The Charm Offensive: Peacekeeping and Policy in China

by Marissa Gibson

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NOTE TO READERS
As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to another frosty winter edition of the Canadian Military Journal, the last before we enter our 19th year of publication. Seems like only yesterday, and as Halloween is today, perhaps that is the scariest realization of all...

Taking point in this issue, reservist Marissa Gibson offers a primer on United Nations’ peacekeeping and the evolution of China’s participation in such initiatives. Initially, China viewed such participation with a degree of skepticism and wariness, “…in part due to China’s strong views with respect to the inviolable nature of state sovereignty, and concern that peacekeeping was a pretext for the intervention of a great power in the affairs of small states.” However, this would change over time, in line with China’s foreign policy goals. “Peacekeeping and foreign policy have grown increasingly linked since the 1970s, and an argument will be made that both have impacted the development of the other.”

Next, logistics officer David Larouche-Couture examines, with the help of various studies, the effects of the frequent rotations and transfers of middle rank level managers upon organizational performance. He maintains that whereas the middle managers are “key players,” and “a vital resource for ensuring the success of any organization …Constant changes in the management team produce impacts – positive or negative – in the work environment.” Larouche-Couture is followed by a courageous and rather different narration of a post-traumatic stress disorder experience by a civilian Department of National Defence employee in a war zone. Dr. Ken Reynolds of the Directorate of History and Heritage penned this article for many reasons, including hope that his unusual experiences will encourage other sufferers to seek the help they need, and also because “…if this can, somehow, serve to express the fears of those more typically associated with such difficulties – the military, first responders, the police, victims of assault – then perhaps, it can do some good beyond the limited confines of my mind.” Dr. Reynolds is, in turn, followed by Chief Warrant Officer Necole Belanger, who believes that while many senior leaders in the Canadian Armed Forces have worked very hard to create diversity within our organization, “…we still haven’t been able to fully understand and embrace or facilitate inclusivity because we have not yet gone beyond the rhetoric.” The organization has committed to the ‘diversity talk,’ Chief Belanger maintains that “…we have yet to embrace the ‘diversity walk,’ such as networking and mentoring of marginalized groups by the true power players of the CAF – those who continue to be predominately those with white male privilege.”

Moving right along, tactical helicopter pilot Captain Mitchell Binding explores the world of unmanned and autonomous weapons systems, then assesses their current uses, reviews the fundamental nature of war and what constitutes and defines fundamental change. “Finally, [he analyzes] what changes have been brought by autonomous and unmanned systems and how they constitute a fundamental change in war.”

We then move on to three very different Views and Opinions pieces. In the first, artillery officer Captain Nicholas Kaempffer charts a brief history of the use of mercenaries, or private soldiers fighting for profit, discusses the rise of modern Private Military Corporations (PMCs), focussing upon arguments both for and against the use of private security forces, and concludes with, as the title implies, ‘consequences, considerations and implications’ for Canada’s armed forces. Next, artillery officer Major John Zwicewicz reviews the issues and findings of a University of Regina research questionnaire that explored the need to provide increased family support to the families of members deployed on international operations. Ultimately, Zwicewicz noted that there were significant inconsistencies in the amount of support military units provide to their deployed members. “Some members received no support at all, while other units make significant efforts to assist members while they are away.” The study also concluded with various recommendations for improvement. In our last opinion piece, infantry officer Major Jonathan Cox asks the question, “Why study history?” and concludes that, “It is insufficient to simply apply past examples directly to emerging problems. The key is to use history to deduce patterns and relationships to supplement experience and build intuition. Understanding history cannot wait until a problem emerges.”

Then, our own Martin Shadwick examines the equipment and policy renaissance of Canada’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities, and while he applauds recent initiatives, Martin also cautions: “We must in particular remember that the broader issues of SAR policy and SAR governance remain to be tackled – and tackled on a holistic, priority basis.”

Finally, as usual, we close with, in this case, a trio of book reviews that hopefully will pique the interest of our readership during the cold winter months ahead, cold at least up here in the Great White North…

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
Introduction

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the nations of the world made a pledge to prevent the recurrence of such a global tragedy, and although this pledge had been made before, the United Nations (UN) promised to be something stronger than its predecessor, the League of Nations. Founded in 1945, the United Nations was an international forum meant to maintain the international order, and the powers vested in its Charter gave it a unique international character that assisted it in maintaining and protecting international peace and security. It is the UN Security Council (UNSC) that holds this responsibility. Comprised of 15 members, including 5 permanent members: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China, the UNSC may take collective action in order to maintain international peace and security, as authorized in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. These actions are manifested in the form of peacekeeping operations, which are staffed by troops of UN member states under UN operational control. Peacekeeping operations emerged in the early-1950s as a response to a growing number of border disputes that were sparked by decolonization processes and the need for a mediating body to assist in the implementation of cease-fire agreements or political settlements to these international conflicts.1

China was originally represented in the UN Security Council by the Republic of China from 1945-1970, but for the purposes of this article, focus will be centred upon the People’s Republic of China (China) as involvement in peacekeeping operations by China did not occur until its formal recognition as the rightful representative of China by General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971. Following the induction of the nation into the UNSC, China maintained a significant distance from peacekeeping missions for nearly two decades. It viewed the missions with a degree of skepticism and chose to maintain a low profile whilst

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refraining from taking any notable actions in UNSC debates on peacekeeping. This is in part due to China’s strong views with respect to the inviolable nature of state sovereignty, and concern that peacekeeping was a pretext for the intervention of a great power in the affairs of small states. China demonstrated its opposition to the missions by not participating in UNSC votes on peacekeeping missions, not paying its annual peacekeeping contributions, and denying the use of troops for ongoing operations.

The development of China’s participation in peacekeeping operations has been in line with its foreign policy goals. Peacekeeping and foreign policy have grown increasingly linked since the 1970s, and an argument will be made that both have impacted the development of the other. Peacekeeping has emerged as an effective foreign policy tool for the Chinese government, and has helped to build an image of a rising power with peaceful intentions, as well as helping to establish stronger connections with other developing states, particularly in Africa, as an economic and military partner. Peacekeeping also provides a means for the Chinese armed forces to cultivate and build upon existing military capabilities. The intent is to demonstrate the important role peacekeeping plays in presenting China in a way to help alleviate Western concerns of a potential economic and military rival.

There are two key items that should be noted: first, UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) are understood in this context to include all peace-related activities, which includes peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peace enforcement unless otherwise specified; second, United Nations peacekeeping according to M. Taylor Fravel, an Associate Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who specializes on international security and China, can be divided into traditional and non-traditional operations. This distinction is important when considering China’s changing attitude towards peacekeeping, because China initially only supported traditional operations, but has since relaxed its stance regarding non-traditional deployments. Traditional UN operations are outlined by four central guidelines: (1) the impartiality of the force and its commander, (2) the consent of the host country or belligerent parties, (3) the non-use of force except in cases of self-defence, and (4) their establishment only after the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement. Non-traditional peacekeeping follows by negative definition, and operations are established (1) in the absence of a political settlement, (2) without the consent of all parties to the conflict, (3) with the authorization to use force, or (4) under national (not UN) command.
The Great Wall of China.

Mao Zedong with Red Army soldiers on the Long March, 1935. The march was a military retreat undertaken by the Red Army of the Communist Party of China, the forerunner of the People's Liberation Army, to evade the pursuit of the ruling Kuomintang Army.
China and Peacekeeping

Spanning more than four thousand years, China has one of the longest recorded military histories in the world. Chinese armies have changed and evolved with the times and have contributed both technological advancements and strategic thought to the development of the world’s armies. As the owners of the world’s oldest military treatise, Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, China has continued to develop and expand its rich military tradition. Currently, the People’s Republic of China controls the world’s largest armed force, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which was founded in 1927 at the start of the Chinese Civil War and has its roots as a peasant guerrilla force. The PLA includes a navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and air force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Despite over two decades’ experience in guerilla fighting against both the Nationalist Party of China and the Japanese, the PLA has remained relatively untested in conventional warfare.

The formation of the UN called for a new world order that would seek to prevent conflict before it occurred and to mitigate damages when it did. Peacekeeping was the order of business, and China’s attitude towards this new form of intervention has undergone a number of changes since the state formally joined the UN. Dr. Courtney J. Fung (nee Richardson), an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Hong Kong, and Yin He, an Associate Professor at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center, outline five phases of China’s developing relationship with PKOs.

From 1971 to 1980, China opposed creating and continuing PKOs, refused both financial and troop contributions, and abstained from voting on all resolutions regarding peacekeeping missions. According to He, the primary reason for China’s abstention was “ideological disagreement with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” China viewed peacekeeping as a way for superpower’s to intervene in the domestic affairs of smaller states in pursuit of their own interests. China was a strong advocate of the Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention, and as the only developing nation of the Permanent Five (P5) there were expectations from other developing states that China would help protect their interests in the international arena. During this period, China never vetoed a UNSC resolution to obstruct a peacekeeping mission for two fundamental reasons: it did not want to be seen as taking sides by voting for any resolutions that might serve the interests of either superpower who might use peacekeeping as a guise for intervention, and it did not want to be regarded as an obstructionist or to displease relevant developing nations that might have an interest in the passing of such resolutions, as China was seen as their representative.9

From 1981 to 1987, the world saw the beginning of a shift in China’s attitude towards peacekeeping. For the first time, in 1981, China voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 495, which extended the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, and in the following year, China began to make financial contributions. However, it continued to refrain from sending troops, and remained apprehensive on issues of state sovereignty and intervention. This gradual opening can be attributed to the 1978 succession of Deng Xiaoping in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who saw the UN as an “…organization that could serve as an ideal platform to broaden its global horizon and create a favourable international environment for its prioritized economic development reform policy.”11

The late-1980s to the late-1990s saw a marked increase in Chinese deployments to UN peacekeeping missions, including operations in Namibia (United Nations Transition Assistance Group), the Middle East (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization), Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), Iraq-Kuwait (United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission), Mozambique (United Nations Operation in Mozambique), and Liberia (United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia). In 1988, it became a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping.
from 2010 to the present. She argues the beginning of this new phase is marked by China’s emerging dialogue on the deployment of combat troops to PKOs. China deployed comprehensive security forces to Mali in 2013, and in 2014, committed a battalion of combat troops to South Sudan equipped with drones, anti-tank missiles, and armoured carriers. More recently, China was in talks with the UN to deploy military helicopters to the peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire (United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) which would help address a serious UN capability shortfall. Today, China is the top troop contributor among P5 members, a vast change from the abstinence of 45 years ago. As time has progressed, China’s attitude towards peacekeeping has become closely linked to its foreign policy and security strategy.

Foreign Policy and Peacekeeping

China’s foreign policy, according to Dr. Pang Zhongying, a Professor of International Relations at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China in Beijing, has not been without “ambiguity and contradiction.” China desires a bigger role in the global arena to increase its influence in world politics, but has played a relatively limited role in peacekeeping.

The initial shift in attitude in the early-1980s can be attributed to the rise of Deng Xiaoping, who offered “…a new paradigm of growth and prosperity for China and aligned its economic policies with the global economy.” In contrast to Mao Zedong’s China, Deng moved the nation towards a more open and accepting view of the world order, which was increasingly focused upon globalization and building international markets. He launched major economic reforms to gain access to international trade, aid, investment, and technology, and Deng and the CCP viewed the UN as a platform to broaden their global horizon and build relationships with others in the international community. Prior to that, China’s closed-door policy and focus upon internal development hindered its participation in Security Council decisions and ensured skepticism towards the legitimacy of intervention of previous peacekeeping missions. As China moved towards a more market-oriented economy, foreign policy changed to reflect this more open relationship with the world, and particularly the West. Of note was China’s interest in separating from the strategic triangle composed of itself, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., in an effort to re-establish and re-emphasize its position as an important country in the developing world.

In the wake of the Cold War and the backlash of the Tiananmen Square incident, the 1990s saw another shift in Chinese foreign policy. The country was developing at a rapid rate with economic expansion into global markets and a military power focused upon modernization, making the United States and its Western allies concerned about a potential rising threat. The China threat theory that emerged in the 1990s was a Western response to the rapid growth and expansion of the nation, and maintained that China would use its burgeoning power to destabilize regional security and pose a very real challenge to the current American hegemony. “[China’s] ambitious program of PLA modernization, its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms sales to rogue states, and its increasingly assertive posture in the region sent alarm bells ringing.” Chinese deployments to UN peacekeeping operations increased during this period in response to its enhanced international profile, which required it to take a more active role in international politics and the UN. This engagement in PKOs was meant to assuage concerns of China’s rise and the country would reiterate its advocacy of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and acknowledge the importance of multilateralism rather than multi-polarity.

“In 2003, China indicated that its experience with UN PKO had led to a departure from their adherence to the concept of traditional peacekeeping...”
In the 21st Century, China has continued to present itself, not as a threat, but rather, as a responsible power concerned with peaceful development. Its attitude towards peacekeeping since the 2000s has demonstrated that it is a “cooperative, system-maintaining state” in international society. By making the effort to project itself as a non-threatening power, China has framed itself as a responsible power and it uses peacekeeping as a medium to solidify this image. Using the term responsible power allows China to redefine its role in relation to other states, and provides four key benefits, as argued by Courtney Richardson (now Fung). First, and most importantly, China is able to “proactively frame the discourse regarding its role in peacekeeping... and thereby shape perceptions and expectations of its position in the UN peacekeeping regime and international system.” Second, using the term creates a distinction between China and the Western notion of the “international community”, because even by being a member of that community, China presents itself as a non-Western, non-imperialist developing state that is a permanent member of the Security Council and able to provide funds and high-impact enabler units, such as engineering, logistic, and medical units, to peacekeeping missions. Third, China can circuitously update the meaning of responsible power to coincide with current conceptions of the international system, and in the post-1945 international system, China’s perceptions regarding international politics have changed significantly. Fourth, responsible power highlights China as an atypical great power, focused upon peaceful development, and its intention not to destabilize international politics for the sake of its own national interests.

Richardson is not the only author to draw attention to the responsible power image that China is projecting. However, as Courtney J. Fung, she further argues that “…responsible power enables China to emphasize that though it is a great power and should be regarded with that status, it views itself as an atypical example.” Yin He also notes that the responsible power image demonstrates China’s increasing awareness of the international expectations for its participation in international affairs, while helping to ease concerns regarding the China threat theory. China’s responsible power and peaceful development reveal its growing confidence in both domestic and international fields. Peacekeeping plays into this image by presenting China as a nation concerned with promoting international peace and security while also helping to blunt criticisms of the nation’s defense spending and military modernization, since the PLA is seen as a contributing force.

Since the 2000s, China’s rise has continued to expand its global reach, and Beijing has made a cautious effort to project the idea that it does not threaten the world.
troops, China sends a message to the global community that it is invested in mission success, that the UN is the best venue to practice multilateralism, and that it shares common concerns for peace and security. China has also participated in a number of peacekeeping training events and exchanges with other countries, and these bilateral and multilateral exchanges allow China to explore future prospects for international cooperation in peacekeeping, creating channels of dialogue between China and concerned neighbours, and help China to be accepted as a positive international actor.36

Peacekeeping also presents an opportunity to build relations with other developing nations and to secure its own interests, a topic that frequently emerges when discussing China’s peacekeeping involvement in Africa, and one that often turns to China’s involvement in Sudan. China has participated in more peacekeeping operations in Africa than in any other region, a reflection of its keen interest in the continent. United States Marines Land Force Planner Colonel Philippe Rogers argues that “…China uses what it calls an ‘independent foreign policy’ to achieve considerable influence in Africa,”37 securing the diplomatic, military, and economic influence of a host nation, in return for unconditional foreign aid – no matter the human rights record or political nature of the beneficiary. By investing in the security and stability of Africa, China is able to garner a number of advantages: increased support for its “One China” policy; securement of its energy future, commerce, and military-industrial complex; and advancement of its international agenda.38

The nature of the Sino-Sudanese relationship is complicated at best. China is perceived to be a part of the problem behind two civil wars: one between Arab northern Sudan and Christian southern Sudan (1983-2005); and the other involving the Darfur region (2003-present).39 Darfur is considered to be one of the greatest humanitarian disasters of the early-21st Century, and Western restrictions of oil exports (and other sanctions) to the nation has

led the Sudanese government to forge closer relations with China. China is thus seen as focused upon obtaining access to oil and by extension supporting the Khartoum government and Omar al-Bashir.

Initially, Sudan denied UN peacekeeping intervention, but international pressure on China regarding its relationship with Sudan led the nation to counsel Sudan to accept a UN presence. Established in July 2007, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission that works to contribute to the restoration of security and protection of civilians.40 China’s voting history regarding UNSC Resolutions aimed at Sudan and the situation in Darfur had gone from predominantly abstention to forceful advocating of UNAMID. However, China still adhered to the tenants of the UN Charter and its own principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention, and would only support the mission with Sudan’s consent. Sudan eventually accepted the mission, but withdrew consent in March 2007, and the international community turned to China to leverage the impasse between Sudan and the UN.41

As the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games approached, China found itself at the centre of international attention. Not only was there pressure from political groups to resolve the Darfur crises, but humanitarian agencies and human rights watchdogs were rebranding the Beijing Games as the ‘Genocide Olympics.’42 The appointment of veteran Ambassador Liu Guijin as Special Representative for African Affairs represented a positive shift in the disagreement, and by May 2007 he had managed to secure Sudan’s compliance, and Resolution 1769 was passed at the end of July bringing UNAMID to life. After repeatedly denying access to foreign troops, it was Chinese engineering units who became the first non-African Union (AU) troops to arrive in Darfur.43

Courtney Fung argues that China was motivated by more than economic interest and even by reputation. For China to emerge successfully as a responsible power, it needed to demonstrate its ability to two key reference groups in this situation: the African Union and the permanent members of the UNSC. The AU represents China’s Global South image, whereas the UNSC represents its great power image.44 Darfur represented an excellent opportunity for China to support multilateral peacekeeping efforts to both the AU and UN, despite the arguably rising tensions between China
and Sudan and the robust peacekeeping mandate that potentially put Chinese lives at risk while on deployment. Fung further states that image concerns were the primary motivator in China’s actions to counsel Sudan into accepting UNAMID, and that China was “…disinterested in continually siding with Sudan, at the cost of relations with its reference groups.”

Darfur represents a significant departure from China’s peacekeeping opinion of the 1970s. Its active participation in a Chapter VII-mandated PKO and its willingness to use its considerable influence over Sudan to accept a peacekeeping mission have come a long way from its history as a state that strongly supported state sovereignty and non-intervention. On a final note, before delving into the role of peacekeeping among China’s broader military strategy, He makes an important observation regarding this growing flexibility regarding the normative principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Its flexibility can be considered a double-edged sword. On one hand, flexibility can provide Beijing with more diplomatic options for dealing with international affairs, prevent unnecessary conflicts with other powers, and yield a favourable environment for its development strategy. On the other hand, when over-exploited, it will not only jeopardize China’s strategic interests regarding state-sovereignty (especially with respect to Taiwan), but also damage its image as a peace-loving power in the eyes of the developing world.

The PLA, Defence, and Peacekeeping

The National Defence 2010 White Paper reiterated China’s ongoing commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, stating: “As a responsible major power, China has consistently supported and actively participated in the UN peacekeeping operations, making a positive contribution to world peace.” In China’s Military Strategy, the text outlines the increasing importance given to ensuring the PLA is prepared for peace enforcement operations and other non-combat tasks, such as the resolution of internal unrest and disaster relief. Peacekeeping presents a unique opportunity for the PLA, which has not had a significant amount of international exposure, by creating a platform for which troops can deploy and work in new environments, engage in military-to-military cooperation, improve military diplomacy, and most importantly, strengthen its own military capability. Peacekeeping has become a form of military diplomacy, used to “counter-balance Western power and to counter negative perceptions of Chinese military spending, modernization and force projection.”

There are a number of benefits to deploying troops on peacekeeping operations, including the opportunity to gain distant operational experience as well as exposure to operational practices and methods of foreign militaries. Peacekeeping is considered to be a low-cost, high-return activity, with advantages such as “invaluable knowledge about logistics, ports of debarkation, lines of communications, lines of operations, operational intelligence, local atmospherics and modus operandi, and means of sustaining forces…over prolonged periods.” Participation over time will also help the PLA to modernize and professionalize their forces. In particular, argues Philippe Rogers, Chinese units are redeploying to Africa multiple times and thereby building a ready force of African operational experts – something the U.S. lacks. Operating in Africa presents units with exposure to countries that are vastly different and difficult in comparison to deployments within China.
At the strategic level, peacekeeping and other non-combat operations have become important components of China’s international security strategy, as seen by their inclusion in recent White Papers. Updated in 2015, China’s Military Strategy speaks to the nation’s focus upon peace, development, and prosperity: “China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue and independent foreign policy of peace and a national defence policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonies and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion.” The White Paper stresses once again the image of peaceful development rather than a threatening rise of power, and highlights a defensive security strategy while still ensuring independent action without threatening the sovereignty of other states. The military is meant to be a staunch protector of world peace.

