Inside this Issue

Reviving the Volunteers: The case for a voluntary auxiliary in Canada Nick Gunz ..............3
The Transfer of Power in China Weixin Lu.................................................................6
Iran: Geopolitical Conundrum Reza Akhlaghi ..........................................................10
Syria: To Fly or not to Fly Joshua Samac....................................................................12
Vacation for Vets: Thanks to a Good Corporate Citizen Jenny Newton .......................14
In this issue, Nick Gunz pursues a fascinating concept that of a Voluntary Auxiliary. He posits that it would: draw upon now-fallow military capabilities among the people of Canada, help address some of the long-term structural problems faced by the Primary Reserve which might even save money in the long run, bring the Canadian Forces closer to the people that they serve, and give Canadians a chance to participate in the military tradition of their country when they might have felt alienated or excluded before.

From a Western perspective, the U.S. Presidential election was the most important recent leadership event. However Weixin Lu, a Toronto-based reporter and blogger, examine the once-every-decade gathering of 2,200 specially selected delegates of the Chinese Communist Party that met November 9-15 in Beijing to choose a new party chief and the other members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The outgoing President Hu Jintao has spoken to the nation only twice in ten years. Not being answerable to an electorate he had no compulsion to do so. This Party Congress and the one preceding are the only two times in history that there has been a peaceful succession and handover of leadership. Weixin contends that it will be an uphill battle for Xi Jinping and his team to tackle the pressing crises inherited from his predecessors without a fundamental overhaul of the system.

Reza Akhrass offers a provocative change in how we think about the shape of the military. China’s economic and military growth is outpacing that of Western powers. We have already surpassed the United States in military expenditure, and China’s military modernization is no longer a question of if, but when. For China, a modern military is at the heart of its rise to global power. And military modernization is a broad concept that includes not only military hardware but also military strategy, organization, command and control, personnel, doctrine, and other factors. China’s arms acquisition strategy is determined not only by national security but also by China’s quest to become a world power.

I think it is safe to say that some members of the Canadian Forces might say "we wouldn’t". It may be traditional—many of our proudest regiments started out as Volunteer outfits (“Fight on Brave York volunteers!”)—but a Volunteer corps would cost money, require officers, and would have little utility in the modern battle space. It isn’t 1812 any more. But I argue that it may be time to take a second look at the benefits that a volunteer auxiliary could bring to the Canadian Forces (CF). This traditional type of military formation could solve problems now faced by the combat-ready Primary Reserve (PR). It could help more ordinary Canadians connect to, and learn about, the CF. It could even give the CF new military capabilities it does not now possess. It could be, in military terms, extraordinarily cheap, perhaps even helping to save money in some cases.

This paper will briefly introduce and discuss the benefits of a volunteer auxiliary. Firstly, what do I mean by ‘volunteer auxiliary’, and what would such an organisation look like in Canada today? Secondly, I will look at how such an organisation would benefit the CF, particularly the PR, by alleviating some of the long-term structural problems faced by our combat-focused reserve system. Thirdly, I will look at how an auxiliary could address some of the problems of ‘civil-military alienation’ in Canada before, fourthly, moving on to the question of what capabilities such an organisation could realistically provide for the CF. Finally, I will discuss the questions of implementation: how such an organisation could be raised in Canada? What models do we have to draw upon? How could such a system be stable enough to support these goals in the long-term, without a strong institutional presence in Ottawa?

Defining ‘Volunteer Auxiliary’

Canada’s armed forces are based on a highly centralised and professionalized model of military force. The Regular Forces are intensively trained and, for financial reasons, often based far away from the major population centres. The combat-ready arm of the Reserves, the PR, is very small by international standards and its primary mission is not mobilisation, but reinforcement. This obliges it to maintain a heavy—even punishing—training schedule with comparatively few resources. The combat arms of the CF are, in short, elite, exclusive and hard core.

The proposed model of a volunteer auxiliary would differ sharply from this structure. It would be part of the CF, perhaps as a ‘secondary’ component of the Reserve, but it would above all stress integration with local communities. Distributed widely across the country, small units would be designed to address local communities. They would have lower barrier to entry, low mandatory commitment, would be unpaid or nominally paid, and would focus on the particular skills of the local people.

Those familiar with the CF might recognise this model as being very similar to our already-existing volunteer auxiliary force, the Canadian Rangers. Based in communities across the far north, the Rangers are nominally paid with no formal commitment to serve in peacetime. Their units are specially structured to fit in with the culture of the local people (many of them Inuit), and they focus on providing the CF with a single, specialist skill set: Arctic survival and navigation. I propose that a volunteer auxiliary like the Rangers could be adapted to the environment in which the vast majority of Canadians live: the large urban and suburban communities of southern Canada. Rather like Legion Branches, each small unit could be specifically adapted to the needs and culture of serving in that area, be it an exclusive and hard core.

The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J. Langley CD and Lt (NS) Edwin F. Groundwater Langley.

© 2012 RCM ISSN 0318-1630 SITREP may be fully reprinted in whole or in part for academic research or institutional purposes, provided that the author’s and the editor’s copyright is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute or its members.

From the Editor’s Desk

Reviving the Volunteers: The case for a voluntary auxiliary in Canada

by Nick Gunz

The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J. Langley CD and Lt (NS) Edwin F. Groundwater Langley.
ticular skills those communities have in unique abundance for the benefit of the CF.

