Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 2016

CONTENTS

3 EDITOR’S CORNER
4 LETTER TO THE EDITOR

CANADA AND THE WORLD
5  A Response to Climate Change: Evolving the Business of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
   by Claire Bramma

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT
16  “From a Beetle to a Porsche:” The Purchase of the Leopard C1 Tank for the Canadian Army
    by Frank Maas
28  Guns, Funds and Power: Defence Spending, Regime Type and the Implications for Canada
    by Joshua Horlings

POLITICAL SCIENCE
39  China’s Re-emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations in the Contemporary Era
    by Kurtis Simpson

MILITARY PERSONNEL
53  Transitioning from Military to Civilian Life: Examining the Final Step in a Military Career
    by Dave Blackburn

VIEWS AND OPINIONS
62  The Foundations of Inclusive Leadership
    by Joseph Harding
68  A Doctrine for Individual Training and Education
    by Julie Maillé and Louise Baillargeon

COMMENTARY
72  Consultation and the Defence Policy Review
    by Martin Shadwick
79  BOOK REVIEWS

Cover
HMCS Winnipeg is backlit by the early morning sun as it sails during Exercise Jointex 15, as part of NATO’s Exercise Trident Juncture, 31 October 2015.
Credit: DND photo
HS2015-0838-L041-003
by Leading Seaman Peter Frew

A Response to Climate Change: Evolving the Business of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

“From a Beetle to a Porsche:” The Purchase of the Leopard C1 Tank for the Canadian Army

Canadian Military Journal/Revue militaire canadienne is the official professional journal of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, Canadian Military Journal, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on condition that appropriate credit is given to Canadian Military Journal. Each issue of the Journal is published simultaneously in print and electronic versions; it is available on the Internet at www.Canada.ca/canadian-military-journal.

ISSN 1492-465X
Guns, Funds and Power: Defence Spending Regime Type and the Implications for Canada

China’s Re-emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations in the Contemporary Era

Transitioning from Military to Civilian Life: Examining the Final Step in a Military Career

NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
As I write these words, autumn has yet to bring its cooling balm to the eastern portion of the Great White North, but nonetheless, a hearty welcome to yet another autumn edition of the Canadian Military Journal.

A truly eclectic menu of offerings this time out... Taking the point, professional engineer Lieutenant-Colonel Claire Bramma discusses the Canadian Armed Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), its mandate, and the ramifications of global climate change with respect to that mandate. This excellent formation, which is tasked with "...assisting civil authorities in disaster response efforts as part of their overall mandate to contribute to peace and security, as well as to uphold Canada’s values and interests," not only performs these functions domestically, but is also tasked "... to meet [both] international and domestic requests for help and underscores Canada’s resolve to support disaster victims anywhere in the world." Given that mandate, Lieutenant-Colonel Bramma offers, "In light of the impacts of climate change, it is worth investigating how the DART should evolve to ensure relevance and responsiveness as it matures.”

Next, Dr. Frank Maas, who teaches at Fanshawe College in London, Ontario, chronicles one of the most successful acquisitions in the history of Canada’s armed forces, namely, the purchase of the German Leopard C1 main battle tank at the height of the Cold War. While proving to be an excellent successor to the British Centurion, perhaps the most significant ‘takeaway’ from this article is the lessons the acquisition provided for future defence procurement activities.

One of the Canadian Military Journal’s most important aims is to encourage young voices with respect to defence considerations. To that end, and also with reference to defence procurement, although on a more general level, Second Lieutenant Joshua Horlings, a recent Honours graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada, and an armoured officer under training, suggests the following: “Democracies consistently spend huge amounts on defence while actually devoting only a small percentage of their GDP to defence. Autocracies, on the other hand, devote larger percentages of their GDP to defence, while generally spending small amounts overall. This difference in spending habits between regime types prompts the question: does regime type determine the nature of a state’s defence spending?” Read on and see what you think...

Then, Kurtis Simpson, an expert with respect to China’s leadership, armed forces, politics, and foreign policy, charts the nation’s rise as an economic, political and military power, and while China professes to the world an image of continued growth and internal stability, in Simpson’s words: “The tipping point in both positive and negative scenarios alike in China is
civilian-military (civ-mil) relations.” To that end, the author places civ-mil relations in an historical context, highlights evolving trend lines in Chinese Communist Party/People’s Liberation Army relations (including tensions), and provides a “...cursory assessment of early signals or indications of future friction points.”

Rounding off our major articles, Professor Dave Blackburn, a former CAF social work officer (major) and an authority with respect to social sciences and the sociology of health, examines that often turbulent period surrounding a member’s release from the Canadian Armed Forces and the concomitant transition to civilian life. In reality, the terms of release vary drastically. Therefore, in the author’s words, “... the CAF must consider all releases individually. The intention of this article is to present thoughts and discussion on the last step of a person’s military career and to provide a military-civilian transition process model.”

We then offer two very different opinion pieces for consideration in this issue. In the first, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Harding, currently a Training Development Officer at Military Personnel Generation Headquarters (MILPERSGEN HQ) in Kingston, Ontario, and a former combat arms officer (artillery), presents “…a proposal for Inclusive Leadership in the context of education, with a direct application to the three Employment Equity Groups of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). It will include a description of chosen concepts that will connect to inclusive leadership – one pertaining to inclusiveness, and two pertaining to leadership, both transformational and participative.” Next, Major Julie Maille and Ms. Louise Baillargeon, both also associated with training development at MILPERSGEN HQ, explore the world of writing doctrine with respect to individual training and education in the CAF, suggesting that such writing is a challenge in itself. In their words, “To remain relevant, doctrine must be flexible and must incorporate emerging concepts and lessons learned. More specifically, it must encompass the generational diversity of the new waves of learners. It must also be open to all innovative approaches in the field of training and education. Doctrine is never fixed; it is always evolving.”

Then, our own Martin Shadwick rolls up his sleeves and examines the Justin Trudeau government’s initiatives to harvest academic, parliamentary, industrial, and other inputs to its ongoing declared Defence Policy Review, an initiative designed to broaden the policy review process in the nation. Finally, we close with a brace of book reviews for our readership’s autumn reading consideration.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
I’m writing in response to the article “Canadian Armed Forces Reserve: Quo Vadis,” which appeared in CMJ Volume 16, Number 3, Summer 2016. By way of background, I served as an Army Reservist in the mid-to-late 1970s, then again in this decade. In between, I served for several decades in the Regular Army, often working closely with Reservists in different settings, both in Canada and on deployed operations.

Please don’t think me rude if I say that this must be the millionth time I’ve seen these issues raised by well-informed, well-meaning and passionate writers. The points the authors raise are all valid and important. I would have recognized them and agreed with them when I was a Militia soldier in the mid-1970s. My comments below concern the Army, as it is that with which I am familiar.

The authors’ plea (I believe) collides with three objects which have historically proven largely immoveable.

First, in my opinion, no Canadian Government (of any political stripe) in my memory has ever really articulated a clear National Defence strategy in the detailed, coherent sense that military professionals would recognize as “strategy.” Repetition of vague policy generalities or lists of un-resourced “priorities” do not constitute strategy. Without this underpinning strategy, no discussion of the role of any part of the Armed Forces has any meaning, be it about Regular Force or Reserve Force.

Second, the larger Regular Army (despite periodic protestations to the contrary) has never really cared much about the Reserve, nor has it ever really known “what to do with the Militia.” During my service career, the approach seemed to vary from neglect (both benign and hostile), to spasmodic, ill-considered over-tasking which was doomed to failure for systemic or “turf protection” reasons to which nobody wanted to admit. And by “nobody,” I mean both the Regular and Reserve communities, who must share equally in the blame for the dismal and persistent situation the authors describe.

Finally, in my opinion, the Army Reserve has never really trusted the Regular Army throughout our entire military history. Any proposal for reform, change, improvement, restructure, etc., emanating from the Regular Army is viewed with (more or less...) un-concealed suspicion by Reserve soldiers. Ill-conceived mishaps, such as the current mess with the CAF Recruiting System “support” to the Reserve, have not helped. Afghanistan mitigated that mistrust a bit by broadening the horizons of a number of Reserve officers who are now holding more senior ranks, but that happy period is rapidly fading in the rear view mirror, and we will soon return to the “old normal.” There are, I think, systemic reasons for such mistrust, and these may be intractable. I suggest that much the same relationship has often existed between the US Army’s Active and National Guard components. (Since we are so fond of comparing ourselves to the Americans...)

Unless these three deeply-rooted systemic and cultural obstacles can be cleared away (or reduced), I see no useful answer to the aforementioned article, nor to the persistent historical problems of which it reminds us.

Yours Sincerely,
Dave Banks
Lieutenant-Colonel Claire Bramma, CD, RCE, a 2002 graduate in Civil Engineering from the Royal Military College of Canada, has filled a variety of command, staff, and operational appointments as a Royal Canadian Engineer. In addition, she completed the UK Army Survey Course in 2006 (MSc in Defence Geographic Information), as well as the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) in 2015 (Masters of Defence Studies). Her operational experience includes both expeditionary and domestic operations, completing two tours in Kabul, Afghanistan, as well as two disaster relief missions in Canada. She also commanded 55 Support Squadron (5e Régiment du génie de Combat), 2009-2011, and deployed on the humanitarian assistance mission to Haiti (Op Hestia), following the 2010 earthquake. Following a year on the Directing Staff for JCSP at CFC Toronto, she is appointed as the CO (designate) of the Mapping and Charting Establishment in Ottawa.

Introduction

The impacts of climate change are being felt throughout the world, presenting a new reality for the natural and man-made dimensions. Incidents of severe storms and flooding as well as wildfires and droughts reveal the consequences of global warming and a distressed hydrological cycle. From too much water to too little water, extreme weather events are on the rise, increasing the risk of natural disasters. When a major natural disaster occurs, whether in Canada or abroad, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is capable of assisting civil authorities in disaster response efforts as part of the their overall mandate to contribute to peace and security, as well as to uphold Canadian values and interests. The CAF’s Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is part of the Government of Canada’s (GoC)
response “...to meet international and domestic requests for help and underscores Canada’s resolve to support disaster victims anywhere in the world.” When the DART was established in 1996, it was a stand-alone capability, and it is now nested within the Humanitarian Operations Task Force (HOTF) concept as part of the CAF’s contingency plan for international disaster assistance, known as CONPLAN RENAISSANCE. This development serves as a fine example of a comprehensive approach that intersects the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Now that the DART is 20 years old, how will this capability continue to evolve? In light of the impacts of climate change, it is worth investigating how the DART should evolve to ensure relevance and responsiveness as it matures.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created in 1992, and it has played an important role in bringing climate change to the forefront of international politics. Over the last 25 years, a greater awareness of the climate change issue has prompted policy makers across a variety of sectors to try and determine how people and societies can adapt to the disaster risks posed by climate change. The Paris Climate Change Conference in November 2015 reinforced the fact that climate change is a highly politicized issue, and is seen as a threat to humankind. As stated in the resulting Paris Agreement, “…climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and thus requires the widest possible cooperation by all countries.” Given the evidence of climate change documented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), there are linkages to increased population vulnerability and extreme weather events leading to greater risk of natural disasters. How will this affect the CAF’s conduct of Humanitarian Operations (HO) in response to natural disasters? How will both the operating environment and operational framework of the DART evolve? Although there is a domestic nexus to the disaster response by the CAF, this article will focus upon the impacts of climate change within the expeditionary context.

Accordingly, global climate change will not only keep the DART in business, but will continue to evolve it. First of all, this article will address the link between climate change and an increase in natural disasters, providing insight into the nature of the DART’s operating environment. Second, a brief historical overview of the CAF’s expeditionary disaster response missions and analysis of the operating framework of the DART within the HOTF model will point to areas for growth. Finally, suggestions for the evolution of the DART’s business will be described through a series of strategic, operational, and tactical recommendations.

Climate Change and Natural Disasters

The evidence of climate change (CC) has been well-documented by the IPCC. The IPCC defines CC as an identified change in the state of the climate that persists for an extended period, which may be caused by natural internal processes, external forces, or by persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere, or in land use. Although there is still room for debate over the root cause, compilation and analysis of climate research by the IPCC over the past 20 years reveals that elevated carbon dioxide emissions, mostly due to human activity involving fossil fuels, is the key instigator of global warming, and as a consequence, major shifts in climate patterns. Figure 1 illustrates the author’s view of how global warming can lead to an increased occurrence of natural disasters. It also highlights the importance of population vulnerability when evaluating disaster risk.

The impacts of CC point to an increase in the frequency, scale, and complexity of future military operations, especially support to civil authorities and disaster assistance.

The latest trends in rising surface and ocean temperatures globally are consistent with the observed warming of the planet.
over the long-term, and the world continues to experience record-breaking years for mean global surface temperatures. For example, the average temperature of the earth in 2014 was 14.59 Celsius, which broke the previous records of 2005 and 2010. Further, 2015 has been dubbed as the hottest year on-record. “Globally-averaged temperatures in 2015 shattered the previous mark set in 2014 by 0.13 Celsius. Only once before, in 1998, has the new record been greater than the old record by this much.” These warming trends correlate to melting ice and a rise in mean sea levels that have been monitored by the IPCC using measurements from satellites and coastal tide gauges over the long term. It is estimated that there will be a steady increase in global mean sea levels at a rate of 4 millimetres per year that will affect 95 percent of the ocean area by the end of the 21st Century. These expressions of global warming upset the hydrological cycle and cause both anomalous and extreme weather events to occur on a global scale. Overall, global warming can certainly influence regional weather. However, the extent to which precipitation patterns and temperatures change remains uncertain, due to regional variations.

**Climatic Disaster Trends**

Disasters occur when natural and man-made systems cannot cope with the effects of natural hazards. The IPCC estimates with very high confidence that CC will increase risks for people, assets, economies, and ecosystems. Thus, the vulnerability of populations and infrastructure are important factors contributing to disaster risk. Even through governments and international organizations have created disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies that promote adaptation and resilience to climate change, there are still residual risks associated with more unpredictable climate extremes. Further, less developed countries continue to struggle with DRR implementation, and with this comes an increased risk of experiencing a natural disaster.

The occurrences of climatic natural disasters over the past 20 years have increased steadily, especially those disasters caused by floods and severe storms. The trends associated with natural disasters related to CC can be identified from statistics published by the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), using the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) data. Given the steady increase in global warming since the late-1990s, the annual trends among the various types of climatic disasters reveal that floods and storms have consistently been the two most frequent causes of natural disasters, as illustrated in Figure 2. Furthermore, the IFRC’s research shows an increasing rate of both floods and windstorms since 1996. This is supported by tropical cyclone trends measured by the Accumulated Cyclone Energy (ACE) index that encompasses frequency, strength, and duration.

The total annual ACE indices have risen noticeably over the past 20 years, and six of the ten most active years have occurred since the mid-1990s, as exemplified by the disasters caused by the severe Atlantic hurricane seasons experienced in 2004 and 2005. When considering the types of climatic events that caused natural disasters globally over the past 20 years, almost 50 percent of disasters were attributed to floods, while almost 30 percent were caused by wind storms (see Figure 2). To assist the planning for disaster assistance operations, in-depth analysis of local and regional trends would be beneficial to identify the existing and potential weather hazards for particular area of interests. Although IPCC reporting points to a rise in wildfires, droughts, and heat-waves in conjunction with global warming (especially in Europe, Asia, and Australia) they do not always progress to a state of emergency. However, in cases where a disaster occurs related to extreme temperatures, the consequences can be wide reaching, as evident by the 2003 European heat wave, which was attributed to almost 35,000 deaths and caused economic losses of over 13 billion USD.

Finally, a geographical analysis of climatic disaster occurrence points to areas of the world that are at greater risk, and therefore points to potential locations for the conduct of HO. One of the key factors for location-based analysis is an assessment of population vulnerability and resiliency. As extreme weather events occur more often, the effect upon communities and infrastructures may compound to increase vulnerability. Countries and states that do not have a DRR strategy or well-developed emergency management resources may be considered as high risk locations. In addition, dense population centres residing along coastlines that are more exposed to natural hazards, such as rising sea levels and severe windstorms, are at greater risk. Climatic disaster statistics from CRED reveal that Asia is the continent most affected by disasters in terms of the number of occurrence as well as the number of people affected. Asia’s tendency to experience natural disasters can be attributed to its greater exposure to weather hazards, the relative concentration of less-developed countries, and the fact that Asia’s four-and- a-half billion people represents an approximate 60 percent majority of the world’s population.

This first section has demonstrated a correlation between global warming, climate change, and an increase in climatic disaster frequency. Recent natural disaster statistics show a trend in the overall increase of floods and storms globally, with countries from Asia being most affected. This overview provides insight into the nature of the environment in which disaster assistance missions...
could occur. Further, if trends continue into the near and long term, this informs operational planners and the DART as to what type of disaster scenarios can be expected in the future and to where HO deployments may occur. There is certainly potential for more in-depth analysis at a regional level, and further research can be done to assert predictions with more fidelity. Having implied that CC creates the potential for an increased demand for the DART, a discussion on how the DART fits within the CAF’s framework for disaster assistance follows.

Analysis of the Disaster Assistance Framework

The mandate to conduct HO when required is well defined in DND’s defence strategy, and is integrated into the CAF’s operational framework. Since 1992 the CAF has formally conducted several expeditionary disaster assistance operations. As part of a comprehensive approach, the DART was formed in 1996 and is designed to fit into both GoC and CAF strategies for international disaster assistance. The operating framework of the DART sees it as a responsive, strategic asset that can deploy in support of a request for assistance to the GoC from a nation affected by a natural disaster. Given the predicted rise in climatic disasters, there is a reasonable expectation that the GoC will call upon the CAF to deploy the DART on a more frequent basis. In turn, this may affect the operational framework for disaster assistance in two ways: a possible expansion of the DART’s role within the disaster management spectrum, and the prevalence of the HOTF concept. Prior to going into detail in these two areas, a brief historical analysis of disaster assistance operations conducted by the CAF will serve to show how the DART has been employed since its inception.

History of CAF Disaster Assistance Missions

In the past 25 years, the CAF has conducted ten international disaster assistance missions which have been inherently ‘Joint,’ at times requiring contributions from all three environments. An overview of each mission is detailed in Table 1, while Figure 3 provides a graphical summary. As illustrated, the DART has deployed on eight missions since its inception in 1996, and on a few occasions, the DART has been augmented with additional CAF resources, depending upon the scale of the disaster. The DART organization has evolved over the past 20 years, most notably by the integration of organic tactical aviation (rotary wing) detachments. In addition, the large Joint Task Force that deployed on Op Hestia led to the development of HOTF model, which allows for the augmentation of the initial DART organization through other high readiness elements residing in the CAF, as the situation dictates. The geographical analysis of the CAF’s disaster assistance missions shown in Figure 4 illustrates that half of all deployments occurred in the Western Hemisphere. There are a variety of reasons leading to this, such as GoC interests, timeliness of the request for assistance, and population vulnerability. Finally, concerning the type of natural disasters to which the CAF has responded, the historical data reveals that half were related to severe windstorms (hurricanes or typhoons), while the other half related to earthquakes. While the latter does not have any direct connection to climate change, this presents a challenge for the DART in the management of how it should respond to a seismic disaster versus a climatic disaster. Therefore, the DART will need to continue to exercise flexibility concerning priorities for training and equipment, as well as understanding the deployment sequence, based upon the situation. Clearly, this flexibility can be supported through early warning and an accurate needs assessment by the
DART leadership immediately upon activation as part of the Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST).

The Disaster Management Spectrum and the DART

Facing the challenge of a potential increase in disaster assistance missions, it is worthwhile to consider how the DART can contribute within the spectrum of disaster management. Disaster management is characterized by four interdependent phases: Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. Typically, military capabilities such as the DART, are designed for the Response phase, and for a relatively short deployment during the Rescue and Relief stages. Response refers to what is done immediately prior, during, and following a disaster event, with the primary aims being to save lives, reduce injuries, and decrease damage to infrastructure. Figure 5 is the author’s illustration of the disaster management spectrum, and where military contributions are most viable. The Response phase is the most complex of the four phases of disaster management because of the time constraints associated with emergencies, and the requirement to coordinate the wide range of activities. Because the disaster management cycle is led by civil authorities, military involvement occurs only when specific requests for assistance are made, or through pre-arranged agreements that call for specific capabilities to temporarily fill gaps in civilian resources and/or capacity.

---

### Figure 4 – Locations of CAF Disaster Assistance Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas/Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe/Continental Asia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Figure 5 – Military Roles in the Disaster Management Spectrum

#### DISASTER MANAGEMENT PHASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Preparation</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–7 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rescue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–50 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Early</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+ days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recovery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Training

- Search & Rescue (SAR)
- Evacuation
- Medical Aid
- Emergency Shelter
- Delivery of humanitarian aid
- Route clearance and repair

#### Essential Services

- Water Supply
- Sanitation
- Critical infrastructure support
- Transitional Shelter
- Capacity building

#### Possible Military Contributions

- Liaison and Advice

---

*Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 2016 ● Canadian Military Journal*
Accordingly, the majority of the CAF’s disaster assistance missions have lasted fewer than 50 days.

