such an impost duty on goods coming from one
part of the United States to another part thereof,
and such duty, besides, would be repugnant to the
requirement of uniformity throughout the United
States.

 To question the principle above stated on the
assumption that the rulings on this subject of Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall in Loughborough v. Blake
were mere dicta seems to me to be entirely
inadmissible. And, besides, if such view was
justified, the principle would still find support in the
decision in Woodruff v. Parham, and that decision,
in this regard, was affirmed by this court in Brown v.
Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. ed. 257, 5 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1091 and Fairbankv. United States, 181 U. S.
283, ante, 648, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648.

 From these conceded propositions it follows
that Congress in legislating for Porto Rico was only
empowered to act within the Constitution and
subject to its applicable limitations, and that every
provision of the Constitution which applied to a
country situated as was that island was potential in
Porto Rico.

 And the determination of what particular
 provision of the Constitution is applicable, generally
 speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the
 situation of the territory and its relations to the
 United States. This is well illustrated by some of the
 decisions of this court which are cited in the margin.
 Some of these decisions hold on the one hand
 that, growing out of the presumably ephemeral
 nature of a territorial government, the provisions of
 the Constitution relating to the life tenure of judges
 is inapplicable to courts created by Congress, even
 in territories which are incorporated into the United
 States, and some, on the other hand, decide that
 the provisions as to common-law juries found in the
 Constitution are applicable under like conditions;
 that is to say, although the judge presiding over a
 jury need not have the constitutional tenure, yet
 the jury must be in accordance with the
 Constitution. And the application of the provision of
 the Constitution relating to juries has been also
 considered in a different aspect, the case being
 noted in the margin.

 The question involved was the constitutionality
 of the statutes of the United States conferring
 power on ministers and consuls to try American
 citizens for crimes committed in certain foreign
 countries. Rev. Stat. 4083-4086. The court held


the provisions in question not to be repugnant to
the Constitution, and that a conviction for a felony
without a previous indictment by a grand jury, or the
summoning of a petty jury, was valid.

 It was decided that the provisions of the
Constitution relating to grand and petty juries were
inapplicable to consular courts exercising their
jurisdiction in certain countries foreign to the United
States. But this did not import that the government
of the United States in creating and conferring
jurisdiction on consuls and ministers acted outside
of the Constitution, since it was expressly held that
the power to call such courts into being and to
confer upon them the right to try, in the foreign
countries in question, American citizens, was
deducible from the treaty-making power as
conferred by the Constitution. The court said (p.
463, L. ed. p. 585, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 900):

 "The treaty-making power vested in our
 government extends to all proper subjects of
 negotiation with foreign governments. It can,
 equally with any of the former or present
 governments of Europe, make treaties providing
 for the exercise of judicial authority in other
 countries by its officers appointed to reside
 therein."

 In other words, the case concerned, not the
 question of a power outside the Constitution, but
 simply whether certain provisions of the
 Constitution were applicable to the authority
 exercised under the circumstances which the case
 presented.

 Albeit, as a general rule, the status of a
 particular territory has to be taken in view when the
 applicability of any provision of the Constitution is
 questioned, it does not follow, when the
 Constitution has absolutely withheld from the
 government all power on a given subject, that such
 an inquiry is necessary. Undoubtedly there are
 general prohibitions in the Constitution in favor of
 the liberty and property of the citizen, which are not
 mere regulations as to the form and manner in
 which a conceded power may be exercised, but
 which are an absolute denial of all authority under
 any circumstances or conditions to do particular
 acts. In the nature of things, limitations of this
 character cannot be under any circumstances
 transcended, because of the complete absence of
 power.