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you may remember in our last Editor’s Desk I mentioned the return to pre-unification titles for the Canadian Armed Forces. Since then the MND has announced further changes to further enhance the identifiers of our military. These changes resonate with many members of our Institute. Although from a history and heritage point of view they are warranted, I get concerned when I see the Army spending an inordinate amount of staff effort on matters of dress and uniforms. Experience has shown me that the ‘heat and light’ of new uniforms sometimes obscures greater issues and is a precursor to more substantive changes that may take place—changes to structures, roles, and/or cuts in defence spending.

An abridged copy of a Sitrep to all Army G1s (Personnel) is provided as an update. Honorary Colonel Dr. Neville G. Poy in his second article on the need to revive the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC), describes how this effort to reconnect the universities and the military has been evolving. This past July the Minister of National Defence announced that the Canadian Armed Forces and the University of Alberta are launching a pilot program to reconnect the university with the military. The project lays the ground work for a contemporary version of the COTC launch of the Breakout Educational Network’s Civil Military Leadership Pilot Initiative (CMLPI). Beginning this September the four year pilot program is intended to test the concept for a national program focusing on leadership, citizenship and nation-building.

John Thompson, a prolific contributor, provides two articles. The first is a forensic of the July return to military rule in Egypt. The 3 July overthrow may have been a blow to democracy as the first elected government in Egypt was deposed and the fruits of the “Arab Spring” and the revolution in Cairo in February 2011 not achieved. Alternatively he suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood would not have formed a truly democratic government in any event and that the autocratic ways of President Morsi and Brotherhood supporters constituted a threat to true democracy. The second article written with Sara Akrami provides an historical overview of the history of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and although a new President has been elected, the real power has always been held by the Supreme Leader of the Council of Ayatollahs who uses murder as an instrument of governance and statecraft.

LCol Scott Smith takes a classical view of war, one of Man’s oldest companions. Throughout history the goal of any contesting party is to win. The prize can take many forms: simple territorial expansion to gain resources; improved security from one’s neighbours; revenge, even perhaps something more ephemeral such as the imposition of a political ideal or system of belief.

Peter King in his Letter to Editor comments on the Richard Betts article in Issue #4, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy That Won the Cold War Can—and Can’t Do Now”.

Please join us for the next two Security Studies events – mark your calendars and bring a friend:

24 October—Breakfast Roundtable: “The Triumph and Tragedy of PTSD” with LCol Chris Linford CD and “Mental Health in the Workplace: Clinical or Leadership Issue?” with LCol (ret’d) Stéphane Grenier MSC, CD.

12 November—Luncheon Roundtable: “Mobilize!: Why Canada was Unprepared for the Second World War” with Larry Rose.
Army G1 Sitrep

(concerning CF Ranks and Insignia changes introduced in July 2013)

(Division G1 reps, here is expedient SITREP 02 to further assist your Division G1s to respond to the recent MND announcements on changes to Canadian Army (CA) identity.

Topics of this SITREP
1. Cost
2. Divisions
3. NCM Rank Names
4. Officers Rank Insignia
5. Army Corps
6. Army Secondary Badge

1. COST

The Army HQ is doing everything to manage the changes from these MND announcements while minimizing the cost impact on Army operations. Our approach to implementation of the changes from the MND announcement will always feature, where feasible, introduction of the changes through normal maintenance (painting new signs only when needed) and restocking when current inventories are exhausted (badges, correspondence). The Army HQ is very serious about cost. This has already limited the degree of change the HQ is permitting. Soldiers are taxpayers, our mission and operations are our priority.

2. DIVISIONS

All Land Force Areas were renamed to Divisions effective 12 Jul 13. There was no change to 1 Cdn Div HQ.

• The Division long names follow this example: 4th Canadian Division and the short form is 4 Cdn Div. The French translations are still being confirmed.
• Divisions will get division formation patches for wear on the left upper sleeve of the Distinctive Environmental Uniform (DEU). The current brigade formation patches will stay on the right upper sleeve. Army HQ has met with Directorate of History and Heritage/Director Soldier Systems Programme Management (DHH/DSSPM) to initiate the procurement of the patches.

• Land Force Areas did not qualify for a Flag. The new Divisions do qualify for a Camp Flag to indicate the location of the HQ.
• All Division camp flags will mirror the historic flag pattern of our WW II Divisions based on the patch colour background and a stylized maple leaf in gold. Divisions must pay for these flags non-publicly like regiments currently do. The Army HQ is requesting these flags be publicly funded. No action required at Division level for now as Army HQ will push flags after the current design consultation with Directorate of History and Heritage.

It is recommended that there be no changes to the Land Force Area badges at this time.

• Divisions may have mottos and marches. This is being discussed with the Division G1 reps under separate correspondence.

3. NCM RANK NAMES

The changes to NCM rank names will not be official until the QR&O 3.01 is amended. Since 1968, we have been informally referring to Ptes, for example, in the RCAC as Troopers but it was not official. Our NCMs lost their historic rank names in 1968. The MND has announced that the Government of Canada will restore the NCM names along with the officers rank badges. The Corps were consulted and all approved the renaming, the RCIC added more. The Army will staff a change to QR&O 3.01 in order to make it official. The end-state is:

(English / French)
RCAC/CBRC. Trooper/Cavalier will be restored for the trained Private/Soldat.
RCA/ARC. Gunner/Artilleur for the trained Private/Soldat.
RCA/ARC. Bombardier for Corporal/Caporal.
RCE/GRC. Sapper/Sapeur for the trained Private/Soldat.
RCSS/CTRC. Signalman/Signaleur for the trained Private/Soldat will be superceded by the introduction of the alternate designation Signaller/Signaleur in Ch 11 of CFP 200.
RCIC/CIRC. Guardsman/Garde for the trained Private/Soldat in the Regiments of Guards.
RCIC/CIRC. Rifleman/Carabinier for the trained Private/Soldat in regiments with historical connection to rifle regiments.
RCIC/CIRC. Fusilier for the trained Private/Soldat in regiments with historical connection to regiments of fusiliers.

The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley.
**RCEME/GEMRC.** Craftsman/Spécialiste for the trained Private/Soldat will be superceded by the introduction of the alternate designation Craftsman/Artisan in Ch 11 of CFP 200. These changes are being made to honour our soldiers and the history of the CA. There are also some alternate designations and forms of address that will be formalized by adding them to a new Ch 11 of CFP 200.

**RCA/ARC.** Master-Bombardier/Bombardier-chef can be used officially in the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery as an alternate designation/form of address for the Master-Corporal/Caporal-chef appointment.

**RCIC/CIRC.** The alternate designation/form of address ‘Colour Sergeant/Sergent Fourrier’ for Warrant Officers can be used in the Regiments of Guards.

**RCIC/CIRC.** The alternate form of address ‘Ensign/Enseigne’ for Second Lieutenants can be used in the Regiments of Guards.

**RCEME/GEMRC.** The use of ‘Artisan’ can be used for the French form of address for Spécialiste (Craftsman). For years these rank names have been used informally. They are simply being re-made formal.