There is, however, scope for an expansion of the role that the military, and by extension, the DART should fulfill within the disaster management spectrum. If climate change means an increased likelihood of natural disasters, then there is potential for the military to enlarge their mandate beyond just the Response phase as part of a wider strategy to bolster the overall management of natural disasters. For example, in the Preparation Phase, disaster assistance experts from the CAF are positioned to assist with training and capacity building through liaison and advice with partner nations who are less-developed in disaster management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Natural Disaster</th>
<th>Forces Deployed</th>
<th>Duration (days)</th>
<th>Tasks and CF Capabilities Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tempest</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Florida, USA and Eleuthra, Nassau</td>
<td>Hurricane Andrew (Cat 4)</td>
<td>Air Force Construction Engineers and HMCS PROTECTEUR (360 pers)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Distribution of humanitarian aid, Damage assessments, Vertical construction/repair, Dental and medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>La Cieba, Honduras</td>
<td>Hurricane Mitch (Cat 5)</td>
<td>DART plus air force dets (259 pers)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Mobility (airlift, evacuations), Distributed 114,000kg of humanitarian aid supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torrent</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Serdivan, Turkey</td>
<td>Earthquake (7.4)</td>
<td>DART (190 pers)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>200,000 L of water distributed, Temporary shelter, Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ampara, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Earthquake (9.1) and Tsunami</td>
<td>DART (190 pers)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Mobility, medical, engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unison</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Gulf Coast, USA</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina</td>
<td>2 frigates, 1 destroyer, CH-146 Griffon helicopters, construction engineers (900 pers)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Support to SAR operations, Distribution of humanitarian aid, Sp to US Navy clearance divers, Vertical construction repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Earthquake (7.6)</td>
<td>DART (200 pers)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Distributed 500,000kg of humanitarian aid supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horatio</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Hurricane</td>
<td>DART HQ only plus air force and Navy elements</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>Evacuations and delivery of humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hestia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Earthquake (7.0)</td>
<td>DART plus JTF HQ, 1 destroyer, 1 frigate, Battle Group (2050 pers)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Distribution of Humanitarian aid, Urban SAR, Role 2 Field Hospital, Evacuation of Canadian citizens, Route clearance and debris removal, Transitional shelters and sanitation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renaissance 13-1</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Iloilo, Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan (Cat 5)</td>
<td>DART plus aviation (319 pers)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid supplies, mobility (airlift, evacuations), road clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renaissance 15-1</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>Earthquake (7.8)</td>
<td>DART (200 pers)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Medical, water, engineering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – Summary of Expeditionary Disaster Assistance Operations 1992-2015

Accordingly, the majority of the CAF’s disaster assistance missions have lasted fewer than 50 days.

There is, however, scope for an expansion of the role that the military, and by extension, the DART should fulfill within the disaster management spectrum. If climate change means an increased likelihood of natural disasters, then there is potential for the military to enlarge their mandate beyond just the Response phase as part of a wider strategy to bolster the overall management of natural disasters. For example, in the Preparation Phase, disaster assistance experts from the CAF are positioned to assist with training and capacity building through liaison and advice with partner nations who are less-developed in disaster management. There is potential for DART personnel to work alongside GoC
stakeholders in Public Safety or Global Affairs Canada to mentor and train host nation authorities, both civilian and military, concerning disaster management practices, such as the operation of incident control centres, or specific skills required for the stages of the Response phase. This would help promote resiliency among both the government and the population, and in the long term, help reduce the risk of disaster from occurring, or reduce the severity of one. In the Recovery phase of disaster management, the DART and other GoC representatives have the ability to continue the capacity building task within a partner nation in order to improve the transition out of the Response phase. Through provision of transitional infrastructure, as well as mentorship and advice, local civil authorities and agencies can more quickly achieve self-sufficiency following a disaster. This, in turn, will also reduce the chance of an affected nation becoming dependent upon outside support, whether it is from the part of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), International Organisations (IO), or military resources.

**Advantage of the HOTF Concept**

As the DART matured into adulthood, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE was first established towards the end of 2010. Then in 2014, the HOTF model for the conduct of expeditionary HO was formalized as a result of the lessons learned process. As previously alluded to, the Op Hestia experience in 2010 highlighted the potential for an expansion of the disaster assistance mission for very large scale disasters, and for operational theatres of strategic and/or political importance. In addition, the response to the 2013 Typhoon in the Philippines reinforced the requirement for the DART to be augmented with capabilities, such as tactical aviation, using high readiness elements residing in the CAF. The nature of disaster assistance missions requires the CAF to be able to deliver a combination of ‘Joint’ effects, which, in some cases, calls for an expansion beyond the DART’s organic structure. Accordingly, the HOTF concept of operations is modularized, with capabilities added according to the needs assessment of the mission. The HOTF model is illustrated as a pyramid where at the top, the Rapid Reaction Package portion of the DART deploys first, and it is closely followed by the DART’s High Readiness Component (HRC). Mission-specific capabilities are then deployed from a pool of the Managed Readiness Elements and possibly other CAF capabilities, as needed. This offers a flexible and modular structure, so that the CAF deploys resources where and when needed.

"...the response to the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines reinforced the requirement for the DART to be augmented with capabilities, such as tactical aviation, using high readiness elements residing in the CAF."

A medical technician/DART member examines a child during Operation Renaissance in Centro, Philippines, 29 November 2013.
most. This aligns well with both the Oslo Guidelines, and accepted forms of military contribution to disaster response missions referred to in Table 2 above.

Having taken a look at how the DART has been employed in the past, and how the DART fits within the disaster management spectrum and the HOTF concept, one can see potential for a continued evolution of the DART as the potential for its employment increases in the face of the consequences of climate change.

**Recommendations**

**Partnerships**

The effectiveness of the DART into the future requires a strengthening and exercising of existing partnerships both internal and external to the CAF. This will enable the DART to be more closely integrated with key civilian and military stakeholders, which can improve operational effectiveness. Civil-military integration is required, not only during the conduct of disaster assistance missions, but also beforehand during training, and throughout the needs assessment phase.

First of all, within the GoC, there are well-established relationships between the CAF and Global Affairs Canada (GAC). The relevant partnerships occur at the operational level between staff at the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and personnel within the GAC directorates involved in disaster assistance. These relationships provide the opportunity for the CAF to link into inter-departmental meetings, and to share information so that major international disasters may be predicted and monitored. Upon the onset of a disaster, whereupon a request for international assistance is made, close coordination between the GAC and the CAF is essential for an accurate needs assessment for the effectiveness of the DART reconnaissance elements. Secondly, beyond the GoC stakeholders, there is room for growth by expanding relationships with International Organizations and NGOs, such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Red Cross. Furthermore, personnel assigned to the DART Headquarters should be afforded the opportunity to interact with representatives from OCHA and from other relevant NGOs through their participation in international fora concerning disaster management. Thirdly, at the strategic level, the CAF’s Global Engagement Strategy (GES) has the potential to make intersections with nations that are at higher-risk of exposure to climate change, and therefore more likely to experience a natural disaster. Deliberate engagement with disaster-prone areas of the world will lead to greater preparedness of the DART at the operational level.

**Training**

Another area for growth is to exercise the aforementioned partnerships through focused training. Although the annual DART training plan does include involvement with GoC partners and NGOs, assessment should be made continually to ensure that the right relationships are strengthened, and that new civilian partners are identified. In exercising CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, resources and time should be allotted so that training occurs in the context of increasingly complex and relevant scenarios. Training involving civilian and military partners will also facilitate the sharing of best practices that can improve how the DART operates. This can be achieved by incorporating civilian stakeholders in DART exercises and likewise involving DART personnel in civilian training events. With the expected increase in operational tempo due to climate change, cooperation between the CAF and civilian agencies is necessary to promote efficiency and to best target military resources. Realistic training not only benefits DART’s partnerships with civilians, but also provides opportunities to exercise the HOTF by integrating CAF Managed Readiness elements. This will promote interoperability between the organic DART components and the HOTF capabilities force generated from the environment. Finally, the training audience should not be limited to the DART and the HOTF. As mentioned earlier, the CAF and the GoC are postured to assist partner nations and their respective agencies in disaster management. The potential to improve resiliency of developing countries in the face of an increased threat of natural disasters can be realised through training and mentorship missions involving both DART personnel and GoC partners.

**Prediction and Monitoring**

The anticipation of a major international natural disaster through early warning is essential for the DART to be responsive. It is recommended that the operational level of the CAF continue to leverage internal and external information sources to ensure
that the prediction of climatic disasters is timely, accurate, and keeps-up with an expected increase in volume. Through advancements in science and technology, the meteorological network of sensors and observation stations are able to monitor atmospheric and hydrologic conditions at an increasing level of fidelity, improving weather forecasting. By integrating meteorological data with other geo-referenced information (i.e., imagery, topography, infrastructure, population) the prediction and monitoring of disaster risk can be achieved. This geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) function therefore contributes to effective indication and warning. Accordingly, there is room to evolve the role of GEOINT residing in CJOC Headquarters in order support the DART’s readiness in the warning and preparation phase.

**Logistics**

Coordination at the operational level by CJOC Headquarters staff can facilitate the use and establishment of operational support hubs (OSHs), so that material can be pre-positioned, and also to serve as a staging area for DART personnel. Arrangements with military bases of our allies could also support the logistics of deploying the DART. For example, CAF OSHs in Jamaica and Kuwait provide gateways for disaster assistance operations that occur in Central America and Southwest Asia respectively. The use of allied military bases for the staging of equipment, supplies, and personnel can also promote the speed of response, especially for regions of interest beyond the reach of established OSHs. As highlighted earlier, the Asia-Pacific region is prone to climatic disaster. The DART’s ability to respond in this part of the world can be enhanced with the eventual establishment of an OSH in the Pacific region. In the near term, the CAF should consider establishing an agreement with key allies, such as the US and Australia, for the use of one of their military bases in Asia-Pacific. It is also worth considering an OSH beyond the military model with which the CAF is familiar. A simple civilian warehouse in proximity to a large airport, combined with a series of contracts with local companies, might be one form of an OSH. The bottom line is that the evolution of the DART should include a reduction of the strategic line of communication from Trenton to an operational area through a regional OSH network. By decreasing deployment timelines, this will make the DART more responsive.

**Equipment**

Tactical resourcing of the DART is another aspect that warrants evolution. Force development and equipment acquisition programs that recognize the flexibility and responsiveness of disaster assistance missions is an important factor with respect to the DART’s viability into the future. First of all, concerning vehicles, it is worth analyzing whether a military or civilian pattern fleet is optimal. Alternatively, an OSH may be well positioned for local contracts to acquire civilian vehicle rentals for the duration of a given mission. This creates the potential for fewer strategic airlift requirements and cost savings in vehicle fleet maintenance.

Secondly, water purification is an enduring DART capability that needs revitalizing. Although the current Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) are undergoing life cycle extension, the large size of this equipment and the very limited methods of distribution present challenges to the DART’s ability to provide potable water. This is especially the case in an operating environment that is dispersed, or where equipment sitting is severely restricted due to debris. One solution is to acquire modern, commercial off the shelf, lightweight water purification systems that can be left in location after redeployment. This concept requires a development plan and funding in coordination with GAC to ensure the sustainability in the mid- to-long-term following a disaster. These are just two examples among several that deserve consideration in order to improve DART equipment. The DART’s evolution should therefore include a materiel resourcing strategy that is versatile, reliable, and up-to-date.

**Security**

Seeing CC as a threat to security has emerged, especially among world powers such as the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), among others. In 2014, the US DoD articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review that CC poses a threat to domestic and international security:

> “It is recommended that beyond reinforcing the response to climatic disasters, the CAF should consider how it may be impacted in humanitarian disasters and armed conflicts that are spurred on by climate change.”

Similarly, the UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review lists CC as a contributor to instability, while offering CC as an opportunity to collaborate with partners, as stated in the forward by then-Prime Minister David Cameron:

> Britain’s safety and security depends not just on our own efforts, but on working hand in glove with our allies to deal with the common threats that face us all, from terrorism to climate change.32

This type of discourse where CC is placed alongside terrorism in the context of security threats suggests that the CAF’s response to CC impacts should go beyond the evolution of the DART and strengthening the disaster assistance capability. The recent documentary, *The Age of Consequences*, and Gwynne Dyer’s *Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats*, explore the security risk that climate change presents at both the national and global scale. It is recommended that beyond reinforcing the response to climatic disasters, the CAF should consider how it may be implicated in humanitarian disasters and armed conflicts that are spurred on by climate change. The DART and HOTF are
doctrinally designed to focus upon disaster assistance, but how would these elements respond to an escalation of violence during HO? Further, is there a mandate for the CAF to respond to humanitarian disasters resulting from population vulnerabilities caused by climate extremes? Answering these questions requires a holistic analysis of how climate change will impact the CAF across the spectrum of conflict, from peace keeping and humanitarian intervention, to total war.

Conclusion

The impact of CC warrants not only a continuation and evolution of the DART mandate as the CAF’s primary strategic disaster response capability, but also presents an opportunity for the CAF to consider the wider aspects of CC upon defence and security. This article has highlighted the link between CC and the increased potential for climatic disasters to occur and has suggested ways in which the evolution of the DART in the face of this challenge can be supported at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The historical analysis of the CAF’s expeditionary disaster assistance operations revealed the prevalence of extreme weather events, such as hurricanes. Evidence from the IPCC and the IFRC has also shown that windstorms and floods have been, and are expected to continue to be, the most dominant cause of climatic disasters, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. A review of CONPLAN RENAISSANCE reinforced that the DART’s operational framework and the HOTF model should be sustained. The flexibility and modularity of this operational concept will support the potential increase in operational tempo, as well as the severity of climatic disasters. The review of the DART’s role as part of a comprehensive approach also revealed the potential to expand beyond the Response phase and into training and mentorship functions within the Preparation and Recovery phases of the disaster management spectrum. Finally, several recommendations, from the tactical to the strategic level, addressed areas that support the DART’s evolution, and opened up the CC debate beyond linkages to natural disasters and into security threats. To conclude, CC presents both opportunities and challenges for the CAF, now and into the future. As a starting point, the CAF’s response to CC and the increased risk of climatic disasters should involve the continued evolution of the DART as it matures in order for it to remain operationally ready and effective.

2. UNFCCC has been ratified by 196 states and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is comprised researchers from 195 member countries. Consequently, these entities have been responsible for raising extensive awareness about the issue of climate change among world leaders.


4. Humanitarian Operation is defined as an international military operation conducted where the prime task is purely to assist agencies of the humanitarian enterprise in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The term Humanitarian Operation (HO) is not a substitute for or a substitute to an expeditionary context for the provision of humanitarian assistance following a disaster. Normally, these missions are launched in response to Rapid Onset Disasters and are conducted in a permissive environment. They may be conducted in other environments, but the parameters for CAF involvement will be jointly defined between the Government of Canada (Global Affairs Canada) and DND. Department of National Defence, Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations, Vol. B-GJ-005-307/FP-040 (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), pp. 1-4.

5. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is comprised of a network of scientists from around the world, and was established in 1988 by the United Nations (UN) through the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The IPCC has published numerous scientific and technical assessments, with the latest being the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). For more information, go to: http://www.ipcc.ch/index.htm.


14. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) cross-cuts a variety of government sectors (public safety, natural resources, defence, and transport) from the federal down to the municipal level. Internationally, the UNFCCC and the UNIDR have encouraged many countries to adopt DRR as part of their strategies to cope with climate change impacts. Despite the emergence of plans and policies to reduce disaster risks, the implementation of practices and processes is expected to take time and requires significant capacity building, especially in less developed countries.


19. Author’s analysis through the compilation of statistics from IFRC 2005 and 2014 World Disaster Reports: (a) International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. World Disasters Report: Focus on Information on Disasters, (Geneva: IFRC, 2005), Annex 1, Table 5; and (b) International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. World Disasters Report: Focus on Culture and Risk. (Lyon, France: Imprimerie Chirat, 2014) Annex 1, Table 5.


22. Author’s compilation from Table 1 to this article.

23. Author’s compilation from Table 1 to this article.


26. CONPLAN RENAISSANCE is the CAF’s operational contingency plan to conduct HO worldwide in response to a major international disaster. The CONPLAN was first issued in 2010 following lessons learned from Op Hestia and revised in 2014 as CJOC CONPLAN 20855/14 RENAISSANCE.


28. The Oslo Guidelines serve to influence how foreign military assets are used in response to an international disaster, and are relevant to CAF and the DART whenever conducting DA operations. Oslo Guidelines maintain that military assets should not be seen to take-over control of the situation, nor fully assume the roles that other government agencies and NGOs are equipped to fulfil. The principle of last resort states that military contribution should, “…be unique in capability and availability,” and stress the preference towards indirect assistance. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Oslo Guidelines (Geneva: UN, 2008), p. 8.


30. Ibid., pp. xiii - xiv.


“From a Beetle to a Porsche:” The Purchase of the Leopard C1 Tank for the Canadian Army

by Frank Maas

Frank Maas completed his Ph.D in War and Society at Wilfrid Laurier University in 2014. His research focused upon armoured vehicle procurement and the policy debates over Canadian ground forces in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, especially Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s defence policy. He is working on a revision of his dissertation for publication with the University of British Columbia Press, and has also started working on a history of the production of the Piranha Light Armoured Vehicle in Canada, which is a major component of the Canadian, American, and Saudi Arabian armies. He currently teaches at Fanshawe College in London, Ontario.

Introduction

The history of Canadian defence procurement has been filled with delays, crises, and scandals, and the impression is of a byzantine system wracked by meddling. The bulk of the analysis on procurement has been critical, exemplified by Aaron Plamondon’s examination of the failed Sea King replacement in his 2010 The Politics of Procurement, but there has been some examination of successes, such as the post-Second World War Canadian aircraft industry in Randall Wakelam’s 2012 Cold War Fighters. This article will add to the modest number of success stories with an examination of the purchase of the Leopard C1 in 1976. The speed of the program compared to most projects was breathtaking – Cabinet directed the army to purchase new tanks in November 1975, approved a deal in May 1976, and the government signed a contract in October 1976. By 1979, the army received 128 modern tanks, on time and under budget. The major reason for the success was that the program enjoyed full political support, however reluctant – every soldier, bureaucrat, and member of Cabinet knew they were a priority.

The second reason was the fiscal and political constraints imposed on the purchase. The contractor, Krauss-Maffei (KM), the German Army (Heer), and Department of National Defence (DND) were all cooperative, but above all, the team responsible for purchasing the vehicle knew they needed to field a limited number of tanks quickly and at a reasonable cost, and so they bought a vehicle which was in production and in service, and with a minimum of alterations. This did not mean they bought an unsatisfactory vehicle or the cheapest option, and the Leopard C1, as it came to be called, was an excellent tank at the time.
Procurement

The procurement of the tanks was quick and smooth, but the defence policy debate over purchasing them was quite the opposite. After a lengthy review of foreign and defence policy in 1968 and 1969, the Trudeau government announced plans to reduce 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Europe by half and replace its Centurion tanks with a lighter vehicle, likely the British reconnaissance vehicle, the Scorpion. This angered Canada’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, but they could not convince Trudeau to reverse course, and the plan was confirmed in the 1971 defence white paper, Defence in the 70s. The following year, the government announced plans to develop trade links with Western Europe and Japan, the “Third Option,” to reduce dependency upon the United States. Attempts to foster a contractual link with the European Economic Community began in 1973, and it quickly became apparent that the Europeans were resentful of the reduction of the brigade in 1969, and pressed Canada to beef up its defences in Europe. An intensive review of Canada’s armed forces, the Defence Structure Review, began in 1974, and NATO allies, particularly West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, prevailed upon Canada’s diplomats, soldiers, and Trudeau himself to reverse the 1969 decision and keep tanks in Europe. The suggestion was that if Canada wanted trade with Europe, it would have to help defend Europe. The army in the person of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Jacques Dextraze also pressed Trudeau to buy new tanks. After a series of discussions with Helmut Schmidt over the spring and summer of 1975, a reluctant Trudeau finally agreed to a limited purchase of tanks to equip Canada’s troops in Europe and provide a training cadre at home, and the government announced this decision in November 1975. It was begrudging support, but everyone in government and bureaucracy knew that the tanks were a priority.

General Dextraze had started work early on a replacement or modernization of Canada’s venerable Centurions, but would have to work fast because the tanks were twenty-five years old and difficult to keep in service. Although the Dutch had rebuilt two dozen Centurions in 1974, they still imposed a heavy maintenance burden and broke down frequently. In June 1975, the army submitted a report to Dextraze on the options for new tanks. The prototypes of the West German Leopard 2 and the American M1 Abrams promised to be impressive vehicles with the latest technological advances, but unfortunately, they would not be in service for several years, and would be very expensive. Canada would likely only start receiving tanks in the mid-1980s after the Germans and Americans had equipped their armies, and the Centurion would not last that long without another costly rebuild. The army would need a tank in-service, and it discounted the formidable British Chieftain because it was too slow, and like the Centurion, difficult to maintain. The three major contenders were a modernized Centurion with a new engine, transmission, improved suspension, and fire control system for the main gun, the German Leopard 1, and the American M60A1. The army ranked the Leopard 1 as the most effective tank, but it was also the most costly. 113 modernized Leopards would likely cost $146 million, while 113 M60A1s would cost $94.1 million, and 113 Centurions only $58 million. The Chief of Land Operations at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, Major-General G. G. Brown, recommended the Centurion upgrade because it was the cheapest, and that they should be modernized immediately before the tanks were totally worn out. Dextraze passed this memo on to Trudeau’s foreign policy advisor Ivan Head, and emphasized that although the hulls were over twenty-five years old, a modernized Centurion was still a first-class tank.

General Dextraze had started work early on a replacement or modernization of Canada’s venerable Centurions, but would have to work fast because the tanks were twenty-five years old and difficult to keep in service.

A Canadian Centurion tank on exercise in West Germany.
A Leopard 2A6 of the German armed forces Bundeswehr during a demonstration at Exercise Area Munster, 20 June 2007.

A British Chieftain Mk 10.
This assessment disquieted Canada’s Department of External Affairs. In late-August 1975, Gordon Riddell, from the External Affairs’ Bureau of Defence and Arms Control Affairs, expressed his concern with respect to the army’s preference for a Centurion retrofit to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, H. B. Robinson. Riddell stated that Major-General Ramsey Withers thought a retrofitted Centurion was qualitatively superior to the M60 or the Leopard, and would also be much cheaper. Riddell’s biggest concern was that NATO allies would scoff at a rebuilt Centurion, and Canada would squander any benefits from the decision to keep tanks, especially with the ongoing negotiations for a trade link with Europe. He suggested that Robinson discuss the matter with Dextraze, and take care to emphasize that he was only addressing the foreign policy, not the military implications of the purchase.  

