contended that it is immaterial to inquire what were
 the conditions of the cession, since if there were
 any which were intended to prevent incorporation
 they were repugnant to the Constitution and void.
 The result of the argument is that the government
 of the United States is absolutely without power to
 acquire and hold territory as property or as
 appurtenant to the United States. These conflicting
 contentions are asserted to be sanctioned by many
 adjudications of this court and by various acts of the
 executive and legislative branches of the
 government; both sides, in many instances,
 referring to the same decisions and to the like acts,
 but deducing contrary conclusions from them.
 From this it comes to pass that it will be impossible
 to weigh the authorities relied upon without
 ascertaining the subject-matter to which they refer,
 in order to determine their proper influence. For
 this reason, in the orderly discussion of the
 controversy, I propose to consider the subject from
 the Constitution itself, as a matter of first
 impression, from that instrument as illustrated by
 the history of the government, and as construed by
 the previous decisions of this court. By this
 process, if accurately carried out, it will follow that
 the true solution of the question will be
 ascertained, both deductively and inductively, and
 the result, besides, will be adequately proved.

 It may not be doubted that by the general
 principles of the law of nations every government
 which is sovereign within its sphere of action
 possesses as an inherent attribute the power to
 acquire territory by discovery, by agreement or
 treaty, and by conquest. It cannot also be gainsaid
 that, as a general rule, wherever a government
 acquires territory as a result of any of the modes
 above stated, the relation of the territory to the new
 government is to be determined by the acquiring
 power in the absence of stipulations upon the
 subject. These general principles of the law of
 nations are thus stated by Halleck in his treatise on
 International Law, page 126:

 "A state may acquire property or domain in
various ways; its title may be acquired originally by
mere occupancy, and confirmed by the
presumption arising from the lapse of time; or by
discovery and lawful possession; or by conquest,
confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or by grant,
cession, purchase, or exchange; in fine, by any of
the recognized modes by which private property is
acquired by individuals. It is not our object to enter
into any general discussion of these several modes


 of acquisition, any further than may be necessary to
 distinguish the character of certain rights of
 property which are the peculiar objects of
 international jurisprudence. Wheaton, International
 Law, pt. 2, chap. 4, 1, 4, 5; 1 Phillimore,
 International Law, 221-277; Grotius, de Jur. Bel.
 ac. Pac., lib. 2, chap. 4; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2,
 chaps. 7 and 11; Rutherford, Inst. b. 1, chap. 3, b.
 2, chap. 9; Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et. Gent., lib. 4,
 chaps. 4-6; Moser, Versuch, etc., b. 5, chap. 9;
 Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens. 35 et seq.;
 Schmaltz, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, chap. 1; Kluber,
 Droit des Gens, 125, 126; Heffter, Droit
 International, 76; Ortolan, Domaine International,
 53 et seq.; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, chap.
 28; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, chap. 4;
 Riquelme, Derecho, Pub. Int., lib. 1, title 1, chap. 2;
 Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt.
 3, chap. 5."

 Speaking of a change of sovereignty, Halleck
 says (pp. 76, 814):

 "Chap. 3, 23. The sovereignty of a state may
 be lost in various ways. It may be vanquished by a
 foreign power, and become incorporated into the
 conquering state as a province or as one of its
 component parts; or it may voluntarily unite itself
 with another in such a way that its independent
 existence as a state will entirely cease.



 "Chap. 33, 3. If the hostile nation be
 subdued and the entire state conquered, a
 question arises as to the manner in which the
 conqueror may treat it without transgressing the
 just bounds established by the rights of conquest.
 If he simply replaces the former sovereign, and, on
 the submission of the people, governs them
 according to the laws of the state, they can have no
 cause of complaint. Again, if he incorporate them
 with his former states, giving to them the rights,
 privileges, and immunities of his own subjects, he
 does for them all that is due from a humane and
 equitable conqueror to his vanquished foes. But if
 the conquered are a fierce, savage, and restless
 people, he may, according to the degree of their
 indocility, govern them with a tighter rein, so as to
 curb their 'impetuosity, and to keep them under
 subjection.' Moreover, the rights of conquest may,
 in certain cases, justify him in imposing a tribute or
 other burthen, either a compensation for the
expenses of the war or as a punishment for the