Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 2016

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Canadian Military Journal/Revue militaire canadienne is the official professional journal of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, Canadian Military Journal, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on condition that appropriate credit is given to Canadian Military Journal. Each issue of the Journal is published simultaneously in print and electronic versions; it is available on the Internet at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

ISSN 1492-465X
NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Now in its 17th year of publication, the Canadian Military Journal has evolved to become an important pillar in the development of the profession of arms in Canada, and a highly-regarded voice in the Canadian conversation on defence. The Journal’s reach is now formidable, and by virtue of its balanced, informed, and constructive commentary on pertinent defence issues, it has come to enjoy broad support and an enviable reputation for professionalism and excellence.

I encourage members of the Canadian Armed Forces, Departmental staff, and the entire defence establishment to continue to leverage and grow this valuable resource. As members of Canada’s defence community, we all have an obligation to contribute to the current defence dialogue, and to stimulate innovative thinking with respect to the many challenges that confront the military profession today.

I want to express my gratitude to all those who have contributed to the last 17 years of the Canadian Military Journal, and I wish this publication every success in its future endeavours. With all of our support, I am confident that the Canadian Military Journal will continue to enliven and enlighten the Canadian debate on defence for many years to come.

Harjit Sajjan
Minister of National Defence
Each and every profession worthy of that categorization requires a forum to voice new ideas and concepts, and to discuss and share views and opinions on a plethora of issues relevant to that profession. It is discussion, debate, and thoughtful engagement that keeps any given profession from stagnating, and helps to ensure that it remains receptive to appropriate and legitimate innovation and change.

With respect to the profession of arms, we exist in a time when there is a significant imperative to confront, indeed, to embrace changes in security threats and defence challenges, equipment needs, organizational structure, and the manner in which we address and conduct all future operations and training throughout a spectrum of mission and service needs. All of this speaks to the health of the institution of the Canadian Armed Forces as an integral part of the Department of National Defence. Our goal is always the promotion of institutional excellence in all its dimensions.

The Canadian Military Journal is a highly appropriate and time-proven forum to address the issue of institutional excellence. To that end, we highly encourage engagement therein from the entire defence community. It is through the frank and open tabling and discussions of these relevant security and defence issues that progress towards resolutions and relevant intellectual growth will occur.

J.H. Vance, CMM, MSC, CD
Chief of the Defence Staff
General

John Forster, BSc, MBA
Deputy Minister of National Defence
Welcome to the Spring 2016 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. As usual, these words are being penned while we are still in the icy grasp of winter, but the end is very much in sight...

Lots of variety for our readership this time out... To begin, we have one Special Report in the issue, and it deals with a very timely subject. Major Lena Angell, the Senior Public Affairs Officer for Operation Provision, the CAF contribution to the Government of Canada’s commitment to the resettlement of Syrian refugees to Canada by early-2016, reports on this Whole-of-Government effort as viewed through the lens of the initiative’s status at year’s-end 2015. And while various circumstances have dictated a slower pace of implementation than was previously anticipated, this Special Report casts a favourable light on this example of close interdepartmental cooperation in Canada’s response to this grave humanitarian crisis.

Issues affecting women in uniform is also, at its core, a very timely subject. To this end, Sub-Lieutenant Kareem Negm, a recent graduate of the University of Victoria’s Political Science program who has been with the Regular Force Royal Canadian Navy for fifteen years, “…challenge[s] the assumption that gendered barriers no longer exist. The overall purpose of this study is not to discount the formidable achievements of those female warriors who have served and continue to serve. Rather, it is my intention to elicit a sense of caution in assuming that all is well on the gender front. The crux of my argument centers on the fact that women in uniform are not representative of their proportions in society. After all these years, the female presence in uniform remains a relatively-token existence, not only in the Canadian military, but it is also reflective of militaries throughout the world. As such, the CAF remains a fundamentally male dominated space, which suggests that gender barriers, either real or perceived, continue to act as deterrents to recruitment and retention. In short, why are women still under-represented in the military?”

