TOWARD A MARXIST PARADIGM FOR
THE EXPLANATION OF POLITICAL CHANGE
IN THE CARIBBEAN

By

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PAPER PREPARED FOR CARIBBEAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
6TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, ST. THOMAS, USVI
MAY 27-30, 1981
Recent political trends reaching crisis proportions in the Caribbean have created the demand for a fresh look at the theoretical bases for the analysis and explanation of change. In particular the periodic setbacks suffered by socialism at the hands of both internal and external factors (Chile, 1973, Guyana 1953, 1964, Jamaica 1980) calls for serious evaluation in the light of contending theories which presume to predict change. Also the emergence of widespread political violence in the contest for political power in the Caribbean has called into question the significance of the electoral process as an effective means to fundamental political change.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the practical political crises would tend to produce corresponding crises in the theoretical foundations of political analysis. Hence the search for a relevant paradigm which can both explain and predict the ebb and flow of Caribbean and Third World political trends. Such a paradigm becomes relevant to the extent that it provides insights into the rather complex experience and illusive processes of change. Within this perspective are formulated the primary objectives of this paper; these are:

(a) to evaluate the capacity of each of three rival theories - pluralism, dependency and Marxism - for explaining change with particular reference to the recent Caribbean experience.

(b) to assess the potential of each theory for attaining paradigmatic dominance in the Caribbean Context, and

(c) to assess the relative influence of the rival paradigms, and more particularly Marxist theory, on Caribbean political practice.
The approach to the first objective is to assess the impact of Caribbean political practice on the theories in so far as they seek to explain political change. The second objective requires the establishment of some criteria for ascertaining paradigmatic relevance, while the third seeks to relate the most relevant theory to political practice within the Caribbean context.

To suggest, that there are basically three rival theories contending for paradigmatic dominance in the Caribbean, is not, however to exhaust the entire range of theories which exist and can claim some degree of relevance to the Caribbean scene. That the plural society theory, dependency theory, and Marxist theory are identified as the major contenders for paradigm status is simply to suggest firstly that they are relatively more dynamic in their attempt to predict fundamental structural change; secondly, these appear to be the most influential, judged from the point of view of their ability to attract adherents in terms of both the pursuit of research interests and the political orientation of the initiating forces of change in the Caribbean. Also, in terms of their particular mode of explaining change, each displays some fundamental incompatibilities compared with the other, so as to form distinct bases of inquiry into alternative directions of change in the Caribbean as elsewhere in the Third World.

Further clarifications as regards the choice of theories become necessary since, firstly, plural society theory is taken in its wider sense to include not only cultural but also social and political pluralism,
except when for the sake of analysis it becomes necessary to specifically distinguish between its various aspects. As for example, despite the arguments of "social stratification theorists" in opposition to the cultural pluralist approach of M.G. Smith, both approaches are in principle similar to the extent that each discerns a multiplicity of groups and organized interests in society as crucial independent variables determining significant aspects of political behaviour.

Secondly, the distinction between Dependency Theory and Marxism might not be very obvious to those who regard the former as an outgrowth of Lenin's Theory of imperialism. What however would seem to justify the distinction between them would become more obvious later, but suffice it to say at this stage that while dependency theory originates from an analysis based exclusively on the problems of most developed stage of capitalism in Europe (the question of the falling rate of profit), there remains a body of literature by Marx and Engels dealing specifically with problems of Colonialism and backwardness in the non-European, Third World, countries, which is largely ignored by the advocates of the dependency approach, much to the impoverishment of the theory itself.

RIVAL THEORIES FOR PARADIGM STATUS

The discernment of basic incompatibilities between rival theories is one indication that each is qualified as a candidate for paradigm status. It is in fact the replacement "in whole or in part"
of one body of theory, or paradigm, "by an incompatible new one" that characterizes what Thomas Kuhn discerns as a scientific revolution. Kuhn further suggests that the choice between competing paradigms is synonymous with "a choice between incompatible modes of community life." The necessarily sharp boundaries between paradigms is also suggested in Kuhn's definition of the term as a "network of theory" which specifies the "sorts of entities the universe does contain, but also, by implication, those that it does not."4

In addition, a paradigm qualifies as such if it is generally accepted by a significant proportion of the scientific community. In other words a paradigm attracts adherents who form a consensus as regards the basic rules and standards governing such a paradigm. Further, a paradigm must provide its adherents with some criterion for choosing problems, and the "rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained."5 However, a theory need not be able to explain everything, or suggest solutions to every problem confronting it, in order to be accepted as a paradigm.6

What then, are the precise boundaries or conceptual limits of the rival theories under examination? Each of the theories is not only distinct as regards the particular universe discerned in the explanation of Caribbean reality, but also self-contained and exclusive in their assumption of adequacy in predicting significant changes in the Caribbean social and political process. Each presumes, also, to speak for the total reality, or be sufficient for a fundamental understanding
Plural society theory in particular, as advocated by N.G. Smith, is perhaps the most explicit as regards drawing strict boundaries between itself and other theories. In relation specifically to Marxism the plural society advocates contend that Marxist class analysis is both theoretically unsound and practically irrelevant to the Caribbean experience. For this reason plural society theory sees itself as a more adequate replacement for Marxism in the Caribbean context. It substitutes for what it discerns as the Marxist "two-class model" the multiple group approach which attributes great significance to the existence of a variety of cultural, ethnic or racial groups or a multiplicity of collective interests in the Caribbean and elsewhere such as in South East Asia and Africa.

But of characteristic importance to the plural society theory is the necessity to define society as a political unit held together only by the dominance of a particular ethnic or cultural section, and the subordination of the rest to that dominant section. This position also sets pluralism apart from Marxism which discerns instead the dominance of a particular class, (e.g. the bourgeoisie in the capitalist system), as an essential ingredient in the definition of the state. However, both theories of cultural pluralism and Marxism would seem to run parallel on the conceptualization of society as being based on force rather than consensus which is assumed by the stratification approach. The two theories, however
are not identical in the use of the concept, since force for the cultural pluralists is necessary to the definition of society while force for Marxists is regarded as an artificial superimposition which is destined to disappear with the eventual disappearance of the state.

The definition of society in terms of force leads the cultural pluralists naturally to assume the inevitability of violent conflict between groups in the contest for political power. To the extent that fundamental structural change implies for the cultural pluralists the replacement of one dominant group by another, then violence becomes a necessary means to change. M.G. Smith has attempted to substantiate this claim empirically by citing several known examples of violent conflict in multi-racial Third World countries, particularly during the time preceding independence when it is claimed a "power vacuum" is created with the impending withdrawal of the dominant colonial elite. Marxism, however, by conceiving violence in its broadest possible terms to include not only armed struggle and physical harm but also agitation, and such circumstances as oppression and injustice, suggests the possibility of avoiding the necessity of physical violence (the extremity dimension of the phenomenon) in the struggle for change.

