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**From the Editor’s Desk**

The following comments concerning the latest Federal Budget are provided for information and consideration. In reading one will find embedded deep in the policy statement the fourth chapter “Protecting Canadians” which comes well after other programs such as “Renewal and Enhancement of Canada’s Honours System”, “Supporting Canada’s Olympic and Paralympic Athletes”, “Promoting Arts and Culture at Toronto’s Harbourfront Centre”, and among others, the “Protection of Sound Recordings and Performances”. Hopefully this is not an indicator of the priority being placed on security and defence.

- Specific to the section “Defending Canada”, such programs as:
  - Strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces by providing $11.8 billion over 10 years through an increase to the annual escalator for National Defence’s budget to 3 per cent, starting in 2017–18.
  - Providing up to $360.3 million in 2015–16 for the Canadian Armed Forces to extend its mission to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
  - Providing $7.1 million in 2015–16 for the Canadian Armed Forces to deliver training assistance to the Ukrainian Security Forces.
  - Providing $23 million over four years on a cash basis, starting in 2015–16, to upgrade the physical security of Canadian Armed Forces bases.

Will this funding ever be realized?

Andrew McNaughton writes that for fifty years, Canada’s air force has played a vital role in Canada’s foreign policy in United Nations operations and other peace-support missions. As governments are risk averse to put ‘boots on the ground’, he posits that the RCAF has increasingly a greater role in providing humanitarian and sustainment support.

Paul Hook provides a perspective on Canada’s current peacekeeping program as part of its foreign and defence policies. He debunks the myth that Canada has abandoned peacekeeping.

Samantha Hossack argues that Canada’s foreign policy from 2001-2006, was based on Canada’s desire to provide security against threats, nationally and internationally. Even though policy makers and governments changed during this period, the policy on Afghanistan remained constant—to provide security Canada would have to resort to military action.

Given that decisions taken in defence procurement impact the federal budget for the next forty years, Caroline Leprince attempts to increase our understanding of why the acquisition of defence equipment in several instances has deviated from strict procurement regulations and cites numerous examples of bad practices in military procurement.

Sincerely,

Colonel Chris Corrigan (retired) CD, MA
Editor and Chair of Security Studies

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Over the last several years the air power community has examined the role of aviation in counter-insurgency operations. This comes as no surprise; many western nations have found themselves fighting these operations in the past decade in the Middle East. Although an important role, it is only a part of the broader spectrum of peace support operations. Many nations have deployed aircraft to support the United Nations (UN) or other organizations in these operations; however this role has gone largely unwritten and unacknowledged by both air forces and academia alike. For fifty years, Canada’s air force has played a vital role in Canada’s foreign policy as played out in United Nations and other peace-support missions. With governments weary of “putting boots on the ground,” they have turned to the air force to provide assistance.

This article argues that this role is so important to Canada that it should be included in current Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) operational doctrine. It is important to remember that air power cannot be defined as merely the offensive or defensive capabilities of an air force, but rather encompasses elements such as airlift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and air traffic control services, among others. These roles, like the conflicts they are employed in, sit on a spectrum of conflict. This spectrum of peace-support operations encompasses all operations from peace-making to war. It is through this framework that the following argument will be placed. With this in mind, a more nuanced definition of air power needs to be addressed by the RCAF. The article is divided into three areas. The first of these will demonstrate that there is a Canadian historical precedent for using air power in peace support operations. The second section will examine current Canadian Armed Forces and RCAF doctrine, and demonstrate that the current RCAF definition of air power is too narrow to include peace-support operations fully. The third and final section will argue that over time peace support operations have not only become more complicated but that this trend will continue in the future. This section will examine the use of Canadian air power in Afghanistan as a model for the future, where all aspects of air power will once again be called upon to play key roles.


The history of the post-Second World War RCAF is one of new capabilities, aircraft, and the overall arms build-up of the Cold War. While the RCAF played an integral role in the defense of North America and the nuclear deterrent in Europe, Canadian air power was also having important effects in peace-support missions around the globe. Although there are many examples, this article will examine four missions where Canadian air power was salient. These missions are the UN missions in the Congo, Pakistan and India, the Balkans, and Haiti.

Air power in peace-support operations began with the UN Mission in the Congo, and this is especially true for the RCAF. Prior to 1960, the Congo was a Belgian colony. When independence was granted on 30 June 1960, the country fell into disorder and Belgium deployed its military to restore law and order, however this was without the agreement of the new Congolese government. It was at this point that the United Nations became involved. Although the employment of transport aircraft in peacekeeping missions was not new to the UN, the mission in the Congo was the first time that air power was showcased on a large scale. Transport elements from both the United States Air Force (USAF) and the RCAF were utilized to get the initial response of 14,000 troops and supporting equipment into the Congo in July 1960. Transport aircraft were only a part of the mission as it also incorporated many different forms of air power including helicopters, support elements for internal airlift, and personnel to run the country’s air navigation system and air traffic control.

Canada’s initial contribution to the mission was in the form of thirteen North Star transport aircraft to provide internal and external airlift. The airlift was a key contributor to the early success of ONUC due to the Congo’s lack of transport infrastructure. The RCAF’s ability in this area was unmatched, where “the USAF of the day lauded our operations as the best military air transport in the world.” Although the North Stars were withdrawn in the fall of 1962, RCAF per-

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The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley.
sonnel continued to serve in ONUC in many other critical tasks, such as air traffic control and the command and control functions of the remaining international air transport force.

Canadian air power in peace support operations expanded throughout the 1960s. After Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947, the region of Kashmir was left free to accede to either state, however it quickly became an issue. The UN stepped in with an observation mission, and by 1964 Canada had become involved with military observers in isolated outposts. These observation stations were extremely difficult to access. The RCAF was called upon to alleviate this problem and contributed a Caribou aircraft and support personnel; however after the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 the force (117 Air Transport Unit) was upgraded to two Caribou aircraft and CC-123 Otters. The Caribous were tasked with internal airlift; meanwhile the Otters flew reconnaissance missions. This contribution was critical to the mission; however it was not without sacrifice. The RCAF lost one Caribou to a Pakistani air strike in 1964.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Canadian peacekeeping contributions lessened. The fall of the Soviet Union brought a new era of peacekeeping missions, many of which Canada participated in. Canada’s forefront operations in this period were the missions in the Balkans. The dissolution of Yugoslavia brought with it an unfortunate number of conflicts. From 1992 to 2001 Canada was involved in eighteen different UN missions, many of which had an air component. Most people will remember the NATO bombing campaign that occurred in 1999, which resembled more of a war than a peace-support operation. It is in this period that the definition of peacekeeping evolved into the spectrum of peace support operations. The Canadian air force participated in many different aspects of the missions in the Balkans from transport to bombing.