Solving Problems for the CF

The creation of a Volunteer Auxiliary aimed at the rest of Canada would immediately address some serious problems currently dogging many PR units in Canada. In a seeming paradox, PR units are often faced with over-subscription and high rates of attrition. This leads to wasted money, and complicates relations with the wider community. While the PR fulfills a number of missions, they, above all, stand in readiness for war. That means their members must be fit, equipped and trained for combat. Those kind of training billets are expensive, demanding and far too few. The chronic shortage of training slots means that many PR units are turning away more fit applicants than they can take.

But those precious recruiting slots seldom stay filled for long. The intense pace of training leads to fierce rates of attrition, in some units exceeding 15% per year. Surveys show that only a small percentage of these people are leaving to take up positions in the Regular forces. Rather, the most common reasons for leaving are workplace and family commitments. Every year, then, we pay to train hundreds of people only to dump them back into the civilian world half-trained and with no mechanism to maintain their continuity of service. This is not value for money.

An auxiliary could help address these two twin problems by acting as a ‘personnel buffer’ to aid with both recruitment and retention. Rather than being ‘sent home’ during a months-long recruitment process, new recruits could be sent to their local Volunteer detachment for accrualation and evaluation. Recruiting delays, as perceived by the recruit, would more or less instantly drop from months to days, and can also be evaluated in a more realistic military environment.

Similarly, PR troopers obliged to leave the service for personal reasons could be sent to the Volunteers (appropriately promoted) to continue their service while their military careers are on hold. Thus a PR corporal who has young children could, for example, become a Volunteer sergeant until his or her children are older, at which point they could rejoin their Regular forces. PR units which sprung up more or less spontaneously during the major metropolitan areas where new immigrants tend to settle. Military participation among urban populations seems unlikely to increase unless more opportunities for that participation are opened up in urban settings.

In some—but by no means all—cultural groups, civil-military alienation is but one symptom—of a larger and more dangerous alienation from the rest of society. In the past, military participation was a key way for newly arrived groups to assert their place in Canadian society. They even created ‘Scottish’ and ‘Irish’ regiments to serve what would have been considered the ethnic minority populations. A flexible Volunteer auxiliary system increase military participation throughout Canada, but it could also allow different civil-military communities to participate in Canadian military service where they live and on their own terms.

Increased access to participation in the CF would benefit both the CF as well as Canadian society at large. It is very rare to find a human culture that does not contain within it a war- risk role. If your young people are denied a legitimate outlet to serve as warriors for their Queen, then they will create their own ‘warrior’ subcultures (as street gangsters or worse) that potentially turn against their society instead of serving it.

New Capabilities for the Canadian Forces

Increased access to participation in the CF, particularly for people in Canada’s diverse urban and suburban communities, would also provide new and unique capabilities to the Canadian Forces. These under-served areas are filled with highly skilled groups of people, and there is seemingly no system in place to take advantage of those skills.

There are many examples of professional, cultural-ethnic and special-interest groups whose skills would be useful to the CF if they could be located, fostered, and brought to bear when needed. Perhaps the simplest example is that of the ethnic minority groups mentioned above. How might things have been different if Canada had had a significant number of Arabic and Pashto linguists ‘in the system’ before 9/11? Or if we had a group of ethnic Somalis to train and advise our troops a decade earlier.

We never know where the next deployment will be, but we do know that linguistic and cultural intelligence will be vital to it. Volunteer linguists could help to train deploying troops and provide a ready source of highly realistic ‘opposing force’ and ‘civilian’ stand-ins for pre-deployment training. Trusted and experienced Volunteers could help remotely monitor the reliability of locally-hired interpreters and fixers. Senior auxiliary personnel could even serve as a pool of people to be recruited into the combat arms of the CF, since they would come pre-vetted and partially trained.

Canadian cities do not just have populations with valuable linguistic and cultural skills. We have entire professional classes whose militarily useful skills would be freely available to the CF if participation in the CF were available on a more flexible basis. For example, Toronto has some of the best programmers and computer security experts in the world. Yet these professionals are essentially barred from service in our current military reserves, not for reasons of physical fitness but because they are busy professionals who don’t have time to take on a second job in the Primary Reserve. If a Volunteer unit were created to cater to the special cultural and social needs of computer programmers, we would have a ready source of highly skilled people already ‘plugged in’ to the military and governmental security systems in the event of a crisis.

The Questions of Implementation

Many more examples of militarily-relevant capabilities could be added to those above (academics, logistics managers, interpreters, police officers, HAM operators, and so on), but they would be irrelevant were such a system impossible to implement. This means that we must resolve the two key questions of implementation: can it be done, and could it endure?

Examples from around the world suggest that, yes, volunteer auxiliaries can run very successfully. The Rangers are a good example, but examples also exist beyond our borders. The United States maintains several volunteer auxiliary organisations connected to, but not a part of, their armed forces. Britain has a long tradition of Volunteerism, notably the Home Guard units which sprung up more or less spontaneously during the Second World War.