### 4. OFFICER RANK INSIGNIA

The Army was not apprised of this announcement until days before the MND made it. It is not generally understood how our Army came to wear the current Navy rank. This SITREP will hopefully allow you to dispel wrong information.

#### Key Talking Points

- **'Stars and Crowns' is not British.** The officers of almost 100% of the armies on every continent of the world including China, Russia, Finland, Colombia, and including the Salvation Army and RCMP wear a system of two identifiers: (i) a star, and (ii) a national symbol...it is an international convention and customary practice so an officer from any country can negotiate on the battlefield or work in coalitions like the UN or NATO and with civilian agencies. Canada’s Army used this international customary practice from 1885, officially recognized it in 1903, but lost it in 1968.

- **Cheaper.** It costs $33.00 to tailor an officer’s DEU sleeve rank every time they get a new jacket or are promoted. It costs $5-6.00s for a pair of crowns or stars. The Army will save 80% of the costs and pay-off the initial project in just over 4 years. ‘Stars and crowns’ is going to save money for the Army not cost money.

- **DEU Slip-ons.** The Army with DHH will also approve patterns for the officers’ slip. Decisions are now being made on the extent of patterns and the extent of public funding support. Vendors are already offering rank badges and insignia to units. Some units might lean forward and we suggest Divisions advise units to not proceed until key decisions are made on (a) permissible public and non-public purchasing, (b) the extent to which units will be permitted to deviate from the CA patterns, and (c) the CA date to implement new DEU rank is announced in a CANARMYGEN. All regiments can trust that our CA HQ is working in the interest of regimental identity and speed to meet the MND intent.

- **Mess Dress.** It is recognized that a substantial number of our Army units still informally use stars and crowns on their mess dress. The current Army recommendation will be that officers with Navy bars on their mess dress will only be required to put-up stars and crowns voluntarily (grandfathered) but it will be mandatory if/when the officer is promoted. This will be further developed.

The full implementation may take considerable time to fully introduce because we were unaware of the change and there is no current stock of crowns or stars in the supply system. The Army will introduce the traditional rank system of WW II as found in Figure 14 of the 1953 CA Dress Regulations. We have already met with DHH and DSSPM for purchase discussions. DEU. The Army will buy and issue one pattern of star and crown at public expense based on one national Army/DHH approved pattern. The crowns and stars will be push pin like the NCM rank badges so the uniform is not damaged.

**Rifle and Guards Regiments.** The Army will respect the traditional prerogative of rifle regiments and Regiments of Guards to purchase their alternate colours and patterns of stars and crowns respectively on DEU, patrol, ceremonial, and mess dress. For DEU, the Army HQ has requested public funding but the outcome is not known. For DEU, rifle regiments must still apply to the chain of command and submit their alternative designs for approval by the CCA and DHH.

### Canadian Disruptive Pattern (CADPAT)

- The project will introduce stars and crowns for officers prior to mass production. Thanks to this project, there will be no new cost to put crowns and stars onto CADPAT slip-ons.

**Date of Implementation.** Stars and Crowns cannot be implemented until a meeting off the National Defence Clothing and Dress Committee endorses the design for wear on DEU uniform. The Army will likely announce two dates: (i) the date that crowns and stars are available from each officer’s Logistik Unicorp account, and (ii) the date they need to be put-up.

Continued on page 16
Whatever happened to our Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC)—Part 2

by H/COL (emeritus) Dr. Neville G. Poy OC, OStJ

As the Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the Queen’s York Rangers I wrote a report for SITREP (Vol. 66, No. 2, April–May 2006) about a research trip I had made to the UK to review the University Officers’ Training Corps (UOTC). My objective was to revive the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC). The trip and the article it turns out were just the beginning of an eight-year effort.

Shortly after the release of the SITREP article I found myself recruited by a unique and amazing organization called the Breakout Educational Network. They pledged to create a team and fund the long term effort necessary to make the cultural change required to revive the COTC. I am pleased to inform the members of the Institute and the readers of this publication that we have just made a significant step towards that goal.

NEWS RELEASE

(Halifax—July 8, 2013) Minister of Defence Peter MacKay today announced the launch of the Breakout Educational Network’s Civil Military Leadership Pilot Initiative (CML-PI) with a partnership between the University of Alberta and the Canadian Armed Forces. Beginning this September the 4 year pilot program is intended to test the concept for a national program focusing on leadership, citizenship and nation-building.

The announcement by the Hon. Peter MacKay that the Canadian Armed Forces and the University of Alberta are launching a pilot program to reconnect the university and the military lays the ground work for a contemporary version of the COTC and its sister programs the UNTD and the URTP. But this lies in a still uncertain future.

What lies in the past, leading up to the Minister’s announcement is much more certain and the members of the Institute deserve a report on the activities undertaken to get us this far. Following the publication of my findings in 2006, which were made possible with the co-operation and support of the then Minister of National Defence, The Hon. Bill Graham, and the encouragement and invaluable introductions by Colonel Michael Stevenson to his former regimental colleagues in the Green Howards, I was discouraged that this wonderful idea was not receiving the support necessary to make it a reality. The road to Ottawa is indeed paved with brilliant ideas, conceived by many well-intentioned and well-connected men and women who wish to make a contribution to Canadian public policy. Was I just another of these Don Quixotes?

At this dark point I was contacted by the Breakout Educational Network. They had just produced a well-crafted film on the powerful connection that Canada’s Reserves have with their communities and the values these soldiers and sailors contribute to the CAF, to their civilian employers and to their own social lives. CITIZEN SOLDIER it turned out had also included an interesting analysis by Brian S. MacDonald who believes that much of the disconnection between the CAF and the public in Canada can be laid to the deeply regrettable decision to withdraw the military from university campuses. This decision occurred, he commented, just as the baby-boomers were arriving to expand the size and influence of the university. The result was a whole generation of upper and middle management classes of Canadian society that were disconnected from the military.

The implications were clear to Breakout. This was now a cultural artifact. Canadians had been culturally disconnected from the military as a national institution whose value they could no longer understand or support. This perception reinforced the observations Breakout’s producers had made during the production of a five part documentary series A QUESTION OF HONOUR on Canadian defence and foreign policy. A period that was labeled the CF’s “decade of darkness” by General Rick Hillier. The Gemini nominated series had been aired by the Breakout Educational Network’s broadcast partner the ichannel (www.ichannel.com) in 2003 and had taken the Breakout producers deep into the thicket of concern over the future of the Canadian Forces. Breakout’s mandate makes it unique among television producers. Its charter is to conduct research and produce audio visual materials that will educate Canadians on matters of public policy. Its approach is unique in that it isn’t considered sufficient just to report on issues, the audience must be provided with the tools to do something about the issue as well.

