MILITARY STRATEGY
5 Victory as a Strategic Objective: An Ambiguous and Counter-Productive Concept for the High Command
   by Jennie Carignan

DEFENCE ETHICS AND SPIRITUALITY
15 Conscience and the Canadian Armed Forces
   by Victor E. Morris
26 Spiritual Resiliency in the Canadian Armed Forces
   by Derrick Marshall and Yvon Pichette

MILITARY HISTORY
34 The Battle for History: Nova Scotia’s 85th Battalion and the Capture of Hill 145, Vimy Ridge, 1917-1943
   by Daniel Byers

VIEWS AND OPINIONS
45 Equine Assisted Therapy to Help Couples with PTSD: The Evidence for Improved Personal Relationships
   by C. Randy Duncan, Steve Critchley, and Jim Marland
53 Up the Creek Without a Paddle
   Alain Cohen and Julien Chaput-Lemay
58 Sir Isaac Brock’s Magic Bullet
   by Guy St-Denis

COMMENTARY
60 A Renaissance for the RCAF?
   by Martin Shadwick

BOOK REVIEWS
67 BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
70 BOOK REVIEWS
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Conscience and the Canadian Armed Forces

Spiritual Resiliency in the Canadian Armed Forces

The Battle for History: Nova Scotia’s 85th Battalion and the Capture of Hill 145, Vimy Ridge, 1917-1943

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NOTE TO READERS
As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to the Spring 2017 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. This is a very special year for “our home and native land,” as we celebrate our 150th birthday as a confederated nation since 1867. And from a military perspective, this Spring marks the centennial of a very significant military victory for the then-young nation, namely, the capture of Vimy Ridge on 9 April 1917.

This historic engagement on France’s Douai Plain ended up being one of the very few successful operations conducted during the ill-fated Arras Offensive of 1917, and it was a watershed moment for the young Canadian Corps under the command of the British General Sir Arras Byng. Fighting together for the first time in the war, all four Canadian divisions captured the ridge from the defending German forces on 9 April, and it was never again surrendered to the Germans during the rest of the war. Although a brilliantly-planned and executed operation, it came at a high cost in blood. In all, the Canadian Corps incurred more than 10,000 casualties, of which at least 3000 were fatalities. However, perhaps more than anything else, this successful engagement by Canadian infantry units, with British formations in support, imbued the young corps with a fierce sense of battle pride and accomplishment, and it gave heart to dispirited and war-weary citizens on the home front. And the motivation, confidence, and sense of self-worth this successful battle generated would serve the Canadian Corps well under the able command of the Canadian Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie in the fierce battles yet to take place, notably Passchendaele, and the last one hundred days of the war.

As a tribute to this epic engagement, the French nation gifted in perpetuity 250 acres of land surrounding the ridge to Canada. “Eleven thousand tonnes of concrete and masonry were required for the base of the Memorial; and 5500 tonnes of ‘trau’ stone, quarried on the Dalmatian coast, were brought from Yugoslavia for the pylons and the sculptured figures. Construction of the massive work began in 1925, and eleven years later, on 26 July 1936, the monument was unveiled by King Edward VIII.” That event is the subject of this issue’s cover image.

Following an extensive multi-year restoration, Queen Elizabeth II re-dedicated the monument on 9 April 2007, the 90th anniversary of the battle. This soaring and elegant memorial, “…stands as a tribute to all who served their country in that four-year struggle, and particularly those who gave their lives (some 66,000). There were [also] many who have no known grave. Inscribed on the ramparts of the Memorial are the names of 11,285 Canadian soldiers who were posted as ‘missing, presumed dead’ in France.”

Four major articles this time out. Taking the point, Brigadier-General Jennie Carignan is a Combat Engineer who is currently Chief of Staff Army Operations, Canadian Army. Herein, she explores the objective of victory in war as a consideration for the highest levels of leadership. In her own words, “The article will demonstrate that victory is not useful as a strategic objective, but it will not call into question the importance of the troops’ operational effectiveness, or of tactical success.” Curious? Read on...

Next, two articles dealing with defence ethics and spirituality. In the first, Padre Captain Victor Morris examines the following questions: “What is conscience and why is it held so sacred that it is listed as the first fundamental freedom of Canadian citizens? What is the role and function of conscience for the Canadian warrior in relation to professional military ethics? What is the role of conscience for those in the CAF who carry out state-sanctioned violence? [And finally] What happens when one’s conscience is at odds with one’s orders or mission?” Padre Morris is followed by Padres Derrick Marshall and Yvon Pichette, who discuss the concept of spiritual resiliency in the Canadian Armed Forces with respect to the mental health of the entire Defence Team, and why they posit that spiritual resiliency issues can be a challenge to anyone.

In our historical section, and very much in keeping with the issue’s commemorative theme, Professor Dan Byers of Laurentian University recounts the epic engagement and capture of Hill 145 by Nova Scotia’s 85th Battalion, the site at which the Vimy Memorial actually stands. These brave maritimers succeeded where others had earlier failed, but their accomplishments were initially overlooked by the Canadian Army’s Historical Section. Byers addresses this miscarriage in depth. He further offers: “…it serves as a reminder of the ways in which much of our history comes to be preserved and written, and how it can be shaped by the influences of particular individuals despite our best efforts as historians to reconstruct events as truthfully and objectively as possible.”

Three very different opinion pieces in this issue… Leading off, Randy Duncan, Steve Critchley, and Jim Marland revisit the University of Saskatchewan’s innovative Can Praxis equine-assisted therapy initiative to help combat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and to “…improve the personal relationships of veterans, active service members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), along with their respective spouses and partners who have been impacted [by PTSD].” Never underestimate the healing power of an equine companion… Next, infantry officers Alain Cohen and Julien Chaput-Lemay posit that “…no modern army can afford to downplay the need for organic anti-armour capabilities within its infantry forces.” They maintain that on today’s battlefield, it is fallacy for infantry forces to depend upon...
support by friendly main battle tanks or from anti-armour close air support. “We believe that beyond the current re-introduction of the Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided anti-tank missile (TOW) in our mechanized battalions, our infantry’s broader anti-armour capabilities need to be seriously reassessed and improved to maintain our relevance, survivability, and effectiveness in the Future Security Environment (FSE), where tanks, next-generation IFVs, and small unit bunkers should well be expected to upset our aforementioned assumptions.” Then, Sir Isaac Brock scholar Guy St. Denis closes this section with a ‘trip down memory lane’ in the form of a fresh analysis of the death of this “Hero of Upper Canada” at the Battle of Queenston Heights during the War of 1812.

Next, our dedicated defence commentator, Martin Shadwick, serves up a thoughtful recap of recent modernization acquisitions and initiatives as they apply to the Royal Canadian Air Force, including some thoughts pertaining to fighter futures.

Finally, we close with a book review essay by Dr. Bill Bentley of some very recent literary efforts dealing with the life and contributions of the great Prussian general, Carl von Clausewitz. Bill is followed by a trio of book reviews on very disparate subjects, which we hope will pique our readership’s interest.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal

NOTES

1. Quoted passage drawn from the souvenir booklet produced for the Vimy Memorial by the Department of Public Affairs, Veterans Affairs Canada, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987), p. 11.
2. Ibid.
Victory as a Strategic Objective: An Ambiguous and Counter-Productive Concept for the High Command

by Jennie Carignan

Brigadier-General Jennie Carignan, OMM, MSM, CD, is a Combat Engineer and a graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada, specializing in fuel and materials engineering. Additionally, she holds an MBA from University Laval and a Masters in Military Arts and Science from the School of Advanced Military Studies (U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth), and is a graduate of the National Security Programme (CFC Toronto). She is a veteran of three operational tours – UNDOF (Golan Heights), SFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and Commander of the Engineer Regiment, Task Force Kandahar (2009–2010) – and her recent experience includes Chief of Staff 4 Division, Canadian Army, and Commandant Royal Military College St-Jean. General Carignan is currently Chief of Staff Army Operations, Canadian Army.

“[I]n war, there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat....”

Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (1959)

Introduction

Inspiration often arrives unexpectedly. The idea for this article was sparked by a discussion I had with one of my demining specialists at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar, in 2009. He described the tactical situation he faced daily in the Kandahar City area, where he was required to neutralize up to nine or ten explosive devices in a single day. The devices were often found in the same places he had cleared a few days earlier. He summed up our discussion by telling me, “Look, Madame, we’re not winning this war.” Clearly, this is alarming and disappointing considering the effort expended, the lives lost, and the Canadian Armed Forces’ intent to fight that battle until victory was achieved.
This raises a question: What, exactly, is victory? What does it mean to “win a war”? Why did my demining specialist – despite his total commitment, the many sacrifices he had made for his country and the risks to his life – have the perception that his actions would not lead to victory?

A number of eminent military experts have stated that the primary objective in war is to win, or that, “In war there is no substitute for victory.” The concept of victory plagues the military. Because an armed force is employed as a last resort, it must win its battles to ensure the survival of its country. The perception of victory as an end in itself – and as synonymous with strategic success – is therefore ever present in the minds of senior military commanders. But what are the implications of victory as a strategic objective for the high command and for military personnel deployed on the ground?

This fundamental, important, and timely question serves as a backdrop for any strategic thinking by senior military leaders who must decide how armed forces will be employed in military interventions. This article will examine military operations in the strategic context of war, from the perspective of the relationship between the end (victory) and the means (the use of armed force). It will also explore how that relationship impacts the manner and the mindset in which military actions are carried out on the ground.

The article is organized into three parts. The first is an overview of the theorists and strategists who have contributed to the cult of victory in military thinking in order to understand their legacy. We will suggest that it is a collection of ambiguous and incoherent ideas. The second part considers how the concept of victory dominates the day-to-day narratives of political decision makers and military experts. When strategic commanders use the word “victory” (or “success”) without bothering to define it clearly, the result is confusion, both for citizens of the country that is mobilizing for war, and for the military personnel tasked with carrying out the operations. The third part proposes possible solutions for moving beyond the notion of victory and offering an approach that might be better suited to the reality of modern warfare, in which it is often impossible to determine with certainty who won and who lost.

“For classical and pre-modern thinkers, the strategic goal of war was to conquer a territory through a series of tactical victories.”

The article will demonstrate that victory is not useful as a strategic objective, but it will not call into question the importance of the troops’ operational effectiveness, or of tactical success. It would be frivolous to think that troops go into battle with the intention of losing. They want to win, but at what price, and to what extent? Given that the phenomenon of war is almost incomprehensible, especially from a moral point of view, and that actual wars often suffer from a lack of clear strategic direction, I would submit that political decision makers and
senior military commanders who commit military forces abroad must not limit their thinking to the idea of victory.

A Theoretical Legacy of Ambiguity

The narrative of victory, as it developed from the writings of Sun Tzu until the early-20th Century, can be divided into two main theoretical orientations. For classical and pre-modern thinkers, the strategic goal of war was to conquer a territory through a series of tactical victories. Consequently, they emphasized the conditions required in order to defeat armies on the battlefield. With the arrival of mechanized forces in the industrial era, military thinkers, including Napoléon Bonaparte, Antoine de Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, and John Frederick Charles Fuller favoured total war that would mobilize all of a nation’s human, economic, technological, and industrial resources to destroy the enemy, and thus achieve “decisive victory.” For a number of strategists, the defeat of Germany in the two world wars lent credence to the idea that the objective of any war is to achieve a series of tactical successes leading to final victory.

The eminent Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, writing in the 3rd or 4th Century B.C., stated: “Victory is the main object in war.” For Sun Tzu, the essence of victory was that it should be achieved quickly, and if possible, without combat. However, he also cautioned against the blind pursuit of victory, suggesting that it is not strictly tactical but inextricably related to strategy. Sun Tzu recognized that victory is not easy to define, and that post-conflict events are unpredictable and difficult to control. In a survey of military thinkers in antiquity, distinguished scholar and Professor of International Security Studies Dr. William Martel points out that Sun Tzu understood the importance of victory on the strategic level. Martel also notes that the Greeks, especially Thucydides, knew the advantages and disadvantages of a strategic victory but that, again, they did not develop their thinking into a more complete theory of war. Lastly, western military thinkers, fascinated by the military superiority of the Romans, focused upon tactical victory, and this can be seen in the writings of numerous strategists in the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the 19th Century.

Building upon the precedent set by the mass uprising of the French Revolution, Napoléon Bonaparte greatly influenced the development and practice of the idea that states can mobilize their citizens and build large armies to wage total wars. Napoléon believed that success on the battlefield would bring him peace and prosperity, but instead, all he achieved was considerable military glory, notably at the Egyptian pyramids, and in particular, at Austerlitz and Jena, where his victories were total. Although the emperor did not define victory solely in terms of interactions
between armies and tactical engagements, his ideas contributed to the idea of victory as a decisive strategic result.

German strategist Carl von Clausewitz is unquestionably one of the greatest military thinkers in history. His reputation is based largely upon his unfinished work *On War*, published after his death in 1831. His famous axiom, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” draws an explicit connection between a war’s military means and its political ends. His conception of war is based upon the importance of its political and social consequences. Understanding and interpreting Clausewitz requires familiarity with the ideas of Emmanuel Kant, particularly “the thing in itself.” As Clausewitz put it, “All in all, therefore, its distinguishing feature is that, more than any other type of action, battle exists for its own sake alone.” Moreover, “Destruction of the enemy’s forces is the overriding principle of war, and so far as positive action is concerned the principal way to achieve our object.”

Although Clausewitz’s theory on war is sophisticated and finely nuanced, the aspect of it that has received the most attention is the principle of destruction. Dependence upon this principle has radically influenced western military thinking and the way wars are fought all over the world. Israeli strategist Shimon Naveh argues that the idea was widely accepted due to its fairly simple but brilliantly organized reasoning. The fact that Clausewitz’s audience lacked critical tools led to the dominance of his principle, and consequently, of warfare based upon destruction.

Throughout Clausewitz’s work, we see the ‘tacticization’ of strategy. “Strategic planning rests on tactical success alone, and that – whether the solution is arrived at in battle or not – this is in all cases the actual fundamental basis for the decision.” For Clausewitz, combat is first and foremost an end in itself. Although he was the first theorist to explicitly distinguish between the military means and the political ends of war, he made little mention of the concept of victory, because he believed that tactical battles would be sufficient to achieve strategic objectives.

The concept of total war and destruction inherited from the 19th Century dominated military thinking during the first half of the 20th Century. In the two world wars, nations mobilized an unprecedented level of resources to produce war machines capable of wiping out enemy states. Thus, the concept of victory retained as a result of that experience is that the strategic objective (victory through complete and unconditional surrender) is obtained by employing military means. As sociologist Eric Ouellet has noted, victory can be constructed in a legal sense (based upon the signature of a treaty of surrender), or in an empirical sense (based upon the achievement of the stated strategic objectives).

Uppermost in military leaders’ minds, implicitly or unconsciously, is the desire for a strategic victory leading to a treaty of surrender. The importance of this objective arises from the fact that it can be clearly defined. However, that theoretical clarity is not infallibly realized in practice. The achievement of strategic objectives in the military sense and the signature of a surrender treaty are two sides of one reality, and they are difficult to reconcile in the current historical context where war involves not only regular armies and states, but also amorphous organizations whose motivations often extend beyond politics in the traditional sense of the term. That is why the operations in which Canada and its allies engage do not in any way facilitate fulfilment of the “desire for a strategic victory” as defined above.

Carl von Clausewitz, lithograph after a painting by W. Wach.
Victory in the empirical sense suggests that the strategic objectives have been clearly stated, and that we evaluate the results – and therefore the victory – in terms of the achievement of those objectives. However, that evaluation is highly unlikely to be interchangeable with victory in the legal sense. This discrepancy creates confusion. The concept of victory may mean a result that is tactical and fundamentally military, or a result that is strategic and fundamentally political, perhaps even ideological and cultural. The ambiguity of the concept presents the high command with a significant problem, including the way it is traditionally used.

The Quagmire of Victory

A ccording to renowned psychologist Elliot Aronson, “From the Little League ballplayer who bursts into tears after his team loses, to the college student in the football stadium chanting ‘We’re number one!’; from Lyndon Johnson, whose judgment was almost certainly distorted by his oft-stated desire not to be the first American president to lose a war, to the third grader who despises his classmate for a superior performance on an arithmetic test; we manifest a staggering cultural obsession with victory.”

For most people, the image of the Allied forces marching victoriously through the streets of Paris at the end of the Second World War is a good representation of military victory. However, despite the fact that war is one of the oldest human activities, to date, no theory has been developed to explain its nature and the way in which it should be conducted. As we offered in the first part of this article, despite the vastness of the literature on the subject of victory, the majority of writers focus upon the mechanical aspects (the “how”) of what a state must do to win the war, without really describing what “victory” means.

As a result, there is no theory, no appropriate language and no narrative that defines victory in terms of assessing the results obtained after a war, or what the political decision makers wanted to accomplish by military means. Curiously, the problem of victory, which is of fundamental importance for a nation, is cloaked in language that is incoherent, imprecise, and confused. We need only think of the public debate in Canada about what “combat” means for our troops, what a war is or is not, and what victory and defeat mean.

The recent Canadian interventions in Afghanistan and Libya illustrate the difficulty of clearly determining who won and who lost. And therein lies the problem: if we agree to use the language of victory, we are automatically required to decide who is victorious and who has been vanquished.
For the strategic command, the fundamental principle is clear and usually implicit. In the words of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, “In war there is no substitute for victory.” And British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, in his 1945 publication *High Command in War*, noted, “A war is won by victories in battle.” If we accept this axiom, how do we explain the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, military triumphs have not generated the expected positive outcomes? One of the most striking examples is that of Vietnam, where the Americans won every tactical battle but lost the war. Strategist and U.S. Army Colonel (ret’d) Harry Summers, speaking to his counterpart in the North Vietnamese Army north of Hanoi five days before the fall of Saigon, said: “You know, you never beat us on the battlefield.” The Vietnamese officer replied, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.” That was also true in the Battle of Algiers in 1957 – an instructive example regarding the notion of victory, for, despite the widespread, systematic use of torture that enabled them to win the tactical battle, the French lost the war. Thus, for both the United States in Vietnam and the French in Algeria, total tactical victory proved strategically costly in terms of human lives, equipment, and international credibility.

Today, many experts agree that there is no causal relationship between tactical victories and the achievement of strategic objectives at the political level. The recent wars in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan are good examples of the limits of tactical success and the use of force. Even though the Canadian Armed Forces “won” all their tactical battles in Afghanistan, it is impossible to conclude that we won the war. Blanken, Rothstein, and Lepore, in their recent book, *Assessing War*, clearly illustrate the challenge of linking tactical success in the field to future strategic success. Over time and in different circumstances and cultures, the word “victory” has had different meanings, some of them confused and contradictory for both the winners and the losers. Today, the norm is to use the word freely on the assumption that everyone understands it, without defining it specifically.

“For most people, the image of the Allied forces marching victoriously through the streets of Paris at the end of the Second World War is a good representation of military victory.”

Lyndon B. Johnson conferring with US troops in Berlin, 1961, prior to him assuming the presidency.
For soldiers, participating in combat requires intense physical and psychological engagement. They endure the unthinkable during their missions, where they must face violence and death every day. They must also cope with the loss of their comrades in arms, while being separated from their families for long periods, with all the disruptions that entails. Soldiers therefore have a pressing need to be convinced that they are doing the right thing, and that their efforts are worth the sacrifice. When the terms of victory – the goal to be achieved, the end – are not clearly defined or, worse, when what soldiers see on the ground does not correspond to the idea they had of victory, they are left with the distinct impression that they are participating in a futile activity.

This means that, if senior commanders are fixated upon the concept of victory, their fixation may be detrimental to soldiers on operations, who may take for granted that the end (victory) justifies the use of unacceptable means to achieve it. The concept of victory that transcends all levels, from tactics to grand strategy, may change in status and meaning in time and space. That being so, it will strongly influence the means employed to achieve a so-called “decisive” victory. Soldiers may lose sight of the fact that a tactical victory is only one of a number of means for achieving the strategic objective.26

Soldiers’ minds assimilate various slogans that set the tone for the way troops are required to act in order to achieve the all-important victory. As we saw earlier, the saying, “there is no substitute for victory” is widespread in the military. There are many other examples, such as “war is hell,” “kill or be killed,” “shoot everything that moves,” “go ugly early” and “shoot them all and let God sort them out.” Thus, if the purpose of combat manoeuvres is destruction, and combat is the foundation of war, destruction and victory inevitably become the objectives of war. Showing clemency becomes a weakness that must be eliminated in the name of “victory.” Morality is for the losers.