Moving right along, Ben Zweibelson, a retired US Army infantry officer with multiple combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and currently the Course Director for Design Programs at the Joint Special Operations University, US Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida, argues that, with respect to military planning “…our exclusive analytical approach and linear style decision making opens us up to vulnerabilities and creates barriers to a more critically reflexive practice. Our institutionalized habits focus only upon analytic and linear models and are unreflexive in exploring critically why we think this way and what alternative ways of thinking may be available. I propose a non-linear approach to ‘sensemaking’ termed holistic non-linear world view as one alternative paradigm to the analytic-linear world view.”

Next, Major Ryan Kastrukoff, a highly-experienced fighter pilot currently serving as an instructor pilot in the CT-155 Hawk on 419 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron at CFB Cold Lake, examines the concept of commander’s intent versus the assignment of specific missions, and offers that “…providing intent instead of specific missions creates space for subordinate commanders and soldiers to use their initiative to achieve the goal once battlefield conditions change.” Kastrukoff further maintains that “…major advances in information technology have changed the battlespace and now require an adaption in organizational structure to best focus and leverage individual initiative, especially in the information battlespace.” After presenting three case studies highlighting the inefficiency of using the current organizational structure, “…a proposed organizational change is then presented that incorporates features of crowd-sourcing and collaborative online workspaces to improve the acquisition, development, and implementation of fast-evolving complex technologies used by the Canadian Armed Forces.”

In our last major article, Professor Jason Cooley of the University of Hartford examines the evolution of transnational revolutionary organizations, specifically beginning with the international communist movement that seized control of Russia in the early-20th Century. In its aftermath, its leaders turned “…to bringing people to power in other nations who would also be concerned about eradicating economic injustice.” That said, while these transnational revolutionary organizations frequently tried to engineer insurrections, none managed to overthrow their detested leaders. “The supporters of the Islamist movement shared communist antipathy for the West, but they were not determined to eliminate economic injustice. Instead, they were more interested in halting the spread of Western culture in Muslim nations…” While the Islamist movement was occurring, multiple transnational revolutionary organizations were created. Initially, these entities were controlled by a revolutionary state similar to the most formidable networks from the communist era. [the Comintern and the Cominform Ed.]. However, as more time elapsed, they began to function in an independent fashion.” Professor Cooley then goes on to specifically chronicle this evolution “…by taking Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria into consideration.”

Four very different opinion pieces in this issue… Taking the point, Major-General [Ret’d] Marc Terreau, an acknowledged expert in defence ethics and a former Chief of Review Services, offers a spirited endorsement of the Defence Ethics Program and the Chaplaincy’s place within it. General Terreau is followed by Major Dan Doran, a Reserve Force combat engineer, who then takes a fresh look at attrition and retention in the reserves, contends that there are attrition problems and unique challenges facing the Reserve Force, and suggests “…possible alternatives that would go a long way in mitigating at least some of these unique challenges through a more strategic outlook on human resource management within the reserves, and accepting hard realities on the perceived/desired vs. functional capabilities of the reserves.”

Next, Kara Leman, a Workplace Wellness Project Coordinator and a former Health Promotion Specialist with the Canadian Armed Forces, recounts the brave struggle of a junior member of the Canadian Armed Forces with depression and the consideration of suicide, a struggle he openly acknowledges in the hope that it will encourage others to seek help. Finally, Earl John Chapman and R. Paul Goodman, both officers associated with the
EDITOR’S CORNER

78th Fraser Highlanders of Montréal, take a fresh look at the actual geographical location of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759 by evoking recent developments in geo-referencing. They contend that “...imprecise or erroneous depictions have been offered to historians, the interested public, and battlefield tourists over the last 180 years.”