The National Defence 2010 White Paper reaffirms China’s support of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which emerged out of the new relationship between China and India in 1954. They reflect much of China’s foreign and security policy decisions over the past 60 years, and can be applied to its overall image projection to the rest of the global community. The Principles call for mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. These principles are demonstrated in China’s decisions to predominantly support PKOs that were consented to by the host nation, and strictly adhered to the UN standard of protecting state sovereignty, although as mentioned there has been increasing flexibility regarding this as demonstrated with China’s willingness to pressure the Sudanese government into accepting a mission. UN peacekeeping by its very nature can be considered to interfere in the internal affairs of the state, an argument that has been made frequently in academic literature. China is more willing to make this concession because action is taken through the UN platform, and not through independent state action, alliance, or coalition.

China has a number of goals that are central to its defence strategy. Foremost is the safeguarding of national sovereignty and the security and interests of national development, followed by the maintenance of social harmony and stability, the modernization of national defence and the armed forces, and the maintenance of world peace and stability. Military modernization takes up a significant amount of space within the White Paper, and “as its guiding principle for military build-up underwent a strategic shift from preparations for imminent wars to peacetime construction,” the PLA ensured that the modernization process were in line with the country’s overall development. The PLA, PLAN and PLAAF all have undergone transformations to improve and enhance current capabilities – most of which is focused upon increasing ‘informationization,’ building joint operation systems, improving military training, innovating political work, increasing logistical support, and developing new and high-technology weaponry and equipment.

Despite the steady improvement and expansion of its military capabilities, it has thus far limited its deployments to its own sovereign territory, its Asian maritime littoral, or under the auspices of UN peacekeeping missions in other regions. Apart from its UN deployments the PLA has no foreign bases or troops stationed abroad, and other than cyber-warfare, its space program, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, its global power-projection remains limited. Global security interests have remained relatively constrained in comparison to great powers, but there are still instances of ambitious competition, especially against the U.S. and Japan. There has also been an increase in its global presence, notably through the participation of multilateral exercises and non-traditional security areas, such as peacekeeping and disaster-relief operations.

China remains in a somewhat-confictual relationship with its growing security and military capabilities. It is constrained by its policies on foreign intervention, and the fact that it holds no foreign forces or military bases, while at the same time it remains wary about the China threat image that will undoubtedly grow in proportion.
to its increasing military capabilities and power-projection capabilities. On the other hand, China possesses considerable financial and economic capabilities that can be used to contribute to and influence global patterns and global governance, including its own international security influence. Thus, Professor David L. Shambaugh of George Washington University, an internationally-recognized authority on contemporary Chinese affairs, notes a paradox: "...for China to contribute more to international security cooperation it must enhance its capabilities; yet as China develops such capabilities it will generate concerns on its periphery and around the world." Not only that, but if it increases its capabilities and shirks its responsibility to maintaining global security, the security dilemma is likely to emerge – and if it remains outside of alliances with the main status quo (namely NATO and those with close ties to the U.S.) it risks further alienation and projecting itself as a potentially dangerous power. Therefore, its foreign policy as a peacefully developing nation, and its continued adherence and participation in UN peacekeeping operations help in presenting itself as a responsible power whose growing military capabilities are strictly due to its own sovereign security and the improvement of UN capabilities.

Conclusion

China is already a regional great power and as it continues to expand economically, politically, and militarily, it must be careful to retain its image as a peaceful state concerned with international peace, security, and harmonious co-existence. Based upon this analysis, China has undergone a significant change since the 1970s and as it has opened its doors to the international community it has emerged as a rapidly developing power. Its relationship with peacekeeping has demonstrated that even its strict beliefs about sovereignty and non-intervention can be bent in some circumstances, as seen by its actions with respect to Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, and Sudan. Peacekeeping has allowed China to project the image of an atypical and responsible power that is deeply concerned with the maintenance and protection of international peace and security. Chinese peacekeeping troops have “…built and repaired over 8,700 km of roads and 270 bridges, cleared over 8,900 mines and various explosive devices, transported over 600,000 tons of cargo across a total distance of 9.3 million km, and treated 79,000 patients.” This is a far cry from the days of refusing to vote on peacekeeping resolutions and the denial of financial and troop contributions.

As Chinese foreign policy has broadened, peacekeeping has reflected these changes. Its image as a responsible power and its increasing flexibility regarding the notions of sovereignty and non-intervention have been demonstrated in its increasing participation in peacekeeping operations. China’s approach to modern peacekeeping is consistent with that of a middle power in its policy development, which has been defined as professing a multilateral approach to building peace, a willingness to compromise, an understanding of middle-power limitations, and a tendency to take a targeted approach to international problems through a ‘helpful fixer’ role. Its focus upon peaceful development is supplemented by its PKO participation.

Finally, peacekeeping provides an opportunity to gain operational experience for the PLA, although it is certainly more limited than the experience that could be gained through armed conflict. Military-to-military dialogue and cooperation, the development of military capabilities, and military modernization have all improved due to participation in peacekeeping. China’s defence policy continues to reaffirm its commitment to sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful development – all of which is seen in its behaviour regarding PKOs. With little conventional experience in warfare, peacekeeping provides ‘boots on the ground’ knowledge and military power projection that does not exacerbate the China threat theory.

In summation, peacekeeping has provided a platform for China to expand its global presence in a relatively non-threatening manner, to build relationships with other nations, and to develop its military capabilities. China’s peacekeeping interests are not wholly altruistic however, and there is much to be gained from the peacekeeping foothold established in Africa, including the possibility of lucrative trade agreements...
with resource-rich nations. Nonetheless, China remains an actor that is motivated by careful consideration of the costs and benefits of its peacekeeping deployment, as evidenced by Darfur, and will likely continue to do so in order to maintain its international standing among global powers such as the U.S. and Russia. It will be interesting to track its continuing investment in PKOs in the coming years and whether or not China will consider providing support for ‘coalitions-of-the-willing’ as a means to increase its standing among the international community.

The United Nations flag flying at UN Headquarters, New York City.

NOTES

3 Fravel, p. 1104.
4 Ibid., p. 1105.
5 Ibid., p. 1106.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 18.
9 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
10 Ibid., p. 20.
11 Ibid., p. 21.
13 Ibid., p. 41.
20 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 278.
25 Singh, p. 797.
26 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 289.
31 Ibid.
32 Fung, p. 419.
33 He, p. 49.
35 Huaq, p. 263.
36 Rogers, p. 74.
37 Ibid., p. 88.
38 Hirono, p. 337.
40 Fung, p. 424.
41 Ibid., p. 425.
42 Ibid., p. 420.
43 Ibid., p. 428.
44 Fung, p. 429.
45 He, p. 57.
47 Richardson, p. 292.
48 Rogers, p. 88.
49 Ibid., p. 89.
50 Ibid.
54 He, pp. 42, 50, and 58.
55 China’s National Defence in 2010.
56 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 270.
59 Ibid., p. 272.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 237.
62 China’s National Defence in 2010.
63 Mwa Hirono and Marc Lanteigne, “China and Peacekeeping,” in International Peacekeeping 18, No. 3 (June 2011), p. 249.
The Effects of Rotation and Frequent Transfers of Canadian Armed Forces Middle Managers on Organizational Performance

by David Larouche-Couture

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Introduction

In recent years, a number of studies have been conducted on the subject of short international assignments (deployments of 6 to 15 months) in both civilian and military organizations, and others have focused on the effects of succession and rotation of senior managers or senior executives. As noted by Soebbing et al., the effects of changes in the management team on organizational performance have largely been overlooked in the past. In addition, insufficient attention has been paid to the effects of middle managers on the organization; studies have tended to focus on senior management and, with few exceptions, on civilian organizations.

Research Question

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of rotation and frequent transfers of middle managers in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) on organizational performance. It has been demonstrated that middle managers are key players in organizations and a vital resource for ensuring the success of any organization. Constant changes in the management team produce impacts – positive or negative – in the work environment. That effect is particularly frequent in the Canadian Army, where it is common to find managers who, over time, have held many different positions in various organizations. As a result, organizational performance may suffer.

It is difficult to directly compare the situation of the CAF with that of another organization – for example, a police force – as the CAF’s reality is highly specific. However, even though the CAF’s situation is unique, it can be argued that the current situation is not optimal and that it has impacts both on individual performance of middle managers and on organizational performance.
Research Objectives

The purpose of this research project was to understand the factors that might influence performance—both of individual members and of the organization as a whole, since the two are closely related—in a crucial public-safety organization. The overall objective of the research was to better understand the effects of rotation and transfers of middle managers on the organizational performance of the CAF. The first specific objective was to document the effects of rotation and transfers on the performance of middle managers by exploring the following themes: effectiveness at work, the ability to adapt to change, leadership development, psychological condition, job satisfaction, engagement with the organization, and a sense of responsibility to the organization. The second specific objective was to examine the mediating effect of middle managers’ individual performance in the relationship between rotation and frequent transfers of middle managers and organizational performance. To achieve this second specific objective, we documented the following aspects of organizational performance: retention of corporate memory; continuity of projects; and transfer of knowledge. The intent was that achieving these two objectives would enable us to assess the effectiveness of this human resources management practice and, if need be, suggest the corrective measures required in order to optimize middle managers’ performance and, consequently, organizational performance.

Literature Review

Changes at the management level and organizational performance have been the subject of several studies. The two are closely related, since changes at the management level are often made in response to a decline in the organization’s performance. A change in management is one of the most frequent. In the studies on professional sports, researchers have considered the effects of manager rotation and succession over a given period in the National Hockey League (NHL), Major League baseball or European soccer. In addition, studies that are more qualitative in nature have been carried out to identify the effects of turnover on the organization. The effects observed included a drop in employee morale following a change; a lack of continuity between the former manager and the new one, causing frustration, uncertainty, and slowness; a decrease in cohesion within the team; and a loss of corporate memory.

Little research has been done on turnover and rotation in the military, and studies of private-sector organizations are not adapted to the CAF’s different reality, although the concepts used in those studies seem to be applicable to the CAF. This study seeks to fill some of those gaps.

At the left side of Figure 1, which presents this new framework in graphic form, is the independent variable: rotation of middle managers. This first variable corresponds to the issue under study, namely a high rate of rotation in the organization. It was essential to determine why the rate of rotation in the CAF is so high; the reasons stem from the nature of the organization and the context of middle managers’ work.

At the right side of Figure 1, we have the dependent variable: organizational performance. This variable reflects the overall purpose of the research project, which is to better understand the effects of rotation and transfers of middle managers on the organizational performance of the CAF. The mediating variable is the individual performance of middle managers, which links the independent variable to the dependent variable.

Changes in leadership are particularly frequent in professional sports, and a number of studies have examined rotation of managers and its effects on the organization. However, little research has focused on the military, where the practice is very frequent. In the studies on professional sports, researchers have considered the effects of manager rotation and succession over a given period in the National Hockey League (NHL), Major League baseball or European soccer. In addition, studies that are more qualitative in nature have been carried out to identify the effects of turnover on the organization. The effects observed included a drop in employee morale following a change; a lack of continuity between the former manager and the new one, causing frustration, uncertainty, and slowness; a decrease in cohesion within the team; and a loss of corporate memory.

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In the centre of Figure 1 is the mediating variable: individual performance of middle managers, which corresponds to the first specific objective of the study. This objective was to determine the effects of rotation and transfers on the performance of middle managers, using five (5) criteria: the managers’ effectiveness at work; flexibility (ability to adapt to change at work); career advancement (leadership development); psychological condition; and job satisfaction.

At the right-hand side of Figure 1 is the dependent variable, organizational performance, which corresponds to our second specific objective of determining the effects of the role of middle managers and their individual performance on the overall performance of the organization. Once again, five (5) criteria were considered in order to determine the effects: achievement of the organization’s objectives; success of the mission; retention of corporate memory; transfer of knowledge; and continuity of projects.

Hypotheses

The studies cited in the literature review suggest that the effects of rotation and transfers, not only on the performance of individual managers, but also on organizational performance, are undeniable. Based on the results of studies by Soebbing et al.,14 Hill et al.,15 and Rowe et al.,16 we would expect to find a reduction in organizational performance following rotations and numerous transfers of middle managers. The issue of the adaptation period following a rotation also arises in a number of studies. We expected to see the same result in our study. However, the above-mentioned research is based on adaptation periods of up to six months, and the adaptation period for this study should be similar, despite the short time for which middle managers occupy a position.

Method

The qualitative approach was used because it would give us access to a wealth of information while also allowing us to contextualize it. This method enabled us to place the subject in the context of the CAF, which by its very nature differs from that of a private enterprise or the public service. The qualitative approach is grounded in reality and focuses on the phenomena under study in their natural context. In this study, the focus was the specific situation of the Canadian Army and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Definition of the Study Population

This study focuses upon one of the three elements of the CAF, namely the Canadian Army. The Canadian Army comprises about 23,000 full-time soldiers and 17,000 reservists, including 5,000 Canadian Rangers across Canada.17 This case is particularly interesting in that the CAF is the only work environment of its kind in Canada. In addition, the results of this study will also introduce new information to encourage strategic thinking about specific human resources practices and assess their effectiveness.

The sample of the study population interviewed was made up, first and foremost, of middle managers in the organization.

Definition of the Study Sample

The sample of the study population interviewed was made up, first and foremost, of middle managers in the organization. In the Canadian Army, middle managers are CAF members with the rank of captain (OF2) or major (OF3). Next to be interviewed were senior managers, who have the rank of lieutenant-colonel (OF4) or colonel (OF5). In addition to relating their own experiences, senior managers are also able to provide a different perspective on the issue being examined because they have an overview of the situation. The sample also included senior non-commissioned officers, who hold the rank of master warrant officer (E8) or chief warrant officer (E9), and are directly exposed to the numerous changes in management. They serve as the right hands of the middle managers and senior managers and bring experience and a different view of the issues. Lastly, we met with civilian DND employees. Civilian employees tend to remain in the same position for years and thus have a front-row seat from which to observe rotation of middle managers in the military. It is important to hear from people at all hierarchical levels, since all of them must deal with the issue under study.

Sampling Technique

Directed, non-probability sampling was used for this study. This means that the researcher selects the study participants based on typical characteristics of the study population.18 This type of sampling enables the researcher to ensure that the participants have the relevant knowledge and information to answer the research questions. The final sample consisted of eight people, enough to reach data saturation.

Data Collection Technique

To gather the information required to answer the research questions, semi-structured interviews were conducted. This type of interview enables the researcher to understand the reality of the people interviewed and to address the study question in depth. The technique allows direct access to the players who are experiencing the issues on a day-to-day basis.19 In addition, the interview provides access to rich, detailed data. It also produces a good response rate and cooperation on the part of the previously selected participants.

Data Collection Instruments

For data collection, an interview guide was prepared. Based upon the theoretical framework, various open-ended questions were formulated in order to obtain the maximum amount of relevant information from the participants. Since we had determined that the ideal data collection technique for achieving our objectives would be semi-open interviews, the interview guide was adapted and made more specific during the interviewing process, according to the relevant information obtained from the participants.
Data Analysis Method

The interviews were recorded and notes were taken throughout each interview. The analytical strategy used was content analysis. The notes and the content of the interviews were then displayed in a table, organized by subject, to facilitate analysis of the data. The content was also described objectively and systematically for interpretation purposes. This in-depth review of the data served to structure it and break it down in accordance with the research objectives. It also made it possible to identify trends and themes and to highlight the important points that to be examined within the conceptual framework.

Results

A few common themes related to the variables identified in the theoretical framework emerged from the interviews: the organization’s motivations behind the rotation rate for middle managers; individual factors; factors associated with organizational performance; the advantages and disadvantages of frequent movements of personnel in the organization; and what works well and what needs to be improved in the current procedure. The results are shown in Table 1.

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“A few common themes related to the variables identified in the theoretical framework emerged from the interviews…”

Corporal Jessica Freeland, a medical technician from Canadian Armed Forces Health Services Centre Moose Jaw, and Captain Kristin Healy, a medical officer from CAFHSC Comox, wait for an ambulance at the ramp of a CC-130J Hercules aircraft during a simulated mass casualty scenario for Rimpac 16 at Lihue Airport in Kauai, Hawaii, 14 July 2016.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivations</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide individuals at all levels with a range of experience. The members of the organization must be exposed to its different levels in order to understand how it functions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide a larger number of individuals with opportunities to hold strategic positions.</td>
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<td>• Respond to a need for change in order to improve the organization's effectiveness.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide leaders with the most complete training possible.</td>
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<td>• Create favourable conditions for rapid development of individuals, given that a military career is relatively short.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Prevent individuals from settling in, and thus make them easier to move; change becomes normal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fill vacant positions. However, priorities and other factors change depending upon the authority in charge.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Individual Factors</th>
<th>Organizational Factors</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness at work</strong></td>
<td><strong>Retention of corporate memory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work is rarely monotonous; it is filled with challenges.</td>
<td>• Rapid changes result in the loss of corporate memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase in motivation and performance in the new position.</td>
<td>• Can be seen directly in the workplace by comparing CAF members to civilian DND employees who have been in their positions for years. DND ends up depending upon its civilian employees because they hold a large proportion of the organization's corporate memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Need for acceptance.</td>
<td>• Difficult for middle managers because they depend upon their personnel, both civilian employees and CAF members, given their level of knowledge about the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Obligatory adaptation period after starting a new position.</td>
<td>• It takes twelve months – a cycle – to understand how things work in a new position. The person has to perform the new duties and build his/her own corporate memory of the position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A change of positions demands a lot from a person.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Feeling of incompetence and loss of knowledge in comparison to predecessor.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Difficulty with continuity of the work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to adapt to change</strong></td>
<td><strong>Continuity of projects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change increases the resilience of members of the organization.</td>
<td>• Moving projects forward is cyclical within the organization; the same projects may be brought back by new managers, depending on their priorities, and there is little continuity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frequent rotations accustom the members of the organization to changes.</td>
<td>• Difficult, large-scale projects. Before they can get new projects up and running or take over those of their predecessors, there is a necessary period of learning the new job which slows down the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The changes prepare the members of the organization for the reality of military life.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• There is a large amount of knowledge to be acquired in a new position.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Development of leadership</strong></td>
<td><strong>Knowledge transfer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Holding a number of positions exposes managers to different types of leadership, but being frequently moved limits the exposure.</td>
<td>• No defined process put in place by the organization for ensuring the transfer of knowledge from an individual who is leaving to his/her replacement. Knowledge transfer is left to the good will of the individuals involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The intensity of the work that results from rotations exposes members of the organization to the reality of senior managers.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Few opportunities and little time devoted to development of leaders; opportunities to exercise direct leadership are rare; exposure is limited.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological condition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Personnel tracking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased stress upon the individual.</td>
<td>• Rapid changes in the chain of command result in insufficient tracking of personnel files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Impacts upon family life.</td>
<td>• Difficult for middle managers to properly evaluate their personnel, given the short time they have worked together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anxiety, fear of not making the right decisions, increase in the time it takes to make decisions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shortage of officers for each of the positions; work environment for the new arrival is not optimal; increase in pressure and stress.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Job satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase in knowledge as a result of exposure to more situations.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Professional development; frequent training and acquisition of new knowledge.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Decrease in job satisfaction; difficult to complete projects.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Difficult to invest effort in projects whose results the individual will not see.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decrease in effort before the transfer; slower pace following the announcement of the transfer (“posting slump”).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Engagement with the organization</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• In general, engagement with the organization is strong. However, the stress and uncertainty caused by frequent personnel rotation erodes that engagement. Individuals accept the situation until they reach their personal limit.</td>
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Table 1. Results.
Discussion

Reasons behind frequent rotation of middle managers

The first variable analyzed in this study was the rotation of middle managers. The interviews revealed a number of reasons for a high rate of personnel rotation. A key motivating factor, which was mentioned by all the respondents, is the desire to ensure training of managers. Since a CAF member’s career is relatively short and the senior leaders are trained internally, there is little time for new managers to acquire the experience they need in order to become higher-level managers. The CAF is a vast organization that operates on three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. The organization has decided that, to ensure that its members are able to understand all these levels, they should be exposed to each of them in order to advance in their military careers. Succession plans are put in place to ensure that the best prospects are identified and have opportunities to acquire the experience needed for advancement.

Another point related to training is that military work is, by nature, demanding and extremely varied. By moving individuals frequently, the CAF is preparing them in part for what awaits them in their work and pushing them to achieve good performance quickly. By continually being placed outside their comfort zone, individuals develop qualities that are essential in the military, such as flexibility, resilience and adaptability. CAF members are thus subjected to constant stress and do not have time to get into their comfort zone. In particular, those frequent changes prepare them for foreign deployments, where they must achieve good results quickly and have little room to manoeuvre or to intervene in local crisis situations.