In the contemporary world, the Scandinavian countries provide examples of Volunteer formations in highly developed constitutional monarchies, such as our own. For example, Denmark’s Hjemmeværnet (‘Home Guard’) is an auxiliary force divided between military and civilian command, and based on the ideal that every Dane should have the right, as they put it, ‘voluntarily and unpaid - to participate in the defence of his country and its democratic values’. It provides a combat-capable land troops, a small air fleet, and maritime patrol craft which operate on a military basis and in support of the police. This is a big programme, and costs some $450 million a year, about the cost of a new jet fighter. For that money Denmark gets some 56 aircraft (out of a total of 5.5 million) drawn from every level of society, up to and including Crown Princess Mary. The Hjemmeværnet alone gives Denmark a higher military participation rate than the United States.

Continued on page 15
The leadership transition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expected to be finalized at the 18th National Congress. In a subtle but explicit fashion, the state media's high-profile coverage of the event sparked a hot discussion about the president role. Xi Jinping, 57, is to retain his position as the next leader. Xi Jinping, re-elected Party Chief
Zhang Dejiang, newly-elected Vice-President
Yu Zhengsheng, newly-elected Li Zhanshu, newly-elected
Wang Qishan, newly-elected Zhang Gaoli, newly-elected

The transfer of power in China to replace the 350-member Central Committee. Then the new Central Committee holds its first session and decides who will sit on the 25-seat Politburo and the 7-member Politburo Standing Committee and who will be the general secretary of the party as well. A total of 2,270 delegates, who represent over 82 million party members, will attend the congress.

Given the limit of two-five-year terms for top leaders, the coming convention is seen as a once-per-decade transfer of power. The lengthy selection process for the next leaders started long before the congress will convene. Over the past months, negotiations have been quietly going on among current leaders, namely, outgoing members of the elite Politburo Standing Committee who endeavor to ensure that their allies get the seats at the highest level of the power hierarchy.

During the process, the most powerful new leader to come out of the convention, Li Zhanshu, who has comfortable ties with outgoing President Hu Jintao and incoming top leader Xi Jinping, in particular, play the key roles. Yet the party elders like former President Jiang Zemin also wield some influence, and recent coverage by the official media of the party elders' whereabouts implicitly suggests the weight they may carry behind the scenes.

Nowadays, given the mechanism of collective leadership, no single senior official, even a top leader, enjoys the same supreme authority as strongman Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping did decades ago. So negotiation and compromise among different factions are essentially a practice in making decisions about the new appointments and policy matters.

On August 6th, the top leader-in-waiting Xi Jinping, along with some other leader hopefuls, met academics and grinding the basics. The reason for the west to stage at the decision making process. However, Professor Hu Angang, a prominent political advisor close to top leaders, asserted in early July that this decision-making body will be still maintained with nine members. (Editor’s comment: Only seven members were finally elected)

No matter which scenario plays out, the spots for front runners on the standing committee are virtually secured. A tight race is predictably among those who are ranked lower in the power echelon or are nearing retirement age. If the seats cut from nine to seven, the competition would certainly get fierce. Besides, there is a slim chance that a dark horse could come out due to the same reason. The next Politburo will comprise the above-mentioned elite committee members and some new faces as well. These newbies are those who have emerged in the past spring in the wake of former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun’s escape to a US consulate to divulge details of the crime.

On August 9th in her closely watched trial, Gu con- fessed to killing their family associate Neil Heywood, which surprisingly wrapped up proceedings within hours. Ten days later, the trial was over. As a reserve wing of the party, the Communist Youth League had long played a secondary role until Hu Yaobang, who died in 1989, came to party general secretary in the early 1980s. Since then, Youth League officials have markedly been placed on the fast-track to key positions in the bureaucratic structures.

The Youth League faction was mute for a while after Hu Yaobang’s death, which sparked off a democratic move- ment ending in the bloody crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Since Hu Jintao, who was Youth League boss in the mid-1980s, came to power in 2002, this political wing has significantly expanded, thus forming an influential force that could challenge the princelings and other bureaucratic groups. Most members of this faction are from ordinary families.

China proclaims that it takes a unique socialist road. In reality, political pragmatism has become a mainstream mind- set among politicians, who are primarily motivated by their own economic interests rather than old-fashioned ideology or political orientation.

For party officials at any level, it is the priority to keep power and guard against any mass incidents that could oth- erwise jeopardize their political future as well as social stabil- ity. The rivalry among different factions is virtually a power struggle emanating from political and economic reasons or, to
some extent, policy differences, even though it is often framed as a detour using eclectic rhetoric laced with newly-invented moral elements. This past July, two mass demonstrations separately broke out in the southwestern province of Sichuan and the eastern province of Jiangsu to force local governments to scrap industrial projects that could otherwise contaminate the environment.

Xi Jinping and his team are coming to power at a time when the macro-environment, both at home and abroad, is fundamentally changed. Apart from the global economic downturn and rising geopolitical tensions such as the recent island disputes with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other neighbours; domestic issues always constitute major challenges. As is known to all, Hu Jintao’s ten-year tenure has seen China’s remarkable rise to become the second largest economy in the world. This has also seen alarmingly deteriorating social disparities and a widespread official graft that is unprecedented in the Party’s history. This not only gives rise to public resentment and the Maoist revival, but also, more importantly, it distorts the China story and is unhelpful to the country.

