accustomed to exercise. My answer is,
that the fathers never intended that the authority
and influence of this nation should be exerted
otherwise than in accordance with the Constitution.
If our government needs more power than is
conferred upon it by the Constitution, that
instrument provides the mode in which it may be
amended and additional power thereby obtained.
The People of the United States who ordained the
Constitution never supposed that a change could
be made in our system of government by mere
judicial interpretation. They never contemplated
any such juggling with the words of the
Constitution as would authorize the courts to hold
that the words "throughout the United States," in
the taxing clause of the Constitution, do not
embrace a domestic "territory of the United States"
having a civil government established by the
authority of the United States. This is a distinction
which I am unable to make, and which I do not think
ought to be made when we are endeavoring to
ascertain the meaning of a great instrument of
government.

 There are other matters to which I desire to
refer. In one of the opinions just delivered the case
of Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 119, ante, 302, 21
Sup. Ct. Rep. 302, is cited in support of the
proposition that the provision of the Foraker act
here involved was consistent with the Constitution.
If the contrary had not been asserted I should have
said that the judgment in that case did not have the
slightest bearing on the question before us. The
only inquiry there was whether Cuba was a foreign
country or territory within the meaning, not of the
tariff act, but of the act of June 6th, 1900 (31 Stat.
at L. 656, chap. 793). We held that it was a foreign
country. We could not have held otherwise,
because the United States, when recognizing the
existence of war between this country and Spain,
disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island