Our resident defence commentator, Martin Shadwick, then takes a look at the Stephan Harper legacy with respect to national defence. Ultimately, he contends it was “...mixed, as is the case with most Canadian prime ministers. Given the sobering realities inherited from previous governments – be they a ‘hot war’ in Afghanistan, or a growing backlog of aging and inadequate equipment – the Harper government arguably managed defence comparatively well in its earlier years. That said, a number of measures might have fostered a stronger Harper legacy on defence…”

Finally, as usual, we close with a number of book reviews for our readers’ consideration.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal

LETTER TO THE EDITOR


I would like to commend the author for his contribution to a much-needed discussion. To further such, I would like to offer the following two observations. First, when highlighting the initiative of a soldier to learn Pashto on his own, the author states that the “professional development [PD] and training system did not provide him with all the tools he needed in order for him to fully perform his tasks.” I would suggest that the PD and training system provided what was asked for; it is for the operators to identify what is needed, and, in this context, it is the senior leaders who did not (early on) emphasize the language requirement. This is even supported in the article by the example from the lessons learned report of the Second Battalion of the Royal Vingt-deuxième Regiment Battle Group (2 R22eR BG), where operational counter-insurgency (COIN) requirements are identified, including linguistic training.

My second observation is that the recommendations offered by the author, which I personally support, require one primary resource – money. Without a reprioritization or balancing of funding for capability development (equipment and human), or a significant injection of funding from government, I fear that the necessary education of the NCM Corps simply will not happen.

Respectfully,

Peter Ball
Lieutenant-Commander
VENTURE, The Naval Officer Training Centre
Operation *Provision* – Canada’s Whole-of-Government Response to a Humanitarian Crisis

Canadian Armed Forces proudly support largest refugee resettlement in Canada’s history

by Major Lena Angell, CD, MA, Senior Public Affairs Officer, Joint Task Force – Forward (JTF-F), with sincere gratitude to team members Master Corporal Darcy Lefebvre and Corporal Mathieu Gaudreault, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

Major Lena Angell graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a BA(Business) in 2001. Originally an Armoured Officer with the Royal Canadian Dragoons, in 2002, she underwent a voluntary occupational transfer to the Public Affairs Branch. In that capacity she has served with distinction on numerous domestic and overseas deployments. In 2014, Major Angell received an MA in Communications, Media and Public Relations from the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. In November 2015, she deployed on Operation Provision in Lebanon, the CAF contribution to the Government of Canada’s commitment to the resettlement of 25,000 Syrian refugees to Canada by end-February 2016. As the senior Public Affairs Officer, supported by a dedicated Canadian Forces Combat Camera team in Beirut, as well as a PA team in Amman, Jordan, she is responsible for communicating CAF and whole-of-government ongoing efforts to the Canadian public.

The Canadian Armed Forces Public Affairs team had the unique opportunity to interview many of the major players participating in Beirut, Lebanon, responsible for the processing of 25,000 Syrian refugees for resettlement to Canada by the end of February 2016, as well as two families personally affected by the conflict in Syria.

22 December 2015
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

Task Force Commander discusses close departmental coordination

A large Health Support Services (HSS) team from across the nation, coupled with members of 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, based at 5th Canadian Division Support Base Gagetown, New Brunswick, and members of 1st Canadian Division in Kingston, Ontario, as well as Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) personnel from Bagotville, Quebec, have come together to form Joint Task Force – Forward (JTF-F). The Canadian Armed Forces team – approximately 230 strong – has been operating at full-speed since early December, supporting the refugee resettlement under Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada’s (IRCC) lead. CAF assistance has included the provision of airlift support to the first two groups of refugees from Lebanon, conducting biometrics, delivering administrative and data entry support, providing linguist services and liaison officers, and performing medical immigration examinations.

“This is a success story,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Patrice Beauchamp, Task Force Commander JTF-F. “We are developing a lot of good coordination with all of the other departments: Transport Canada, Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), Immigration, the mission [Global Affairs Canada] itself, and other partners like IOM [International Organization for Migration] that logistically support the process. They’re great people.”

As with any major operation, challenges can be expected and this one has had its own unique set. “One thing that is difficult is that they [the other departments] are more rotational than us. So we establish this network and after that you know, you have a way to conduct [business], but they change and they are replaced; as we are more static in our approach. This operation is very complex, but it’s a great experience.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Beauchamp spoke of the many components of the mission and how it was drawing on the cumulative experience he gained throughout his time in the Forces. “For me it means that I’m part of something bigger than I have ever been in 28 years in my career. I’m used to dealing with other departments, but this [operation] is more complex and way bigger because now you are talking about five different deputy ministers and departments that coordinate the effort. For me it’s a challenge, and something that brings everything I did [previously] together. So it means a lot to me personally.”