The country faces a serious growth bottleneck. Over the past two decades, a GDP oriented strategy has made China a global economic engine and meanwhile resulted in such overdevelopment woes as frenzied real estate investment and contaminated environments. The pendulum now swings to the opposite: a political backlash and the need to rebalance.
Iran: Geopolitical Conundrum
by Reza Akhlaghi

Political tugs of war, tireless lobbying efforts, a barrage of op-ed pieces vying for public opinion support, not to mention fear-mongering by various interest groups, all point to a long-standing and undeniable reality: dealing with revolutionary Iran is a conundrum of considerable proportions. Case in point: par excellence; the seemingly never-ending Iranian nuclear saga, compounded by recent negotiations over sending Iran's stockpile of its low enriched uranium (LEU) outside of the country. The negotiations, which started in Geneva last October, followed the brouhaha over a ostensibly grand discovery of a new enrichment site near the city of Qom. At present, the five UN Security Council permanent (and nuclear) powers (the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France) and Iran are contemplating their next move, further to Iran's recent announcement that it has no intention of sending its stockpile of LEU out of the country.

As these powers contemplate their next move in confronting Iran in the wake of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) censure of Iran's nuclear programme, it is important to be cognizant of the complex geopolitical factors that make dealing with Iran such a very intricate affair. In an energy-hungry world, where new and emerging economies become increasingly integrated into the global economy, developed economies and emerging energy security has become a standard practice. Central Asia is one such region, where regional and global powers alike are actively pursuing their own energy security interests. And that is where the new fronts of the new century's geopolitics are being played.

There are two increasingly intertwined factors affecting the geopolitics of global energy: one is energy development, and the other is transport routes for energy delivery. With its geographic vicinity and the ability to offer energy transport routes to Western Europe, China is becoming an integral part of geo-energy rivalries in Central Asia. Iran is therefore destined to play a crucial role in global energy markets, with far-reaching implications for the future of international diplomacy; hence the makings of a diplomatic tug of war that has barely begun to make itself felt on the international scene. Iran's nuclear programme and the debate over whether the country deserves to be the subject of painful sanctions (or even military action) can be analyzed within this context.

So what does this mean for major world powers when it comes to dealing with Iran's nuclear programme, its increasingly post-revolutionary Iran? Is it feasible for the US to reverse in any significant way its negative influence on the region? Iran neighbours Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Armenia and, via the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan and Russia. Iran has been actively pursuing its interests in the region, carving out an indispensable role for itself in the region's economic development. It has also been in direct geopolitical rivalry with the US in the development of Central Asia's energy resources. With or without Ahmadinejad in power, Iran will continue to pursue its strategic goal of becoming an energy hub. As part of its greater geo-energy strategy, Iran is actively pursuing a role as the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCO) lead. Its goal is access to full membership in becoming an energy hub. For Iran, the SCO is a way of assuring its economic interests as it tapers into Central Asia's immense energy reserves. And, from a security standpoint, SCO membership is seen by Iran as a buffer to the development of any Western-led (in particular, US-led) alliance–economic or military – against Tehran.

One global power that is ready to pump legitimacy into Ahmadinejad's regime and its geopolitical aspirations is China. China has been a major player in Central Asia's energy politics—one that relies on Iran's role in the region. China is a power on the global stage, developing an increasingly sophisticated economy, while Iran is a regional superpower sitting on a sea of hydrocarbon energy, with grand hegemonic aspirations. Nearly 45% of China's oil imports come from the Middle East. Iran is the second largest oil exporter to China, after Saudi Arabia. In the first half of 2009, Iran provided 15 percent of China's oil; Saudi Arabia provided 20 percent.

Chinese investors are amenable to Iran's resurgent demand for economic and energy sanctions, and a possible military confrontation with the West or NATO allies. China's political factors, combined with Iran's post-election legitimacy crisis, is what makes Iran the international wild card of 2013.

What about Russia? Well, as the geopolitics of geo-energy indicate, an Iran closely aligned with the West would simply suspend Iran's nuclear programme. The US would seek to impose more sanctions, while Russia and China would consider a Western-led attack on Iran to be a direct assault on their national geo-energy interests. One can imagine what the implications of such an attack would be were Iran granted full access to the SCO.

The 64,000 dollar question re-emerges: Will Iran be enlisted in a military confrontation with the West; and should this come to pass, who will be dragged into it? One thing is clear: as Iran is set to become the international wild card of 2013, an international tug-of-war is now starting between war- and peace- mongers. Not only will political lives be on the line, but also the actual lives of thousands of ordinary people stretching from Tel Aviv to Tehran.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.
The never-ending flow of Tweets, YouTube posts, Facebook updates, and on-the-ground reporting coming out of Syria has diplomats and pundits debating the possible course of action on what is now a year old civil conflict in Syria. Eric Morse poignantly observes that “the Twittersphere does not dispel the fog of war,” a modern maxim made glaringly obvious as we watch yet another supposed turning point in this war unfold. As rebels, generals, diplomats, and pundits all call the current battle of Aleppo as the mother of all battles, one cannot but help look on with skepticism and recall that weeks earlier, Damascus was also the symbolic breaking point of this conflict. Benignly optimistic, I do think these predictions are hopeful, so call me a glass-half-emptysthough I say that this war will rage on until some form of intervention tips the awkward balance of power between a ruthless regime and an increasingly emboldened opposition.