Reviving the COTC fit this mandate perfectly. At a meeting with Kitson Vincent, Breakout’s main benefactor and Robert Roy its senior producer, I aired my discouragement. Vincent who is a venture capitalist and investor with a long interest in public policy entrepreneurship immediately pointed out the futility of my quixotic approach. What was needed to achieve success was a mobilized public that politicians and

H/COL (emeritus), Dr. Neville G. Poy, OC, OStJ, MD, CM, FRCS(C), FACS, is the Honorary Colonel (emeritus) of The Queen’s York Rangers, 1st American Regiment. A graduate of McGill University, he practiced his specialty of General surgery and Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery as a Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons of Canada in Toronto until his retirement in 1995. Dr. Poy was the Director of the first burn unit in Canada. He is a former President of the Ontario Medical Association, Plastic Surgery Section and is a Visiting Professor to McGill University and the University of Toronto.
hence bureaucrats could only ignore at their peril. To build that public demand required an organization that citizen's could invest their interest and involvement. But to build that citizen based interest first required an organization that was as adept at promoting and telling its own story as well as theirs. Breakout would build that organization if I would commit to returning to the UK to re-tell the story of my investigation of the UOTC program at Oxford and Cambridge universities for a documentary film.

Two years later that film was released as FOR QUEEN & COUNTRY and broadcast by the iChannel. Also broadcast was NO COUNTRY FOR YOUNG MEN a film on the lost values the COTC and its sister programs the UNTD and the URTP provided to the career successes of a wide range of prominent Canadians. Both films are high quality examples of the documentary art. They are persuasive arguments for the revival of officer training without the failures of falling into propaganda or the feel of an industrial video.

The release of these films had an immediate impact. Discussion about the project ceased to be ethereal and diffuse. There was now something concrete in the representation of people's experiences that provided Breakout and its now growing board of advisors with an argument that transcended print and the intellect. It impacted upon you emotionally – it grabbed at your heart. “Why can't our students have something like this?”

In October 2009 the Ottawa premiere of NO COUNTRY FOR YOUNG MEN was held as part of a symposium on Parliament Hill—Leadership, Citizenship and Nation-Building for our Times – Is There a Role for Officer Training in Universities? Room 200 of the West Block, the largest committee room available was required to hold the over 200 participants there to listen to a distinguished panel and discussion of the subject. The event, dinner and screening was co-hosted by Breakout along with the Ottawa “Old Oars” of the UNTD Association. With unequivocal support the participants endorsed the concept we were now calling the Canadian National Leadership Program (CNLP).

Among the audience of Senators, MP’s and their staffs, military and business representatives, students and university administrators was Ernie Ingles, Vice-Provost of the University of Alberta which was developing a significant institutional interest in the still inchoate project. As a result of an earlier screening of FOR QUEEN & COUNTRY to the annual meeting of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) the Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) were able to raise the matter of reviving the COTC at a meeting with the University of Alberta. The outcome was an invitation to Breakout to pitch the concept with the sponsorship of the Strathcona’s to the leading administrators of the university.

The result of these discussions and the representation present at the Ottawa Symposium, was a glossy limited circulation brochure published by the University of Alberta titled A University-Based, Officer Training Pilot Program At The University Of Alberta that included a DVD disc of NO COUNTRY FOR YOUNG MEN. The bilingual brochure of 18 pages included pictures of the Alberta COTC program from the past with a U of A/COTC Cap badge highlighting the cover. (Each university unit had its own cap badge and a collection exists in the RCMI museum) The administration's objective was to have the university prepared to negotiate with the military when, and if, Breakout was able to deliver the military.

So behind the scenes, Breakout’s hard work continued with introductions to other university presidents and explanatory meetings with senior officers none of whom had been old enough to attend university in the 1960’s when the programs were cancelled. This made our pitch an uphill battle. The idea sounded nice but where was the money going to come from? We launched into meetings with Cabinet Ministers and MP’s, again preparing the ground for the day when we could find a military champion.

In November 2011 Breakout was called to testify about the CNLP before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence Chaired by the Hon. Pamela Wallin and the Hon. Romeo Dallaire. Reference to this hearing was made in the Committee’s Interim Report Answering the Call: The Future Role of Canada’s Primary Reserves and in its recommendation that the “DND/CF should consider re-establishing a military presence on the campuses of educational institutions, as used to be the case with the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps. The Canadian National Leadership Program provides a private-public partnership model for the training of Canada’s future leaders.”

Last June our military champion emerged in the guise of Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, the Army Commander. The University of Alberta and the Land Forces Western Area (LFW A) centered on the Edmonton Garrison had made progress on discussions between themselves about the possibilities of a pilot program, but high level support in NDHQ was needed to move forward. General Devlin provided that support and in less than a year, with some legalistic delays intruding, a Memorandum of Understanding was passed by the Armed Forces Council for approval. The Minister’s office had shown early interest in the concept and once all the legal hurdles were passed, they were eager to make the above announcement official.

Now known as the Civil Military Leadership Pilot Initiative (CMLPI), I hope that advocates of the COTC and its traditions will understand that we are beginning from scratch. The UOTC in the UK and the ROTC in the US have had long histories of bureaucratic accounting and legal precedents to work with. In Canada in order to get the pilot approved we have had to work with what was possible given the budgetary reality. This has meant that participants in the CMLPI will join the Reserve Regiments that are part of the Edmonton

Continued on page 8
Egypt: Revolution, Counter-Revolution, or Chaos?

by John Thompson

What will tomorrow bring for Egypt? On 3 July 2013, Egyptians overthrew their elected government when the military backed a massive street demonstration in Cairo. President Mohammed Morsi was arrested and replaced on an interim basis by Judge Adly Mansour.¹

A week later, the Egyptian military outlined plans for a rapid return to civilian rule, secured $8 billion in badly needed funding, and is now seeking the arrest of the remaining leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.² Given the Brotherhood’s call for armed insurrection and civil war, and clashes that have left dozens of dead, will the crackdown be enough to restore a measure of stability or will it guarantee an end to it?

On the face of things, it would seem that 3 July was a blow at democracy as the first elected government in Egypt had been deposed and that this had undone the fruits of the “Arab Spring” and the revolution in Cairo in February 2011. The counter-argument might run that the Muslim Brotherhood would not form a truly democratic government and that the autocratic ways of President Morsi and Brotherhood supporters constituted a threat to true democracy.

Either argument can be easily dismissed, but both might be fundamentally irrelevant.

In a world dominated by social media, the internet, and instant transmission of news—accompanied by video and photographs—almost everyone with a modern cellphone can be a news-source. We can follow dramatic events minute-by-minute. Unfortunately, we seldom pause long enough to do more than the most rudimentary and immediate analysis.

Egypt is struggling over whether it is to be a Muslim country or an Islamic nation and the distinction between the two is far too complex to be easily satisfied, and the debate—as seen in Afghanistan, Algeria, and elsewhere—can be a very deadly one.

The events of July 2013 were not a second revolution as some broadcasters suggest. Rather they are an additional stage of the same revolution begun in 2011, and the fundamental causes of that initial unrest have yet to be fully addressed. The Egyptian revolution is still ongoing and may be far from finished. Moreover, revolutions can go straight to the heart of weak or flawed institutions in a society and can bring it mercilessly crashing down. In the case of Egypt, this could bring on a catastrophe with the potential to cost millions of lives.