The third motivating factor mentioned by the respondents is much subtler and not deliberative. The structure of the organization is vast and complex. There are many sub-organizations, each with a well-established structure of positions. One of the problems in the CAF is that there are insufficient personnel to fill all the positions in the organization. Therefore, the third factor that explains the high rate of rotation is the leaders’ desire to fill the vacant positions. But when they do so, other positions are inevitably left vacant and must be filled in turn. The leaders also change positions quite frequently and arrive in their new positions with their own priorities. Changes at high levels thus set off other changes in the rest of the chain, creating a cycle that contributes to increasing the frequency of personnel rotations.

“A key motivating factor, which was mentioned by all the respondents, is the desire to ensure training of managers.”
Individual performance of middle managers

The high frequency of changes, identified as the independent variable, clearly affects the performance of middle managers. In their comments, the interview participants identified six factors (mediating variables) on which change has impacts and which in turn impact organizational performance. These factors are similar to those found in previous research cited in the literature review. The first factor – mentioned by all of the participants – is effectiveness at work. The impacts on individuals’ effectiveness are both positive and negative. Starting in a new position reduces the person’s effectiveness, as he or she is facing the unknown and must go through a learning period whose length will vary from person to person. The new manager may feel incompetent compared to his/her predecessor, and that feeling may undermine performance. In addition, given that the elements for ensuring a smooth transition are not always in place and that, at the middle-management level, a lot may depend on personality because no formal supports exist, the conditions for success are less than optimal. Inevitably, performance decreases when an individual arrives in a new position. However, certain personal factors can compensate for that: the attraction of a new challenge and the desire to perform well and impress the new supervisor can increase the new arrival’s motivation and thereby improve his or her performance.

The second factor mentioned by participants was the ability to adapt to change. Resilience is one of the CAF’s values. Frequent changes condition individuals to change and prepare them for the reality of the organization and the potential challenges they will have to face during a military career (international missions, separation from loved ones, training, intense stress, etc.). Thus, frequent changes of position prepare CAF members to improve their performance at work.

Another important CAF value is leadership. Through their various moves, middle managers hold different positions in which they exercise the art of leadership, and they also have opportunities to observe different leadership styles. In addition, the number of leadership positions in the strict sense of the term, in which individuals directly lead soldiers, is limited, and quickly rotating people through these positions provides exposure for more of them. On the other hand, the exposure is limited, because the demand is high and middle managers must take the training associated with a new position (the learning period mentioned previously). In short, by holding a series of positions, managers improve their performance because they have the opportunity to develop their leadership skills in a variety of contexts, but that exposure is not always high-quality.

All of these changes have impacts on members’ psychological condition. Issues raised by participants during the interviews include increased stress on individuals due to moves; significant effects on family life; the difficulty of handling the new position; and impacts on home life. Participants also spoke of the fear of making mistakes and of not making the right decisions. And, once again, they highlighted the lack of personnel to fill all of the positions. The new work environment that goes hand in hand with a change in position is not optimal for a new manager. All of these factors will negatively affect his or her individual performance.
They will also affect middle managers’ job satisfaction in a similar way. Since there is always a period of adaptation when an individual starts in a new position, the manager will not be working at full potential, and that will inevitably have an effect on his or her job satisfaction. In addition, since CAF members do not remain in positions for long, it is difficult for them to take on large-scale projects and see them through to completion. The member may be reluctant to put in all the necessary effort because he or she will not be there to see the results. On the other hand, some participants said that they found satisfaction in increasing their knowledge, and in being able to participate in a variety of training that would help them acquire new knowledge. Again, it is clear that the effect of these changes on job satisfaction are largely negative.

Organizational performance

Before we can determine how the rotation of middle managers affects organizational performance, we must understand how that performance is measured in the CAF. Interview participants were asked this question, and all of them said that it is difficult to define organizational performance since, unlike traditional businesses, the CAF has no measurable performance criteria such as reaching a sales target or a given level of profit. The answers common to all respondents were “Are we achieving the objectives defined by the Government of Canada?” and “Was the mission accomplished?”

That said, the respondents did mention a number of organizational factors. First, the organization’s corporate memory is affected by multiple rotations, as has already been documented in the literature. The results are clear: change creates a significant loss of corporate memory. Measures are in place to counter this loss, such as hiring civilian employees, who remain in the same position much longer than military personnel, thereby conserving part of the corporate memory, or non-commissioned members, who also normally stay in the same position for longer periods. At the senior management level, there are concrete measures in place to ensure follow-up when there are changes in key positions. Those measures involve the key personnel of the person being replaced, as the contributions of the entire command team make for a more effective transition. However, we learned that, at the middle-management level, the transfer of knowledge is difficult. In fact, as a result of frequent rotation of middle managers, little or no corporate memory is retained at that level.

Similarly, and as mentioned previously in the discussion of the individual factors, it is difficult to maintain continuity of projects. Managers are reluctant to invest in the longest projects, in part because the period of adaptation required prevents them from implementing projects as soon as they arrive, and in part because, given the short time they will be in the position, they have little interest in launching large projects. In addition, it is difficult to ensure continuity from one manager to the next. Thus, over the years, projects may go in circles, being revived periodically depending on the inclinations of successive managers. Taken together, these factors have a direct impact on organizational performance. Projects for improving the way things are done, the effectiveness of operations, or simply overall functioning, fall by the wayside, handicapping organizational performance.

Advantages of the current system

In light of the interview results, it appears that the current system has certain advantages at both the individual and organizational levels. On the individual level, personnel movements contribute to members’ development by making them more adaptable. Rotation gives them chances to deal with a wide variety of situations, which helps them acquire knowledge. They learn how to get up to speed quickly in order to deal with any situation and to respond to the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces, the government or the people of Canada, which helps reduce response time in crises.

Recommendations

Although the current way of doing things has its advantages, there are some aspects that could be reconsidered and improved. One point raised by almost all of the interviewees was the frequency of rotations: six of the participants agreed that it is currently too high. However, the same people also agreed that rotations are necessary. Managers need to be in a position longer in order to have any significant influence on the organization. For example, the term of the highest-ranking member of the CAF, the Chief of the Defence Staff, is longer than a year or two, so that the incumbent can have time to make a mark on the organization. The participants felt that the same reasoning should apply to middle managers, and that assignments lasting about four years, rather than the current norm of one or two, would be very beneficial for individuals and for the organization.

Participants noted that another aspect which could be improved is local professional development for middle managers. Is it really necessary to move young managers from one end of the country to the other so that they can gain experience? Couldn’t it be done locally? It seems obvious that local professional development is possible and would make it easier to identify individuals with high potential and place them in positions that would make good use of their talent. Participants suggested that, barring exceptional circumstances, middle managers should remain on the same base, or at least in the same geographical area, from the time they are commissioned as officers until they are promoted to the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel.

Lastly, this study identified one other aspect for improvement: there is a need for a second path to professional advancement. Currently, the command/leadership path seems to be the only possibility, or at least the best known. Participants felt that it would be ideal to also recognize a technical path and to guide each individual onto the path for which he or she is best suited, a bit like draught horses and race horses. That second path currently does not exist as such and should be not only created, but also recognized by the highest authorities.
Conclusion

The results of the recent studies included in the literature review have clearly demonstrated the effects of rotation and transfers on the performance of individual managers and the organization as a whole. This study confirmed the findings of Soebbing et al., Hill et al., and Rowe et al. that rotation and numerous transfers of middle managers reduce organizational performance. We also found that every rotation requires a period of adaptation.

Thus, we can now state that the high rotation rate of middle managers in the CAF has a direct impact on organizational performance. That said, even though the CAF’s missions may be vast and ever-changing, its objectives are being met and its missions accomplished.

The current CAF structure is based on an operational model within which everything must fit, leaving little room to manoeuvre for personnel on the garrisons, support structures, financial administration, and so on. The personnel, especially middle managers, and the mid- and long-term projects bear the brunt of rapid rotations. Although the results sought are being achieved, the question remains: at what cost to the members, their psychological health and their family lives? The results of the study showed that the impacts are very real and that CAF members pay the price for the numerous rotations. The psychological health of middle managers would be an interesting subject for future research.

NOTES

3. Ibid.
7. Soebbing et al., pp. 485-497.
Coming Home: The Journey Back to Canada

by Ken Reynolds

Ken Reynolds, Ph.D., is an official historian with the Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence. He is currently working on the volume of the historical summary of the Canadian Armed Forces campaign in Afghanistan, dealing with the period between 2005 and 2011.

Introduction

I hope this article will put a very public light on a very private struggle, and, because of that, I reluctantly submitted it for publication. Why do it, then? Because, I hope that my unusual experience might encourage others with what they suspect might be a mental illness to seek the help they deserve. Because, if I can succumb to such a thing, then there are undoubtedly others who might find themselves in similar situations based upon experiences more traumatic than mine. Because, writing is one of the therapeutic weapons at my disposal to fight the battle still going on within my brain. Because, if this can, somehow, serve to express the fears of those more typically associated with such difficulties—the military, first responders, the police, victims of assault—then, perhaps, it can do some good beyond the very limited confines of my mind.

I am fully aware that the experiences of troops deployed to forward operating bases or patrol bases or sent on combat and logistics patrols in Afghanistan were often more Spartan, more difficult, and more violent than anything I experienced. In no way am I trying to undermine the intensity of their service. At the same time, this is not a competition. In the mental realm there is no “us versus them,” there is only the individual and their relationship with their mind.

And, yes, there is a stigma surrounding the acknowledgement and discussion of mental health issues. I don’t accept it and consider it to be someone else’s problem. I know mental injuries happen—and they are injuries—and am not particularly bothered whether others will think less of me for admitting it. That’s their problem, their stigma, not mine. My name is Dr. Ken Reynolds and I’m an historian with the Directorate of History and Heritage in the Department of National Defence.
When I started writing this piece in late-2015, it was only a few days since my wife, daughter, and I attended the Remembrance Day ceremony at the National War Memorial in Ottawa. It was the first such ceremony for me since I was diagnosed and had gone on sick leave. It was also the first time I openly cried at a Remembrance Day ceremony, and, more difficult for me, it was the first time where I had to fight the desire to leave the ceremony before it was over. I wasn’t sure I could get through it all, as my thoughts of those men and women who were killed, wounded, or otherwise survived our nation’s wars were intensely strong. I managed to stay, my hand gripping my wife’s shoulder, although I was utterly exhausted by the end. My ‘performance’ was also somewhat embarrassing to me. I knew—and could see—that I wasn’t the only one present who was struggling to get through it. Undoubtedly, many in attendance had witnessed or experienced much more than I had. Part of me thought that was irrelevant, as we were all in the same boat, struggling with our demons. Another part of me thought I was a fraud, in some manner trying to associate myself with those who deserve to be recognized for their service and sacrifice and the unfortunate side-effects such service can entail. I didn’t think I was doing the latter, but I simply wasn’t sure. But, as one of my Facebook friends—a retired military officer—responded to an entry about my struggle that day, “no one judges why, we support.” I was, and remain, extremely thankful for that.

Exactly five years before, on 11 November 2010, I attended the Remembrance Day ceremony at Kandahar Airfield in southern Afghanistan. The service itself was held in the compound of Headquarters, Joint Task Force—Afghanistan, the Canadian formation in theatre, at the memorial to the men and women who died fighting in the Afghan campaign. As a staff officer from another organization, and as a civilian, I found a spot on the edge of the ceremony and, as a result, couldn’t really see or hear much. It didn’t matter as that wasn’t the point. Being there was.

By that time, I was waiting to return to Canada and was finishing the seemingly never-ending paperwork that constitutes out-clearance within the military bureaucracy. I was completely exhausted and simply wanted to go home. Two days later I was on a plane to Dubai, on the first leg to London, where I underwent a week of debriefing—the result of working with the British Army. One week later, I was home. Unfortunately, it seems that at least some part of me has never truly left Afghanistan.

Clearly, that requires some explanation and, with deference to the patience of the reader, a step back in time. I had a difficult childhood, was a quiet child, more introverted than most, way too serious, and, like my maternal grandfather, I developed into a champion worrier.

Despite all that—or perhaps because of it—I did well in school and went on to study history in university. Following graduation, I worked first as a freelance historian and then as a public servant with DND. Initially, I was employed as a heritage officer focusing on non-operational matters such as flags, badges, battle honours, and the like. I also had various other opportunities such as providing battlefield tours to Canadian Armed Forces’ personnel in the Netherlands in 2005 and Vimy Ridge in 2007, as well as working on First and Second World War casualty identification cases.

In 2007, another exciting prospect arose when the historians at my directorate were asked if they’d be willing to deploy to Afghanistan for a few months the following year…“In 2007 another exciting prospect arose when the historians at my directorate were asked if they’d be willing to deploy to Afghanistan for a few months the following year…”

Soon, I began to have some doubts about going. Our daughter was three years old in the spring of 2008 and I was increasingly reluctant to leave my wife to shoulder the burden as a single parent. That, at least on the surface, was the reason for my doubts. However, in hindsight, I think it was just as likely that I was feeling nervous, less than confident in my abilities, and genuinely worried about being away from home for so long. But, my wife, ever the logical one in our relationship, said if I didn’t go I would regret it for the rest of my life. She was right, and, despite all that has happened since, I know I made the right call.

Before my planned departure I underwent a physical at a Health Canada office in downtown Ottawa. I failed it, or rather, I failed the blood pressure portion as my readings were too high for me to be permitted to deploy. I had one month to get my high blood pressure under control through medication—the start of a difficult four weeks to get the pharmaceutical balance right. Some days my blood pressure dropped dramatically, and on other days it shot up as we experimented with various combinations and types of meds. Finally, I passed the test and received permission to go.

I was in Kandahar Airfield from late July to early November 2008—leaving Canada on my daughter’s fourth birthday—and trading one desk in Ottawa for a much dustier one in theatre. At Headquarters, Regional Command (South) I worked as an historian, tasked with gathering as much material as possible, for posterity’s sake, on NATO’s operations in southern Afghanistan. In addition to my formal duties—taking notes at meetings, gathering electronic and paper documents, writing reports and narratives, and contributing to the war diary—I did little else other than walk from one building to the next to the next and back, eat, and sleep. Someone else cooked my food, did my laundry, and cleaned the bathroom in our shack. My wife, gallantly holding down the home front (giving her, I suspect, much in common with military spouses), quickly pointed out to me over a call home one night how spoiled I was after I stupidly complained about the state of some of my clothes received back from the laundry.
During the entirety of my time in Afghanistan, I attended roughly two dozen ramp ceremonies to pay my respects to nearly 50 Canadian, American, Dutch, Danish, and Romanian fatalities. I tried to attend every ceremony that took place. I was stuck in meetings or briefings for some and had to stay where I was. Others took place during the middle of the night when a departing aircraft became available. The latter often occurred with little or no notice, or were special forces’ deaths supposedly off limits to civilian attendance. I missed many of those that happened in the middle of the night when I was trying to catch what passed for sleep during those long months.

I admit, with a large measure of embarrassment, that for some of them I was simply unwilling to sacrifice shuteye to get out of bed and make an appearance.

Most of the ramp services were similar—piper, padre, and the movement of the casket(s) to the aircraft. Other, smaller aspects differed—like the United States Marine Corps playing “The Halls of Montezuma,” the Canadians with their camp flags, or the Romanians with their Russian Orthodox priests.

In general, the format of the ceremony itself was well-enough known to the public back home. After all, from what little I saw of Canadian media coverage of the war, much of what happened in theatre seemed to be attendance at ramp ceremonies, eating on the boardwalk, and hanging out at Tim Horton’s. Nonetheless, no amount of coverage on television could make up for the other sensations present on the tarmac—the violence of the sounds, the heat, the emotions, and the smell.

The truth was, in 2008, the ramp ceremonies I attended reflected, for me, instances of something akin to death from another world—the one ‘outside the wire.’ In addition to being a civilian—which already placed enough psychological distance between myself and the men and women in uniform—I was also a REMF; a term used to describe anyone stationed in a war zone, but not especially in harm’s way. This is not meant to disparage in any way the service of troops who stayed ‘inside the wire,’ but that distance—thus, the ‘wire’ terms themselves—existed.

Nonetheless, given the nature of insurgencies, the campaign in southern Afghanistan didn’t have a front line in the traditional sense (or, alternatively, it had hundreds). As a result, Kandahar Airfield was in danger of attack, no matter how remote or point less or miniscule in scale and number. The airfield was routinely struck by 107-mm rockets, albeit launched in an ad hoc manner by insurgents who immediately fled the launch site to avoid being tracked down by the airfield’s defenders.

I remember roughly two dozen rocket attacks in the summer and autumn of 2008. One, in the middle of a September night, wounded five people in a nearby compound and shook my room. Upon going outside, I remember seeing the smoke rising, backlit by emergency lighting on the scene. On another night, I’m certain I saw the red glare of one rocket’s tail for the briefest instant just metres away before it struck a nearby shack, wounding two soldiers.

Most of these attacks meant we had to go into protective bunkers where I immediately tried to go back to sleep. It wasn’t that I was brave or unafraid, but an inability to do anything about it and exhaustion increasingly took over. In October 2008, late in my first deployment, I even joked during a barbeque about how bad it would be if the insurgents rocketed us as we ate. Within less than five minutes they did, and I remember lying uncomfortably on the gravel underneath a table laughing about it. This was not logical behaviour. Looking back, I wonder if something wasn’t already wrong with me. I have a
photo a colleague took of me a few days later, on the flight out of Kandahar Airfield to Camp Mirage, the Canadian staging base in Dubai, on the first leg of my return home. I look exhausted and was half-awake as I tried to rest on the noisy, hot, and smelly Hercules transport. At the same time, something in my appearance—I still don’t know how to describe it—was, well…wrong.

To be blunt, my homecoming in 2008 was difficult. I didn’t have a decompression period like military members (it had only been four months) and, so, didn’t have a few days to start de-stressing before continuing the journey home. My wife and I quickly discovered that my return to the family routine was a difficult process and one that took longer than anticipated to complete. After a few weeks of leave, I returned to work and was on full-time training by early-2009. Although this went well, there were some trying moments, and, in hindsight, possible warning signs. I was attending a school in downtown Ottawa, on the same block where construction workers were demolishing a building. For a time, the workers were destroying the foundations of the old building and their use of explosives and warning sirens, similar to those used at Kandahar Airfield, shook both the school and me.

In the meantime, another opportunity arose to deploy overseas. The British Army’s 6th Division was preparing to assume command of Regional Command (South) in 2010, but the army’s historical section was too small to supply all the people needed to write the operational record (or war diary) for the entire period from February to October. Although this went well, there were some trying moments, and, in hindsight, possible warning signs. I was attending a school in downtown Ottawa, on the same block where construction workers were demolishing a building. For a time, the workers were destroying the foundations of the old building and their use of explosives and warning sirens, similar to those used at Kandahar Airfield, shook both the school and me.

But, something had changed, and it wasn’t just that I was working for a British formation instead of a Canadian one, although that did have its differences. For one, the headquarters consisted mostly of British Army, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army personnel. Amusingly, I often found myself interpreting British culture and language to Americans, and vice versa. Ah, the joys of being Canadian. (I also recall being completely unable to help an English officer sitting next to me during a briefing comprehend a Scottish officer’s verbal report.) Nor was the difference explained by my going ‘outside the wire’ a handful of times, or nothing especially dramatic or extraordinary happened, even though being airsick on Chinook helicopters was quite vivid at the time.

Insurgent actions against the airfield increased dramatically during my second deployment. Within two months, I experienced more rocket attacks than during my entire tour two years earlier. But that experience had much less of an impact than the never-ending ramp ceremonies.

On 31 August 2010, I recall walking through the sand at the base, which had the consistency of talcum powder. Each stride of my boots kicked up a small cloud which then settled back down in my wake or simply drifted away. I’d been at the airfield long enough, though, that I no longer noticed. The damned stuff got into your clothes, your hair, and your nostrils. Years later, there’s still some of it in the cracks and crevices of my luggage. There could still be some in my lungs for all I know. As I approached the fence surrounding the tarmac, I removed my building pass, rolled down my sleeves, brushed myself off, and ran my fingers through my hair, all to look more formal, more reverential. But my shirt was still wrinkled, my pants smeared with sand, and the heat of the day—somewhere about 40ºC—had left an aroma on my person. Futile, but at least I tried.

Then I waited. I kept to myself. That was fine with me as I’m introverted and was bone weary by that point in the deployment. Anyway, I never felt much like talking on such occasions. The moment never seemed to call for it and, to be honest, I always found it frustrating that others didn’t seem to share my feelings on the matter. Many small clusters of people continued to discuss business or shoot the breeze. Maybe, subconsciously, they were ignoring the reason why they were there. Perhaps, in hindsight, I would have been better off if I had done the same.
Finally, after what seemed an eternity, one of the senior base non-commissioned officers called out to those gathered. One by one, each group marched out on to the tarmac and into position. The last crowd consisted of the Headquarters, Regional Command (South), personnel, representing the senior formation. As a civilian, I walked at the rear of the group as the military personnel went first. On my way I saw a 747 land, not particularly far away. More importantly, I noticed seven American armoured personnel vehicles nearby—each with a metal casket protruding out its back hatch.