The source of conflict between competing groups is also conceived by the cultural pluralists to be fundamentally different from that suggested by Marxist theory. While cultural pluralists locate the source of conflict in the characteristics of the groups themselves - in what is regarded as the observance by each of different compulsory
institutional practices that are incompatible with those of the other groups - Marxism identifies the source of conflict as rooted beyond the observable characteristics of the groups or classes themselves - i.e. in the exploitative nature of the capitalist economy - which manifests itself in the particular relationship between the resulting classes. As such by definition conflict is for the cultural plurists a permanent or constant condition of plural societies. Marxism on the other hand views conflict as transitory or variable depending on both the historical circumstances and the fortunes of the economy itself.

The question of changing economic conditions determining corresponding changes in the social structure, which is usually attributed to Marxism, is itself challenged by the plural society theorists. M.G. Smith for instance regards this challenge to Marxism as a fundamental point of departure for his plural society approach.13 Leo Kuper further suggests that revolution itself is not necessarily premised on economic processes,14 and regards the racial dimensions of society - particularly its dichotomizing tendencies - as relatively more fundamental causal factors in revolutionary change.15

Several weaknesses are displayed by the plural society theory. The major problems would seem to be its tendency toward an exaggerated empiricism and its failure to specify criteria for the identification of independent and dependent variables in the process of racial conflict and change. But perhaps the most significant feature of the plural society approach is its suggestion of a basically
cyclical model of change in which, in theory, one dominant group replaces
the other in seemingly endless repetition. A most effective challenge
to this cyclical pluralist model of change is presented by dependency
theory.

Dependency theory differs from plural society theory in
several fundamental respects. Firstly, the primary level of analysis
tends to shift from sub-national units to the nation as a whole. Thus
for dependency theory the primary relationship discerned is that
between states i.e. at the international level. In this sense also
the dynamic of change tends to shift more significantly toward external
factors. For example, in Amin's terms "the proletarianization of the
periphery" is directly fostered by the instance of international
capitalism, and the forces of imperialism located in "center" or
metropolitan countries such as the U.S.A. and U.K. Class configuration
within Third World countries are directly determined by the nature
of the external capitalist control. Thus the indigenous bourgeoisie
is a mere extension of the international capitalist bourgeoisie, in
the same manner as the indigenous proletarian forces are determined
by external capitalist relations. The consequence of the dominance of
the international bourgeoisie in the consciousness of Third World
political forces is the starting point of Fanon's analysis of class
struggle in colonial (and ex-colonial) countries. 16

Another basic methodological difference between plural society
and dependency theories is the substitution by the latter of an
essentially historical as distinct from a purely structural approach to
the analysis of change. In short, structural changes within the periphery are inextricably bound up with the historical development of capitalism on a world scale. The favourable consequence of this approach is to make for a more dynamic analysis of the process of change in the Third World. This historical dimension in dependency analysis is in sharp contrast with the rather ahistorical approach of the plural society theory.

In addition to the historical perspective on change dependency theory, regards economic conditions and relations as the central if not the sole determinants of structural change. Not only is the creation of dependencies a direct result of the international capitalist exploitative system, but the contingent or derived process of underdevelopment, seen as ever increasing in Third World countries, is directly determined by capitalist economic relations. Thus proletarization of, or other class formations within, the periphery are also regarded as a resultant of this complex process of external-oriented economic relations.

Undoubtedly, these two factors, the necessity of the historical approach and the conception of a causal process based essentially on economic conditions and forces, reflect the basic Marxist influence on dependency theory. However, beyond this basic methodological outlook the Marxism inherent in dependency theory becomes questionable. In particular the relationship between underdevelopment and change is conceived to be essentially linear. As such the theory suggests
that the greater the degree or process of underdevelopment the greater is expected to be the likelihood of revolutionary change in the periphery. This linear model contrasts sharply with the cyclical model of change suggested in the plural society approach. It contrasts also with the general Marxist concept of change which is essentially non-linear. This basic distinction between Marxism and dependency theory, in conjunction with other significant differences, would seem to suggest that Marxism qualifies as a rival paradigm not only as against the plural society approach but in opposition to dependency theory as well.

THE MARXIST APPROACH

The writing of Marx and Engels on Colonialism are rich in their suggestion of fruitful insights into the creation of a more dynamic theory directly relevant to the Third World experience. A close examination of these writings reveals the rudiments of a theory that is in marked contrast with what was traditionally assumed to be the Marxist analysis of change. Dependency theory itself reflects what could be viewed as a caricature of Marxism characterized as embodying the following theoretical positions:

(a) that the relationship between the developed capitalist States and the underdeveloped Third World countries is essentially a zero-sum relationship in which the former always gains at the expense of the latter,

(b) that economic factors are always dominant, if not exclusive in the determination of structural change,

(c) that the greater the economic deprivation or impoverishment of the social force, the greater the probability of that source initiating revolution,
that the existence or development of the class struggle is dependent on the numerical strength of the various classes in the society,

that physical violence initiated by the disadvantaged sector of the system is necessary for revolutionary change.

Marxist theory as applied to the Third World, however, would seem to be rather more flexible as regards its perspectives on the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries, the role of economic factors in explaining revolutionary change, and the necessity of physical violence in socialist revolution. Far from embodying either a purely zero-sum or a linear conception of change, Marxist theory on Colonialism suggests some significant elements of reciprocity in the consequences of the relationship between colonized and colonizing powers. But this approach becomes clear only to the extent that we recognize distinctions in both the economic and political implications of the relationship. Unlike the dependency approach which tends to subsume the political within the economic bases of explanation, Marxist theory on colonialism discerns the possibility of a variable relationship between the economic and political dimensions of change. Engels' famous letter to Conrad Schmidt (1890), suggests that the interaction between economic movement and political power is an "interaction of two unequal forces", in which political power, "strives for as much independence as possible, and which, having once been established, is also endowed with a movement of its own."17 This argument is reiterated elsewhere in Marxist writings.15 One of the implications of this distinction between economic and political spheres
of activity, and the relatively independent variability of the latter sphere, is that Marxist theory should no longer be viewed in strict economic determinist terms. The economic sphere, nevertheless, remains the basic or ultimate, rather than the exclusive, determinant of social change.\(^\text{19}\)