Anybody with an elementary knowledge of history can recall where revolutions are capable of going without cracking a book open. For example:

- The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 China seemingly lasted for four months. It did bring down the Manchu Dynasty. Yet the celebration of the birth of the Republic of China was premature—the baby was neither healthy nor strong. Sun Yat-Sen had nothing but violent unrest from factions and warlords, and two years after his death in 1925, we saw the beginning of a savage civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists that took 24 years and unknown millions of lives to resolve.
- While the French celebrate Bastille Day as the start of their revolution in 1789, they did not have a stable government until the Directory took power in 1795. Even this arrangement was toppled in 1799 when Napoleon headed off a return to Jacobin extremism with a coup that led to his own position as First Consul, his last stop on the road to becoming emperor several years later.
- The American Revolution might have begun in 1775, but they did not have a normal government until the Constitution was drafted in 1787, four years after the Revolutionary War ended.
- The Russian Revolution of 1917 kicked off in February 1917 and the Bolsheviks seized power in November of that same year, but it really took until 1922 before Russia was stable... for a given value of stability where the solution to famine, insurrection, and unrest was all-encompassing police terror backed by the Gulag system.

One could go on but the point is that revolutions are seldom simple, or without risk, and there is no guarantee that stability will soon return. Egypt, however, is in as fragile a political situation as Russia and China were, with the added concern that the country is largely incapable of feeding itself and has a fragile economic and physical infrastructure. A fundamental breakdown of order might yield devastating results.

Egypt 101

Egypt has 5,000 years of recorded history and a rich archeological record that predates that. However, almost all of its people—in the past and the present—live in a long narrow swath of cultivated land running through the Sahara Desert along the Nile valley and in the Nile delta.

Population density has always been an issue. Between 1996 and 2013, the mean population density has shifted from 59.5 to 81.3 people per square kilometre, mostly concentrated along the Nile.³ The overall population is 84.3 million, over half of whom are under the age of 25. Youth unemployment is a severe problem. Cairo, with over 9 million residents, is also

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infamously overcrowded and congested. Overcrowding and high unemployment can make for exciting politics particularly among young men.

The British Army spent decades in Egypt between the 1880s and the 1940s, and one of the slang terms that came back was bucksheesh (which also made it into the Canadian military lexicon). This is a corruption of the term baksheesh, originally a Persian term that spread through much of the Islamic world. The term’s original sense implied a small gift or tip for services. However, it largely implies an operating principle of the Egyptian economy—as almost all but the most sheltered of tourists who have visited the country can attest. Still, the cheerful avarice of taxi-drivers and tour guides is matched right up to the highest levels of commerce and industry.

Economic corruption was a fundamental weakness of the Egyptian economy for decades and remains a major problem. The corruption was compounded with extremely convoluted and complex business regulations, and a separate—and slightly more efficient—military based economy. While there is widespread recognition of the need for urgent economic reform, the inertia that resists reform is formidable.

To compound matters, Egypt’s economy was already a poor performer before the 2011 Revolution and the continuing flight of capital after Mubarak’s fall has pulled billions of dollars out of Egypt. The country’s vast numbers of poor could well be ready to riot again if food prices rise once more to the point where they were at in February 2011. Much of the country’s slender financial resources have been earmarked over the last two years to subsidize food prices and a global hike in prices would ignite unrest all over again.

According to USDA statistics (usually the best standard for assessing food production globally), Egypt relies on imported food despite the saliency of agriculture. In 2002, Egypt produced 6.13 million tons of wheat and imported 6,944; by 2011 production had grown to 8.4 million tons and imports had risen to 11.65 million tons. In other words, despite a decade of intense effort to expand production in the face of a rapidly growing population, domestic production had slipped from an ability to meet 47% of demand to only being able to meet 41%. A similar situation exists for maize and other staples. Egypt’s ability to feed itself is under severe strain.

Egypt’s port capacity is also under severe strain. Their cargo capacity is very nearly at maximum use with 68% of all cargo coming through Alexandria, El Dekheila, Damietta, and Port Said. These four vital points are closely clustered all at the mouth of the Nile. In a civil conflict, a party that controls the ports will have the ability to rapidly induce hunger in other parts of the country. But then again, Egypt itself is a long linear country stretched out along the banks of the Nile River. Its internal transportation infrastructure will always be acutely vulnerable to disruption.

The fundamental weaknesses of Egypt persist because even the Muslim Brotherhood did not get around to really undermining the military and the civil service—the real rule.

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**COTC—continued from page 6**

Garrison and be badged to those units. This means that the candidates for the program will have to pass through the Recruiting system and meet all of its requirements including potential service which may dissuade some participants, but I hope not. The objective was to get a concrete program up and running so that its success would lead to a broader program involving the other services and other universities. By utilizing the existing recruiting system and regimental organization, the liability and budget issues related to pay and staffing were resolved. The coherence of a separate University of Alberta unit is challenged but there will be opportunities for the participants to blend in exercises planned during the school terms and during the focused summer training.

There is also the added opportunity of adding curriculum to the program that will provide participants with classroom connections. The CMLPI again differs from the old COTC model by offering its students the opportunity to earn a Certificate in Civil Military Leadership to accompany the degree program of their choice. 15 or so credit courses will be required to be completed in a variety of subjects during the 4 years needed for an Honours degree in Science or Arts, along with 3 years of the Basic Officer Training Course conducted as a paid extra curricular activity during the school year and on the summer break. Completion of the Basic Officer Training Course qualifies the participant for 2nd Lieutenant’s commission. The CMLPI blends aspects of the UK and Canadian COTC model, with the US ROTC and the Australian reserve officer training model at University Regiments into a unique made-in-Canada model reflecting our realities and needs.

There is still some heavy lifting to do to make the CMLPI into a national, all service, program that will deliver “leadership, citizenship and nation-building” once again to Canadian campuses and students. The Breakout Educational Network is committed, as am I, to seeing this become a reality. We have made a good start and I hope that we have earned your support for our work in the future.

With my thanks and grateful appreciation, to Mr. Robert Roy and the Breakout Educational Network for their diligent effort and help over the years with the realization of a promising future in sight.

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The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.
ers of Egypt since King Farouk was toppled in 1952. Before he became president, Nasser was the Army colonel who led the 1952 coup. Sadat had been a junior to Nasser but had also been an Army officer during the coup. Mubarak’s titles include Air Chief Marshal—head of the Egyptian Air Force.

While the current leader of the Egyptian military, Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi has not appointed himself president, as the leader of a successful coup, the new interim president will pay close heed to him.

Al-Sisi represents some of the complexities of Egyptian political life. A young infantry officer (he was commissioned in 1977), Al-Sisi had risen to become the junior member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt when he was selected by Morsi to replace the head of the Armed Forces in August 2012. His reputation is that he is ‘religious’ but not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his selection may have been a compromise by Morsi. Al-Sisi was also popular with the Saudis and tolerated by the US, and his appointment might have been a nod to Egypt’s two most critical sources of external funding and support.

As for Al-Sisi, his background and behaviour suggests a stronger commitment to the more secular model of Egypt than to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic one.