If we extend the paradox farther, we realize that even if a soldier wants to act morally, the need to win at any price may push him or her to commit atrocities in the name of the victory the troops have been directed by the high command – whether explicitly or implicitly – to achieve. As Demosthenes told the Athenians, “The difficulty lies not in teaching you what is best, since I think that in general you all know that very well. Rather, it lies in persuading you to do what is best.”27 [Translated from French.] In his article “Le paradigme analytique du tortionnaire,” philosopher Marc Imbeault explains that the more just the cause, the more noble and urgent the goal, the more the end seems to justify the means. For Imbeault, the use of torture during the Battle of Algiers and the war on terrorism clearly demonstrates the perverse effect of the apparently noble pursuit of victory at any price.28

Beyond the Concept of Victory

If we cannot make victory a strategic goal, what other possibilities are open to us? In this section, four potential solutions are explored: civil–military relations and the decision-making process; setting limited objectives; making peace the goal; and evaluating the means employed.

Part of the answer can be found by examining civil–military relations. Political Scientist Dr. Risa Brooks of Marquette University challenges the popular belief that democracies make the best strategic decisions, due to the participatory nature of the system and the presence of public debate. Rather, she suggests that it is conflictual civil–military relations, combined with clumsy coordination, lack of consultation and an ambiguous decision-making process, that impact negatively upon the quality of the political decision makers’ strategic decisions. As a result, for political decision makers, using the concept of victory without defining it may lead to decision paralysis, loss of popular support, an explosion of post-intervention violence and, ultimately, political failure. The discourse of victory glorifies national interests, but it does not necessarily clarify the intent of those in power, and, as we saw earlier, it is often couched in language that does not make sense to soldiers on the ground. The strategic command must therefore develop decision-making processes and maintain healthy relationships with the political decision makers so as to ensure the quality of the military strategies produced.

The military high command must also anticipate that they will not receive clear orders from the political decision makers and must recognize that ultimately, professionals of arms are responsible for asking the right questions at the right time. This is necessary in order to open a dialogue about what we mean by victory or success, and thereby encourage the political decision makers to be specific about their intent and their strategic objectives. In other words, the military high command must take political issues into account, and political decision makers must be aware of the limits and realities of the use of force, and not abandon the conduct of war to the generals without asking the tough questions. That makes the conduct of war as much a political act as a military act.

Given the military and political cultures, civil–military relations represent a considerable challenge, since military professionals instinctively prefer to concentrate upon military operations, while political decision makers would rather focus upon the political battles to be fought before and during the war. Because military professionals are the ones with the defence experience, training, and knowledge, they have the ultimate responsibility to initiate, generate, and sustain an ongoing dialogue with the political decision makers in order to clearly articulate what it is really possible to achieve militarily. In addition, they must avoid being too optimistic about the possibility of achieving strategic objectives through the use of force, and not make promises they cannot keep. To quote the current Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance: “When we say we are going to do something, our politicians are listening and they believe us. We better make sure that we are able to do what we say we are going to do and this means we should rather aim towards limited and achievable objectives.” Lastly, the high command must translate strategic objectives that are sometimes vague into coherent actions for the deployed troops to carry out, so that the mission objectives will make sense in the context of their actual experience on the ground.

Let us return to General Vance’s idea of limited objectives. According to American philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952), “Nothing happens which is final in the sense that it is not part of an ongoing stream of events.” He considers the concept of finality to be deficient in the sense that an end in itself really has no value unless the means for achieving it are taken into account. For example, if we look at the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, the inescapable conclusion is that the military operations did not bring about a final result in terms of democratic progress, or even stability and security. The strategic command must therefore adopt a frame of reference in which tactical success is not the goal or end state to be pursued. Since success and victory are difficult to define, and also because a war’s “moral value” may vary over time, the aim should be not victory, but peace.

In 1961, J.F.C. Fuller wrote in The Conduct of War that, “…the true aim of war is peace and not victory; therefore, that peace should be the ruling idea of policy, and victory only the means towards its achievement.” The implication is that the high command should set limited objectives when it engages military forces in a war, and that it should be prepared to envision something beyond military success. Today, a number of experts agree that we need to reduce the number of wars that end in a tactical victory and instead seek a negotiated end to conflicts. This argument is based upon the reasoning that the conditions imposed by a victor on the vanquished undermine any possibility of lasting peace. A negotiated peace facilitates mutual understanding and respect between the opposing sides. The high command should therefore reflect upon what kind of peace they are seeking once the war is over, rather than focusing only upon total victory regardless of the cost. If soldiers on the ground are seeking a negotiated peace rather than a total victory, that will have a significant effect upon the way they fight. Acting honourably could become more important than victory at any price.

Lastly, evaluating the means used during the intervention becomes crucial, since those means will have long-term effects after the intervention. Dr. Timothy L. Challans of the US Army Command and Staff College proposes the principle of reciprocity: if the end determines the means, perhaps the means should determine the end. In Dewey’s words: “No case of notable achievement can be cited in any field, in which the persons who brought about the end did not give loving care to the instruments and agencies of its production.” The means employed during a war thus become more important than victory at any price. We should therefore expect the strategic command to have a practical knowledge of the consequences of the use of military means during an intervention. That includes not only individual acts of soldiers and leaders on the ground, but also the national policies governing the conduct of war, such as the treatment of enemy prisoners, the quality of training, and the selection of personnel. These national policies,
or their absence, exert an enormous influence upon the actions of troops during operations. As Sun Tzu wrote: “Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their governments invincible.” The debacle of the Canadian mission in Somalia after the torture and murder of Somali teenager Shidane Arone at the hands of Canadian soldiers is a cautionary tale of what can happen when the high command fails to meet its obligations. In short, the strategic command has the moral responsibility to develop strategies employing fair military means in order to create the necessary conditions for the troops to behave honourably.

Conclusion: Thinking and Acting Beyond Victory

Regardless of the debate about what victory means or the value of a given intervention by the Canadian military, and sometimes even in the absence of clear strategic directives, military personnel are called upon to deploy on the ground, and they must act. The idea of clear, legal strategic victory thus conflicts with the day-to-day reality experienced by the troops – a reality which gives them the impression that they are losing the war, particularly in modern warfare, in which it is difficult to distinguish between the victor and the vanquished. Law, and therefore victory in the legal sense, has meaning only when looking back into the past, after the events, whereas what soldiers need in order to deal with the complexity of the battlefield is the ability to look to the future, toward peace. If a soldier must choose, it is better to lose with honour, as a dishonourable victory is the worst possible defeat. “Moral reasoning comes before action; legal reasoning comes after it.”

This article has analyzed the concept of victory and demonstrated the ambiguity that surrounds it and its inadequacy as a strategic objective. Not only is victory of little use as a concept, it is also counter-productive because it can be used to justify the employment of unacceptable military means in order to achieve a decisive victory. In my opinion, the means employed during hostilities are more important than achieving victory at any price. The actions of soldiers on the battlefield which are so crucial for building the future peace – the jus in bello, to use the terminology of “just war” theory – depend upon the tone set and the directives issued by the military high command. The strategic command thus has the moral responsibility, when developing its military strategies, to ensure that the means employed are consistent with the desired end. Therefore, to move beyond the notion of victory, I propose the pursuit of limited strategic objectives and a negotiated end, which should create the necessary conditions for honourable military actions on the ground and lead to a lasting peace. Acting honourably is the only possible option for military personnel. The only things the troops control on the ground are their means, their actions, and their reactions. The memory of those actions is all they are left with when they return home.
Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance (right) alongside HMCS Charlottetown in Souda Bay Crete, Greece, during Operation Reassurance, 19 December 2016.

NOTES

1. I thank professors Marc Imbeault of Royal Military College Saint-Jean and Eric Ouellet of the Canadian Forces College, MGen (ret) Daniel Gosselin, and Eric Lefrançois for their invaluable help during the writing of this article. However, I take full responsibility for its content.


3. General Douglas MacArthur in his address to the U.S. Congress, 19 April 1951.


7. Ibid., p. 54.

8. Martel, p. 66.


12. Professor Marc Imbeault notes that, in Kant’s philosophy, the thing in itself is unknowable and is in opposition to the phenomenon, the thing we know. Thus, knowledge is not truth, but rather a construction of reality that is, in itself, unknowable.


21. Quoted in Martel, p. 102.


30. Vilmer, p. 323.


33. Quoted with the permission of General Jonathan Vance by e-mail dated 22 November 2016, General and Flag Officers (GO/FO) Symposium, Ottawa, 31 August–1 September 2016.

34. Quoted in Challans, p. 113.

35. Vilmer, p. 486.


37. Mandel, p. 177.

38. Quoted in Challans, p. 126.


40. Sun Tzu, p. 88.

41. Quoted in Vilmer, p. 496.
Conscience and the Canadian Armed Forces

by Victor E. Morris

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Introduction

After proclaiming that Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law, the first fundamental freedom that is listed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the freedom of conscience. Our nation’s warriors, the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are called upon to defend, protect, safeguard, and uphold these fundamental freedoms. What is conscience and why is it held so sacred that it is listed as the first fundamental freedom of Canadian citizens? What is the role and function of conscience for the Canadian warrior in relation to professional military ethics? What is the role of conscience for those in the CAF who carry out state-sanctioned violence? What happens when one’s conscience is at odds with one’s orders or mission?

These questions will be examined in this article through the lenses of three case studies; the Somalia incident and inquiry, the Robert Semrau incident and trial, and Operation Honour. The first two case studies are historical and seminal events. Somalia led to the development and application of Canada’s Defence Ethics Programme (DEP), which will be examined with a view towards understanding how those principles and values shape, impact, guide, and align with the individual conscience. The Semrau trial made headlines around the world as a military court proceeded, a citizenry discussed and a nation’s warfighters debated the role of personal conscience held up against lawful orders, rules of engagement (ROEs), and the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). The final case study, Op Honour, is a current operation within the CAF to “eliminate sexual harassment and misconduct.” An examination of conscience, ethics, and values will be applied against this mission’s aim, intent, and execution.

Conscience

What is conscience? The etymology of the word conscience is from the Latin conscientia, a literal translation of the Greek word for syneidesis. The prefixes “syn” and “con” translate as together or in conjunction with. The second construct of this word “scientia” and “eidesis” translate as knowing or knowledge. One might recognize this word in English as the word for science. Conscience as a noun is thus constructed as with knowledge.

One’s conscience is a powerful and motivating force compelling and driving a person to act in accordance with their firmly held beliefs. When one conducts themselves in accordance with their conscience, by definition one is taking action(s) that have been held up against a norm – their knowledge, wisdom, and understanding. The beliefs, values, and judgements that form this knowledge are deeply personal, connected to the very essence and ethos of one’s identity. It is for these reasons that the first fundamental right and freedom for Canadians is the freedom of conscience.
How, why and in what way the conscience (and the knowledge to which it norms) is inherent, genitive, and/or created within a person has been the study of philosophers, psychologists, scientists, and theologians throughout the centuries. It is beyond the scope of this article to present a complete historical progression of study on the conscience. Consider the works of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (as they made a connection between conscience and virtue), the writings of the stoic Marcus Aurelius (in his meditations), ancient Greek writings (Sophocles and the story of Antigone petitioning the tyrant king, appealing to a law higher than human authority), sacred works of verbal and non-verbal revelation; (the Jewish Noahide commandments and the Christian writings, i.e., Romans 2:14-15), the foundational theological writings (St. Augustine and the connection between morality and theological virtues), philosophers (Kant – our duty to follow universally known rules), ethicists, such as University of Texas professor J. Budziszewski, leaning heavily on the writings of Thomas Aquinas, stating that the core principles of natural law informing the conscience are universal; not only right for all, but also known by all. And so it goes.

Throughout these varied faculties, however, one finds overlapping, universal truths and complimentary understandings of conscience and its function; that the conscience is a powerful force, driving one to do what is right as one norms their actions against their eidesis, scientia, knowledge, and; conscience convicts one when they have acted in violation of their beliefs, values, and ethos.

For Canada’s warriors, the freedom of one’s conscience remains enshrined as a Charter right, as for all Canadians. One does not lose this freedom when one makes an oath of allegiance to the Queen of Canada, when joining the CAF. Conversely, should a member of the CAF feel that their conscience will no longer allow them to serve; this fundamental freedom is protected through Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5516-2, Conscientious Objection. The DAOD recognizes the voluntary nature of the CAF, and then states:

A conscientious objector is a person who claims the right to refuse to perform military duties on the grounds of having a conscientious objection. A CAF member who has a conscientious objection remains liable to perform any lawful duty, but may request a voluntary release from the CAF on the basis of their objection…a sincerely held objection, on grounds of freedom of conscience or religion, to participation in:

- war or other armed conflict; or
- carrying and use of weapons as a requirement of service in the CAF.

What is the current relationship pertaining to conscience, the CAF ethos, and professional military ethics? The answer begins in Somalia.

**Somalia**

On the night of 16 March 1993, Shidane Arone, 16 years old, was caught hiding near the Canadian compound by Belet Huen in south-central Somalia. The compound contained the food and supplies of the Canadian Battle Group, whose nucleus was the elite Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). The Canadian mission was to support the United Nations (UN) by keeping the peace in order to facilitate the distribution of food and relief. Shidane Arone’s mission appeared to be the theft of something to sell on the local black market. What happened next proved to be a “transformative event in the course of Canadian military history.”

Over the course of the night, Shidane Arone was brutally tortured and killed. The trophy pictures taken by the perpetrators showed images of smiling faces posing with their victim. The images made national and international headlines, an investigation was launched, a cover-up attempted, and charges were laid. Stuart Hendin, an expert in the law of war, who teaches on leadership, morality, and ethics at the Royal Military College of Canada writes:
What is frightening about the Arone matter is that there were, within earshot, individuals who could and should have stopped what was happening, and they didn’t — and that represents an absolute failure of command responsibility at several levels…

Canadian soldiers have a responsibility to humanity, their country and their chain of command…and if they lose that perspective, then things can happen.9

The Canadian public was shocked. The investigation led to nine soldiers facing charges that ranged from second-degree murder to negligence. Four were acquitted (though the prosecution filed appeals against two). Three generals submitted their resignations.9
Institutionally, the CAR was accused of having “rogue soldiers, weak junior officers, and apathetic senior NCOs,” and, to the shock of the military, this elite unit was disbanded. Individually, the strongest sentence went to Private Kyle Brown for manslaughter and torture. Brown served one-third of a five-year sentence. Master Corporal Clayton Matchee attempted suicide while detained, suffering brain damage to the extent that he was found unfit to stand trial.  

What was the role of the conscience in this incident? What effect did the conscience have upon both those who ought to have known better, and those who were motivated to act? 

In the book *Tested Mettle*, we read that in the hours that followed the death of Arone during torture, Matchee is “panicked.” His suicide attempt takes place “27 hours after his arrest for murder.” Brown is described as “worried sick” in anticipation of the arrival of the Military Police. He stated that he “could not stomach his role” (beating Arone, posing, and taking pictures), and “had pleaded” with Matchee to “ease up or you’ll kill the boy” during the beating of Arone. 

Brown claimed to have sought out someone in command to intervene, but found them drunk, so he sought out a number of sergeants to speak with as he was troubled by his incriminating role, captured on film. These sergeants are motivated to do right, and as a group, they confront their officer commanding, and “protest his inaction” thus far, forcing him to arrest Matchee and report the incident higher. 

Twenty-three years later, in an interview, Brown spoke about his life since his release from prison, revealing that he “struggles with alcohol, anger, an emotional roller-coaster,” and that for a long time he was “holed up in Edmonton’s river valley, living under a tree in a tent, with a blanket and crack pipe.”

For those in positions of moral leadership, the Medical Officer and the Chaplain, they felt duty bound by their conscience to speak, but faced a bureaucracy that ordered them to remain silent. The regimental surgeon is described as having “steadfastly refused to destroy the incriminating medical evidence of murder and… change his medical assessment.” When it is apparent that his report would be buried, his wife took the information and went to the press. 

A CAF chaplain appears in the trophy photos of another incident, standing behind a detained group of young Somalis who were captured while attempting to steal garbage from the Canadian camp. The photo implicates the chaplain as party to these acts. The chaplain is later cleared during the investigation that follows when the context of the photo is discovered to be the padre speaking with a village elder to be merciful to the youth once they are released and returned to the community.

In Canada, a public inquiry was launched, as well as multiple investigations. The eventual reports that were released contained over 300 recommendations that were accepted by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Minister of National Defence. These transformations of the CAF began with a review of its military ethos, a revision of the professional development of leadership (the LOAC was now taught at all levels), and the creation of the Canadian Defence Academy, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, a military ombudsman’s office, and the development of ethics training deliverables. 

Associate Professor Dr. Joanne Benham Rennick, the Director of Social Innovation and Venture Creation at Wilfrid Laurier University, writes “…the incident in Somalia made it clear that military personnel need moral leadership and encouragement to think and act in ways that accord with Canadian and mission values. Since then, moral and ethical training has taken a more prominent place….” What Rennik is referring to is the creation of the Defence Ethics Programme (DEP). 

The Defence Ethics Programme (Informing the Conscience) 

Canada’s military follows a values-based model, where the individual is expected to act in accordance with a military ethos shaped by “Canadian values, Canadian military values, and beliefs and expectations about military service.” The explanatory documents of the DEP itself
The heart of the DEP is the Statement of Defence Ethics, which contains: Three hierarchical ethical principles; Respect the dignity of all persons, Serve Canada before self, and Obey and support lawful authority, as well as five ethical values of equal weight, which are; Integrity, Loyalty, Courage, Stewardship, and Excellence.

The CAF model is not the same as those of her closest allies, most notably, those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Other models of ethics programmes are described as compliance-based and preventive-based. The differences are described as follows:

…the compliance-based approach tends to develop elaborate codes emphasizing compliance with rules, thus acquiring a strong legalistic tendency. A preventive-based approach identifies areas of organizational behaviour that are considered to be exposed to high risks of non-compliance and focuses its efforts in these areas. A values-based approach to ethics, on the other hand, states in general terms what is desirable, rather than specifying in detail what should or should not be done.

How can the DEP be used as a norm for the conscience in professional military ethics and what are the challenges? Are the principles and values detailed enough to be reference for the conscience of the Canadian warfighter? Are these principles and values agile enough for conscience to refer to in an operational context?

In 2004, Major John Robert Woodgate of the CAF, while working on his Master’s thesis, studied the DEP in comparison to the decision making models of two other allied nations (the United States Army and the Royal Netherlands Army) in order to determine if the CAF DEP was effective. One of the first conclusions he made was “...despite all of the DEP guidance listed above, a detailed model for ethical decision making is not provided. Consequently, members must carefully consider DEP references to make decisions.” He also found that “both the DEP ethical decision-making steps and pocket card are too general to be applied effectively without considering DEP source documents,” and finally, that “DEP guidance is also not focused on making military operational decisions...” Woodgate concluded that while the DEP provides effective and general guidance, an operational model (specifically to guide the use of force) would be an improvement.

Semrau

When Captain Robert Semrau stepped off on that October morning in 2008, his mission was to maneuver to a British forward operating base with a force of Afghanistan National Army (ANA) soldiers in order to take part in a major upcoming operation. Semrau was part of an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), small Canadian teams whose role was to provide leadership and expertise to the ANA. The plan called for two OMLT teams to guide their ANA sections into positions that would create a “hammer and anvil” effect upon the enemy.
As the teams advanced, Semrau’s counterpart team initiated a Taliban ambush, triggering a massive firefight. Semrau advised his ANA officer and team to move into positions to support, but the officer refused. The situation grew desperate as air support was called in. An Apache helicopter gunship attacked the Taliban positions with devastating results. As Semrau and his team liaised with the other OMLT team he described the scene as “…sheer devastation…the Apache had just loitered over the enemy and ripped him apart with 30mm high-explosive rounds…shrapnel damage all over the place…big pools of blood.”

Semrau’s own words follow, taken from his book The Taliban Don’t Wave:

What happened next was hotly contested during my court martial for second degree murder. Depending on who gave testimony, a few different versions played out. One soldier said we came across a wounded insurgent that some ANA soldiers had just finished kicking and spitting on. He had a small, fist-sized hole in his stomach, a partially severed foot, and an injured knee. Another soldier thought the insurgent was already dead, with a hole in his stomach the size of a dinner plate. Captain Shafiq Ullah said the man was torn apart, had lost all his blood in a nearby stream, and was ninety-eight percent dead. Although they differed in their testimony as to the manner and what was said before and after the incident, two witnesses basically agreed that I had shot the insurgent two times, in what was later dubbed by the international press as a mercy killing.