Having visited each step of the processing, Lieutenant-Colonel Beauchamp has seen results first-hand. “I’ve had chances to speak with refugee families and children to feel what we are bringing, and I see a lot of positivity, a lot of smiles. You never see people in Canada at an airport waiting and smiling. They are very thankful for what the Government of Canada is providing, which is a chance to start a new life. It’s quite moving.”

HSS performs medical examinations

The greatest concentration of CAF members is in a hospital in Beirut, where they occupy a wing and utilize on-site laboratory and x-ray facilities. Here, the CAF – a robust team of physicians, nurses, and healthcare administrators, as well as medical, laboratory, and x-ray technicians supported by CAF interpreters – conduct all the immigration examinations.

“The people here have been doing a lot of hard work,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Currie, Task Force Surgeon. “Certainly, what surprised a lot of people is that we were able to work outside of what we normally do. So, right from the corporal to my position, we were able to identify and use skills that we may have not even realized we had, and it was amazing to see how our team was able to gel and create a clinic where there wasn’t any clinic before.”

Each member of the HSS team regularly pulls 12-to-14-hour work days, but the long hours are not a concern. “The most challenging part of this mission has been listening to the personal stories of refugees who have had to leave everything they know behind and flee their country,” said Lieutenant (Navy) Sheena Teed, a nursing officer in charge of overseeing the lab section. “It is difficult to know that there are so many people in need and I am only able to help so few. This experience has provided me with a new appreciation of what it means to be a Canadian, and all of the opportunities and rights associated with it.”

RCAF assists with airlift

The RCAF’s contribution to the operation was observed most profoundly on 10 December and 12 December, when a CC-150 Polaris airbus transported more than 300 Syrian refugees to Canada. This movement required close coordination, not only with other Canadian partners, but also heavily with local airport and security authorities. The RCAF team, including the Air Movements Squadron responsible for additional screening of personnel and luggage, operations officer, aircraft commander and crew, flight engineers and loadmasters, as well as ground crew all contributed to the successful departures.

“The RCAF and the CAF ‘writ-large,’ we are very proud to be part of this operation and supporting the other government partners such as IRCC, CBSA, Transport Canada, as well as local agencies here: airport security, armed forces, and other security agencies,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Coutts, Air Component Coordination Element Director. “It’s a privilege and an honour to provide the first two lifts for the refugees to Canada.”
Head of the Mission speaks to security, public health and Canadian values

In this complex operation, Michelle Cameron, Canada’s Ambassador to the Lebanese Republic, plays a key diplomatic role as the Head of Mission (HoM). “My job is to lead the whole-of-government effort as a variety of government departments come together to work on resettling Syrian refugees. Some days that means my job is to step out of the way and let the great people who are here do their jobs. Other days, it means I’m liaising closely with the government of Lebanon to make sure that we are doing this in a way that is consistent with Canadian values and also with Lebanese processes,” remarked the ambassador.

On the question of security to Canadians, specifically the concerns expressed over the possibility of terrorists filtering through the refugee chain, the ambassador highlighted the close integration of expertise saying, “Canada has been resettling refugees and encouraging migration for years. So over and above this effort, we have a well-defined process. We have law enforcement, intelligence partners in Canada and around the world. We are not ‘cutting corners’ in this effort. We are making sure that all the processes are being followed, that we are working with our partners. Throughout the whole process, two points are at the forefront of all our efforts, and that’s the security and the health of Canadians and the refugees.”