The first role the Canadian air force played in the Balkans was during the Sarajevo airlift, where CC-130 Hercules aircraft flew into the city three times a day with 35,000 lbs of food and other aid. Later when SFOR was established, more aircraft fleets became involved, including CF-188 Hornets and the new CH-146 Griffon helicopters. The Hornets were mostly employed in the air-to-ground bombing role; however they also flew air patrol flights. The flexibility of the Hornet as well as their Canadian pilots was well noted by the air campaign’s commanders. The Griffons had a variety of roles, including command and liaison missions, passenger and cargo transport, reconnaissance and photo missions, as well as presence over-flights. Even the Kosovo air campaign fits within the spectrum of peace-support operations, albeit on the far right towards all-out war.

These operations were not restricted to regions on the other side of the globe; some existed in North America’s ‘backyard’. In particular, Canada has had a large involvement time and again in Haiti. The first of these where air power was important was in 1995, where air force personnel were tasked with the logistics and construction support for the mission. The next year the mission was expanded and saw the deployment of Twin Huey helicopters to the island. These aircraft greatly assisted the Canadian contingent by providing transport, reconnaissance, and an evacuation capability. After a pause in operations, in 2004 the Air Force once again became involved. This summertime mission saw the deployment of six Griffon helicopters providing transport and reconnaissance capabilities to the Canadian army contingent. Through this brief snapshot of Canadian missions, it is apparent that air power is a valuable tool to any peace-support operations commander. These missions have varied in time, place, and especially aircraft, however many of the roles are the same. Transport is and has always been vital, internal and external...
airlift is the lifeblood of most of the Canadian contingents. Many missions had Canadian aircraft provide reconnaissance and photographic intelligence. Further still in the Balkans Canadian air power was called upon to use its CF-18s in combat missions. As evidenced by the four previously discussed missions, the roles of Canadian air power evolved over time. In all, Canadian air power across the spectrum of peace support operations is important, with many lessons learned.

The graphic on page 4 illustrates the Spectrum of Peace-support Operations. It is a sliding scale, as we know missions and their situations on the ground change. On the left are the more peaceful disputes, where the international community is involved to facilitate some peaceful end to a dispute. As you move towards the right, the potential for violence increases. In the middle we have our traditional peacekeeping missions—the interposition of military forces. Further still on the right lies peace-enforcement, where missions like the Balkans fit. The furthest right is all out war. All conflicts and peace-support missions fit somewhere at any given time on the spectrum. This spectrum also illustrates where air power can be employed as evidenced by the historical examples. It is important to note that the definition of air power must not be confined to individual capabilities as showcased in these missions like airlift or tactical aviation, but rather includes these capabilities and much more. It is these other operations outside of traditional combat and domestic operations that we have historical experience in, and where the RCAF employs all of its different air power assets in varying combinations. This is not represented in current RCAF doctrine.

Current Canadian Armed Forces and RCAF Doctrine

Despite the size of the RCAF during the Cold War, there were not many air force staff members or scholars who created air power doctrine. Of the Canadians who did, their focus, not unsurprisingly, was on the offensive and defensive roles of aircraft in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Today, the RCAF has created doctrine through its own institution, the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre (CFAWC), located in Trenton Ontario. So far, the Centre has produced ten doctrine documents from the strategic level capstone document to specific operational capabilities. Absent however, is a document that clearly defines the roles of the RCAF across the Spectrum of Peace Support Operations. Its focus lies with the traditional offensive outlook of air forces, where fighter aircraft are supported by other air power capabilities.

The document Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine is the foundation. It begins with a history of the Canadian air force through its many organisational changes, however, it wholly neglects the important role Canadian air power has played in peace-support operations. The document further defines the structure in which aerospace doctrine will be formed, following the model of the overall Canadian Forces military doctrine document. Underneath this capstone document are the operational level documents. These subordinate level documents are to “describe the organization of aerospace forces and guide their employment in the context of broad functional area, distinct objective, force capabilities, and operation environments.” It is at this level that a document for peace-support operations would fit. As it stands right now, the overall problem with the current doctrine is not so much the lack of a peace-support document (although it would be beneficial), but the fact that the definition of air power is too focussed on the offensive and defensive roles. This ‘fighter’ focus leans towards a Maslowian thought process where “if the only tool you have is a hammer, treat everything as if it were a nail.” As we know historically this is not true for Canada’s air force, and should not be found in its doctrine. Very little mention is made to the roles of the many aircraft fleets outside of what they could do in war or domestic operations. This definition needs to be expanded to include the many roles that not just aircraft, but all of Canadian air power, can play in varying combinations across the spectrum of peace-support operations.

There is an historical trend when viewing peace-support operations through the frame of the spectrum. Peace-support missions have become more complex over time; furthermore the requirements on air power have also become larger. Canada’s air force has used in simple missions and complex ones, with many lessons learned of how to organize and utilize aviation elements in varying situations. This trend will no doubt continue into the future. To further reinforce this point, a brief case study of the RCAF in Afghanistan follows.

Afghanistan and the Need for Doctrine Moving Forwards

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States the west found itself in a war on ideals. The conflict in Afghanistan was complicated. Most recent academic writing, in terms of air power, is found in books and articles of counter-insurgency and the role aircraft can play there. What is missing however is the overall impact air power can play in a complicated peace support operation such as Afghanistan. For Canadian air power, Afghanistan was the catalyst for a new and upgraded air force. The RCAF acquired new capabilities in strategic airlift, medium to heavy lift helicopters, improved ISR through new UAVs, and the fact that this was the first mission in over 50 years that saw the RCAF deploy an expeditionary air wing. This was Canada’s defining peace support operation, where most of the possible roles air power could play were utilized.

The mission in Afghanistan began in 2001 with the deployment of HMCS Halifax with its on board Sea King helicopter. Shortly after, Canada committed a CC-150 Polaris transport to the mission and two CP-140 Auroras to provide an ISR capability to assist maritime coalition forces. In 2002 the air force committed three CC-130s to provide external airlift from Camp Mirage into Afghanistan. These numbers vastly overshadow the Cold War RCAF’s airlift contributions.