Densely populated and in a precarious economic situation with a highly inefficient economy and civil service, Egypt could have certainly benefited from a sweeping revolution… but the revolutionary faction that gained power were part of the problem and not the solution.

**Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood**

*Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law, the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.*

—motto of the Muslim Brotherhood

In the debate over the nature of Arab and Muslim societies, one of the key players has been the Muslim Brotherhood. It has no ambivalence about the issue since its founding; its commitment to the creation of Islamic institutions has been unwavering.

The Muslim Brotherhood has been the opposition to all Egyptian governments since it was founded in 1928. Nasser purged the group and executed the Brotherhood’s main ideological influence, Sayyid Qutb, in 1966. Terrorist organizations created as Brotherhood fronts killed Anwar Sadat in 1981 and nearly got Mubarak later. The Brotherhood is patient, conspiratorial, and deeply rooted.

The Brotherhood can be found throughout the Islamic world and is already deeply entrenched in Western Europe and North America, where they are assiduous about infiltrating existing institutions.

The Muslim Brotherhood holds the Quran and the body of Sharia law derived from it to be supreme source of all aspects of family, social and political life. No other legal code or ideal can equal it – which puts Western notions of democracy in a secondary place.

For example, the Brotherhood is fundamentally opposed to the idea that a woman’s vote can have the same value, as a man’s, or that a non-Muslim’s franchise and legal rights can be equal to those of a Muslim.

While the Muslim Brotherhood might (and frequently does) declare their commitment to democratic values, this commitment must be understood as being secondary to their core values. In short, as many a Fascist or Marxist demonstrated in the twentieth century, a declaration of support for the idea of “one man, one vote” would be a temporary tactic to allow the acquisition of power as opportunity allows. A more accurate idea of their participation in a democratic system might be construed as being “one man, one vote—once”.

The Muslim Brotherhood was slow to emerge into the open in the 2011 aftermath of the protests that toppled Hosni Mubarak, but they realized they were the most influential and best organized of the myriad new parties that became involved in the three sets of elections of 2011 and 2012 (the 2011 Parliamentary, 2012 Shura Council and 2012 Presidential elections). While the Party failed to win a majority of the votes in the Parliamentary and Shura elections, they scored higher returns than any other party did.

Like the Nazis in Germany in 1932-33, the Muslim Brotherhood could not quite secure enough votes to win power in the election. However, they had the biggest bloc of voter support in 2011 and 2012. The second largest voting bloc was the Salafists, who were ideologically akin to the Brotherhood in their own commitment to Sharia law. Hitler’s Nazis got 33% of the popular vote in the November 1932 elections and this was enough to make him the leader of a coalition in January and—democratically—become the Chancellor of Germany. Morsi’s appeal to the Salafists resulted in a successful Egyptian coalition of undemocratically minded Islamists.

Again, like the Nazis of Germany in the early 1930s, the Brotherhood has the best organization, the most ruthless ideology, and all manner of other assets. They are deeply entrenched in universities and away from the inner core of the major cities. However, to achieve power they had to form a bloc with other parties and formed a common cause with the Salafists – who are also committed to an Islamic vision of Egypt.

Mohammed Morsi was the Muslim Brotherhood candidate for president—albeit the Brotherhood adopted the name of “the Freedom and Justice Party” for its political front. On 24 June 2012, he was elected as president with 51.73% of the vote. The conduct of Morsi’s presidency contained a whole series of mixed messages. He had token positions for Coptic Christians and other minorities in his government—even while Brothers and Salafists were busy tormenting the Copts throughout much of the country. He kept running into opposition from the civil service and military, but still sacked a number of senior military and security officers… but promoted Al-Sisi to head of the Armed Forces.
Morsi also gave many signals about a desire to ensure a stronger place for Sharia law in the new Constitution, and for a strengthened position for the presidency with reduced judicial oversight. His messages to the international community were equally mixed, but an anxious Egyptian press continued to monitor Morsi’s involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists—finding ample evidence of his continued adherence to Muslim Brotherhood doctrines. Indeed, several senior staffers at Al Jazeera—the Arab news network—recently resigned given the partisan pro-Morsi slant taken by their editors.12

Dimensions of the July 3rd Revolution

The protests that greeted the anniversary of Morsi’s presidency represented a broad cross-section of those elements that had also long opposed political and economic conditions in Egypt. The lead organization “Kefaya” is the unofficial name for the Egyptian Movement for Change—a domestic opposition group formed in 2004. In June 2013, they formed a new coalition called Tamarod (‘rebellion’) and organized national demonstrations for 30 June against Morsi.

Intellectuals who feared the Muslim Brotherhood, Copts, secularized Liberals, military leaders, and others soon joined in. The Muslim Brotherhood staged counter-protests and violence flared. Nevertheless, they do not seem to have been quite as ruthless as their potential indicated. Moreover, despite some dire threats to Coptic Christians to stay out of the protests, the Brotherhood was soon on the defensive when demonstrators sacked its national headquarters in Cairo on 1 July.13 Gunfire at an anti-Morsi protest killed eight people that same day, but a pro-Morsi demonstration on 2 July was shot up with 16 deaths and several hundred injuries.

In any event, the military was soon safeguarding the anti-Morsi protests and called for his resignation. When the deadline was reached on 3 July, the coup went into effect.

Morsi was the first elected President of Egypt, and was toppled by a military coup. However, one could be reminded that Adolf Hitler came to power through largely constitutional means in 1932; or that any number of other dictators through-out the twentieth century often entered power through legal constitutional means. The acquisition of power is a very different issue from the retention of power.

Was Morsi working to ensure to undermine Egypt’s fragile democracy and clear the way for a democratic façade while implementing a Muslim Brotherhood agenda? Enough Egyptians think that he was, and made their opposition clear.

Democratic government does not depend merely upon elections alone, but also on the measures that balance, curb and check power between institutions and elements in society. Morsi might have been elected, but Egypt was far from becoming a democratic society, and their first democratic leader might have prevented them from ever achieving it.

The protest and the coup might – just maybe – turn out to be a victory for democracy in the end.

Yet the risk of internal warfare remains high. In the week since the coup, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists have declared themselves fundamentally opposed to it and there have been several violent armed clashes. The military is currently rounding up Muslim Brotherhood leaders, but there are whole neighbourhoods in Cairo and communities elsewhere in Egypt that could easily revert to being ‘No-Go’ areas under Brotherhood control without much effort.

The situation in Egypt remains immensely fragile for additional reasons. The events of 2011-2013 do not constitute separate revolutions so much as they might best be considered a single revolutionary era. The circumstances that initially generated the revolution largely remain and could force more unrest easily enough.

The ‘Great Recession’ triggered by the global financial events of 2008 is far from over, as those who watch financial news around the world can readily attest. Egypt needs to undertake major economic reform in a time when all economies are fragile. Capital for investment remains scarce, Egypt’s own financial reserves have been weakened, trade remains weak, and unemployment remains high. The events of the last two years have also robbed Egypt of much of its income from tourism. The recent infusion of $8 billion from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates might buy some time.