It is against this background of the variable rather than fixed interrelationship between the economic and the political that the Marxist Third World perspective took its form. As a consequence the Marxist perspective on the relationship between the Colonizing and Colonized powers tends to be reciprocal, although unequal, in terms of its consequences for change and development. Marx refers to the reciprocal, although unequal, relationship between colonized and colonizing power as "the universal intercourse founded upon the mutual dependence of mankind".\(^\text{20}\)

The reciprocal or dialectical process of the economic and political impact of Colonialism is illustrated in Figure I.
FIGURE 1

Dialectical Relationship between Colonizing and Colonized regions in Economic and Political Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Consequences</th>
<th>Colonizing Power</th>
<th>Colonized Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Consequences</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+  Positive Effect  
-  Negative Effect

Figure 1 suggests what would seem to be implicit in the Marxist analysis on Colonialism, that (a) the economic consequences tend to be positive for the developed Colonizing power, and at the same time negative for the Colonized region, and (b) the political consequences tend to be, on the reverse, negative for the colonizing power and at the same time positive for the colonized Third World region of the world. The economic consequences are manifested in
factors such as capitalist exploitation of the natural resources and labour of the colonized societies, and the export of finished manufactured products to new markets on the colonies. The political effects are manifested in terms of increased corruption and factional disorder within the colonizing powers, and, on the other hand, increasing political unification and the generation of revolutionary political consciousness on the part of the disparate peoples that make up the Third World.

Further reciprocity is also reflected in the effects of revolutionary struggle in one country upon the other. Not only is the Leninist contention that genuine independence and the attainment of socialism among peripheral countries are dependent on the revolutionary successes of the proletariat and working classes within the developed capitalist countries a significant dimension of Marxist theory, but equally important is the possibility of revolutionary struggles in Third World countries directly affecting the level of the class struggle in the developed metropolitan countries as well. Marx, therefore, recognized not only the significant international consequences of revolutionary events in the periphery, but even more importantly that at times these Third World events can supersede other important indigenous causes of European revolutionary events. Similar statements about this kind of reciprocity recur frequently in Marxist writings.

What would, therefore, seem to be significant is the accent
which Marxism places on political factors as determinants of change in the Third World. A political reconstruction of colonized societies would seem to be, for Marxism, a sine qua non of further economic and social transformation of these peripheral societies. Marx contends for example, that the people in India "will not reap the fruit of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the new ruling class shall have been supplemented by the industrial proletariat, or all the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether."26 Here it is interesting to note how Marx interrelates, or even tends to equate, class revolution in Europe with anti-colonial revolution in the periphery.

The accent which Marxism places on political factors as significant, though limited, determinants of change in the Third World, and the consequent tendency to subordinate at times the centrality of the domestic economic base, not only leads away from the strict deterministic perspective about the relationship between base and superstructure, but is fundamental to our understanding of the essentially non-linear model of change implicit in Marxist theory. This non-linearity is implied firstly in the Marxist contention that subordinate groups (such as peasants and proletariat) are predisposed toward revolutionary action not only as a result of economic exploitation but also, (or of equal significance) as a result of political oppression.27 It could be conceived for example that it is
political oppression more than economic exploitation which revolutionizes the peasantry, while on the other hand exploitation of labour would seem to be more significant in mobilizing the industrial proletariat.  

Secondly, the non-linearity is also implied in what appears to be a disjunction between exploitation and impoverization. In other words, the degree of exploitation does not necessarily vary directly or proportionately with the degree of impoverishment of one class or region relative to another. Thus the industrial proletariat to which is attributed the vanguard role in the socialist revolution is not necessarily the most impoverished of the subordinate classes or groups compared, say, to the poor peasantry or the lumpen-proletariat which comprises the bulk of the unemployed in Third World countries.

It is against this background that Marx's analysis of Third World resistance or revolutionary movements should be judged. The essentially non-linear character of this approach is most forcefully brought out in Marx's analysis of the Indian Revolt in 1857 in which he draws some parallels with the French revolution. "The first blow dealt to the French monarchy", Marx concluded, "proceeded from the nobility not from the peasants". Similarly, the Indian Revolt, Marx suggests, "does not commence with the ryots, tortured, dishonoured and stripped naked by the British, but with the sepoys, clad, fed, petted, fatted and pampered by them." Here Marx further suggested that the Indian revolt was more significantly the inevitable response to the brutal political oppression which the Indians suffered at the hands of the British colonial authorities. He therefore likened the violent
extrremities of the sepoys against the British to something like "retribution" which Marx discerns as a regular pattern in human history. 30

More specifically it would appear that the precise characteristics of the Marxist non-linear approach tend to approximate what behavioral social scientists term the curvilinear model of change. In other words the crucial variables (both independent and dependent) relate to each other only up to a certain threshold beyond which the nature of the relationship changes. Thus, in concrete terms, this explains why it is neither the least endowed (such as the poor peasantry and the utterly impoverished groups) nor the most endowed (such as the righ bourgeoisie) which under the capitalist system tends to be most revolutionary, but rather the working classes occupying a position between these two extreme levels. 31 Another closely related example of this curvilinear tendency is the relationship between the degree of oppression on the part of the state apparatus and the potential for active resistance on the part of the subordinate groups. Thus while Marx and Engels attributed to the Irish the potential for increasing resistance against British rule, 32 the nature of oppressive rule observed in Algeria was so extreme that Engels doubted the Algerian ability for any serious resistance. 33

This approximation to the curvilinear approach would seem to be in keeping with the general Marxist perspective on the nature of change within particular dimensions of global history, which itself
witnessed sequential periods of both development and decline. Although of course, the totality of the global historical process would appear to be linear, in specific terms the particular conditions of different periods and geographic regions tend more toward undulating or "zig-zag" patterns in the process of change. \textsuperscript{34} Marx discerns in history some elements of freedom which implies choice, a necessary element in the non-linear patterns of change. Thus, although there are definite interconnections between events, the question of their absolute necessity must give way to the question of their being conditional and dependent upon particular stages of historical development. It is in this sense that the question of the necessity of violence in revolutionary change is conditional upon the particular nature of political oppression and the character of the ruling class. \textsuperscript{35}

In terms of the methodology for identifying the particular level of class conflict Marxism goes beyond the mere empirical bases of the distinction between classes. In this regard what would seem to be most crucial is the discernment of certain configurations of interests pursued by particular groups or movements in the system. To the extent also that the movements and groups representing the particular interests are politically organized, the antagonism between groups reaches revolutionary (and often violent) proportions. It is in the sense of collectively organized pursuits of economically determined interests that class conflict is applicable not only to developed capitalist societies but to the underdeveloped Third World countries as well.
One must therefore perceive the Marxist two-class model not so much in the empirical sense of the existence of only two classes in the society, but in the sense of a polarization of forces around two basic contending interests, in a word as Marx and Engels put it, a contention between oppressor and oppressed. In addition the Marxist theory recognizes the actual existence of a multiplicity of other classes in society but regards this fact alone as relatively insignificant in terms of the determination of fundamental structural change.