Continued on page 16
Canadian Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping: More Than Just Canadians in Blue Helmets

by Paul E. Hook

Think of peacekeeping and immediately many Canadians picture a Canadian military soldier or police officer with a blue helmet manning an observation post or helping somebody in the developing world. Canadians believe that: Canada practically invented peacekeeping, former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson received the Nobel Prize for it and peacekeeping has been firmly cemented in the national identity of Canada. Move ahead one or two generations and the view of Canada continuing that legacy is diminishing. Unfairly, journals, newspaper articles and opinion polls all lament the sad state of Canada’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. The model of 1st generation peacekeeping—peace operations, humanitarian intervention, etc.—has occupied tens of thousands of UN soldiers yearly since the end of the Cold War. Canada participates in this type of peacekeeping, but the public, academics and others, sometimes become nostalgic for the days when Canada was a middle power with a solid reputation and a seat at the table based largely on its contribution to keeping peace. As well, with so many ongoing missions and with the numbers required to conduct those missions, it is almost impossible for Canada to lead the contributing nations.

This article will provide a perspective on Canada’s current peacekeeping program as part of its foreign and defence policies. Despite criticism that Canada has abandoned peacekeeping; it has not. Canada’s engagement has evolved into regional empowerment focusing on capacity building with developing countries. Much like the old adage, “give a man a fish he eats for a day; teach a man how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime,” Canada has determined that assisting other countries to increase their skills as peacekeepers can provide better results than always dispatching Canadian soldiers to UN missions. Canada now helps other countries, through capacity building, to train their military, police and civilians to participate in those UN peacekeeping missions. This will be demonstrated through quantitative analysis of Troop Contributing Nations to UN missions from 1992 until 2013 and in conjunction with those statistics utilize a three-part theory of capacity building (a qualitative approach), to include: policy, financial assistance and training.

Troop Contributions

Most articles and papers reviewed for this article, concerning Canadian participation in peacekeeping focused on numbers. The UN keeps statistics for each year, each country and each mission, that describe in detail what every nation is doing to contribute to peace; whether financially or through people, like troops in blue helmets. The number of soldiers sent to missions is something tangible that can be put in new stories and told to Parliament. Even today, Canada’s contribution to the crisis in Ukraine is focused on how many ships, aircraft and soldiers we have sent to nearby NATO countries. Regrettably, these metrics are not true indicators of effectiveness. There must be a quantitative analysis done to combine all efforts that a country is doing to support UN peacekeeping. In 1992 Canada contributed a significant number of military troops to UN missions. As can be seen in Table 1, one out of every 12 soldiers, observers or police officers in a blue helmet came from Canada. This statistic seemed to follow logically from the pre-Cold War years as Canada was the single largest contributor of peacekeepers and participated in every UN mission. Twenty-one years later, Canada contributes only 130 personnel and has fallen behind as one of the top contributors. This statistic has been used by others in describing the sad end or decline of peacekeeping, the end of a proud Canadian tradition that was routed in a, as Jocelyn Coulon and Michel Liegéois state in a 2010 article in CDFAI, “perception of peacekeeping inherited from the 60s.” Coulon and Liégeois also state that the trend of other nations contributing to missions began to change and countries outside of the western world started to send the soldiers in blue helmets to conflict zones around the world. The countries in Table 1 are from different continents, have different economies, have gained varying degrees or levels of peacekeeping experience and have differing degrees of professionalism in their militaries. All were chosen because in one form or another, they are connected to Canada through ABCA, NATO, peacekeeping associations or defence policy.

Another misleading fact about statistics concerning troop contributions is that they do not factor in the quality of the people sent on missions nor the positions in which those individuals are employed. Canada has an extremely professional officer corps that has fully trained staff officers capable...
of working in multinational headquarters, under demanding circumstances for long periods of time. While the numbers are miniscule, Canada currently has five staff officers, including a colonel in Haiti, that are employed in senior positions in the military headquarters. Canada also has 12 officers deployed to the South Sudan as part of United Nations Missions in South Sudan (UNMISS) and they too are staff officers and military liaison officers. The same could be said for all missions to which Canada contributes members, including those that are outside of the UN such as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which is an independent U.S.-led peacekeeping operation in the Sinai Peninsula. This is not to say that other countries lack the ability to send experienced professional officers to fill key positions, but rather that the calibre of military education that Canadian officers receive throughout their careers is on par with the best militaries in the world, which is why other countries send selected senior officers to attend Canadian staff courses.

**Capacity Building**

While many people believe that tangibles such as personnel and material are what Canada should contribute, Canada gives in other areas such as support to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), financial contributions to peacekeeping and capacity building of peacekeeping skills with other militaries. It is necessary to understand all of these activities in order to appreciate the larger role that Canada has in UN peacekeeping.

With the merger of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) into what is now known as the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFAT-D), the Canadian government has streamlined its foreign relations by unifying its key internal functions under one department. DFAT-D has a significant role in maintaining or helping to achieve international peace and security and it does this through the Stabilization and Reconstruction (START) Task Force which was created in 2005. Its specific goal is, on behalf of Canada, to support other countries “in complex crises—conflicts or natural disaster—and to coordinate whole-of-government policy and program engagements in fragile states.” That goal is further broken down into numerous tasks, all of which are done with a concerted national approach in order to maximize the effect and minimize on duplication of effort.

START committed funding and resources to numerous initiatives around the world in order to facilitate peace and security. This funding, called the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), has existed for eight years. The total amount of funding expended through GPSF reached its height in 2010-11 with approximately 125 million dollars. Each year, of that amount, approximately 8 million dollars is used for peace operations and capacity building through the Global Peace Operations Program (GPOP). Part of the funding went to the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (the Pearson Centre). This was due to the Pearson Centre’s international reputation as it trained both Canadian and foreign police, military and civilian personnel in numerous UN courses to prepare them for peacekeeping missions.

Examples of how the GPSF is used to build capacity include:

- **2011**: funding to the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (the Pearson Centre) to work with African countries with regards to the African Standby Force and peacekeeping activities.
- **2011–2012**: funding to the Pearson Centre for the Latin American Peacekeeping Partnership (LAPP) to hold workshops in numerous countries such as Guatemala and discuss police and military cooperation on UN missions.
- **2011–2013**: funding to the Pearson Centre to work with Colombia’s Escuela de Misiones Internacionales y Acción Integrale de Colombia (ESMAI) to create a plan to develop a training centre for Colombians to deploy on UN peace operations. The director of DMTC, another individual and I, worked with ESMAI in May 2013 and discussed how Colombia could increase its capacity for teaching UN PSO courses to its officers to take part in more UN missions.
- **2011–14**: capacity building with the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF) to increase the knowledge of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Troop Contributions 1992-2013</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2775 (6.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3450 (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3991 (5.6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4500 (5.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>227 (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>128 (1.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>160 (1.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>776 (1.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. - *Statistics are for the month of April for each year and include Police, and military contributions. The number in brackets is a percentage of the troops contributed for all countries in all missions that year; gathered from [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors)*
the instructors at the Tanzanian Peacekeeping Training Centre. Funding a new building for the TPDF to train its peacekeepers to participate in missions in the Middle East, Somalia and other African countries.

