Republican party convention in 1860, when Mr.
Lincoln was nominated, as will be seen from an
excerpt therefrom set out in the margin.

 The doctrine that those absolute withdrawals of
power which the Constitution has made in favor of
human liberty are applicable to every condition or
status has been clearly pointed out by this court in
Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co.v. McGlinn (1885) 114 U.
S. 542, 29 L. ed. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005,
where, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, the
court said (p. 546, L. ed. p. 271, Sup. Ct. Rep. p.
1006):

 "It is a general rule of public law, recognized
and acted upon by the United States, that
whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power
over any territory are transferred from one nation or
sovereign to another the municipal laws of the
country-that is, laws which are intended for the
protection of private rights-continue in force until
abrogated or changed by the new government or
sovereign. By the cession, public property passes
from one government to the other, but private
property remains as before, and with it those
municipal laws which are designed to secure its
peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course,
all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with
the political character, institutions, and constitution
of the new government are at once displaced.
Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and
legislative power-and the latter is involved in the
former-to the United States, the laws of the
country in support of an established religion, or
abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing
cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would
at once cease to be of obligatory force, without any
declaration to that effect; and the laws of the
country on other subjects would necessarily be
superseded by existing laws of the new
government upon the same matters. But with
respect to other laws affecting the possession,
use, and transfer of property, and designed to
secure good order and peace in the community,
and promote its health and prosperity, which are
strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general
that a change of government leaves them in force
until, by direct action of the new government, they
are altered or repealed. American Ins. Co. v. 356
Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 542, 7 L. ed. 255; Halleck,
International Law, chap. 34, 14."

 There is in reason, then, no room in this case to
 contend that Congress can destroy the liberties of


the people of Porto Rico by exercising in their
regard powers against freedom and justice which
the Constitution has absolutely denied. There can
also be no controversy as to the right of Congress
to locally govern the island of Porto Rico as its
wisdom may decide, and in so doing to accord only
such degree of representative government as may
be determined on by that body. There can also be
no contention as to the authority of Congress to
levy such local taxes in Porto Rico as it may choose,
even although the amount of the local burden so
levied be manifold more onerous than is the duty
with which this case is concerned. But as the duty
in question was not a local tax, since it was levied in
the United States on goods coming from Porto
Rico, it follows that, if that island was a part of the
United States, the duty was repugnant to the
Constitution, since the authority to levy an impost
duty conferred by the Constitution on Congress
does not, as I have conceded, include the right to
lay such a burden on goods coming from one to
another part of the United States. And, besides, if
Porto Rico was a part of the United States the
exaction was repugnant to the uniformity clause.

 The sole and only issue, then, is not whether
 Congress has taxed Porto Rico without
 representation,-for, whether the tax was local or
 national, it could have been imposed although
 Porto Rico had no representative local government
 and was not represented in Congress,-but is
 whether the particular tax in question was levied in
 such form as to cause it to be repugnant to the
 Constitution. This is to be resolved by answering
 the inquiry, Had Porto Rico, at the time of the
 passage of the act in question, been incorporated
 into and become an integral part of the United
 States?

 On the one hand, it is affirmed that, although
 Porto Rico had been ceded by the treaty with Spain
 to the United States, the cession was accompanied
 by such conditions as prevented that island from
 becoming an integral part of the United States, at
 least temporarily and until Congress had so
 determined. On the other hand, it is insisted that by
 the fact of cession to the United States alone,
 irrespective of any conditions found in the treaty,
 Porto Rico became a part of the United States and
 was incorporated into it. It is incompatible with the
 Constitution, it is argued, for the government of the
 United States to accept a cession of territory from a
 foreign country without complete incorporation
 following as an immediate result, and therefore it is