IDENTIFICATION OF RELEVANT PARADIGM

The establishment of fundamental and incompatible differences between the three theories is only a preliminary to the assessment of their relative importance in terms of their applicability to the local context. These basic differences in the theories embrace (a) the levels and units of analysis, (b) conceptual outlines of the causal model of change, (c) the nature of conflict, and (d) epistemological bases of analysis. Table II outlines the nature of the differences on these various levels:
TABLE II

BASIC CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PLURALIST DEPENDENCY AND MARXIST THEORIES OF CHANGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEORIES</th>
<th>BASIC DIFFERENCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULTURAL PLURALIST</td>
<td>Sub-national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPENDENCY</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARXIST</td>
<td>Sub + international</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table II indicates, the three theories differ with respect to the level of analysis in the sense that whereas the cultural pluralist approach emphasizes the sub-national level of interrelationships between indigenous groups, the dependency approach focuses on the international level of analysis, stressing the relationship between national entities, and finally Marxist theory on colonialism inter-relates both the sub-national and international dimensions of analysis with class relations being both of domestic as well as of international significance. In terms of the model of change, the cultural pluralist tends to be cyclical, the dependency
approach tends to be linear, while the Marxist perspective approximates a curvilinear model of change. The nature of conflict invariably manifests itself in physical violence in the context of change for the cultural pluralists, while for the dependency approach a spontaneous popular uprising is implied in its advocacy of violent revolution against a totally dominant and oppressive externally based system. In the Marxist approach the use of violent means of change tends to be variable depending on the nature of the historical, social and political conditions. On the epistemological level fundamental differences between the theories are suggested in that while cultural pluralism is based on an ahistorical-empirical approach, dependency theory presumes the priority of the historical, although it also involves an empirical approach. Meanwhile Marxist Theory would seem to be more complex in its utilization and advocacy of an approach that is essentially historical but at the same time dialectical in its discernment of fundamental interconnections between both the empirical base and logical-deductive analyses. 

On the basis of Kuhn's criteria for identification of the dominant paradigm it is possible to discern varying degrees of importance, relevance and acceptability on the part of the rival theories in the Caribbean context. Apart from the factor of attracting adherents, Kuhn had also suggested the ability to resolve theoretical problems as the basic criteria for the recognition of the dominant paradigm. Kuhn further suggests that the complete replacement of one paradigm
by another constitutes a scientific revolution. However, since old paradigms die hard, or manifest tendencies towards inertia,\textsuperscript{39} it takes according to Kuhn a crisis, usually stemming from internal theoretical anomalies to produce alternate candidates for the dominant paradigm status.\textsuperscript{40} At the same time the choice of a particular paradigm by the potential adherents is usually based, as Kuhn suggests, either on arbitrary considerations, some kind of historical accident, or simply on faith.\textsuperscript{41}

While one can understand that the attractiveness of a particular paradigm candidate might be based on its problem solving capability, its internal theoretical consistency, or even on aesthetic considerations, it is difficult to understand why these considerations in themselves are sufficient to enable a choice between a variety of what appear to be equally capable theories. Explanations in terms of faith or arbitraries for making this kind of choice among supposedly highly sophisticated scientific theories would therefore seem to be inadequate. Applied specifically to the social sciences the bases of this kind of choice tend to be more calculated and utilitarian than a simple conversion experience as Kuhn contends. For example, in the political field, the choice of particular political theories to guide political pursuit, is as Wolin contends, not so much a response to a theoretical as to a political crisis, or rather to conditions in which long established paradigm can no longer adequately respond to concrete challenges and changes in society.\textsuperscript{42} In other words Kuhn does not relate the changes in choices of paradigms to the particular conditions and changes in
society, or to the possibility that the practical demands and needs of the particular community or society might influence perspectives in defining the priorities as regards the problems to be solved, and so indirectly influence the choice of paradigms. These considerations, overlooked by Kuhn, would therefore form the basis of the central hypotheses to be examined here in the light of the Caribbean experience.

The main hypotheses which seem to be borne out by the Caribbean experience are (a) that the emergence of rival paradigm candidates in the political science field is determined more by the nature of the practical political problems than by a theoretical crisis (b) that paradigms are relevant mainly with respect to particular historical conditions and not regardless of those conditions and (c) that the choice of the most appropriate paradigm is determined mainly on its ability to resolve political problems relevant to particular historical contexts and (d) that the ability of the paradigm to retain its position of dominance is dependent on its ability to support or protect the basic interests of the dominant or controlling political group in the system. These hypotheses can be supported in terms of the nature of political practice relevant to particular historical phases in the Caribbean context, and the volume and orientation of political science research based on the respective theories.

Table III illustrates what is intended by political theory relevant to particular historical phases in the Caribbean:
### Table III

**Political Theory Relevant to Particular Historical Phases in the Caribbean**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Phase</th>
<th>Nature of dominant Politics</th>
<th>Central Political Theory</th>
<th>Relevant Problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Independence</td>
<td>Colonialist</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Plural Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Dependency Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Independence</td>
<td>(Socialist)</td>
<td>Class Consciousness</td>
<td>Marxist Theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III suggests three significant historical phases in the Caribbean, (1) pre-independence, (2) independence, and (3) post-independence. It is suggested here that the characteristics of the historical phases have more significance than the precise dates themselves. The dominant characteristics of the political process relevant to each phase could be summarized as follows:

(a) The pre-independence phase (in general prior to the 1960's in the Caribbean) is characterized by what could be termed colonialist politics in which case the centers of political control stemmed essentially from outside the particular country. At the same time the primary problem as usually
defined by the colonialist state is that of political legitimacy or attempts to preserve its dominant status at the expense of other competing groups in the system.

(b) The independence phase (peak period in the 1960's) is characterized by nationalist politics in the sense that an indigenous ruling group controls the state apparatus. Politics, during the period focuses on both the attempt at reconciling conflicting (class) interests and the mobilization of internal resources for the sake of economic development. The Caribbean appears today to be at the turning point between this and the next (post independent) phase.

(c) The post-independence phase (possibly the immediate and near future) could be characterized in terms of a focus on the socialist basis of politics in which case class interests tend to override national interest, and political mobilization focuses on the development of working class consciousness and social transformation.