DFAT-D has a working relationship with the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its current goal is to build capacity within the UN, support regional organizations to conduct UN missions and to contribute to the corporate knowledge of the department. Canada is currently chair of the General Assembly’s Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations, works on creating and updating doctrine for peacekeeping operations and it deploys civilian personnel to numerous fragile states. Canada also supported the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005, which is responsible to help with post-conflict peacebuilding. Additionally, Canada was a founding member of the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) which it commanded from 2003 until 2006.

Eight years ago, the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF) was created with the help of Canada. As described in Table 2, Canada’s current contributions account for approximately 6.5% of all money in the UNPBF. The funding goes toward three main areas: security reform, governance and economic development.

Canada ranks 11th in the world for GDP according to the International Monetary Fund yet it consistently provides more than, for example Germany, which is ranked 4th in the world (this does not include other funding through organizations such as Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GiZ), for which data was not accessed). Canada’s voluntary contributions also exceed the combined totals of all countries in Table 2, with the exception of the UK, yet most of those countries provide a greater military contribution to UN missions. One can argue from this that those countries with money contribute financially and without financial resourc-Training Centres (IAPTC) in 1995. The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), a unit within the CAF that was created in 1996, is the lead for Peace Support Operations (PSO) training of Military Observers and is the Centre of Excellence for the Department of National Defence (DND). On behalf of the Canadian Armed Forces, the commandant of the PSTC attends annual conferences such as the Association of Asian Peace Training Centres, La Asociacion Latinoamericana de Centros de Entrenamiento Para Operaciones de Paz, the IAPTC and the NATO Working Groups on PSO. These regional associations discuss topics on peacekeeping training, they conduct workshops on topics such as UN Resolutions on gender and they promote the advancement of new tactics and doctrine on peacekeeping. Canada sends members to participate as staff and students on international PSO exercises in South America and Asia as recently as 2012-13 where the staff help to plan and create scenarios for the large exercises and students take part in the training with numerous students from the region and around the world.

Within DND, under Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) (Policy), the Directorate – Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC) supports the enhancement of PSO training and interoperability with Canada’s numerous partners throughout the world. DMTC works with other government departments through the Military Assistance Steering Committee (MASC) to determine which countries to focus its efforts on. This whole of government approach is very important to any tactical activities achieved because they must be synchronized with the efforts of DFAT-D, Public Safety and other groups. The MASC is convened annually to provide an opportunity to discuss the priorities for the upcoming one to three years. They are also involved in designing courseware for PSO training with the UN through direct talks and international workshops.

Recently, DMTC changed the way it delivers peace support training and has now focused on bi-lateral capacity

Table 2 – Amounts are in US dollars and are the amounts deposited, not committed; gathered from http://www.unpbf.org/what-we-fund/.
building which also incorporates regional staff. DND teams go to other countries to train the instructors and to run Canadian-developed or Canadian-led courses and seminars. This capacity building is seen as key to increasing the ability of other countries to support peacekeeping missions, which will lessen the need for Canada to send its members on numerous missions. The shift will lessen the cost to DMTC, enable more people to be trained and further Canada’s national interest of maintaining international peace and stability. Already, courses, training, and seminars have been held in Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia, Senegal, Kenya and Tanzania. These countries are now contributing more and more military support to UN missions (Table 1). DMTC has focused on regional training centres so that maximum effect can be achieved through focussed effort and spending. Also, DMTC has personnel posted at some of the regional training centres such as at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Kenya. Two personnel have been working with the centre since 2006 and another position has been placed in Malaysia. These positions are in place to support the development and implementation of UN courses.

Although programs through DMTC have been extremely successful and will continue into the foreseeable future, few people within Canada know of the existence of these programs or what they are achieving on behalf of Canada to secure peace and stability throughout the world, one could ask if they are effective. Clearly the public believes, as do many authors, that Canada has cut its commitments to peacekeeping. Little has been done to dissuade this idea. Consequently, as public diplomacy and international opinion is important to Canadians, the government needs to do a better job of projecting its policy goals to Canadians and the world. Recent papers on Canada and peacekeeping contain some information about capacity building actions, but there was little to no mention of the scope of current and future activities planned. Future programs address the perceived problems of long-term commitment to countries in order to give the Canadian government a lasting effect with those countries, not only for contributions to UN missions, but for bi-lateral trade deals and other issues. It is an integrated approach to capacity building.

**The Way Forward**

Canada is not alone in a decline in direct support to UN missions. Countries such as the UK and Germany (Table 1) have also stopped contributing significant numbers to peacekeeping missions, but Germany is conducting exchanges with other countries and organizations; the UK is collaborating with Thailand and in the 1990s began the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme that was essentially a train-the-trainer programme, much like what DMTC has begun to do. Canada and other industrialized countries, mostly those in the G20, have focused their resources to different areas of peacekeeping.

Canada and other Western countries were the only countries that could contribute battalions and commanders to UN missions in the early years of peacekeeping. Up until the 1990s, no country had established a training centre devoted to teaching the skills of peacekeeping. Canada began with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in 1994 and the PSTC in 1996. In the last twenty years, most countries have developed their own peacekeeping training centres and further developed the concept. For example, working groups on gender in PSO are being conducted by the African Union and regions such as South America and Asia have developed peacekeeping associations to maintain corporate knowledge and enhance training. Other countries are building their own centres all in a bid to have their country contribute to the UN and to the world in the name of peace. Those countries have the will and the manpower to send thousands of soldiers to peacekeeping missions in part because the UN pays US$1,028 per soldier per month.

It is not clear on the part of the government of Canada that activities and results described were planned as a desirable policy, but it is certainly underway and from most accounts, it has provided other countries in the UN the ability to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions. This, although not conclusive, can be the focus of future studies as Canada’s capacity building activities with six key countries as regional peacekeeping continues. Countries like Colombia want to play a larger role in international missions. They just have to build upon their experiences in Haiti and seek new opportunities with the UN. As has been shown above, Canada’s direct military contributions with soldiers has decreased, but Canada still contributes a significant amount of money, resources and corporate knowledge to the UN, its member states and the peacekeeping organizations around the world. The Canadian government’s defence and foreign policy with regards to peacekeeping is not well-known, but it is thriving and improving as time goes by. Canadians believe that war and conflict is the second most important global issue, behind the economy and that Canada’s greatest contribution to the world is peacekeeping. In 1993, 40% of Canadians believed that peacekeeping was their greatest international contribution. In 2012, only 18% of Canadians polled shared this belief. Canadians must be informed about what its government and military are doing in the areas of peacekeeping because it is important to them and important to the world.  