Upon arriving at the spot closest to the tail of the aircraft—a C-17 from McChord Air Force Base, Washington—we collectively fell in and then, in good military tradition, stood and waited. Typically during these ceremonies, I tried to keep to the far left of the headquarters grouping, as even then I wasn’t keen on being in the middle of a crowd, no matter the context.

Silence fell over the gathering which, this night, numbered a few thousand men and women from several countries. On some occasions there were more troops present, sometimes fewer. The majority of those in uniform based at the airfield didn’t attend this or any other ramp ceremony. That is not a judgement. Many of them were otherwise occupied, either out in the field, busy with their base duties, relaxing, or asleep. I suspect that some didn’t attend because they didn’t want to witness this kind of event—“there, but for the grace of God, go I.” I fully understood that desire, if that was indeed the case. It was also probably easier for me, a civilian, to ignore such a feeling. I was unarmed, not expected to defend myself or others, nor did I spend much time on base. In other words, I didn’t need to put myself in harm’s way or psychologically face the consequences of what that might entail.

It didn’t, however, remain quiet out on the tarmac that night. In fact, it rarely was, given that Kandahar Airfield was one of the busiest single runways in the world at that time. Every few minutes, combat or transport aircraft were landing or taking off. Two fighters, French if I recall correctly, mere metres away, took off and the ground vibrated up through my body in a violent fashion.

The level of noise grew beyond the norm as higher command launched a large amount of air cover—both manned and unmanned—above the airfield to protect those of us in attendance. The early evening was a bad time to hold a ramp ceremony as it was the insurgents’ favourite period to launch rockets against the base. A crowd this size was certainly a delicious target.

The ceremony began after a desperately long few minutes as sweat dripped down my back, legs, and into my boots. The perspiration might have been from nerves though, as it was relatively cool evening, probably 30°C or so. I remember running through a gamut of emotions—sadness, indignation, anger, impatience…guilt, shame, helplessness. A Canadian played the bagpipes, as was often the case during such events, no matter the nationality of the deceased. The padre spoke, but I don’t recall what he said and rarely did. It was nothing personal; I just tended to be deep in my own thoughts at the time.

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Then, one after another, the armoured vehicles pulled up to the end of the line of flanking troops, farthest from the plane and out of my view. The heavy metal caskets—constructed to carry each set of remains in as preserved a condition as possible—were removed from each truck. Seven groups of exhausted, sweat-soaked, and emotionally-drained comrades—each brought in from the combat zone where these men died—bore the remains of their brethren on their shoulders. Slowly, they made the long march down the gauntlet of saluting soldiers and respectful civilians, walked up the ramp of the aircraft, and deposited their cases inside its hold. This night, or unfolding of events, the limited scene in front of my eyes—essentially the ramp itself as the troops advanced their fallen comrades one step closer to home—was enacted repeatedly… until all seven had been loaded onboard.

And, with that, the ritual was over. With a right turn the Regional Command (South) group walked off the tarmac, a little quieter than when it entered. Then, the troops marched off and everyone returned to work, or sleep, or the gym, or whatever. I rolled up my shirt sleeves, put my pass back on, and went back to my office. I returned to see that my wife had sent me an email, relating the fun she and our daughter were having on a short vacation back home. As much as I wanted to, I simply couldn’t respond. Not then. I was too scared I would respond by blurting out that “I just came back from a ramp ceremony for seven American soldiers blown up by an improvised explosive device.” I would write them the next day.

I didn’t know any of the seven men in that ramp ceremony. It will sound quite selfish but, at the time, I was content with the limited knowledge I had. It was hard enough watching them pass, on their way home in a manner which none of them would have wanted, carried in the arms of their peers who were toughing it out to get the job done. I had less room to remain oblivious when a fatality was Canadian, as I would send the relevant details back home to Veterans Affairs Canada to enter into the 7th Book of Remembrance once the communications blackout was lifted (i.e., the families had been informed).

In hindsight, psychologically, my protective walls appear to have begun to collapse by September 2010. During the first three weeks of that month, the number of rockets launched against the airfield spiked, sometimes more than one a day, and up to five times one day. In the same period, in what I think might have been even more important to my state of mind, I also attended three ramp ceremonies for 28 American soldiers and marines. And, to top it off, for a variety of reasons, my work life grew increasingly difficult. To be brief, I found myself situated somewhere between the military and civilian solitudes, with no real foothold in either group. I was a civilian staff officer in a military setting, with little in common with most of the Canadian civilians on base. If it hadn’t been for MWO Lever and my weekly calls home, I would have been lost. It’s almost as if my own sense of personal identity was disintegrating.

By this point, in my mind the whole idea of death being elsewhere that I felt in 2008 was disappearing. Drama aside, I was no longer able to think of the area ‘outside the wire’ as another world, despite the far greater dangers the men and women operating there experienced. This became more evident following a 21 September ramp ceremony for ten American soldiers. To this day, no matter what I do I can’t clear my mind of the sound of the brakes made by the ten armoured vehicles carrying their remains—as they, somehow, have come to represent all who died in
my time in country, as well as those before and those yet to come. In effect, the dead had once been distant, and then they were not...

I couldn’t explain it then and I still cannot. I won’t claim it makes any sense or that it’s justified. Compared to those personnel who’ve experienced combat trauma it’s undeniably weak. And, yet, there it is. Perhaps it has to do with the fact that I went to war (if I really did) unarmed and couldn’t shoot back or do anything else about the war, the deaths, the losses, or the overall situation. I had no sense of control. Something snapped. I just knew that something—everything—had changed. When I returned home that November my wife could see it too. She asked, justifiably, when her husband would come home. I wondered the same thing. It was clear that the experience of war was for keeps and I questioned if I would ever be able to leave it behind.

I returned to Ottawa in late November 2010, following my debrief in London. To avoid the difficulties of two years previously, my wife and I immediately took our daughter on vacation to New York City. (The location was my idea; I don’t know what I was smoking.) It was a disaster for me—too many people, too many crowds, too much... everything.

The years that followed 2010 involved a massive mental and physical struggle which took a toll on me and my family. Personally, it covered a wide range of ground: constant hypervigilance—uncertainty and insecurity—avoidance of the problem—detachment from other people and my pre-deployment life—self-medication in the form of alcohol—attempts to hide the mental truth from myself and my family—a never-ending and exhausting struggle to maintain some sense of normalcy—negative thoughts while awake—nightmares while asleep—fatigue... the never-ending fatigue.

In the summer of 2013, I crashed, coming down with a series of phantom symptoms and a spike in my blood pressure. A doctor told me that it was either a brain infection or it was all in my head—and he meant it sympathetically—explaining that only a mental injury could otherwise lead me to where I was. I was soon diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder (I worry about everything, all the time), an ailment which I’m sure I’ve been suffering from for decades. Two years later, and after much time spent with a psychiatrist and a psychotherapist, I was diagnosed with depression and the chronic form of post-traumatic stress disorder, apparently from an accumulation of first- and second-hand experiences. As I understand it, my form of PTSD is like that often suffered by first responders—it is not the result of things I have done, as much as it is from the things I have witnessed: the accumulation of observed violence, incredible stress levels, extreme fatigue, a strong feeling of helplessness, and a sense of social isolation. In my case, my eight months of reading or viewing documentary descriptions, imagery, and video—of combat realities—and some first-hand consequences may have pushed me too far.

My unwillingness for five years to acknowledge that something was wrong—my fear of appearing weak, insufficient, or of being just an unworthy ‘greasy civvy’ or ‘suit’—prevented me from seeking the help I needed. By 2015, with the truth revealed, there was no sense of triumph. However, there was some measure of comprehension and relief. The enemy, as it were, was known and the next stage began.

Once I realized I needed help, the question was where to turn? Well-meaning staff at Health Canada administered my post-deployment interviews in 2008 and 2010—meetings in which I probably would have said anything to end the session and go home. In 2013, I was uncertain exactly where to turn aside from my family doctor. He set me up with a psychiatrist and we worked out the start of a medication regime to attack the problem. At my request, the latter also recommended a psychotherapist and we began to talk (she soon took maternity leave and I moved on to my current therapist—she remains an extremely important element in my recovery and maintenance). This group has been essential to my current stability.
On the work front, I realized that I was not capable of performing as I had previously, and I started burning through sick leave in 2014. At that point, I wasn’t entirely sure what was happening, just that I couldn’t pull my weight in the office. I didn’t know where to turn within DND. The folks with the Employee Assistance Program tried to help, but it just wasn’t enough. So, in November 2015, I started a period of leave without pay. Then, with the support of my supervisor, I contacted the Clerk of the Privy Council—the senior public servant in Canada. I asked what help was available for a public servant in my position and the response was amazing. I was contacted by several people within DND and the CAF—staff within the Director General of Morale and Welfare Services and the Soldier On and Operational Stress Injury Social Support programs—all offering to help, particularly, in the case of the latter two, as I was injured during an operational deployment.

In September 2017, after nearly two years and with the support of therapy, medications, social organizations as mentioned above, the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, peers at DND, and family, I returned to work. Although I still suffer from mental illnesses, things are relatively stable (there are good days and there are bad days), and it is now more a question of maintenance and using my ‘tool box’ of skills to stay ‘level.’ Upon my return to work, I switched positions, moving from the Heritage Section to the Historical Section, partly because there would be fewer projects on the go at any one time as an historian, as opposed to a heritage officer, and partly because of the project I would begin to undertake.

I am now working on the third volume of the historical summary of the Canadian Armed Forces’ campaign in Afghanistan (the period from 2005 to 2011). I was asked by several people at the start of this whether this project might lead to ‘triggers, undermine my return to work, or worsen my condition. Not so far. There is some part of me that is determined to make it through this. I have invested so much in the Canadian story of Afghanistan, and, despite my struggle, I refuse to give it up.

I have not related my story for the sake of sympathy or pity. What I know now is what I knew then—Canadian men and women served in Afghanistan as members of the Canadian Armed Forces. As such, they were required, fundamentally, to be prepared to kill or be killed as part of that service. More than 150 times, this resulted in a Canadian fatality. More times than that, the total number unknown, it led to insurgent casualties.

I’m a storyteller. I’m not a warrior and certainly never had the courage to enlist and serve my country. I’m not a veteran, although I might share some of their experiences. (During my deployments in Afghanistan and elsewhere I have missed my daughter’s first-time crawling, her first day of school, her first time as a flower girl, her first days with glasses, and too many hockey games—not to mention many of my wife’s successes at work and as a runner.)

Those who have had the courage to serve in uniform—in the past, the present, and the future—need to have their stories told. It’s that simple. If that means that I needed to take leave of my family for a short amount of time and travel half way around the world to be better prepared to tell those stories, then so be it. It’s the least I could do. Melodramatic, maybe. But, it is no less true for that.

Nonetheless, eight years later, I’m still coming home.

NOTES

1 I would like to thank Dr. Steve Harris, Dr. Sarah Lockyer, Dr. Jim McKillip, and Chief Warrant Officer Bill Richards for their reviews of, and comments on, the various drafts of this article.
2 The others were Major Bob Caldwell (Ret’d) and Dr. Jean Martin.
3 Regional Command (South) was under the command of Major-General Marc Lessard and a multi-national (but majority Canadian) headquarters from February to October 2008.
4 As anyone who’s ever been to Kandahar Airfield has experienced, the base had an open sewage storage system—the ‘poo pond’—meaning the smell of human waste was always present whenever you were outside.
5 A “rear-echelon mother-f**ker.”
6 Captain Dale Goetz, Second Lieutenant Mark Noziska, Staff Sergeants Casey Grochowiak, Jesse Infante, Kevin Kessler, and Matthew West, and Private 1st Class Chad Clements.
7 Major Robert Baldwin, Lieutenant Brendan Looney, Chief Warrant Officers Jonah McClellan and Matthew Wagstaff, Senior Chief Petty Officer David McLeod, Staff Sergeant Joshua Powell, Sergeant Marvin Calhoun, Petty Officer 2nd Class Adam Smith, Petty Officer 3rd Class Denis Miranda, and Senior Airman Michael Buras.
"Inclusive Leadership"
If we build it will they come?

by Necole Belanger

"No culture can live if it attempts to be exclusive"
~Mahatma Gandhi~

Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Necole Belanger, MMM, CD, is a graduate of the Officer Professional Military Education Programme, the Canadian Security Studies Programme, the Executive Leaders Programme, and the Non-Commissioned Member Executive Professional Development Programme. She holds a bachelor’s degree with grand distinction from the Royal Military College of Canada and a two-year college diploma in Law and Security Administration from Loyalist College of Applied Arts and Technology. A military policewoman by trade, CWO Belanger has been employed as the Strategic Joint Staff CWO, the CWO for the Strategic Response Team on Sexual Misconduct in support of Operation HONOUR, the 16 Wing CWO. In 2018, she was appointed to her current position as the Formation CWO for the Canadian Defence Academy.

Introduction

Many senior leaders of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have worked extremely hard to create diversity within the institution, yet as an organization we still haven’t been able to fully understand and embrace or facilitate inclusivity because we have not yet gone beyond the rhetoric. True, we have committed to the ‘diversity talk’, which can be seen through the CAF Diversity Strategy and training, but institutionally we have yet to wholly embrace the ‘diversity walk’ such as networking and mentoring of marginalized groups by the true power players of the CAF – those who continue to be predominately those with white male privilege. To go beyond the rhetoric we must invite all subordinates, including white males to the party. After all, inclusivity is much more than just the composition of our members by sex (male/female), ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, and privilege, rather it has to do with how we relate to each other. In other words “diversity is about counting numbers. Inclusion is about making numbers count.”

Lieutenant (N) Susannah Chen from Team MARPAC waves to crowds that came to greet the Nijmegen marchers in the town of Elst, Netherlands, 17 July 2012.
Inclusion Is the Key That Unlocks the Power of Diversity

I
clusive leadership, more than any other leadership theory, is about follower behaviour. In order for it to work, those who hold positions of power as the majority and hierarchical decision-makers, must adapt to followers just as followers must conform to these leaders. Therefore, if you subscribe to the premise that leadership is a relationship then most of what I am about to say should not come as a surprise to you.

“There is an ingrained sexism in the CAF that is tricky to specify and even more difficult to explain, especially for diverse groups, due to the pressure to conform.”

While it is true that the military has made several policy adjustments toward becoming more diverse; counting numbers through self-identification, setting goals and targets, and attaching a GBA+ checklist to everything is not really indicative of inclusiveness. Changing entrenched views about marginalized groups is difficult, but just because it is challenging is not reason enough to preserve the status quo. It is this author’s opinion that the CAF has not yet completely figured out how the inclusion key fits into the diversity lock, nor how to leverage the advantages of inclusivity once we unlock the diversity door. Just as the problem of sexually inappropriate conduct is not a woman’s problem, nor is inclusivity a marginalized group’s problem. “Instead, it is a problem affecting the integrity, professionalism, and efficiency of the CAF as a whole.”

Even well-intentioned leaders committed to inclusive leadership can inadvertently exclude diverse groups. As leaders we have our ‘go to’ people, those that we share information with, those that we include in our decision making processes, and, those whose opinions we value most. It is a common held philosophy that ‘like attracts like’ according to social cognitive psychologist, Albert Bandura, best known for his development of the ‘social learning theory’. Social Learning theorizes that people categorize themselves and others based on surface level characteristics in order to ascertain who ‘one of them’ is and who is not. Support for this theory can be found at the very top of the CAF leadership ladder, which is mostly white, mostly male, and mostly heterosexual. This is not necessarily a bad thing. The success of diversity and inclusion efforts are greatly enhanced by their engagement as champions and advocates, especially because of their continued formal and informal positions of power and authority within this institution. Nevertheless, I call readers to reflect on how many women, transgender, people of colour, aboriginals, ethnic minorities, lesbian or gay men do you mentor compared to the white male soldier? If the answer is none, you may unknowingly be what ‘Athena Rising’ authors Brad Johnson, PhD, professor of psychology at the United States Naval Academy, and David Smith, PhD, associate professor of sociology at the United States Naval War College, call a “homosocial.” According to these authors, those who engage in homosocial behaviour prefer to surround themselves with others who look and act like them, almost to the exclusion of these other diverse groups. While some of you may now be offended and may be tempted to disregard this article, I ask you to join me as I unpack this argument and hopefully convince you that diversity and inclusion is not a zero sum game. It is “not intended to take away roles, but to create parity and opportunity for ALL employees to succeed.”

“If we attempt to add women, gay men, transgendered individuals, people of colour, aboriginals, and even encouraged different ethnicities into the ranks, yet the CAF is still characterized as a hyper-sexual masculine organization with a “combat masculine heterosexual warrior identity.” And, it is not just white males who embody this masculine culture. Former Supreme Court Justice, Madame Marie Deschamps, found that members appear to become accustomed to this hyper-sexual masculine culture as they move up the ranks. For example, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), both men and women, appear to be generally desensitized to the combat masculine heterosexual warrior identity, which speaks to a larger culture of masculinity that is embodied not only by men. There is an ingrained sexism in the CAF that is tricky to specify and even more difficult to explain, especially for diverse groups, due to the pressure to conform. If you speak up you are labelled a “Complainer or a Non-Team Player or worse an Outsider”, which only serves to cover up this non-inclusive behaviour. In the end, this lack of acknowledgement only serves to weaken the CAF’s overall capacity.
The Groupthink syndrome can easily set in when leaders continuously reward like-minded people and are eventually replaced by more people with the same characteristics, background and mindset. We’ve made progress on the diversity front with the leaders we’ve had but how much further ahead would we be if our leaders had been more diverse….In an ideal world, CAF leadership and its members should not have to be “labelled and accounted for” based on characteristics they were born with or cannot change. However, until we have achieved an Inclusive Force, we will continue to have to track numbers to measure and celebrate whatever short-term success we achieve.

Major (Retired) Chris Thibault, Special Advisor to Director of Cadets, RMC

In-Groups and Groupthink

Surrounding ourselves with those who are likeminded is what sociologists and social psychologists define as our ‘in-group’. An in-group association can have a profound effect on favouritism towards one’s own crowd. This concept is also known as in-group-outgroup bias. Besides the obvious perils of in-group segregation, there lurks the dangers of ‘groupthink’, a term coined by Yale University Research Psychologist Irving Janis. According to Janis, “members of high-status decision-making groups may develop such extreme forms of camaraderie and solidarity that they suppress dissent, valuing group membership and harmony above all else.” Janis also suggests that groupthink occurs more often than not when there is “a strong, persuasive group leader; a high level of group cohesion; and, an intense pressure from the outside to make a good decision.” In a hierarchical system such as ours, where inclusivity has not yet been fully embraced, the risk of an in-group making faulty decisions is almost a foregone conclusion. Take for example the National Defence Clothing and Dress Committee (NDCDC), which up until most recently was comprised of middle aged white males. This very homogenous group was ultimately charged with making decisions on dress for women in the CAF, including brasseries, earrings, high heeled shoes and pantyhose!

Unconscious Biases and Privilege

Granted, blatant expressions of discrimination against marginalized members of the CAF have almost all but disappeared; however, modern forms of discrimination still pose an unjustified, often unconscious challenge. Homosocial behaviour is, for the most part, an unconscious bias, and often operates below conscious awareness. These social stereotypes reside deep in our subconscious and are different from conscious or explicit biases that we may choose to conceal for the purposes of social and/or political correctness. Everyone holds unconscious beliefs about various social and identity groups, and these biases stem from one’s tendency to organize social worlds by categorizing. In other words, it is a human phenomenon we use to make sense of societal norms and life experiences. As humans we have limited cognitive capacity and because of this our brains involuntarily have learned to create short cuts or make associations when we experience people and situations. For example, when we observe a behavior or experience a situation, such as seeing a man with grey hair, we filter what we see and then draw the conclusion that he is old, similarly when we see an obese woman, our natural assumption is that she is lazy or the belief that a person of Asian descent is incredibly intelligent. Comprised of both favourable and unfavourable assessments, “unconscious bias is far more prevalent than conscious prejudice and is often incompatible with one’s conscious values.”