The sheer deprivation experienced by Syrian refugees is a side to the story that Canadians need to know, explained the ambassador. “I would reassure Canadians that this truly is a necessary humanitarian effort, one that is consistent with Canadian values since our country was founded. I believe that if folks could come here and see the conditions under which the refugees are living – be it in an informal settlement or in a crowded apartment where multiple families gather, trying to get enough money for food and rent – the Canadian people would see that this is Canadian values in action. This humanitarian effort to bring 25,000 Syrian refugees to Canada quickly, safely, efficiently, and with all the support for which Canadians are known, I believe they would feel that this is such an effort of which to be proud. And as proud as my team who are working on it feel, Canadians would feel just as proud.”
IRCC leads complex operation, thanks partner departments

IRCC is no stranger to refugee resettlement. “We’ve had a presence in Lebanon for many years as part of the diplomatic mission here,” said Sharon Chomyn, IRCC Project Lead. “However, with the announcement [by the Government of Canada to move 25,000 refugees by end-February] we’ve had to significantly increase our operations in Lebanon, as well as Jordan and Turkey. Our role here is as the project lead. We are coordinating the delivery of this project on the ground, working very closely with a number of partners in the field.”

With multiple departments, each reporting back to its own headquarters, strong communications up, down and across all levels is at the heart of the operation, says Ms. Chomyn. “It’s always difficult with something that is this complicated and this large to have a seamless communication program, but I’m very, very pleased with the way things have been working here. Whenever there have been hiccups, we have managed to find ways to overcome them. I’ve been involved in this type of work for 30 years and I’ve never seen anything this big and this complex work as well as it is working, and that’s really a tribute to the people who are on the ground who are making it work, notwithstanding any frictions that may come up or lapses in communication.”

In a recent visit to Canada’s Operations Centre, Ms. Chomyn remarked about the experience. “I was so impressed with how everything was working there, the very positive frame of mind, notwithstanding the fact that all the mission programs [IRCC, CBSA, IOM, DND] are very, very tired. They’ve been working 12 and 14-hour days for several weeks. The refugees themselves, despite the circumstances that they have been living under, their spirits are remarkably high, children are happy, everyone looks well cared for.”

DND partnering, a new relationship

Ms. Chomyn emphasized the noteworthy contribution of the Canadian Armed Forces who are providing direct support and delivering real effects in the Canadian Operations Centre. “I have never seen biometrics being conducted so quickly. That’s I’m sure in part due to the skills of DND personnel, but also because of the IT system that we have there.” She also credited the CAF for their work in a nearby hospital performing medical screening, while in the embassy (the back-office), a number of military clerks and administration assistants perform data entry.
“It’s been quite interesting what is happening on the ground here. We [IRCC and Department of National Defence] are obviously the same part of the Government of Canada, but we don’t have the opportunity to work as closely very often as we have been working here,” she added.

**CBSA partnering, familiar ground**

On the other hand, Ms. Chomyn pointed out that CBSA and IRCC have had a long history and very close working relationship. The two departments work together administering the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Canada’s immigration legislation, each having separate responsibilities under the act. CBSA has been assisting with certain aspects of the case processing, such as the background and security checks, for each of the applicants. In addition, working closely with IOM and local airport authorities and security partners, CBSA has the lead role in departure arrangements, moving refugees to the airport, verifying travel documents, pre-flight clearances, handling security related issues, and customs-related work with respect to personal effects and baggage.

“CBSA is very proud to be a part of this operation and works very closely with various departments,” said Mary Teresa Glynn, CBSA Team Lead. “This has really been an interesting operation to be a part of, and of course it has a number of unique challenges and opportunities that go along with it. One of the more challenging parts of this operation from my perspective has been identifying the roles and responsibilities of all of the different operators that work together. Many of us share aspects of a mandate, so identifying ways in which we can best leverage our assets to achieve our common goal has been a challenge, but certainly one that we have been able to work through.”

When asked about the significance of this mission, Ms. Glynn pointed to Canadian intrinsic ideals. “I believe this mission is important for Canadians because Canadians have strong values for humanitarian work. It’s an opportunity to leverage our international network to work closely with partner departments for a Whole-of-Government approach. Canada has always been a welcoming country, and this operation is reflective of that.”
Global Affairs Canada, a critical partner

The operation would not be possible without the logistical support and administrative platform provided by Global Affairs Canada, remarked Ms. Chomyn. “They are a very important partner for us in all of the work that we do overseas, and especially in support of the Syrian resettlement project.” Global Affairs is involved in issuing visas, clearing and transporting diplomatic bags (material and equipment brought in to support the operation) to various locations, receiving, housing, and transporting temporary duty personnel surged in to assist. Furthermore, Global Affairs provides IT support, security, manages procurement and finances, coordinates media inquiries, and leads the operation with the Lebanese authorities through the HoM.