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.
Defending Canada in the Twenty-First Century: Participation in ISAF and the Defining of Success

by Samantha Hossack

Our objectives are threefold: to defend our national interests, ensure Canadian leadership in world affairs, and help Afghanistan rebuild into a free, democratic and peaceful country.¹

Canada's foreign policy at the turn of the twenty-first century shifted dramatically from that of the 1990s, partially in response to the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Public opinion in the United States, and also in Canada, strongly dictated that action needed to be taken to avenge this act of terrorism; that the world needed to be secured, as it could not afford another 9/11.² As a result of these sentiments, the Canadian government acted to promote Canadian interests, at home and abroad to aid in ensuring global security. The decisions that Canada made in the days and months immediately following 9/11 were unprecedented in their speed and scope: the creation of an ad hoc committee of Cabinet less than one day later, the decision to contribute “air, land, and sea forces” to Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as the drafting and passage of anti-terrorism legislation prior to Christmas of that year, are all indications of the far-reaching impacts of the terrorist attacks on the policies of Jean Chrétien’s government.

In this article, I argue that Canada’s foreign policy from 2001-2006, under the Liberal governments of Chrétien and Paul Martin, was based on Canada’s desire to provide security against threats, nationally and internationally. The decisions that were made ultimately followed the pattern for a Clausewitzian premise of war: involvement in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan would be an extension of Canadian political desires. To affect this argument, I will draw upon one of the main tenants of Canadian participation in security talks, with Rumsfeld, NATO ambassadors, and representatives to the UN. Further to these talks, Canadians became involved in military actions; sending soldiers to Afghanistan became a means by which to contribute to security. As Brigadier-General David Fraser explained upon being asked why Canada was in Afghanistan, “this is the home of the Taliban, the Taliban are a threat to nations around the world, including our own. It’s naïve of us to think that Canada is not a pathway to get to America and that Canada would not be the next objective.” The desire and need for security contributed significantly to Canada’s decision to enter into the war on terror, and indicates the relevance of military action in Afghanistan to the Canadian public. The security implications of 9/11, on national, continental, and international levels, prompted the development of a security strategy, on all levels, by Canadian policy makers.

National Security

The 9/11 attacks on the American homeland confirmed for Canadians that they were no longer in a “fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials.” As a result of the recognition that Canada was vulnerable, policy makers were obliged to develop plans to protect Canada. Priorities of policy makers shifted significantly following the 9/11 attacks: the focus of the pre-9/11 budget for 2002 was to be post-secondary education, while the post-9/11 budget was almost exclusively based on national security, allocating almost eight billion dollars to this end.³

In 2001, the CF was unable to protect Canada sufficiently without the aid of other, more powerful countries, primarily the US.⁴ Following 9/11 however, Canada needed to prove its commitment to the US to continue to receive the same level of military security from the US. The US, although reliant on Canada for continental security, desired the symbolism of Canada exerting itself militarily and standing with the US on its campaign against terror. Participating in Afghanistan, therefore, became a means to the end of Canadian national security.

The desire to protect Canada, which Jean-Christophe Boucher terms the “us” argument, has consistently been

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used by Canadian governments to justify Canadian military action in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, as a base for militant Islamism, presented an important security threat to Canadians; the vulnerability of the US emphasized the even greater vulnerability of Canada, and therefore of the continent. As Boucher notes, “the [Canadian] government...was protecting Canadian security by contributing to the war on terror, which, incidentally, had its main front in Afghanistan.” Through this justification, it made sense for the Canadian government to intervene militarily in Afghanistan, if only for its own national security interests.

**Continental Security**

Even more important than national security, was the need for continental security: without continental security, Canadian politicians agreed (and always have) that Canada is at risk of attack by their own enemies, as well as those of the US. As a result, 9/11 had a significant impact on Canada’s understanding of its own safety. The immediate aftermath of 9/11 necessitated a Canadian response that would appease the US so as to ensure that Canada would remain defended by a more able power. Nonetheless, the need for continental security played an influential role in Canadian policy toward Afghanistan.

Continental security has become an even greater issue in the post-9/11 era. The conflict in the Middle East, especially the naming of the US as the primary target of militant Islamism, significantly changed the dynamics of continental security: threats from all regions of the world were now possible, and likely, to occur. As Michael Hart explains, in the aftermath of 9/11:

> Canada and the United States need to cope with the daily reality that their own populations are directly vulnerable to foreign-based security threats. Rather than working on the basis of a shared desire to cooperate in pursuing offshore security threats, they now confront the need to cooperate in facing a common threat at home and abroad... ‘Canada’s security is linked to that of the United States because the US has a stake in the security of Canada unlike that shared with any other NATO ally...No ally has been so involved in the direct defense of the American homeland, and for so long, as Canada.’

The relationship between Canada and the US in the form of continental security played an important role in the decision by Canadian policy makers to join in the war in Afghanistan; the attack on the US homeland was, in many ways, also an attack on the Canadian homeland and it was necessary to assure solidarity with the US in order to continue to protect this time-honoured tradition of continental security.

The security of the continent was particularly important for Canadian decision makers. The threat to the US was equally, or more, great to Canada as a result of its proximity to the US, its allegiance to the US, and its lack of emphasis on military security. The realization that the US was vulnerable only increased the need for Canadian policy makers to work with the US in the eradication of the threat to continental security: to eliminate al-Qaeda and stabilize the Afghan region to prevent it from continuing to foster militant Islamism.

**International Security**

The final security concern for Canada was that of the international community. Canada, with a weak ability to maintain national security without the collective security of the international community was impelled to act against al-Qaeda. The premise of collective security belied selective intervention. If Canada was to receive security from its allies, it needed to be a part of providing security as well. This justification of involvement was founded on the premise that, as a “wealthy G8 country and a responsible world citizen, Canada has certain global obligations. Contributing to international efforts in Afghanistan was presented as proof that Canada was fulfilling these obligations.”