Northwestern University professor Alice Eagly and Adelphi University professor Jean Chin assert that “people can unknowingly exclude people by means of mindless processes that operate beyond their conscious attentional focus, all the while thinking that they are choosing the best person for the job or otherwise acting in an unbiased manner.” It’s easy to see how unconscious bias can affect the progress of marginalized groups at work. For example, men make automatic gender assumptions about women, not out of malice, but simply because these assumptions just seem right and natural, even though they are frequently distorted overgeneralizations. Often these suppositions are detrimental to women. For instance, assuming that women “will either want to suspend their career at some point to focus on starting a family or that women will focus on their careers to the exclusion of all else,” is bias based on societal gender norms and expectations. As well intended as these assumptions may be, they can “scuttle her advancement and leave her feeling stereotyped, undermined, and powerless.” Another stereotypical assumption is that all gay men possess exaggerated feminine character traits. Naturally, our conscious brain knows better but “when we see members of social groups perform behaviors, we tend to better remember information that confirms our stereotypes than we remember information that disconfirms our stereotypes.” Fortunately, “forewarned is forearmed” and unconscious bias can be mitigated. In many ways addressing unconscious bias is an easier process than addressing more blatant prejudice.
As leaders we want to believe that all marginalized groups are given a fair opportunity to make it to the upper echelons of leadership, but are they? Gender role socialization and privilege may have a lot to do with this because society expects different attitudes and behaviours from women and men. Generally in society boys are still raised to conform to the masculine gender role, while girls are still raised to conform to the feminine gender role. A gender role is a set of behaviours, attitudes, and personality characteristics expected and encouraged of a person based on his or her sex (born biologically male or female). More often than not these beliefs taint our judgements of individuals within that group. These judgements can be very harmful because people do not feel as if they are free to fully express themselves and their emotions – take the old adage: ‘boys don’t cry.’ Eagly and Chin suggest that “the potential for prejudice is present when social perceivers hold a stereotype about a social group that is incongruent with the attributes that they believe are required for success in leadership roles.” Meaning, if a woman leader shows emotion others conclude that she is weak. Conversely, if a male shows the exact same emotion, he is considered compassionate. We call little girls bossy if they exhibit leadership, yet we praise boys for the exact same behaviour. The point being, we do not feel as if we are free to fully express ourselves and our emotions as if we are free to fully express ourselves and their emotions – take the old adage: ‘boys don’t cry.’

The Dreaded Double Bind

As leaders we want to believe that all marginalized groups are given a fair opportunity to make it to the upper echelons of leadership, but are they?

~Bill Proudman, White Men as Full Diversity Partners.

Directed toward corporate women, their observations do not hold up in a military context. According to a recent technical report by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), which examined the perceptions of 26 women, both officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs), in the four combat arms (infantry, armoured, artillery, and combat engineer), this study concluded that a relatively minor number of the participants anticipated any negative implications arising from them exhibiting a masculine leadership style. Moreover, many of those surveyed remarked upon the negative associations concerning the display of feminine leadership characteristics and almost half of the [NCMs] felt that they had to become more masculine in order to be seen as effective leaders. Placing such an intense value on ONLY masculine leadership traits is problematic because our expectations (even for women) of how leaders behave are controlled by cultural norms – ‘think male – think leader’. The system’s failure to put more women in the ‘C Suite’ (an adjective used to describe high-ranking executive titles within an organization) is due to biases created from centuries of one element (male) dominating the system. “We’ve always done it this way can be translated to what systems thinking scientists define as a reinforcing feedback loop; an action produces a result which influences more of the same action thus resulting in growth or decline. So, with regard to ‘think male – think leader’, humans like and reward what they already know, and thus, the system perpetuates itself through the reinforcing of the main element. Simply put, male dominance in leadership is fueling more male leadership.”

Privilege

Another obstacle in the race to the C Suite is privilege, specifically white male privilege. A study by Catalyst Knowledge found that many white men were unaware of the notion of their privilege. They failed to recognize that certain societal advantages have been afforded to them because of their sex, however it is not an advantage they can just choose to not take, because society gives it to them and unless they change the institution which gives advantage to them, they will continue to have it. Francis Kendall, a consultant for organizational change, specializing in issues of diversity and white privilege, defines white privilege as “an institutional (rather than personal) set of benefits granted to those who, by race, resemble the people who dominate the powerful positions.
in our institutions.”32 White male soldiers have to discredit themselves in order for their privilege to be taken away, such as when a male who does not perform the “expected and accepted type of militarized hyper-masculinity. Only when this happens is he positioned lower in the gender hierarchy, as does anyone else who does not fit that binary.”33 Interestingly, women who “perform” masculinity or maleness are not automatically granted white male privilege.

Often, it is not the white male’s intent, to make use of these unearned benefits but rather they do not see the advantages that they are being afforded because of their birthright and as such inclusion of marginalized groups in significant numbers is not likely to rapidly increase at the very senior ranks of the CAF until such time as meritocracy is recognized for the myth it is. According to U.S. Army War College Colonel Michael Hoise and doctoral candidate in Industrial and Organizational Psychology at Penn State University Kaytlynn Griswold, marginalized groups, less a narrow group of white, privileged and highly educated women, struggle with obstacles that their counterparts do not face. Hoise and Griswold contend that these barriers stem from three sources:

1) the bias inherent to subjective ratings;
2) stereotype-based behaviour; and
3) lack of social networks that facilitate access to important opportunities for skill acquisition.4

They further contend that the bias inherent to subjective ratings goes back to Bandura’s Social Learning Theory principles. In other words, drafters of personnel evaluation reports (PERs) are “motivated to see themselves in a positive light and therefore [unconsciously] evaluate those who share group membership with them positively as well.”35 Moreover, their research has concluded that stereotype-based behaviour is “linked to decreased performance in under-represented positions.”36 Marginalized groups fear being judged by the very stereotypes that have been inflicted upon them, thus they “fail to perform to their potential, thereby fulfilling the stereotype.”37 Your typical double bind. Likewise, confirmation of this stereotype then limits their access to mentors and social networks. After all, what leader wants to attach his or her name to an individual who is not performing? I would argue that a shift in our mentality is needed. We seem to equate mentoring with enabling already successful people to reach even higher goals. In reality, it is not the highly successful that require our assistance but rather those who struggle to just perform or actually fit in. This is one facet of being an inclusive leader. Other facets of being an inclusive leader include “coaching” and “sponsoring” of marginalized groups. Coaching and sponsoring can have very different impacts and outcomes because in mentoring, a mentor speaks to an individual about them, whereas a sponsor speaks about individuals to others. It must be remembered that creating and facilitating networks of support and communities of practice are also critical for inclusion.38

One thing is for certain, no longer can diversity and inclusion strategies afford to exclude the white male from these conversations. To do so means that they will continue to believe that diversity is inherently divisive. They will continue to feel alienated and vulnerable and may uncompensantly resist efforts to make the workplace more inclusive.39 Moreover, as baby boomers and Generation X personnel begin to retire, millennials are becoming the mainstay of our military, while the visible minority is becoming the majority, according to the 2016 Census from Stats Canada. In fact, in 2016, visible minorities made up more than 21 percent of the Canadian workforce, while millennials accounted for 50 percent of the working-age population.40 Subsequently, one could naturally conclude that without diversity, the CAF will not be able to recruit nor retain personnel in this changing demographic.

According to the 2018 Deloitte Millennial Survey “good pay and positive culture attract millennials and Gen Z but diversity/inclusion…are important keys to keeping them happy and keeping them with the organization beyond five years.”41 Therefore, since we recruit from across Canadian society and grow our leaders from within, it is imperative that the CAF incorporate inclusion within our diversity strategy. “Diversity is about being different, and inclusion is about welcoming those differences. Somehow that has become confused with the opposite notion, that valuing people as equals means suppressing our differences.”32

Not All Doom and Gloom

The good news is that the unconscious biases we have learned throughout our lives do not necessarily fall in line with our stated beliefs. More importantly, these biases are malleable, meaning associations we have ‘learned to make’ for ease of categorization can be gradually unlearned through a variety of methods,43 which in turn has the potential to eliminate the double binds that diverse groups face on a daily basis. Elimination of double binds also has the potential to increase mentoring, coaching, and sponsoring opportunities for these groups, allowing the organizational culture to “become more egalitarian, effective, and prone to retaining top talent.”44 Likewise, by openly acknowledging white male privilege, those in the prestigious power seats, can now earnestly contribute to resolving the disparity within the upper echelons of CAF leadership. Breaking down gender stereotypes allows everyone to be their best selves and according to ‘Athena Rising’ authors Johnson and Smith “workplaces defined by flexibility, collaboration, and caring are much more likely to exist when [marginalized groups] are deliberately integrated, assimilated and valued at all levels of leadership.”45
If We Build It, Will You Come?

While the implementation of a CAF diversity strategy is important, it is meaningless unless complimented by an action plan to make all our members feel included. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has made it abundantly clear that “ultimately, diversity is about making all of our people count and enabling their competencies, while maximizing their potential within the CAF. This means as a matter of practice, policy and institutional culture, we recognize, embrace and actively promote diversity as a core CAF institutional value,”46 and that we are committed to seeing beyond our differences. Yet, these efforts are being undermined by the current lack of inclusivity we are suborning by failing to act on unconscious biases, privilege, and meritocracy. Hence, we need to educate and hold to account all CAF leaders on what Deloitte Insights authors Juliet Bourke and Bernadette Dillon call the Six C’s of Inclusive leadership – “Commitment, Courage, Cognizance, Curiosity, Cultural Intelligence, and Collaboration.”47

If the military wants to be considered inclusive, it has to commit and that takes time and energy, something very little of us have in abundance. The one sure way to do this is empower all CAF members, not just those with privilege. “Leaders need to prioritize time, energy, and resources to address inclusion, it signals that a verbal commitment is a true priority.”48 In other words, they need to demonstrate their ‘intent’ followed by ‘action’ and ‘outcomes’. It is easy to take the first step to demonstrate and communicate intent and then follow this with action, it’s the ‘so what’ and performance measurement through ‘outcomes’ that is most critical.49

These very same leaders also need to have the courage to speak up on behalf of marginalized groups and challenge the status quo. Courage is the central behaviour of an inclusive leader, and it occurs at “three levels: with others, with the system, and with themselves”.50 For example, courage with others may include letting a superior know that he excluded those of Asian descent when he stated that ‘we are going to open the preverbal kimono.’ Courage with the system might include challenging the institutional assumption that only Royal Military College (RMC) grads make the best General Officers/Flag Officers (GOFOs) and courage with themselves may include their willingness to shine the spotlight on themselves, acknowledge their privilege, and expose their own unconscious biases.

In identifying weaknesses in themselves, courageous and committed leaders are also cognizant of organizational blind spots, such as ‘in-group favouritism fueled by privilege’, because they understand intuitively that unconscious biases are a leader’s and an institution’s ‘Achilles heel.’51 Inclusive leaders are also highly curious. They have a natural thirst to complete their knowledge picture, and thus are open to different ideas and experiences.

In the fifth C of Inclusive Leadership involves being culturally intelligent. For example, understanding how women are under mined every time they are reminded that they are the first female to be the (insert position here). “When you remind a person of a stereotype shortly before she must perform, focusing on the stereotype often lowers performance.”52 Think back to our discussion on meritocracy and stereotype-based behaviour. Finally, highly inclusive leaders are collaborative, because they know that “a diverse-thinking team is greater than the sum of its parts.”53

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Focus within:
- Tune into your emotions
- Recognize how your experience has shaped your perspective
- Stick to facts, and don’t make assumptions
- Turn frustration into curiosity

Learn about others:
- Recognize how their experiences have shaped their perspective
- Consider how they might see the situation and what is important to them
- Think about how your actions may have impacted them

Engage in dialogue:
- Ask open-ended questions
- Listen to understand, not to debate
- Offer your views without defensiveness or combative-ness
- Disentangle impact from intent
- Avoid blame, think contribution

“eXpand” the options:
- Brainstorm possible solutions
- Be flexible about different ways to reach a common goal
- Experiment and evaluate
- Seek out diverse perspectives

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How to decrease unconscious bias.
All CAF members, but most especially white male members who still make up the majority of the current strength of the CAF, have a critical role to play in creating an inclusive work environment and can do so by incorporating the six signature traits laid out by Bourke and Dillon in their day to day interactions with others. Unconscious biases, privilege and fake meritocracy will continue to disrupt inclusion efforts unless we include and more importantly engage male CAF members in the discussion.

**Conclusion**

When the CAF updated the Leadership doctrine and published *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* in 2003, the definition of leadership was changed from the old style of being “the art of convincing others to do what they might not have otherwise done” to defining effective leadership as “directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success. Effective CAF leaders get the job done, look after their people, think and act in terms of the larger team, anticipate and adapt to change, and exemplify the military ethos in all they do.”

Inclusive leadership may seem like a new term and has become a popular topic in the past few years as society recognizes the value of this approach in the workplace. However, this concept is based on the same principles of effective CAF leadership with slightly more ‘civilian language’ to illustrate that “strongly inclusive leaders show optimism, promote collaboration and are dependable. They might be competitive but not from a need for them to be on top. They want to see the group succeed. They alter the recipe from ‘just add diversity’ to making the essential ingredients count. Champions and advocates must lead the way when it comes to acknowledging unconscious bias, privilege, and meritocracy – they must demonstrate the ‘diversity walk.’ Inclusive leadership is the only way this institution will continue to attract, recruit and retain members from across Canadian society. Essentially, as stated in the very beginning of this paper, diversity and inclusion is not a zero sum game. By being open to inclusivity we will create parity and opportunity for all our members to succeed – not just those who were born with privilege and who demonstrate agentic leadership traits.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel S. Herr – DHRD.
2 Rear-Admiral Luc Cassivi, CDA Commander.
4 Bjorn Lagerlof, conversation with CWO Belanger, CDA HQ, 30 July 2018.
6 The External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces, 2015.
13 Ibid., p. 236.
15 Office of Strategic Diversity and Inclusion Programs, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Unconscious Bias, accessed 9 August 2018, at: https://diversity.llnl.gov/about/bias.
Have Autonomous and Unmanned Systems Changed War Fundamentally?

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Introduction

Technology is advancing at a pace that is changing how we visualize war. Have autonomous and unmanned systems changed war fundamentally? Remaining aware of the Clausewitzian distinction between the nature and character of war, I argue that war is undergoing a fundamental change in character. War is changing due to transformations in the technology on the battlefield, as well as in society and politics, and in relation to the warrior. This article begins with a background of unmanned and autonomous systems, before assessing current uses. I ask what we mean by war, and what defines fundamental change – specifically the much-discussed ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), societal and political change, and how the warrior has changed. Finally, I analyze what changes have been brought by autonomous and unmanned systems and how they constitute a fundamental change in war.

First, Some Definitions

Unmanned systems are vehicles that do not ‘contain’ a human, but are directly or indirectly controlled by a human who has made all decisions, often remotely. Importantly, automated systems deterministically ‘reason by a clear if-then-else, rule-based structure,’ meaning that, all other things being equal, output is always the same. Autonomous systems are similar, but can navigate their own environment and make their own decisions. Based upon environmental inputs, these systems reason probabilistically to predict the best course of action to achieve the goal. Autonomy is best understood on a scale and not as a binary, as there are varying levels of semi-autonomy.

From Whence the Unmanned System?

Humans have been removing themselves from combat for centuries; as long ago as archers in the 14th Century, combatants have sent forth aerial weapons. The unmanned leap can be traced to the 1940s, when Germany developed its V1, V2, and FX-1400 rockets. These were pilotless bombs powered by ram-jet or rocket motor, the first glimpse of a remotely-controlled ‘aircraft,’ and they were the predecessors of the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles of the 1950s and then armed with nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War. These systems became increasingly computerized, as they already required computational speed beyond human ability, and were superior at the repetitive and monotonous tasks required to monitor airspace for aerial or nuclear attacks.

In the 1970s, these technologies grew still more capable. Observers of the industry discussed Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) being potentially utilized in combat, including 'bombing, reconnaissance and even close air support,' and as an air superiority fighter capable of maneuvers unlimited by human physiology. Weapon autonomy increased with technologies such as the ship-born Aegis, a system designed to defend naval ships from missile attacks; B-52 computers, which calculated when to open the bomb doors and release weapon payloads in the 1991 Gulf War; and Patriot missile systems, able to lock on to threats at distances and speeds beyond the capabilities of humans, and with an ability to react autonomously.

This brief background aims to demonstrate that early iterations of unmanned and autonomous systems have existed for some time. Today, their uses are enmeshed in warfare – being used by air forces, armies, and navies in every tactical environment. Unmanned and autonomous technologies have been especially appealing for jobs that are ‘dull, dirty, or dangerous.’ These are jobs that humans are either inherently not good at, or strongly dislike, or are likely to result in user death or serious injury. Not only are these technologies seen as important for their contributions to national security and for saving human lives, their low price tag compared to manned systems makes them attractive. For example, the Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is designed to be ‘employed primarily against dynamic execution targets,’ fulfilling some of the same missions that manned fighters such as the F-35 does, but can do it cheaper. The Predator UAV costs approximately one-thirtieth that of new manned fighter jets, and it can carry out many of the same functions. And the cost-effectiveness of unmanned aircraft is expected to improve. Unmanned systems will continue to get better and cheaper as the ‘smart-phone revolution’ introduces and refines tiny sensors, gyroscopes, GPS, radio and controls – providing opportunities for the military, but also for non-state actors with access to basic technology.

This progress in unmanned vehicles is not limited to aircraft systems, but has become ubiquitous on land and at sea as well. Bomb disposal and delivery systems in combat zones have been increasingly entrusted to unmanned vehicles such as the PackBot and SUGV. Militaries are also developing autonomous transport vehicles that rival the leaps being made in the commercial sector. Some militaries also continue to push ahead with autonomous weapon systems, such as South Korea’s SGR-A1 sentry robot that monitors the Demilitarized Zone. The United States Navy also continues to utilize its advanced Aegis combat system with its ability for fully autonomous target engagement. And the US is also developing new technologies like the Shipboard Autonomous Firefighting Robot.
These technologies will continue to become ‘more capable, intelligent, and autonomous.’ Current trends indicate these machines will soon ‘learn world models,’ not only mapping surroundings but segmenting and labelling objects as do humans. These possibilities exemplify the field of unmanned and autonomous technology today, and its trajectory in the future.

**What Is War?**

Distinguished British historian Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers of the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, provide five criteria in Oxford’s ‘Changing Character of War’ project: “First, war involves the use of force...Second, war rests on the contention [that]... possibly the most important feature of war is reciprocity...Third, war assumes a degree of intensity and duration to the fighting...Fourth, those who fight do not do so in a private capacity, and fifth, and consequently, war is fought for some aim beyond fighting itself.” These five criteria, while raising some questions (largely regarding thresholds and metrics), are instructive in helping us discern what constitutes war. Unmanned and autonomous systems do fit the five criteria; an objection could be that reciprocity is unclear between a low-technology insurgency and a high-technology robotized force, but we must remember that “…the enemy has a vote and that his responses might be ‘asymmetrical.’” Having said this, unmanned and autonomous war still fits this definition.

Clausewitz provides the most well-known conception of war. He says that “war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale... War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfils our will.” Clausewitz claims “war...always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is therefore a political act.” He sees war consisting of a “wonderful trinity,” embodied in the people, the general and his army, and the government. This trinity is necessary to the nature of war, and will factor into our later analysis. Lastly, Clausewitz describes war as such:

“There is only one single means, it is the fight. However diversified this may be in form, however widely it may differ from a rough vent of hatred and animosity in a hand-to-hand encounter, whatever number of things may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting, still it is always implied in the conception of war, that all the effects manifested have their roots in the combat... All that takes place in war takes place through armed forces, but where the forces of war, i.e., armed men are applied, there the idea of fighting must of necessity be at the foundation.”

Importantly, “fighting must be at the foundation,” and all war’s effects must have “roots in the combat.” Therefore, we could reasonably argue that belligerents of both sides must be present, “i.e., armed men are applied.” The question of thresholds arises... Would archers have counted as combatants? What about artillerymen and bomber pilots? Do UAV pilots count? And ‘supervisors’ of autonomous systems? Clausewitz might answer that as ‘the fight’ is in pursuit of a political end, the nature of war has not changed, even if technologies ‘may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting.’

**What Is Fundamental Change?**

The term ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ has become prolific in military writing, but the meanings scholars attach to the term are diverse – with diverse arguments that there have been between two and eleven RMAs throughout history. Futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler claim that the only true RMAs resulted from the Agrarian and Industrial revolutions, and all other ‘so-called ‘revolutions’ in warfare are greatly exaggerated.” Less restrictively, historian Simon Adams argues there have been eleven revolutions, and career US Army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich submits that ten RMAs have occurred just since the 14th Century. From a middle viewpoint, British Army officer and historian J.F.C Fuller has identified three, and Israeli military historian Martin Van Creveld argues for four. Some have attempted to bridge the divide by describing a spectrum. Others, such as American strategists Steven Metz and James Kiievit, separate “minor and major RMAs.” While avoiding semantics, it is important to decide where warfare diverges from evolutionary progress and becomes “revolutionary.”

Most authors agree that a revolution entails “not mere reform but rather an overthrowing of an established order and its replacement with something fundamentally different.” It must “fundamentally affect strategy,” and advance “broader economic and political changes.” Importantly, most experts, including the “most restrictive in defining RMAs,” believe that a revolution is presently occurring.