Robinson duly met with Dextraze for a lunch meeting, and reported that the general’s mind was still open with respect to the tank. His first choice was the Leopard 2, but it would not be in production for at least three years. Dextraze’s next choice was for a Centurion retrofit, and he said that this would give Canada a tank superior to the Leopard 1 or M60, and would be much cheaper. Robinson raised the possibility of a rental of Leopard tanks, but Dextraze said that this was “lacking in dignity and self-respect for Canada,” although he would accept it if there were no alternatives. The final option was to carry on with the Centurion for another four or five years and wait for another decision.  

This discussion might have prompted Dextraze to explore other options, because a few weeks later, he sent some high-ranking soldiers and bureaucrats to Germany to discuss the acquisition of the Leopard. They received general cost information, as well as notice that it would be twenty-two months before the Canadians could receive their own vehicles, but the Germans could loan thirty to thirty-five tanks as an interim measure. Dextraze also recalled that he persuaded the head of the German armed forces to arrange a meeting between himself and the German defence minister, Georg Leber, asking him for about a hundred new tanks. Dextraze stated he “…got him [Leber] to agree by stressing that PET [Trudeau] was usually in disagreement with everything, but that he had agreed to a new tank.”

The army did not want to wait for new tanks, and the Department of National Defence allocated funds for the replacement or modernization of 128 new tanks on 27 November 1975. This number would equip Canada’s troops in Europe with roughly ninety tanks, and the remainder would be used for training at home. Some in the army began talking about buying 156 tanks, and Dextraze was infuriated, fearing that the higher number would ruin his credibility with Prime Minister Trudeau and his staff. The Chief of the Defence Staff brought in senior members of the requirements staff and the armoured corps, lined them up in a conference room, and shouted that they were embarrassing him as he had already passed the number of 128 to his political masters. He then picked up a heavy ash tray and threw it at the wall (the ash tray did not break), and then asked each officer whether the number was 128 or 156. Each officer said 128.
The army formed a Project Management Office to look at the possibilities for a *Centurion* modernization, long-term lease of tanks, or a new purchase in December 1975. The key figures in the purchase were the Project Manager, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Hampson, and his civilian partner, Robert Bradshaw, at the Department of Supply and Services, the purchasing arm of the federal government in the 1970s. The Project Director in charge of combat requirements was Major Ken Black, assisted by Major Jim Gervais, tasked to the project in 1977. The Deputy Project Manager as well as the Project Engineer was Major Mac Campbell, replaced by Major Gerry Koeller in 1978. Major Larry Brownrigg managed and tracked expenditures. 10 Their work was reviewed by a Steering Committee, and the most important oversight was from the Senior Review Board, composed of high-ranking officers and bureaucrats from the Departments of National Defence and Supply and Services. 11

Dextraze, Hampson, Bradshaw and Jim Fox, a colonel and senior planner for the army, met on 2 December 1975 to discuss the plans. Dextraze asked if Fox could live with a rebuilt *Centurion*, to which Fox answered, “yes.” The general then said that a new tank might be a possibility, and that he wanted the options on his desk by 20 December. The team put a roll of paper around their room, and charted out when the various tanks would be available, and the support and logistics required for each option. Like earlier reports in 1975, they ruled out the M1, *Leopard* 2, and *Chieftain*, leaving the modernized *Centurion, Leopard* 1, and the *M60*. They studied the costs and benefits of a *Centurion* retrofit, which would involve replacing the entire power pack (cooling system, engine, suspension, and drivetrain) with newer and more reliable models. A modernized *Centurion* would indeed be serviceable, and its mobility and reliability would be greatly improved, but the team concluded that this option, although cheaper in the short-term, was undesirable. In the team’s terms, it would be a “bastard” tank that no one else would be using in Europe, and the Canadians would pay a premium for spare parts for a small fleet.

Ultimately, the team preferred the *Leopard* 1. It was relatively light for a Main Battle Tank, forty-seven tons to the *Centurion*’s fifty-six, and it had less armour, but it was fast and reliable, and armed with the same 105 mm gun as the *Centurion*. It was newer than the *M60*, and the Germans had already mentioned that they could loan the Canadians some tanks, and KM could produce vehicles for the Canadian army, likely in 1978. The team concluded that the best option was to rent tanks from the German Army for two years to finally retire the *Centurions*, and field their own *Leopard* 1s in 1978. Spare parts and support from allies would be plentiful because there were thousands of these in service with Germany and other countries. 12 It was also in production. The Australian army had tested the *M60* against the *Leopard* 1 in 1972 and 1973, and decided to purchase 101 *Leopards*, which were in production from 1976 to 1978. The Canadian plan was to buy the Australian variant with only minor alterations to avoid significant re-tooling or developmental charges. 13 National Defence’s highest committee approved the program on 5 April 1976, and the next stop was Cabinet. 14
Cabinet met to discuss the tank purchase just a few weeks later, on 20 May 1976. The memo that the ministers read compared the modernization of the Centurion to a purchase of new Leopard 1s. The British company Vickers submitted a proposal to retrofit Centurions, but had never rebuilt them in quantity, so there were many unknowns associated with the project. Vickers estimated that it could deliver refurbished Centurions starting in April 1980 and finish the program by January 1982, but this would necessitate a rebuild to squeeze a few more years out of Canada’s existing tanks. The army’s estimate for the overhaul of 128 Centurions was $65 million, close to the estimate of $60 million of 113 Centurions from the summer of 1975, but the total project costs had risen to roughly $150 million. The major increases were a contingency fund of more than $20 million, logistics support of roughly $25 million, and a $16 million rebuild of Centurions to keep them running until the overhauled tanks came into service in 1980. Vickers also promised $10 million worth of Industrial Regional Benefits, a contractual obligation to buy Canadian products to offset the costs of the purchase.

“The British company Vickers submitted a proposal to retrofit Centurions, but had never built them in quantity, so there were many unknowns associated with the project.”

A Centurion tank stands sentry during the early morning fog.
The memo argued that the Leopard was a much more attractive alternative which met Canada’s need at a reasonable cost, and it would be easier to field and maintain. It was also more expensive – 128 Leopards would cost around $160 million. New tanks could start arriving in January 1978, and the order completed by April 1979. KM, with a good reputation for fulfilling offset obligations, could offer Industrial Regional Benefits worth 30 to 50 percent of the value of the contract. Allies would likely be happy with either option, but a Leopard would obviously help German-Canadian relations, and it was less risky than the Centurion modernization. The paper concluded that the government should buy 128 Leopard 1s, and negotiate to dispose of the Centurion fleet through KM.15

Cabinet was prepared to accept this recommendation, and there was a minimum of discussion on the matter. The foreign minister, Allan MacEachen, sent a message from Europe that he was being criticized by NATO allies for the recent cancellation of a major Canadian procurement program for a long range patrol aircraft, and wanted to deflect this with a firm statement on Canada’s plans for new tanks for its forces in Central Europe. Most ministers were sympathetic, but did not want
to prejudice negotiations with KM. Trudeau was adamant that the “…final decision on procurement of the Leopard be subject to the successful conclusion of iron-clad undertakings on the part of the suppliers, particularly with respect to offsets [Industrial Regional Benefits].” Cabinet agreed that the military could purchase 128 *Leopards* and loan thirty-five tanks as an interim measure, and sent word to MacEachen that he could announce this decision to NATO allies.16

National Defence wanted to finalize the deal by late-September, and guarantee that it could squeeze its order in before KM geared up to produce *Leopard 2* s for the German Army.17 The negotiations took place at KM’s main plant during the summer shutdown, and every report on the negotiation from multiple government offices noted that it went smoothly, and that there was a cordial relationship between the Canadians and the Germans. In a report, Hampson commented: “They [KM] negotiated as very tough and knowledgeable businessmen, but once an agreement was reached the firms were dedicated to achieving [sic] their contract obligations.”18 Deputy Project Manager Mac Campbell stated that there was real trust between the Canadians and Germans as they negotiated during KM’s summer shutdown, and there were no significant problems. The Canadians were impressed by the company’s professionalism and their intimate knowledge of the vehicle, and could talk directly to the firm’s design and engineering staff.19 The negotiations were completed by 6 August 1976,20 and the contract was signed on 12 October 1976.21

The first German rental tanks, *Leopard 1A2s*, started arriving in late-1976, and the full complement of thirty-five had arrived by April 1977.22 The Germans scrounged for tanks to equip the Canadians, even taking some from a training range in Wales, and in all supplied thirty-two gun tanks, two recovery tanks, and one bridgelayer. The total cost of the rental of thirty-five tanks for roughly two years was $2.7 million, a bargain price that basically covered the cost of inspecting and repairing the tanks after the Canadians had returned them.23 When the 1A2s started arriving, Clive Milner, Commanding Officer of Canada’s armoured regiment in Europe, the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCDs), recalled that he asked Technical Services in Ottawa to translate the *Leopard* manuals. They responded that it would take two years. The army obviously could not wait this long, so the RCDs sent some officers to the German Armoured School in Münster in October 1976 to develop training materials and an instructor cadre for the rest of the unit. An officer named Harry Mohr was instrumental in helping the regiment adapt to the Leopards.24 His parents were Sudeten Germans who had immigrated with him in 1956 when he was eleven, so Mohr could speak German, and he and some other soldiers literally cut and pasted from the German manuals as they developed materials to train Canadian troops, and developed adaptation courses in gunnery, driving and maintenance, communications, and also a course for crew commanders.25 The Canadians ran these courses in January 1977, and the training was rushed, but it worked, and the brigade was operational with the rental *Leopards* in mid-1977.

In the rental agreement, there was a usage limit of 1450 kilometres imposed for gun tanks for the first year, and 1200 for subsequent years, and these were well in excess of the *Centurion*’s capabilities.26 The turret and crew compartment of the *Leopard* was smaller than the *Centurion*, but it was almost twice as fast.27 The *Centurion* retained its edge in armour, but this had made the tank so heavy that it could not cross some bridges, and its tracks would rip up the asphalt on roads. Milner also noted that the brigade’s tactics changed, and that the infantry in armoured personnel carriers did not have to wait for the slow *Centurions* to catch up. He stated that the transition was “like going from a Beetle to a Porsche.”28 The *Leopard* was also much easier to maintain. An engine change on the *Centurion* could take up to forty-eight hours, but Terry Seeley noted that a good crew could change an engine on a *Leopard* in fourteen minutes.29 This might have been a
The first Canadian Leopard C1 tank being driven off the production line in Germany by Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Hampson, 29 June 1978. Major D. Henderson stands in the background.

The first Canadian Leopard C1 tank outside at the handover ceremony, 29 June 1978. Left to right, Major D. Henderson, Major Terry Seeley, and then-Lieutenant-Colonel Clive Millner of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, and then-Brigadier-General Jim Fox.

record, the reliability and ease of maintenance of the Leopard were dramatic improvements over the Centurion.30 The Leopard engine also used diesel fuel, not gas like the Centurion, so it was easier to get fuel from German or American stocks.31

The first batch of Leopard C1s rolled off KM’s lines in July 1978, and arrived at Gagetown in August 1978, where they replaced Canada’s last Centurions still being used for training.32 The school sent driving and maintenance instructors to the RCDs in Germany, and some gunnery instructors went to a NATO armour school in Belgium.33 There were some wrinkles, and the manuals needed to be completely rewritten. The driving and maintenance manual took eight months to produce, and had to be written into “Canadianese,” and the French manual was also difficult. They did this work in-house at the school.34 In the interim, they relied upon manuals developed during the rental period and Australian manuals,35 but they were still not completed by the time the Project Management Office for the Leopard closed in 1981.36 However, this was a
small problem in the grand scheme of the purchase, and once the crews and instructors had adapted to the tank, things ran smoothly. The tanks at Gagetown were run nearly twenty-four hours a day upon arrival, and there was fear of wearing them out.37

The Canadians in Europe received their first C1s in late-1978, and returned the rentals, four at a time, as the new tanks came in. The two-year rental of the Leopard 1A2s was good training and preparation for the arrival of the C1s, and the army put the new tanks through their paces with two major exercises in late-1979.38 The introduction was smooth, and unlike some other pieces of equipment, the Leopard 1s were fully operational upon delivery.39 The major differences between the rental 1A2s and the C1s were a larger turret with spaced armour, and the Belgian SABCA fire control system with a laser range-finder. The SABCA was the most advanced system in service on Leopard tanks, and it was accurate and quick.40 It had seven sensors which accounted for wind speed or temperature and automatically adjusted the gun,41 but it suffered from some teething problems. In one instance, the system did not account for the heat expansion of the turret during repeated firing, and at long distances, rounds would miss just long of their targets.42 On sunny days in the summer, the top of the gun barrel would droop slightly because of the heat, and rounds would miss just below the target.43 These unanticipated problems were common to all nations which used the SABCA system,44 and after some consultation with the manufacturer, they were resolved.

Despite these problems, the arrival of the Leopard was a morale booster. Its major advantages over the Centurion were its speed and reliability, and an army report from 1982 noted: “The mechanical performance of the fleet to date has been good and is an outstanding improvement over the Centurion.”45 Colonel Hampson noted that personnel worked overtime to make the introduction a success, and maintenance, logistics, and training personnel had a hard time keeping up with demand. Overall, eighty-seven Leopards were in Europe to equip a full regiment of tanks with war stocks, thirty-one went to Canadian Forces Base Gagetown for training, and the remainder were distributed across Canada at other schools and facilities.46

The Germans had also established what was called the “Leopard Club,” an organization for the exchange of information on training, logistics, operational use, and improvements by nations that operated the tank. Three major sub-groups of the Leopard Club – Combat Improvement, Training, and Logistics – would meet twice a year at meetings coordinated by the Germans.37 Canada joined the Leopard Club in early 1977,48 and these meetings produced reams of technical data. This kind of detailed discussion allowed the army to quickly resolve many problems and adopt the best practices from other countries, and the army saw the Leopard Club as being very beneficial.49

The Leopard Club also facilitated the supply of spare parts and repairs for the Leopard fleet. Each year, member nations would submit their requests for spare parts and rebuild assemblies to the German Ministry of Defence, and the Germans would make spare parts available for pick-up at their supply depots. The Canadians in Europe picked up their spare parts at a German army depot at Herbolzheim, eight miles from the major base at Lahr. Canada joined this arrangement in 1977, and the only wrinkle was that the Canadians needed longer lead times for spare parts for the Leopard fleet in Canada, which would take time to arrive by sea.50

The final feature of the purchase was offsets, or Industrial Regional Benefits. Trudeau had emphasized this in Cabinet, and the procurement of the Leopard C1 was the first major Canadian procurement program to require foreign contractors to spend a proportion of the contract’s value in Canada. Despite KM’s hesitation, the Canadians secured contractual obligations for KM to spend 40 percent of the contract’s value in Canada within ten years, and best efforts to get to 60 percent. The criteria were entirely quantitative, and there were no requirements for licence production of parts or assemblies in Canada or technology transfers. Only manufactured products counted as offsets, although some semi-processed materials were acceptable. The value of the offset was determined by the Canadian content of the product, whether it was labour, raw materials or transportation. KM negotiated the provision that any purchases by its holdings or associated companies would count against the offset targets, as long as there was some proof that it occurred because of the efforts of the contractor.51 The costs for administering the offset program amounted to roughly $1.3 million, which were folded into the price of each vehicle.52

In the summer of 1976, representatives from KM’s sub-contractors visited Canada to canvas possible Canadian companies for offsets, and returned in December. They showed interest in electronics, as well as fine castings and wood products, but none of these purchases was likely to be directly related to the production of the Leopard. By January 1978, KM had $19 million worth of orders in Canada, of which $10 million had been backed up by formal contracts, and this represented 28 percent of the commitment.53 By November 1979, it had met 40.5 percent of the total offset commitment,54 and four years after the contract was signed, KM had reached 54 percent of their obligation for offsets in the ten year period.55 Most of the money went to Ontario and Quebec for manufactured components. Therefore, in May 1980, the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce sponsored a trip for sixteen representatives from twelve German firms to show off Canadian companies from the Maritimes and the West. By 1982, KM was close to the requirement, and had spent 32 percent of the entire contract value in Canada.56

Although the Canadians received a new tank on time and under budget, there was some criticism that Canada was getting an old tank. It was true that Canada got some of the last Leopard 1s to be produced, and the generation of tanks fielded by allies in the early-1980s, the M1 Abrams, Leopard 2, and the Challenger, were significantly better than the Leopard 1. The Soviets also improved their armoured forces, and factories in the Urals continued to churn out new and improved tanks. In the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, critics continually pressed military officers and the Minister of National Defence (MND), James Richardson, then his successor Barney Danson, as to why Canada had purchased the Leopard when allies were on the cusp of introducing new tanks with larger guns.57 In December 1975, Andrew Brewin, defence critic for the
New Democrats, asked Dextraze if it would not be better to refit the Centurion, and buy a state-of-the-art tank ten years down the road, rather than buying the Leopard 1. The general responded with some home-spun wisdom. He said: “My father used to say, wait for two years and you will get a much better car; when the two years were up he would say, wait another two years because it’s going to be even better then.”

General Dextraze and the army knew that the window of opportunity, both fiscal and political, might not be open for long.

Conclusions

This imperative set the stage for a successful procurement. Canada’s allies demanded a serviceable tank and would not wait ten years for something better, and although the Centurion had given a good account of itself, it was finished. The army’s initial interest in a rebuilt Centurion was warranted, and the Israelis had used them effectively in combat, but it was clear after closer inspection that standardization with allies would greatly simplify supply, and the project team’s choice of KM’s Leopard was effective. The company had produced thousands of these tanks since 1965 for various customers, and Canada effectively bought “off-the-shelf.” There were few major alterations to the vehicle, and consequently little technical risk with the project, and very little cost fluctuation – the army’s estimate for the tanks was $110,099,500.00, and the actual cost was $114,010,700.00.

The Germans were also accommodating at all levels of government, industry, and military. They did their best to ensure that the purchase moved along quickly, and did not take advantage of the Canadians, despite being the sole source. The government and army helped the Canadians with the bargain price for rental tanks, and ensured that the Canadians were trained, and had enough spare parts and maintenance knowledge to keep the tanks running. The maintenance of NATO’s vitality was a priority for the Germans, and it is no surprise that they helped the Canadians after Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made it a priority in discussions with Prime Minister Trudeau.

The fundamental reason for the success of the purchase, however, was its clear and unambiguous political support. In many analyses of procurement, there is the criticism that politics, whether in the form of favouritism with contractors, or arbitrary decisions made without regard for professional military advice, makes acquisitions more costly and endangers soldiers in the field. This was not the case with the Leopard, where politics was not a liability, but an asset. Trudeau did not want to buy the tank, but he had been convinced that they were necessary to facilitate Canada’s broader foreign policy objectives, so there was no doubt that the army would get tanks, and get them quickly. Although General Dextraze carved out a place for the Leopard in the defence budget, he could do little without the prime minister’s approval. No project, however necessary or well-managed, can prevail against a sceptical Cabinet or prime minister who do not see the political utility of major projects. The Leopard C1 had this support, however begrudging, and when combined with the wise choice of a proven, in-service vehicle and accommodating contractor, it proved to be one of the more successful procurements of the Cold War.
NOTES

9. Mac Campbell, telephone interview with author, 6 December 2013, confirmed in e-mail message, 18 January 2014 (hereafter referred to as Mac Campbell).
12. Larry Brownrigg, interview with author, 12 August 2013.
19. Mac Campbell.
31. Terry Seeley.
34. Bill Coupland, e-mail message to author, 20 January 2014 (hereafter referred to as Bill Coupland).
37. Bill Coupland.
38. Jim Fox, telephone interview with the author, 12 August 2013, confirmed in e-mail message to author, 29 January 2014.
42. John Marteinson and Michael McNorgan, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History (Toronto: Published by The Canadian Royal Armoured Corps Association in cooperation with the Canadian War Museum, 2000), p. 387.
43. Darrell Dean, telephone interview with the author, 23 May 2014 (hereafter referred to as Darrell Dean).
46. Ibid., p. 25.
50. National Defence to Treasury Board, “Authority to Enter into an Agreement,” 10 March 1977, File 1180-120L8, Part 2, RG24, Accession 1977-98/625, Box 244, LAC.
53. Hampson, Leopard Briefing 1978.
54. Hampson, Leopard Briefing 1979.
57. See the testimony on 13 May 1976, 29 November 1976, 1 December 1976, 17 May 1977, 2007-11, Boxes 6 and 7, DHH. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 1 December 1975, File 7, 2007-11, Box 6, DHH.
An AK-47 assault rifle can be purchased for between $10-$300, depending upon where you are in the world. As a result of its relative cheapness and extreme durability, there are an estimated 75-100 million AK-47s worldwide—one for one-in-every-60 of the world’s population. Assuming the entire world military expenditure for 2014 was spent on $300 AK-47s, it would be enough to purchase around 6 billion rifles—one for nearly every person on the globe. With global military expenditures rising yearly, the governments of the world are not only purchasing AK-47s but also tanks, fixed wing aircraft, attack helicopters, submarines, aircraft carriers and a plethora of other weapons platforms. Nearly every country has increased its military spending since 1990, including democracies—and that includes Canada. Democracies consistently spend huge amounts on defence while actually devoting only a small percentage of their GDP to defence. Autocracies on the other hand, devote larger percentages of their GDP to defence, while generally spending small amounts overall. This difference in spending habits between regime types prompts the question: does regime type determine the nature of a state’s defence spending?