The same threats to continental security apply to international security as well. The instability of Afghanistan allowed it to become a perfect operating base for militant Islamism. Allowing militants, such as al-Qaeda to continue to operate in the Middle East was problematic for two important reasons: first, it allowed militants the ability to operate unhindered and to recruit a wider support base; and second it indicated a lack of willingness to engage with the enemy, prompting additional, and likely more devastating, action. As a result of the festering of militant Islamism in unstable countries, such as Afghanistan, the logical response, from an international security perspective, would be to create stabilization and remove the current threat.

Canada’s commitment to international security reflected these requirements. Chris Alexander, Canada’s ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003-2005, explained the importance of stabilization and providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people, once al-Qaeda, and their governing sponsors, the Taliban, were removed. The importance of this for Canada under the Liberals from 2001-2006, as Boucher intonates, was evident through the government speeches: 22.8% of Chrétien’s speeches, and 38.9% of Martin’s speeches indicated the importance of international security. International security, they argued, was achieved through the success of the War on Terror. The Afghanistan mission was the key to this war.

Overall support for Canada to join the US in Afghanistan was immense, both internally and externally. The Canadian public was outraged following 9/11: according to Ipsos-Reid, 66% of Canadians feared a terrorist attack on Canadian soil in October 2001, while an astonishing 72% of Canadians supported US-led air strikes on terrorist targets in Afghanistan. This overwhelming fear, and the desire to support military intervention in Afghanistan in order to remove the threat of attack assured the Canadian government of its course of action. As a result of its vulnerability to attack, the Canadian
government needed to respond to the threat on its own national security by taking the offensive; ensuring that militant Islamism did not find its way to Canada. Furthermore, in order to assure itself of collective security, both continentally from the US, and internationally, Canada needed to contribute to this collective security. Canada had numerous obligations to the continent and the international community, and joining the War on Terror through military intervention in Afghanistan provided Canada with the opportunity to fulfill its international obligations, as well as ensure that the international community remembered, but more importantly noticed, Canada and its contributions to security in the twenty-first century.

The Afghanistan Mission: International Security Assistance Force

In December 2001, the Security Council passed Resolution 1386 (2001), the last of the year. This resolution outlined the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as per Annex I of the Bonn Agreement. The creation of ISAF became, for Canada, a means by which to achieve its end of contributing to security and developing a role for itself on the world stage. For Canada, ISAF was the perfect mission: it bridged the gap between combat and peacekeeping, allowing Canada to maintain its image, but to also adopt a new role. As then-Minister of Defence Art Eggleton explained, it is “not an offensive mission, not a front-line mission. This is a stabilization mission to assist in opening corridors for humanitarian assistance.” For Canadian politicians, ISAF was an ideal compromise: it was led by the Europeans, was humanitarian in focus, would conform to the “early in, early out” strategy, was in a relatively safe region in Kabul (in the north), and would pacify the Americans. ISAF appeared to be a perfect fit for Canada.

Despite many setbacks regarding participation, in mid-July 2003, Canada's Brigadier General Peter Devlin took command of the ISAF operation in Kabul. Days later, Canadian forces began to deploy to Kabul. Only one month later, on 11 August, ISAF became a NATO mission, and Canadian Major-General Andrew Leslie became the deputy-commander of ISAF in Kabul. Canada, for the first time in decades, was leading its own operation, and commanding the armies of other NATO countries: a victory for Canada on the world stage and a clear indication of Canadian commitment to security. Operation Athena, Part I was a significant morale boost for Canada. Throughout 2003, the main focus of Operation Athena was reflective of Canada's commitment to NATO through UN Resolution 1386 (2001): to help the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) maintain a safe and secure environment in which the Loya Jirga (Grand Council) could be developed and a Constitution written for Afghanistan. The UN-sanctioning of action in Afghanistan provided the Canadian government with an opportunity to become involved on a legally endorsed level. Furthermore, the role that NATO played, both by invoking Article V as well as by eventually taking command of ISAF, gave Canada a greater role to play. At the behest of the US, Canada was able to take on leadership responsibilities within NATO, and particularly ISAF; that ultimately allowed Canada to improve its international image. Through collaboration with these two bodies that form alliance structures for Canada, the CF were able to find a niche for themselves within the overall Afghanistan campaign and be recognized as one of the prominent forces in Afghanistan.

Canada's New Place in the World: Conclusion

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Canadian government, under the leadership of Chrétien and later Martin, between 2001-2006, had a series of decisions to make on the issue of Afghanistan. The brunt of these decisions would be made with the greater notion of improving Canada's standing within the international community in the forefront. In order to effectively increase the world's view of Canada as a middling power akin to its NATO allies, Canada needed to overcome a number of obstacles, internally and externally, that counteracted this desired image. These obstacles, including the image of Canada as a “peacekeeping nation” and the inability of the Canadian Forces to be effective combat soldiers, had to be proven incorrect, and the war in Afghanistan provided the perfect opportunity for Canada to revamp its international image.

One of the most important ways that the Canadian governments were able to assert a new Canadian identity in the post-9/11 world was through the emphasis placed in security. National security was the foremost priority for Canada in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. It was entirely feasible that, if the US could be attacked, so too could Canada be threatened. As a result of this possibility, Canada was voluble in efforts to aid in the war against terror led by the US. Continentally, Canada also became a much more important and willing asset to security initiatives. The threats, which had previously been hyperbolic, were now real and the government needed to act accordingly. International security also played an important role in the Canadian decision to engage in combat in Afghanistan. The presence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan provided a threat to the entire Western world, as well as the Middle East. By routing out al-Qaeda and stabilizing the Afghan state, it became possible to restore the international security that had existed since the end of the Cold War.

The best means of achieving international security, for Canada, for the international community, and for Afghanistan, was through ISAF, the “safest” option for Canada that would allow it to undertake combat operations while maintaining its image as a peacekeeping nation. However, the purpose of ISAF was to secure Afghanistan, and provide a stable base for the Afghan Transitional Administration by Hamid Karzai. Slow progress was made, and by 2006 there existed potential for ISAF goals to be met, though this had not yet occurred. By 2014, when the mission officially ended, the objectives of ISAF had nominally been accomplished:
Afghanistan is no longer a highly-ranked base for terrorist activity, and the Afghan National Army is perhaps even able to effectively deal with what threats remain.

However, important questions must be asked: Has Afghan security been achieved? Nominally. Has Canadian security been achieved by ISAF? No. Has international security? No again. In fact, ISAF has largely succeeded only in moving the problem of terrorism away from Afghanistan and into other states within the Middle East, but still directly threatening Afghanistan. In 2006, Canada’s newly elected Minister of National Defence indicated that “terrorist attacks in continental North America...have alerted us to the necessity of enhancing security...in Canada” leading to the implementation of the Canada First Defence Policy that remains in effect to this day. Canadian national security from terrorist threats was an important element of the 2006 Speech from the Throne, indicating that the Canadian government, as well as the public, still viewed terrorism as a significant threat to Canadian national security: by 2006, the ISAF mission had not achieved Canadian security.