**The Social-Political Dimension**

What makes a RMA truly revolutionary is that it drives or is driven by broader social and political change. There are two aspects of social and political changes currently being driven by the technological changes – casualty avoidance and lack of societal connection to the military.

Leaders endeavour to minimize war’s casualties to prevent domestic resistance to foreign policy. This approach was seen in Bosnia and Croatia, where “No nation that sent forces to join UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force], or for that matter NATO in support of UNPROFOR, had any intention of committing those forces to battle or indeed of risking them at all.” The distinguished British General Sir Rupert Smith, commanding the mission, said the UN’s rules of engagement made clear that “…the safety of the forces was more important than implementing the mandate.” This demonstrates the disinclination governments have for casualties.

Citizens are also increasingly uninterested in war. With the widespread end of conscription and the proliferation of technologies that separate soldiers from direct combat (neither of which are negative developments in themselves), the West has grown accustomed to watching “from a safe distance, empathizing but not experiencing, sympathizing but not suffering.” This disconnect has serious implications, especially in democracies, where there
is supposed to be an innate connection between the demos (populace) and the foreign policies of its government. As unmanned and autonomous systems spread in warfare, the last remaining human connections with the frontline may be severed. War becomes more a sport to be watched and enjoyed than to contemplate with mortal seriousness. This is apparent in viral ‘war porn’ videos from soldiers and UAVs uploaded to YouTube and shared by millions of people. And this brings to mind General Robert E. Lee’s observation over a century ago, that “…it is good that we find war so horrible, or else we would become fond of it.” The downside to the public, and its political representatives, becoming desensitized to the realities of war is that war begins to seem less awful as a tool of politics.

A related question is whether autonomous and unmanned systems have changed the warrior fundamentally. Again, technology has continuously increased distance between soldiers and their enemies – from archery, to artillery, to bomber aircraft. Unmanned and autonomous technologies create a more profound distance in that it is not merely physical, but also a “psychological distance and disconnection.” Pilots of some unmanned systems face the challenge of flying combat missions in a war zone, and then driving home to their families. A Predator pilot shared the following illustrative statement: “You see Americans killed in front of your eyes and then have to go to a PTA meeting.” This situation has resulted in a high rate of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among UAV pilots as they struggle to reconcile the battlespace with their home life.
Another aspect of warriors’ disconnect from the battlespace is that they become entirely indifferent to killing. As the new warrior safely fights his battle from a control station, the emotion and fear that normally exist are absent, and the act of killing a designated enemy becomes routine.60 Today’s ‘techno-warrior’ heralds the arrival of a ‘new’ combatant – some have questioned whether they should be considered warriors at all.61 However, in the end, “…warfare is quintessentially a human endeavor…technologically sophisticated weapons are only means to an end.”62

So, Have These Systems Changed War Fundamentally?

Unmanned and autonomous systems bring fundamental changes to warfare. The number of unmanned vehicles in Iraq skyrocketed from a few in 2003, to more than 5,300 in 2009, becoming utilized in practically every mission.63 Unmanned Combat Aerial Systems (UCAS), such as the Boeing X-45 and Northrop-Grumman X-47, are being developed to replace human fighter pilots and are already capable of flying many air combat missions.64 Unmanned systems are employed in a vast array of tasks: by ‘combat commuters’ in Nevada who fly Global Hawks and Predators from thousands of miles away, as well as troops operating mini-UAVs for tactical surveillance and reconnaissance.65

 Autonomous systems also continue to improve, to the point that humans are being pushed further out of ‘the loop.’ Operators have maintained ‘veto power’ over computers, but as the battlespace grows faster, more confusing, and more complex, hesitation to overrule autonomous systems increases.66 This is becoming more relevant as autonomous systems are capable of decisions without humans, including to take life, but they have not yet been permitted to do so. In the coming decades, however, militaries will become more confident in autonomous systems’ learning and decision-making, permitting them to override human decisions when necessary.67 When this happens, humans could be pushed out of the loop at every plateau except the political-strategic level.68 Some militaries have already accepted the need to “adapt its tactical authority delegation and eventually use artificial intelligence and automation to enhance and speed up decision-making.”69

A final hurdle in granting autonomy to systems in warfare is permitting ethical decisions. Computers can follow ethical frameworks or rules of engagement. In fact, autonomous systems excel at Kantian ‘categorical imperatives’ and the demands of strict ethical guidelines, perhaps better than humans.70 Autonomous systems are uninfluenced by anger, fear, vengeance, or even self-preservation in uncertain environments.71 These possibilities constitute a further step in the fundamental change in war, so we must consider them now.

Conclusion

After introducing the concept of war, we discussed fundamental changes, noting that a Revolution in Military Affairs should “fundamentally affect strategy.”72 The use of unmanned systems, particularly drone strikes and surveillance, have played a key role in the West’s role in the Middle East
over the last decade. President Obama made them “the centerpiece of his administration’s counterterrorism policy,” confirming a shift in strategy at the strategic and political level. Recall also, that military revolutions must coincide with “broad economic and political changes.” Economically, the unmanned and autonomous revolution has had a dramatic impact upon employment, as machines transform the economy and job landscape. We also discussed the political and social changes underway due to unmanned and autonomous systems – including public and political disconnect from war, and the ‘spectator sport’ mentality, possibly undermining the very foundation of ‘peaceful democracies.’

“Economically, the unmanned and autonomous revolution has had a dramatic impact upon employment, as machines transform the economy and job landscape.”

Finally, recall Clausewitz’s triunity, comprising the people, military, and government. The people are scarcely affected by war, the army does not even need to be physically present, and the government (resulting from the other two) experiences a lack of accountability. If every aspect of the triunity is presently undergoing fundamental change, then it is reasonable to conclude that unmanned and autonomous systems have fundamentally changed the character of war. It is important that we address this change now because, in one manner or another, this issue will continue to require our deep attention.

NOTES


3 Ibid.


6 Ibid., p. 23.

7 Ibid., p. 5.


10 Ibid., p. 338; Gordon Johnson et al, p. 2.

11 Gordon Johnson et al, p. iii.


22 Ibid., p. 7.


25 Ibid, pp. 16-17.

26 Ibid., p. 24.


28 Ibid., p. 15.


30 Tim Benbow, p. 16.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 20.


34 Ibid., p. 22; Michael O’Hanlon, pp. 74-75.


38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., p. 9.

40 Colin McInnes, p. 154.


42 Ibid., p. 351; Colin McInnes, pp. 143-144.


45 Ibid.


47 Ibid.


51 Christopher Coker, p. 116.


57 Christopher Coker, p. 149.

58 Ibid.


60 Christopher Coker, pp. 182-183.

61 Ibid., p. 177.

62 Tim Benbow, p. 22.

63 Hillel Ofek, pp. 35-36.

64 Michael O’Hanlon, pp. 74-75.


66 Hillel Ofek, p. 36.
The Rise of Private Military Corporations: Consequences, Considerations and Implications for the Canadian Armed Forces

by Nicholas Kaempffer

Introduction

Life, death, and the provision of violence required to change a human being from one state to another in a war zone previously relied upon the discretion of state-levied soldiers. In this regard, the authority and legitimacy to kill was solely within the purview of the military, which was guided, controlled, and ruled by civilian oversight. This brief article will demonstrate how members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) must be aware of the ever-unfolding, and still unfinished story of the rise of Private Military Corporations (PMCs), and the commodification of violence that has been established, guided, and maintained by newly-established governmental security policies. The first two sections, A Brief History of Fighting for Profit, and The Rise of Modern PMCs, will situate the reader within the history of mercenaries, and explain the transition from soldier-for-hire armies of old to operator-based security corporations today. Next, the section entitled

- Rajiv Chandrasekaran
  2003 meeting CPA Governor Paul Bremer
Challenges of Privatized Force Provision will discuss the unique difficulties that modern PMCs create for the contracting agent, focusing upon arguments from major opponents both for and against the use of private security forces. This article will then conclude with a final section entitled Consequences and Conclusions, a discussion of the specific issues regarding PMCs found within Iraq, and more specifically, within the Green Zone inside Baghdad, will be undertaken. The intent of this research paper is to highlight how PMCs are changing the very nature of war, as modern security policies dictate life and death throughout global ‘hot spots’ based upon motives of profit alone, which is of significant concern for members of the CAF, who have the potential to work with, and fight against these non-state actors. As the nature of war changes, so too does its impact upon the CAF and our NATO allies. As the provision of force and violence transitions from an issue of state control to private profit, private security theories are having life-and-death consequences worldwide, as PMCs become ever-more prevalent – significantly altering the battlefields and conflict zones to which members of the CAF may be deployed. To properly contextualize this privatized security revolution, the initial link between the state security and mercenary engagement must first be discussed.

A Brief History of Fighting for Profit

At a first glance, the proliferation of PMCs within zones of conflict appears to be a relatively new phenomenon. Yet, when analyzed from a historical perspective, the usage of privatized military entities was prevalent (albeit in a different form, discussed herein) during the world’s first military empire of Sargon of Akkad, in 2500 B.C., up to the start of the 19th Century. When comparing past to present, two important distinctions must be made, one being terminology, and the other being corporate structure. Sargon’s professional army was comprised of foreign warriors, known as mercenaries, enticed by profit to provide military service for a foreign ruler. Many famous generals headed successful campaigns with armies comprised of mercenary soldiers, most notably Hannibal of Carthage. It was Europe’s feudal age that sullied the reputation of soldiers-for-hire, as privately raised armies savaged Europe’s urban landscape during the Thirty-Years War:

Drunk with victory, the troops defied all efforts to control them... Towards midday flames suddenly shot up at almost the same moment at twenty different places. There was no time for Tilly and Pappenheim to ask whence came the fire; staring on consternation, they rallied the drunken, disorderly, exhausted men to fight it. The wind was too...
strong, and in a few minutes the city was a furnace, the wooden houses crashing into their foundations in columns of smoke and flame. The cry was now to save the army and the imperialist officers struggled in vain to drive their men into the open. Rapidly whole quarters were cut off by walls of smoke so those who lingered for booty or lost their way, or lay in a drunken stupor in the cellars, alike perished.4

The demise of the feudal state at the end of the 18th Century coincided with the general disappearance of mercenaries, as standing armies of levied citizens replaced private soldiers of ill-repute and wavering allegiance. In present day, with the rise of cost-efficient, risk-adverse security policies and agendas, privatized military forces have reappeared, albeit in the cloak of altered terminology. PMCs provide operators, who provide what are essentially identical services to those of Sargon’s mercenaries. The preference and selection of the word operators over mercenaries by PMCs stems from the desire to distance their employees’ services from the negative connotations of the latter term. Thus, over time, the terminology of outsourced military service has been rebranded, as by definition alone, mercenaries and PMC operators are identical – they are hired soldiers, motivated by money, as opposed to patriotism or ideals. It is the corporate structure of PMCs that sets the current model of privatized military force generation and use apart from the mercenary armies of the past. Mercenary armies were generally comprised of individually hired soldiers, under the command and control of officers from the hiring nation. Individual soldiers-for-hire had little agency beyond choosing their employer, while the burden of decision-making fell to state-appointed actors (officers).5 PMCs, through their corporate structure, are different entities entirely. While, as discussed previously, there is essentially little difference to the mercenary of the past and the operator of today, the corporate structure of PMCs means that the agency over the private use of force falls upon corporate leadership.6 Not only does this change the dynamic of responsibility within armed conflict from a national level to a corporate level, it places a financial ‘bottom line’ on the provision of organized violence. Thus, PMCs are subject to market cycles and investor demands, and private leadership in a way unknown to mercenary armies of old. The history of private military forces goes back to the dawn of organized warfare, and whilst contemporary PMC operators are little different than their mercenary counterparts of the past, it is the corporate structure of modern military companies that has produced a new, complex urban actor. This article will now examine how the re-emergence of private military forces, in the form of PMCs, was brought about by risk-adverse, cost-efficient security policies.
The rise of PMCs was directly correlated with the acceptance of neo-liberal economic and political policies by the governments of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and Ronald Reagan in the United States of America. These policies were then adopted by many Western and non-Western nations alike, and fuelled by globalization. Peter Singer, author of *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, describes how PMCs are part of this overall economic agenda:

Thus, the privatized military industry is just the next logical step in this global trend of privatization and outsourcing. It is simply a more aggressive manifestation of the market’s move into formerly state-dominated spheres.

As one observer opined, ‘If privatization is the trend these days, the argument goes, why not privatize war?’

With PMCs at the many modern conflicts, questions have been invariably raised as to the validity of the outsourcing of state-sanctioned violence. Lacking the oversight of conventional military forces, PMCs are often regarded with great scorn by local populations, and the resulting tensions have led to international incidents. The escalation of the insurgency in Iraq is largely credited to the deaths of four operators working for the PMC Blackwater in Fallujah. Despite advice from the American Department of Defense (DoD), Blackwater sent two under-manned vehicles against contractual agreement into Fallujah in March 2004, which were ambushed, and their occupants burnt and hung from a bridge over the Euphrates River. The subsequent invasion of Fallujah by US forces resulted in the deaths of many soldiers, and was the coalescing point for a national insurgency movement that still rages today. Proponents of PMCs, such as Brigadier-General (retired) Ernest Beno, have countered that despite the dangers of utilizing PMCs in complex urban battlefields, the increased risk can be balanced against “…the drain of having highly skilled soldiers doing tasks that can be accomplished in a more efficient manner.” Thus, PMCs can ‘free-up’ soldiers from mundane tasks, allowing the state’s military forces to focus upon combat mission effectiveness, which may override the aforementioned monitoring challenge.

Beyond arguments of cost-effectiveness, the usage of PMCs by governments has been described as a political tool, with the outsourcing of the provision of force providing distance between the government and the harsh realities and consequences of war and combat. In later interviews, Singer provided a further explanation for the rise of PMCs as a neoliberal creation, going beyond the simple economic rationale, stating that: “It’s not about economic cost savings; it’s about political cost savings. When things go wrong, you simply blame the company.” Thus, PMCs have become an expedient political solution for leaders eager to distance themselves from conflict. It is within this zone of separation that the potential for moral and ethical dilemmas exists, as decision makers are increasingly removed from the economic and political consequences of military actions; this challenge will be discussed in depth later. The acceptance and rise of PMCs on the contemporary battlefield is clearly attributed to the
endorsement of modern economic and political policies; this reintroduction of private armies into areas of urban conflict does not come without significant challenges to contracting governments.

Challenges of Privatized Force Provision

As demonstrated, policies that outsource war and urban conflict to PMCs present many challenges and key considerations to the provisioning government. When employed, PMCs are primarily used to provide both security and logistical assistance within a delineated theatre of operations. One inherent problem with PMCs is the issue of oversight, as it may be difficult for government agents and forces to observe and limit the behaviour of the PMCs it employs. Peter Singer, a vehement critique of PMCs, believes that this lack of oversight in any operation possess the ability to produce a negative operating environment for mission success, placing friendly elements (i.e. soldiers, diplomats, and foreign aid workers) at an increased risk. However, PMC industry leaders are highly sceptical of academic censure levelled against their business, with Erik Prince, president of Blackwater, one of the largest PMCs in the world, stating that:

'We have been trying to get Peter Singer [of the Brookings Institution and author of Corporate Warriors] over to Iraq for months. He won’t go,’ says Erik. When asked what he thinks about Singer’s constant criticism of the unregulated use of private security contractors, he thinks for a moment and says with a chuckle, ‘Let’s just say that Peter Singer has very soft hands.’

Despite Erik Prince’s vehement rebuttal to Singer’s argument in 2006, time and history has detracted from the strength of his argument, as Blackwater was banned from operations in Iraq in 2008 after several high-profile incidents, including the murder of 17 Iraqi civilians at the hands of Blackwater operatives. Following their ejection from Iraq, Erik Prince stepped down as the CEO, and the company rebranded itself as Xe, and has shifted the focus of its operations to aircraft provision and law enforcement training. While Blackwater is no longer operating within Iraq, many other PMCs have entered the foray to fill the void left by their departure, competing for immense profits offered through security contracts.
Consequences and Conclusions for Members of the CAF

PMCs are changing the very nature of war, as governments often eschew the cost and risk of employing state actors within conflict zones — therefore these modern firms and policies are dictating life and death throughout global ‘hot spots’ based upon motives of profit alone. No longer does the authority and legitimacy to kill exist solely within the purview of the military, guided, controlled, and ruled by civilian oversight, but within the boardrooms of powerful PMCs, where security practice is based upon policies designed to maximize profit. Members of the CAF must be aware that PMCs are now an ever-present component of the battlefields and conflict zones of the 21st Century – certainly the implications of this movement will continue to affect and alter war as we know it.

Captain Nicholas Kaempffer, BA, an artillery officer, and a previous CMJ author, was the 1st Place winner of the 2017 Geoffrey Brooks Memorial Essay Competition with this short article. He is currently Battery Captain – Headquarters Battery, The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery School of the Canadian Armed Forces.

NOTES
5 Gwynne Dyer, p. 222.
8 Peter Singer, p. 70.
11 Peter Singer, p. 70.
13 Peter Singer, p. 35.
14 Ibid, p. 68.
15 Robert Pelton, p. 296.
18 Ibid.
Improving Family Support in the Canadian Armed Forces: A Qualitative Study

by John Zwicewicz

NOTE: Research Ethics Board approval was received by the University of Regina prior to conducting the survey questionnaire.

Introduction

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members face a wide array of challenges while deployed on international operations. These deployments vary from six to twelve months in duration and occur regularly throughout one’s career. Service members and their families are both affected throughout these long periods of absence. The deployed member faces demanding working conditions, stressful situations, and the dangers inherent in combat operations. Their families back home must adapt to their absence not only emotionally, but by increasing their relative share of family responsibilities. Increasing the support to the families of Canadian Armed Forces members has been identified as one of the key initiatives within the new defence policy, Strong Secure and Engaged. Over the next 10 years, $144.8 million has been budgeted to increase support to military family resource centres, and $198.2 million has been budgeted for a new total health and wellness strategy that will focus on well-being in the work place, which includes physical, mental, spiritual, and family support. The intent of this research was to analyze the opinions of deployed CAF members on the current family support mechanisms in place, and to identify recommendations to improve existing programs and policies that support military families.

Problem Statement

Military members who frequently deploy on operations report higher-than-average rates of life dissatisfaction, due to the negative impact that deployments have upon their families. The CAF is presently facing both recruitment and retention challenges. Therefore, reducing rates of job dissatisfaction is of significant concern. As a result, Canada’s new defence policy places significant emphasis upon improving the way that military members and their families are supported. To inform subsequent program development efforts, research is required to identify and prioritize areas of concern affecting deployed CAF members.
Research Objectives

The research objectives were to define gaps in current family support programs for deployed members, members’ knowledge of current support programs, and identify suggestions on how family support could be improved. The data for this research could be used to inform further research into the development of policies, programs, and awareness campaigns to augment family support mechanisms in place for deployed service members. The target group studied included CAF members who are currently away from their families on a deployment.

Methodology

The methodology for this exploratory research study employed a qualitative method through a written questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed to ten CAF members currently deployed on Operation Impact, which is the CAF mission that provides support to the global coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The participants were all selected from a population of CAF members currently serving within the Joint Task Force – Iraq Headquarters who are currently in the midst of completing a six month deployment in Kuwait. The questionnaire included five open-ended questions that were designed to understand the effectiveness of current CAF family support programs. Further, the questionnaire allowed participants to identify opportunities where family support programs could be improved or introduced.

Background

A literature review was conducted that indicated several critical trends related to reducing the job dissatisfaction of military members through improving family support. Economic incentives, the availability of professional services, and programs that strengthen social support networks in military communities were identified as methods to improve support to families. The literature review also noted that concepts of family is changing in society to expand beyond policy and legal interpretations of marriage, to include an increased rate of cohabitation without legal marriage, which is not accounted for in military policy or programs.

Limitations

This study had a small sample size of ten respondents. Each respondent was selected from the Canadian Joint Task Force – Iraq Headquarters. Military headquarters primarily consist of senior members within the CAF who would have greater experience in coping with military deployments and earn higher salaries than junior members. As a result, their responses cannot be considered as representative of the entire CAF population. Further, the members on this deployment have reliable methods to contact their families via the internet and telephone. Those who are deployed in austere conditions with limited mechanisms to communicate with their families may have a different perspective on family support mechanisms due to the increased stress faced by themselves and their families during a deployment.
Findings

*Current deployment compensation programs are not perceived by military members to adequately compensate additional expenses incurred during a deployment.*

Deployments often result in additional burdens being placed upon military families due to the absence of the service member. For members with children, child rearing responsibilities must be fully assumed by the CAF member’s partner. Several participants indicated their deployment resulted in their spouse’s earning potential being negatively affected. For example, one member stated, “...my wife isn’t able to work the same hours due to my deployment and family obligations.” These types of comments were also raised by several other participants who noted their spouse had to place an increased focus upon taking care of children.