Were an intervention to occur, the most likely of all possible scenarios would be a no-fly zone air campaign. Following talks between the Turkish and American state departments earlier this month, leaders of the Syrian opposition have once again called on the US to back a no-fly zone over Syrian air space. Addressing these calls, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed the need for intense operational and feasibility analyses to be conducted before a no-fly zone is operationalized. As of late, this option has been gaining traction throughout Western think tanks and policy circles and would almost certainly be bolstered by humanitarian corridors or safe zones along the Turkish and Jordanian borders with Syria. Critics and supporters alike generally tend to agree as to the strategic effectiveness of no-fly zones, though discord gravitates around their legality and hence lead to arguments regarding sanctioned versus unsanctioned interventions. Precedents exist on both sides of the legal debate, making the decision to implement a no-fly zone that much more difficult.

**What is a No-Fly Zone?**

As the name would suggest, a no-fly zone is a cordoned off sector of air space within which air-traffic is severely limited and sanctioned. Often conceived of in militaristic terms, some of the most protected geographical spaces on the planet are in fact secured by internationally recognized no-fly zones. The White House, The Taj Mahal, and Buckingham Palace are among internationally recognized no-fly air space. The imposition of a no-fly zone during a civil conflict such as that in Syria is usually implemented to halt an aerial assault campaign against civilian populations by a despotic government and would effectively constitute the “occupation” of Syria’s sovereign airspace. In Syria, a no-fly zone would require first neutralizing the unabashedly formidable Syrian air force and disabling its Russian-supplied surface to air defence systems. Once achieved, the international community must enforce the sanction by patrolling, policing, and regulating air traffic within that space. This extended constabulary presence required the establishment of a UN Charter of sorts, such as tankers, air bases, and frigates for refueling and staging purposes. Once achieved, no-fly zones usually require some measure of boots-on-ground presence to effectively halt the military operations of, in this case, the Assad regime.

**Case For No-Fly:**

The most immediate example supporting the implementation of a no-fly zone against Syria is the Libyan air campaign conducted last year. On March 17, 2011 the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1973, which implemented a “ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to protect civilian populations” with exceptions being sanctioned by the UNSC. Pursuant to the ban on air-traffic inside Libyan air space, the Security Council further authorized “measures on the ground...to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance” whereby necessary measures usually refer to military action.

In the Libyan case, member countries to the resolution could choose act as part of an ad hoc coalition, or through a regional organization like NATO to exact the terms of the resolution. In this instance, fourteen member states and four partners acted under the NATO framework, which provided the established command structure necessary for conducting an air campaign of this complexity. According to the international codified law, Resolution 1973 (Libya) and a no-fly zone such as that being called for in Syria is permissible under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which identifies a “threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” as reasonable grounds for authorizing a violent or air campaign against sovereign air space. Without Chapter VII recognition, a no-fly zone would constitute an unlawful use of force against Syria – contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As far as a Syrian no-fly zone is concerned, most ad vocates refer to the success of the Libyan air campaign as a precedent (and indeed a blueprint) for intervention in Syria and despite marked differences in air defense capabilities, the operational metrics remain starkly similar. In Syria, a civilized opposition has formed against a recognizably unpopular regime and like Qaddafi facing that opposition, Assad has been crucially backed down on by the civilian populace. The Homs massacre in March killing dozens of women and childrenbeckons comparisons to massacres in Tripoli and Misrata last year.

**Case Against No-Fly:**

Beyond the geopolitical and strategic arguments against intervention in Syria, (which would point to regional instability and political feasibility on the US front) the legal argument against an air campaign over Syria – similar to the one seen in Libya – rests on the lack of consensus at the UNSC. Similar discord at the Council affected the response to the Kosovo crisis in 1998-1999, which pushed the United States to lead the NATO air campaign Operation Allied Force (OAF) against the Former Yugoslav Republic. While much ink was spilled over the justification and legitimation of OAF with the remains that OAF was conducted outside the UN framework. Discord in the current UNSC is now resulting in a diplomatic stalemate whereby the international community cannot act within UN framework despite recognizing the humanitarian crisis in this war’s wake. The United States, Russia and China – have vetoed attempts at pursuing action that may lead to the implementation of a no-fly zone, most notably the February 4, 2012 Draft resolution. Passage of this measure would call for the invocation of Chapter VII wherein a no-fly zone (in the liberal sense) requires the UNSC to authorize the protection of civilian populations and the removal of hostile ground forces. Facing this impasse, the international community may again be forced to act outside the purview of the UN.

**Legitimacy and Perceived Legitimacy**

By most measures, the 2011 Libyan air campaign was a success. Air strikes on strategic targets lent to achieving air supremacy shortly after the first sortie and six months into the campaign, Qaddafi was killed at the hands of the people. That Operation Unified Protector was granted UNSC approval lent to its perceived legitimacy and political support throughout the international community. On the other hand, the Kovid-19 campaign was conducted outside the purview of UNSC. Though contrary to codified international law, the case can be made for the intervention’s consistency with customary international law.