Since autocracies require a large military to maintain control and to deter uprisings, it has already been established that they often spend more as a percentage of GDP on defence. However, if autocracies spend such a large percentage of their GDP on defence, why is it that they still spend so little overall? This leads to the first part of my hypothesis that autocracies will have a lower GDP growth rate and will spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defence than democracies. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that autocracies will have more of a focus on the military as a control measure, and less of a focus upon economic growth through trade or international cooperation.

Democracies, on the other hand, gain more from spending on social services and building trade, rather than spending on defence. This is because democratic regimes maintain power by keeping citizens happy through economic growth, and cannot resort to violent repression. Therefore, the second part of my hypothesis is that democracies will spend less as a percentage of their GDP, but more overall on defence. The rationale behind this is that since democracies focus upon economic growth, their economies are capable of huge output. Given this, my hypothesis is that autocratic regimes will spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defence than democratic regimes, but democratic regimes will have higher GDP growth than autocratic regimes, and higher overall spending.

The initial question I had before writing this article was, why do democracies spend so much of defence, if democracies are supposed to be peaceful? However, by researching more into the democratic peace theory, I found that my understanding of that theory was wrong. Democracies are, in fact, often as violent as autocracies, and have fought many wars—just never with other established democracies. Kant built his argument for democratic peace on three elements, also known as the “Kantian Triangle of Peace.” These three elements build the basis for why democracies do not fight other democracies. They are “republican constitutions, ‘cosmopolitan law’ embodied in free trade and economic interdependence, and international law and organizations.” Essentially, democracies do not fight other democracies because there is no longer a distinction between “us” and “them.” Instead, the two states
see a far larger benefit to economic relations and international co-operation, and a disadvantage in going to war. Furthermore, Kant argued that as democracy spread, defence spending would decrease since states would no longer need to fear their neighbors. Assuming that the way in which a government allocates GDP indicates importance, Kant theorized that as democracy spread, states would be less inclined to spend on defence. This is because he believed defence spending would be viewed as less important than social services, health care, and education. Based upon this reasoning, a state that spends a large percentage of GDP on defence would place a large importance on the military. Instead of military strength, a democratic government will pursue economic growth, and thus satisfy the second element of the Kantian triangle of peace through the emphasis on free trade and economic interdependence by democracies. As a byproduct of economic growth, however, democracies can get away with spending only a small percentage of their massive GDP on defence, since a small percentage can translate into billions of dollars. What these factors come down to is essentially a method of staying in power. An autocracy will use military strength to stay in power, whereas a democracy will use economic growth as a way of keeping voters happy and staying in power.

Aside from the democratic peace theory, I could also have examined defence spending in relation to external threat, and in relation to alliances or multilateral security. However the relationship between regime type and defence spending is less prevalent in these theories, and has already been examined by University of Mississippi professor, Jeff Carter and Pennsylvania State University professor, Glenn Palmer. Another option I considered was the use of case studies related to a few specific states. However, I believe using a large dataset and looking for statistical relationships will provide a clearer answer to my hypothesis. Seeing as the democratic peace theory is being considered “…perhaps the most influential domestic level framework in analyzing world politics, and the theories of how societies divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them,’”6 I concluded that it would be the best theory for analyzing if regime type determines the nature of a state’s defence spending.

The democratic peace theory is perhaps one of the most controversial and heavily researched theories in politics. Dating back to 1795, it was initially proposed by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who theorized that democracies are less likely to go to war than any other regime type.7 In major revisions by American international relations scholars Michael Doyle and Spencer Weart, the theory has changed and now proposes that
democracies will fight a different regime type quite willingly, but will almost never wage war on another democracy. Many other studies have been conducted on the credibility of the theory, including those by prominent political scientists, such as Stuart Bremer and Robert Ivie. Rather than focus upon the democratic peace theory as a whole, I will focus more upon the literature pertaining to regime type and defence spending.

Research regarding the relationships between regime type and military spending has only really become a topic of interest over the past two or three decades. Perhaps this is due to the new understanding of the democratic peace theory, or as an effort to explain post-Cold War military spending trends. Regardless, the literature with respect to the determinants of defence spending and regime type is substantial. Studies into regime type and defence spending have found, for the most part, that Kant’s theory holds water. Democracies do, in fact, devote fewer resources to their militaries than autocracies. However, it is unclear if regime type is the strongest factor in determining this relationship. William Nordhaus, John Oneal, and Bruce Russett, a trio of American political scientists who have published a number of articles together on the Democratic Peace Theory, explore this question of causation in a study. Their study found that external security threats have a far larger implication on defence spending than does regime type. Other American political scientists have also examined the topic, including Carter and Palmer, who studied the role of external security threats in order to find patterns of defence spending among different regime types based on times of war and peace. This study focused more upon the economics of mobilization, regime type, and interstate war; finding that non-democratic regimes are more equipped to mobilize for war than democratic regimes. This perhaps indicates that autocratic regimes place a higher importance on the ability to use their military, and thus are willing to invest more.

In terms of a comparison between regime types and percentage of GDP spent on defence, a study by a British academic, Jennifer Brauner, found that democracies do, in fact, spend less than autocracies as a percentage of GDP and that there was a causal relationship between regime type and military spending. The data examined in this study, however, did not go beyond the year 2000, and unlike my article, did not look to find a relationship with GDP growth. Brauner also mentions in her literature review that her study is the first that she is aware of to examine the causational relationship between regime type and defence spending as a percentage of GDP.

In terms of literature regarding regime type and GDP growth, there is also a substantial body of work. Unlike literature regarding regime type and defence spending however, the studies in this area are far less conclusive. A 1993 study by the respected and award winning political scientist, Adam Przeworski, determined that “…we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth. All we can offer at this moment are some educated guesses.” Similarly a 224-page study by Taiwanese political scientist
Dr. Chin-en Wu on the topic found that regime type did encourage certain economic behaviors and that overall, democracies tended to be more prosperous. However, results were far from conclusive. In a comprehensive 529-page study on regime type and economic growth, the highly published Norwegian academic, Carl Knutsen, essentially concluded there are too many factors at play and that there are too many outliers to draw any conclusions regarding regime type and economic growth. On the other hand, a study by prominent Bonn University professor, Erich Weede, found democratic regimes may have a detrimental effect on economic growth. There is currently a study underway at Stanford University investigating the relationship. However, the website description admits the difficulty in finding substantial results as, “…for every high-growth authoritarian regime like China there are authoritarian economic disasters like Zimbabwe.”

Other studies of note include a study by University of Macedonia professor, Nikolaos Dritsakis, which looked to determine if there was a relationship between defence spending and economic growth, using the examples of Greece and Turkey. The study hypothesized that high defence spending would indicate good economic growth. However, it found no relationship between the two variables. This study varied from my own in that it used a more economically-focused view, and only examined two states, with no consideration of regime type. Another study referenced herein is a study by the prominent American political scientist, Ethan Kapstein, which examined the relationship between economics and security studies and built a case for a stronger emphasis upon economics within the field of security studies.

Through this literature review, it is clear that my study fits within a very contemporary and changing field of research, with most prominent sources being written over the last ten-to-twenty years. It is clear, through examination of the existing literature, that regime type and defence spending have an established causal relationship. However, the relationship between regime type and GDP growth lacks conclusions. In terms of how I am connecting the three variables, I was unable to find any literature, thus giving me the opportunity to possibly extend this field of study.

Discussion

In my analysis, I used data from 131 countries for the year 2013. The data I used covered five variables: regime type, percentage of GDP spent on defence, total government spending on defence, percentage of total government expenditure spent on defence, and GDP growth. I tested all the data in pairs in order to determine if there was any correlation. I then used the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient Table to analyze the results. By doing this, I was able to determine whether any correlation relationship I found was significant, and if so, to what degree it was significant. I chose the method of statistical analysis since it gives not only an indication if a relationship exists, but also how strong the relationship is. As well, since my topic is rooted in statistics, it made the most sense out of all the quantitative methods. The inherent difficulty in any relationship is differentiating correlation and causation. In this article, I will only be looking for correlation, and will be discussing any given relationship without searching for causation.

The data I used for regime type was taken from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World country ratings. The data is measured in two categories on a scale from one to seven. The two categories are Political Rights and Civil Liberties, and together, the two categories are combined to rank states as Free, Partially Free, and Not Free. For my research, I used only the raw data for political rights. I chose to only use the one set of data, since the two categories reflected essentially the same scores, and correlating with both Political Rights and Civil Liberties would have been redundant. I used the Freedom House’s data since the seven point scale provided a simple data set, yet still included enough variation for distinct score differences to exist between regimes. The scale ranked the most free states with a score of one and the least free states with a score of seven. Through these scores, I determined which states could be considered democratic or autocratic.
The data for percentage GDP spent on defence, total defence spending and percentage of government expenditure dedicated to defence was all taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) data set regarding armaments, disarmaments, and security. As mentioned earlier, the variable of percentage GDP spent on defence is important, because it indicates the degree of necessity placed by a regime upon the military. The variable of total defence spending indicates a state’s military capability, and a state’s economic capability for output. I also included the variable for percentage of a government’s budget dedicated to defence as a second piece of data, indicating the necessity placed upon the military by a regime. The difficulty in researching the topic of defence spending is that data is sometimes unavailable or unreliable for many states. As a result, a number of states had to be removed from the data that I used, since no defence spending data was given, most of these states being autocratic regimes. As well, some of the data included was either created through SIPRI estimates, or highly uncertain. These data scores are indicated in blue and red respectively on the data table. In order to analyze the data further, I also conducted all the correlations in two different sets; one with the USA included and the other without. I chose to do this since the USA represents a huge outlier in overall defence spending, as it spends as much on defence as the next nine states in succession.

The fifth variable is GDP growth, and it was retrieved from a dataset provided by the World Bank. The importance of GDP growth indicates whether or not a state is growing economically, and by how much it is growing. The reason I chose this variable was based on my hypothesis that democracies will have larger economic growth than autocracies and that democracies will use this large growth as a method to stay in power. The reason I chose GDP growth rather than overall GDP was because I believe GDP growth gives a better view of a state’s economic health. GDP growth indicates that citizens’ standard of living is increasing and that citizens are employed, meaning, in accordance with my hypothesis, that they were satisfied with the government in power. For example, a state such as Greece that has experienced negative GDP growth over the past few years, has also experienced huge political turmoil. The dataset from the World Bank was fairly comprehensive. However, it lacked data for a few states that had to be removed from the dataset as well.

Figures 1 and 2 show the correlation data found through a series of data correlations. The data used in Figure 1 included the USA where as Figure 2 did not do so. Between Figure 1 and 2, there are a number of differences. However, they are less dramatic than I expected. Due to the overall similarity between the two sets of results, I used the data from Figure 1 in constructing any graphs, since it includes the complete data set. I will, however, discuss Figure 2 later in the article.

The results reflected in Figure 3 show a strong relationship that supports the conclusions made by the Brauner study that autocracies do, in fact, spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defence. This finding, therefore, was not a surprise, and it provided support for the first part of my hypothesis that autocracies will spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defence than do democracies. There are a number of interesting outliers in these results, including Israel and the USA, that rank highest among the Level 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>% GDP on Defence</th>
<th>Total Defence Spending</th>
<th>% Govt Spending on Defence</th>
<th>GDP Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% GDP on Defence</td>
<td>0.43***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Defence Spending</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Govt Spending on Defence</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

Figure 1 – Statistical Analysis Results for Regime Type, Percentage of GDP Spent on Defence, Total Defence Spending, Percentage of Total Government Spending and GDP growth. (Dataset includes USA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>% GDP on Defence</th>
<th>Total Defence Spending</th>
<th>% Govt Spending on Defence</th>
<th>GDP Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% GDP on Defence</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Defence Spending</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Govt Spending on Defence</td>
<td>0.50***</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

Figure 2 – Statistical Analysis for Regime Type, Percentage of GDP Spent on Defence, Total Defence Spending, Percentage of Total Government Spending and GDP Growth (Dataset without USA)
Regimes. Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan were also outliers with ranks of first, second, and third respectively among the Level 6 regimes. Although not unexpected as outliers, the degree by which these states outrank their counterparts is interesting. Interestingly, there are also no outstanding Level 7 regimes.

As expected in Figure 4, the variable for percentage of total government expenditure spent on defence and regime type reflected the same findings as percentage GDP spent on defence and regime type. However in this relationship, there were far more outliers and a slightly stronger correlation. As in Figure 3, states such as Israel, Oman, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia can be easily identified as the highest spenders in their respective categories. However, this relationship brought out other states not significant in Figure 3. This included prominent Level 4 regimes, such as Singapore at 20.5%, and Pakistan at 16.2%. Also prominent in the Level 5 category were Armenia at 15.8%, and Sri Lanka at 14.2%. Another interesting note, as in Figure 3, is the lack of high spending Level 7 regimes...
As expected in Figure 5, the USA was an extreme outlier in overall defence spending, dedicating an astounding $600 billion in the examined year. Other prominent states included China, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that the USA spends more than the next top nine defence spenders combined, no significant correlation was found between regime type and overall defence spending. I found this surprising, since I expected democratic regimes to correlate with higher overall spending. This finding goes against my hypothesis that democratic regimes will be correlated with more spending. Even with the USA removed, no substantial correlation existed connecting regime type and overall spending in any direction.

As seen in Figure 6, the relationship between regime type and GDP growth did not support my hypothesis. Rather than democracies having the highest GDP growth, many had the lowest. Overall, the data was very widespread, and I was surprised, despite the wide spread, by the strength of the correlation found between autocratic regimes and GDP growth. This finding is the opposite of what I expected. The states with the largest GDP
growth were Paraguay (Level 2), Liberia (Level 3), Kyrgyzstan (Level 6), and Ethiopia (Level 6), none of which were significant in any other category.

In the clearest results against my hypothesis, Figure 7 shows the lack of any substantial correlation between percentage of GDP spent on defence and GDP growth. If these results had supported my hypothesis, I would have expected to see a clear grouping slanting down from the top left corner to the bottom right. However, these results show no relationship.

Although my research did not support my hypothesis, it did offer some interesting insight into what determines the nature of a state’s defence spending. My findings that autocracies spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defence match the findings of Brauner, as well as those of Fordham and Walker, and Yildirim and Sezgin. My research also supported Nordhaus, Oneal, and Russett in the finding that external security threats play a very important role in determining defence spending. Although I did not statistically prove this support, by looking at the highest spenders, an interesting common denominator can be found in an external security threat. For example, states such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, and Armenia, which all have major external security threats, all placed high in both percentage of GDP spent on defence, and percentage of total government expenditure spent on defence. Similarly, states in the midst of warfare, such as Afghanistan, the USA, Pakistan, and Colombia, all spent a fairly large percentage of their total government expenditure on defence.

My research, however, did not support Fordham and Walker, and Yildirim and Sezgin in the findings that democracies devote fewer resources to defence than other regime types. That said, this discrepancy is due to the fact that both studies used percentage of GDP spent on defence as their measure for resource allocation. I find this problematic, since a country such as Oman can allocate a larger percentage than the USA, but allocate fewer resources, due to a huge difference in GDP size. Although autocracies devote a larger percentage of GDP and government expenditure, there was no indication they contributed more overall. The correlation for this data, in fact, proved very low, and was very heavily influenced by ‘heavy spenders,’ such as the USA and China. Even when I removed the USA and China from the dataset, only a small correlation of -0.10 existed in favor of more democratic regimes spending more overall. This finding surprised me, seeing as the top ten defence spenders account for a huge percentage of total defence spending, and they are all ranked Level 1 or 2 regimes, except China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.

Another interesting finding was the absence of any prominent Level 7 regimes other than China. As the most autocratic, I assumed these states would have ranked high in percentage of GDP spent on defence and percentage of government expenditure spent on defence. However, they failed to stand out in any way. One possible reason for this is the lack of available data for these states. Seeing as the large majority of states removed from the dataset, due to lack of data, were Level 6 and 7 regimes, my results were undoubtedly affected. Although there were also Level 1 and 2 states with unavailable data, I can only assume that states such as Syria, Sudan, or North Korea will outspend states, such as Mongolia and Iceland.

![Figure 7 – Percentage of GDP Spent on Defence and GDP Growth](image)
Between the two data sets on percentage of GDP percentage spent on defence and percentage of government expenditure spent on defence, there was a very strong correlation of 0.89. Although similar, I found the data with respect to percentage of government expenditure spent on defence gave a far more varied and insightful display of the data. Percentage of GDP spent on defence is widely accepted as a primary measure for defence spending. However, based upon my results, I would argue that percentage of total government expenditure provides a better analysis and perspective on outliers and on states for which the military is of high importance.

In relation to the minimal impact of the USA on the data, I can only attribute this to the fact that the USA is only outstanding in its overall defence spending since it spends a low 3.8% of its GDP on defence, and an unremarkable 10% of its total government expenditure on defence.

In my hypothesis, I attempted to relate the nature of defence spending with a method for a regime to maintain power. Based upon my findings, I believe there is a relationship between autocracies maintaining power by spending on the military. However it appears as though there is no relationship between democracies, high GDP growth and low percentage of GDP spending on defence. Although many democracies spent only a small percentage of their GDP on defence, these states did not necessarily have high GDP growth. I believe this points to a fundamental error in my choice of variables. Although as mentioned in my methods section, I chose GDP growth as a variable since it better portrays economic health, it proved ineffective in gauging the health of a state as a whole. By using GDP growth, established democratic states such as the USA, France, Germany, and Canada stood no chance in ranking high since with huge existing GDPS, any GDP growth as a percentage is extremely hard to attain. On the other hand, tiny underdeveloped states, such as Liberia, Moldova, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Congo could experience huge rises in GDP growth while actually growing very minimally, due to tiny existing GDPS. As a result, some of the most underdeveloped and authoritarian states exemplified large GDP growth since GDP growth is based upon GDP size, and not actual output. Therefore, it would be interesting to change the variable of GDP growth to total GDP size and make the argument that it is overall GDP size that makes citizens happy and content with government, and not GDP growth. However, as determined by Knutsen, making any kind of connection between regime type and GDP size or growth is extremely difficult, since there are so many factors at play. Furthermore, to make the argument that citizens are content with a government as long as there is a large GDP is extremely naïve, and it fails to take into account the larger scope of study, which is comparative politics.

Through my research, it is clear that the determinants of defence spending rely upon far more than regime type and economic growth. The one clear relationship I found was with respect to autocratic regimes spending a high percentage of their GDP on defence. This is a result that leads to the conclusion that autocracies value their militaries highly in order to repress internal strife and to deter external interference. However, no such clear-cut relationship exists in relation to democratic regime defence spending. Although, as expected, democratic regimes spent less as a percentage of their GDP, there was no relationship between democratic regimes and large overall spending, nor between democratic regimes and high GDP growth. In fact, autocratic regimes were found to have a fairly strong correlation with GDP growth. However, there are far too many outliers and external factors to deem this relationship anything more than a statistical anomaly. The largest limitation in my data was the lack of defence spending and GDP growth data for all regimes, which undoubtedly affected my results.

There are many directions that research on this topic could go in the future. In specific relation to this research, it would be interesting to replace the variable of GDP growth with GDP size or GDP per capita. It would also be interesting to examine individual states and their unique determinates to defence spending. Oman for example, ranked highest on percentage of GDP spent on defence at 11.5%, and highest in percentage of total government expenditure spent on defence at an astounding 27.4%. Other states, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Singapore, also could provide interesting examples. Further regional analysis in areas such as the Middle East and South-East Asia would also be interesting, since these areas have seen huge spikes in defence spending since the year 2000. Similar to the study done by Dritsakis, the relationship between GDP growth and defence spending could be examined over a longer period of time to determine if defence spending creates economic growth through the military-industrial complex. However a study of such nature would have to take a more economics-based approach, rather than a comparative politics basis.

In terms of defence spending, Canada, unsurprisingly, remains hidden in the larger “pack” of states, including many of our allies, such as Spain and Australia. Overall, Canadian defence spending has been slowly increasing from a low of $14 billion in 1997, to a recent high of $22.9 billion in 2009. However, in percentage of GDP spent on defence, Canada has been consistently decreasing steadily, and is now approximately half of what it was in 1990. The 2013 percentage of GDP allotted to the Canadian military totaled 1.01%, half the NATO recommendation of 2% GDP. The global increases in defence spending combined with this decrease prompts a number of questions as to how Canada will be prepared for the future, and how we will be able to interact with our allies in the future.
Conclusion

Although my hypothesis was not proven to be true, I do not believe it has any implications with respect to the credibility of the Kantian Triangle of Peace. In my results regarding percentage of GDP spent on defence, the Kant’s Triangle was supported, since it was clear democracies placed a lower importance on the military in favour of other spending areas. I believe this finding is far more critical to supporting Kant’s Triangle than the lack of results in my hypothesis are to discrediting it. As seen through the SIPRI annual report, it is clear that defence spending is rising worldwide. Understanding why and how states spend on defence will increasingly be a crucial field of study as long as this trend continues. Although states may look to buy AK-47s, tanks, and aircraft, perhaps understanding why states feel the need to invest in these items could lead to a better understanding on how to reduce worldwide defence spending. And in doing so, we may be able to avoid a situation in which the 75 million AK-47s in the world become 750 million AK-47s.

“Although states may look to buy AK-47s, tanks, and aircraft, perhaps understanding why states feel the need to invest in these items could lead to a better understanding on how to reduce worldwide defence spending.”
NOTES


5. Fordham and Walker, p. 141.


7. Weart, p. 3.


China’s Re-emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations in the Contemporary Era

by Kurtis Simpson

Kurtis H. Simpson has been conducting research on China’s leadership, Communist Party politics, the People’s Liberation Army and foreign policy for over 30 years. After receiving a scholarship to study in Nanjing following the ‘Tiananmen Massacre’ of 1989, he completed both a Master’s Degree and a Ph.D at York University and commenced his professional career as an intelligence analyst at the Privy Council Office in 1997. He subsequently assumed leadership of the Asia Research Section at the Department of National Defence’s Chief Defence Intelligence (CDI) organization, and has filled numerous Director’s Positions in Transnational Relations, Global Issues, Policy, Programmes, and Personnel. He has published over 100 largely classified assessments, articles, and conference proceedings, and has served as the Head of Delegation abroad for the Canadian government. Dr. Simpson has recently been named a Centre Director with Defence Research and Development Canada.

