exercised?

 Yet again. Suppose the United States, in
 consequence of outrages perpetrated upon its
 citizens, was obliged to move its armies or send it
 fleets to obtain redress, and it came to pass that an
 expensive war resulted and culminated in the
 occupation of a portion of the territory of the
 enemy, and that the retention of such territory-an
 event illustrated by examples in history-could
 alone enable the United States to recover the
 pecuniary loss it had suffered. And suppose,
 further, that to do so would require occupation for
 an indefinite period, dependent upon whether or
 not payment was made of the required indemnity. It
 being true that incorporation must necessarily
 follow the retention of the territory, it would result
 that the United States must abandon all hope of
 recouping itself for the loss suffered by the unjust
 war, and hence the whole burden would be
 entailed upon the people of the United States. This
 would be a necessary consequence, because if
 the United States did not hold the territory as
 security for the needed indemnity it could not
 collect such indemnity, and, on the other hand, if
 incorporation must follow from holding the territory
 the uniformity provision of the Constitution would
 prevent the assessment of the cost of the war
 solely upon the newly acquired country. In this, as
 in the case of discovery, the traditions and practices
 of the government demonstrate the unsoundness
 of the contention. Congress on May 13, 1846,
 declared that war existed with Mexico. In the
 summer of that year New Mexico and California
 were subdued by the American arms, and the
 military occupation which followed continued until
 after the treaty of peace was ratified, in May, 1848.
 Tampico, a Mexican port, was occupied by our
 forces on November 15, 1846, and possession
 was not surrendered until after the ratification. In
the spring of 1847 President Polk, through the
Secretary of the Treasury, prepared a tariff of duties
on imports and tonnage which was put in force in
the conquered country. 1 Senate Documents, First
Session, 30th Congress, pp. 562, 569. By this
tariff, duties were laid as well on merchandise,
exported from the United States as from other
countries, except as to supplies for our army, and
on May 10, 1847, an exemption from tonnage
duties was accorded to "all vessels chartered by the
United States to convey supplies of any and all
descriptions to our army and navy, and actually
laden with supplies." Ibid. 583. An interesting
debate respecting the constitutionality of this


 action of the President is contained in 18 Cong.
 Globe, First Session, 30th Congress, at pp. 478,
 479, 484-489, 495, 498, etc.

 In Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603, 13 L. ed.
 276, it was held that the revenue officials properly
 treated Tampico as a port of a foreign country
 during the occupation by the military forces of the
 United States, and that duties on imports into the
 United States from Tampico were lawfully levied
 under the general tariff act of 1846. Thus, although
 Tampico was in the possession of the United
 States, and the court expressly held that in an
 international sense the port was a part of the
 territory of the United States, yet it was decided that
 in the sense of the revenue laws Tampico was a
 foreign country. The special tariff act promulgated
 by President Polk was in force in New Mexico and
 California until after notice was received of the
 ratification of the treaty of peace. In Cross v.
 Harrison, 16 How. 164, 14 L. ed. 889, certain
 collections of impost duties on goods brought from
 foreign countries into California prior to the time
 when official notification had been received in
 California that the treaty of cession had been
 ratified, as well as impost duties levied after the
 receipt of such notice, were called in question. The
 duties collected prior to the receipt of notice were
 laid at the rate fixed by the tariff promulgated by the
 President; those laid after the notification
 conformed to the general tariff laws of the United
 States. The court decided that all the duties
 collected were valid. The court undoubtedly in the
 course of its opinion said that immediately upon the
 ratification of the treaty California became a part of
 the United States and subject to its revenue laws.
 However, the opinion pointedly referred to a letter
 of the Secretary of the Treasury directing the
 enforcement of the tariff laws of the United States,
 upon the express ground that Congress had
 enacted laws which recognized the treaty of
 cession. Besides, the decision was expressly
 placed upon the conditions of the treaty, and it was
 stated, in so many words, that a different rule would
 have been applied had the stipulations in the treaty
been of a different character.

 But, it is argued, all the instances previously
referred to may be conceded, for they but illustrate
the rule inter arma silent leges. Hence, they do not
apply to acts done after the cessation of hostilities
when a treaty of peace has been concluded. This
not only begs the question, but also embodies a
fallacy. A case has been supposed in which it was