The most obvious example of customary international law in Kovid-19, Libya, and now Syria is the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. After recognizing the impending humanitarian catastrophe at hand in Kovid-19, the international community – led by the United States – effectively sidestepped the political process embroiled in the UN and embarked on an air campaign against the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Used as doctrinal support behind the Kosovo intervention, the responsibility to protect against humanitarian crises is a morally sound case for intervention when the political process stymies effective collective action. It is interesting to note that when it came to ratifying Resolution 1973 for intervention in Libya, Russia and China remained oddly silent and actually abstained from a vote on ratification. The air campaign over Libya was not therefore conducted under international consensus but rather by way of tacit acceptance through abstention by Russia and China. The stringent no-budge attitude by Russia and China over the current situation in Syria has provoked much speculation as to why Russian and Chinese support for Assad is so ardent. Russian foreign minister Lavrov claims that Russia’s respect for other countries’ national sovereignty is the cause for disagreement here. However, international armament dealings, naval bases, oil pipelines, and the fear of precedent setting are common and more likely explanations for the Russian and Chinese opposition to the current crisis. Whatever the case may be, the international community facing a deadlocked Security Council must act expeditiously to avoid yet another humanitarian crisis in Syria.

Does this mean stepping outside the comfortable boundaries of the Security Council and codified law enshrined in the UN Charter? Perhaps. Will all this be mistaken for the advocacy of complete disregard for international law and the multilateral order. What does this warrant is a second look into the legitimacy of customary international law. As it stands, the international nature of the norms surrounding humanitarian intervention and the opinion juris (belief in the existence of the law) allows self-interested states masquerading as legal puritans to stonewall efforts at mitigating a humanitarian crisis by decrying the need to respect the legal status of Syria’s sovereignty. This is unacceptable and morally sovereign. Hopefully, the Western-aligned powers are not waiting for a nudge on the back to step into the legally murky waters of a NATO-led intervention in Syria. If the West waits for a second Homs massacre to spark action, it will find those waters to be flooded by the global community. If action is taken before that time, then I believe retrospective legitimization will follow.

**The Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.**
Vacation for Vets: Thanks to a Good Corporate Citizen

by Jenny Newton

M%
oring aquavit classes, afternoon naps and evenings sipping wine on the terrace of my suite located in Carriage Hills Resort just north of Toronto—finally a relaxing getaway for this weary Veteran, one made even sweeter thanks to Vacations for Vets. Launched in January of 2012, the Vacations for Vets program is a collaboration between the Canadian Forces (CF) and Shell Vacations Club (SVC) Canada benefiting those serving or former members of the CF who have sustained an injury or illness while serving in a Special Duty Area/Operation and, who in receipt of a Veterans Affairs benefit as a result.

Since 1978, SVC has been a vacation ownership pioneer serving more than 155,000 vacation owners and members. In early 2009, SVC partnered with Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) to implement a new program to help injured American military personnel. This program provides injured active service members with one week's free accommodations, based on availability, at one of 24 SVC and affiliated resorts located in the U.S., Mexico and Canada. The complimentary lodgings, which are offered annually, do not include airfare. Canadian destinations include Mountainside Lodge in Whistler, British Columbia and, Carriage Hills and Carriage Ridge Resorts located north of Toronto, Ontario.

With the success of this program, Canadian SVC owners wanted to support our Canadian injured troops. This is when Richard Cassara, Vice President Eastern Region for Shell Vacations Hospitality took up the task of bringing the Vacations for Vets program to current and former members of the CF. As Richard soon found out, it was an easy task navigating the halls of the Department of National Defence.

“I spoke with Ottawa initially, worked through the Minister who was overseeing at that point… and then eventually it evolved into Jo-Anne MacDonald who then took it over as an outreach service for the Canadian Forces, “ he said. Richard was referring to Jo-Anne MacDonald, the Director of Corporate Outreach Program CPFSS and the CF’s point of contact for the Vacations for Vets program. They must indicate their top three destinations and include the names of family members who will be joining them. Nancy then sends a request to SVC’s reservation manager located in Chicago, who then dips into a special account filled with points donated by SVC owners. Upon verification that a pre-paid room is available, a confirmation notice is sent directly to the member or Veteran by the resort’s reservation department.

“Members will utilize their points to do whatever they do for their vacation and inevitably at a given point, they have 50 points left over, 100 points left over, 200 points left over, and they have to decide what they’re going to do with these small amounts,” explains Richard. “They can carry those points over if they want to, but presenting them with a donation opportunity to support the Canadian Forces, they often take advantage of it... you can see that the owner-base is very proud to support the program.” Donated points are then dumped into a central account for use by U.S. and Canadian injured military personnel.

To date, 30 injured CF members and Veterans along with their families have benefited from the Vacations for Vets program with almost 100% of the vacancies filled. Letters and emails sent by thankful members to resorts and the CF administrators of the program are received regularly.

“We have received some really, really glowing letters from Veterans who have been through the properties and have stayed and loved their experience,” said Richard. Richard said, “they are really touching, really, really touching... it’s really quite uplifting for us.” Testimonials come from active and former members of the CF of all ranks who have received physical and/or mental injuries such as post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or operational stress injury (OSI) as a result of their deployments.

“My wife and I wish to thank you for making this possible as it gave us a much needed vacation in which I feel we were able to reconnect,” wrote a former Master Warrant Officer stationed at Mountainside Lodge in Whistler. “The lodge was outstanding and the staff went out of their way to make every visitor feel at home.”