Several members also noted that additional expenses related to pet care, such as boarding fees, are not accounted for in current compensation packages. One member stated, “...while CAF members choose to own pets, the mental health benefit of pet ownership is well documented and provides companionship to spouses when their partners are deployed. However, the CAF does not pay for any costs associated with pet care during deployments.” Legally, the definition of family does not include pets. However, those with pets often consider their pet as a member of their family. These costs of additional pet care services can vary from full-time to part-time boarding fees for members who are single, or whose family members cannot care for the pet for the full duration of their deployment.

Other members noted that homecare services, such as housekeeping, lawn services, or snow removal were not covered. One member noted that, “…the idea of weekly yard work can be overwhelming for families with a deployed spouse, particularly for snow removal in winter. There is no compensation provided for yard service or snow removal companies.” CAF benefits policy provides two tiers of this type of service to deployed members. Single members on deployment can claim up to $230 per month for homecare services. However, members in marriage or common-law relationships are entitled to no reimbursements. The current policy presumes that the spouse at home should be responsible for managing the household and the accompanying increased workload. As the proportion of dual earning families with children has increased from 35.9% to 69.1% from 1976 to 2014, this policy could benefit from revision to account for the realities of the modern household. 8
One participant indicated that they felt they were fairly compensated. “I feel that the CFA [sic] fairly compensates me for additional expenses incurred by my family while I am deployed. The operations foreign service pay is granted to members in order to offset the additional costs owing to the member’s absence.” This response highlights a potential need to ensure members are aware of the purpose of the additional benefits they receive on deployment. Members may feel more satisfied with compensation packages if there are educated with respect to the purpose of each specific compensation bonus they are afforded during deployments.

Home units offer varying level of support to deployed members and their families.

In the CAF, a member’s primary place of employment prior to deploying is considered their home unit. Members on deployment are temporarily detached from their home unit to an overseas mission and then return to work in these same organizations upon completion of their tours of duty. Several participants indicated that their home unit offered support to their families while deployed. One member noted, “…my Commanding Officer’s wife checks in with my wife and helps with whatever she needs,” and that their “…unit fire team partner…also checks in and provides any assistance of support she needs.” Other participants note that home units, “…offered to invite them to unit events/dinners.” Several other participants provided similar responses indicating that units had contacted their families to invite them to these types of event as well. One participant indicated their home unit has given no support, and stated, “…my spouse has also received no contact or check-ins from my chain of command.” Conversely, another participant indicated that their unit, “…offered support for the spouse that included shovelling driveways, mowing lawns, helping to winterize vehicles, free tire change outs for deployed members. Also had a robust comms [sic] plan for the spouses.”

The questionnaire results indicated there is a wide range of support provided to deployed families, ranging from none at all, to significant support being provided by the unit to help their spouse during the absence. The absence of consistency in unit support programs could be based upon the lack of standardized policy on what support a unit should provide. The Chief of the Defence Staff guide for Commanding Officers states, “…the CAF has a moral obligation to support military families in meeting the unique challenges of service life.” However, little formal guidance exists regarding what types of support should be provided within a unit, and how it should be delivered. While some units may adopt this guidance and consider assisting families as a responsibility inherent in the requirement to care for their subordinates, others
CAF members have a basic understanding of the deployment support programs available.

Awareness of support programs through the Military Family Resource Centre (MFRC) was common among participants. Prior to deployment, members are obligated to receive a briefing and counselling session with the MFRC, and therefore, this level of awareness is expected. Several members noted taking advantage of these services, such as “...childcare services through MFRC. Scheduled youth activities at MFRC for deployed families.” Another participant noted that they used a program to receive compensation for their child’s hockey camp. However, another attempted to use this program but stated, “...[the]summer camp grant ran out of money before we applied.” Summer camp funding is offered through the Support Our Troops Program, which is funded by non-public funds that are contingent upon transfers from the Government of Canada and private donations. While this program offers a significant benefit, its inconsistency in availability to deployed members could be investigated to consider the advantages of better funding the program.

One participant noted they were aware of the “Deployment Support Centre.” However, the organization has been deactivated as of 2013 after the Canadian mission in Afghanistan ceased. This comment may indicate a lack of knowledge of current programs being offered to members. Further, several other members indicated they were aware of MFRC, but did not indicate they had taken advantage of any of the available programs, aside from mail service that provides a means to send mail to deployed members free of charge. This reporting may be a result of hesitancy to disclose personal information related to the use of emergency child care or crisis services, or it could be a result of poor retention of the information provided during MFRC briefs and interviews.

CAF members have valuable recommendations to improve family support.

Participants provided diverse recommendations with respect to how the CAF could improve support programs for military families. One participant recommended that the CAF work with the Government of Canada to introduce legislation to better protect the jobs of reserve soldiers on deployment, similar to other countries, such as the United Kingdom, which provides robust job protection for reserve soldiers. Presently, no such protections exist in Canada and reserve members on deployment may find their civilian employment in jeopardy upon return. Lack of job protection impacts family life, due to the instability in income upon return from deployment.

Members also made recommendations for improving services provided by the MFRC. Several respondents indicated that while offers of support were made, they were not specific. One respondent recommended that, “...[the]MFRC actually ask the spouses/partners in for a one-on-one check-in...done at least monthly...in addition to deployed family activities.” This method could provide beneficial assistance, as both units and the MFRC were noted to offer support in a non-specific or vague manner. Families could benefit from the MFRC taking a more active role to help assess family needs so they could provide support for specific areas of concern during the deployment period. One participant suggested that the CAF introduce “…a formalized volunteer-based resource for sporadic assistance with child care and household tasks.” This type of program could be implemented by local MFRCs, and could leverage local high school students who are required to complete volunteer service prior to graduation.

Conclusion

The research study analyzed the opinions of CAF members currently deployed to Kuwait on Operation Impact. Participants noted that they are well supported by the military, but there is room for improvement. Questionnaire responses noted that benefit packages should be more inclusive: both single and married members should receive housekeeping benefits, the same Home Leave Travel Assistance benefits, and pet care should be considered for members that must board their pets while on deployment. Current compensation policies assume that a deployed member’s spouse will be able to handle the additional housework and child care responsibilities during the member’s absence. However, this research strongly suggests that this policy is out of date, as several respondents noted that their spouse had to make career and personal sacrifices to take on these additional family responsibilities. All CAF compensation programs that affect family benefits should be reviewed to ensure their inclusiveness, given the increases in the proportion of dual earning families.

The research also noted inconsistencies in the support that military units provide to their members on deployment. Some members received no support at all, while other units make significant efforts to assist them members while they are away. While units are advised to take measures to care for the families of their members, there are no specific activities to achieve this goal that must be taken. Some units may be faced with operational pressures such that they have little resources to dedicate towards rear-party tasks, such as family support. This data indicates the need for further research to determine what type of support should be offered to families by units, and how units can be enabled to offer that care. This research could involve both families and unit leadership to determine how a unit support program could be delivered.
The study also noted recommendations to improve the provision of services from MFRCs. Opportunities for awareness campaigns were identified to ensure that all CAF members are made aware of the range of public and private benefits available to them while a family member is deployed. Further, it was identified that MFRC services are often generalized and lack a personal touch. Further research could be conducted to determine how increases in the scope of MFRC services could best improve conditions for the families of deployed members.

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NOTES


Why Study History?

by Jonathan Cox

Military history in and of itself is of little value. The study of history must be about more than simple facts and figures of the past if it is to be useful. The effective study of military history helps to build a conceptual framework for the study of historical context, generating pseudo-experience that can be applied to modern-day problems. If examined on a wide front and probed deeply, history will uncover many truths, forcing one to ask the right questions in an attempt to truly understand the obscured nature of historical events. Seeking these answers provides access to the collective knowledge of the profession of arms which can add to or supplant practical experience. The search for such knowledge ought to begin now, particularly in young military professionals, in order to develop the capacity to effectively apply these skills when needed.

There are those who believe that history is of no use in understanding modern conflict. They argue that conditions of today have evolved to such a point that historical examples are incapable of being replicated in modern terms. This viewpoint is based upon a narrow assumption that history is only useful for providing simple answers to old problems. If history is used solely to search for direct correlations to discover archetypal solution sets to today’s problems, then the military professional is doomed to failure. To garner true value, one must understand what the study of history provides and how to apply its lessons.

Clausewitz discusses the proper and improper use of historical examples. He acknowledges that some examples provide simple explanations of events. However, it is when history is used to prove the possibility of an effect or to deduce a doctrine that it provides the greatest benefit to the education of military professionals.1 Even then, it is not the conclusions themselves that are of most value; it is the development of creative and critical thinking skills that teaches one how to effectively apply history. Historical events must be understood within specific historical context, “which is always unique,” if it is to “offer meaningful lessons from history.”2 History itself will not provide concrete answers to future challenges, but it can uncover a path.

The importance of history is the skills gained from its rigorous inquisition. This will help to produce generalized concepts to inform future actions. The validity of these concepts will increase relative to sample size by challenging assumptions from differing viewpoints and highlighting the uncertainties present in the nature of conflict. The role of history is to “illuminate for the military professional the true, ‘untidiness’ of history” and highlight the complex and unclear interplay between factors.3 The goal is to provide a framework within which to think about the problems themselves. This framework can then be used to glean potential solutions based upon general themes and balanced against current conditions. It is the process of analysis that provides the ultimate value, not the history itself.

Professional knowledge can be gained through practical or educational experiences. The study of military history provides the most reliable method, since it is readily available to any individual willing to seek out the information. Practical experience often is a product of circumstances beyond the control of the military professionals.4 Even though the study of history does not equate directly to experience, it does provide a reliable backdrop that can approximate experience. Even direct experience itself will not necessarily provide the skills to deduce solutions to future problems. The value is not gained until that experience is analyzed.

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1 Clausewitz, Vom Begriff der Kriegsführung, 1839.
2 Ibid., p. 144.
3 Ibid., p. 147.
4 Ibid., p. 149.
and internalized. It is this process of examination that develops stronger intuition to help frame future thinking, just as the proper study of history will provide.

By understanding why conflicts occurred and how they unfolded, whether directly experienced or studied, one can begin to understand the conditions of the time and generalize theories to develop a deeper understanding. Furthermore, the range of historical examples available as a portion of the corporate knowledge of the entire profession of arms extends well beyond the experience available to any one individual. This pseudo-experience can be used to better adapt historical models to new scenarios, creating analogues of old problems within current conditions. It is not about the right facts, but using the framework to ask the right questions that generates value.

In considering the application of military history, it is important to consider the time constraints imposed on the individuals relied upon to produce viable recommendations or decisions. Effectively synthesizing and applying historical information is a time-consuming process. The time to conduct an in-depth analysis of emerging problems will not always be available. Thus, it behoves one to have this information available, or at the very least, to be in possession of the skills to rapidly deduce relevant context. Military professionals ought to practice this skill often in order to be able to deliver thoughtful and coherent recommendations when required.

Military history, when understood and applied properly, is a valuable tool for the military professional. It is insufficient to simply apply past examples directly to emerging problems. The key is to use history to deduce patterns and relationships to supplement experience and build intuition. Understanding history cannot wait until a problem emerges. The study of history must begin now if it is to support effective application in the future.

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NOTES

7 Luvaas, pp. 28-29, 35.
The Trudeau government’s December 2016 and May 2018 decisions to, respectively, replace the long-serving CC-115 Buffalo and legacy CC-130 Hercules with 16 Airbus CC-295s and “to replace or upgrade current and projected obsolete systems on the CH-149 Cormorant fleet [and] to augment the current CH-149 fleet size” portend a long-awaited rejuvenation and renewal for a vital component of the broader Canadian search and rescue system. The decisions to acquire the well-equipped CC-295 and to initiate a mid-life upgrade and fleet augmentation for the Cormorant—one of the comparatively few new-build aircraft specifically acquired for SAR in Canada—also represent something of a revolution for a search and rescue arm that has, since its formal inception in the late-1940s, largely depended upon a variegated mix of modified, often minimally modified, conversions of aircraft types already on the Canadian inventory. In the early postwar years, this included such repurposed types as the Avro Lancaster, Douglas Dakota and Consolidated Canso, as well as the Noorduyn Norseman, Lockheed Ventura and Canadair North Star. New production SAR aircraft were largely confined to such types as the Piasecki (Vertol) H-21 helicopter, the de Havilland Canada Otter and the Grumman Albatross amphibian. In more recent decades, the conversion in lieu of procurement model—which would have been more palatable had it been unfailingly accompanied by timely and genuinely substantive SAR modifications—has similarly embraced multiple types, ranging from the de Havilland Canada CC-115 Buffalo and Lockheed CC-130 Hercules to the Boeing Vertol CH-113A Voyageur, Bell CH-135 Twin Huey and Bell CH-146 Griffon.

Even when new-production aircraft were ordered or procured for Canadian search and rescue units there have been quantitative and/or qualitative issues. The RCAF’s original early-1960s order for the Boeing Vertol CH-113 Labrador—destined to become one of the true backbones of SAR in Canada—ludicrously provided for only six aircraft. The de Havilland Canada CC-138 Twin Otters, as delivered in the early 1970s, were strikingly ill-equipped for search and rescue. By the same token, Brian Mulroney’s abortive CH-149 Chimo SAR variant of the Anglo-Italian EH101 (now AW101) helicopter was better equipped for search and rescue than Jean Chrétien’s EH101-derived CH-149 Cormorant.
Guardian Angel, by Charles Vinh. A successful rescue by a CH-113 Labrador and its crew.
Not surprisingly, further advanced in timescale than the more complex and multifaceted Cormorant mid-life upgrade and fleet augmentation initiative, the fixed-wing element of SAR renewal embraces 16 Airbus CC-295s (i.e., three aircraft each for CFBS Greenwood, Trenton and Winnipeg, five for CFB Comox—which will ultimately house both an operational squadron and a new operational training squadron for the CC-295 and CH-149—and two maintenance ‘floaters’), infrastructure and set-up activities, such as training and engineering services, the construction of a new simulator-equipped training centre at CFB Comox, and the requisite maintenance and support services. Base-level maintenance by RCAF personnel will be reduced from the current CC-115/CC-130 model, but, in an intriguing and potentially promising departure from the full Alternative Service Delivery approach adopted for some Canadian fleets, first-line maintenance of the winglet-equipped CC-295 will utilize predominantly RCAF personnel working alongside a small number of private sector (i.e., PAL Aerospace) aircraft maintenance engineers. The aircraft will incorporate substantial Canadian content, including the PW127G powerplant from Pratt & Whitney Canada and the ubiquitous MX-15 electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) system from L3 WESCAM. The RCAF’s CC-295s, the first of which is slated for delivery in late-2019, will also feature an ELTA ELM-2022A maritime radar.

The CC-295’s sensor suite and mission management system represent a quantum leap over the austerely-equipped Buffalo and Hercules—and provide the new aircraft with some intriguing secondary and tertiary potential in ISR applications such as coastal surveillance—but, that said, the CC-295 does represent some loss of speed and endurance from the legacy SAR CC-130H Hercules. Canada’s newer CC-130J Hercules will remain relevant as a secondary SAR asset (i.e., for the deployment of major air disaster [MAJAD] equipment and supplies), but a case could also be made for maximizing the broader—albeit secondary—SAR potential of the CC-130J by procuring a modest number of roll-on/roll-off sensor packages that need not interfere with its primary transport role. This admittedly raises financial, doctrinal, crewing and other issues, but is worthy of the most thorough analysis.

On the rotary-wing side of the ledger, Sikorsky initially expressed the hope that Ottawa would hold a competition to meet its emerging search and rescue requirements—for which Sikorsky would offer an appropriately configured variant of its S-92 helicopter, a type already adopted by the coast guards of Ireland, the United Kingdom and South Korea. In Sikorsky’s view, an S-92-based solution would be “more affordable at acquisition and throughout the entirety of the lifecycle” and offer useful levels of commonality with the RCAF’s existing, S-92-derived, CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopter. Although an intriguing concept and one similar in certain respects to the Mulroney government’s abortive plan to acquire variants of the EH101 for both maritime and SAR applications, the Trudeau government opted to pursue the Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade (CMLU) Project through “a non-competitive process with the Original Equipment Manufacturer, Leonardo S.p.A. (formerly AgustaWestland)” and its associated Team Cormorant (CAE, Rockwell Collins Canada and GE Canada).

In the view of Leonardo, Ottawa’s CMLU decision “recognizes that the AW101 [ex-EH101] is the only helicopter to meet Canada’s primary [rotary-wing] search and rescue requirements and that it has been an excellent search and rescue asset providing outstanding coverage and capability…for RCAF search and rescue squadrons.”
On a more practical political note, the prospect of plunging into yet another full-scale helicopter procurement competition—not exactly an area of strength for any Canadian government—could not have filled the Trudeau government with unbridled joy.

The CMLU Letter of Notification released by Public Services and Procurement Canada in May 2018 sought “to inform industry of Canada’s intent to replace or upgrade current and projected obsolete systems on the [CH-149] Cormorant fleet, to augment the current [CH-149] fleet size, and to procure a [Rotary-Wing] Search and Rescue Flight Simulator.” In a subsequent statement, a DND spokesperson noted that “the Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade project will extend rotary-wing SAR services to at least 2040 by upgrading the existing CH-149 Cormorants” and augmenting the current 14-strong Cormorant fleet with up to seven additional AW101 helicopters. Fleet expansion, as media reports noted, could entail any of several options, including the acquisition of new-build AW101s, the leasing of AW101s or the activation of seven of the nine American VH-71s that were acquired by Canada in 2011 as a source of spares for the existing Cormorants. Perhaps most telling, and potentially unsettling for those who seek an integrated, comprehensive and truly full-scope rejuvenation of the Cormorant (as opposed to piecemeal upgrades) were the spokesperson’s observation that “capability enhancements will include replacement and modernization of avionic, communication and sensor system components. Other upgrades including replacement of older systems and new systems that improve operational effectiveness may be considered [emphasis added] following further industry consultation.”

A Leonardo press release of 29 May 2018 reported that the firm, together with Team Cormorant, looked forward “to continue working with the Government of Canada to conclude the Options Analysis and finalize the requirements for the CH-149 CMLU and fleet augmentation, simulation and training program. Based on the AW101-612 standard, Leonardo and Team Cormorant will provide a very low risk solution to upgrade, enhance and address obsolescence, as well [as] augment the fleet to return the Cormorant to all four RCAF Main Operating Bases.” Leonardo took note of recent efforts to reduce the cost of operating the Cormorant fleet, adding that “the CH-149 CMLU and [fleet] augmentation will position the rotary-wing SAR fleet for further reductions in [the] cost of ownership over the extended life of the fleet to 2040 and beyond.”

Some inkling of what a rejuvenated Cormorant might bring to Canadian search and rescue was explored in the October-November 2018 issue of Skies magazine. Invited to fly a new-production AW101-612 destined for Norway—and representing a “configuration that Leonardo has proposed to the RCAF”—former test pilot and Labrador pilot Robert Erdos concluded that the
AW101-612’s "leading-edge systems—particularly electro-optic sensor technologies—offer SAR capabilities that are as much a generational improvement over the current Cormorant as the Cormorant was over my beloved…Labrador." Upgrades on offer to Canada, noted Erdos, included "new, more powerful, full-authority digital electronic-controlled (FADEC) General Electric CT7-8E turboshaft engines; a more modern Rockwell Collins cockpit and avionics suite; [an] improved aircraft management system; and a newly-designed, four-axis dual-duplex digital automatic flight control system (AFCS)." The sensor package “promises the biggest capability upgrade, and includes an electro-optical surveillance system; a multi-mode active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar; [a] cell phone detection and tracking system; and [a] marine automatic identification system (AIS) transponder receiver.”

Although much delayed, the CC-295 and CMLU initiatives signal at least a start to a genuine renaissance in the primary search and rescue capabilities of the RCAF. The CC-295 should provide an operationally effective, and genuinely cost-effective primary SAR asset for multiple decades. That said, it would be lamentably short-sighted if appropriate steps are not taken to realize the full secondary search and rescue potential of the CC-130J fleet. The definitive future shape of the rotary-wing element of primary SAR is more difficult to discern at this juncture, but there is a certain intoxicating appeal about the prospect of 21 Cormorants (or quasi-Cormorants) functionally equivalent to the AW101-612—a SAR helicopter that even externally looks more business-like than our existing Cormorants. The conundrum, of course, is that eye-watering performance often comes at an eye-watering price. Whether the available funds will stretch sufficiently to provide a truly comprehensive and integrated upgrade for the Cormorant, a meaningful increase in fleet size—which is crucial if the long-neglected Trenton search and rescue region is to regain a truly credible helicopter capability—and other elements of the CMLU package remains to be seen. The need for CMLU is readily apparent—indeed, Canada’s broader SAR credibility is on the line—but there are sceptics who fear that it could amount to a series of piecemeal enhancements and thereby fail to generate vital SAR capabilities or to realize the full potential of the Cormorant.