Canadian participation in ISAF therefore has failed to succeed in its objectives: the three identified areas of concern, in which Canada hoped to achieve security through involvement in ISAF, remain areas of concern in 2015, even after the ISAF mission as a whole has concluded. As Clausewitz suggests, “the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” If Canada’s political goal was to achieve security, and its military means was participation in ISAF, then Canadian participation in ISAF cannot be considered in isolation from its purpose to achieve security for Afghanistan, Canada, and the international community. Therefore, Canada’s political objectives in Afghanistan were not met through ISAF. Perhaps the goals themselves were too lofty, or perhaps the means by which Canada was willing to achieve its goals were too “safe”. In either case, it is necessary to consider what the impact of Canada’s mission to Afghanistan accomplished. It certainly was not security for Canada, the continent, or the international community (i.e. Afghanistan and the Middle East), as all three are still threatened by militant Islam and terrorism.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

Notes
3 Gross Stein 5-6
5 Jean-Christophe Boucher, “A Discourse Analysis of Canada’s Military Intervention, 2001-08” International Journal 64:3 (Summer 2009): 726
6 Michael Hart, From Pride to Influence: Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008),138-139.
7 UN Resolution 1386 (2001).

Under Scrutiny: Defence Procurement Programs

by Caroline Leprince

Recently, scandals over the mismanagement of military procurement programs have been in the forefront of the media. Criticized for the series of lengthy delays and cost overruns in its military procurement programs, the government’s confidence in the Department of National Defence (DND) has been greatly undermined. In February 2014, the announcement of the new Defence Procurement Strategy served as a pretext for the Conservative government to limit DND’s procurement capacity. Henceforth, a permanent Defence Procurement Secretariat, established within Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), is now responsible to ensure coordination among key departments.

Given that decisions taken today in defence procurement will impact the federal budget for the next forty years, it is reasonable to expect that its decision-making and project management processes are strictly followed and respect the highest norms of integrity. This article focuses on understanding why the acquisition of defence equipment in several instances had a tendency to deviate from strict procurement regulations. In order to do so, an analysis of recent major defence acquisitions – like the replacement of the CF-18 fighter jets – helped identify bad practices in military procurement. The main observations made in this article are based on the normalized practices of the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) guide, an essential reference in project management.¹

Context of military procurement in Canada

An inevitable question that every government asks themselves when the time comes to decide to “make or buy” military equipment is whether to out-source to defence suppliers or to maintain an in-country capacity to ensure the main-
tenance of the equipment throughout its life cycle. In general, buying equipment off-the-shelf is always the easiest, cheapest and fastest option, but it rarely offers industrial benefits to the national economy. In contrast, favouring an in-country supplier creates skilled jobs and ensures a guaranteed return on investment to Canadian taxpayers. But doing so also means that the government restricts its range of options to what is available domestically which excludes many competitive out-sourcing options.

The current trend in Canada in military procurement is clearly in favour of the Canadian defence industry. The promises made in the Canada First Defence Strategy, to spend $240 billion to re-equip the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), had the effect of putting enormous pressure to produce domestic benefits. However this bias for the Canadian industry is rarely the most cost-efficient option. In the specific case of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, the choice to build in Canada will cost approximately 20-25% more for the taxpayers. This example shows that the choice to “make or buy” is generally more a reflection of a partisan ideology rather than the result of a conscious economic calculation.

Bad practices in military procurement

In order to understand the reasons why military procurement programs tend to not respect established costs and timelines, this section identifies some bad practices that have been observed in the purchase of the F-35 and other defence procurements.

1. Biased statement of requirements

The main disputes surrounding the purchase of the F-35 were mainly attributable to its skewed operational requirements. During the procurement planning process, a statement of requirements is drafted that describes the particular platform or capability in sufficient detail to allow prospective sellers to determine if they are capable of providing the product. However, the original statement of requirements for the F-35 appeared to be written with one aircraft in mind and was never opened for competition.

In the F-35 file, DND never justified why its operational requirements needed fighter jets with fifth generation capability. Despite several requests made by PWGSC, the statement of operational requirements was not provided until August 2010, well after the government had announced its decision to purchase the F-35 without competition. Yet the real mistake in this file was made when PWGSC endorsed the key decision to sole source the acquisition of the F-35 without the required documentation. If the operational requirements had given sufficient justification that the F-35 was the best option, its purchase would no longer be a source of debate today.

This was not the first time that DND was found to skew its operational requirements to favour a winner. In the past, the fixed-wing search and rescue project had been removed from DND because its statement of requirements was written in a way to favour the C-27J Spartan. In this particular case, it was decided to transfer the procurement process to the National Research Council Canada which caused DND to lose all authority on the purchase of the equipment.

2. Improper risk assessment of projects in development

According to Treasury Board policies, all risks must be communicated to decision makers at key decision points and be reassessed periodically throughout the life of the project. It turns out that for the F-35, DND deliberately underestimated the risks associated to the ongoing project to avoid any questions pertaining to its acquisition.

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, led by Lockheed Martin, has experienced cost increases, schedule delays and major technological difficulties. Yet the briefing materials from 2006 through 2010 made no mention of these problems and the associated risks of relying on the F-35 to replace the CF-18. According to Auditor General Michael Ferguson, the rating provided by the Senior Review Board to assess the overall risk of the project was “inconsistent with the problems the JSF Program was experiencing at the time.”

Following the announcement of the purchase of the F-35 in 2010, Auditor General Sheila Fraser replied to the media: “I hope no one is assessing that as low risk.” Her comments were a direct allusion to the Sea King replacement project that shared striking similarities with the case of the F-35. From the beginning, the selection of the Cyclone in 2004 was considered as a high-risk proposition, yet it was identified as a “low to medium” risk even if the aircraft was still in development. In the end, the Cyclone will replace the Sea King, but rather than being delivered in 2008 as stipulated in the contract, the Royal Canadian Air Force will have to wait until 2018 to receive them.
3. Initial estimates petrify as official project estimates

In 2008, the federal government revealed through the Canada First Defence Strategy its intention to replace the fleet of CF-18s with 65 next-generation fighter aircraft. This is problematic since the White Paper should be used to outline the capability and deficiency gap, without specifying the number, the type of equipment or the project costs for the acquisition.