The military and the civil service remain in place, and their inefficiencies and habits of corruption are what sapped much of Egypt’s economic strength in the first place. Major reforms are necessary and whatever government appears as a successor to Morsi is not likely to challenge the institutions on which its survival must rely.

Food prices continue to fluctuate and remain high, but —good news for once—global prices appear to be trending downwards at the moment.14 The February 2011 peak in the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s price indexes has not been reached since then, and food stability directly correlates to political stability—as revolution after revolution over the last several centuries can readily attest.

However, the people celebrating in Cairo on 3 and 4 July represented the urban elites, religious minorities, secular liberals and the Egyptian establishment. The Muslim Brotherhood and their Salafist allies are plentiful out in the suburbs, smaller cities, and the countryside.

One can again be reminded of the role of Blackshirts in Italy, Brownshirts in Nazi Germany, Chavezistas in Venezuela, and so many others who had their own views of whom they might see as sissified, big-talking, city-dwelling fancy-pants and their foreign ideas. If push does come to shove, one can guess—based on so many bitter lessons in history—as to who might prevail when one side shows up with Twitter accounts and cellphones and the other arrives with axe-handles and pockets full of rocks. If the conflict escalates to truck bombs or gun battles, the same dynamic might hold.
There is Nothing New under the Sun

by LCol Scott Smith CD

War, one of Man's oldest companions, has taken many forms and many lives. Throughout, however, the obvious goal of any contesting party is to win. The prize can take many forms; simple territorial expansion to gain resources; improved security from one's neighbours; revenge, even perhaps something more ephemeral such as the imposition of a political ideal or system of belief. Whatever the cause and whatever the desired outcome it is axiomatic that political and military leaders must preserve their forces relative to those of the enemy in order to gain victory. To accomplish this preservation two main forms of protection have developed: separation by physical means such as armour, fortifications and obstacles, and separation by distance which, due to the limited nature of the human body, has necessarily been focused on technological innovation. This article focuses on the latter form, beginning with the basic motivation behind attempts to ensure force viability by increasing the range between combatants. Moving forward it will be shown that at various stages of development, invention has been a powerful lure, drawing in leaders both political and military with the promise of a quick victory. Finally, we will conclude that the very desire to preserve military forces through separation has had the paradoxical effect of endangering the entire populace.

It is difficult to kill another human. This point is elucidated in Dave Grossman's book, On Killing. He spends many pages describing the psychological factors that impair one normal person's ability to kill another person. His main point is that the closer one gets to the adversary, the more one is forced to see him as a real person and the harder it becomes to do the actual killing. To compensate for this, armies have developed ways to condition men to kill. From endless battle drills in ancient times to modern human-shaped targets, men must be trained to overcome their natural aversion to killing. Another way to solve this problem is to create weapons that increase the separation between combatants. This makes it easier to kill more of the enemy with progressively less misgivings as the distance increases. According to traditional logic, if a tool allows you to kill more of your enemy, it must be an improvement. From our earliest ancestors we have understandably sought to gain an advantage over our enemies.

However, due to the ineffectiveness of early ranged weapons, soldiers had no choice but to meet face-to-face. The very idea of a fair fight likely developed from the unfortunate need to make soldiers feel better about killing each other at close range. Entire cultures have revolved around the idea of the soldier as an honourable fellow acclaimed by society for doing its dirty work. In the Iliad, Achilles is lionized as the archetypal warrior while Paris is made to look the coward because he preferred the bow. According to Patrick Lin, this affliction carried on into the middle ages when, in 1139 the Pope banned the use of the crossbow because of its amazing lethality in the hands of barely trained peasants. The crossbow upset the social order and demonstrated the advantage that could be gained by separating one's forces from an enemy. As John Keegan writes, later at Agincourt the English archers employed their weapons as dispassionate technicians because the indirect nature of their trajectory made it easy for them to avoid the connection between their actions and French deaths. While, in the interim, the ascendancy of gunpowder finally made it impossible to ignore the lethal advantage of separation, we will move on to more modern times. Grossman found that soldiers, sailors and airmen who killed their enemies from long range, particularly with indirect means, were quite willing to engage in this destructive behaviour without hesitation and without remorse. He notes specifically that, "Even in the case of the individuals who dropped the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki...there are no indications of psychological problems." This extreme case, where airmen killed close to 100 000 individuals in each city must be considered a triumph of the long efforts to de-humanize human targets. The advantage of moving friendly forces out of range can be seen in many other examples, from WWII aircraft attacking submarines and sub pens with impunity, to the development of indirect artillery in WWI, which without adequate counter-battery fire, effectively removed bombardiers from immediate danger.

The admirable desire to increase the range between forces, making it easier to kill and easier to believe in the safety provided by distance has a destructive and unfortunate corollary, in what Robert Leonhard calls the, "Religion of Firepower." He describes the seductive call of the next great thing, that weapon system that will finally dominate the battlefield so quickly and effectively that friendly troops need not endure the rigours of combat. Leonhard notes Grossman's observations on the aforementioned reluctance to kill and says, "firepower —with its eternal promise of increasing the distance between combatants to a morally comfortable scale—repeatedly captures the adulation of peoples shocked and offended by the latest war." The idea of firepower dominance has so enraptured leaders seeking an easy solution that it has developed its own mythology. James Tritten posits that although changes

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in doctrine such as the employment of pike squares ended
the age of metal body armour, "folklore persists in crediting
firearms with the knight's demise." The often zealous propo-
nents of new technology invariably clash with traditionalists
who claim as Clausewitz did that, "condition of the mind has
always the most decisive influence on the forces employed
in war." Traditionalists contend that it is men not machines
that win wars, often making similar outlandish claims about
manpower as technology enthusiasts do firepower. Guderian
expressed his contempt for those blinded to technology when
he said, "Incredibly enough one is still accounted a heretic if
one dares to assail the sacred cow of Infantry shock action, as
invested in the bayonet." A whole-hearted believer in the util-
ity of the tank, Guderian compares technology's value to that of
the moral, saying, "The most noble sacrifice, the glowing
enthusiasm and energetic command – all proved unavailing."

As Geoffrey Parker writes, traditionalists in Maurice
of Nassau's time, "dismissed gunpowder as a passing fad." By
comparison, S.L.A. Marshall is very critical of the blindness
in US planners and politicians in exaggerating the potential
of air and armour to the detriment of the infantry before and
during WWII. He rails against their obsession with techno-
logical solutions, saying that, "The belief in a push-button
war is fundamentally a fallacy." The appeal of the silver bullet
solutions, as Leonhard calls them, has a long history in mod-
ern warfare. Sherman believed that breech loaders would,
"reduce battles to short, quick, decisive conflicts." During
World War I artillery enthusiasts trumpeted the revolutionary
nature of indirect fire, however, "Artillery's ability to create a
moonscape on the Western Front failed to achieve the desired
strategic effect of ending the war."1 The Japanese developed
super-battleships and the Mitsubishi Zero as part of their plan
for, "a short war of annihilation"2 in the Pacific. Although all
of these attempts and many more promised a quick victory
with little loss of life through extended range, none of them
delivered. Parker echoes Leonhard when he describes the
overzealous marketing of technology by its inventors. This
leaves vulnerable politicians, "anxious to win decisive results
quickly" eagerly handing over their money for the weapon
to end all wars. An example of this tendency comes from the
early history of the tank.