We would do well to remember that shiny new or rejuvenated fleets of fixed-wing and rotary-wing search and rescue aircraft—although absolutely indispensable—will not alone provide the type of thoroughgoing search and rescue renaissance (and world-class search and rescue system)—that Canada and Canadians require. DND’s partners in SAR, including the Canadian Coast Guard, the RCMP, provincial and territorial governments (most notably, but not exclusively, their law enforcement agencies), civilian volunteers, and the private sector participants in search and rescue, have SAR shopping lists, too.

We must in particular remember that broader issues of SAR policy and SAR governance remain to be tackled—and tackled on a holistic, priority basis. One could posit, for example, that Canada still lacks an up-to-date, integrated and comprehensive national search and rescue policy, that the original concept of
a “lead minister” for search and rescue has seemingly disappeared into the ether, and that the National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS)—now ensconced within the Department of Public Safety—has continued to contract in size and apparently now lacks a military representative or, indeed, an ex-military individual with direct operational experience of search and rescue. In a somewhat similar vein, as Jean G.R. Leroux recently posited in the pages of this journal (Canadian Military Journal, Vol 18, No 2): (a) the “current framework and resources allocated to the [NSS] prohibit an effective connection between the strategic level and the operational elements of the SAR system”; (b) the “SAR agencies are often operating parallel to each other with no genuine coordination linking them together”; (c) even though “the [National SAR Program’s] vision calls for SAR coordination [emphasis in the original] integrated in a multijurisdictional approach, the operational level is a cooperation [emphasis in the original] that is constantly challenged by federal-provincial relationships”; and (d) the “lack of coordination produces erroneous expectations of the SAR system from the population.”

To address such shortfalls, Leroux recommended that Ottawa “empower the National SAR Secretariat (NSS) to its original purpose of being the central agency of SAR representatives” and “augment current joint Rescue Coordination [Centres] (JRCCs) with the RCMP, relevant lead police agencies and Ground SAR (SARVAC) to make them multi-dimensional [centres] of operational coordination for all types of SAR incidents in Canada—land, marine, and air.”

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BOOK REVIEWS

Why We Fight: The Cognitive Basis for War
by Mike Martin
London: Hurst & Company, 2018
224 pages (HC), $25.78
ISBN-10: 9781849048897
Reviewed by Christopher Elliott

Scholarly attempts to understand aggression in *homo sapiens* are probably as old as the human sciences themselves. From the labors of IR scholars studying interstate conflict at the level of whole political systems, to micro-level examinations of the psychological structures that impel individuals towards violence, the existing literature on the subject is fatiguing even to summarize. The story of Cain the farmer and Abel the herdsman can convincingly be read as a retelling of a land war between agriculturalists and pastoralists at the dawn of civilization. Later, in ancient Greece, Thucydides surmised that the Peloponnesian Wars were explicable by three thematic motives: fear, honor, and interest. Looking inwardly, Sigmund Freud imagined aggression as a death instinct which arose in direct opposition to the creative, life-producing drive exemplified by sex.

Continuing unto the present, others, from Konrad Lorenz, with *On Aggression*, to Azar Gat, with *War in Human Civilization*, have also tried to answer the fundamental question – why do humans set out, purposefully, to kill each other? In the same scholarly tradition is Mike Martin’s *Why We Fight*. From the outset, and writing as a war studies scholar with expertise in biology and social psychology, Martin’s thesis is bold and clear. “Status and belonging are the two main drivers of human conflict,” he contends – a claim evidenced by examining the neurological and evolutionary impulses that steer all *homo sapiens* in analogous directions.

Central to the study of violence, Martin argues, should be a mutual agreement that humans, as animals, are subject to the fundamental laws of natural selection – a biological fact that frames his status-and-belonging model. In then rejecting “group selection” – a Darwinian theory which posits that evolution can also occur at the level of the group – Martin adopts the gene-centred view of evolution, whereby selfish genes are replicated across generations by the vehicle of status-seeking individuals.

An organism’s primary prerogative, Martin argues, is to propagate its genetic material. This means that in a state of natural competition, humans will seek first to maximize two important quantities: status (which helps one to secure mates and resources) and belonging (which helps one to form war coalitions in order to stave off the violent ambitions of aggressors). At a neurochemical level, Martin asserts, status and belonging are underpinned by the release of two hormones – testosterone, the hormone which spurs inraspecific competition and hierarchy-climbing; and oxytocin, the bonding hormone which strengthens in-group impulses and generates hostility towards out-groups.

In also examining wartime self-sacrifice, Martin argues that combat altruism in early hunter-gatherer bands originally evolved because of “inclusive fitness” – the notion that genetically-related kin were included, consciously or otherwise, into an individual organism’s survival calculus. By this reasoning, a warrior should be willing to die for two brothers or eight cousins because kin persistence would guarantee his genes’ survival. As societies then grew larger, the kin identification-and-preferencing mechanism came to apply to non-kin such that modern soldierly “bands of brothers” now resemble “imagined” or “fictive kin.” In-group-out-group divisions meanwhile, continue to cause wars, while the risk of dying in battle is seen, in biological terms, as a soldier’s membership price for belonging to the group. Implicitly, the group is understood here as a mere marriage of convenience for the individual’s genes – an obstinate rejection of the group selectionist view, which would see self-sacrificial war service as a group-level survival adaptation. As a neurological, psychosocial and genetic account of warlike behaviour from the perspective of the individual, Martin’s thesis is comprehensive – intuitively sound, tested empirically, and with anecdotes from his own experiences serving in the British Army on operations in Afghanistan. Moreover, his distilment of individual motivations for fighting down to “status” and “belonging” is nigh-on as good as we can ask for with currently-available research.
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Full disclosure though... Mike Martin is currently co-supervising my doctoral studies at King’s College London. As such, and to put his theory into practice for a moment, there are both “status and belonging” considerations at play here which, all things being equal, will probably influence how I review Why We Fight. Having said that, it might surprise the reader to learn that although I see Martin’s book as an important addition to the sociobiological study of conflict, he and I furiously disagree on the role played by group selection (and by extension, ideology) in how and why conflict occurs. Indeed, where Martin’s grappling with human aggression seems most inadequate is in his discussion of the role of ideology – here defined as the normative beliefs and values which adhere groups and which individuals within the group are socialized into holding as self-evident.

We know, of course, that ideology can be a potent shaper of behaviour in wartime. It was bushido which drove Japanese kamikazes to fly aircraft into Allied ships during the Second World War. It was the mere thought of having dishonoured the Führer which drove Hans Langsdorff, captain of the pocket battleship Graf Spee, to shoot himself after defeat at the battle of the River Plate. It is the utopian phantasm of a global “caliphate” which inspired a jihadist suicide bomber to blow himself up at a roadside checkpoint. And it is the esprit de corps – the spirit of the [group] body – generated by recruit training at Parris Island which, over the years, has propelled more than one US Marine to dive on a grenade for his friends.

When influenced by deeply-embedded ideological structures, humans in the midst of fighting frequently put aside their own interests for those of the group. This seems obvious. Such frameworks of “moral sense,” as Darwin described them, can be weaponized to ensure that individual organisms are willing to serve the group, even to the detriment of genetic longevity. This is group selection at work. If not, then how could it be better or more parsimoniously explained? The short answer is that most cases of combat altruism which result in the death of the individual probably cannot be explained in terms of individual, kin or “fictive kin” selection because when one’s comrades are not one’s relatives, there is no genetic advantage selecting in favour of self-sacrifice. This applies especially to expeditionary wars, where the violence threshold is well below that of total war – i.e., where the survival benefit for one’s family back home is negligible.

In these instances, social norms override the organism’s in-built gene propagation drive. Thus, the group and not the individual is the vehicle by which natural selection occurs. Although Martin’s individualist rationale probably holds true for many or even most explanations of conflict, the existence and persistence of combat altruism presents a puzzling outlier, as the earlier examples show. This is where recent research in the domain of “multilevel selection” – which posits that clusters of organisms can sometimes behave like a “superorganism” and that the process of natural selection can “toggle” between individuals and groups – might fill the gaps left by Martin. Individually-disadvantageous, group-advantageous behaviours among non-genetically-related kin are observed across the animal kingdom – from parasites living in the stomachs of cattle, to leaf-cutter ants, through to forest chimpanzees, and finally, to humans.

As such, and although Martin’s well-articulated status and belonging theory may explain many things about the ethological history of conflict in homo sapiens (and animalia, more broadly) the significant exceptions to the rule where altruistic ‘groupishness’ does exist requires more serious consideration. ‘Zooming out’ from the individual allows us to look in on the system-as-whole – allotting for holism and curiously, given the scale, greater detail. The question of ‘why we fight,’ it appears, will never be answered until we learn to see a war-band of humans, not just as a collection of individuals, but also as an occasional functional collective.

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Always Ready: A History of the Royal Regiment of Canada
by Donald E. Graves
Toronto: The Royal Regiment of Canada Association, 2017. i-xii, 562 pages, illustrated; 47 maps. $50.00

Reviewed by Steve Harris

"... the job of the regimental historian," observed C.P. Stacey, “is to see that full justice is done to his own regiment.”

J. Goodspeed’s Battle Royal, published in 1962, was a serviceable history of the Royal Regiment of Canada’s first hundred years. Fifty-six years later, it was time for a new account, but in Donald E. Graves Always Ready, the Regiment has much more than a merely updated, serviceable history. Well-researched, wonderfully written, spectaculously illustrated (there are thousands of photographs, diagrams, and other images), and with some 47 clear, uncomplicated, and informative maps, it is the epitome of the new standard for Canadian regimental histories – a standard which Graves and Robin Brass Studios have been instrumental in establishing.

The historical narrative lies at the core, and in one sense, this narrative is what it is and has always been. Emphasis is given to ‘operations,’ but the vagaries of peacetime soldiering are not left out. Nor are ‘peacetime’ deployments.

What makes the telling of the story different here reflects, in part, Graves’ access to or use of documents not previously used (particularly first-hand accounts), as well as his idiosyncratic insights – the product of some forty years’ experience researching and writing Canadian military history. If the personal accounts add a contemporaneous legitimacy to the story, the author’s
unsurpassed familiarity with his material allows him to contextualize convincingly. He knows the army and the militia, and is therefore able to assert, persuasively, that not only was it “imprudent” for the Regiment to seek a “Royal” prefix after only one year or so of its birth, but also that the grant of the prefix on 10 April 1863 was “probably much to everyone’s surprise.” (p. 9).

Similarly, although the story of Lieutenant-Colonel Allan’s insistence that the 3rd Battalion CEF was not a pre-war regiment has been told before, the author found an interview transcript that clinches the significance of the episode. “In the words of Captain Henry Cooper,” he writes, “the Toronto Regiment ‘found its soul’ in Allan and never lost it thereafter.” (p. 110). This speaks to the power inherent in the regimental system and to the loyalty Canadian Corps veterans had to their wartime units – the reason why, after the war, there was such a demand to create The Toronto Regiment in the Militia, rather than have it simply perpetuated.

As they should, the wartime chapters focus upon battalion-level operations, and are based upon war diaries and first-hand recollections. Where contextual background is necessary, it is clear that the author is familiar with all the broader historical analyses, and there are useful interludes dealing with the medical system, manpower problems, conscription, and above all, (for the Second World War) the prisoner of war experience. Illustrations of soldiers’ personal kit, the weapons commonly issued to the infantry, and organisation charts are well-placed. Successes at the unit level are celebrated: “It went just like clockwork; it was a corker; I mean, oh boy, did we whack them!” Henry Cooper recalls of Vimy. But success is not over-stated: Vimy is seen as a “triumphant moment for the Canadian Corp” but correctly assessed as marking only its “increasing” professionalism. (p. 135)

The fighting in Northwest Europe from July 1944 to May 1945 was difficult. Verrières Ridge, Hautmesnil, Forêt de la Londe, the Albert Canal, Woondecht, and the Rhineland were all ‘slogging matches.’ There were no great victories such as Vimy, Hill 70, or the battles of the “Last Hundred Days.” As the Regiment knew, and Graves relates, the Royals were “fighting a war, not making headlines.”

The one headline the Regiment did make was Dieppe. Questions are still being asked about 19 August 1942, and not all of them have been conclusively answered. For Dieppe veterans, the agonizing reality has always been the possibility that they had seen their friends die for no worthwhile purpose whatsoever. Given this, and the weight of available evidence, writing the story of 19 August is no easy task for the historian of a Dieppe regiment. He is not an alchemist who can concoct a victory out of disaster, but neither does he want to pile hurt on psychological wounds that still inflict pain. What is “full justice?”

Graves acknowledges the historical debate on the politics of the raid – to impress the Soviets; persuade the Americans that it was too early to launch a cross-Channel assault; and perhaps, to further Mountbatten’s career – and that is essentially all he can do. There is no conventional wisdom which clinches any of these alternatives. On the other hand, he is very direct in his assessment of the raid’s planning (both for RUTTER and JUBILEE), accepting the testimony of both Goronwy Rees and Bertram Ramsey that the planners were “amateurs” or “inexperienced enthusiasts.” And he observes that both Royals’ commanding officers, Colonels Basher and Catto, expressed doubts, only to be told to shut up…

That the Royals had been given an impossible task at Dieppe has been clear for years: thirty minutes to clear the East Headland before the main force landed. That Catto did what he could to improve the Regiment’s chances (ordering Bangalore torpedoes because he was certain there was wire on the seawall), or its survival on the active order of battle in the event of “tragic results” (pp. 233-234) is, unfortunately, less well known. The author’s account of the raid is superb, as one would expect, and is well supported by photographs explaining the killing ground Blue Beach came to be.

But perhaps the greatest contribution regarding Dieppe lies in Appendix E, where Graves addresses head-on two issues upon which the Regiment, until now, has steadfastly maintained a dignified silence: allegations by a handful of Royal Navy officers that some Royals were reluctant to leave their landing craft upon approaching the beach at Puys, and ad hominem criticism of Lieutenant Colonel Catto for not doing more once he reached the headland. The historiography of the former has never been told before, and what appears here must be considered to be the full and final word on the subject. As for the latter – the author exposes the negative comments about the commanding officer to be the calumny they are.

Speaking personally, I would be intimidated by the task of writing the peacetime history of any Canadian militia regiment because so much depends upon what funds are made available...
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to support recruiting and training. Unfortunately, it is not just conscription that has been “a pipe dream not grounded in political reality” (p. 427), but also the consistent and adequate financial and administrative support that allows a regiment to move ever forward. The bad years are easily visible here, years when a Regiment capable of maintaining a strength of perhaps 250 or more was reduced by fiat to 157 plus the band. Still, the good years are also apparent, years in which the Royals’ success matched that of the growing metropolitan Toronto area.

Added to the mix, at least since the 1970s, is the requirement to track operational deployments, both at home and overseas – deployments often enough by individuals or Royals in small groups. This is done well, but for me, two aspects stand out: the breaking down of barriers between regulars and reservists, and, more importantly, the support the Regiment has offered to its soldiers both when away and when they have returned home. True loyalty ‘up’ has always required loyalty ‘down,’ and it is clear from this history that the extended Royals’ family has never forgotten that adage.

Always Ready has done ‘full justice’ to the Royal Regiment of Canada and its predecessors. It is a good read – and it is very good history.

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My Country, My Life: Fighting for Israel, Searching for Peace
by Ehud Barak
New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2018
$31.95 (HC)
$15.99 (Kindle)
ISBN: 978-1-250-07936-7
Reviewed by Michael Goodspeed

By any reckoning, Ehud Barak is an enthralling character, but this is certainly not the main reason for reading his autobiography, My Country, My Life: Fighting for Israel, Searching for Peace. Barak is arguably the most experienced soldier in recent history and has been one of the foremost political leaders in the world’s most dangerous region. His careers as a soldier and a politician are inextricably entwined with virtually every key event of the last half-century in the Middle East.

As a member of Sayeret Matkal, operating deep in Syria and Egypt, Barak commanded long-range reconnaissance missions that provided the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) critical early warning as to their enemies’ intentions and preliminary movements just prior to the Six Day War. During the fighting, he commanded a reconnaissance group. In 1972, he led the rescue mission of the hijacked Sabena airliner at Lod airport, and shortly thereafter in Beirut, he led one of the major retaliatory counter-strikes against the perpetrators of the Munich Massacre. In the Yom Kippur War, in command of a tank battalion, he spearheaded the pivotal counter-attack at Chinese Farm. He was a key planner in the legendary rescue mission at Entebbe. Among other influential jobs, he went on to command an armoured brigade, he served as head of military intelligence, was a key player in implementing the Oslo Accords, and was one of the chief advisors in negotiating peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt. Latterly, he served as Chief of the Defence Staff.

As a politician, Barak served as head of the Labor Party. From 1999 to 2001, he served as Prime Minister in a Labor coalition, and as Defence Minister under both Labor and Likud governments. In his political life, he pulled Israeli troops out of Lebanon, ending a twenty-two year occupation. He oversaw the political direction of Israel’s response to the two Intifadas, was the initial driving force behind building the West Bank Wall, and oversaw the strike on Syria’s nuclear reactor. He supervised Israeli preparations for a strike on Iranian nuclear installations, and was Defence Minister during the 2008-2009 conflict in the Gaza Strip. In the peace process negotiating with Yassir Arafat, he unsuccessfully attempted to bring about the creation of an independent Palestinian State. Later, he was one of the dominant political drivers in advocating the unilateral dismantling of all Israeli settlements and military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. He is a man who deserves to be listened to what he has to say.

For Canadian military leaders, My Country, My Life is an important book for several reasons. On its own merits, Barak’s leadership certainly warrants study. But of greater worth are his portrayal of the attitudes and cultural differences in Israeli operational and strategic problem solving and his detailed and relatively impartial analyses of the strategic situation in the Middle East. Despite being a fascinating narrative in its own right, these insights give the book its value to contemporary military leaders.

While Israel is the most embattled nation on earth, and Canada is seemingly one of the most secure, there is still much about their planning processes from which that we could benefit. One
of the major undercurrents that runs throughout the narrative is the IDF’s characteristically aggressive and daring operational planning. Israeli successes, as described by Barak, were uniformly marked by resourceful thinking, innovation, a measured acceptance of risk, collaborative planning, and rapidity of decision making – all features that were notably missing in less successful operations, such as the outset of the Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

Although Barak does not specifically make the point, one notion his book makes abundantly clear is that Israel has been fighting the same war for survival and legitimacy since 1948. What differs are the conflict’s campaigns, specific enemies, tactics, and the level of intensity. The campaigns, as he describes them, have been waged across the spectrum of conventional and asymmetric operations. Barak has fought in campaigns that vary in nature from traditional high intensity battles, such as the Six Day War, to protracted irregular insurgencies, such as localized responses to rocket attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah. At the heart of each phase of these agonizingly-long hostilities has been Israel’s battle for existence and acceptance.

Despite his decades of active service and unparalleled combat experience, Barak sets out his story as a moderate and a centrist, which is not to say he is impartial. He is a fervent Israeli patriot, but he is neither a zealot nor an absolutist. The image that emerges in his autobiography is a man who is humble, self-effacing, direct, slightly introverted, and shrewd. It would appear that his professional success stems largely from his intellect, his focus, and a streak of creativity. Born and raised on a kibbutz North of Tel Aviv, he has degrees in Mathematics and Physics from Jerusalem’s Hebrew University and Engineering Economics from Stanford. A man of broad interests, he is a competent, classically-trained pianist.

Barak believes that since its inception as a nation, Israel has had to take its fate in its own hands and can never wait for approval for action from outside states. This theme of having the courage to take decisive independent action is a recurrent one. As a soldier, Barak’s operational career was characterized by boldness, creativity, and resolution in the face of uncertainty. As a Prime Minister, he took an enormous calculated risk in offering to relinquish up to 93% of the West Bank, along with Gaza and most of East Jerusalem. The peace talks collapsed when Yassir Arafat refused to negotiate. The Israeli electorate blamed Barak and he paid the price at the polls.

Notwithstanding the political defeat, Barak remains adamant that despite Israel’s military superiority, a never-ending state of hostilities is in the long term unsustainable. In a state where the Palestinian birthrate consistently exceeds the Jewish birthrate, Israel cannot remain both a Jewish state and a democracy. He believes demographic realities demand that Israel must coexist with its Palestinian neighbours in two separate states.

In this respect he condemns the current government as being “…the most right-wing, deliberately divisive, narrow-minded and messianic government we have seen in our seven-decade history.” Barak depicts Netanyahu’s government as one that is single-mindedly attempting to establish control over all of biblical Judea and Samaria, a quest he believes will leave Israel in a state of perpetual insecurity.

Barak’s book is written in a refreshingly simple and straightforward style. It provides much to think about in terms of power, strategy, leadership, and politics. It is an illuminating study of conventional, unconventional, and asymmetric warfare, as well as a nuanced examination of the political considerations of military action. It is an important book, and more than worth the investment of a few hours reading.

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