According to the PMBOK, the Project Cost Management is divided into two distinct processes: Estimate Costs and Determine Budget. However, the current procurement strategy of the Government of Canada takes the initial estimates to officiate as official estimates of the project. The Treasury Board authorizes the project’s budget based on the estimates provided by the industry during the Option-Analysis phase. Afterward, this figure becomes essentially set in stone making it impossible to adjust to inflation or unexpected cost increases during the Definition phase.

These practices have remained unchanged despite the recommendations of the Auditor General of Canada made in 2013 “that budgets not be capped until definition activities are sufficiently advanced to develop substantive cost estimates.” Unfortunately, these recommendations made for the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy have not been implemented to this day.

4. Lack of accountability in the procurement process

The lack of accountability certainly contributes to the bad practices observed in the defence procurement strategy. In Canada, the responsibility of military procurement is divided between three departments: PWGSC, DND and Industry Canada. However, none of them has authority over the others. Since no one can be singled out when the process goes wrong, this has the result that no ministry feels ultimately accountable for the decisions made. More often then not, the procurement process stalls due to disagreement between the different governmental bodies which leads to other problems: delays in the schedule, erosion of buying power, rise in the cost to maintain existing equipment, difficulty to maintain operational capacity, etc.

In the Defence Acquisition Guide and in DND’s Project Approval Directive, the procedures are clearly detailed. It states that Treasury Board has the exclusive authority over the decisions on major defence procurements. Yet, it seems that in practice, the governance structure in place is incapable of ensuring strict compliance to the procurement guidelines at all the stages of the acquisition cycle.

5. Political interference

Although all politicians agree to avoid wasting taxpayers’ money, when the procurement of a major platform for the military becomes an electoral issue, all the duly established procurement guidelines go out the window. For example, the Liberals under Jean Chrétien in 1993 promised to cancel the contract to replace the Sea King maritime helicopter if elected. After winning a majority, he kept his electoral promise and the repercussions of this decision are still being felt today. DND has been waiting to replace the Sea King for more than twenty years now.

Similarly, when the Conservatives decided to opt for a sole source selection for the F-35, it gave the impression that the most expensive procurement in Canadian history did not follow proper management processes. The F-35 then became a political target for the opposition parties that undermined the acquisition process during a difficult economic recovery. This aptly demonstrates that when politics interfere with major defence procurement, more often than not acquisition plans derail.

Conclusion

Based on recent defence acquisition experiences, this article identified bad practices that were observed in military procurement programs: biased statement of requirements, underestimation of risks, skewed budget caps, lack of accountability and political interference. Although the decision to transfer military procurement to PWGSC may bring some benefits, scepticism remains to see whether it will strengthen the integrity of the procurement process. Indeed, since PWGSC does not have the expertise to identify the defence equipment’s criteria of selection for a procurement process, the CAF will continue to control the statement of requirements. Therefore, it seems that as long as this expertise will remain the prerogative of DND, it is unlikely that the current reforms will change the basis of procurement processes.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

Notes

4 Sloan, Elinor. 2014. Something has to give: Why delays are the new reality of Canada’s Defence Procurement Strategy. Calgary: University of Calgary School of Public Policy.
10 Ross, Dan. «Is Defence Procurement Broken, or is this normal?” FrontLine Defence 10 (6), 8-9, 2013.
to UN missions, and clearly show the great effect of this capability. By 2006 it became clear that some outposts in Helmand, Zabul, Oruzgan and Kandahar provinces needed to be supplied from the air, thus began the first aerial resupply missions flown by the air force since the Korean war. In the eight years these aircraft were involved they moved 78,000,000 pounds of cargo, more than 244,000 passengers, and logged more than 22,000 flight hours over 4,500 flights.

Even with three fleets of aircraft already committed to the mission, in late 2008 the RCAF saw the need for additional airpower, and stood up Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing. In another first, this expeditionary force was the first deployment of its kind since the Second World War. This air wing controlled all RCAF flights in and out from the theatre of operations, and oversaw the deployment of RCAF aircraft in the following roles: air combat support, ISR, strategic airlift, and tactical airlift. Not only did the existing Canadian air power assets play a huge role in the mission, but the RCAF also expanded its capabilities to further prove the worth of air power. The mission saw the acquisition of four CC-177 Globemaster aircraft to better provide a strategic airlift capability; new D-Model Chinook helicopters from the US Forces and chartered medium lift Mi-8 helicopters to provide a medium-lift capability, as well as the leased Sperwer and Huron UAVs. In the words of the LGen Blondin (Commander RCAF), “The establishment of the JTF-A Air Wing ushered in a new era in Canadian military air operations and underlined the importance of having an agile and expeditionary Air Force. It also underlined the importance of having the right equipment to do the job. The RCAF fed a vital, comprehensive battle picture to Army commanders on the ground, and contributed to the protection of soldiers’ lives from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines and ambushes by reducing their reliance on ground-based transportation for moving personnel and cargo.”

The air wing itself was a major undertaking, having three of its own subordinate units: the Canadian Helicopter Forces Afghanistan (CHFA) operating Chinook, Griffon, and Mi8 helicopters; Canadian Heron UAV detachment; and the Tactical Airlift Unit (TAU) operating the CC-130s for internal airlift. The Air Wing did its intended job: save lives. By being able to move troops and supplies by air the threat to Canadian, Afghan, ISAF troops, and police was greatly diminished. This gave the Canadian forces the advantage in the region, allowing other resources to be spent in the development of Kandahar province.

The mission in Afghanistan was a major undertaking, and it is an understatement to say that there needs to be more attention paid to the RCAF’s role in this mission. With the mission now complete it is now the job of both academia and the air force to look back at lessons learned and improve the way the air force operates in missions across the spectrum of peace-support operations. Through the brief snapshot of previous peace-support missions it is clear that air power has played an important role. Furthermore, this role has expanded as the missions became more complex. The future will hold many more peace-support operations, some as complex as the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. A more nuanced definition of air power is needed in the RCAF, one that includes the many roles air power can play in peace-support operations. The current definition from which the doctrine is written is too narrow, and too focussed on the offensive role and supporting capabilities. This is not to discount the important role of offensive air power. This new definition of air power that allows room for peace-support operations will help the RCAF in the future, as it will be called upon time and time again to deploy to various regions and complicated situations. The RCAF will see itself employed in operations from one end of the spectrum to the other, from humanitarian missions on one side of the world to combat support missions on the other. It is imperative therefore; that the air force should ensure that it is not only prepared for future operations with its new capabilities, but also has codified the lessons learned from the past.

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