Introduction

China’s rising economic, political and military power is the most geopolitically significant development of the post-Cold War period. For some, America’s unipolar moment has passed, and the essential debates now focus on the rate and relativity of US hegemonic decline. In tandem with this, the question of can China rise peacefully must be considered? All such external preoccupations rest, however, on assumptions of continued economic growth and internal stability. The tipping point in both positive and negative scenarios alike in China is civilian-military (civ-mil) relations. This single factor is all determining, under-studied, and currently in a period of profound transition.

To date, the literature on civ-mil relations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is overly reductionist in its scope, simplifying relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to a single entity, built on dubious assumptions (for example, over-emphasizing the reach and control of the Party) and finally, prone to exaggerating some trends, most notably professionalization of the military, at the expense of others, including divided loyalties, the decentralization of power, and the endless political bargaining that now characterizes the relations between Party, military, and bureaucratic stakeholders.

The purpose of this article is threefold. It will first place civ-mil relations in a historical context, mapping fundamental transitional changes between the revolutionary period (1921-1949), the politicized era (1949-1976), and the modernization years (1976-2014). Second, it will highlight evolving trend lines in CCP-PLA relations, identifying emerging tensions. Third, it will provide a cursory assessment of early signals or indications of future friction points.
A critical review of civ-mil relations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) makes apparent that the military’s political power resources are increasing; a relationship of ‘conditional compliance’ now exists where the Party is required to negotiate with the PLA on key issues (whether it be funding increases, force development, or foreign policy priorities) for its continued support. As a result, the potential for fractures between the Party and PLA are increasingly possible during crises situations.

Prior to beginning with a historic examination of civilian-military relations in China, we need first to root our discussion in a viable theoretical framework, or model, in which to help organize the information/evidence being considered. As expansively covered by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip Saunders, perspectives on Chinese elite politics are relatively few in number,
and often period specific. Each is not without its limitations, but all have explanatory potential. Of growing relevance, however, is the bureaucratic politics approach, because not only does it easily incorporate the tenets of earlier schools (such as symbiosis, factionalism, and the Party control lens) it, moreover, best captures the PRC’s current political landscape of distributive power. In essence, since the 1978 economic reforms, the CCP’s receding ideological justification for rule, and varied rates of development in China’s 34 provinces, the country has increasingly witnessed ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,’ where the control of a paramount leader (such as Mao Zedong) is greatly reduced, a growing separation between the economic and political spheres more pronounced, and individual ‘pockets’ of authority—often the result of ‘factions’ within both the Party and the PLA—more evident. The end result of this is increased “bargaining” both between and within government and military apparatuses, a process which requires negotiations, exchanges, and consensus building. This type of interaction is strikingly different than that which first typified Party-PLA relations in the early revolutionary period.

**Party-PLA Relations during the Revolutionary Period (1921-1949)**

The CCP (founded in 1921) and the PLA (established in 1927) originally enjoyed a level of intimate interaction or ‘fusion’ typical of the militaries and revolutionaries coalescing in a united front, or common cause, to overthrow an existent political order. This pattern is well documented, and will only be briefly touched upon here. In short, where elites regularly circulate between military and non-military posts, a symbiotic relationship forms where ideas, authorities, allegiances and circles of interaction take root, fostering a common commitment and vision towards a desired end.
state. In the case of China, what is referred to as ‘symbiosis’ started in 1934-35 while the Communists were in retreat during “The Long March” period. As a consequence of this shared experience, close cooperation between military and civilian figures resulted in significant overlap in leadership roles, with key individuals (most notably Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) being dubbed “dual role elites.”

Up until the declaration of Chinese independence, the military was a major recruiter for the Party and a strict ratio of Party members to non-Party members among combat soldiers was upheld. They were, in a sense, two faces of the same organized elite. For many years, political leaders were also generals or political commissars in military units; the party and the army “…formed throughout their history a single institutional system, with a single elite performing simultaneously the functions of political and military leadership.” While in many respects effective and efficient, the merger of the military with the political, particularly absent of institutions, over time opened the door to significant infighting when differences arose, often ending in intensive ideological campaigns (such as the Great Leap Forward, 1958-1961), massive popular mobilizations, and widespread national unrest.

The Politicization of the PLA under Mao Zedong (1949-1976)

Upon assuming power, Chairman Mao Zedong early on turned to the military to champion and enable his ideas and to serve as his last line of defence. While less critical in the honeymoon period of the early-1950s, the PLA was increasingly drawn into the political realm, most notably during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a decade long period of social turmoil and populist furor spawned by the PRC’s senior most leaders. While beyond the scope of this article to discuss in any detail, the research of others chronicles how overtly enmeshed in politics the PLA became during this period, serving as a direct tool of Mao and his inner clique.

Unable to effectively mobilize radicals and students, in early January 1967, Mao and the Central Cultural Revolutionary Group (CCRG) ordered troops to ‘support the masses of the revolutionary left.’ As the campaign developed and became ever more chaotic over the following months, the army was subsequently directed to restore order, ultimately granting PLA members sweeping latitude to use any means necessary to reaffirm peace. In a fluid political situation, PLA members were pitted against the populace, who asserted they were acting as
directed by China’s leaders, forced to adjudicate between opposing interests, and autonomously resolve unrest all over the country with no rules of engagement, clear direction, or often even understanding of the context of a given problem as it varied dramatically throughout China depending on the parties involved, the interpretation of the ideological direction being followed, and the local agendas at play.

For more than a decade, the PLA was the only institution in the PRC still functioning. The military was decisive in both policy-making and determining power struggles on many levels. While the details remain opaque, in 1970-1971, military commanders were reportedly divided, with some supporting Marshal Lin Biao, Vice-Premier, in a purported counter-revolutionary coup d’état. Throughout the period, other incidents of intra-party conflict drew the military into non-military matters and significantly eroded earlier periods of harmonious symbiosis. With the death of Mao in 1976 and the rehabilitation of Deng, specific actions were undertaken to modernize the military and professionalize it. While successful on many fronts, these transformations have also not been without complications and unanticipated consequences.
Deng Xiaoping during the celebration of the 35th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, 1 October 1984.

Massive parade commemorating 70th anniversary of victory over Japan, 3 September 2015.
A New Focus on Modernization (1976-2012): Defining Trends

Increased Professionalization

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA has become a focal point for reform, improvement, and de-politicization. The armed forces were downsized from 4.5 million to 2.2 today. It is rapidly becoming a more modern force which is increasingly educated, better equipped, more regimented with retirements, selection and recruiting. Doctrinal adjustments are regularly made and announced in biannual Defence White Papers, moving the army along a continuum away from land based notions of “People’s War” to concepts like “Limited War under High Technology Conditions.”

Highlights of this trajectory include: professional military education; specialization in key knowledge sectors like cyber security; a primacy placed on science and technology; improved training and augmented technical skills; the integration and operation of more sophisticated military kit; improvements to command and control; and a focus upon combined joint operations.

Since 1997, China’s military budget has increased at double digit rates, with much of these augmentations going to offset higher salaries, better housing, and improved facilities. In 2014, official defence spending was published as USS 131.57 billion; the second largest in the world, and by some intelligence estimates, only half the actual number. Increased professionalism is, however, a two-edged sword. While on one level it removes the military from the daily entanglements of political life, it also promotes a greater sense of autonomy, corporateness, and a sense of responsibility to intervene if vital interests are threatened, coupled with the expertise to do, so should the occasion arise.

A Reduced Emphasis upon Political Work or Ideological Study

While exceptions to the rule exist (such as the immediate period following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre), military professionalization has generally resulted in less emphasis on political work and political education (relative to the time spent on military duties). The eroding foundations of Communist ideology are particularly of high impact on the military, as this calls directly into question the forces’ raison d’être—the promotion of Communist ideals through revolution and unqualified support of the Party. While Marxist ideology can still be invoked as required justification when needed, it is not treated in the sacrosanct manner it once was and this significantly reduces the ‘connective tissue’ seamlessly joining the party and the PLA.

The Growing Bifurcation of Elites

China’s transition into a developed country with a relatively modern military force has demanded a move away from “dual role elites” to streams of distinct and separate senior officials who no longer share similar backgrounds, work experiences, or career paths. Promoted according to functional area expertise, few common bonds (including formal educational experience, common technical knowledge, shared management history, and common political connections) join military professionals, Party leaders, and senior civil servants, as was once the case with their revolutionary predecessors. The implications of this are important. Common frames of reference do not currently exist, and the potential for miscommunication is high. Civilian leaders do not regularly interact with their military counterparts, and a general ignorance of military tactics, training, and procedures continues, which is not systematized through effective briefing channels.

In short, the growing bifurcation of elites impedes relationships built on trust as the distance between the military sphere and the political sphere lengths. In particular, varying perspectives on national security issues are increasingly evident.

Divided State-Party-Citizenship Loyalties

In China, theoretically, the Communist Party, state apparatus, and military are all distinct entities with formal authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities. In practice, the Party dominates all according to varying degrees through its membership, appointment routines, and sanctions. This too, however, is evolving. As China modernizes, power is becoming more decentralized, and the legitimacy of the Party (or lack thereof) is linked almost solely to the country’s economic performance. In fundamental respects, China’s legislature (or National People’s Congress) and its Standing Committee are now more appropriately serving an oversight function of the military. Directly linked to this is the NPC’s role in approving the military’s annual budget allocation. Once a ‘rubber-stamp’ process, this is less and less the case.

The emergence of a stronger state structure with ties to the military is fostering a duality of legally and administratively distinct centres (one state, one party) with which the PLA must successfully interact, each often sharing overlaps in membership, but at times competing and conflicting agendas. In short, where the Party provides guidance and direction, the state administers and implements policy on a day-to-day basis. The constitutional ambiguity of the military’s allegiance to the Party and the state potentially fosters conflictual loyalties, and challenges the asserted shorthand understanding that the Party and PLA are indivisible and the same. Moreover, the Army’s de facto loyalty to China’s citizenry is historically founded (hence the name “the People’s Liberation Army”), and when tested on 4 June 1989 [Tiananmen Square uprising in Beijing], manifested itself in command and control issues (troops in some cases would not fire on protestors). Long-standing damage to a relationship previously viewed by both sides as inviolable continues to this day, and many assert that even if ordered, such violent suppression would not happen again in light of this precedent and the fallout from it.

Internal Factionalism within the PLA

Paralleling divided loyalties between Chinese Party, military and government bodies, one must also recognize that within each, factions exist, based upon generational, personal, professional, geographic, or institutional allegiances. These minor fault lines are most pronounced during crises, and they continue
independent of professionalization. As was demonstrated by the civil-military dynamics of the Chinese government’s suppression of student demonstrators, both divisions and allegiances of interests emerged with respect to how to contain this situation and factional interests largely determined which troops would carry out the orders, who commanded them, what civilian Party leaders supported the actions, and who would be sanctioned following the mêlée. A consequence of factionalism within the PLA is that the Party’s control mechanisms (particularly because rule of law and constitutional restraints on the military are weak) needs to be robust to control not only a single military chain of command but (particularly during crises) perhaps more than one. This is not likely the case. A review of the evidence indicates the military’s influence, on the whole, is increasing, and the Party’s control decreasing.

On one level, the Party clearly controls the military as the Central Military Commission or CMC (the highest military oversight body in the PRC) is chaired by a civilian, President Xi Jinping. Moreover, the PLAs representation on formal political decision making bodies (such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the NPC) has decreased over the years, but this does not necessary equate to a reduced level of influence. For example, the two Vice-Chairman of the CMC are now military generals, as are the remaining other eight members.

Irrespective of institutional membership, military leaders retain considerable say. Personal interactions and informal meetings with senior party elites provide venues to sway decisions. They do, also, hold important places on leading small groups dedicated to issues like Taiwan and other security questions, such as the South China Seas.

In a similar vein, other methods of Party influence, as exercised through political commissars, party committees, and discipline inspection commissions are no longer empowered to enforce the ideological dictates of a paramount leader. In the face of diffuse reporting chains, competing allegiances, and often effective socialization by the military units they are supposed to be watching over, most do not provide the Party guardian and guidance function once so pervasive.

While perhaps overstated, Paltiel’s observation that “…China’s energies over the past century and half have given the military a prominent and even dominant role in the state, preempting civilian control and inhibiting the exercise of constitutional authority” is likely now truer than ever before in history. While still loyal to the party as an institution, the PLA is not unconditionally subservient to a particular leader and retains the resources to enter the political arena if (at the highest levels) a decision is made to do so.
Assessing the Implications of the Civilian-Military Trend Lines in China

The civilian-military trend lines evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution affirm that the symbiotic nature of the Party-PLA relationship has morphed in important respects since the late-1960s. The promotion of professionalism, a reduced role for ideological indoctrination, an increasing bifurcation of civil-military elites, and growing state powers (complete with divided loyalties and continued factionalism) has complicated the political landscape informing how the CCP interacts with the PLA. If, as postulated, we have moved from a fused, ‘dual role elite’ model to one of ‘conditional compliance’ in which the military actually holds a preponderance of the power capabilities and where its interests are satisfied through concessions, bargaining, and pay-offs, empirical evidence should reflect this. A review of China’s three major leadership changes since the transition from the revolutionary ‘Old Guard’ to the modern technocrats confirms this.

“The civilian-military trend lines evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution affirm that the symbiotic nature of the Party-PLA relationship has morphed in important respects since the late-1960s.”


Formally anointed and legitimized by Deng in 1989, Jiang assumed leadership without military credentials and few allies, viewed by many as a ‘caretaker’ Party Secretary in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre. Despite his limitations, Jiang was well versed in the vicissitudes of palace politics. Informed by a high political acumen, he immediately promoted an image as an involved Commander-in-Chief, personally visiting all seven military regions, a sign of commitment not made by either the likes of Mao or Deng. Symbolic gestures like this were bolstered by his providing incentives to the PLA, such as: consistent raises in the defence budget; funds for military modernization; as well as equipment, logistics, and augmented R&D.23

Referred to as the ‘silk-wrapped needle,’ Jiang marshalled Party resources to not only reward, but to punish.24 His institutional authority over appointments enabled him to manipulate factions, dismiss those who opposed him, enforce new rigid retirement standards, and promote loyalists. A delicate equilibrium was established during the early-1990s until his semi-retirement
where Jiang guaranteed military priorities such as supporting ‘mechanization’ and an ‘information-based military’ (promoting the concept of RMA with Chinese characteristics) in exchange for the PLA backing of his legacy contributions to Marxist Leninist Mao Zedong thought with the enshrinement of his “Three Represents” doctrine.

Hu Jintao (2002-2012)

Like Jiang, Hu Jintao’s succession was the product of negotiation, compromise, and concessions. While neither opposed by the PLA, nor supported by the military ‘brass,’ Hu was a known commodity, having served as Vice-President (1998) and CMC Vice-Chairman since 1999. He was deemed acceptable until proven otherwise. In the shadow of Jiang (who retained the position of CMC Chair until 2004), Hu did not exert the same kind of influence in nor engender the same kind of deference from, China’s military, but equally proved capable of fostering a pragmatic relationship with the army which ensured its interests, and in so doing, legitimized his leadership position.

Ceding much of the military planning and operational decisions to the PLA directly, Hu played to his strengths and focused upon national security issues (such as the successful resolution of SARs in China), which bolstered his credibility as a populist leader among the masses, indirectly increasing his power within both the military and the Party. Additionally, he focused upon foreign military security affairs (most notably, North Korea-US negotiations), which enabled him to link his personal political agenda with the military’s latest ambitions.

In according the military a distinct place in China’s national development plan, supporting China’s rise, and ensuring its vital interests, Hu recognized the military’s evolving requirement to ‘go global’ and its worldwide interests in non-combat operations, such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as well as stakes in the open seas, outer space, and cyberspace as interest frontiers with no geographic boundaries. Under the slogan of ‘China’s historical mission in the new phase of the new century’ and his acquiescence to the PLA’s stated requirements ‘to win local wars under modern conditions’ by funding new technology acquisition, Hu received the army’s formal recognition for his contributions to military thought based upon “scientific development” which informed a “strategic guiding theory,” resulting in a new operational orientation for China’s military. Emulating his predecessor, Hu won ‘conditional compliance’ from the PLA by successfully bartering military needs and wants for the army’s support and endorsement of his political tenure. This was not done outside of self-interest. Hu, as did Jiang, skillfully coopted, fired, and promoted select Generals to serve his greater ends, and he did this through varied means. Ultimately, however, it was done in a manner acceptable to the military.
Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, while replicating the ‘horse-trading’ of Jiang and Hu, marks a fundamental departure in leadership style. Often described as a transformative leader, Xi is openly critical of his predecessors and rails against earlier periods where reform stalled and corruption grew. An advocate of ‘top-level design,’ incrementalism is being supplanted by a massive attempt to centralize all aspects of the CCP’s power, which includes a major restructuring of the economy, government, administration, and military.

Nicknamed “the gun and the knife” as a slight for his attempts to simultaneously control the army, police, spies, and the ‘graft busters,’ Xi’s power appears uncontested at present. Nevertheless, he is also viewed as ‘pushing the envelope too far’ and endangering the equilibrium which has been established between the Party and PLA over the past 25 years. For example, only two years into his mandate, he fostered a Cult of Personality, “the Spirit of Xi Jinping” which was officially elevated to the same standing as that of Mao and Deng, by comparison, foundational figures in Chinese history. His open attacks of political ‘enemies’ (most notably Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and former security czar) breeds fear among almost every senior official, all of whom are vulnerable on some point. Equally true, an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign is inciting comrades to turn on comrades, not unlike a massive game of prisoner’s dilemma.

Nowhere is the pressure for reform greater than in the PLA. Xi advocates administering the army with strictness and austerity, promoting frugality and obedience. At his direction, “mass-line educational campaigns” designed to “rectify work style” through criticism and self-criticism are being implemented. Ideological and political building is now equated with army building, as a means of ensuring the Party’s uncontested grip over the troops ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Select military regions (those opposite Taiwan and adjacent to the South China Seas) and commanders from those regions are witnessing favoritism and promotion at the expense of others. Moreover, a new “CMC Chairmanship Responsibility System” has been instituted, which directly calls into question the support of some of Xi’s senior-most generals.

A ‘hardliner’ by nature, Xi recognizes that he must earn the support of the PLA. New military priorities he supports include: accelerating modernization; Joint Command and C4ISR; training; talent management, as well as equipment and force modernization. That said, his goal of achieving the Chinese dream of building a “wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized nation” by 2021, the

“Ideological and political building is now equated with army building, as a means of ensuring the Party’s uncontested grip over the troops ideologically, politically, and organizationally.”
100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, is exceptionally ambitious. It will require endless commitments to competing interests in a period of economic stagnation and global economic downturn. Should the PLA come to believe they are not first in line for government largess, support for Xi could erode very quickly.29

Conclusion and Outlook

Projections of China’s purported rise to global Superpower status, or its possible implosion due to political infighting, an economic downturn, or large-scale civil unrest resulting from any number of possible reasons (ranging from the rural-urban divide or massive health issues) makes for rich debate. What is certain is that regardless of outcome, China’s civilian-military relations will be a determining factor in how events unfold. This subject matter is profoundly understudied by Western scholars, particularly since the relationship between the Party and the PLA has been witnessing a fundamental transformation since the late-1960s.

Civilian-military relations in the PRC have morphed from a symbiotic nature during the revolutionary period (1921-1949), to a political nature after the founding of China in 1949, to a situation best described as ‘conditional compliance’ in the modernization era (1976-2014), where PLA support was secured through funding increases, political bartering, and guarantees to prioritize military development goals on an a priori basis with other competing domestic interests. Conditional compliance is an outcome of evolving civ-mil trends, which include the PLA’s professionalization and its growing sense of autonomy, reduced political study and indoctrination among Officers and enlisted men alike, the growing bifurcation of military and civilian elites, a sense of divided loyalties between the military, state, Party, and populace, as well as factionalism and weakened Party levers of control.

Irrespective of these trends, under the leadership reigns of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (stretching from 1989-2012) an equilibrium was established where both the Party and PLA secured mutually beneficial results useful enough to keep the arrangement functioning. The succession of hardline Xi Jinping in 2012 is, however, increasingly calling this delicate balance into question.

Xi’s massive ongoing recentralization of power goals, his ‘Cult of Personality’ as China’s paramount leader, rather than acting as ‘first among peers,’ his prosecution of all possible political threats, and his zealous commitment to Communist ideology over all else, fundamentally risks alienating now entrenched alternative centres of power or ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,’ which has been a product of China’s modernization. If this proves true, there is a very realistic case for the PLA to redefine or terminate its backing of the Communist Party and opt for a new type of power sharing arrangement.

While impossible to predict, key indicators capable of fomenting such a dramatic change in China include the following: (a) President Xi pushing his personal agenda for China and self-aggrandizement to a point where it fundamentally challenges other entrenched interests; (b) a political-military crisis (such as with Japan and the East China Seas, Taiwan, or interests in the South China Seas) which involve external nations—particularly the US—and divide civilian/military interests on how to respond; or (c) a social crisis where mass mobilization takes place and civ-mil factions disagree on either how address the situation, or on who makes the decision when and where to act.

Each of the dire scenarios listed is a real possibility and all would be determined by the nature of civ-mil relations in China. Increased scholarly attention, critical thinking, and improved surveillance of early warning signals portending such possibilities must become a priority for Western intelligence analysts, militaries, and strategic planners.

A protester in the traditional costume Kimono shouts slogans during an anti-Chinese march in Tokyo, 16 October 2010.