That political legitimacy is the central problem of the colonial state is born of the need to justify alien or foreign political control. Thus from the inception the colonial state is basically insecure. The fact that the colonial state relied heavily on the military-bureaucratic apparatus to perpetuate its rule is no doubt a reflection more of its basic insecurity than its "over developed" nature, as assumed by Alavi and the theorists of the post colonial state. Hence tendencies towards conflicting loyalties, such as are exemplified in multi-racial societies like Guyana and Trinidad where loyalties toward the local state tend to be problematic, would no doubt pose serious threat to the insecure colonial state. As a response to this legitimacy problem colonial regimes usually institute a policy of "divide and rule" in which case racial and ethnic division and strife are usually encouraged in order to justify external colonial control.
This policy, using the racial basis of divisions, was exemplified in the case of Guyana in 1953 when in order to destroy the strong working class basis of political solidarity against colonialism the British Government not only suspended the democratic constitution but also induced a split in the dominant working class party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP). 46

The important aspect of this colonialist resolution of the Guyana "problem" in the early 1950's is that the split in the PPP was rationalized on the grounds that cultural pluralism makes working class solidarity impossible. In this way blame is shifted from the colonial authorities to the fact of the cultural or ethnic divisions themselves. When, in addition, the colonial office in 1964 imposed an electoral system of Proportional Representation which served to further cement the ethnic divisions along political lines it was done on the assumption that cultural pluralism is the most significant dimension or "problem" of Guyanese politics. 47 Although, of course, cultural pluralism cannot explain the total implications of the divide and rule policy, the latter is usually justified by the former. Cultural pluralism, therefore was a very convenient theoretical tool in the hands of the colonial rulers.

Perhaps the most glaring example of this divisive tactic on the part of the colonial regime is the deliberate institutionalization of racially based centers of political control. Thus the military and the bureaucratic centers were dominated by one ethnic group. In the
case of Guyana the consciousness of this discriminating tendency led to the demand for official inquiry, as a result of which recommendation were made for drastic changes.48 In the meantime the centers of economic control were dominated by another ethnic group as a result also of the deliberate policy of the colonial office which discriminated in the granting of loans and other facilities for commercial enterprises.49

It is, therefore, not difficult to understand how these entrenched politically motivated divisions could have resulted in serious inter-ethnic conflict reaching violent proportions between 1962 and 1965 on the eve of independence. A similar trend was witnessed in Trinidad where electoral violence erupted during the 1956 and 1961 general election.50 In this way inter-ethnic competition and violent conflict not only find theoretical justification in plural society theory but also furthers the interest of external political control.

The approaching of political independence in the Caribbean ushered in the second phase of political change when the externally controlled state gave way to the indigenous based state. At the same time the problem of political legitimacy which plagued the colonialist era gave way to the problem of national development based on the harnessing and management of local economic resources. It became necessary, therefore, to champion a nationalist resolution of the inter-ethnic conflict situation in the quest for political unification. While resolution of the economic problem invariably takes the form of nationalization of foreign based enterprises, resolution of the
concomittant problem of political unification is reflected in attempts at coalition between hitherto competing political organizations, even to the extent of creating one-party states. In the case of Guyana the concept of "Paramountcy of the Party" is a singular attempt by the PNC Government to have both a directive and unifying control over the various competing interests in the society. Current debate on what is usually referred to as "the post-colonial state" which discerns direct state intervention in the economy also reflects the emphasis on the primarily economic objectives during this period. In both Guyana and Jamaica, and possibly Grenada, nationalization of foreign owned enterprises, to as much as 80% of the economy in Guyana, has been embarked upon as a first step towards what is expected to be rapid economic advances. This trend also embraces other major Caribbean territories, notably Trinidad where the government controls a sizeable proportion of economic enterprises. However, the economic problem is still severe as evidenced by the increasing amount of foreign debt which accrues to all of these newly independent states in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the Third World.

While domestic inter-group competition is innimical to the interest of nationalist political control, conflict is viewed more on the international plain usually in anti-imperialist terms. The rhetoric of the Guyanese, recent Jamaican and Grenadian governments in terms of defining the conflict situation is very clearly along these internationalist lines. However the nexus between international and
internal politics usually finds expression in such developments as
the "Black Power" movement which relates both imperialist and colonialist
exploitation to the increasingly miserable conditions of the poor non-
white sector of the particular population. This trend was most evident
in Trinidad in 1970, and would seem also to have emerged in Jamaica,
Grenada and other Caribbean societies in the form particularly of the
Rastafarian movement. However, the necessity for both the concentration
on the usually troubled economy and the externalization of the conflict
situation makes dependency theory a natural ally of the interests of
the dominant political group, or state entity, during this period.

Conditions by which the Marxist approach can attain
paradigmatic status in the Caribbean are largely dependent on the
level of economic and political development attained by the various
independent countries in the region. It is contended here that, although
Marxist analysis applies most appropriately to the region, the level
of political-economic development is not yet adequate to propel the
Marxist perspectives into the position of a dominant paradigm. In
particular the primary problem of class consciousness which is peculiar
to the socialist system is bound up with the problem of the nature of
economic exploitation and political oppression. Firstly, it is only
to the extent that the domestic economy is adequately (not necessarily
fully) developed that exploitation attains the level to produce
distinctive and antagonistic class divisions to allow for the necessary
development of class consciousness. Secondly, it is only to the extent
that economic exploitation is matched by political oppression of the subordinate by the ruling classes that class consciousness assumes national and indeed universal proportions. In this sense class consciousness is superceded by political consciousness and under these conditions the socialist revolution is approximated.

For these reasons, the Caribbean region would seem to lag behind Latin America with its longer history of political independence, and hence a longer period of concentration on domestic economic problems. Thus dependency theory became paradigmatic among Latin American scholars and power centers long before it emerged as a candidate rivaling cultural pluralism for paradigmatic status on the English Speaking Caribbean. Perhaps, also, these early foundations are crucial in the production of the many socialist oriented revolutions which attained greater successes in Latin America if we compare the case of Cuba, Nicaragua and possibly El Salvador, with Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada in the Caribbean. Thus it is not difficult to understand why Marxism has gained paradigm status in Cuba and is fast approaching that status in other Latin American academic communities as well.