What was the state of Semrau’s conscience at the time of the offence? Semrau, a Christian, whose conduct and military service the judge noted as exemplary, had, according to numerous witnesses, stated that his actions were a “mercy kill,” and that he had stated he “couldn’t live with myself” if he left the insurgent to suffer. Members of the ANA that Semrau’s team was mentoring declined to give the wounded soldier medical care. The Operation was kinetic. The wounds of the insurgent were so severe that they were deemed untreatable on the battlefield. Semrau later allegedly spoke of the soldier’s pact, and unwritten code of honour to “quickly end battlefield suffering.”

Semrau, the first Canadian officer ever tried for a battlefield murder, faced a General Court Martial. He was tried on charges of second-degree murder, attempted murder, conduct unbecoming an officer, and failure to perform a military duty. As was his right, Semrau remained silent throughout the investigation and proceedings. At no point did he confirm or deny his actions. He writes: “I chose to remain silent during my murder trial, and I never gave testimony on the stand, nor did I make a statement to the police. The truth of that moment will always be between me and the insurgent.”

The military court determined that Semrau did indeed shoot the unarmed man, but there was no body and no evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that his bullets killed the man. Semrau was found not guilty of all charges, except for conduct unbecoming an officer. He was subsequently demoted to second-lieutenant and dismissed from the CAF. While rendering his judgment, Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Guy Perron stated:

You failed in your role as a leader…how can we expect our soldiers to follow the rules of war if their officers do not? Shooting a wounded, unarmed insurgent is so fundamentally contrary to our values, doctrine and training that it is shockingly unacceptable behavior…You made a decision that will cast a shadow on you for the rest of your life…Your actions may have been motivated by an honest belief you were doing the right thing, nonetheless, you have committed a serious breach of discipline. Decisions based on personal values cannot prevail over lawful commands.

It is this statement in italics that is at the heart of this case as it connects to the warfighter, and their individual conscience.

“The military court determined that Semrau did indeed shoot the unarmed man, but there was no body and no evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that his bullets killed the man.”
Semrau did not take the stand and testify to his state of conscience. From his actions however, it seems self-evident that as the judge articulated, Semrau placed his personal convictions over lawful commands. The LOAC, from the first and second Geneva Convention, and to which the legal bounds of Canadian ROEs on operations are laid out – specifically state that the wounded will be protected and given medical care. Article 12 of the first Convention states: “Any attempts upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or exterminated…they shall not willfully be left without medical assistance and care”.

**Tentatio Conscientia: The Tension of “Right” Between the Individual and the Institution**

The Semrau case raises an intriguing question of conscience for the Canadian warfighter, namely, at what point do individual values, ethics and personal codes of honour become subordinate or supersede the institutions? The Canadian public and her warriors certainly engaged in a nationwide debate on this topic as they wrestled with the morality of the Semrau events.

Major-General (Ret’d) Lewis Mackenzie, who wrote the foreword for Semrau’s book, captures the tentatio of this debate on the individual conscience for the warfighter when he states: “When a soldier is faced with a similar situation in some far-flung battlefield in the future and has those 10 seconds to reach a decision, no regulation, nor memory or knowledge of Captain Rob Semrau’s court martial will spring to mind. It will be his or her own moral code that will dictate their response – nothing more, nothing less.” Speaking to CTV News Channel after the judgment of the court martial, Lewis noted that “…mercy killings have likely always taken place on battlefields,” and that due to the high profile of this case, that the Canadian military’s rules of engagement would probably have to be altered. Speaking to the tentatio of conscience, he concludes: “…but let’s face it: nobody but nobody is ever going to say mercy killing is okay. It’s something that’s between a soldier and his conscience on the battlefield. Anybody that tries to put that in fine print is not going to succeed.”

This challenge is acknowledged in the DEP training material for the CAF when it states: “...not everyone holds the same values; however we have learned, through parents and/or teachers, as well as societal norms, the difference between an action that is considered right and one that is considered wrong.”

Canada seeks to recruit conscientious individuals for her warfighters who know right from wrong, who have a high sense of virtue, morals, ethics and values. Canada holds her warriors to the highest standards of conduct, expecting them to serve honourably in accordance with those same virtues, morals, ethics and values. A soldier is duty bound to follow a lawful order, and duty bound to disobey an unlawful order. The defence of the Nazis at Nuremburg was that soldiers were simply following orders. This defence was not accepted. Dr. Helmut Thielicke, a German Protestant theologian and a former rector of the University of Hamburg, notes that the prosecution at Nuremburg argued that there were “moral standards” and “basic axioms of humanity” that could not be overturned by a “government edict.” The argument of the prosecution was that there was a “fundamental morality” that exists and binds the human conscience, which is known to be true, and known by all.

**Soldiers may not like an order, may not tactically agree with an order, may feel burdened by an order, but they are obligated to carry out and execute that order if it remains lawful.** The third ethical principle of the DEP is to obey and support lawful authority. Canada acknowledges and accepts that individuals have the fundamental freedom of conscience. The burden of responsibility and leadership when faced with an ethical dilemma is to find the right way forward. Both the hand of obligation, and the hand of conscience grip the sword.

Therein lies both a challenge and a tension regarding the individual conscience for the warrior in the CAF, the formation of professional military ethics and the development of the military ethos of a nation’s warfighters. The CAF is made up of individuals who act in accordance with their fundamental charter right and freedom of their individual conscience, while bearing true allegiance to act in accordance with the defined (and potentially undefined or competing) norms of the institution.
These individuals, however, are part of a professional, uniformed, state-sanctioned, military force. As officers holding the Queen’s Commission, and as non-commissioned members, these soldiers collectively serve in accordance with the LOAC and the ROEs both at home and on the missions to which the Government of Canada sends them. The CAF as an institution leaves no room for misconduct, unethical, or unlawful behavior on or off the battlefield as life and death decisions are made often in a fraction of time, while the world watches, often in real time, with potential global consequences.

Institutions however, do not make decisions on and off the battlefield. Individuals do. Historian Dr. Richard A. Gabriel of the Saint Louis University College of Arts and Sciences, in his book, *The Warrior’s Way*, writes:

Ultimately only individuals are capable of ethical actions and only individuals can be held responsible for their acts… (An ethical code) is not too individualistic and does not stress individual conscience at the expense of authority. It merely recognizes that a soldier acting within an organizational setting may be subject to severe ethical cross pressures…even so, a soldier cannot abandon his or her conscience…

Can we accept that in the face of ethical dilemmas (uncertainty, competing values, harm/lose-lose scenarios) that perhaps our nations warriors need direct and specific guidance that does not compromise the integrity of a values-based approach. Gabriel calls for ethical code, while Major Woodgate suggests a guide to augment and assist making difficult decisions.

The creation of the materials could be complimentary to the current course of action when one is faced with a question of conscience. Specifically:

- Apply the unique values-based approach of the DEP, measuring the decision of one's conviction against the three hierarchical principles, and six values.
- Then, in the face of competing obligations, move through the hierarchy of principles in order to prioritize, triage, and determine what is the *right* thing to do.

A third step would be the provision of explicit examples of what this [right] looks like in practical terms. The warfighter of the CAF needs to know what *right* looks like, not only at home, but on operations. Such a provision would speak to the paradox between “professional conduct and morality” as writes Major Hau, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership at the Royal Military College (RMC) of Canada and course co-ordinator of the Military Professionalism and Ethics course (mandatory for all fourth year RMC cadets):

For the military…it is the professional military ethic…that is supposed to govern the conduct of its members. However, in contrast to most professions, there is no written code of ethical conduct for CF military personnel. While the pros and cons of not having a written code for the military profession can be debated, we can likely agree that military members generally have a good awareness of how they should behave when performing their professional duties.

The challenge that the Captain Robert Semrau case presents is one where a commissioned officer, trained by both the British and the Canadian Armed Forces, and entrusted with command authority found himself in a position where the highest decision related to humanity needed to be made, a decision of life and death. It was in this context where his conscience was put to the ultimate test, and Semrau had to choose between his convictions informed by his faith, his obligations as an officer, his understanding of honour as a warrior, his upbringing and formation as a citizen of Canada in a foreign land, and between his obligations as stated in the LOAC and "The CAF as an institution leaves no room for misconduct, unethical, or unlawful behavior on or off the battlefield as life or death decisions are made often in a fraction of time, while the world watches, often in real time, with potential global consequences."
the ROEs. It would appear, then, that Semrau clearly followed his conscience while clearly breaking the law.

If the allegations of the witnesses are correct, when faced with the refusal of the ANA to provide medical aid, Semrau was convicted by his conscience to honour the warrior’s pact, and kill his grievously-wounded adversary. If the hierarchical principles of the DEP are applied to this scenario, respect the dignity of all persons supersedes obey lawful authority and becomes the norm to which the conscience must refer for the right decision. Those who defend Semrau would argue that by his estimations and convictions, Semrau kept this highest principle by giving the insurgent, whose demise was imminent and inevitable, the dignity of a quick death. In the absence of an ethical code (Hau, Gabriel) or guide (Woodgate), are we setting up our soldiers for success when we ask them to make decisions of conscience, and then only in hindsight, we inform them what they decided was not what we meant?

Operation Honour

On 16 May 2014, Maclean’s magazine published a report entitled, “Our Military’s Disgrace,” stating that sexual assaults in the CAF had reached “epidemic” levels. This report was released concurrently to a time while two other stories were making national headlines; one involving a corporal at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Petawawa who was accused of sexual assault and voyeurism, and another involving the former commander of CFB Wainwright, who was accused of drunkenness and sexual assault.

In response, the Minister of National Defence directed Canada’s top soldier, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Tom Lawson, to order a review. The investigation and eventual report was conducted by an external review authority, retired Chief Justice Marie Deschamps. Her report gave ten recommendations, and drew attention to the fact that “…there is an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGBTQ members.”

When the leadership of the CAF changed that summer, the first order given by the new CDS, General Jonathan Vance, was: “Whether you are a leader, a subordinate or a peer, any form of harmful sexual behavior undermines who we are, is a threat to morale, is a threat to operational readiness and is a threat to this institution. It stops now.” This order initiated Operation Honour (Op Honour), the CAF response.

The mission of Op Honour is: “To eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behavior within the CAF.” To that end, a number of steps were taken, including the establishment of a strategic response team, a sexual misconduct response centre, on-line materials defining inappropriate sexual behavior, as well as the creation of a soldiers card referring to and summarizing all the above.

Conscience plays a key and critical role in the prevention, definition, and prosecution of harassment in the CAF. DAOD 5012-0, Harassment Prevention and Resolution, defines harassment as “…any improper conduct by an individual that is directed at and offensive to another person or persons in the workplace, and that the individual knew or ought reasonably to have known would cause offence or harm…” As philosopher, theologian, and historian E.W.A. Koehler writes: “…this feeling of ‘oughtness’ is the very essence of conscience.”

Op Honour is a current operation, and as such, can only be studied and evaluated thus far. The effectiveness of Op Honour with respect to the CAF leadership response will be determined in the years to come. However, as an initial response, some key features have already been implemented to position this operation for success. There has been direct leader engagement through social media, as well as mandated, leadership-led town halls relaying the mission and the expectations of the CAF membership. The beginnings of both a code and guide have been created and made available on-line, and in the form of a pocket reference for soldiers to reference. In an updated set of orders dated 18 March 2016, the CDS outlined the progress thus far, and reiterated the
need to advance in accordance with the DEP. The orders called for the development of “clear, correct and precise terminology” on what constitutes harmful incidents of sexual behavior, as well as “unified, coherent policy using plain language” that defines what right looks like. Additionally, new training materials were called for, both for those in leadership, and for members of the CAF.

Conclusion

Somalia identified the need for a cultural change with respect to ethics, and this article has attempted to demonstrate the role of the conscience as a powerful force that norms to knowledge in the doing of right. For Canada’s warfighters, this knowledge is provided through the DEP, DAODs issued, and courses and training delivered. The Semrau incident demonstrates the need for a clear code and guide in the execution of the DEP. Warriors need to know explicitly what right looks like. Leaders need to provide engagements to clearly articulate what right looks like, and then to lead by example. The media exposed and the Deschamps report confirmed the need to change the sexualized culture of the CAF. For Op Honour to be successful, Canada’s warfighters will need to know in explicit, plain language what this means, what right looks like, and what they ought to do and refrain from doing so that their conscience can guide them in serving with honour.

2. For the purposes of expediency and readability, these cases will subsequently be referenced as “Somalia,” “Semrau,” and “Op Honour.”


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.


17. Ibid., p. 53.


20. Ibid.

21. The first version of the statement lists the last two values as Fairness and Responsibility/Duty.

22. Defence Ethics Programme.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


34. Semrau, Foreword.


36. This last statement identifies both an ethical challenge and a capability delta. General Lewis acknowledges three things: 1. Mercy killing on the battlefield is at the very least unacceptable, if not altogether wrong. 2. The decision to commit this act is left to the soldier in accordance with his conscience (which must norm itself to what one knows to be right). 3. The task of articulating guidance for this decision in writing is, in his opinion, impossible.

37. CFLI, Ethics, p. 10.


47. The DAOD specifically identifies what constitutes harassment as: “It comprises any objectionable act, comment or display that demeans, belittles or causes personal humiliation or embarrassment, and any act of intimidation or threat.” The DAOD also identifies what harassment is not, namely, “...the provision of advice, the assignment of work, counseling, performance evaluation, discipline, and other supervisory/leadership functions” that do not cross the line where authority is abused.


49. Koehler, p. 344.

Padre (Major) Jon Derrick Marshall, CD, D Min, first ordained as a Baptist Minister in 1991, joined the Canadian Forces as a Protestant Chaplain in 1997 and has served extensively at home and abroad in a variety of operational postings. He currently serves at Canadian Forces Support Unit (Ottawa) as Senior Chaplain to Chaplain Services.

Padre (Lieutenant-Colonel Retired) Yvon Pichette, CD, Ph.D, retired from the Canadian Armed Forces after a long and distinguished career as a Canadian Armed Forces chaplain. In his last posting, he served as the Senior Chaplain to the commander of the 2nd Canadian Division.

**Introduction**

Much is being written and spoken of these days with regards to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the resiliency of its soldiers, sailors, and air personnel in the wake of increasingly complex, difficult, and harrowing operations. These assignments have taken a physical, psychological, and a spiritual toll on military personnel and their families. According to the Department of National Defence Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR), “Resilience” is defined as:

> “…the capacity of a soldier to recover quickly, resist, and possibly even thrive in the face of direct/indirect traumatic events and adverse situations in garrison, training and operational environments. Recovery from the greatest physical and mental hardships of the military environment is geared in the near term to the soldier’s current mission, but also is required in the long term throughout one’s career.”

Consequently, the CAF has been in the process of building its own concept of what constitutes “resiliency” for its personnel, as well as a complex set of resiliency organizations and programs. These programs are both proactive (in terms of providing “inoculation” to military personnel before operations), and reactive (through redeployment and reintegration strategies and programmes). These have the objective of helping military personnel and their families prepare for operational stress before deployments, as well as finding resilience from operational stress after deployments.

Recent research on resilience has shed light on existing human resources used to face adversity. It has identified sources of resistance, self-preservation, and resourcefulness during difficult times and experiences. Researchers began to use the concept and the term “resiliency” in a metaphorical sense within the psychosocial sciences. They explored psychological and sociological
mechanisms which endowed resistance to adversity in relation to those things which lowered risk, stress, and vulnerability.

According to philosophy and theology, “resilience” also includes ethical, spiritual, and religious resources which encourage people to actively face adversity, to be able to resist a reduction or suppression of their capacities, or which bolster their capabilities in difficult circumstances through fostering their spiritual assets and skills.

Mental health issues do not only occur among deployed serving military personnel, and, [in the eyes of some], there is no direct link between deployment and occurrences of suicide. [Representing one viewpoint], the following conclusions were reached by Suicide in the Canadian Forces 1995-2012:

1. From 1995 to 2012, there has been no statistically significant change in male CF suicide rates;
2. The rate of suicide when standardized for age and sex is lower than that of the general Canadian population;
3. History of deployment is not a risk factor for suicide in the Canadian Forces.

This may explain why issues related to resiliency also occur in civilian contexts when we examine and analyze such occupations as firefighters, first aid responders, and so on. This article is concerned with issues of mental health and spiritual resiliency among the entire Defence Team personnel (whether they have deployed or not), since spiritual resiliency issues can be a challenge to anyone.

How Do We Define Psychological/Spiritual Resiliency?

The Royal Canadian Chaplain Service (RCChS) defines spiritual resilience as “the ability to recover the emotional, psychological and physical strength required to adjust to diversity, or a traumatic change.”

Within the CAF, resilience is comprised of the following five component pillars:

1. Physical – whereby health is maintained through physical activity, nutrition, and good sleeping patterns.
2. Psychological – according to psychiatrists Steven Southwick and Dennis Charney, authors of the book Resilience: The Science of Mastering Life’s Greatest Challenges, psychological resilience is a multi-dimensional ability to bend, but not break under life’s stresses. Someone might be highly resilient in their work lives, but less so in relationships, and they may fluctuate in different stages of their lives. Psychologists Susan Folkman & Richard Lazarus have contended:
… Managing stress includes accepting, tolerating, avoiding or minimizing the stressor as well as gaining mastery over the environment seem to be the central processes in the management of stress. Anything that we do to adjust to the challenges and demands of stress, by way of adjustments made to reduce the impacts of stress, could be defined as coping. Thus coping can be viewed as constant changes in our cognitions and the use of behavioral effort to mitigate both external internal demands that are appraised as ‘taxing’ (Cummings, 1991) or ‘exceeding the resources of the person.’

3. Spiritual – at the heart and soul of wellness, spirituality is a driving force to total well-being. It refers to one’s value system (ethics, moral compass), one’s search for meaning and purpose in life, one’s experiences, and one’s connectedness with others.

4. Social – refers to good relationships with one’s family, friends, the community, and others with whom one shares common values, beliefs, or commitments which fulfill or nourish oneself personally.

5. Emotional – refers to how one manages emotional responses to events, such as joy, anger, fear, and so on, since all these responses can affect one’s state of being. This also involves one’s psychological outlook, such as self-esteem, intellectual/cognitive skills (such as problem-solving, analyzing, mental recall, and so on).

However, according to Dr. Deanna Messervey, a subject matter expert on defence ethical decision-making, there are actually two types of ethical decision making processes. The first is automatic processing (intuitive judgement), which includes a fast and effortless, autonomous system (which does not require controlled attention), and which is below the person’s level of awareness; and a deliberative processing (reasoned judgement), which involves a generally slow and effortful process, is linked to a central working memory (controlled attention), and which involves awareness.

The CAF clearly envisions a consensus for the need to approach resiliency in a holistic manner, as mentioned in Pillar Number 3, which includes the spiritual component.

In Contemporary Canadian Public Life, with the State’s Conscious Attempts at Official Secularism, Does Religion/Spirituality Have a Legitimate Place within the Public Sphere?

While there are public thinkers who would say a definitive “no!” to this contentious question, there is also an argument among some thinkers that spirituality or religion, as with any other comprehensive doctrine, should be acknowledged and managed by public leaders. In other words, the State must acknowledge and treat the entire spectrum of the human person (including religion/spirituality), and it must do so in a holistic manner. In this context, what we mean by religion is an organized and institutionalized response to human spiritual beliefs based upon transcendent revelation, general and specific revelation, which results in its own values and ethical code of behaviours.
For example, as was recently mentioned in an editorial in *The National Post*,11 *The Ottawa Citizen*,12 and in *The Globe and Mail*, The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has suggested that the creation of a Muslim imam registry might be an excellent way:

“… [to] get the state in the business of deciding who is allowed to preach and teach which religion, and implicitly what they get to say while preaching and teaching.”13

Without advocating whether or not this proposal is the correct way to manage this issue, these authors believe that the State does have a responsibility to be informed and involved in some manner (even though many consider religion to be a strictly private matter), since what clerics believe, teach, and promulgate directly influences the public sphere to varying degrees.