“A very peaceful and relaxing place to be for a person like myself who has PTSD and OSI injury,” wrote an active Petty Officer (SVC) Canada benefiting those serving or former members of the CF who have sustained an injury or illness while serving in a Special Duty Area/Operation and, who in receipt of a Veterans Affairs benefit as a result.

Since 1978, SVC has been a vacation ownership pioneer serving more than 155,000 vacation owners and members. In early 2009, SVC partnered with Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) to implement a new program to help injured American military personnel. This program provides injured active service members with one week’s free accommodations, based on availability, at one of 24 SVC and affiliated resorts located in the U.S., Mexico and Canada. The complimentary lodgings, which are offered annually, do not include airfare. Canadian destinations include Mountainside Lodge in Whistler, British Columbia and, Carriage Hills and Carriage Ridge Resorts located north of Toronto, Ontario.

With the success of this program, Canadian SVC owners wanted to support our Canadian injured troops. This is when Richard Cassara, Vice President Eastern Region for Shell Vacations Hospitality took up the task of bringing the Vacations for Vets program to current and former members of the CF. As Richard soon found out, it was an easy task navigating the halls of the Department of National Defence.

“I spoke with Ottawa initially, worked through the Minister who was overseeing at that point… and then eventually it evolved into Jo-Anne MacDonald who then took it over as an outreach service for the Canadian Forces, “ he said. Richard was referring to Jo-Anne MacDonald, the Director of Strategic Outreach and Initiatives at the Canadian Forces Personnel and Family Support Services (CPFSS). Jo-Anne, herself a retired Colonel, described how difficult it was for outside organizations to get support to CF personnel prior to her directorate being stood up.

“Organizationalantly, we’ve matured quite a bit,” she said, “it’s just a better way for us to connect those who want to make a donation with those who are benefiting from that donation. So, this bounced around a little bit but Richard persevered and when we finally connected, we struck a program called Vacations for Vets. By all accounts it’s marvellous and we are getting tremendous feedback from the program.”

To access the program, active CF members and Veterans meeting the criteria send in their request forms to Nancy Branco, Manager of Corporate Outreach Program CPFSS and the CF’s point of contact for the Vacations for Vets program. They must indicate their top three destinations and include the names of family members who will be joining them. Nancy then sends a request to SVC’S reservation manager located in Chicago, who then dips into a special account filled with points donated by SVC owners. Upon verification that a pre-paid room is available, a confirmation notice is sent directly to the member or Veteran by the resort’s reservation department.

“Members will utilize their points to do whatever they do for their vacation and inevitably at a given point, they have 50 points left over, 100 points left over, 200 points left over, and they have to decide what they’re going to do with these small amounts,” explains Richard. “They can carry those points over if they want to, but presenting them with a donation opportunity to support the Canadian Forces, they often take advantage of it... you can see that the owner-base is very proud to support the program.” Donated points are then dumped into a central account for use by U.S. and Canadian injured military personnel.

To date, 30 injured CF members and Veterans along with their families have benefited from the Vacations for Vets program with almost 100% of the vacancies filled. Letters and emails sent by thankful members to resorts and the CF administrators of the program are received regularly.

“We have received some really, really glowing letters from Veterans who have been through the properties and have stayed and loved their experience,” said Richard. Richard said, “they are really touching, really, really touching... it’s really quite uplifting for us.” Testimonials come from active and former members of the CF of all ranks who have received physical and/or mental injuries such as post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or operational stress injury (OSI) as a result of their deployments.

“My wife and I wish to thank you for making this possible as it gave us a much needed vacation in which I feel we were able to reconnect,” wrote a former Master Warrant Officer stationed at Mountainside Lodge in Whistler. “The lodge was outstanding and the staff went out of their way to make every visitor feel at home.”

“A very peaceful and relaxing place to be for a person like myself who has PTSD and OSI injury,” wrote an active Petty Officer

Volunteer Auxiliary—continued from page 5

Volunteer Auxiliary—continued from page 5

Volunteer Auxiliary—continued from page 5

China transfer—continued from page 9

In 2002, the people put much hope in President Hu and his team for a fresh change as new leaders came to office in the first orderly changing of the guard in more than half century under the Communist rule. The public believed new leadership should make a positive difference in part because Hu and Premier Wen, both from ordinary families, had worked as grassroots cadres for a long time in impoverished areas before being promoted to higher positions in Beijing.

Today, most people don’t believe in official rhetoric about the harmonious society any more, nor do they feel the same enthusiasm for the convention as ten years ago. If history is to judge, this is a lesson worth learning, particularly as we are now facing a new round of social unrest in the countryside. This organisation might see a volunteer auxiliary as a way to bring in new membership while simultaneously supporting its core purpose of fostering remembrance into the next generations. This is merely one example of an institution well placed to help renew the Volunteer tradition in Canada.

Conclusion

I am very well aware that unless an idea like this is taken up by some powerful entity like the Legion (or the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, or the Vice Chief of Defence Staff) it is very likely to remain a mere hypothetical. But sometimes it is worth talking about something hypothetical when it is a good idea: good ideas can trigger better ideas in cleverer minds, and lead to new and better ideas.