Acceptance of a particular theory-candidate for paradigm status within the Caribbean academic community has also varied depending on the particular historical and political conditions. Academic debate on the plural society theory came earliest, during the colonial period. This debate seemed to have derived its earliest
stimulation from the works of Sociologists and Anthropologists reproduced in the occasional papers of the Extra 'ural Department of the University of the West Indies. It was not until the 1960's on the eve of Caribbean political independence that a new debate on the 'plantation society', based on the 'dependency' tradition of scholarship, was initiated mainly by economists in Social and Economic Studies. In addition, a variety of monographs and books on this dependency theme by such authors as Girvan, Beckford, Thomas and others, were produced by the Institute of Social and Economic Research based on the Mona Campus of the UWI. It was during this period also that the New World Group was created which was dedicated to the dissemination of radical thought in the Caribbean. Unfortunately, the New World Journal produced by this group did not survive for long due to economic and management problems.

Political science as a specific discipline in Caribbean Universities, has so far been unable to make any significant or original contributions to the development of relevant theory. The major thrust of empirical research in the political science field would seem to involve investigation and testing of the various propositions of the plural society theory. On the other hand the plantation society or dependency theme crops up here and there in the efforts of some of the more recent additions to the pool of Caribbean political scientists. In general, however, theoretical developments in political science would seem to have lagged behind that of the other disciplines in terms of its immediate relevance
to Caribbean conditions and processes of change. A survey of articles in *Social and Economic Studies* over the years reveals not only a serious dearth of political science contributions, but even among these few an overwhelming concentration on the institutional-legal framework seems to be evident. The fact, as Almond claims, that this particular theoretical framework has itself been *superseded* in the discipline by structural functionalism which is itself largely irrelevant to the Caribbean prospects for change, should give some indication of the serious plight of the discipline. 56

Political science therefore has a special responsibility not only to make up for this lag but also to fill a theoretical void in the exonomic-determinist perspectives of the dependency school. The inability of dependency theory to explain the complex and variable dimensions of the political realm has already been recognized by Cardoso, one of the initiators, and foremost champion, of this approach. 57 Recent attempts by some Third World political scientists to grapple with the concept of the post colonial state as a distinct or "autonomous" realm of analysis, following the lines laid down by Poulantzas and Miliband, is an encouraging sign in the appropriate direction. However, the inchoate nature of these attempts suggests the need for more thorough-going analysis of the political dimensions of Third World change. Herein also lies an opportunity for Caribbean political science to make significant contributions even to the extent of supplementing the rare and disparate attempts to enhance Marxist scholarships in the region.
The lag in the orientation of Caribbean political science is perhaps a reflection of the tendencies toward inertia characteristic of old paradigms. Kuhn had suggested that old paradigms tend to resist attempts at change and are "often intolerant" of the invention of new theories. Despite this inertia, however, the emergence of a new paradigm according to Kuhn, results in the complete disappearance of the old, when adherents to the latter are usually read out of the profession. In the social science field, however, as distinct perhaps from natural science, this apparent finality about the withdrawal of old paradigms is not so obvious. As the Caribbean experience shows old theories still linger and attract prominent adherents even when both time and events have demonstrated their irrelevance or retrogressive potential, and other more dynamic and appropriate theories emerge to take their place. It would further appear from this experience that the attraction of adherents away from old paradigms is much more difficult than the recruitment of the hitherto uncommitted to the new rival theories.

A further observation from the Caribbean experience, is what appears to be a disjunction between the capability of the theory to explain and predict events, and its ability to attract adherents. According to Kuhn the simple fact that a theory might only seem better than its rivals, without necessarily being actually better at explaining the reality, is sufficient to attract enough adherents to make such a theory a dominant paradigm. It is in this sense that one can explain the failure of Marxist theory to attain dominant paradigmatic status.
despite its intrinsically more dynamic qualities and its capability of explaining wider and more fundamental variations in the Caribbean reality as elsewhere in the Third World.

TOWARD A MARXIST PARADIGM

The fact that Marxism is not yet a dominant paradigm in the Caribbean is explainable more to the fact that the theory is not yet in keeping with the basic interests of the dominant ruling classes, than to its intrinsic merits as a comprehensive and relevant theory. The relevance of Marxism is related primarily to its greater dynamism in the analysis and prediction of political change, and the insights it provides as regards the alternative paths to change appropriate for particular stages of historical and material development. This is not to say, however, that Marxism does not have some significant limitations which undermine its predictive potential and make analysis of the extremely complex Caribbean reality rather difficult.

The paradigmatic significance of the rival theories in the Caribbean can be assessed in terms of their consequences for the Caribbean political process, and their influence on the movements of change. For instance cultural pluralism, carried to its logical conclusions, would seem to issue the most uncomfortable choice between total subjugation on the one hand, and the possibility of mutual elimination through ethnic violence on the other. Dependency
theory similarly confronts us with the choice between fatalism and spontaneous violence. Marxism however, would seem to issue the imperative of the need for perpetual transformation of unnatural social conditions or, in the final analysis, the total liberation from necessity itself.

The immediate consequence of cultural pluralist theory would seem to foster both a conservative and pessimistic outlook. Its conservativism is reflected, for instance, in attempts to justify the power sharing of rightwing or pro-colonist groups and movements, in order to ensure what is regarded as political stability. Thus Rothchild applauds the PNC-UF (center and Right) coalition government as against a PNC-PPP (center-Left) coalition in Guyana on the assumption that the latter is impossible because of the priority of racial antagonism, and that the former is a better guarantee against racial strife. Similarly, Peter Dodge suggests that in Surinam there is a general preference for the expatriate Dutch presence as an inhabiting factor against the feared domination by any one of the other local ethnic groups over the rest.

Dependency theory, potentially at least, engenders fatalism in the sense that it provides adequate rationalization for the continued depressing conditions affecting the Third World economy and society. As such the incapacity to successfully respond to the serious problems of dependency could be explained in terms of the very fact of dependency itself. There is no recognition, for instance, of any particular threshold of development - or underdevelopment - beyond which change or transformation of the dependency conditions
becomes inevitable. Nor does it suggest the possible source of this change within the dependent countries themselves. Also, the linearity implicit in the dependency model of change suggests an irreversible tendency in social movements which is not borne out by the experience of Third World states which have initiated a socialist thrust in the midst of a hostile, predominantly capitalist, environment. The experiences of Guyana during the 1950's, Chile under Allende, and Jamaica under Michael Manley are obvious examples of the myth of irreversibility.

Not only does dependency theory provide no means by which we can anticipate set-backs in developments and changes aimed at correcting the problem of dependency itself, but more fundamentally it is unclear on the precise way in which change will be brought about. The lack of consensus on this question among dependency theorists is reflected in a comparison between the assumption of Cardoso that dependent development is possible, and the rejection of this view by Frank who suggests a violent revolutionary outcome. This suggestion by Frank, coupled with the failure to specify the particular threshold of the inevitability of violence, gives the impression that the moment of revolution is determined spontaneously. However, the failure of pure spontaneity as an assured means of change has already been pointed out, not only in the criticism's levelled at Fannon's work, but equally by Lenin who earlier recognised its illusionary prospects. The history of the Caribbean, and Latin America is replete with the continual failure of slave and
peasant uprisings born specifically of the spontaneous moment.