Domestically, in a post-9/11 world, any attempt to relegate spirituality and religion to the private sphere in Canada will prove inadequate. Terrorist attacks on Western establishments in the name of religion/spirituality have proven that spirituality which is ignored or suppressed does not simply disappear from view, or from affecting a wider number of citizens. As a full-time Professor of Theology at Boston College David Hollenbach has elucidated, a private individual or private faith group’s spiritual and/or religious sensibilities provide a significant influence in the life of individuals and faith groups. This unconsciously or consciously influences their values (i.e., the way they live their lives, interact with the wider community and society, the way they tend to vote, whether or not to join the military, etc.) and all of which, thereby, eventually influences the public sphere in both indirect and direct ways.14

Internationally, religion/spirituality still plays a very integral role in other societies, albeit to different degrees. Among many other operations, the CAF was involved in a peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, was on operations in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism, and most recently, deployed the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) after the earthquakes in Nepal. In the midst of these operations we came to realize that our failure to take into account the religious/spiritual realities of those nations (whose religious world view strongly influences most aspects of their lives) clearly hampered our operational effectiveness. As a result, the CAF has recently developed a new doctrine regarding Religious Area Analysis (RAA) and Religious Leader Engagement (RLE). This doctrine now allows the military chain of command to understand the religious/spiritual culture and realities “on the ground” in a given theatre of operations, which may well have an impact upon the success of any given mission. The ultimate purpose of RLE is to gather all the appropriately involved religious leaders in a theatre of operations to meet for discussions as one element of conflict resolution and a resultant peace process.15

“Domestically, in a post-9/11 world, any attempt to relegate spirituality and religion to the private sphere in Canada will prove inadequate.”
Whereas religion/spirituality impacts military operations writ large, it also can play a significant part in the healing of individual warriors after those same operations. When soldiers, sailors, and air personnel are significantly impacted in the course of their service to the public, they deserve every tool available to them in their healing and a holistic approach to their care. If it is effective, then a truly holistic approach should include a publicly funded, publicly administered and publicly supported spiritual resiliency component to any health care program.

Whereas spirituality and religion are important to psychological resilience for military personnel and their families, the question is not should we implement a spiritual resiliency program, but rather, what kind of program should it be and how should we implement it, so as to be both effective and acceptable in the CAF for all its personnel and their families? This is a delicate balancing act, given the plethora of spiritual, religious, and secular perspectives which exist in the CAF today. The CAF, as a public institution, is called upon to respect the freedom of conscience of all military personnel and their families, since the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees, among its fundamental freedoms, the freedom of individual conscience and religion (whether religious, agnostic, or atheist) and sets the foundation for the Royal Canadian Chaplain Service’s mandate to minister, found in Queen’s Regulations & Orders, Chapter 33 – Chaplain Services. Canadian military chaplains are, thus, called upon to care for all, at home and on operations, through the provision of religious/spiritual support and care for all Canadian military personnel and their families, wherever they live and serve, empowering them spiritually and morally to meet the demands of military service.

The essential role of a Canadian military chaplain in such a pluralistic environment, working within a care-based ethos (rather than an ethos of proselytization) is not without its challenges. It has always been an ‘interesting dance’ for the Canadian Government to address the competing needs, demands and perspectives of religious, spiritual, and secular-minded interests within the public sphere. Canada is one of the only countries in the world to have attempted to separate Religion and State almost entirely in any official capacity, to the degree that some thinkers would seek to ignore religion altogether as an actor in or influence upon the public sphere. This was not the original intention of our nation’s founders, nor is it healthy for faith groups or for the public sphere. To reduce the interaction and influence of the State and Religion is to impoverish both. Elsewhere in the world this kind of separation of State and Religion is far less entrenched (i.e., United States). The Canadian Government disengages itself altogether from religion and were to refuse a place for religion/spirituality in the public sphere, then whose influence would hold sway regarding faith-based schools (i.e., their financing, their curricula, etc.) and what these schools teach? For the common good of the whole of society, what should be sought after in Canada is for faith groups and their respective social, educational, and charitable organizations to be separate but not entirely private in nature, lest both State and Religion lose out on the possibility of a healthy mutual dialogue and influence (as opposed to any attempt at control of one another’s distinct spheres of responsibility) between the two.

There is significant evidence to suggest that religious/spiritual practices are effective in contributing to resilience, and should, therefore, be supported in a public resilience program. For example, during 17-20 November 2014, in an annual collective chaplain training event for 2nd Canadian Division to Canadian Army (CA) chaplains and other military and civilian personnel, psychologist Dr. Mona Abbondanza of the Université du Québec à Montréal, who specializes in cognitive behaviour therapy for anxiety disorder and depression in adults and seniors, underscored the value of spiritual practices on wellness and well-being in her presentation. She stated:

“The vast majority of empirical research, as well as clinical knowledge, indicates that religion has a positive influence on mental health, as well as on the ability of a person to function well. This goes beyond a lack of pathology or suffering to include positive traits…”

Her presentation also elucidates a link between religion/spirituality and psychological resilience, due to its effects upon a person’s lifestyle. In general, regular spiritual and religious practices in adults results in less tendency towards alcoholism, fewer eating disorders, less incidence of divorce, less high-risk sexual behaviour, fewer homicides, and less incidences of participation in other criminal activities.

Dr. Abbondanza has also presented the connection between spirituality and the practice of religion and psychological resilience within the military. Research results on combat-induced Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) show spirituality and the practice of religion’s impact upon health and well-being, both for good and for ill. The positive effects of regular spiritual and religious practices in adults include increased resilience in the face of future life challenges, an increased sense of one’s meaning or purpose in living, and a strengthened capacity to use positive coping resources amid significant life incidences and/or crises. For example, post-deployment interviews of United States Marines on spirituality, religion, and the military underscored a sense of meaning or purpose which strengthened certain Marines’ capacity to use positive coping resources amid crises. However, a sense of meaning or purpose also included negative beliefs about safety, goodness, and the meaningfulness of the world, such as negative views of one’s relationship with God, beliefs that God is punishing or abandoning the individual, a loss of core spiritual values, and an estrangement from or questioning of one’s spiritual identity. Also, those suffering from PTSD are often also in spiritual distress, a distress which includes loss of faith, and difficulty reconciling one’s personal beliefs with wartime events. CAF chaplains are equipped to manage and counsel individuals in these thorny religious/spiritual issues as well.
“Resilience” in psychology may also be defined as the capacity to live, to succeed in life and to develop despite adversities. For the French psychiatrist Boris Cyrulnik, resilience “…is a complex process by which people who have suffered adversity are, against all negative prognoses, able to thrive.” Resilience might be said to be, “… the capacity of a person or a group to develop well, and to continue to project themselves in the future, despite destabilizing events, difficult life conditions and sometimes severe trauma”. He also suggests that this, “… art of navigating between torrents” is a facility which is not innate, but can be found in the roots of infancy, and in the relationship which parents have with their child.”

According to Professor of Psychology at the Université catholique de Louvain Vassilis Saroglou, where he is the director of the Centre for the Psychology of Religion, there are four essential religious dimensions of Spirituality and Religion which can be powerful resources in bolstering or restoring resilience. These are described as: “Believing (in the truth); Bonding (to a transcendent reality); Belonging (to a trans-historical group); and Behaving (in a virtuous way).”

We could expect that each of these dimensions could play a role in bolstering resilience. The purpose of the following table is to juxtapose the spiritual person and a spiritual person who is not also religious, using the four essential religious dimensions and their traits:

Table 1 – Religious/Areligious variations plotted against four religious dimensions.
What is the CAF chaplain’s role in facilitating this art of spiritual resilience? Padre (Captain) Mario Sonier has stated how CAF chaplains facilitate the “Believing” aspect of spiritual resiliency:

"Believing" is the foundation of spiritual resiliency. It is the belief that something greater than oneself exists, something that can help guide and sustain one through difficult times. This belief can take many forms, from a deep faith in a higher power to a philosophical belief in the interconnectedness of all things.

Chaplains, and in particular, mental health chaplains, help CAF members adapt well to the reality of their situations, and assist them in their meaning-making process. They walk and talk with CAF members in order to help members feel reassured and empowered in their personal journey through life. In this sense, chaplains help soldiers to maintain “sanity” in chaos and operations, and guide them on their way back “home.”

The key role of a chaplain is to help people develop “meaning” in life. Resiliency involves a return to fullness of life, which presupposes a meaningful life to return to in the first place. CAF chaplains, amongst other caring professionals (i.e., psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers), are in the business of meaning-making for military personnel and their families. CAF chaplains in particular provide a meta-narrative (world view) in which to live and act in the world, they provide an ethical framework in which to navigate life’s uncertainties, and they offer a system of, and a means for, forgiveness, reconciliation, and healing. As Padre Harold Ristau reminds us, CAF chaplains, in addition to providing religious services, also inculcate meaning through other important services, such as the provision of spiritual care, counselling, spiritual direction, and support.

Conclusion

What specific or unique role does spirituality bring to the table that a secular/psychological approach cannot already fulfill by itself? Religion/spirituality offers a system of meaning-making and belief, an over-arching metanarrative (i.e., world view), a value system and a moral compass by which to navigate life’s vicissitudes. Religion, as a socially organized expression of spiritual beliefs and values, also offers ready-made community, spiritual resources stemming from thousands of years of wisdom and practice, and a vital sense of belonging and social support.

CAF chaplains also work as part of a multi-disciplinary team and can never work totally independently, but they are also an indispensable part of the CAF health care team, since – if it is true that spiritual resilience improves operational capacity of the CAF – it must be part of its holistic approach to healthcare. To be maximally effective, spiritual resilience practices must be: disciplined, intentional, regular and guided. CAF chaplains are specifically-trained professionals, qualified and experienced to intentionally and regularly guide military personnel and their families in disciplined spiritual and religious health care regimes.

CAF chaplains’ spiritual program and chaplaincy contribution to resilience is not to be accomplished along utilitarian grounds only, but strives for a more holistic and multifaceted approach to the issue of spiritual resilience. Its mission is to provide comprehensive religious, spiritual, and ethical support to military personnel and their families, to monitor and foster unit morale, and to provide support to the chain of command and the wider Defence Team Community.

We know that to implement a spiritual resiliency program requires a commitment to an introspective, organized, and institutional approach to resiliency that takes seriously the existence of the spiritual aspect of human existence (meaning-making) and organizational health. While CAF chaplains are one of many professions who treat this aspect of the whole person, we are a unique and valuable resource in the provision of care and tending to the spiritual aspect of health care and resiliency. The question remains: will the Canadian Government shy away from this important aspect of resiliency even though its professional practitioners already exist within the CAF and stand ready to help, or will they embrace this challenge and give the sailor, soldier, and air personnel every chance at health, happiness, and success in the conduct of their duties?

“CAF Chaplains’ spiritual program and chaplaincy contribution to resilience is not to be accomplished along utilitarian grounds only, but strives for a more holistic and multifaceted approach to the issue of spiritual resilience.”
DEFENCE ETHICS AND SPIRITUALITY

DEFENCE ETHICS AND SPIRITUALITY

1. The concept of “resilience” is actually, first and foremost, a scientific one belonging to the realm of physics – referring to physical resistance to distortion or deformation (i.e., a metal bar would be considered resilient if it not only resists breaking or denting, but takes on its original form after shock or pressure).
4. Ibid.
7. The Royal Canadian Chaplain Service aide-memoire pamphlet “Achieving Spiritual Resilience”
8. Ibid.
10. The authors’ definition of that which constitutes religion.
15. Canadian Army Doctrine Note (CADN) 13-1, Religious Leader Engagement (RLE), 24 July 2013.
16. The principles of respect for the dignity of all persons, service to Canada before self, and obedience to lawful authority remain at the core of CAF military ethos. These core principles are essential to military capabilities in peace, in conflict, and in war.
18. Major Jon Derrick Marshall, D Min., “The Ethics of Exile, “Ottawa: in Theforum, 24 June 2008, p.1. “The arguments often made for the marginalization of religion in Canada are those of inclusiveness and tolerance for all Canadians and the separation of Church and State are pluralistic democracy. Yet, the separation of Church and State in North American democracies has gradually come to be interpreted erroneously to mean, rather than a “line of distinction” of responsibility between pulpit and legislative, there should be an impermeable wall that divides them altogether. It was never intended by the founders of the North American democracies that separation of Church and State would preclude these two institutions from influencing each other in a healthy, respectful and democratic manner; rather, it was intended that no one religion could enjoy favoritism of influence or power over others.”
The Battle for History: Nova Scotia’s 85th Battalion and the Capture of Hill 145, Vimy Ridge, 1917-1943

by Daniel Byers

Daniel Byers, Ph.D, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History of Laurentian University. He has published in Ontario History, the Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, the Bulletin d’histoire politique, Canadian Military History, and the Canadian Army Journal. His first book, Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription in the Second World War, appeared recently as part of the “Studies in Canadian Military History” series published by UBC Press and the Canadian War Museum. The present article comes out of his research for a forthcoming biography of J.L. Ralston, and a planned future history of the 85th Battalion from its creation in 1915 to the winding down of its postwar veterans’ organization in the 1980s.

Crowds gather at the Vimy Memorial for its dedication, 26 July 1936.
The story of the role played by the 85th Battalion in the battle of Vimy Ridge has become almost mythical. Raised as part of what became a great province-wide undertaking over a few weeks in the fall of 1915, it had only just arrived at the front in February 1917, and was still waiting to take its place in the line of battle. On the morning of 9 April, when all four divisions of the Canadian Corps attacked together for the first time in the First World War, the 85th was relegated to acting as a work battalion, to help repair trenches and carry out other tasks behind the initial advance. Within a few hours, Canadians had captured almost the entire ridge, and only the two highest points held out: the “Pimple” and Hill 145 (the summit where Canada’s Vimy Memorial now stands). Having seen all of his existing battalions broken up attempting to capture Hill 145, the 11th Brigade’s commanding officer, Brigadier-General Victor Odlum, turned to the 85th to attempt one more advance before the end of the day. “C” and “D” companies under Captains Harvey Crowell and Percival Anderson were charged with the task.\(^1\)

Shortly before the start-time of 5:45 p.m.,\(^2\) the two companies filed out of Tottenham Tunnel. “C” fanned out to the left and “D” to the right. When the artillery barrage that had been hurriedly requested to accompany them did not materialize, Crowell decided that if he did not stick to the plan and order his men to go forward, then all might be lost. He led them out of their trench, followed shortly afterwards by a startled Anderson and the men of “D” company. The attackers began to draw heavy fire (Crowell himself was severely wounded by a bullet through his right shoulder). But one corporal remembered his recent training with newly-introduced rifle grenades, and fired from his hip as he moved forward. Other soldiers soon followed his example. This relatively small amount of firepower, along with the shock of the German defenders at the audacity of the 85th in attacking without artillery support in the first place, were just enough to allow its men to capture Hill 145.

Yet, this was not the picture of events that the Canadian army’s Historical Section had as it began to search its files on the battle in the mid-1930s. In fact, were it not for the efforts of Harvey Crowell, a pre-and post-war civilian accountant, and J.L. Ralston, a corporate lawyer who was the 85th’s adjutant in early 1917, later its commanding officer, and then served twice as Canada’s Minister of National Defence (in the 1920s, and again in the 1940s), many of the details of the Nova Scotia battalion’s part in the battle might never have been preserved – or at least, they might not have been given nearly as prominent a place in later accounts. The story of how these events came to be documented also says much about how the history of the Canadian Corps itself came to be pieced together and written, especially by the Historical Section and its Director, Colonel A.F. Duguid, in the first two decades after 1918. And beyond that, it serves as a reminder of the ways in which much of our history comes to be preserved and written, and how it can be shaped by the influences of particular individuals despite our best efforts as historians to reconstruct events as truthfully and objectively as possible.

The rewriting of the 85th’s place in the battle of Vimy Ridge began with the Pilgrimage to France that was organized by the Canadian Legion in 1936 to unveil the newly-built Memorial. Walter Allward’s now-famous design had come to be built on Hill 145, not necessarily because Vimy was considered at the time to be the Canadian Corps’ most significant victory of the war, but more because the feature so dominated the area around it that when a special Commission was formed to plan to build memorials at several sites in the early 1920s, it was clearly the
most striking place to locate what was considered to be the most far-reaching out of the many proposals that had been submitted.\(^3\) The sheer scope of the Pilgrimage itself, which included a mass ocean crossing by approximately 6,400 Canadian veterans or next-of-kin and their families on five large passenger liners, as well as 1,365 Canadians who traveled from England, tens of thousands more British and French citizens at the ceremony itself, and even the accompanying speeches, most of which attempted to discern the precise meaning for Canadians of Vimy and the larger war, all then also did much to begin cementing the notion that because Vimy was being given such recognition, it must have been the country’s most important battle.\(^4\)

According to Harvey Crowell, who was among the participants who made the trip from Canada, Vimy was much less significant to many veterans at the time: as far as he knew, he was the only person from the 85th who attended. As he put it, “On the voyage I talked to many former officers about the location of the Canadian War Memorial, and, strangely enough, the site did not mean a great deal.”\(^5\) Yet, he became upset when he read the description of the battle that was provided in the official guidebook produced by the Canadian Legion for the Pilgrimage. That section had been written by A.F. Duguid, one of whose roles as the head of the army’s Historical Section was specifically to prepare a proper, detailed history of all parts of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) that had been recruited to fight the war overseas. Thus, he was the apparent authority on the Canadian army’s wartime activities. His brief account in the guidebook did not mention the 85th at all. Instead, he left his comments on Hill 145 vague, noting only that Canadian soldiers as a group had captured it by nightfall on 9 April.\(^6\)

Despite Duguid’s standing as one of the leading experts on Canadian participation in the First World War, by 1936 he had yet to publish a single volume out of the total of eight that the government had authorized him to write. In the end, he would only produce a first volume in 1938, along with a companion book of documents and maps, both of which dealt with events only up to September 1915.\(^7\) As distinguished historian Tim Cook has noted, throughout the interwar years, Duguid’s small office was overburdened with various tasks that kept him from focusing on his writing. He tended to see himself as the guardian of all aspects of the memory of the Canadian army’s role in the First World War, and as a result, kept feeling compelled to get involved in further activities that distracted him from his primary duty.\(^8\) As Professor Wes Gustavson of the University of Western Ontario has indicated, the terms of reference that guided Duguid in his work also did not make it clear that writing the history of the CEF was supposed to be his primary task.\(^9\) Even more importantly, Duguid was an engineer rather than a historian by training, and a former Canadian artillery officer from the First World War – something that was considered to be a strength at first, since he would fully understand the subjects about which he was writing. And he did work diligently and conscientiously to
live up to the professional standards of a historian. But at times this almost made him too conscientious, and he became obsessed with attempting to collect every possible piece of written evidence before beginning to set his conclusions down on paper. He also followed the precepts of professional historians of the time, and considered written records to be far superior to the recollections of the individual participants in the battles about which he would be writing. In a sense, if a written document did not confirm an event, then it had not happened.\(^{10}\)

Clearly, Harvey Crowell also realized that if Duguid was viewed as the leading authority on the history of the CEF overseas, then what would become the standard account of the battle of Vimy Ridge would not include any major recognition of the part played by the 85th. For that reason, he took up the issue with J.L. Ralston. Ralston had also been present at Hill 145 in 1917. As the 85th’s former commander, and by the late-1930s, also a former Minister of National Defence, his opinion would no doubt carry a certain weight in supporting Crowell. In addition, his experience of being part of the 85th had shaped his own life just as significantly as it did for all Canadians who served in uniform during the First World War. He remembered the comradeship and other positive aspects of his time in Europe very fondly, and remained in close touch with Crowell and other former members of his battalion for years afterwards. He especially looked forward eagerly to the annual reunions of its veterans’ organization, the “85th Battalion Memory Club.”\(^{11}\) Thus, he was also personally supportive of what Crowell saw as setting the record straight on behalf of the battalion. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, thanks to Ralston’s former role as Minister of National Defence, he knew A.F. Duguid personally, and could approach him more easily about the topic.

Crowell appears to have first discussed his concerns privately with Ralston at some point between 1936 and 1939. In February of the latter year, he confirmed his account in a written letter. He described how the 85th’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel A.H. Borden, had been forced to provide very rushed handwritten orders when the 85th were suddenly called upon to capture two trench lines that were still held by the Germans on the mid-afternoon of 9 April, and then the roles that Crowell and Anderson and their two companies had played in the events. As far as Crowell remembered, their men had actually gone beyond their official objectives, but he was less worried at the time about documenting their exact position than to pull them back in case a friendly artillery barrage caught them in the open, where only German troops were expected to be, and so that they could prepare to defend against potential counter-attacks. He was also the first person to tell the story of Corporal Milton H. Curl, the man who had first thought to fire his rifle grenade from the hip at the Germans. But Crowell’s key objective was clearly to establish that the 85th Battalion had indeed captured Hill 145, since as far as he knew, the Canadians had faced no further opposition in that area from that moment onwards, and therefore the 85th seemed to have accomplished the task. Obviously, he had something to gain for his former unit by making such claims, and although he does not seem to have ever sought personal recognition for the role he had played in the battle, he also acknowledged in his letter that “I really thought that I had something to do with the success of the attack, having led C Company unsupported and drawn all the fire for the first ten minutes.”\(^{12}\)
In addition, it is worth noting that in support of his argument Crowell mentioned that he had actually preserved the first two out of the three pages of the original handwritten orders that Borden had produced on the spot in April 1917 to guide the two-company attack.13 Apparently, Crowell had ended up with them still in his possession at the end of that day, and had then held onto them for the next twenty years, recognizing their potential significance and yet never realizing that they might have been worth submitting to some historical authority so that they could be used to help reconstruct events. This was just one of the difficulties that Duguid faced in trying to piece together such written documents in the interwar years, given the lack of experience that the early CEF had had with record-keeping during the war.