The victims of the civil war in Syria

The flow of refugees continues at an alarming rate. A number of media reports indicate that as many as 4.2 million Syrians have been forced from their homes since the outbreak of the conflict in 2011. Each one has their own story, including Elizabeth Demirijan and Joumaa Al Moussa.

Privately-sponsored refugee family speaks of Canadian kindness

As privately-sponsored refugees, Elizabeth Demirijan and her husband Joseph were excited about reconnecting with her two brothers, one who arrived in Canada five months earlier, and the eldest, who has resided there for 25 years. “They are waiting for us to rejoin our family, to celebrate Christmas and New Year together,” she said on-board the CC-150 Polaris airbus, the first flight departing Lebanon with refugees, on 10 December. Elizabeth’s son and mother remain in Lebanon, and are expected to follow soon. “I will be happier then,” she added. This is the first time Elizabeth and her husband will have travelled to Canada, and despite the questionable and likely-cold weather awaiting, she remarked upon the anticipated warm welcome of Canadians. “They are a very kind people. I know about Montréal. My brother lives in Laval. They help each other. My husband, maybe he will find a job and learn French.”
Government assisted refugee family sees a future for children

“The most important thing is the education that his children will receive,” said Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) worker Tatiana Audi translating for Joumaa Al Moussa, a 29-year-old Syrian refugee living in a wood-framed tent on a cement slab in an informal settlement in Dalhamiye, Bekaa Valley, home to more than 600 refugees. Joumaa was recently contacted for resettlement to Canada and will soon begin the application process, along with his wife Khatoun, 25, and three young children, Aya, 7, Mohamad, 5, and Ahmad, 3. “He thinks of the resettlement as a way forward for his children,” added Tatiana. Having been a refugee for three years, seeing his house destroyed, and livelihood completely extinguished – going from a very comfortable working middle-class, to barely ‘scraping by’ on $400 USD per month from UNHCR welfare programs and seasonal menial work – his eyes go misty and voice fades to almost a whisper when speaking of the future.

How does a Syrian refugee family in Lebanon make it to Canada?

The process starts with the Government of Canada identifying the criteria, with vulnerability to the refugees at the forefront, as well as national security and public health and safety to Canadians. UNHCR registers those who qualify, and then the ‘ball starts rolling’ with a simple text message to the family, followed by transportation arranged by the refugee or IOM to the Canadian Operations Centre (commonly referred to as the processing centre) in Beirut, where formal processing occurs.

Oscar Jacobs, the Canadian Operations Centre Manager, explained to CAF Public Affairs each step of the process. It starts with pre-reception, verifying the names of those who arrived before anyone is allowed entry into the centre. The refugees pass through security, similar to a metal detector and screening at an airport. They progress to a reception area, and next move to a photo booth station to obtain pictures for visas. Afterwards, fingerprints and additional digital photos are taken, and data is entered as part of the biometrics collection, allowing for positive identification and protection from identity theft. Continuing on, refugees enter the visa form-filling and application station. Files are then reviewed as part of the pre-interview checks, and immediately following, experts lead interviews with a specific line of questioning, which verifies information provided by the refugees themselves, and confirms eligibility for resettlement. Once completed, the post-interview checks follow, where specialists review information and update each file, and finally, an appointment is scheduled for medical screening conducted by CAF personnel at a nearby hospital, or by IOM in various clinics.
The entire process at the centre is a ‘well-oiled machine,’ and takes the average Syrian refugee family of six persons three hours to complete, with another day required for the medical portion. At the hospital, a five-step process awaits: identification verification, registration, and photos, laboratory exams, chest x-rays, and a full medical examination by a physician. From there, the family returns to their temporary housing or informal settlement and awaits to receive the text or call which will inform them that travel arrangements have been formalized, changing their lives forever.

“The process starts with the Government of Canada identifying the criteria, with vulnerability to the refugees at the forefront, as well as national security and public health and safety to Canadians.”