Marxist theory on the other hand, caters not only for the setbacks and reverses of social trends in its curvilinear, or zig-zag, model of change, but also for a very studied approach to change in keeping with the particular historical conditions. The richness of the Marxist perspective on colonialism provides much insight into the development of a relatively more dynamic model of change which at the same time suggests alternative routes to the primary objective of the realization of socialism, with the possibility also of avoiding the necessity of armed violence. Table IV suggests these possible alternative routes based on a typology of political systems conceived in terms of a disjunction between economic exploitation and political oppression:

**TABLE IV**

Typology of Political Systems and Possible Alternative Paths to Socialism

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>High</th>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Type C</strong></td>
<td><strong>Type A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM</td>
<td>AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type B</strong></td>
<td><strong>Type R</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIALIST SYSTEM</td>
<td>LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM</td>
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ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION
Figure IV suggests four basic types of political systems as follows:

Type A, or Authoritarian system, is usually characterized by both a high degree of exploitation and a high degree of oppression. In general, the colonial state system with its emphasis on external elitist control far removed from the masses who are denied opportunities for political participation should be located in this category. The mode of production is essentially capitalist.

Type B, or the Liberal-Democratic system, is characterized by low levels of oppression and high levels of economic exploitation. Post colonial state systems which usher in greater domestic control of the political apparatuses and a greater level of mass participation in the political process without necessarily reducing the level of capitalist exploitation, should be located in this category.

Type C, or the Totalitarian state system, is characterized by a high level of political oppression and a relatively low level of economic exploitation. This is no doubt the transitional type of state system which stresses nationalization of economic enterprises, redistribution of the economic surplus and at the same time a great deal of political centralization.

Type D, or Socialist system, is characterized by both a low level of exploitation and a low level of political oppression. This Socialist system succeeds in reconciling the decentralization of political control with localised collective management of economic enterprises (workers control) and represents the ultimate objective of most Third World including Caribbean States.

It is suggested here, that the applicability of this model is restricted mainly to Third World conditions where capitalism is not yet adequately developed and the political super structure often predominates in the determination of fundamental change. The assumption is that the initiators of relevant change for Third World societies involve the striving for at least the significant reduction, if not the total elimination, of both economic exploitation
and political oppression. A further assumption is that the initiators of relevant change in these systems would seek at the same time to minimize cost at least to themselves in the pursuit of these goals. The particular path chosen toward socialism will however, determine the probability and nature of violence in the process.

As regards the choice of paths to change, one can venture the proposition that transition from A to B to C to D involves the least cost to the state system. This is so because in this approach change is initiated through political directives which precede development of economic forces. Between economic exploitation and political oppression it is necessary to reduce one dimension at a time, rather than both simultaneously, (e.g., from A to D) if we are to evade much of the traumatic effects of change. In other words an attempt to reduce capitalist exploitation without the prior strengthening of the local state apparatus is extremely perilous, especially in the context, as in the Caribbean and other Third World societies, where capital itself is controlled by external sources. The Chilean and Jamaican examples reveal the extreme difficulty of taking this kind of path, say from B to D, in the wake of both (a) the rift between the domestic controllers of the state apparatus and the external controllers of capital investment into the domestic economy, and (b) a relatively weak state system relying essentially on a liberal-competitive political structure. The path from B to D is also potentially turbulent because conditions are more open to the free development of class forces and their mutual antagonism in
the process of change.

Most Caribbean states have already progressed from system A to system B. However, few have attempted to move beyond this point, and those that have declared for socialism are faced essentially with two choices, either to proceed indirectly to D, (the decentralized collectivist system), through C, (the state-nationalization, or totalitarian system) or directly from B to D with the risk of externally determined violent reaction or reversal in the struggle toward socialism. Guyana today under the PNC regime seems to have opted for the indirect totalitarian path and has therefore settled for a more lengthy period of transition. Grenada, too seems to be going the way of Guyana in this respect. The danger, however, with this approach through C is that the system could just as easily revert to system A, (the authoritarian system) which increasingly distances the regime from the masses and encourages external capitalist exploitation and control depending on the capability and level of consciousness of the political leadership. It must be recognized also that the possibility of reverting to A becomes greater because of the contradictory tendencies inherent in the state directed approach to socialism, which is to stifle the development of the relevant class forces, particularly an independent working class which is necessary for the success of socialism. In other words the centralizing tendencies in system C tends to inhibit approaches towards the decentralizing tendencies essential for system D.
The question, however, might be asked whether violence must be avoided at all cost in order to attain socialist goals. It would seem also that the complete avoidance of violence broadly speaking is improbable since some degree of force is necessary for purposeful social change. In any case the practical choice would seem to be limited either to (a) revolutionary collective violence, (b) reactionary collective violence and (c) state violence, such that the avoidance of one might easily lead into the assertion of the other. It is clear also that, from the Caribbean experience, the electoral process as a means to fundamental progressive change proves to be rather ineffective as the cases of Guyana and Grenada reveal.

However, the one alternative which can possibly avoid some of the most descriptive consequences of political violence is a massive political education campaign coupled with the establishment of mass controlled, or grassroots, political institutions directed from both state and mass levels of society. In addition, a serious effort must be made to match theory with practice. In Guyana, the formal establishment of Local Democratic Organs and the emphasis on cooperatives as the economic means of socialist transformation are, theoretically at least, a foundation on which the mass educational programme for the development of political consciousness could be constructed and the violent alternative avoided. But in Guyana, theory and practice do not always coincide or unite. Yet emphasis on the non-violent alternative
is crucial in the Guyana context where the existence of sizeable racial groups provide the ready-made background for political manipulation which can easily transform revolutionary into reactionary violence, a mutual elimination contest among the races, and so stem the tide toward the desired socialist objective. This particular aspect of racial reaction is largely neglected in Marxist theory.

Another question relevant to this analysis is how to develop precise measures of exploitation and oppression so as to recognize on the basis of the balance between the two the particular stage of development of any society. In this question the guidelines suggested by Marx that "at a certain stage of development" the capitalist system brings forth the material agencies for its own destruction, seems rather vague and therefore unhelpful. This vagueness points up a particular weakness in the Marxist theory which in concrete terms could best discern particular stages of development only in ex post facto terms. "From that moment" wrote Marx, "new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society". In this way it becomes relatively easier to detect the resultant new forces and passions or the changed conditions than to be able to anticipate that precise moment. In concrete terms, therefore, we can be certain of that stage only after the revolutionary forces are nearing the completion of their struggle for change. It is suggested here that to the extent that it becomes possible to ascertain precise
measurement of the balance between exploitation and oppression, some clue to the determination of the necessary moment of change is approximated.