Ralston did forward Crowell’s information to Duguid and asked him to look into the matter. But the reply Ralston received was almost a perfect model of how Tim Cook describes Duguid and his procedure as a historian (not to mention that having to respond to such queries, and having taken the time to write for the Vimy Pilgrimage guidebook in the first place, were two further examples of how Duguid kept having to stop and devote his attention to other issues rather than being able to focus on completing his CEF history). Duguid began his response with a hint of annoyance, noting that “I went into this before writing the account in the Vimy Pilgrimage book, and have now gone over the evidence again.” There was no doubt, he admitted, that the 85th’s two companies had captured certain of the trenches on Hill 145 on the evening of 9 April. Its war diary (the day-to-day record of events that every operational military unit was required to keep during the conflict) confirmed that.14 But the war diary stopped short of confirming that the battalion had captured all the German positions. Duguid, in fact, then cited the German government’s published history of its forces during the war that discussed events that night as an authority to support his own point of view, since it recorded the 85th’s men as being in the same place as the existing Canadian documents. Although the Germans obviously might have had motives of their own to avoid having to admit that all of Hill 145 had been lost so quickly on 9 April, Duguid concluded that the written sources on both sides provided only that much information. And if there was a conflict between a written document and someone’s personal memory of an event, then once again, to him, the written account should hold supreme. He did acknowledge that if new evidence appeared, his version of events might change. In that connection, not only did he indicate that he had not ever seen any copy of Colonel Borden’s handwritten operation order from the afternoon of 9 April in his own files, but he enclosed, along with his letter to Ralston,
a general appeal to former members of the CEF asking for help locating similar original documents that they might have retained in their possession after 1918.\textsuperscript{15}

When Ralston informed Crowell of Duguid’s reply, Crowell showed some annoyance of his own. In particular, after seeing Duguid’s focus with respect to written accounts, over what Crowell considered to be the unquestionable truth of his own experiences, he revealed a view that some members of the public still at times seem to have towards professional historians today: “I began to wonder if a good deal of what has been considered to be authentic history was ‘made up’ in this way.” But to some extent, he also had a point. Keeping the 85th’s war diary “was just one further job to be attended to by a tired officer, and often based on rather sketchy records,” he commented, and as a consequence, it was not always the best source of detailed information. He seized, for example, upon its description of Crowell’s men having captured their first enemy trench in just ten minutes. Despite the fact that his own perceptions may have been somewhat skewed by living through the attack first-hand, in his view this timeline was “…absurd. We were wading in mud and water over our knees and up to our hips a good deal of the time, and did not reach our Objective,... in less than 15 or 20 minutes, and we were under Machine Gun and Artillery fire every foot of the way.”\textsuperscript{16} In a follow-up letter, he also questioned the war diary’s description of men firing machine guns from the hip during the advance, which had come to be repeated by many later authors, but was likely the result of confusion over the role of Corporal M.H. Curll in firing rifle grenades.\textsuperscript{17}

Crowell also produced an even more telling comment on the potential reliability of the 85th’s war diary in the form of a supporting letter from Earle Phinney, who had been second-in-command of the battalion in April 1917. As Phinney pointed out, Lieutenant-Colonel Borden, who had been a peacetime officer in the Permanent Force (the full-time professional component of the Canadian army at the time), would never have allowed his unit’s war diary to admit in writing that they had exceeded their orders by overshooting their objective. However, Phinney had personally visited the front lines to see to consolidating the 85th’s positions on the evening of 9 April, and he could confirm that they had been forward of the ones officially reported. And as a well-regarded postwar civilian lawyer in Halifax, he was “…quite prepared to make a statutory declaration” to that effect.\textsuperscript{18}

The fact that written documents (and war diaries in particular) can sometimes be misleading, or worse, is not news to historians. But it is interesting to see the merits of the 85th’s war diary being disputed quite so openly by Crowell and Phinney. Still, by the time that Crowell was advancing some of these arguments, it was the fall of 1939 and the Second World War had now broken out. Ralston had returned to politics as Minister of Finance. After
the death of his friend and colleague Norman Rogers in June 1940, he went on to become Minister of National Defence for the second time in his career until he was removed from Cabinet on 1 November 1944, over sending conscripts overseas to help maintain the strength of the Canadian army in Europe. Crowell acknowledged the new conflict in his correspondence in late-1939, noting that given the situation, at this point probably “…the best thing to do is to hand all the information over to Colonel Duguid and get on with our other work.”

And yet, the story did not end quite there. Crowell kept pursuing the subject with other 85th veterans, and in December 1940, he wrote to Curll, who was by then an employee in the Royal Bank of Canada’s headquarters in Montreal (in the same building, in fact, where Ralston had practised law throughout the 1930s), to ask him to confirm Crowell’s memory that there had been no further attacks on Hill 145 after the 85th’s advance on 9 April. In commenting about his own role in events, Curll noted wryly that:

Anything I did that evening was purely in self-defence.... As you will remember, it was getting pretty hot and realizing that we had no barrage, I must admit that I ducked for a shell hole and luckily landed in one with one of our boys who had an apron full of bombs. The first three or four bombs I sent over were from this shell hole. My companion then called my attention to the fact that he didn’t hear the machine gun bullets overhead any more, so we decided it was time to move forward and did so, but continued to shoot over the bombs to make sure the job was completed.

As Curll added, he had not wanted to be acknowledged too openly at the time for doing this, because he had been forced to use regular bullets rather than blank cartridges to fire his grenades, and in the process, had destroyed government-issued property in the form of his service rifle. “However, I procured another rifle before the evening was much older,” he summed up poignantly. “The chap who had previously had it, had no further use for it.”

Despite how preoccupied Ralston came to be with numerous tasks over his next four years as Minister of National Defence, in April 1943 he found time to have the entire file of correspondence with Crowell forwarded once again to Duguid at the Historical Section. This time, while nothing was...
stated directly, he was clearly expecting it to be reviewed while he had the opportunity to request that Duguid take it more seriously, as Duguid’s ultimate superior within the Department. At first, Duguid appears to have simply put the file aside – likely just due to how much he was still burdened with other tasks while trying to complete his history of the CEF (and something that was now rendered that much more complicated by the need to document the new conflict that was then in progress). But one is tempted to speculate that he also might not have been in any rush to respond, if he still disagreed with Crowell and Ralston, and he worried about the implications of openly so doing. When he finally did begin to prepare a response, his first handwritten draft actually did continue to challenge Crowell’s version of events. Duguid took exception to Crowell’s earlier arguments that while Duguid tended to stress there was no evidence of the 85th having fully crossed over Hill 145 until the morning of 10 April 1917 (and thus no proof that it had captured the top of the Hill), that was not the relevant point, because Crowell and other participants themselves remembered being there at the end of the attack the night before, and all opposition to their presence had ended by then. As Duguid wrote in this draft letter, even putting some of his comments in capital letters for emphasis, “THAT POINT is the point at issue.” He then went on to cite evidence from the German history, once again, that suggested that Canadian units other than the 85th had forced the enemy to withdraw.

In the end, however, Duguid seems to have thought better of his initial reaction, and decided to adopt the well-known maxim that “discretion is the better part of valour.” Five months after Ralston had first forwarded the file to him, he finally replied back with a brief memo, which stated simply that “After careful re-examination of all relevant documents, no further action is at present indicated.” He also asked permission to retain the file to add to the Historical Section’s records.

Thus, Duguid had clearly seen the wisdom of conceding the point. It is not necessarily true that without this file, Crowell’s memory of events would never have been recorded, because in the early-1960s, he got the chance to recount it once again when the CBC decided to conduct an extensive series of interviews for what became a well-known radio series, “In Flanders Fields.” Crowell also kept copies of all of his correspondence from the 1930s and 1940s, and he clearly shared it with authors Fraser McKee in the 1960s, and Pierre Berton again in the 1980s, based upon the accounts that appear in their books. Yet, during the earlier years, Crowell had had no reason to suspect that Duguid’s version of the battles of 1917 would not come to be published first, and that it would therefore come to influence every later account. Therefore, he led the fight to ensure that the 85th would be included at that time. As a result, when a briefer version of the government’s official history was finally completed in the early-1960s by Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, it did acknowledge the role of the two companies of the 85th in a single sentence. Fighting this paper battle in the 1930s and 1940s also gave Crowell the opportunity to rehearse and hone his own version of the events, and correspond with other participants to help clarify it and collect other supporting evidence several times before sharing it with the public for the first time in his 1960s interview.

The story of how Crowell and Ralston worked to try to change what might have become the generally-received version of events surrounding the capture of Hill 145 also serves as a reminder of several elements that surround how we write history generally, and especially, how the early effort to write the history of Canada’s participation in the First World War was carried out. It reminds us, first of all, of the approach taken by Colonel A.F. Duguid towards trying to write that history between the 1920s and
the 1940s. Records were not nearly as well-collected and ordered as would be the case for the Second World War. At times, it was only a matter of chance that key documents even survived, and anyone thought to make them part of the public record. At the same time, Duguid himself perhaps relied too strongly upon the written word as his most reliable source of information. On the other hand, the role of Crowell and Ralston in what might be described as outrightly lobbying Duguid for recognition of the 85th and its role at Vimy, reminds us of the way that personal relationships and motives can shape, not just how we write history, but even how the records come to be collected, and upon which we rely to reconstruct history.

Lastly, this specific case is an excellent example of some of the other struggles that Duguid faced in attempting to compile his history of the CEF, and in particular why he sometimes agonized over producing what would be seen as a true account but at the same time would pay homage to all of the Canadian troops who had been involved, without stirring up anger from one group of veterans, or another at how they were portrayed – a further likely reason why he spent so much time worrying over getting everything just right before he was willing to publish in the first place. If nothing else, the story of how the 85th came to be remembered for its role in the battle of Vimy Ridge suggests that even a hundred years after what has become one of the central events in our national memory-building about the First World War, there still remains something new to be learned by studying the developments surrounding it.

I would like to thank my colleague Dr. Brad Rudachyk, and the students who took part in several years of his course, HIST 2026: Historical Methods, for first inviting me to present the primary documents upon which this article is based, as an example of how historians use evidence generally – and in the process, for helping me to tease out some of the intricacies of the subject myself. I have also benefited from comments on earlier versions of this paper that I delivered to the “Great War’s Shadow” conference in Lake Louise, Alberta, in September 2014, and the Laurentian University Alumni Association in Barrie, Ontario, in November 2015 (and particularly on the former, by Dr. Tim Cook of the Canadian War Museum).
It’s over... Officers of the 85th Canadian Infantry Battalion, January 1919.

The Monument at Vimy Ridge in 2007.


8. Cook deals with the various factors that affected Duguid’s work in his chapter on the interwar years in Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the Two World Wars (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2006), pp. 41-92, and see also Wes Gustavson, “‘Fairly Well Known and Need Not Be Discussed’: Colonel A.F. Duguid and the Canadian Official History of the First World War,” in Canadian Military History 10(2), Spring 2001, pp. 41-54.

9. Ibid., p. 45.

10. Ibid., pp. 45-47, and Cook, Clio’s Warriors, pp. 43, 45, 48-49 and 89-90.


13. Ibid., pages enclosed with correspondence, Crowell to Ratson, 8 June 1939 (the original two pages remain in Ratson’s file, to this day).


16. Ibid., Crowell to Ratson, 8 June 1939.

17. Ibid., Crowell to Ratson, 12 October 1939.

18. Ibid., Phinney to Crowell, 4 October 1939.

19. Ibid., Crowell to Ratson, 12 October 1939.

20. Nova Scotia Archives, Manuscript Group 100, Vol. 116 (Microfilm Reel 15171), Item #11h, correspondence, Crowell to Curll, 6 December 1939.

21. Ibid., #11g, Curll to Crowell, 16 December 1940.

22. Ratson Papers, Vol. 44, “85th Battalion... Controversy over Hill 145...” L.M. Breen, Assistant Private Secretary, Minister of National Defence, to Duguid, 19 April 1943.

23. See Gustavson, p. 50, and Cook, Clio’s Warriors, p. 117.

24. LAC, Record Group 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 1907, File DMS 5-7-51, “85th Canadian Infantry Battalion,” draft letter, Duguid to Assistant Private Secretary to the Minister [of National Defence], n.d.

25. Ibid., Duguid to Private Secretary to Minister of National Defence, 21 September 1943.


Equine Assisted Therapy to Help Couples with PTSD: The Evidence for Improved Personal Relationships

by C. Randy Duncan, Steve Critchley, and Jim Marland

Introduction

Can Praxis has been operating since March, 2013, in an effort to improve the personal relationships of veterans, active service members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), along with their respective spouses/partners negatively impacted by post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). There remains a steady inquiry and demand for this unique equine assisted therapy program, which is almost always initiated by the spouses/partners of individuals diagnosed with service-related PTSD. These remarkably dedicated spouses/partners typically attend the program with the hope that the negative effects of PTSD on their family relationships can be repaired. The following quote highlights the resilience of many of the spouses/partners:

“Can Praxis gave us both more tools to work with in rebuilding a trusting relationship. The emphasis on the spouse being an equal partner in the PTSD experience/relationship has been particularly important to us.”

(Spouse – 6 months post-intervention)

The aim of Can Praxis in knowingly taking on a lengthy and expensive pilot testing process has been to facilitate establishing the validity and reliability of their emerging program within a diverse equine assisted learning (EAL)/equine facilitated psychotherapy (EFP) industry. As such, there is a need to establish an empirical evidence base to support any assessment of the degree to which couples experience better personal relationships following completion of the first phase of a unique three-phase PTSD-tailored equine therapy program. Critical to the validation of the Phase I intervention, is reliably determining whether any detectable long-term improvements in these personal relationships are attributable to the targeted learning goals and objectives of the Can Praxis program.

Through 40 months of pilot testing, Can Praxis has obtained a follow-up sample size of $n = 88$ from the 292 participants who have completed Phase I. The current sample facilitates an examination of program progress by reporting the early trends relative to the intended long-term outcomes. However, it is acknowledged that these trends, which suggest some initial support for the benefits of equine assisted therapy, do not yet meet academic standards for an empirical evidence base to establish the Can Praxis program as a
best practice within the EAL/EFP industry. In part, this is because social behaviours cannot be measured perfectly. Therefore, it is important methodologically for Can Praxis to continue increasing the number of respondents in the follow-up sample to reduce the chances that reported change in personal relationships are due to non-program sources.1

This article focuses upon the follow-up results for the Can Praxis program, viewed at an average of 10.9 months post-therapeutic intervention. There is an examination of the extent to which participants identify and describe positive change in their personal relationships, and whether the impact of PTSD symptoms upon the family has been reduced. The working assumption is that the Can Praxis intensive three-day equine assisted therapy program produces self-mediation knowledge and skills that are remembered and implemented for a sufficient duration in the couples’ day-to-day environment to positively affect personal relationships.

**Background**

Can Praxis utilizes an experiential learning model, which integrates practical self-mediation techniques with equine activities to produce targeted communication skills and knowledge intended to be maintained long after completing the program.2 The use of horses is intended to help participants ‘be in the moment’ and develop increased awareness and engagement towards acquiring a working knowledge of a practical self-mediation process. As such, the critical outcome assessment for determining the effectiveness of the program is based upon the data obtained from couples who have been back in their day-to-day environment for a minimum of three months. Relative to the following quote, having a high proportion of participants’ report how and why their relationship has improved in the timeframe between the equine assisted therapy...
intervention and the follow-up assessment suggests a linkage to the program’s *implicit* and *explicit* learning goals.

“I practice modelling the behavior I wish to see in others daily now. My wife and I talk on a regular basis and are able to defuse situations before they implode. I am more open to understanding that at times my behavior scares the horses (my family) away and even though I say sorry, it may take them awhile to come back to me. This course has greatly improved my relationship with my sons, and they feel comfortable talking to me.”

(Veteran – 10 months post-intervention)

Can Praxis has a goal of having their innovative equine assisted therapy program established as an evidence based best practice for treating individuals diagnosed with PTSD. The challenge is to move beyond justification based upon examples of emotionally powerful narratives that are prevalent across the EAL/EFP industry, to an empirical evidence base that will meet the criteria of the scientific community. The need for organizations like the CAF, the RCMP, and VAC to require empirical evidence that is more factual and can be checked is a legitimate concern.3 However, for equine assisted therapy programs to clear this research bar, the requirements are complex, lengthy, and very costly. Indeed, to have an equine therapy program considered for inclusion in the long-term mental health strategies of the aforementioned organizations requires considerable resources and perseverance through a rigorous and lengthy pilot testing process.

An important aspect in making an argument for credible long-term outcomes is linking the findings to an effective and standardized intervention delivered in a consistent manner. The Can Praxis program is consistently facilitated by the two co-founders; one, a 28-year veteran of the CAF and accredited mediation trainer, and the other, a registered psychologist, a communication and leadership trainer, and an accredited EAL facilitator with more than 36 years of experience. As shown in Figure 1, the focus of the experiential learning program is helping couples impacted by service-related PTSD to acquire a practical self-mediation process that does not require on-going third-party intervention. The use of horses provides a very effective way to leverage participants’ awareness of the communication principles and techniques taught within the context of applied self-mediation towards better managing conflict and facilitating problem-solving.4
The Can Praxis program utilizes the same series of nine targeted EAL activities that are offered in the same way in each Phase I session. For example, the non-verbal ‘join-up’ EAL activity is offered at the start of sessions because of its impact and ability to leverage participant awareness of how horses are able to read human body language. The activity demonstrates the concept of ‘pressure and release’ by using relaxed body language to invite a horse back into one’s personal space (i.e., a metaphor for “I’m sorry”), after first displaying aggressive behaviour (i.e., pressure) to drive the horse away. Experiencing this immediate feedback and seeing the consequences of their change in body language is virtually always ‘eye-opening,’ and it provides a new level of awareness of how the horse’s behaviour mirrors the behaviour and attitude of their spouse/partner. In this way, the individual meets a self-mediation learning objective of a real time feedback moment, which is suggested to be transferable to their human relationships.

As shown in Figure 2, the two intended short-term, end-of-session outcomes for the Can Praxis Phase I program are: 1) a reduction in PTSD symptoms over the course of the therapy session, and 2) the perceived acquisition of self-mediation skills helpful towards repairing personal relationships. To aid in measuring these two dimensions, content experts were utilized to develop the Horses relieving Operational Stress Through Experiential Relationships (HOLSTER) scale; a semi-structured self-report questionnaire. Based upon the current sample size (n = 146), the 20-item PTSD scale of the HOLSTER has a high internal reliability coefficient of 0.80. Similarly, the 16-item Self-Mediation Skills scale has a high internal reliability coefficient of 0.74.

At this juncture in the pilot testing, there is a high positive linear relationship ($r = 0.77, p < 0.001$) between the PTSD scale and the Self-Mediation Skills scale. The resulting $r^2 = 0.59$ indicates that a higher score on the PTSD scale (i.e., a perceived reduction in PTSD symptoms) may be a predictive factor in higher scores on the Self-Mediation Skills scale (i.e., perceived confidence in acquiring communication skills). As such, 81.5% of participants report being very positive about relief from their PTSD symptoms over the course of Phase I, and 93.2% of participants were very positive that they had acquired useful self-mediation skills. This suggestion that positive experiential learning using horses may be a predictive factor in better outcomes for acquiring self-mediation skills represents a start to understanding the efficacy of the Can Praxis equine assisted therapy program.

In addition, a semi-structured self-report instrument for the spouses/partners participating in Phase I was adapted from the HOLSTER. The Benefitting from Experiential Learning Together (BELT) instrument includes a 5-item Self-Mediation Skills scale that has a moderate internal reliability coefficient of 0.66. Based on the sample size pertaining to this instrument (n = 133), 89.5% of spouses/partners reported being very positive about having acquired self-mediation skills useful towards repairing their relationships. Having the spouses/partners participate in this PTSD-tailored equine assisted therapy program is both integral to acquiring an effective self-mediation process and towards obtaining collaborative follow-up data that changes in the personal relationships are attributable to the Can Praxis program.
Methods

The current level of follow-up data represents 30.1% \((n = 88)\) of the 292 veterans, active members of the CAF, members of the RCMP, and their respective spouses/partners who have completed Phase I of the Can Praxis program. These 88 respondents are comprised of 46 veterans, active members of the CAF, and/or members of the RCMP and 42 spouses/partners. The follow-up data represents a range of 3.0 to 29.0 months \((M = 10.9)\) post Phase I intervention.