Mulvenon, James C. “Xi Jinping and the Central Military Commission: Bridesmaid or Bride?” in China Leadership Monitor-The Hoover Institute, No.34, pp.1-5.

Mulvenon, James C. “Comrade, Where’s Your Military Cat?” Xi Jinping’s Thrownback: Making the PLA Campaign to curb PLA Corruption,” in China Leadership Monitor-The Hoover Institute, No.42 pp.1-5.


2. The most objective and balanced report of the shift to global multipolarity and the rise of China can be found in National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030: Alternate Worlds. NIC 2012-01, December 2012.


8. Palitiel, p. 44.


12. The continual list of adaptive initiatives to China’s military are well chronicled in regular online publications, such as The China Brief produced by the Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/chinabrief/

13. For a comprehensive assessment of China’s military modernization see, Michael S. Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation-Assessing the Weaknesses of the PLA. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2015). www.rand.org/R/RR/93

14. Constant number/estimates are published online http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_budget_of_China


16. After reviewing incidents with the US and Japanese militaries and aspects of Sino-Taiwanese threat posturing, Andrew Scobell concludes that “...the incidents strongly suggest that civilian leaders were not aware of the specific activities and timetables, and had poor oversight.” See Andrew Scobell, “Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China’s Peaceful Rise?” in Parameters, Summer 2009, p.14.


19. Often cited factions include the Shanghai faction, the Party Youth League faction, the Communist Party School faction, and others across a broad political spectrum, or those based upon the PLA’s field army structure.


24. Reports indicate that by 1992 alone early retirements, rotations, or dismissals led to the replacement of almost half of the PLA generals (some 300 individuals). As well, the commanders and political commissars of all seven MRs were changed, enshrining Jiang at the forefront of PLA leadership. A second wave of reorganization occurred between 1993-1995, which resulted in the demolition of a further 100 officers.

25. In a deal reached between both Party and PLA leaders, Jiang (like Deng) upon retirement retained Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission to ensure continuity of leadership and to retain a power base to fully protect his own personal interests.


29. Press reports as early as 2013 suggest that while the PLA continues to pay homage to Xi, support is more ritualistic than sincere and being exacerbated by his factional tendencies.
Transitioning from Military to Civilian Life: Examining the Final Step in a Military Career

by Dave Blackburn

All Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members are eventually released from the Forces. Some request a voluntary release as new career opportunities open up to them. Others are released when their physical or mental health are such that they no longer meet the universality of service principle.\(^1\) That principle includes “the requirement to be physically fit, employable and deployable for general operational duties.”\(^2\) There are also CAF members who are released because their time is up: they have reached the mandatory retirement age or completed the required period of service. In the worst-case scenario, CAF members are pushed into retirement as a result of their misconduct or unsatisfactory service. Thus, there are a number of reasons that may lead to a CAF member being released.\(^3\)

For career CAF members, the process of being released from the armed forces that they belong to and identify with and transitioning to civilian life can be particularly stressful and complicated. The process affects many facets of life and impacts people on the personal, social, family, financial, and administrative levels, which can be positive or negative for the member.\(^4\)\(^5\)\(^6\)\(^7\)\(^8\)\(^9\) As renowned leaders in the field of military social work J.E. Coll and E.L. Weiss note, “transition from military life to civilian life can be a daunting task, and for many people it’s a confusing time.”\(^10\) Indeed, for some members, transition is difficult, while for others it goes smoothly and is relatively problem-free. The release and transition experience is different for each person.\(^11\)

Although Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) finds that the majority of releases seem to go well, there are still a number of widely recognized difficulties and challenges. One VAC study states that “two-thirds (62%) of CF Regular Force Veterans who were released from service during the years 1998–2007 reported an easy adjustment to civilian life, and a quarter (25%) of the STCL [Survey on Transition to Civil Life] population reported a difficult adjustment to civilian life.”\(^12\) That last statistic is very revealing: one out of every four CAF members will have trouble transitioning from military to civilian life. The difficulties can be caused by a variety of factors, take on different forms and vary in intensity, and there may be multiple solutions. Still, the fact remains that, as members become veterans, some

---

Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 2016 • Canadian Military Journal
will suffer the consequences of this difficult transition and may face serious psychosocial problems such as homelessness, alcohol and drug addiction, poverty, unemployment, suicide, criminality, incarceration, or mental illness.\textsuperscript{13, 14, 15}

The psychosocial problems outlined above result from an unsuccessful transition, and involve a social maladjustment to the realities of returning to civilian life. Recently, a study was conducted to identify the number of homeless people in Montreal. Of the 3,016 people counted, 6\% were veterans (181 people).\textsuperscript{16} That figure is similar to the ones obtained in 2013 in Toronto (7\%) and 2014 in Ottawa (nearly 140 people).\textsuperscript{17} In January 2016, Employment and Social Development Canada identified at least 2,250 homeless veterans in Canada.\textsuperscript{18, 19} Those proportions are higher than that of veterans within the general Canadian population, which is around 2\%. Given these numbers, there is reason to believe that investing in preparing military personnel to transition to civilian life will enable them to do so with less difficulty.

This article takes an in-depth look at the period leading up to a member’s release from the CAF. That period is a pivotal time in a member’s transition that can span anywhere from several days (in the case of a voluntary release) to several years (in the case of a release for health reasons). Because the length of this period varies greatly, it is nearly impossible to develop a general transition program that would include all types of releases. As a result, the CAF must consider all releases individually. The intention of this article is to present thoughts and discussion on the last step of a person’s military career and to provide a military–civilian transition process model.

**A Military Career**

It is important to recognize that each person’s military career trajectory is unique. A number of factors influence the course of a career, including the person’s choice of occupation, their performance at each qualification phase, their opportunities to advance in their chosen field, their openness to postings and deployments, their family situation, their relationship with the chain of command, their individual readiness, their physical and mental health, and the length of their career. It is therefore difficult to chart the course of a career and its progression in a way that would be specific to a group of CAF members or a given occupation. Still, it is possible to chart what might be considered a “typical” military career, from the time a member is recruited, to the time that he or she retires, assuming that the career will last 25 years.\textsuperscript{20} Figure 1 was created by the Department of National
Defence and shows the typical trajectory of a military career. What Figure 1 does not show is the disproportionate relationship between what the Department of National Defence and the CAF spend on candidates at the time of recruitment versus the time of retirement and release. Civilians must go through many steps when newly recruited, including a 12-to-15-week stay at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School. However, at the time of their release, after members may have given 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 or even 35 years of their lives to the organization, they may only be entitled to a few hours of guidance. That imbalance is hard to explain, given that adaptation challenges appear to be more complicated when a member is returning to civilian life and support resources are lacking. Another major factor that should justify a considerable investment is that, at the time when members are released, their physical and mental health is generally not as good as they were at enrolment, and numerous deployments have eroded their social support networks. Logically, one would expect members leaving the CAF to receive special attention, as “leaving the military ‘family’ is not an easy process for many serving men and women ….”

Recruitment or Enrolment

A person’s military career begins at the time of recruitment or enrolment. After carrying out the administrative enrolment procedures at a CAF recruiting centre, candidates are sent to the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School for 12 weeks (for non-commissioned officers) or 15 weeks (for officers). That stop at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, marks the true start of a military career, and is the beginning of the first qualification phase. Once candidates have gone through “door 154” or, in military jargon, the “green office,” they quickly begin to understand exactly what they have gotten themselves into. In the weeks to come, candidates must go through the different steps of Basic Military Qualification or Basic Military Officer Qualification.

Why does the transition from civilian to military life require such a long period of adjustment, ranging from 12 to 15 weeks at minimum? Here is one of the possible explanations: there is no other career or organization in Canada that requires such a complete and deep adherence to a totally new way of life, which is ruled by regulations, orders, specific values, a hierarchy, and a regimental system. “When you join the military, you go through a cultural indoctrination to become a soldier, sailor, airman or airwoman. You are in a military community. You are looked after. It is unique.”

From the Department of National Defence’s point of view, military candidates must undergo a period of indoctrination: “Candidates will have restricted free time for the first four weekends, with training scheduled on Saturdays and Sundays. This period helps to develop basic skills, facilitates the integration to the military life, and develops team spirit among the members.” This rite of passage therefore presupposes an indoctrination in the sense set out by Quebec professor and author Dr. Francis Dupuis-Déri: “[Indoctrination] is distinguished by its voluntary nature and its political orientation: the aim is to encourage, through speech and/or formative practice, respect, and even enthusiasm, for the official authority or ideology that the one who indoctrinates intends to serve.” Among the specific values of military organizations are the following: “subordination of the self to the group, obedience, acceptance of sacrifice, commonality of effort, and self-discipline.”

From this perspective, the CAF wants to train its military leaders and, in order for that to happen, the candidates must adhere to a particular lifestyle, embody values that are specific to the military system and take part in ongoing training and professional development. Figure 2 shows the five leadership elements (expertise, cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacities and professional ideology) based on the member’s level of leadership.
Transitions from civilian to military life involves adapting to a whole range of specific and unique components. The adaptation is gradual but is not necessarily a cause of ongoing psychosocial imbalance for a civilian who has freely made the choice to join the military.

**Retirement and Release**

A military career eventually ends with a member’s retirement or release. On a practical level, that final step is essentially administrative, but it impacts a number of facets of a person’s life. Members must undertake a series of steps regarding their pension benefits, the return of their equipment, and their final move. They may also participate, if they wish, in a seminar to prepare for a second career. An optional transition interview with a Veterans Affairs Canada case manager may also take place; that meeting is for passing along information concerning the programs offered to veterans and, in particular, disability benefits. Then, before the official departure, a member’s career may be celebrated with a Depart-with-Dignity luncheon, at which the member will receive cards and certificates, and speeches will be given highlighting his or her accomplishments.

In such cases, there is no period of indoctrination to civilian life. For members who have spent a number of years within a very organized, regimented, relatively inflexible system that has occupied most of their professional their lives, the absence or loss of support from this structure can be destabilizing. In fact, losing what the University of Ottawa’s Karine Regimbald and Jean-Martin Deslauriers refer to as the “symbiotic” relationship between members and the CAF institution [trans] “which requires its members to forget or lose themselves, that forces them to take part in exercises that lead to resocialization, and that imposes a system of values on them” is a source of contradiction and has no equivalent in civilian life. “Transitioning military personnel must now fend for themselves and their families, and some feel a sense of abandonment and alienation.” There are many transitional challenges, including returning to the civilian job market or an academic institution, physical and mental health problems, access to provincial health and social services, psychosocial difficulties, insufficient or no social support, the jumble of emotions that people experience, and family issues.

Although the results of all the studies consulted indicate that most CAF members will navigate the transition successfully, Paul Davies, a Research Associate at Lancaster University, admits that those results are questionable. Indeed, “it is arguable that data on transitions is open to interpretation since transition can occur at different levels, for example, occupational and emotional, and what could be perceived as a successful transition at one level might disguise the fact that transition at another level has gone less well.”

For some members who have not taken the time to prepare a retirement action plan that fosters a sense of belonging in the community (place to live and reside), a life purpose, interpersonal relationships, recreational activities, occupational projects (work or school) and access to health services, adapting can be brutal and lead to psychosocial imbalance. Some authors maintain that the transition from military to civilian life is a serious long-term planning exercise that should begin at least 12 months before the person’s release.

**Recruiting and Retirement: Two Different Adaptation Processes**

A CAF career requires constant adaptation on the part of members and their families, from recruitment to retirement, in many situations. These include basic training, the various phases of occupational training, leadership courses, training exercises, pre-deployment training exercises, deployments, deployment homecomings, and postings in Canada and overseas, to name just a few. This process of constant adaptation affects the psychological, social, cultural, professional and family spheres of a person’s life. The stress the member experiences in various situations is a reaction to having to adapt to the constraints of the environment. The adaptation reaction, which psychologists Richard L. Lazarus and Susan Folkman refer to as “coping,” represents the “constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person.” It is therefore not incorrect to say that recruiting as much as retirement is a “process that involves the constant interaction between the individual and the dynamic world in which he or she evolves and interacts.”

They are two adaptive processes that force people to face stressors from sources that are specific to each process. How individuals subjectively view a process is key, as what is stressful for one person is not necessarily stressful for another.

There is a huge body of research on adapting and coping. Theories around role transitions are very relevant to the transitions from civilian to military and from military to civilian life. The transition that members must go through when they are released from the CAF is first and foremost a professional one. These theories [trans] “make intelligible, during these transitions, the processes at work in the subject–environment exchanges, that is to say, to explain ways of adapting to new professional roles and the reciprocal adjustments of the subject and his or her work environment.”

**The Military-Civilian Transition in Four Phases**

There is no consensus within the scientific and military community on the operational definition of the military–civilian transition process. Nor is there any unanimously accepted conceptual model. Scientific research has made it possible to advance the concept of the transitional approach, but without arriving at an explanatory model. The scientific community agrees that the military–civilian transition process is complex, personal and multi-faceted. The transition can have an impact on a person’s psychosocial balance, quality of life, well-being and health.
Some U.S. studies have highlighted the importance of certain factors in the transition process. We feel that it is necessary to conduct an interpretive reading of the results and place them in a Canadian context. Among other things, it appears that having completed college or university and being an officer facilitates the transition process but that having had traumatic experiences, having been seriously injured, having served in a combat zone and having known a military member who has been injured or killed makes the transition process more challenging.

Loyola University’s Lisa Burkhart’s and Nancy Hogan’s study of 20 female veterans of the U.S. military leads to a better understanding of this transition in women. The study highlights seven specific categories of adaptive measures used by service-women. The study is interesting, but its scope is limited.

Between 2014 and 2016, we conducted a qualitative study of 17 French-speaking veterans living in Quebec. Some of the main findings were that the transition process generates negative feelings among the majority of participants, particularly those who were released for medical reasons; the type of release (voluntary/end of service or health reasons) has an impact on the transition; personal preparation plays a very important role in the process; and creating and maintaining a social network before the transition period is an element that positively affects the experience. On the last point, it seems that CAF members who retain a strong social bond with civilians have an easier time going through their transition.

Of all the scientific articles consulted, the University of Southern California’s Carl Andrew Castro’s and Sara Kintzle’s study of 20 French-speaking veterans of the U.S. military leads to a better understanding of this transition in women. The authors postulate that the military–civilian transition process has three phases that interact and overlap. Each of the phases brings into play individual, interpersonal, community and organizational factors that influence the transition. The authors refer to the first phase as “approaching military transition,” in which personal, cultural and transitional factors create the foundation for the transition trajectory. They refer to the second phase as “managing the transition”; it involves the individual, community, organizational and transitional factors that impact the individual’s transition from military to civilian life.

The third phase, “assessing the transition,” covers the outcome of the transition (from the veteran’s perspective). The theory proposed by Castro and Kintzle focuses upon American soldiers’ transition from military to civilian life. From our point of view, although it adds to the reflection on this last stage of the military career and attempts to conceptualize a little-studied and poorly documented phenomenon, their theory is incomplete and only moderately applicable to the situation of CAF members.

We are therefore suggesting a Canadian model called the military–civilian transition process model. Our model has four consecutive, interconnected phases. The entire transition process from military to civilian life is based on shared responsibilities between several parties. Obviously, the CAF members and their families play a vital role and share a part of the responsibility at each phase. The Department of National Defence plays a very active role in the pre-release and release phases. Veterans Affairs Canada plays a central role during the release phase. Provincial and municipal governments and community and social organizations, regardless of whether they are specifically for veterans, play a crucial role during the post-release phase.

Each phase of the military–civilian transition process model includes social, personal, family, health-related, financial, academic, professional, and psychological factors. It is the sum of those factors that will determine whether or not the CAF member is able to adapt to his or her new civilian life. That adjustment or maladjustment will be subjectively perceived by the member in transition through indicators such as quality of life, well-being, social integration and health. Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the model.

Figure 3 – Military-civilian transition process model (M–C TP)
Below are the detailed characteristics of each phase.

### Phase 1 – Pre-release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Active member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start of the phase</td>
<td>Phase starts with the desire to request voluntary release, as mandatory retirement age approaches, when there are indicators of conduct that is inconsistent with military service, or when the person has been assigned a permanent medical category.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of the phase</td>
<td>When the release message is received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>It varies. Obtaining a release may take over a year, but sometimes it takes only a few days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things to consider</td>
<td>The type of release must be considered, as should the state of the member’s health and his/her level of education, military occupation, marital status, choice of living environment and occupational project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to take</td>
<td>A transition action plan must be prepared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of time</td>
<td>Members complete their normal job tasks, their condition permitting, but they should be given time to prepare for their release.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF support</td>
<td>Individual meetings between the member and a social work officer/social worker to prepare for the release. Meeting between the member, his/her family and a social work officer/social worker.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Phase 2-A – CAF release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Serving member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start of the phase</td>
<td>Phase starts when the release message is received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of the phase</td>
<td>Phase ends on the last day of active service (including take-back holiday).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>It varies from several days to several weeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things to take into account</td>
<td>Obtaining the release message. This phase is essentially administrative and includes departure procedures, pension benefits, final move, return of military equipment, and the departure meal. Medical services continue until the member's health has stabilized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to take</td>
<td>Transition action plan should be set in motion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of time</td>
<td>The member should be given most of his/her time to prepare for the release.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF/VAC support</td>
<td>Individual follow-up meetings between the member and a social work officer/social worker to ensure that the release goes smoothly. Meeting with a CAF and VAC case manager.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Phase 2-B – VAC release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Veteran and civilian-to-be</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start of the phase</td>
<td>Phase starts when the release message is received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of the phase</td>
<td>It varies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>From several hours to several years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things to consider</td>
<td>Phase during which the veteran negotiates with VAC for service delivery. Phase is focused on administration, services and health care. The type of release and transition issues should also be considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to take</td>
<td>Transition action plan should be set in motion. Member should join veterans' groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of time</td>
<td>The veteran decides how to use his/her time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC support</td>
<td>Meetings with a VAC case manager. Programs and services in place if the veteran has access to them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Phase 3 – Post-release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Veteran and full-fledged civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start of the phase</td>
<td>Phase starts when the veteran subjectively feels that he/she has adapted to civilian life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of the phase</td>
<td>Indeterminate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>It varies. Each veteran will reach this phase at his/her own pace, based on a number of factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things to consider</td>
<td>The following things should be considered: type of release, social integration, a sense of belonging in the community, interpersonal relationships, social and sports activities, and the person's occupational plan and health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to take</td>
<td>The veteran should try to maintain a healthy level of social and community engagement. The veteran should join social and/or veterans' groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of time</td>
<td>The veteran decides how to use his/her time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Access to provincial health and social services. Social and community programs. Veterans’ initiatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAF Pre-Release and Release

“The CAF and DND have primary responsibility for providing transition programs and services to still-serving CAF members, and everything should be done to help releasing CAF members, particularly ill and injured ones, make a successful transition to civilian society.”

During Phase 1, the pre-release phase, there is a shared responsibility between the member, his/her family, the CAF, and the Department of National Defence. Members who begin this phase may have decided to ask for a voluntary release, or know that they will soon be released because they are reaching the mandatory retirement age, or for health reasons because they have been assigned a permanent medical category. The concept of time may appear abstract, but it is a good idea for the member to begin thinking about his/her release as soon as possible. That reflection should focus upon social, personal, family, physical and mental health, financial, academic, and professional aspects. The professional aspect is of particular importance because, according to one study, most veterans (89%) work after their release. The member should develop a realistic, structured action plan.

The CAF can play a leading role during the pre-release phase. Who better than social work officers and social workers to help members and their families prepare for the pre-release phase, and, ultimately, for their transition to civilian life? “Social work is a profession concerned with helping individuals, families, groups and communities to enhance their individual and collective well-being. It aims to help people develop their skills and their ability to use their own resources and those of the community to resolve problems,” or to prevent those problems. A number of challenges related to the transition are psychological, and social workers, using a systemic approach, are able to consider the various difficulties and address them with the member.

Currently, CAF social workers and social work officers play absolutely no role in the transition process from military to civilian life. In our opinion, this is a major gap to fill, especially considering that they have the mandate of supporting and encouraging “all CF members to take an active part in maintaining their personal health,” and creating and supporting “a climate that fosters positive mental health and by striving to reduce the factors that put mental health at risk.”

“A number of challenges related to the transition are psychological, and social workers, using a systemic approach, are able to consider the various difficulties and address them with the member.”
A minimum of three meetings should be mandatory during the CAF’s pre-release and release phases. The first meeting should take place between the social worker and the member, alone, when the release is imminent. The first meeting should build the foundations of an action plan, including short-, medium- and long-term objectives, as well as the means to achieve them. The second meeting should take place a few weeks later between the social worker, the member and the family. It should be aimed at educating the family about the likely challenges of the transition. The third meeting should take place in the member’s final days of service to validate his/her status and transition plan implementation, and provide referrals to external organizations if needed.

In short, [trans] “military social workers play a key role within the Canadian Armed Forces; as experts, they are consulted on the well-being of the troops.” They should therefore be there to support member well-being until the moment members hang up their uniforms.

Conclusion

There is an acute need for military authorities to address the pre-release and release phases because they have many impacts upon the unique and subjective coping mechanisms of each member who is released from the CAF, and upon whether members successfully transition from military to civilian life or develop psychosocial problems. Those early stages are crucial in the transition process, and the full responsibility rests with the Department of National Defence, the CAF, the members, and their families. A member who is well-oriented and well-equipped should be able to navigate the adjustment process with less difficulty than a person who can only count on himself/herself, and whose preparation is limited. The CAF has all of the necessary resources within its workforce to introduce preparatory initiatives to help with the transition. It would only require a bit of determination and recognition of the urgency to act.

2. Ibid.


11. Ibid.


18. Ibid.

19. It is important to note that the Employment and Social Development Canada data is incomplete, as it comes from a review of information from 60 shelters across Canada. It is therefore possible that some veterans who do not use those establishments were not counted.