What then are the prospects for the Caribbean revolution and the ascendency of the Marxist paradigm as a guide to understanding and action? The fact that most of the Caribbean states fall in the category of system B, (the post colonial liberalist tradition) does not necessarily mean that they must or can remain there forever. The very dynamics at work between capital and labour will tend to push the system either toward system C or system D, or even towards a reversal to system A depending on the degree of control by foreign capital. If the state takes the initiative toward change most likely it will aim at system C. If on the other hand the state seeks to remain at B, other class forces will be at work pushing the system directly toward system D with all its possibilities of disruptive violence. To a large extent, however, the direction the Caribbean states take will depend on the successes or failures of those few states such as Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada which are more advanced along the socialist path. To the extent that they succeed in their advance toward socialism, either directly or indirectly, Marxist theory will advance toward paradigm status with the potential to reinforce and enhance further socialist practice in the Caribbean.
CONCLUSION

A Marxist paradigm pervading political theory and practice in the Caribbean would seem to be more applicable in the future depending on the successes of the few Caribbean states such as Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada which have dared to openly pursue socialist goals. At that time Marxist theory will qualify for paradigm status not only on the basis of its attraction of adherents in both academic and practical political circles but more importantly because of its capacity to explain wider variations in the Caribbean political process compared to the other contending theories for paradigm status. In particular, Marxist theory with its reliance on a more curvilinear (or zig-zag) model of change is better equipped to explain both advances and reverses in the movements towards the declared objectives of the various state systems in the Caribbean as elsewhere.

The Caribbean experience further reveals that the criteria for the choice of a paradigm are related primarily to practical political problems and fundamental social changes. This observation should serve to modify Kuhn's assumption that the criteria for paradigm selection are based mainly on subjective or accidental factors. At least the ultimate choice of Marxist theory as a dominant paradigm will largely depend on its capacity to resolve urgent practical issues which are beyond the capability of any of the
other rival theories to anticipate or resolve. In this way paradigms will be more in accord with basic needs defined within particular historical contexts than determined by arbitrary and absolute preferences. Thus the social scientific revolution becomes more directly interrelated with the actual process of social change.

The dominance of a social scientific paradigm does not necessarily mean that other rival theory contenders will cease to exist, or that their adherents will finally be "read out of the profession" as Kuhn assumes. Although to a large extent, dependency theory has superceded plural society theory as the dominant social sciences paradigm in the Caribbean, strong and committed adherents to the latter still exist. However, to the extent that the ascendancy of Marxist theory toward paradigm status depends, for its attractions of adherents, not simply on its "apparent" but on its actual capability of explaining and resolving a wider range of practical social problems, to that extent other rival theories become rather redundant. Perhaps, also, the demise of the rival theories would then be a result of their own serious limitations as far as the explanation of fundamental change is concerned.

Caribbean political science, in particular, would seem to have the urgent task of coming to grips with the theoretical developments in the social sciences and to make valuable contributions in the development of theory itself. More significantly, it needs to keep step with the practical developments and social changes in
the region with a view to the construction of more meaningful and relevant theory. To the extent that Caribbean political science can contribute to the forging of closer and more consistent links between theory and practice it is probable that the social sciences would reach the point which makes unnecessary the existing artificial disciplinary divisions in the field. To that extent also the ascendancy of the Marxist paradigm is facilitated.
FOOTNOTES

1. Apart from the three theories discussed here one can identify also, structural-functionalism, stratification theory, nullianarianism and charismatic theory to name a few. Although each has peculiarities which distinguish the one from the other, they are nevertheless characterized by their rather limited capacity to explain fundamental structural change. There are also no basic incompatibilities between them.


3. Ibid, p. 94.


Carl Stone, Stratification and Political Change in Trinidad and Jamaica, Beverly Hills, 1972, p. 7, also Carl Stone, Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica, Kingston, 1973, p. 16;


Braithwaite, op. cit. p. 821.


18. Ibid; p. 75; Also V.I. Lenin; What is to be Done, Peking 1975; F. Engels, Anti-Duhning, Peking, 1976, p. 234.


26. Ibid, p. 85


28. cf. V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution, New York, 1 68, p. 35.


30. Ibid


33. Ibid, p. 156.

34. Dirk Struijk, writing in the introduction to Marx's 'The Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1944, alluded to Marx's Ph.D Thesis in this way: 'Here Marx showed how Democritus, whose atoms moved
in a straight, the only, constructed a physical theory of strict
determinism, whereas Epicurus, who allowed the atoms a slight
development from the strictly atomic to a much fuller world
outlook on the one hand and as well as determinism. Thus, Epicurus
reached out for a far richer conception of reality and deeper than
that of Democritus, the objective world of Epicurus no room
existed for superstition, and Marx considered him "the greatest
Greek representative of the enlightenment." Introduction to
Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
Schopenhauer," 1854, in op. cit., p. 76.

38. Cf. Eugene T. Miller, "Positivism, Historian, and Political
Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI,
39. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 74
40. Ibid., p. 74
41. Ibid., p. 145
42. Cited in Miller, op. cit., p. 74.
43. Cf. Bryan P. Cohen, "Science and Scientific Revolutions"
44. The concept of "postkolonial science" is a recognition of a renewed
interest in internationalism as against narrow nationalist
perspectives which are a concomitant to the struggle against
colonial domination. It is not intended to suggest a return
to external colonial control or the erosion of self determination
of states in the Third World.
45. Cf. Harry Courtois, (ed.) Politics and State in The Third World,
47. Ibid., p. 269 ff.
49. The monopoly of commercial business by the Portuguese, in particular, has led continually to racial riots and clashes with the African population in Guyana. Cf. James Rodway, *History of British Guiana*, V 1. III Georgetown '891, p. 113.


52. It is significant to note that calls for a new international economic order which could help to remedy current financial and economic problems facing Third World countries have met with little success so far primarily because such a move will be inimical to the interests of the dominant economic powers in the international system: cf. "Punching Holes in The Smoke", *South*, No. 1, Oct., 1980.

53. Perhaps the earliest work in this series is M.G. Smith, *A Framework for Caribbean Studies*, The Extra-Mural Dept., University College of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica. (Undated).


64. Karl Marx, Capital - A Critique of Political Economy, New York, 1906. p. 703


66. Ibid