Follow-up to examine the intended long-term outcomes from Phase I is conducted in three ways. In each case, a separate survey questionnaire has been designed for those diagnosed with PTSD (i.e., veterans, active members of the CAF, and members of the RCMP), as well as for the respective spouses/partners. After a minimum of three months back in their day-to-day environment, couples who agreed to be contacted are mailed out a 17-item semi-structured survey questionnaire. Secondly, those individuals who have completed Phase I and returned to participate in a Phase II session, which incorporates a riding component, complete the respective 26-item survey questionnaire at the end of the experiential learning session. Thirdly, those individuals who have completed Phase II and returned to participate in a Phase III session, which also includes a riding component, complete either an 18-item survey questionnaire (i.e., those diagnosed with PTSD) or a 21-item survey questionnaire (i.e., spouses/partners) at the end of the session.

Twenty-nine couples, one veteran, and one spouse \((n = 60)\) responded to the mail-out survey questionnaires. Four couples, nine veterans, active members of the CAF, and/or members of the RCMP and 3 spouses/partners \((n = 20)\) participated in a follow-up Phase II Can Praxis session. Four couples \((n = 8)\) participated in a follow-up Phase III Can Praxis session.

Results

The findings to date are first examined to determine the extent to which participants identify an improvement in their personal relationships. These empirical results are expanded to include what and how the relationships have improved. Additionally, there is an examination of the extent to which the impact of PTSD on the family has been reduced. This also includes the substantive findings about what symptoms of PTSD have been reduced and/or are being better managed.

Improved Personal Relationships

The preliminary follow-up results suggest that a high proportion of personal relationships have improved an average of 10.9 months post Phase I intervention. Overall, 83 (94.3%) respondents reported that at least ‘Sometimes’ their personal relationships have changed for the better. More specifically, 59 of the 88 respondents (67.1%) reported ‘Yes,’ their relationships have improved, and 24 respondents (27.3%) reported ‘Sometimes.’

For the 46 individuals diagnosed with PTSD, veterans, active members of the CAF, and/or members of the RCMP, three main themes emerged about what had improved in their personal relationships. Twenty-seven (58.7%) respondents indicated that the communication was better, more regular, and/or more effective, which included having increased patience and listening to their partner more often. Secondly, 10 (21.7%) respondents reported that their relationship was better because they were able to reduce conflict with their partner and engage in better problem-solving conversations. Thirdly, eight (17.4%) respondents indicated that improved relations with their partner was due to personal growth in terms of being more open and in-tune with their emotions.
For the 42 spouses/partners, three main themes also emerged about what had improved in their relationships since participating in the Phase I Can Praxis session. Sixteen (38.1%) respondents reported that they had experienced better, more regular, and more honest communication, which included the perception that their partner was more patient and less distracted. Secondly, the same number, 16 (38.1%) respondents, indicated that there was less conflict with their partner, and they engaged in better problem-solving conversations. Finally, 15 (35.7%) respondents indicated that their partners were less defensive and became more accountable for their bad behavior when it surfaced.

**Reduced PTSD Symptoms**

At this juncture, the results suggest that a high proportion of the 88 respondents perceived a reduction in PTSD symptoms since participating in Phase I of the Can Praxis program. Overall, 68 (77.3%) respondents reported that at least ‘Sometimes’ they felt that PTSD symptoms were improving and/or being better managed. More specifically, 34 (38.6%) respondents reported ‘Yes’ that previous PTSD symptoms experienced had improved since the therapy intervention, and a similar number, 34 (38.6%) respondents, reported improvement as ‘Sometimes.’

For those 46 individuals diagnosed with PTSD, 20 (43.5%) reported ‘Yes,’ they were better able to manage their symptoms since returning to their day-to-day environment. Additionally, 17 (37.0%) reported that at least ‘Sometimes’ they were better able to manage their symptoms. As such, three main themes emerged based on the veterans, active members of the CAF, and/or members of the RCMP identifying which PTSD symptoms had improved. Twenty-one (45.7%) respondents indicated that they felt less stress and anxiety interacting with family members and in social situations. Secondly, 20 (43.5%) respondents reported they experienced less depression and remembered sadness. Thirdly, 14 (30.4%) respondents indicated that they experienced less anger and had more emotional control.

For the 42 spouses/partners, 14 (33.3%) reported ‘Yes,’ they perceived an improvement in their partners’ PTSD symptoms since completing Phase I of the Can Praxis program. Additionally, 17 (40.5%) reported they had perceived an improvement at least ‘Sometimes.’ As such, four main themes were identified about which PTSD symptoms had improved and/or were being better managed. Nineteen (45.2%) respondents indicated that their partner displayed less anger and aggression towards them. Secondly, 12 (28.6%) reported that their partners appeared to be less stressed and anxious when interacting with the family and/or in social situations. Thirdly, a similar number, 12 (28.6%) respondents, indicated that their partners were not isolating themselves as much from the family. Finally, 9 (21.4%) respondents reported that their partners were not as depressed as they were prior to the equine assisted therapy intervention.

**Relationship Change Attributable to Phase I Intervention**

Starting with the 50th follow-up response (n = 39), a more direct question was included in the survey questionnaires about the perceived effectiveness of the Phase I self-mediation communication skills in repairing their personal relationships. For those 22 individuals diagnosed with PTSD, 12 (54.5%) indicated the self-mediation skills were ‘Extremely’ helpful. Additionally, 7 (31.8%) reported that learning the targeted communication skills were ‘Good’ training towards improving their relations. For the 17 spouses/partners, 6 (35.3%) indicated that the self-mediation skills were ‘Extremely’ helpful. An additional 10 (58.2%) reported that learning the targeted communication skills were ‘Good’ training towards improving their relations.
Conclusion

The co-founders of Can Praxis have never assumed that a complex disorder like service-related PTSD is easy to manage or recover from based upon one treatment option. Practical experience based upon 40 months of recruiting for and delivering the program, has also reinforced the perspective that for many individuals, there are no quick fixes, and that it is not sufficient to limit treatment to a pharmacological-based regimen for the major mood disorder symptoms of PTSD. Can Praxis offers a unique couples’ experiential equine therapy program which has the potential for individuals to achieve sustainable behavioural change. An added feature of acquiring an increased awareness of and utilization of improved communication techniques is the potential to positively benefit concurrent and/or future treatment. As such, the effectiveness of the Can Praxis program is supported by a growing body of evidence suggesting that an integrated self-mediation and equine assisted therapy process will help couples recover from one typical associated feature of PTSD, dysfunctional personal relationships.

Overall, the results herein suggest emerging evidence for a positive link between the intended relationship outcomes and the integrated equine assisted therapy and self-mediation skills delivered in Phase I. The early follow-up data indicates that 67.1% of respondents were very positive that their personal and family relationships improved, and an additional 27.3% reported improved interpersonal relations, at least sometimes. The early trend towards linking the intended outcomes to the Can Praxis program is supported in the following two ways: 1) explicitly through targeted questioning of the benefits of the self-mediation training from a sub-sample of follow-up respondents; and 2) implicitly through the data and written comments from the overall sample of respondents. First, the early trends from the sub-sample of 39 of the 88 follow-up respondents shows that 18 (46.2%) indicated that the self-mediation training in Phase I was extremely helpful in repairing their relationships. Additionally, 17 (43.6%) respondents reported that these acquired communication skills were good training towards repairing their relationships.

Second, the many written comments obtained in the follow-up data help describe the positive program link to relationship outcomes by putting things in a context of the contribution of the horses. For example, a key integrated learning objective is having a targeted equine activity that demonstrates the self-mediation principle that interpersonal communication is improved by using appropriate body language. The intended outcome, particularly for those diagnosed with PTSD, is to respect the power of body language along with their partners’ ability to read it. As such, the most frequently perceived relationship improvement observed in those diagnosed with PTSD, as reported by spouses/partners, was less anger and aggression displayed towards them. The following two quotes help support and illustrate this trend towards positive relationship outcomes:

“The fear that is generated in horses with body language has become a mirroring agent and reminds me daily that if I am not careful I can present as highly aggressive and a threat to any human just by the way I look or stand.”

(Veteran – 10 months post-treatment)

“I never understood PTSD, only what it was doing to us. I used to internalize the feelings I had to cause less stress. I learnt how to recognize, approach and defuse through discussion. PTSD is big and heavy, but not as big and heavy as the horses, and I managed to persuade them to move aside/into a (pole) box. I can do the same with PTSD – move it aside and get to the real person gently.”

(Spouse – 8 months post-treatment)

These early results offer support that the co-founders of Can Praxis are moving in the right direction by using horses as an adjunct in their PTSD-tailored equine therapy intervention to create opportunities for learning and healing. Further, the findings herein suggests support for the premise that utilizing targeted equine assisted activities brings a relational element to the experiential therapy process, which helps individuals affected by PTSD regulate their emotions and calm down so they are better able to internalize new information. In addition, the trend in the follow-up data, highlighted by the two preceding quotes, suggests that the horse-human interaction...
leverages an awareness of behavior that is positive, sustainable, and ultimately transferable to human interpersonal relations.

In spite of these positive early trends, the co-founders of Can Praxis acknowledge that these results do not yet comprise sufficient empirical evidence to establish their equine assisted therapy program as a best practice in accordance with the criteria of the scientific community. Therefore, the pilot testing process needs to continue, and to more substantively address two important methodological considerations: 1) increase the sample of Phase I participants sufficiently to validate the HOLSTER and BELT instruments; and 2) increase the sample of follow-up respondents towards minimizing the possibility that positive relationship outcomes are caused by non-program factors. The need for this continuing research aside, the current findings do represent an encouraging start to understanding the efficacy of this unique PTSD-tailored equine therapy program.

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Steve Critchley, CD, C Med, is a 28-year veteran of the Canadian Armed Forces and an accredited mediation trainer with international experience. Critchley provides services in conflict situations, such as harassment, landowner/community and energy company disputes, and workplace grievances.

Jim Marland, BSW, MA, is a registered psychologist and an accredited equine assisted learning facilitator. Marland started out by helping the ten largest United Kingdom companies with their communication and leadership training over 36 years ago.

Duncan’s program evaluation training and experience, in his field of educational psychology, helps guide an objective evaluation of Can Praxis’s innovative three-phase equine assisted therapy program. Critchley and Marland developed their integrated self-mediation and equine assisted therapy program in 2013 with the goal of establishing this unique intervention as a best practice treatment option for couples suffering from the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder.
“A tank is the best weapon against a tank.”
“What if you don’t have any when enemy tanks show up?”
“That would never happen if we went to war.”

This caricatured line of reasoning is not far removed from reality in the Canadian Army. Our commonly held views on defeating armoured threats often rest on two fundamental assumptions: the first is that our deployed infantry forces will always be supported by main battle tanks; the second is that, in any event, nearly all enemy armour will be knocked out by aerial means in the opening phase of a campaign.

These assumptions were formed over the past three decades of unchallenged NATO supremacy. Today, however, these assumptions seem too bold for comfort, if not dangerous in the authors’ view. So here we are, interjecting a simple question at the end of the opening dialogue: “Really?”

A Canadian light infantry battalion deploys to the mountainous border region of an allied nation as part of a hastily-assembled stability force. The battalion’s orders are to enter a border town at first light to ease tensions between belligerents, while contributing to a broader show of force. The latter will aim to deter incursions by well-trained and well-equipped proxy forces mustering in the neighboring country. Close air support assets are only expected to become available 24 hours following the battalion’s arrival. As night begins to fall that first day, the battalion observation post (OP) reports four main battle tanks cresting at an 800 metre distance across the border, while machine gun fire erupts from an unknown location, suppressing B Company members, who report the contact.

This scenario is one of dozens that could be written credibly without expending much imagination. The probability of our infantry coming under contact against tanks or heavy infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) without immediate combined arms or air
support is not one to be discounted. There will be segments in
time and space where our infantry will be engaged in isolation
by armoured threats. (i.e., during the first few hours of a stability
operation when light forces are deployed to secure a bridgehead.)
The very notion of Adaptable Dispersed Operations (ADO) implies
that such situations could indeed occur during established, mature
operations as well. (i.e., as regional conditions shift unexpectedly,
requiring the battle group to physically regroup within its Area
of Operations to head-off a rapidly emerging symmetric threat.)

Our ‘bottom line’ up front is that no modern army can afford
to downplay the need for organic anti-armour capabilities within
its infantry forces. This holds true even for the most heavily
mechanized armies in the world, such as those of the Israelis, who,
despite their abundance of main battle tanks and attack aviation
assets, still choose to invest in their infantry’s anti-armour capa-
bilities as a weapon that can also serve to engage enemy bunkers
at standoff ranges during clearing operations.¹

We believe that beyond the current re-introduction of the
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided anti-tank missile
(TOW) in our mechanized battalions, our infantry’s broader anti-
armour capabilities need to be seriously reassessed and improved
to maintain our relevance, survivability, and effectiveness in the
Future Security Environment (FSE), where tanks, next-generation
IFVs,² and small unit bunkers should well be expected to upset
our aforementioned assumptions.

Testing the current state

O ur views expressed here were not formed in theoretical
isolation. Starting with a hypothesis about a widening gap
in our anti-armour capabilities, we designed and conducted a
week-long field tactical exercise that brought together some
300 participants, primarily from infantry and combat engineer
regiments, both Regular and Reserve.³

We thus ‘stress-tested’ our infantry’s ability to take on an
armoured force conventionally. More precisely, we sought to ascer-
tain whether a task-tailored dismounted infantry company could
defeat a mechanized opposition force (OPFOR) through defensive
operations with a one-to-three force ratio (friendly to OPFOR).

The exercise was split into three phases. The first phase
consisted of multiple iterations of an infantry company-group
(three rifle platoons plus one ‘light’ TOW platoon equipped
with ATVs and open trailers) defending against a short-changed,
mechanized OPFOR regiment. 1 RCR provided the OPFOR – a
reinforced platoon with seven LAVs (acting as T-80 MBTs, and
in some cases, heavy IFVs, both of which were supported by
dismounted infantry). The platoon was allowed to ‘reset’ itself
in order to simulate the engagement of up to two OPFOR combat
teams.⁴ Every iteration brought a change to a control variable to
test for outcomes, such as kill and survivability rates.⁵ Variables
included: tank-hunting team configurations and weapons mix,
use of terrain (urban vs. natural), open-fire policy distances
(minimum-maximum), and so on.

Building upon lessons learned from the first phase, the
second phase of the exercise consisted of a 36-hour field tactical
exercise that pitted a reduced light infantry battalion⁶ against the
same OPFOR mechanized regiment. The battalion fought a guard
action, followed by a main defensive battle in an urban area, and
capped by a battalion ambush against follow-on forces in nighttime.

The third and final phase of the exercise consisted of an
84mm live fire complete with tank-hunting team demonstrations.

The exercise provided invaluable training for those involved
in our view. However, the exercise also demonstrated that our light
infantry was generally ‘up the creek without a paddle’ against an
armoured/mechanized OPFOR. Individual tank hunting teams
(THT) did wonders and progressed incredibly over a single week
of rapid, iterative, closed-loop learning. They responded with
creativity when incorporating complementary weapons, namely,
the C14 command detonated, rocket-propelled AT mine, and
ground-laid mines. Teams made best use of the additional fire-
power, increasing both their survivability and kill rates.

But no amount of tactical innovation, of which there was
lots at all levels, could compensate for the fact that our infantry
lacked some of the critical weaponry and related TTPs to credibly
defeat a sizeable armoured threat and live to fight another day. Our
observations and After Action Reports from that exercise form
the basis of our opinions provided in this article.
ADO doctrine assumes freedom of movement, which cannot exist without the ability to neutralize armoured threats that deny it

An armoured OPFOR can quickly dominate open terrain, approaches, and key terrain. In doing so, it can deny our infantry’s ability to move through the battlefield and prevent us from rapidly massing or even withdrawing effectively. This is as much (if not more) a factor of an armoured platform’s weapons range and target acquisition capability as it is a factor of mobility.

Even in closed terrain, where doctrine attributes the advantage to infantry, we noted that some of the best-prepared kill-zones set by highly motivated tank hunting teams could easily be neutralised when OPFOR units employed cautious clearing drills (i.e., defile drills, etc.). This is consequential to our assumptions about armoured units always insisting upon speed and shock action. These should not be taken at face value; the Future Security Environment will likely include hybrid warfare involving localized, fragmented, and cautious engagements repeated over months and even years as adversaries seek to preserve combat power over speed. This has been the case in Eastern Ukraine and in Syria, where MBTs have been extensively employed, but not in sweeping armoured thrusts.

Even at close range, our tactical effectiveness is more limited than we generally assume

Throughout the exercise, but particularly in the beginning, we often saw engagements fail because of improper consideration for the minimum arming distance and/or the blast radius of anti-tank weapons. These factors severely limited the availability of firing positions and egress routes for the infantry, forcing tactical commanders to engage the OPFOR at greater distances. This posed a particular challenge in urban terrain, where uninterrupted line of sight paired with sufficient range could rarely be found. Tactics had to be adapted by increasing the depth of engagements to accommodate urban environments, or to achieve sufficient standoff in defiles. In many cases, dismounted infantry had to adapt by moving into terrain favourable to tanks, trading cover for stand-off distance. In principle, we considered this to be tactically disadvantageous but unavoidable, given the characteristics of the weapons available to them.

We can’t see them at night!

In low-visibility conditions, the absence of thermal or light-intensifying optics on the 84 millimetre Carl Gustav severely hampers its effective range. It became obvious that defensive operations against armoured vehicles at night were difficult. Acquiring moving targets with precision in the dark at ranges greater than 100 metres was a near-impossible task. Also, the enemies’ optics were outperforming our dismounted troops’ ability to camouflage their defensive positions, especially after initial contact. Egress movements were tough to execute once the ambush had been revealed.

The 1000 metre gap

The current arsenal of anti-tank (AT) weapons available to light and dismounted infantry is particularly inadequate for the 500-1500 metre range. While it can be argued that light forces are better at engaging at shorter ranges, it is important to offer them the freedom of manoeuvre and tactical flexibility that comes with medium range anti-armour weapons. The standoff provided by this weapon will assuredly increase the survivability rate of our troops. Range offers options (engagement, egress, and so on.) This is a mathematical fact.

Currently, the medium range capability gap is filled by the TOW weapon system. Considered as an interim measure, the allotment of these weapons to infantry battalions in its dismounted version (tripod) fails the test of realism. It is too heavy, too
cumbersome, and offers an obvious target to the enemy once fired. Its few redeeming qualities are its sights, its ability to destroy strongpoints, and, at least for now, the encouragement it will provide to the Infantry Corps to relearn how to win the anti-tank fight.

Recommendations

In short, our infantry must be capable of destroying armoured threats, as these can surface across the spectrum of stability and combat operations.

We understand that selecting the next generation of anti-armour weapons for the infantry will mean having to make choices among lethality, range, and portability. Currently, the greatest gap, in our view, is the absence of a portable medium-range weapon system (500-1500 metres) that would allow for the standoff destruction of tanks, IFVs, and strongpoints. Such a weapon system is needed now to improve the survivability and freedom of movement to acceptable levels for dismounted infantry companies and light infantry battalions.

Next, our short-range weapons systems (84 millimetres) should be upgraded to include uncooled thermal sights that would allow our infantry to engage enemy armour and strongpoints in low-visibility conditions at short range (75-500 metres).

Finally, in closed terrain, our infantry should be equipped and especially trained on existing systems, such as ground-laid and remote-detonated AT mines that can neutralize or destroy armour at very close range (0-75 metres).
Anti-armour warfare training should be incorporated as mandatory battle training for infantry soldiers deploying abroad. Future light infantry doctrine should certainly address the issue as well, and include provisions for a portable medium-range AAW.

In February 2002, Directorate Land Requirements 5 published an Anti-Armour Master Plan (AAMP) with a number of forward-looking recommendations. The plan, however, fell victim to the growing needs in other types of materiel and capabilities for our combat mission in Afghanistan. Now, some fifteen years later, as the world’s geopolitical situation shifts towards multipolar competition and conflicts by proxy, it is grand time to move forward with a new AAMP. This will be needed to maintain the Army’s effectiveness as a deterrent and as a generator of combat-capable task forces. With the looming deployment of a Canadian Battle Group to Latvia, we see no better time than the present to do so.