Writing before WWII, Guderian describes the enthu-
siasm that armed forces have expressed for the tank's many
excellences. While politician and generals alike saw the tank as
a revolutionary solution to the positional style of warfare that
characterized WWI, Guderian condemns them for avoiding
any discussion of tank versus tank operations. He highlights
the zealous blindness that allows leaders to employ a system
without a full understanding of its implications. Sadly this
blindness continues while ranges increase, as when Cohen
refers to future battles as, "a spectator sport...[where] the kind
of sacrifice and effort that lit national conflagrations will no
longer exist." The belief in technology to provide a solution
even takes James Stavridis into the realm of institutional blas-
phemy with his prophecy that modern sensors and precision
guided munitions will provide such good intelligence and such
effective stand-off that they will be capable of, "dissipating if
not eliminating the fog of war." These well-intentioned efforts
continue to fail and in the long run may endanger the society
they hope to protect.

It is reasonable to suggest that any healthy adult has a
well-developed and rational survival instinct. Well-adjusted
people do not seek death nor do they invite circumstances
which might invite it without good reason.3 Lin points out
that individuals and societies choose to avoid deadly conflict
whenever possible; that humans are naturally peaceful, not
because we are intrinsically opposed to violence but rather that
peace entails a much lower chance of death and is therefore a
rational end. Just as troops must be conditioned to kill, they
must also be conditioned to control their fear of death. For
this reason early armies such as those of the Egyptians and
Romans were drilled and cajoled by their leaders to inure them
to the stresses of war. They conducted long hours of training and placed veterans in the rear ranks, to calm newer soldiers’ fears and to aggressively re-motivate when required.

As William Tecumseh Sherman said, “All men naturally shrink from pain and danger, and only incur their risk from some higher motive, or from habit.” It should stand to reason therefore, that rather than conditioning its forces to fear, an army should seek to remove itself as much as possible form the source of fear. This leads to technologies that increase the range of attack. Strawser points out the fallacy in the thinking that led to the idea of the fair fight. He contends that combatants do not owe each other any concession to equality based on the concept of military honour and that it is illogical to avoid using a system (UAVs is this particular case) that gives one’s own troops a better chance of survival. Strawser compares this idea to the thought of a police officer ensuring that he keeps himself on an equal footing with criminals. This duty to one’s own troops is an important point.

Whether from the simple logic of preserving combat ability, or from a genuine concern for soldiers’ welfare it makes sense to do everything possible to reduce their exposure to the possibility of death. Thus the Syracusans halted their ground assault and showered Demosthenes’ cornered forces with missiles to avoid unnecessary friendly casualties at the moment of victory. Some criticize the illusion of safety provided by range. For example, at Agincourt the English archers were separated geographically and psychologically from the French knights. Even so, they were provided with various protective measures to guard against destruction if distance alone should prove, as it did, insufficient. Each archer wore a sword and shield and was provided with a stake to ward off cavalry assault. The cavalry’s speed made it possible for them to negate the archers’ range advantage, forcing them to shelter behind a hastily replanted forest of stakes. While Keegan is quite clear that the physical separation provided by the stakes saved the day for the archers, it is also clear that the archers ferocious return to fighting once the moment of fear had passed was facilitated by their ability to engage from a distance. The archers were able to see the knights off from the relative safety of the stakes while their friends ran out to dispatch those unhorsed knights who had lost their advantage.

In modern Western armies where casualty levels are scrutinized and agonized over at all levels military, political and civilian it is seen as important to develop technologies that obviate friendly casualties. Further, if the apprehension of death is decreased, then fear is decreased. Decreasing the danger of war puts a discount on the value of the traditional courageous warrior and makes less courageous potential combatants available to the state or actor. Although Sherman opined that, “Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster” a reduced chance of dying certainly makes military service a more attractive option, preferable to the ‘zombie’ conscripts of bygone days. Phelan extends this argument into the information age in his discussion of Fourth Generation Warfare. He describes an electronic battlefield where all citizens can play a direct role in the conflict, while remaining practically anonymous and, “beyond the reach of governments and military forces.” While it remains to be seen how long this impervious armour of the internet will last, at the moment the instant nature of cyberwar makes it possible to influence global politics and economies on a scale and at such a remove as never before possible. This development represents a culmination of the attempts by the bow, the gun and the drone to separate combatants from their targets.

Thus we arrive at the ironic but inevitable conclusion that efforts to insulate soldiers from death, innovators have made every citizen a potential target. Lucas has noted the unfortunate reality that the immense stand-off provided by the internet can make cyberwar seem more like entertainment than a real destructive process. It desensitizes people to the effects of war and makes it more likely that they will participate from the comfort of their homes.

Increasing the range between combatants to the point where they can influence each other from deep within their own homelands sets a dangerous precedent. Just as a hospital used for warlike purposes becomes a legitimate target, so to will the houses and workplaces of citizens engaged in cyberwar become legitimate targets for enemy reprisals.

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Notes

3 Whether the thrill of engaging in activities such as ‘extreme sports’ is a good reason to invite death will have to wait for another day. This article focuses on the apprehension of immediate and likely death in combat.
In Iran, Government By Murder Won’t Change With a New President

by John Thompson and Sara Akrami

Authoritarian governments almost always use a culture of terror and violence to intimidate or eliminate their opponents. The Islamic Republic of Iran is no different in this regard, no matter who might be the “face” of the regime as president. Real power has always been held by the Supreme Leader of the Council of Ayatollahs who run the president, and they use murder as an instrument of governance and statecraft.

The assassination of political dissidents inside and outside Iran has two major objectives for the Supreme Leader. Because the heart of the Iranian government is the Council of Islamic Jurists, opposition means one is both “anti-revolutionary” and an apostate -- literally “corrupted on earth.” Therefore, the murder of opponents is justified on both grounds.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has a significant role in pursuing the Iranian government’s terrorist goals. The IRGC is an armed force that was formed by Ayatollah Khomeini to preserve the “Revolution” and its “achievements.” The two major organizations involved in assassination of Iranian political activists were the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

Lebanon’s Hezbollah organization was originally created and trained by the IRGC, which armed it as well. Accordingly, Iran bears responsibility for all the terrorism committed by Hezbollah over the last 30 years, in addition to its own appalling human rights record.

The IRGC is not just a political paramilitary group like Hitler’s SS or Stalin’s NKVD; it also has its own economy and runs contraband activities to help fund itself. It consists of:

1. 31 Paramilitary “Corps” distributed close to the cities, which get first call on conscripts and new military equipment
2. The Basij Militia: a paramilitary police force of 90,000 that are the ideological police of the Iranian Revolution
3. The Ansar ol Mahdi Force: It provides bodyguards for senior members of the regime and controls the nuclear program and the rocket force
4. The Qods Force which plots and cooperates with terrorists around the world.