20. In order to be entitled to a pension upon release, members must have 25 years of eligible service, or 9,131 days. For more information, go to the following link: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/cf-community-pension/contribute-page.


33. A scientific article in French about our study De la vie militaire à la vie civile – Enjeux transitoires pour les anciens combattants will be published in 2016–2017.


36. Ibid.


52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.


55. Department of Veterans Affairs Canada (2014).


The Foundations of Inclusive Leadership

by Joseph Harding

Introduction

There is a lot of research that indicates that the business of education is more inclusive than in the past, but challenges remain for the next generation of students, teachers, and senior management. This short article will present a proposal for Inclusive Leadership in the context of education, with a direct application to the three Employment Equity Groups of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). It will include a description of chosen concepts that will connect to inclusive leadership – one pertaining to inclusiveness, and two pertaining to leadership: both transformational and participative. The concepts of inclusivity in education and transformational leadership will be explained separately, then combined with a proposal for an educational setting perspective. Arguments will be presented in favour of this outlook in education with respect to validity, practicality, and usefulness. Finally, the proposed perspective will be compared against other considerations. Inclusive Leadership in the field of education will not only increase CAF Diversity learning opportunities, but will also help educate a CAF that strives for adaptability; an important principle of both leadership and the art of war.

Web Resources

An excellent web resource for Inclusive Leadership in Education is provided by Dr. Susan Bainbridge, an expert in Inclusive Leadership in Education, at http://www.livebinders.com/play/play?id=80716. It is listed as a 2016 reference, due to its constant refresh of information and links to current research material. The site is designed in a tabular format for links to inclusivity in education, as well as relevant leadership concepts and examples. Also, websites such as the one dedicated to inclusivity in education by inclusive educators, such as Dr. Paula Kluth, provide practical and intuitive examples, based upon research that can be used by everyday implementers: http://www.paulakluth.com/readings/inclusive-schooling/is-your-school-inclusive/.

In addition, the CAF has an imbedded centre of excellence for leadership at the Military Personnel Generation Headquarters, with CAF Leadership Doctrine managed by the Professional Development Department. All publications and relevant policies and research can be requested or sourced via the following website – http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page.
The emphasis of this Department is to manage both the current requirements and future requirements for the leaders who manage the CAF.

**Inclusivity in Education**

Inclusivity in education in Canada is not new. New Brunswick’s education system had its Canadian champion, Dr. Gordon Porter, about 25 years ago. He took a key transformational leadership role to develop an inclusive system. According to Dr. Jude McArthur, a Senior Lecturer in the Institute of Education, Massey University, New Zealand, “Systemic efforts focused on supports, resources and professional development for schools to include and teach all students, and Gordon argues that inclusion necessarily turns our focus to school improvement.”

If we are to tackle the challenges of inclusivity, we must first understand what it is and is not. It can be argued that “inclusivity” is a blend of the elements of equality, diversity, and the act of inclusion, in accordance with the goal of Figure 1 to present “ALL” as the outcome. Although the term “ALL” relates to everyone in the education system and might be altruistic, the logic is that the more inclusive the education environment, the closer it will be to achieving equal opportunity for students graduating into our education system and might be altruistic, the logic is that the plan appropriately.

In Figure 1, the state or quality of being equal, the state or act of including, and the state or fact of being different are represented. The trinity presented in Figure 1 is simply illustrated, and an excellent representation of what inclusivity can look like. The test is the ability to transfer the simplicity of the message into the complexity of the bureaucracy of education, stereotype behaviours against the three elements presented, and finally, to manage the expectation that there might not be a simple end-state, but instead, a steady state of continuous improvement. This steady state could be the benchmark for success.

**Transformational and Participative Leadership**

The first key definition is leadership itself. Defined many ways, but expertly and neutrally explained in the CAF Doctrine Manual of Leadership as, “…directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one’s intent or a shared purpose.” The key verb is influence, a trait that some people have naturally, or can develop to varying degrees. Leadership is present within all ages, all levels of the work place, school, and at home, can range from dictatorship to laissez-faire attitudes and approaches, and is obviously not limited to the military. The different styles and concepts matched with people’s capabilities is where this “art” becomes either useful or dangerous. However, positive action can most certainly result from a style known as Transformational Leadership, which will be further defined and offered as an option for inclusive leadership in education.

There are many interpretations of the term Transformational Leadership. However, expert on education equity, reform, and innovation, Dr. Matthew Lynch, proposes four attributes of Transformational Leadership as: Idealized/Charismatic influence, Inspirational Motivation, Intellectual Stimulation, and Individualized Consideration. According to leadership researcher Dr. Joseph Meng-Chun Chin of the Department of Education, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, “...transformational leadership examines the relationship between leader and follower and considers that by engaging the higher needs of the followers, instead of merely working for the greater good, the followers become self-actualizing and finally grow to be leaders themselves.” Participative and Transformational Leadership specialist Doreen Franklin further presents the role of the Transformational Leader as follows:

- Looks for potential in everyone
- Is a role model
- Motivates others
- Spends time with individuals
- Recognizes individual differences and strengths
- Encourages creativity
- Is an open book

In addition, Franklin provides an explanation of what Transformational Leadership looks like: “There is an obvious goal (it is clear what the team is working on and why.) Everyone has a part in achieving that goal (based on their individual strengths and talents.) Everyone can see how the goal will affect them for the better (this makes them want to combine their talents to work toward that goal and provides intrinsic motivation).”

Leadership in Organizations researcher Dr. Larry Coutts offers that, “Participative leadership is a style of leadership that involves all members of a team in identifying essential goals and developing procedures or strategies for reaching those goals. From this perspective, participative leadership can be seen as a leadership style that relies heavily on the leader functioning as a facilitator rather than simply issuing orders or making assignments.”

By better understanding the three separate elements of inclusivity, only then will educational stakeholders be able to plan appropriately.

---

**Figure 1 – Model for Inclusion, Equality and Diversity**

---

The state or quality of being equal

The state of being or act of including

The state or fact of being different

---

**VIEWS AND OPINIONS**

Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 2016 • Canadian Military Journal 63
Doreen Franklin further presents the role of the Participative Leader as follows:

- Presents goals
- Encourages participation
- Involves people in decision making
- Encourages cooperation
- Directs the project

In addition, Franklin provides an explanation of what a Participative Leader looks like: “The leader presents a problem (something they want to work on), the team brainstorms ideas (everyone’s ideas are valued), the team votes on the ideas (everyone feels involved), and team members choose what job they do to reach the goal (some gaps may occur as this is not necessarily based on individual goals and strengths).”

The Canadian Armed Forces doctrine on leadership presents a more thorough definition of Transformational Leadership, including a link to the spectrum of leader influence behaviours that span the transformational style along the span of control, as illustrated in Figure 2. The CAF defines effective CAF leadership in terms of achieving the mission assigned by the Canadian Government, while ensuring the appropriate ethos of the profession of arms is respected. Improvement is always a consideration and goal.

**Leadership for Inclusive Education Model Proposal**

Based upon the definition of inclusivity and the selected leadership concepts, it is now time to develop an integrated proposal for Inclusive Leadership in Education. “We believe for inclusion to live, we must ‘live inclusion.’ How do we go about creating a school that ‘lives inclusion’?” This is the fundamental question. Given that the Transformational Leader spans a control of influence behaviours that include a participative style, Transformational Leadership will be further presented as the overarching leadership concept to tackle inclusivity. This proposal will be entitled “Inclusive Transformational Leadership” as a strategy to blend the leadership style with the inclusivity elements of diversity, inclusion, and equity. The proposal of Inclusive Transformational Leadership will be analyzed in Table 1 as a comparison between some of the key principles of Transformational Leadership and their validity, practicality, and usefulness in an educational context to achieve an inclusive environment.

**Leadership for Inclusive Education – Comparison to Alternate Options**

Inclusive Leadership can be used holistically or even targeted to challenging areas, such as diversity in the education system. New Zealand educators Timoti Harris and Lesleigh Henderson looked upon diversity as a face of inclusivity by providing a different option to the status quo, celebrating the “…concept of difference as richness, cultural capital as an asset not a barrier.” This formed the foundation of instructional design, conduct of business in the school system, and the basis for transformation.

The CAF is pursuing an innovative path on its journey to Institutional Excellence. The authors present three components of Institutional Excellence as “…the harmonization of the three clusters of ‘running the business,’ Whole of Government framework and operational excellence.” Part of the challenges of the CAF recruitment process is to be as inclusive as possible with respect to a representation of Canadian society, and yet also to achieve mission success in accordance with the Canadian Government’s

---

*Figure 2 – Spectrum of leader influence behaviours*
**Validity, Practicality and Usefulness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformational Leadership Principles</th>
<th>Validity in the educational context</th>
<th>Practicality in the educational context</th>
<th>Usefulness in the educational context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Looks for potential in everyone</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When applied by many leadership levels of the educational organization, this principle can have a multiplying effect for both students and staff. This principle of the transformational leader is almost the most vital principle of inclusion. If all have varying degrees of potential, then the accepted balance is a blend of people. Although this is extremely useful in redefining the inclusive classroom, it is difficult to achieve for all schools and learning environments where exclusive practices exist, and others where costs and student learning challenges threaten the advancement of the group.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a role model</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership by example is a key element to success. Senior management and teachers combined with representatives from the public can set standards that others will strive to achieve once successful. Leaders in the educational setting such as principals and teachers will be vital in setting a culture of change. More importantly, senior management in both school and political realms acting as role models for transformation could spike a momentum that simply cannot be reached at the tactical levels of the schools. Together role model behaviour can shatter an unacceptable status quo.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivates others</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One teacher's efforts might spread to other teachers, as well as within the classroom environment among skeptical students. Limitations will occur where some talented leaders are restricted in the access they have to others. Social media and other rapid forms of communication can help.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spends time with individuals</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policies crafted alone for issues of inclusion, equity and diversion will not achieve an inclusive environment. It will take effort with people to develop the necessary transformation. Time will be a limitation as well as the natural physical and geographic boundaries of the school systems and environments. Instead of making separate time to “transform” people's attitudes, spending time with others can form part of the natural rhythm of communication within the educational venue.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognizes individual differences and strengths</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not all will appreciate the vision of an inclusive society. Some change agent efforts will not be successful on all fronts, accepting limitations where appropriate. Teachers, administrators, students, and society change at a different pace so patience and continuous effort will be the key pathway to ensuring that the educational stakeholders' expectations are met.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourages creativity</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary advancements require an open mind and creative approaches from the team. Change is ever constant and even faster today, due to advancements with technology and globalization. How gender plays a role in distance education, as an example, might not be a significant factor for males, but it could be the key element to inclusivity for rural women in developing countries, leading to an expanding and more successful workforce.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is an “open book” or maintains a high profile</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is necessary for others to view leaders as setting an example, but full disclosure of oneself is not necessary. The “open book” analogy is not very practical to reach a large audience, unless it is used in a politically charged position of senior management. It does not appear to be a trait that would be well-applied in the role of spreading the word for inclusive leadership in education. A successful leader who also maintains a low profile could be equally successful.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – Inclusive Transformational Leadership
direction through a professional selection process. Once members are hired, the military training and educational environment can then perform its tasks with goals of inclusivity of learning styles by occupation, gender learning differences, managing diverse group needs, and constantly learning amidst a high tempo of operational support to the country. The blend of meeting the needs of the government, the business, and the military mission limit the inclusivity goals of the Human Rights of Canada, but within the restrictions placed by the “Whole of Government,” “Operational (Military) Art Tactics,” and “Running the Business,” an Inclusive Transformational Leadership approach would simply need to be redefined. This classification of inclusive learning could apply within the unique nature of the military if the appropriate research fed the policy and practical applications for those operating within the military framework.

Characteristics of Inclusive Schools defined as: Committed Leadership, Democratic Classrooms, Supportive School Culture, Engaging & Relevant Curricula, and Responsive Instruction, according to acknowledged experts, such as Dr. Paula Kluth, compare well with Inclusive Transformational Leadership. All five features require a strong will to adapt current practices and procedures, and adopt a change management approach to improve inclusivity. There is no reason why CAF Schools and training and education management activities could not strive to achieve similar intentions. The CAF develops its leaders with a standard systems approach to instructional design that progresses student learning through developmental periods over their careers. By employing the latest research on leadership doctrine, and adopting a continuous improvement philosophy with advanced technology support, the results should be exceptional. The challenges that remain are also similar to other learning institutions that need to evolve. Inclusivity will be achieved when the CAF is a representative of Canadian society (given its unique job), which presently it is not. The Employment Equity Act, the law, states that Employment equity, as defined in Canadian law by the Employment Equity Act, requires employers to engage in proactive employment practices to increase the representation of four designated groups: women, people with disabilities, Aboriginal peoples, and visible minorities. The “proactive” capabilities of leadership can take the Employment Equity Act and use the different leadership styles to address issues of exclusivity with the Act as the foundation.

While the four key diverse groups of the Employment Equity Act need to be addressed for employment in Canada, the limitation of the proposed concept for Inclusive Transformational Leadership will preclude the recruitment of disabled people in the CAF. This might not be the case in the future as new battlefields (i.e. cyber warfare) will require unique approaches to combat readiness. Customized exceptions might just become the norm for certain occupations that are in desperate need for talent, and more inclusive leadership and innovative practices could simply be the best solution, resulting in positive second and third order effects for Canadians. Regardless, improvements need to occur now for women, Aboriginal peoples, and visible minorities with respect to employment and training in the military.

Conclusion

Inclusive Transformational Leadership is simply a blend of an appropriately matched leadership concept with the goal of achieving the most inclusive environment and attitude for the community. The aspiration of this approach in education would be one of exponential growth where leaders influence the stakeholders of the educational environment to then become leaders themselves who advance positive change. It is assessed from the research embodied in this article that no one leadership approach is the panacea for inclusivity in education. Advancement for students starts with the people who teach, support, help, manage, and care for them. This positive attitude develops future inclusive leaders. Diversity is strength for both learning and the art of war; Inclusive Leadership being a fundamental path to victory on both fronts.

Lieutenant-Colonel Joe Harding, CD, is a Training Development Officer presently employed as the Senior Staff Officer of Personnel Generation Policy at the Military Personnel Generation Headquarters in Kingston, Ontario. He graduated with a Bachelors of Engineering Management degree from the Royal Military College of Canada, and has previously served in both the infantry and the artillery, where his deployment experience includes Bosnia, Cyprus, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone. This autumn, he will graduate with a Masters of Distance Education from Athabaska University, with an interest in Inclusive Education, Tutoring and Student Support, and Music.
NOTES

8. Ibid.
10. Franklin.
11. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
18. Ibid, p.16.
19. Ibid.
A Doctrine for Individual Training and Education

by Julie Maillé and Louise Baillargeon

“The road to knowledge is still under construction.”

– Audrey Gray, professor at the University of Saskatchewan

Looking back, looking forward

No official doctrine had ever been written for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) training and education system. So, in a spirit of collaboration with the Joint Doctrine Branch, Military Personnel Generation (MILPERSGEN) was mandated to develop a Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) on individual training and education doctrine covering the entire CAF. The Doctrine and Directives – Individual Training and Education section, which was tasked with writing the publication, has been working on it almost exclusively since June of this year.

For the past thirty years, CAF training and education personnel have had two successive sets of manuals to guide them: the Canadian Forces Individual Training System 9000 series, and the Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education...
System (CFITES) 9050 series. The content of those publications was certainly useful. However, there was an ever more pressing need to support it with a structured, current, detailed official doctrine explaining the training and education system. It had become imperative to refresh some dated concepts, and to introduce new ways to design and deliver training and education.

The CFITES manuals in use today cover various levels of doctrine, from strategy to tactics. The generic approach and the scope of CFITES itself led to inconsistencies in the application of the system, and, in institutional design and concepts, and ways of doing things emerged that were diametrically opposed. The new doctrine on the subject is intended to consolidate the activities conducted across the CAF, and to harmonize them with the concepts developed by our allied partners. This doctrine sets the parameters guiding the activities of CFITES and the decisions associated with them.

**Need and vision**

In order to carry out its mandate, the CAF engages in three large interdependent spheres of activity: operations, recruitment/selection, and training and education. Military Personnel Command (MILPERSCOM), through MILPERSGEN, drives the individual training and education activities, whose purpose is to prepare CAF members intellectually and professionally for the operations of today and tomorrow. MILPERSGEN’s mission is to guide the personnel generation system and to enable it to maintain the specificity of the profession of arms. In order to accomplish these missions, it establishes the parameters of the professional development system and ensures support for learning throughout CAF members’ lives, in order to maximize operational success. The joint doctrine on training and education was designed to direct the planning and delivery of learning activities. The doctrine describes the fundamental principles upon which the CAF relies in order to achieve the objectives set by the Government of Canada regarding training and education.

To meet the need for doctrine, in 2012, MILPERSGEN proposed that a new, three-part structure be adopted: policies, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The purpose of this approach was to establish the conceptual foundations of the training and education system. The doctrine related to the subject was supposed to describe the connections between the parts of the system in order to develop its principles, and to provide a framework within which to apply them in the CAF. The new series of doctrine publications will take the following form: CFJP 7.0 will offer an overview of the entire training and education system, Volume 7.1 will cover individual training and education, Volume 7.2 will describe joint collective training, and Volume 7.3 will focus upon training leaders. All this will be supported by a series of TTPs covering individual training and education that will serve as concrete guides to applying the processes of development, conduct, and management of CFITES.

**Doctrine: The cornerstone of the learning organization**

Doctrine presents concepts and reflections that give direction to instructors and educators. The Defence
Terminology Bank defines doctrine as, “...fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.” Based as it is upon lessons learned and upon projections of future trends (research and development), military doctrine is the link between the organization and the employment of military forces. Writing doctrine on individual training and education was a process strewn with obstacles. First, we had to identify the foundations of CFITES, based upon the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, which states that Canadians will be able to count on “…a first-class and modern military that is well trained, well equipped and ready,” and one that possesses the basic capabilities and flexibility required to maintain naval, land, air, and special forces that are versatile and combat-ready. Developing doctrine is necessarily collaborative. This proved to be an energizing force, but it also slowed down the work at times, since some of the many ideas suggested were contradictory. Selecting the important points was a considerable challenge, as the needs of all stakeholders had to be taken into consideration. In addition, training and education doctrine is based upon a development cycle influenced by various factors, including research and development and lessons learned. It therefore had to be adaptable in order to deal with discoveries, emerging concepts, and new knowledge, while being simple enough to encompass the feedback obtained on all aspects of training and education.

“The key to being a learning organization is the development and inculcation of a body of unifying doctrine that leads the development of the CF at large through our capability development, professional development and training regimens.” Developing a solid doctrine with respect to training and education required us to question the traditional concepts, and to organize the established practices.

One publication for all

The purpose of *training* is to instil the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required to carry out specific tasks, while that of *education* is to lay down a base of knowledge and intellectual skills that can support the learner in interpreting information effectively and exercising judgment. Because education in civilian and military institutions has evolved, professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwomen today have a better understanding of the military organization and its place in the current and future security environments. For this reason, training and education are key elements in the CAF’s operational success. Training activities enable the CAF organizations and their members to enhance their know-how, their effectiveness, and their efficiency. On the one hand, the organization is responsible for providing learning opportunities. On the other, learners are responsible for fully engaging in the learning activities and in making the most of them.

Training and education are part of the concept of lifelong learning for military personnel. This concept is related to the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and attitudes in various contexts – for example, through individual and collective training activities using formal, non-formal, and informal methods. Learning takes place on a continuum that varies, depending upon each learner’s path. Whether it is formal, non-formal, or informal, learning has direct impacts upon personal and professional development. The CAF’s basic approach, with both instructor-led courses and independent learning, is to focus upon actively engaging learners in the learning process, because the best way of learning is through targeted, guided intellectual or physical activities. Instructional designers and instructors must vary the training methods and increase learners’ level of activity. Performance-oriented training and education means that all related activities must be directed at preparing CAF members to meet operational requirements, and to achieve departmental performance objectives.
Training activities are not incidental; they ensure operational effectiveness. They enable CAF members to be effective and the CAF to be efficient. Although training is given in a variety of environments and circumstances, all the training and education activities are focused upon performance, and upon achieving organizational objectives.

**Conclusion: A sizeable challenge**

Writing doctrine with respect to individual training and education is a challenge in itself. A whole new series of publications had to be created by refreshing the concepts addressed in CFITES while introducing up-to-date training and education concepts, particularly current theories, new concepts such as a competency-based assessment system, lifelong learning, and leader development. We also had to take into account the new military occupation structure. In fact, we had to develop a complete, authoritative doctrine that stakeholders in training and education at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the CAF could build upon. The doctrine also had to include complementary concepts, such as quality assurance, lessons learned, innovation, and institutional excellence.

To remain relevant, doctrine must be flexible and must incorporate emerging concepts and lessons learned. More specifically, it must encompass the generational diversity of the new waves of learners. It must also be open to all the innovative approaches in the field of training and education. Doctrine is never fixed; it is always evolving.

For us, writing joint doctrine on training and education has been a unique experience, a great learning opportunity, and a truly humbling experience.

Major Julie Maille has been a member of the Training Development Branch since 2005. Her substantive position is at MILPERSEGEN HQ in Kingston. She has completed several degrees, most recently a Master of Arts at Université Laval in administration and assessment in education.

Louise Baillargeon is on an attached posting to MILSPERGEN HQ in Kingston. She has been a public servant since 1984, has worked in the Official Languages branch of the Department of National Defence, and is currently a translator at the federal government’s Translation Bureau. She holds two bachelor’s degrees: one in translation from Université Laval, and another in adult education from Brock University.