A Voluntary Auxiliary is a good idea because it would let us draw upon now-fallow military capabilities among the people of Canada. It is a good idea because it would help address some of the long-term structural problems faced by the PR in a cheap, efficient way which might even save money in the long-run. It is a good idea because it would bring the Canadian Forces closer to the people that they serve, and give Canadians a chance to participate in the military tradition of their country when they might have felt alienated or excluded before.

For all these reasons, I think that this is an idea that is worth, at the very least, thinking about. For perhaps the question should not be “why would Canada want a volunteer auxiliary?” perhaps the question should be “how can we make this happen?”

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

China transfer—continued from page 9

In 2002, the people put much hope in President Hu and his team for a fresh change as new leaders came to office in the first orderly changing of the guard in more than half century under the Communist rule. The public believed new leadership should make a positive difference in part because Hu and Premier Wen, both from ordinary families, had worked as grassroots cadres for a long time in impoverished areas before being promoted to higher positions in Beijing.

Today, most people don’t believe in official rhetoric about the harmonious society any more, nor do they feel the same enthusiasm for the convention as ten years ago. If history is to judge, this is a lesson worth learning, particularly as we are now facing a new round of social unrest in the countryside. This organisation might see a volunteer auxiliary as a way to bring in new membership while simultaneously supporting its core purpose of fostering remembrance into the next generations. This is merely one example of an institution well placed to help renew the Volunteer tradition in Canada.

Conclusion

I am very well aware that unless an idea like this is taken up by some powerful entity like the Legion (or the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, or the Vice Chief of Defence Staff) it is very likely to remain a mere hypothetical. But sometimes it is worth talking about something hypothetical when it is a good idea: good ideas can trigger better ideas in cleverer minds, and lead to new and better ideas.

A Voluntary Auxiliary is a good idea because it would let us draw upon now-fallow military capabilities among the people of Canada. It is a good idea because it would help address some of the long-term structural problems faced by the PR in a cheap, efficient way which might even save money in the long-run. It is a good idea because it would bring the Canadian Forces closer to the people that they serve, and give Canadians a chance to participate in the military tradition of their country when they might have felt alienated or excluded before.

For all these reasons, I think that this is an idea that is worth, at the very least, thinking about. For perhaps the question should not be “why would Canada want a volunteer auxiliary?” perhaps the question should be “how can we make this happen?”

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.
Officer vacationing at Foxhunt at Sapphire Valley in North Carolina. “Again thank you for everything you have done for me and my Brothers and Sisters of the Canadian Forces.”

An active Master Corporal vacationing at the Peacock Suites in Anaheim, California with his 4 ½ year old daughter added: “the assistant general manager (Andrew) personally welcomed us to the resort and provided some extras for my family and I including colouring books, a t-shirt for my daughter, pop and snacks for our room on check in. PLUS the hotel staff and front end staff was more than willing to help out. This trip was great and a positive for both me and my family.”

As I personally experienced, the accommodations were great, but it was how I was treated by the staff that really made this vacation special. “They feel very supportive of the program,” Richard explained of his staff. “They’re fully aware of what we are doing, why we are doing it. They take an active interest; they treat the Canadian Forces reservations as if they’re VIPs; they handle them accordingly; they put the time and effort into it.” With a knowledgeable and friendly reception staff, warm and thoughtful housekeeping and an upbeat activities team, I can attest to being made to feel like a VIP, something that soldiers are simply not accustomed to.

The passion shown by Jo-Anne and her team for the Vacations for Vets program cannot be understated. “It is really about them [owners], I mean what we are doing here,” Jo-Anne said. “Nancy and her team are doing wonderful work but the first credit has to go to the Shell Vacation timeshare owners who have really generously donated…we are simply matching those folks who do qualify with an opportunity. I don’t want to diminish that because I think we are doing that with great compassion and with great respect.”

When accustomed to sleeping in a modular tent or a sparse barracks room, my two bedroom unit at Carriage Hills Resort was total luxury. My unit had a fully equipped kitchen complete with dishwasher and kitchenware, a living room furnished with a gas fireplace, a spacious dining room and even a Jacuzzi located off the master bedroom. The studio suite adjacent to my unit, which was used by members of my family, included a kitchenette. Each room had a private deck, complimentary wireless internet and access to a washer and dryer.

After being provided with a weekly activities sheet and brochure of local attractions and services by Christine, a wonderful young lady who booked me into the resort, I quickly zeroed in on the morning aquafit classes and local spa services. For an hour and a half, Susan used her magic hands to give me a Swedish massage complete with a salt glow body treatment right in my suite. It was so deliciously relaxing that my sister-in-law could not resist getting one herself. On one of my evening strolls I ended up hiking into Horseshoe Valley only to find people zip lining, crossing suspended bridges and other obstacles high up in the trees. Treetop Trekking, a local attraction located beside Horseshoe Valley Resort, was soon added to my bucket list. The off-site summer and winter attractions as well as the local shops and restaurants offer even those with the most discerning of tastes something fun to enjoy.

The Vacations for Vets program is made possible from the generous donations of SVC owners, the kind support of SVC staff and the dedication of CF administrators is a superb program benefitting our injured CF personnel and Veterans. To find out more about the program, please contact branco.nancy@cfpsa.com or Google Vacations for Vets CF.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.