Iranian officials claim terrorism is strange to them but they have facilitated a lot of it. Victims include Shahriar Shafigh, the Shah of Iran’s nephew, assassinated in 1979 in Paris; and Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a former Iranian press attaché in the U.S. under the Shah of Iran, assassinated in 1980 in Washington. In 1984, General Gholam Ali Oveisi, the former military governor of Tehran, and his brother Hossein Oveisi were assassinated in Paris. Dr. Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, along with two party members, Abdollah Ghaderi and Fazel Rasoul, were killed in 1989 in Vienna. The assassins were sent by the former Iranian President, Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Dr. Kazem Rajavi, Iran’s first ambassador to the United Nations headquarters in Geneva after the 1979 Revolution and a member of Iran’s National Council of Resistance was killed in 1990 in Switzerland. The Swiss investigators discovered that 13 Iranian embassy officials were involved.

In 1991, Dr. Abdol Rahman Boroumand, a founder of the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance, was stabbed to death in the lobby of his apartment by agents of the Iranian government in Paris. Three months later, former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and his assistant Soroush Katibeh were also stabbed to death in Paris. Ali Vakili Rad, one of the assassins of Bakhtiar and Katibeh was given a life sentence by a Paris court but the French government released Rad in 2006 and let him to return to Iran.

During the early 1980s, Bakhtiar was unsuccessfully targeted by a Lebanese terrorist group led by Anis Naghash. Naghash is currently one of the commanders of the IRGC. In 1992, Fereydoun Farrokhzad, the Iranian poet and singer who used to criticize the Iranian government and Ayatollah Khomeini, was stabbed to death in Germany.

Another terrorist attack by Iranian government agents occurred in a Berlin restaurant in Berlin in 1992; Sadegh Sharafkandi (the Secretary General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran), Fattah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan, and Nouri Dekordi were murdered. In April 10, 1997, a Berlin court announced the assassination was plotted by Ali Khameini (Iran Supreme Leader), Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (then Iran’s president), and Ali Fallahian (Iran’s former minister of intelligence). This attack was coordinated by Iran’s secret services in Bonn -- which were instrumental in enabling terrorist attacks against Iranian dissidents across Europe during the late 1980s and 1990s.

Iran might have a new president today, but sponsorship of terrorism will remain as one of the key tools of the state.

Special thanks to Parviz Dastmalchi, the survivor of Berlin Mykonos Restaurant assassinations of 1992.

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Dear Editor:

I recently read Richard Betts’ article on deterrence in the Sitrep and found it interesting and informative with one glaring exception. The sections on China, left me bewildered with deficiencies in logic and in factual matters. Permit me to itemize:

**Beijing is a threat**

When assessing a threat, surely China will take heed of Sun Tzu’s dicta…that the best war is one that does not have to be fought. Further, a war can only be won by knowing both the enemy and one’s own forces. In this day and age, I would hazard that China is possibly better informed about potential enemy forces than anyone else’s (and I refer to mental as well as physical strengths.). If no potential invasions of home lands are on the books, I wonder about the mental preparedness for military action by either the West or China. China is not psychologically ready to take on the US and I can hardly see domestic US enthusiasm for yet another war, particularly in the face of previous government justifications (and dubious achievement of objectives) for military actions.

My immediate question then is a threat how and to whom? Militarily, China has not launched a major invasion of another country since the ill-fated excursions of Siam and before that Japan. Further, when we talk of Beijing do we mean the government or the nation? Previous military attempts were launched by the ruling classes that with the exception of the Ming Dynasty were all members of the nomadic and warlike northern tribes. The Indian border issues was hardly a major military issue but a localized border dispute of the type that the US has launched many times to its North and South.

China defends its possessions…even if others argue as to the validity of such possessions. Within those possessions China acts to ensure peace among the majority of the local inhabitants or to protect legitimate minorities. To argue against such actions is to display ignorance of Chinese values and philosophies (and I do not refer to the rapidly weakening socialist values of the last century).

For every admonition I have read that the West hurls at China, I can find a culturally base value that denies the accusation…although I will recognize that individuals do not all adhere to those values or practice them….however, China is certainly not unique in that respect. Perhaps, though, China is relatively more open in admitting its faults.

China is acquiring its resources by massive purchases and once acquired will act to defend its acquisitions if the host government does not or cannot do so, but I would hardly call that a threat…unless US companies feel threatened….and if that be so, let the US come out and say so….and admit that the pursuit of profits justifies any means.

**China decides to act with humility**

Humble towards whom and why?

**China feels entitled to the prerogatives of a superpower**

Just what are these prerogatives? Are these the same prerogatives as the Colonial powers once exercised? Do we expect to see a sign outside a building “No White people or dogs allowed”???

In conclusion, I do feel that Dr. Betts needs to do more homework on China.

Peter King
G1 Sitrep—continued from page 4

5. CORPS

- On 19 Apr 13, the MND restored the names of:
  (English / French)
  
  RCAC / CBRC
  RCE / GRC
  RCCS / CTRC
  RCIC / CIRC
  RCEME / GEMRC

The RCA / ARC was already Royal and not affected.

For the Army, this changed the names of some (not all) Branches are now referred to as Corps. Branches with RCN and RCAF personnel in them like the Logistics Branch are still proudly called Branches.
- Army HQ has already coordinated with Corps Directors and we have met with DHH//DSSPM to order new metal shoulder titles and cloth CADPAT flashes. These will be both ENG or FRE. When they are produced (3-4 months), our plan is to push the new metal shoulder titles to soldiers through their indiv Logistik Unicorp account.

6. ARMY HISTORIC DEVICE AND VISUAL IDENTIFIER

- The MND has approved the Army to use a version of our proudly worn circa 1940-60s Army badge as our secondary badge. It is being called the heraldic term the ‘Canadian Army historic device’. This change is important as we are about to enter a significant period of commemoration from 2014-20. Our veterans are very pleased.
- **Canadian Army Flag.** A new Canadian Army Camp Flag has already been requested for procurement by DHH for delivery this FY.
- **Army Pocket Badge on DEU.** Army HQ has already met with DHH and DSSPM to initiate procurement of a new pocket badge for DEU that will be delivered in at the beginning of the next FY 14-15.

Egypt—continued from page 16

In the military, the officers might be part of Egypt's long-standing ruling caste; their men are a different matter. Who knows what weapons’ lockers and ammunition storage depots became mysteriously unguarded in the last week. Will desertion and mutiny become possible in some units? Some police units are strongly opposed to the Brotherhood, but others may be thoroughly infiltrated.

The Muslim Brotherhood was ultimately behind the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1960s, Hamas in the 1980s (when Arafat was not Islamic enough for their tastes anymore), al-Qaeda, and a host of other groups. Terrorism is one of the tools in their tool chest. Muslim Brotherhood terrorists plotted against Nasser, killed Sadat, and made several attempts on the life of Mubarak. One can expect a strong revival of terrorism in Egypt in the immediate future, even if a larger form of civil war is avoided.

It would be wonderful if all were well in Egypt, but the people are a long way from getting clear of their current crisis. Economic collapse, famine, civil war, or major bouts of terrorism are all still possible. We should hope for the best, but be prepared for the worst and govern our own responses accordingly.

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