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2. It is well to note that the new generation of heavy IFVs, such as the T15 Armata or Kurganets-25, are not likely to be as defeatable (if at all in the case of the T15) by Bushmaster cannon, as were earlier generations (i.e., BMP series).
3. The following units participated in the exercise held at CFB Petawawa in May 2016: “A” Company from 2R22R, “B” Company (composite) from Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR), Canadian Grenadier Guards, and Régiment de Maisonneuve, a Weapons Platoon from 1R22R, a Composite Engineering Field troop from 2CER and 34e Régiment de Génie du Canada, and a Battle Group HQ from FMR, 2R22R, and 34e Régiment des transmissions du Canada (RTC). OPFOR was provided by 1RCR in the form of a reinforced mechanized platoon.
4. Unfortunately, none of the armoured units approached were available to participate in this exercise. The officers, NCOs, and soldiers of 1RCR returning from Op Unifer did a great job of conveying lessons learned from their time in Ukraine, applying observations they had gleaned regarding the use of armour equipped with advanced countermeasures in disputed zones.
5. An operational researcher from Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre (CALWC) supported the exercise to this end, accompanying us in the field.
6. Two rifle companies, the TOW platoon, the Engineer troop, and the HQ platoon.
7. Shooter safety issues will also emerge at close range in the design and choice of anti-tank weapons powerful enough to destroy a modern MBT.
8. ‘Very close range’ is defined here as that range under which shoulder-fire systems are ineffective, due to minimum arming distance and blast effects.
Sir Isaac Brock’s Magic Bullet

by Guy St-Denis

Or, rather, Sir Isaac Brock’s magic musket ball. The title of this article is a take on the conspiracy theory made famous by the Kennedy assassination, which ridicules the Warren Commission’s finding that a single bullet struck both President Kennedy and Governor Connally in a seemingly impossible trajectory. In the late-1970s, a similar conundrum was brought to light during an investigation of the short coat, or coatee, worn by Sir Isaac Brock at the time of his death.¹

Known as the “Hero of Upper Canada” for his spirited defence of what is now Ontario during the Anglo-American War of 1812, Major-General Sir Isaac Brock was killed at the Battle of Queenston Heights in October of that same year. Remarkably enough, his coatee was preserved and eventually put on display in the Canadian War Museum. It was there that Ludwig Kosche discovered the prized artifact. As the Museum’s first librarian, Kosche took it upon himself to authenticate the coatee, and part of his research focused upon locating contemporary descriptions of the fatal wound sustained by Brock. There were precious few, but at least they seemed to correspond with an apparent gunshot hole in the upper chest of the coatee. Two of these same descriptions also gave the musket ball’s point of impact, which must have been especially welcomed … until they were discovered to be completely at odds with one another.

Coatee worn by Major-General Sir Isaac Brock.

[Image of The Death of Brock by C.W. Jefferys]
The day after Brock's death, his aide-de-camp, Captain John B. Glegg, wrote that the musket ball “entered his right breast and passed through on his left side.” This description was problematic, as it did not agree with the physical evidence presented by the hole in the coatee – which was just to the left of centre. Yet, it seems that Kosche was loath to reject Glegg’s authority in the matter and possibly because of his close association with Brock. The other description was that of Major Thomas Evans. It was written a day later than Glegg’s, and mentions that Brock was slain by a “ball entering under the left breast [and] passing out by the right shoulder.” Curiously, while Evans’s description was more in keeping with the location of the hole in Brock’s coatee, Kosche dismissed it as “…undoubtedly the result of an unintentional error, or confusion of the real points of the bullet’s [sic] entry and exit.”

Kosche preferred Glegg’s version of events, and for good reason.

Kosche thought the contradiction in Glegg’s description could be explained by a distortion in Brock’s coatee, which was likely to have occurred as Brock exerted himself in leading the charge. The act of raising a sword in his right hand would have pulled his coatee upwards and to the right, thus accounting not only for a wound in Brock’s “right breast,” but also a hole in his coatee “slightly left of centre.” Kosche based this theory upon the first-hand account of Robert Walcot, an American soldier who claimed the dubious honour of having killed Brock. According to Walcot’s recollection, Brock had his face “partly turned” in the direction of his troops when he was shot. As Kosche visualized, this action would have caused “a corresponding shifting of his upper body,” and he devised a simple test to prove it. Tying a string to the third buttonhole of his shirt, he turned his head just as he imagined Brock must have done at the fateful moment. The result verified the prediction. Furthermore, the string “...shifted by as much as three inches [7.62 cm].” After confirming that Brock actually began the charge “waving his sword,” and that he was indeed right-handed, Kosche ruled in Glegg’s favour.

But Walcot’s claim is now entirely discredited, and while Brock probably was holding a sword in his upraised right hand at the time he was shot, the test Kosche utilized with a piece of string does not bear scrutiny. A comparable test was conducted in 2008 at Brock University in St. Catharine’s Ontario, but this time with an exact replica of Brock’s coatee. In duplicating Brock’s supposed stance at the time he was mortally wounded, very little movement was detected in the coatee, and not more than half an inch [1.27 cm]. The sash worn around the test subject’s waist had an anchoring effect, and so it was concluded that Brock’s death wound was not far out of line with the hole in his coatee. Initially, this new determination seemed to favour the description by Evans. But then, the all-important consideration of perspective came into play...

It suddenly occurred to me that Glegg and Evans both described the same wound, but from different points of view. As the diagram below illustrates, Glegg wrote from his own perspective (A.), and Evans from that of Brock (B.). But when Glegg’s description is reversed (C.), it is seen to be in complete agreement with the description by Evans. They are clearly one and the same. However, Evans’s description is to be preferred. Besides conforming to modern forensic practices, in so much as a wound is always described from the perspective of the victim, it has Brock facing the enemy and therefore establishes the fact that he was killed by a shot fired from the left.

While Kosche noticed something analogous in the wound tracks described by Evans and Glegg, he failed to recognize the significance of perspective in attempting to explain the discrepancy between them. Kosche also discarded evidence which proved troublesome, and in the process, he made a confusing situation worse.

Guy St-Denis is a dedicated Brock scholar, whose on-going research continues to reveal new insights into Sir Isaac Brock’s untimely demise.

NOTES

2. Archives of Ontario, Ferdinand Brock Tupper Papers (F 1081), John B. Glegg to William Brock, 14 October 1812. Actually, the musket ball appears to have remained lodged in Brock’s body.
3. Library and Archives Canada, Thomas Evans Collection (MG 24, F70), Thomas Evans to Unidentified, 15 October 1812.
5. Ibid., p. 51.
In 28 November 2016 testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, the Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Lieutenant-General Michael Hood, posited that the RCAF “is going through a time of great renewal.” He noted that the CH-147F Chinook medium transport helicopter had achieved full operational capability and that the CC-130J Hercules had recently completed a significant software and hardware upgrade, adding that “our fifth [CC-177] Globemaster is proving to be a tremendous addition to our readiness posture.” On a decidedly different operational front, Lieutenant-General Hood observed that “our anti-submarine warfare platform, the Aurora, has evolved into a long-range patrol aircraft capable of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR] over land as well as water. Fourteen Auroras are undergoing major upgrades that will keep them at the forefront of these capabilities into the 2030 timeframe.” The Aurora is a huge Canadian success story, with world-leading capabilities—Canadian capabilities researched, designed and built in Canada, developed by Defence Research and Development working alongside our Canadian industry. The question now, and my priority, is how to move that capability” into an eventual successor platform. “I would like to see a Canadian-built platform such as the [Q400] or a [C Series] when the Aurora’s flying time is done.”
Moreover, by April 2018, “…we expect to have two helicopter air detachments of Cyclone helicopters deployed at sea, with further detachments to follow as we transition from the Sea King fleet, which will retire in December 2018.” He also anticipated that “…the defence policy review will shape our current unmanned aerial vehicles programme [i.e., JUSTAS]. Information from industry is being assessed, and notional delivery timelines are between 2021 and 2023, with final delivery in 2025.” The renaissance theme was reinforced a few days after his testimony by the announcement that Ottawa had selected the Airbus C295W to replace the long-serving CC-115 Buffalo and legacy CC-130 Hercules in the fixed-wing search and rescue role.

Earlier in his testimony, Lieutenant-General Hood noted that “because of [the RCAF’s] roles and missions, we have the highest percentage of personnel on high readiness” of the three services. “In this context…the Government of Canada has just announced that it is investing in the [RCAF] and that we will grow to meet their policy direction regarding the availability of our fighter capability. The government has now directed that we be ready to meet our daily NATO and NORAD commitments simultaneously. The government is committed to delivering those resources, in part through an open and transparent competition to replace the fighter fleet. Meanwhile, they will enter into discussion with the U.S. government and Boeing to augment our present CF-18 fleet. We will also be provided the additional resources required to continue to fly the CF-18, and a potential interim fleet, through to transition to the ultimate replacement aircraft.”

Although it is readily apparent that Canada’s air force continues to confront a sobering and multifaceted array of challenges and dilemmas, one could indeed posit that recent developments—however lengthy their gestation periods—do signal, if not a full-scope renaissance, then at least a future that arguably approximates a renaissance more than a requiem. Indeed, some analysts may posit that the country (and its armed forces) could experience a 21st Century variation of the type of trade-security interface that influenced the 1974-75 Defence Structure Review conducted by the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Prompted in part by entreaties from Canada’s European allies—their influence noticeably enhanced by Canada’s quest for a trade-diversifying ‘contractual link’ with Europe—the Defence Structure Review rescued DND from the financial wilderness and bequeathed to Canada’s armed forces everything from CF-18s and CP-140 Auroras to Halifax-class patrol frigates and Leopard C1 main battle tanks. Playing the increased defence spending card in return for trade access and trade stability in the age of President Donald Trump may or may not prove advantageous or even viable, but, in a potential echo of the mid-1970s, it could bring at least some additional financial and other resources to DND. If increased Canadian defence spending favoured areas of concern to the new administration in Washington, such as home defence and North American defence, then multiple areas of air force endeavour—from its fighter, air-to-air refuelling and maritime patrol/ISR capabilities, to the eventual successor(s) to the aging North Warning System—could conceivably benefit. If such investments simultaneously advanced Canadian sovereignty and security interests in the Arctic, so much the better.

A thoughtful contemporary overview of the challenges facing civilian and military decision-makers was provided by Alan Stephenson in The RCAF and the Role of Airpower: Considering Canada’s Future Contributions. In the July 2016 essay, one of
a series commissioned by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Stephenson observes that “however remote major conflict may seem in the current geopolitical environment, the possibility that the RCAF will be called upon to participate in combat operations in the future cannot be ruled out”—adding, quite correctly, that “combat-capable platforms can be used for non-combat missions whereas the reverse is not true.” While acknowledging that the “economy is under duress,” he urged Ottawa “to approach the Defence Policy Review as the preservation of Canadian values rather than as a defence against identified threats. The government has a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Canada and Canadians, neighbours in North America, friends and alliance partners, and the international system and society—in that priority. These imperatives demand a balanced RCAF in terms of the breadth of capability needed to meet national security and defence requirements in both domestic and deployed operations.”

The specific recommendations advanced by the Stephenson essay argue that: (a) “the Defence Policy Review should focus on maintaining core airpower capabilities, roles and missions, then incorporate emerging capabilities as increases in defence budgets permit;” (b) “operational deployments of long duration should be minimized to maximize funding for capital projects;” and (c), that “the RCAF should invest in life extension programs to maximize fleet life expectancy.” The latter point is worth repeating, although it should be noted that not all life extension programs are cost-effective and that some may unintentionally extend a type’s service life beyond the production life of a desirable new-production replacement aircraft. The essay also recommends that: (d) “the RCAF must be capable of participation in both control of the air and air attack combat operations at home and abroad. Canada should maintain the capability to deploy and sustain six multi-role fighter aircraft with air-to-air refuelling to support NATO- or UN-sanctioned operations in addition to defence of Canada commitments;” (e) “mobility support to the CAF and alliance partners should remain the basis for assigned mobility roles and missions. The government should consider increasing airlift contributions to complex peace support and traditional peacekeeping missions as well as humanitarian assistance operations.” In that regard, one cannot resist the temptation to suggest asking Airbus to quote on a modest number of transport-configured C295Ws. “Given recent recapitalization of organic helicopter capabilities as well as life extension projects to the CP-140 and CH-146,” the essay further recommends that “RCAF roles and missions in support of the RCN, and SOFCOM [Canadian Army] should remain at current levels pending available funding for increased UAV ISR capabilities,” that “search and rescue should remain a required RCAF role” (a recommendation most heartily endorsed by this analyst, although one that is undermined by the increased outsourcing of base-level maintenance, as in the case of the forthcoming SAR C295Ws), and that “the recapitalization of the North Warning System with the United States should be approached from a holistic perspective to maximize Canadian sovereignty and national interests through ISR integration with national capabilities.” The essay also posits that “replacement of the CF-18 is required by 2025. As the CF-18 has proven to be flexible and resilient during changing political and threat environments, the Future Fighter Aircraft must be multi-role and capable of integration into the technologically evolving IAMD [integrated air and missile defence] system construct. Cost-effectiveness requires that analysis of all four dimensions of airpower be considered in the options analysis.”

The upgraded Aurora clearly constitutes an integral element of any RCAF renaissance, but Canada now faces two choices—one very short-term and related to the modernization and life extension of more than the fourteen aircraft currently programmed, and one

An RCAF CP-140 Aurora takes off from the inner runway during Exercise Maple Flag at 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alberta, 7 June 2016.
One of Canada’s newly-acquired CH-148 Cyclone helicopters practicing landing procedures on HMCS Halifax off the coast of Nova Scotia, 27 January 2016.

Soldiers from 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, load equipment aboard a CC-130J Hercules in the Wainwright Garrison training area during Exercise Maple Resolve, 25 May 2016.
longer-term and related to an ultimate successor to the \textit{Aurora}. Given the demonstrated versatility of the \textit{Aurora} and the lack of funding for a short-to-medium term replacement initiative, a credible case can be made for modernizing and life-extending at least some additional \textit{Auroras}. A recent study by the Maritime Air Veterans Association, for example, urges that “RCAF manpower and funding be increased to restore the \textit{Aurora} fleet to its original 18 aircraft capability.” Similarly, an Air Force Association of Canada position paper recommends that Ottawa upgrade “…as many \textit{Aurora} aircraft as possible (up to 18).” The industrial window of opportunity for additional conversions is fast closing, however, thereby necessitating a prompt decision. The question of a successor to the \textit{Aurora} is more complicated. As this column has in the past observed, it is difficult to see how a modified twin turboprop or business jet could provide the long-range and endurance, the space and capacity for a comprehensive mission avionics suite, the armament, the quantity of droppable stores, and the growth potential required of a multi-purpose maritime patrol/ISR aircraft. An adaptation of the C Series is admittedly an enticing prospect on several levels, but one that would incur substantial non-recurring expenses and could pose logistical and other challenges if the RCAF proved the only customer for a maritime variant. If would-be replacement candidates, such as the Boeing P-8 \textit{Poseidon}, the Kawasaki P-1, or a suitable adaptation of an Airbus commercial aircraft go out of production or fail to materialize, Canada, and the RCAF, could be caught in a most awkward situation. The \textit{Aurora}’s maritime stablemate, the CH-148 \textit{Cyclone}, constitutes another element of an RCAF renaissance although, given repeated, well-publicized and frankly disconcerting delays in its development and operational deployment, it may for the moment be prudent to de-emphasize it as an ‘element-in-waiting’ of an air force renaissance. Still, the type holds genuine potential across a broad spectrum of military, quasi-military and non-military roles in both the domestic and overseas environments, and should, in due course, prove even more versatile than the legendary \textit{Sea King}.

The SAR element of a renaissance is anchored by the recent decision to acquire 16 Airbus C295W aircraft (i.e., two ‘maintenance floaters,’ three aircraft each for CFBS Winnipeg, Trenton, and Greenwood, and five aircraft for CFB Comox). The latter will also provide operational training, as it does for the CH-149 \textit{Cormorant} SAR helicopter. As such, CFB Comox will truly become the centre of excellence for Canadian SAR, and the home to almost one-third of Canada’s fixed-and rotary-wing primary SAR aircraft. The C295W, the sensor suite and mission management system of which bear no comparison to the austereley-equipped \textit{Buffaloes} and \textit{Hercules}, should provide an operationally effective and cost-effective alternative to the current fixed-wing types. Base-level maintenance by the RCAF will, however, be reduced to the first-line level. The C295W does represent some loss of speed and endurance from the \textit{Hercules}, but it is intriguing that this issue—and Arctic SAR, which arguably benefits more indirectly than directly from the change of aircraft—attracted almost no parliamentary, public or media attention. The newer \textit{Hercules} (i.e., the CC-130J) will remain relevant as a secondary SAR resource (i.e., for the deployment of major air disaster [MAJAJID] elements), but some analysts will no doubt favour a somewhat more active but still secondary SAR role, perhaps facilitated by removable sensor packages. The SAR element of any broader RCAF renaissance, however, will remain incomplete until the now-veteran \textit{Cormorant} helicopter fleet is modernized and life-extended and augmented in size—partly to cover for aircraft removed from service to undergo updating, and partly to reintroduce the \textit{Cormorant} to CFB Trenton. Fleet expansion could entail any of several options, including the activation of American VH-71s acquired by Canada as a source of spares for the \textit{Cormorant}.

On other fronts—all of which will need addressing if the RCAF is to experience a thoroughgoing renaissance—Canada will in the not-too-distant future require a multi-role replacement for the Airbus CC-150 tanker-transports. If Canada acquires four-or preferably-five replacement aircraft, the entire fleet—unlike the current CC-150 quintet—should be capable of performing both transport and air-to-air refuelling duties. For this procurement—which represents a vital enabling, regardless of which fighter or fighters Canada ultimately acquires—the procurement options \textit{include}, but are not \textit{confined to}, such types as the Airbus A330 MRRT. Mixed public-private initiatives, such as that adopted by the Royal Air Force, are worth examining but are not necessarily appropriate or desirable in a Canadian context. In other transport or transport-related realms, some observers also seek a slight increase in the number of CC-130Js, while more than a few analysts favour deploying something beyond ‘re-winged,’ 50-year old \textit{Twin Otters} in the Arctic. A decision to upgrade or replace the now twenty-year old CH-146 \textit{Griffon} helicopter—which has gradually morphed into something more than a stock utility transport helicopter—would also constitute an important element of an RCAF renaissance. At the very least, a limited upgrade will be required to cope with obsolescence and airspace access issues. Supplementing the \textit{Griffon} or its successor with a light or heavy attack helicopter (i.e., \textit{Apache}, \textit{Tiger}) has its devotees, but raises a host of doctrinal and financial issues. The medium transport helicopter side is well taken care of by the \textit{Chinook}, the Canadian version of which is particularly well-equipped. Other areas in due course requiring attention are the successors to the current flying training and related programs, including but not confined to the NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC) operation. A partial RCAF return to the NATO AWACS operation—which was unceremoniously and imprudently jettisoned during the Harper era—could also constitute a useful element of a renaissance. The Snowbirds will require attention as well, if Ottawa sanctions the acquisition by lease or purchase of a successor to the ‘seemingly evergreen’ \textit{Tutor}. This decision could generate political angst on several levels, thereby prompting one to recall that equipping air demonstration teams was considerably easier in earlier decades (but not necessarily budget-proof in operating terms) when one could transfer surplus Crown-owned fighters or trainers to such a role.

At the end of the day, the renaissance gold standard for most air forces is the potency and effectiveness, both \textit{qualitatively} and \textit{quantitatively}, of their fighter aircraft and fighter squadrons. The Canadian journey to replace the CF-18 has taken an intriguing number of twists and turns, ranging from the Harper government’s 2010 decision to pursue the acquisition of the Lockheed Martin F-35A \textit{Lightning II} Joint Strike Fighter—and its subsequent pausing of that intention—to the 22 November 2016 decision of the Justin Trudeau government to pursue a two-phase approach embracing “…within its current mandate, an open and transparent competition to replace the legacy fleet of CF-18 fighter aircraft” while also exploring on an immediate basis “…the acquisition of 18 new [Boeing F/A-18] \textit{Super Hornet} aircraft to supplement the CF-18s until the permanent replacement arrives.” Discussions with the U.S. Government and Boeing would “…determine if Boeing can provide the interim solution at a cost, time, and level
The Canadian Armed Forces Snowbirds in their Big Arrow formation over the Strait of Georgia on Canada’s west coast.

A Boeing F/A-18F Advanced Super Hornet.
of capability that are acceptable to Canada.” The decision to pursue an interim solution reflected a perceived “capability gap” wherein Canada lacked sufficient mission-ready fighter aircraft to simultaneously meet obligations to both NORAD and NATO. The government also stated that “Canada will continue participate in the Joint Strike Fighter [program] until at least a contract award for the permanent fleet. This will allow Canada to maximize benefits of the partnership and gives Canada the option to buy the aircraft through the program, should the F-35 be successful in the competitive process for the permanent fleet.”