---

**NOTES**

1. Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP 01), Canadian Military Doctrine, Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, September 2011, p. vi.
The Justin Trudeau government’s quest for academic, public, parliamentary, industry and other inputs to its Defence Policy Review (DPR) represents the latest attempt to broaden the policy review process in Canada. With some notable exceptions, Canadian governments have long sought—albeit with varying degrees of success and varying levels of governmental, bureaucratic, and military enthusiasm—to solicit outside perspectives on defence policy. In the late-1960s, for example, the newly-elected government of Pierre Trudeau made a concerted effort to gather academic, parliamentary, and other perspectives on foreign and defence policy to supplement—and frequently challenge—what it characterized as the unduly cautious, essentially status quo positions of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence. The Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney followed suit, making noteworthy use of parliamentary committees, and tapping the not-inconsiderable expertise of the university strategic and international studies centres, funded in part by the Department of National Defence through the MSS/SDF program.

The subsequent Liberal government of Jean Chretien followed a somewhat similar path. The Chretien government’s defence policy review of 1994 also benefited from the appearance of a plethora of studies and reports—some prepared by existing university strategic studies centres and non-governmental organizations, and some prepared by ad hoc panels and committees. Particularly noteworthy were Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century, an 85-page report from the Canada 21 Council (a blue-ribbon panel drawn from business, academe, and politics) and Canadians in a Dangerous World, a 32-page monograph written by the respected British scholar Colin S. Gray and published by The Atlantic Council of Canada. The former, which rapidly became a ‘lightning rod’ for both praise and criticism, argued that the post-Cold War strategic environment and harsh financial realities demanded a radical restructuring of Canada’s armed forces. If such a restructuring did not take place, warned the Council, “…the result will be…a miniature model of a traditional ‘general-purpose’ military force—one with just a little of everything, but not enough of anything to be effective in any conceivable situation.” By venturing into the ‘general-purpose/multi-purpose’ versus ‘niche’ defence establishment debate, the report effectively foreshadowed one of the debating points of the 2016 public consultation process. Canadians in a
**Dangerous World**, unlike the report from the Canada 21 Council, deliberately eschewed force structure prescriptions but offered a most useful—and still relevant—‘checklist’ of the factors and national interests that governments should reflect upon when reviewing defence policy.

The public consultations on defence policy initiated by the Trudeau government in April 2016—billed, accurately, as the “first public consultation of this magnitude on Canadian defence policy in over 20 years”—embraced a number of interlocking elements. These included:

(a) The release of a 27-page Public Consultation Document—replete with background information, statistics, and a series of questions—to stimulate and inform debate on future directions in Canadian defence policy.

(b) A series of six multiple-topic, almost day-long roundtable discussions—in Vancouver, Toronto, Yellowknife, Edmonton, Montréal and Halifax—populated by invited experts (typically eleven-to-fifteen per roundtable) in defence, security, and foreign policy, as well as in such relevant domains as technology, health and wellness, international development, and human resources. The roundtable discussions were led by a third-party moderator from public opinion and polling firm Ipsos, and were “conducted in a way that [encouraged] discussion amongst participants…rather then formal presentations.”

Roundtable participants were requested to provide a brief, two-page submission outlining their views and the key points they wished to bring forward during the meetings. During the roundtables, which frequently had Ministerial (Harjit Sajjan) or Parliamentary Secretary (John McKay) representation, the experts were to focus on “the main challenges to Canada’s security,” “the role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in addressing threats and challenges, now and into the future,” and “the resources and capabilities needed to carry out the CAF mandate.” Two more specialized roundtables in Ottawa, the first defence-industrial focused and the second devoted to gender perspectives on defence and security, followed the six multiple-topic sessions.

(c) Provision, until 31 July 2016, for online feedback from Canadians on defence policy.

(d) An invitation to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence and the Standing House of Commons Committee on National Defence “to study issues of relevance to the policy review” and a request that Parliamentarians “encourage their constituents to submit feedback.”

Ottawa also encouraged the holding of defence policy review “consultation events” by Members of Parliament, Federal riding associations, non-governmental organizations, and others. Most of these events were open to the general public.
In addition, the Trudeau government created a Ministerial Advisory Panel “to support the Minister of National Defence during the review of Canada’s defence policy.” The panel, announced on 6 April 2015, comprised former Justice of the Supreme Court Louise Arbour, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Minister of National Defence Bill Graham, former Chief of the Defence Staff General (retired) Raymond R. Henault and former Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Security and Intelligence) in the Privy Council Office (as well as former Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence) Margaret Purdy. The panel members were expected to “add considerable value to the review process by testing ideas and approaching issues from their own unique perspectives to provide a critical voice.”

Readily available online, the Public Consultation Document identified a series of “key consultation questions” to help inform debate on the future shape of Canadian defence policy and the Canadian Armed Forces. These included:

1) Are there any threats to Canada’s security that are not being addressed adequately?
2) What roles should the Canadian Armed Forces play domestically, including in support of civilian authorities?
3) How should Canada-United States cooperation on defence of North America evolve in the coming years?
4) What form should the CAF contribution to peace support operations take? Is there a role for the CAF in helping to prevent conflict before it occurs?
5) Should the size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Forces change from what they are today?
6) How can the DND and the CAF improve the way they support the health and wellness of military members? In what areas should more be done?
7) Should Canada strive to maintain military capability across the full spectrum of operations? Are there specific niche areas of capability in which Canada should specialize?
8) What types of investments should Canada make in space, cyber, and unmanned systems? To what extent should Canada strive to keep pace and be interoperable with key allies in these domains?
9) What additional measures could the DND undertake, along with partner departments, to improve defence procurement?
10) What resources will the CAF require to meet Canada’s defence needs?
This list by no means exhausted the questions and sub-questions contained in the Public Consultation Document. Indeed, some of the questions embedded in the text generated greater attention and debate than those labelled as “key.” The overview of search and rescue, for example, noted that the armed forces “take their role in search and rescue very seriously and [remain] focused on continuous improvement. Yet, given the range of other actors engaged in this activity and the small proportion of rescues that require CAF assets, a valid question is: What role should the CAF have in search and rescue? Are there models for alternative service delivery that could be explored? What would the implications of alternative service delivery be for search and rescue across Canada, including in the North?” Such phraseology implied that a decision to privatize SAR had, in effect, already been made—thereby drawing media and other criticism and prompting a Ministerial reassurance that no such privatization was intended. Left uncertain were the prospects for continuing partial privatization of the military’s SAR activities (i.e., squadron/base-level maintenance of the new fixed-wing SAR aircraft).

The 77 participants at the six multi-topic roundtables represented a solid, albeit not perfect, cross-section of the Canadian specialists in defence and security policy, and in other relevant fields of study. The invitee list, for example, included a commendable blend of senior, mid-career and young academics, as well as a number of graduate students. The latter, so important to the future health of the defence-academic community in Canada, offered some particularly intriguing analyses in their written submissions. Also commendable was representation from a much wider array of disciplines and areas of expertise (i.e., health and wellness) than would have been case at consultations in the 1980s and 1990s. Welcome, too, were the contributions of retired senior officers, although those with army and navy backgrounds noticeably outnumbered their air force brethren. On the downside, media coverage of the roundtables, other DPR-related events, and the written submissions was, typically, limited.

The short-sighted and unimaginative elimination of DND’s long-running Security and Defence Forum during the later Harper years removed some of the stalwart actors in earlier Canadian defence consultation exercises and seriously eroded an important supporting element for academic research and academic-military discourse in defence, security, and related areas. Although some of the university centres previously associated with the Security and Defence Forum (SDF) have continued to prosper (notably those with other revenue streams), others were disbanded or significantly downsized. Indeed, in their written submissions to the DPR, a number of academics called for the restoration of an SDF-like program.
In the post-SDF environment, it was consequently heartening that such organizations as the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) made significant contributions to the defence policy review. The latter, for example, held a ‘by-invitation’ DPR roundtable in Ottawa that included participation by two members of the Ministerial Advisory Panel, held a series of more accessible roundtables and offered an impressive “curated selection of commentaries, analyses, and op-eds” to “provide some much-needed context and insight on Canadian security and defence issues.” As its official submission to the defence policy review, the Canadian Global Affairs Institute commissioned a collection of essays “with a view to offering advice and suggestions to the government on issues that CGAI believes are most germane to Canadian defence policy.” Reflecting the labours of fourteen respected analysts and dealing with issues ranging from the futures of the army, navy, air force, and special forces to procurement, peacekeeping, and Canada’s role in NATO, the thought-provoking collection represents an important addition to the literature on Canadian defence policy.

Parliamentary committees made some useful contributions, at least qualitatively, to the defence policy review process. Particularly noteworthy were the 13 June 2016 appearances of two former ministers of national defence—David Pratt and Elmer MacKay—before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, and the testimony of representatives of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and the Conference of Defence Associations and a number of retired senior officers and retired senior DND civilians before the same committee on 20 June 2016. Indeed, the latter session generated some of the most useful parliamentary testimony on defence issues in many years. One must, nevertheless, agree with David Pratt’s observation that he “would have liked to have seen more parliamentary input into this [defence policy review] process.”

The written briefs prepared by the academic and other experts who appeared at the roundtables in Vancouver, Toronto, Yellowknife, Edmonton, Montréal, and Halifax explored a diverse range of issues. Some authors focused, laser-like, on some or all of the “key consultation questions” identified in the Policy Consultation Document, while others ventured into different, but
no less salient areas. Not surprisingly, a substantial amount of attention was devoted to the future shape of the global strategic environment and the Canadian politico-security environment. Both generated thoughtful interpretations. Denis Stairs, in particular, provided some invaluable analysis in these areas. Canadian defence priorities received extensive attention as well, but generated relatively little controversy, given the near-universal acknowledgement that Canadian defence was essentially and almost perpetually locked into a troika consisting of home defence, continental defence, and contributions to international peace and security. Defence spending made comparatively few detailed appearances in the written submissions, largely because most observers saw little prospect of noteworthy increases in the defence budget.

Other themes drawing substantial attention included Canada and Peace Support Operations (scarcely a surprising development), defence diplomacy (which showed marked strength), and Arctic sovereignty and security. The latter was not surprising, but it did usefully underscore the debate between those who favour a robust, multi-faceted Canadian military capability in the Arctic, and those who advocate a more modest, more nuanced Canadian military capability in the region. The assorted quasi-military and non-military roles of Canada’s armed forces also received noteworthy attention, in part because many—although certainly not all—have links to Canada’s military presence and role in the Arctic. Indeed, some of the written submissions offered intriguing suggestions for the expansion of the CAF’s quasi-military and non-military roles in the Arctic. The extent to which there is, or is not, growth potential for the CAF’s quasi-military and non-military roles in the rest of Canada was the subject of debate. Although some saw potential for an expanded role in the face of climate change-related natural disasters, other contributors suggested that the expansion of relevant civilian agencies—federal, provincial, and municipal—would in fact undercut the disaster relief role of the armed forces. One of the most intriguing contributions to the discourse over the relationship between the military, quasi-military and non-military roles of the armed forces was made by Major-General (retired) Cameron Ross. In his written submission, Ross argued that some Militia units should be re-roled as Combat Engineer Regiments, thereby generating skill sets useful at home (i.e., disaster relief), overseas (i.e., disaster relief and peace support operations), and in combat operations. The overseas humanitarian assistance and disaster relief role of the armed forces also attracted noteworthy attention in the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres submissions, although both stressed that there were practical, legal, and
philosophical barriers to an expanded military role in that area. The written submissions also devoted considerable attention to the long-standing debate over whether Canada should seek to field a ‘multi-purpose’ or a ‘niche’ (i.e., a specialized) military establishment. Ex-military personnel, and a not-insignificant number of academics, strongly endorsed the former, arguing that the ‘niche’ option was inherently risky and problematic. The latter option did, nevertheless, command the support of a not-insignificant number of participants. Stephen Saideman made a useful distinction when he noted that this debate was often distorted by those who inaccurately equated ‘niche’ or ‘specialized’ with “a military that cannot fight.”

Themes that drew less attention in the written submissions included, but were not confined to the future of the reserves (a most disquieting and frustrating lapse), Canada and NATO (although recent developments could alter this calculus), the procurement system and the defence-industrial base (a lapse made partially good by the special-purpose roundtable in Ottawa), the military and Canadian society, and alternative service delivery. The latter was frustrating for those who harbour reservations about the extent and pace of defence outsourcing in Canada, and, concomitantly, about the lack of transparency and debate surrounding the outsourcing of Canadian defence activities and capabilities.

In the final analysis, of course, there remains the suspicion—by journalists, pundits and some participants—that governments of all political stripes engage in policy review consultation exercises for reasons of public relations and ‘window-dressing,’ having long made up their minds as to the type of defence policy and defence establishment that they wish to pursue. There is undoubtedly more than a little truth in this characterization—most recently offered up by John Ivison in a National Post analysis of 7 March 2016—but one would still like to believe that Canadian governments are capable of occasionally plucking a couple of good ideas out of a public consultation process.

Martin Shadwick has taught Canadian defence policy at York University in Toronto for many years. He is a former editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, and he is the resident Defence Commentator for the Canadian Military Journal.
One of the generals who wrote a chapter for this book, commenting on other generals who had also authored chapters in this volume, including some with whom he had served, noted: “The majority I would rate as fair, a few I would gladly join and assault hell’s gate, and some I wouldn’t follow to the latrine.” Another, speaking of the press, observed: “You will hear media presenters tell you that they are committed to obtaining an objective assessment of the news. Rubbish.”

Having spent three years on exchange with the British Army, I became very aware that the writing style of the Brits remains quite different to ours, and can perhaps be best described as “robust,” while also getting its point across in a most forthright manner. And so it was that I obtained a copy of this fine book, and indeed, I was not disappointed.

British Generals in Blair’s Wars is part of the Ashgate Series on Military Strategy and Operational Art. The work had its genesis in a series of seminars presented at the University of Oxford from 2005 to 2011 as part of the Leverhulm Programme on the Changing Character of War. The seminar consisted of a series of presentations by senior British officers, recently returned from senior operational command overseas, while also drawing upon a lifetime’s experience, experience which ranged from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Most of the contributors (the majority of whom were from the British Army) reached at least three-star rank, and there are also chapters from a Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal (full General equivalent), a chapter on the psychological impact of operations by a senior, civilian medical practitioner, and a highly instructive contribution on civil-military relations by a former senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The book is divided into five parts:

- **Part I: Setting the scene** in which the political context is described and in which former Prime Minister Tony Blair comes under a great amount of criticism, for inter alia, not thinking through the consequences of his decisions, in particular those which led to British intervention in Iraq in 2003;
- **Part II: Hard Lessons**, which focuses largely upon the early stages of Britain’s involvement in the Second Gulf War;
- **Part III: Iraq 2006-2009**, and which is sub-titled, “Success of a Sort;”
- **Part IV: Improving in Afghanistan**; and
- **Part V: What Have We Learnt?**

To those lay readers who might expect this work to be a series of critical diatribes written by “intellectual thugs” (which is how one of my professors characterized my fellow cadets and I at the Royal Military College), there is not a bit of that here. Each chapter is very well written, and several common themes become apparent: one being the need for clarity (clarity which was often lacking, as the contributors freely admit) from the political level in terms of the aim of the intervention. For one of the contributors at least, the British involvement in Iraq in 2003 had nothing to with Iraq, and everything to do with British-American security relations. Almost without exception, the contributors writing here strongly express the view that we need to be better at implementing the so-called “Comprehensive Approach,” or what we in Canada have called the “Whole of Government Approach.” Sound familiar?

Many of the generals here are writing of their time when serving within a higher US headquarters, often as the Deputy Commander, and so the book is replete with insights into the US way of war. Here I thought that the Brits might be overly critical of the military approach of our neighbours to the south. However, the book quickly disabused me of that notion. For the most part, while some British generals deployed with a “John Wayne” image of the US military, they quickly came to be impressed at how rapidly (compared to their own forces), for instance, the Americans adapted to the Counter Insurgency (COIN) environment in Iraq.
Indeed, the book devotes much space to the subject of “learning organizations,” with the British Armed Forces not always getting top marks. The book replete with several prescriptions as to how things can be done better, admittedly from the military point of view. However, I found the advice from a former MoD civil servant regarding three potential areas of friction in civil military relations, to be particularly useful. In his view, these were:

- Timeframe;
- Strategic understanding and expectation; and
- Culture, including the reaction to casualties. 5

As a very open and honest account (actually several accounts) of generalship and high-level civil-military/Alliance/coalition relations in the post-Cold War era, this book can hardly be bettered. Sadly, MoD regulations regarding serving officers publishing material that might be considered controversial resulted in six of the chapters being withdrawn. Pity. Perhaps there will be an updated version of this book published when those contributors hang up their uniforms. Indeed, the just released (at the time of the writing of this review) UK Chilcot Report into Britain’s part in the 2003 Iraq War will no doubt reinforce many of the points raised herein.

Canada, apart from the odd exchange or seconded officer, did not participate in the Second Gulf War, although we do get passing mention in references to the Afghanistan conflict, in which we fielded a relatively sizeable contribution. Which begs the question of why we have not produced a similar work about the experiences of our senior commanders on recent operations? In addition to Afghanistan, where we held many senior command appointments, including command (by then Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier) of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Canadian general and flag officers have held or are holding such diverse senior commands as:

- Multinational Division South-West (MND-SW) in the Balkans;
- Command of the multinational naval Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) in the Arabian Sea;
- Command of the Canadian team working with the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator to build security capacity in the Palestinian Authority;

- Joint Force Commander for NATO operations over Libya in 2011;
- Command (as I write) of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula;
- Command of Joint Task Forces involved in domestic operations; and indeed,
- Component and higher command under the US during the biennial Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).

Surely with such an embarrassment of riches to draw from, Canada could produce its own equivalent of British Generals in Blair’s Wars. One would hope that we are not (to quote the title of one of the chapters in this book), “Too Busy to Learn.” I would very strongly recommend this book to those, both military and civilian, who work at the highest levels of Defence, and indeed, for counterparts in Global Affairs Canada and in the Privy Council Office, for that matter. To those in uniform about to proceed on senior collation or Alliance command appointments overseas, you should definitely make reading this book a mandatory part of your pre-deployment training.

Colonel (Ret’d) Williams’ final post before retiring was as Director Arms Control Verification on the Strategic Joint Staff.

NOTES

4. This was the experience of General (Retired) Sir Nick Parker. He makes this admission in a very useful on-line panel discussion about the book, which took place at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, England on 17 July 2013. This discussion, just over an hour long, can be accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Obt2tkg4U4k
Military Operations and the Mind: War Ethics and Soldiers’ Well-Being
by Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger and Daniel Lagacé-Roy (eds.)
Soft Cover, 244 pages, $29.95
ISBN 0773547185
Reviewed by Christopher Huffam

This work is divided into four main sections and is composed of nine essays dealing with the thorny issue of the need for a distinction between ethical standards as understood and applied in contemporary Canadian society, and a separate set of ethical standards within Canada’s Armed Forces. Thoughtfully laid out, the reader is provided with an understanding of the need for a clearly defined and communicated standard of ethical practice that is grounded in the common values of Canada, the rule of law, compassion, and the differences in orientation from that of the average Canadian that a member of the Canadian Armed Forces must have to ground his or her behavior. Through the language and example choices used in the individual essays, the reader is also permitted a glimpse into the past, and shown how public perception and government direction contributed, at various times, to the current situation.

Through the first three essays, written by Ethan Whitehead, Joe Sharpe and through the combined efforts of Peter Gizewski, Heather Hrychuk and Richard Dickson, we are reminded that operational and geographical environments play a part in setting the expectations for ethical behavior. These discussions are presented through a discussion of the evolution of current national policy - the DND /CAF Code of Values and Ethics, and include a thoughtful reflection on the conflict between legal obligation, personal and institutional morality, and the impact of this clash upon the execution of command responsibilities.

The second group of essays was written respectively by the teams of Peter Bradley and Shaun Tymchuk, and Damien O’Keefe, Victor M. Catano, E. Kevin Kelloway, Danielle Charbonneau, and Alister MacIntyre. Through these two essays, this section brings reflections from the first section to the managerial levels and defines the concept of ethical risk, discusses approaches to train leaders to manage it in the decision making process, and discusses a three stage model for this process. This section also discusses the ethics of influence and how the perception of an individual can flavor the perspective of subordinates’ views of leadership.

Part three includes two essays written by the team of Alister MacIntyre, Joseph Doty and Daphnie Xu, and by Howard G. Coombs. This section is oriented to the operational level, and proposes potential methods for the measurement of ethical sensibility. In it, we see the suggestion of integrating ethical considerations into the Operational Planning Process, a consideration that had been previously included informally, if at all.

The final section of the book deals with cultural clashes and decision-making. In his essay, Allen English discusses 100 years of conflict between operational necessities and commonly-held Canadian values within the Canadian military, drawing examples from the medical services for each of the periods discussed. In discussing examples of ethical conflict, the author frames his discussion in the circumstances of the day, and describes the approaches taken to each. This is possibly the best essay in the book. In the final essay, Donna Messervey and Karen D. Davis discuss mitigating the ethical risk of sexual misconduct in organizations. This issue, unfortunately common to many large organizations, such as a nation’s armed forces, can only be ameliorated through a process of cultural change at all levels, and cannot be expected to succeed if focused only upon the individuals, as the organizational culture is equally at fault.

This book is highly recommended reading.

Major Christopher Huffam, CD, Ph.D, joined the CAF as a Militia Private with ‘A’ Company, The Canadian Scottish Regiment, in 1977. He transferred to the Regular Force in 1987 as an Armoured Officer. Employed as a Training Development Officer since 1990, he is currently the Team Lead, Knowledge Mobilization at Military Personnel Generation Headquarters. From July 2013 to March 2014, he was employed as a police training mentor, and was involved in both on-site evaluation of training at Regional Police Training Centres and as an advisor to senior staff at the Afghan National Police Training General Command in Kabul during the final Canadian Rotation of Operation Attention.
The Canadian Armed Forces 2016 CF-18 Demonstration aircraft performs at the Yellowknife Airport during the Yellowknife International Airshow, 9 July 2016.