The quickest, least expensive, and most straightforward path to an interim Super Hornet fleet would presumably entail essentially stock, minimally-modified, USN-pattern F/A-18Es (single-seaters), and a small number of two-seat F/A-18Fs for operational training, combined with the training in the United States and perhaps Australia of an initial cadre of RCAF aircrew and maintainers. Indeed, some observers have broached an all-F/A-18E option, combined with out-of-Canada operational training. More ambitious scenarios have been advanced or broached in various quarters, including respected international aerospace journals. One of the latter, for example, speculated on an all-F/A-18F fleet with the necessary wiring to facilitate later conversion, if Canada so wished, to the EA-18G Growler configuration. Other options mooted in various quarters have included an all-F/A-18F fleet sans wiring for later electronic warfare conversion, while still others have embraced a largely F/A-18E fleet incorporating at least some features of what was once designated by Boeing as the Advanced Super Hornet. Fiscal, doctrinal, and lead-time considerations would appear to leave such options as non-starters, although such “future proofing” of the Canadian interim Super Hornet fleet does hold a certain appeal and could look prudent if a member of the Super Hornet family prevailed in Canada’s forthcoming fighter competition. The latter should prove a most intriguing affair, pitting the Super Hornet or advanced versions of the Super Hornet (which appear likely to secure further orders from the USN, although not necessarily in the numbers mooted by some in the Trump administration) against a matured F-35A benefiting financially from increased economies of scale and formidable stealth and sensor capabilities. Non-American contenders, for a variety of reasons, would appear to be far less likely choices. Precisely which longer-term fighter path Canada will select remains unknowable at this time, but will in its own way contribute to an RCAF renaissance—albeit in a more circuitous and contentious manner than most would have predicted a decade ago.

Martin Shadwick has taught Canadian defence policy at York University in Toronto for many years. He is a former editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, and he is the resident Defence Commentator for the Canadian Military Journal.
These four recent books on the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) attest yet again to this master theorist’s ongoing interest to practitioners and scholars in the fields of strategy, international relations, military theory, and civil-military relations. His masterpiece, *On War*, has been of enormous influence worldwide ever since its posthumous publication in the 1830s. There have been innumerable testimonials to its impact, but four will suffice here to make the point. According to Major-General JFC Fuller, Clausewitz rises to the level of a Galileo, a Euler, or a Newton. T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) considered Clausewitz the intellectual master of all writers on the subject of war, and the British philosopher W.B. Gallie is of the view that *On War* was the first and to date, the only book of outstanding intellectual eminence on the subject of war. Finally, one of the leading strategic theorists still writing today, Colin Gray, has concluded that for as long as humankind engages in warfare, Clausewitz must rule.1

The books under review here fall into two distinct categories; Bellinger’s and Stoker’s are conventional biographies, whereas Cormier and Waldman address Clausewitz’s work, especially *On War*, from a detailed, philosophical perspective. Bellinger’s work is particularly interesting as she uses a large number of hitherto undiscovered letters exchanged between Clausewitz and his wife Marie, or between close friends from the moment they met in 1802 until his death in 1831. On one level, Bellinger’s book is a love story. The story the letters tell is of a couple deeply in love and sharing a deep interest in philosophy, history, politics, literature, and the visual arts. On another level, Bellinger gives us a much more personal picture of Clausewitz, the man influenced rather profoundly by his highly intelligent, politically astute, and sensitive wife. This then fills in some gaps in Stoker’s more traditional account of Clausewitz’s life, which takes us through the great Prussian’s military career, detailing his role in many of the great campaigns and battles of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815). Both provide useful, sometimes new, and always insightful accounts of Clausewitz’s activities and work during the period of writing *On War* from 1815-1830.

Cormier and Waldman focus, not on the man, but on his work. They seek the major influences that shaped Clausewitz’s theorizing, and ultimately, the philosophical architecture that grounds the final theory.
Fundamentally, this involves explaining the origins and philosophical rationale of Clausewitz’s distinction between absolute war and real war, and the meaning and importance of the “trinity” at the core of Clausewitz’s definition of war as ‘merely the continuation of policy with the admixture of other means.’

Cornier is particularly interested in establishing direct links between Clausewitz and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and subsequently, Georg Hegel. Although he devotes about the first half of War as Paradox dealing with the Kantian influence, he does not succeed in making a convincing case. Bellinger probably comes much closer to the reality of this relationship when she concludes that “…in all probability Clausewitz probably never read Kant’s treatises but came into contact with them through the lectures of Johann Kiesewetter. Clausewitz’s tendency to use precise definitions and abstract notions in particular seems to correspond to Kant’s emulation of the method of the sciences in philosophy as instructed by Kiesewetter.”

Cornier makes a more compelling case concerning Hegel’s impact on Clausewitz. This is not surprising for a number of reasons; perhaps not the least of which is that they knew each other well in Berlin during the 1820s when Hegel was a professor at the University of Berlin. Also, as Christopher Clarke informs us, “Hegel’s influence was profound and lasting. His arguments diffused swiftly into the culture.” Cornier makes a strong case that Clausewitz’s dialectical thinking was derived from Hegel. However, even though Hegel is the thinker best known for the concept of ‘dialectical development,’ the idea was formulated by Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel long before him. Clausewitz knew all three well.

Equally significant in tracing the relationship between Hegel and Clausewitz is their perspective of war itself, and its role in the state. According to Hegel, “…just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone, perpetual peace.” Hegel thus concludes that in peacetime, bourgeois life is the bog of humanity, and that it is only through war that bourgeois man is elevated above his own self-interest to concern himself with the state. Compare this with Clausewitz: “Today, practically no means other than war will educate a people in the spirit of boldness: and it has to be waged under daring leadership. Nothing else will counter the softness and desire for ease which debase the people in terms of growing prosperity and increasing trade. A people and nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction.”

Most telling of all regarding the relationship between Hegel and Clausewitz is the use of the trinity construct to ground their philosophy around the concepts of the absolute and the real. For Hegel, Absolute Spirit (the Ideal) is represented by the trinity of Religion, Art, and Philosophy. In the real world, the Absolute manifests itself most fully in the State which in turn consists of the trinity of the Family, Civil Society, and the State. Furthermore, the State, for Hegel, was an organism possessing will, rationality and purpose. Its destiny, like any living thing, was to change, grow, and progressively develop. Hegel vehemently rejected the metaphorical machine-state favoured by the high Enlightenment theorists on the grounds that it treated free human beings as if they were mere cogs in its mechanism.

Turning to Clausewitz, this military theorist posited the concept of Absolute War (the Ideal) represented by the trinity of Passion, Chance, and Reason. In the real world, these elements or ‘moments’ were associated mainly to People, the Army, and by Politics or Policy. For Clausewitz, an army should not be conceptualized as a machine but as a conscious, willed organism with its own collective genius. It is important to note here that around 1800, the word ‘politics’ had taken on the meaning of the conduct of external affairs. Much of what we today consider ‘politics’ was then deemed to be ‘administration,’ the domain of worthy bureaucrats perhaps, but certainly not a concern of aspiring statesmen. In a moment, we will see that this metaphor of an organism is ubiquitous in all Romantic philosophers, historians, and artists.

Thomas Waldman takes on the task of analyzing Clausewitz’s Trinity in detail. To begin with, the Trinity is not merely a triad or three elements associated with each other, but, like the theological trinity, Clausewitz’s is ‘three-into-one.’ Waldman reveals convincingly why and how the superficially reductionist primary and secondary trinities (passion, chance, and reason: people, army, and policy) are nothing of the kind when they are properly understood. According to Colin Gray, “…to the best of my knowledge, no one has unpacked Clausewitz’s theory of war more convincingly than does Waldman.” With great skill and in accessible prose, Waldman presents the subject of war in Clausewitz’s Trinitarian terms with the respect for complexity, nuance, ambiguity, and uncertainty that the master’s treatment implies. Waldman’s explanation of Clausewitz’s theory of war is a major contribution to the provision of better theory for better practice.

The striking similarities between Clausewitz and Hegel can only be fully understood and appreciated in the context of Romanticism, and especially, the more politically-oriented German Romanticism. Romanticism as an intellectual movement should be understood as an overwhelming international tendency which swept across Europe and Russia at the end of the 18th Century and at the beginning of the 19th Century (roughly 1770-1840). It was in reaction to earlier neo-classicism, mechanism and rationalism embodied in the Enlightenment (roughly 1687-1789). It was a synthesizing nature that transformed the entire character of thought, sensibility, and art. Romantic scientists and philosophers were determined to look at nature and society holistically, to see ‘wholes’ and relationships, rather than discrete events and phenomena. In other words, they rejected the analytical, reductionist, and linear approach to breaking things apart to study that was so characteristic of the methodology embedded in Enlightenment philosophy.

Donald Stoker’s biography clearly detects the influence of the Romantics on Clausewitz when he observes that “…the passions of German Romanticism, the harkening to the classical age, fed upon and powered nationalist’s ideas among many German intellectuals.” Clausewitz read the works of these writers – Schiller, Fichte, Hegel, and Goethe being perhaps the most important – and soaked up the intellectual passions of his age. His own zealous temperament seems to have made their ideas (the Romantics) particularly attractive to Clausewitz.
BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

However, it is Bellinger’s biography of Marie von Clausewitz that most clearly illustrates the deep and prolonged friendships and associations with many of the leading Romantic philosophers, writers, artists, and statesmen. These relationships developed first in Berlin during the period 1802-1806, then again in Berlin from 1810 to 1812. Different friends were made in Coblenz during the couple’s stay there between 1815 and 1818. Finally, during the actual writing of On War between 1818 and 1830 in Berlin, the Clausewitz’s remained both socially and intellectually active with numerous Romantic personalities. The list of these, both individuals and couples, is a long and impressive testimony in the first instance to Marie’s noble status and close connections to Prussia’s royal court. First and foremost among the friends were Baron von Stein, first Prussian Chancellor, Fichte, Hegel, and the Schlegel brothers, August and Frederick. Others included Goethe, the jurist von Savigny, the famed historian von Ranke, von Humboldt, Germaine de Stael, the philosopher Hölderlin, and the theologian Schleiermacher.

Mere friendship, of course, does not in itself demonstrate intellectual influence, so we need to look more closely at the common intellectual structure shared by all these Romantic thinkers. The Romantics were Idealists, and they developed a form of idealism known as Absolute Idealism in an attempt to supersede Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Hegel accepts Kant’s insight into what is consciousness or spirit, and also that this consciousness is fundamentally contradictory. He rejects, however, Kant’s transcendental solution. The solution, in his view, lies not in absolute separation, but in absolute reconciliation, not in the distinction of a movement of logical realism and/or the phenomenal realm of consciousness, but in a single phenomenology of spirit. This latter form of idealism, Absolute Idealism, was developed primarily by Hegel, Friedrich Schlegel, and Friedrich von Hardenberg, and it advocates doctrine that everything is a part of the single universal organism, or that everything conforms to or is an appearance of its purpose, design or idea. The opposition between the real and the idea, the mental and physical, the Particular and the Universal disappears.

In Romantic (or Absolute) Idealism, a Particular is first in order of existence, since to know that a thing exists, we must know something about particular or determinate properties. This is because if it exists, a Universal exists in Particulars. A Universal, however, is first in order of explanation because to know what a thing is we must be able to specify some of its properties, some features that it shares in common with other things. Universals do not exist in the spatial – temporal world as such, but are only manifested in particular things. Goethe, for example, in the field of botany, argued that while the outward forms may change in countless ways, the idea of a formative principle remains the same. Goethe called this formative principle the Urpflanze. The archetypical plant is not a specific plant anywhere in nature, nor is it to be understood temporally. Von Ranke referred to this universal in history as the Ideen: other philosophers referred to the same concept as the Begriff or Notion.12

The Begriff is the genuine first and things are what they are through the action of the Begriff, immanent in them and revealing itself in them.13

This then brings us to the crux of the matter. Absolute War for Clausewitz was the Notion, Begriff, or Universal. It is to be understood in terms of the three elements of the Trinity – Passion, Chance, and Reason. Real war is the Particular and always involves the people, the Army and its commander, and Policy. The manifestation of the Absolute appears as the real world and throughout history in many forms. Therefore, the nature of war is eternal, but its characteristics vary widely. When war appears in history, it is always shaped, conditioned, and restrained by contingency, chance, political conditions, and, above all, by Friction.

Clearly, the argument here is that Clausewitz received much of his inspiration when conceiving and writing On War from two main sources – his actual experience of the subject, as chronicled in Bellinger’s and Stoker’s biographies, and by the prevailing geist, or intellectual spirit of the age, German Romanticism. Many, if not most, of the practitioners and scholars in the field stop short of this conclusion by virtue of the simple fact that they have not delved deeply into the subject of Romanticism as a study in itself.

The literature on the subject of Romanticism is extensive, and readers interested in assessing this reviewer’s hypothesis regarding the relationship between Clausewitz and German Romanticism can readily access this material. The best in this area include: Frederick Beiser, The Romantic Imperative; Tim Blanning, The Romantic Revolution; Maurice Cranston, The Romantic Movement; Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism; and Robert Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe.

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NOTES

7. Clarke, p. 431.
The thought of wrestling with the dilemma that is defence procurement usually fills me with dread, not unlike a dental checkup – a necessary task but one I do not relish. Kim Richard Nossal’s book chronicling Canada’s defence procurement history, however, is very different. With arguably the best title for a policy book yet, Charlie Foxtrot, a euphemism for a “cluster f@ck” (a big mess), is very readable, full of useful, if not maddening anecdotes, and is dedicated to trying to find a solution to Canada’s defence buying woes.

In just 200 pages, Nossal first outlines the century worth of procurement “messes” before switching to a discussion of solutions aimed at politicians for the future. The acquisition melees include the Ross rifle, the CF-105 Arrow, the Ilis Jeep, the Victoria-class submarines, the Sea King helicopters and the F-35. Nossal’s analysis is remarkably even and reserved in tone given that these projects represent thousands of unnecessary and heartbreaking deaths of soldiers as well as millions of wasted taxpayer dollars. Successful Liberal and Conservative governments (the “principals”) are brought to task for numerous partisan decisions that have resulted, in most cases, in anything but the “right equipment, at the right time, in the right place with the right support at the right price.” The “agents” (or civil service) are shielded from criticism as is the public and this is where Nossal could have probed more deeply. While implied in several of the procurement problems, there is no overt mention made of the role of the defence industry, think tanks and the media that I include as part of the “public” that have specific agendas and are equally partisan.

Nossal focuses upon governments and oppositions to remind them of some unhelpful Canadian memes (what he refers to as distal causes) that persist and encourage acquisition disasters.

1. Defence procurement is driven chiefly by the political need to spend as little as possible while at the same time expecting maximum economic spill over;
2. Politicians are afforded a “permissive environment” (by the public) – there are few consequences for making the wrong decisions and few incentives to make the right decisions; and
3. Canada insists it needs a “combat capable” military. (i.e. the military needs all manner of equipment and capabilities to fulfill multiple rather than niche roles).

Of course, this book was written with the usual U.S. neighbour in mind – i.e., a relatively benign superpower that supports and defends Canada, and, most importantly, puts up with Canada’s procurement disasters. A Trump government may be less tolerant of this particular Canadian proclivity – no doubt communicating his displeasure in a tweet.

Most importantly, for academics, this book is a reminder of the importance of tenure and academic freedom. Few junior scholars would dare to dress down politicians as Nossal does, albeit more gently than is probably deserved, nor have many the scholastic clout of this particular Canadian proclivity – no doubt communicating his displeasure in a tweet.

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This excellent new book is an intriguing historical study of the continuing evolution of artillery as an arm of deception, in addition to its classical role as the arm of disruption and destruction on the modern battlefield.

The author, Colonel Olivier Fort, is a senior officer of the French Army with long and distinguished service in field, mountain, and airborne artillery units at home and on recent operations overseas. After serving several tours as the Senior French Liaison Officer at British Army Headquarters, he is now the head of the future doctrine and concepts cell at the French Army’s School of Artillery in Draguignan. Such a wealth of varied experience has shaped a serious and productive soldier-scholar whose reputation in French military education circles is solid.

The author’s thesis is both straightforward and thought-provoking. Though artillery continues to be the classical arm of destruction, its employment as an instrument of deception has grown steadily since the introduction of indirect fires made that possible at the turn of the 19th/20th Century. The literature of modern warfare has tended to, at best minimize, and at worst, overlook this obvious development which appreciates the potential for artillery as an agent of influence. It is the separation of the gun line from the destructive power of its munitions exploding in the battle space that has created tactical opportunities for battlefield commanders to produce psychological effects on adversaries.

To support his thesis, the author leads us on a brisk march through the most recent wars, outlining the many non-destructive uses of artillery, or to be more precise, its potential for creating psychological impact on an adversary. From creating dummy artillery positions to encourage false impressions of friendly forces’ strength, to using the noise of gunfire to mask the main effort or provoke the commitment of an enemy’s reserve, artillery has mounted numerous successful deception operations in the immediate past.

The author’s professional experiences have allowed him to use many English language sources. So it is not surprising that some of the historical examples of artillery deception he cites are close to home. The gunners of the Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge used the timings and rehearsals of the massive three-week long preliminary bombardment to mask the exact moment of H-hour. In Normandy, Canadians found themselves victims of an enemy artillery ruse. German gunners lured Canadian artillerymen into what appeared to be an abandoned rocket battery position. Once it was full of curious Canadians inspecting an enemy weapon they had never seen, an adjacent German rocket battery pummelled the position, causing great losses among Canadian gunners caught in the open.

The last chapter describing the employment of artillery deception and influence operations in the context of counter-insurgency is indeed a significant contribution to the list of “must-reads” for practitioners of the profession of arms. Well-written and a quick read, this new book merits close examination as Canadian gunners, and the soldiers they will continue to support, face the challenges of further unconventional operations in an increasingly dangerous world.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Oswald Boelcke: Germany’s First Fighter Ace and Father of Air Combat
by R.G. Head
London: Grub Street, 2016
Hardcover, 192 pages, $39.95 (CAN)
Reviewed by
Ryan Kastrukoff

Brigadier General (ret.) R.G. Head of the USAF was one of the first fighter pilots in Vietnam flying over 325 combat missions, earning him the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and thirteen Air Medals. He is a graduate of Advanced Fighter Training (Top Gun) and later filled staff positions in the US Joint Staff. From this position of intimate familiarity with modern air combat, the author presents a biography of one of the world’s first fighter pilots and the first German fighter ace of the First World War, Oswald Boelcke. Brigadier General Head ambitiously proposes that Boelcke be considered as one of the most important fighter pilots of any era, due to his skill, leadership, development of doctrine, tactics, and particularly, due to his character. The author also offers a secondary thesis that the rise of the fighter ace during the First World War was an example of the resurgence of the individual in an increasingly mechanized society, and it stood in stark contrast to the impersonal slaughter of the ground war.

The work is divided into 16 chapters and seven appendices that, at times, follow Boelcke’s career, but also provide context by discussing the development of the aircraft industry, the ground battles, and the development of various national air doctrines and snippets of air combat wisdom. Through the narrative it is made clear that Oswald Boelcke was a key figure in the development of early air combat, and is, in part, responsible for many concepts, procedures, and training styles that are still present in today’s fighter aviation. It is also made clear that Boelcke was an exceptionally skilled pilot for his era, and that he deserves consideration as one of the greatest fighter aces of all time. While the author does prove his case that Boelcke was an important fighter pilot, he does not succeed in proving it beyond all doubt.

In an attempt to give context to Boelcke’s achievements, the author shows that being in the right place at the right time was a significant contributor to his success on many occasions. For example, not once but twice in his career, Boelcke was flying aircraft that were considerably more capable than his foes, leading him to easily rack up his victory count. The author goes on many tangents about different aircraft flown by all sides, and the various doctrines in vogue that again could have made it significantly easier for Boelcke to stand out among his contemporaries.

For his secondary thesis, the author was less able to prove that the rise of the fighter ace showed the resurgence of the individual. In fact, the author concludes that Boelcke’s greatness is in part due to his development of a training system and a teamwork mentality for fighter squadrons that holds true today. This is almost completely opposite to the author’s original thesis. Boelcke’s early career was, indeed, highly individualistic, but once given his own squadron, he stressed teamwork and the victory of the group. He maintained that squadron was more important than the ace. Regardless, the fact that Boelcke also maintained his character in the midst of fame and adulation, espoused teamwork, and built a training system that led to one of the most effective squadrons in operating during the First World War, is, to this reviewer, the author’s argument that most proves that Boelcke should be considered one of the founding fathers of air combat.

This is a recommended read for all interested in First World War and early aviation. For those in the air combat profession, this work gives valuable insight and context to our current understanding of air warfare, and it is highly recommended as such.

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