To learn more about the Whole-of-Government response, visit the following websites:


IRCC at http://www.rescue.org/crisis-syria


Follow on Twitter: #Welcomerefugees
Women in Military Uniforms: Looking Beyond the Numbers

by Kareem Negm

Sub-Lieutenant Kareem Negm, a recent graduate of the University of Victoria’s Political Science program, has been with the Regular Force Royal Canadian Navy for fifteen years. Initially serving as an NCM Naval Communicator, he spent most of his NCM career aboard HMCS Winnipeg, during which time he deployed twice for Operations Apollo and Altair. Subsequently selected for higher education and concomitant commissioning under the UTPNCM program, he is presently a Maritime Surface/Sub-surface Officer undergoing initial occupation training at the Naval Officer Training Centre Venture at CFB Esquimalt.

EDITOR’S NOTE – Sub-Lieutenant Negm’s article was written prior to former Supreme Court Justice and External Review Authority (ERA) Marie Deschamps’ report on sexual misconduct within the Canadian Armed Forces. Accordingly, and in response, in August 2015, General Jonathan Vance, the Chief of the Defence Staff, launched Op HONOUR. In General Vance’s words: “The report… indicated the existence of an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF, which if not addressed, is conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Indeed, this conduct is wrong and runs contrary to the values of the profession of arms and ethical principles of the DND/CAF. The cornerstone of any military is the ability to be ready to respond to a wide variety of challenges at a moment’s notice. Personnel readiness is a function of many factors, the most basic of which is a high degree of physical and mental fitness. Harmful or inappropriate sexual behaviour grievously erodes the confidence that members need to successfully carry out military duties. It is from this perspective that harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour involving members of the CAF is an operational readiness issue, incongruent with our ethics and values, and wrong. Harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour is a real and serious problem for the CAF which requires the direct, deliberate and sustained engagement by the leadership of the CAF and the entire chain of command to address. Sustained engagement on this issue is critical to our effectiveness as a military force and the continued support of the Canadian people… My intent is to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within the CAF by leveraging the unequivocal
support of my Commanders and all leaders within the CAF. Any form of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour is a threat to the morale and operational readiness of the CAF, undermines good order and discipline, is inconsistent with the values of the profession of arms and the ethical principles of the DND and the CAF, and is wrong. I will not allow harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within our organization, and I shall hold all leaders in the CAF accountable for failures that permit its continuation... Eliminating harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within the CAF depends on its members demonstrating the integrity to act in a manner that bears the closest scrutiny and the courage to overcome difficult challenges through determination and strength of character. There shall be no grace period for the application of our values and ethics. Proper conduct starts now.”

Much more will be covered with respect to the specific initiatives that constitute parts of Op HONOUR in issues to follow.

Introduction

The inclusion of women into the contemporary military apparatus has generated a quiet revolution in Canada. Since before the Second World War, women have broken down gender barriers and have proven themselves as equally capable, if not more so, than their male counterparts. The mass introduction of women in uniform during the Second World War into non-traditional occupations effectively set the precursor for those who would eventually command warships, pilot fighter jets, and lead troops in the field. To be sure, the trajectory of such progress was by no means linear. The inclusion of women into combat positions in Canada’s three services proved to be an uphill battle that raged on for many years, and included both the loss and gain of valuable ground in terms of public policy and gendered social norms. Overall, it is important that Canadians not lose sight of the progress that women have achieved and continue to achieve.

In support of International Women’s Day 2014, the Department of National Defence (DND) published an article on its website which championed successful women in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). This article recognized servicewomen who have chosen, not only to enter the male dominated Profession of Arms, but those who have managed to excel in their chosen careers. In doing so, the article provokes a sense that gendered barriers no longer exist, and that feminists of both sexes can ‘pack their duffel bags,’ because equality has been achieved. In the following article, I will challenge the assumption that gendered barriers no longer exist. The overall purpose of this study is not to discount the formidable achievements of those female warriors who have served and continue to serve. Rather, it is my intention to elicit a sense of caution in assuming that all is well on the gender front.
The crux of my argument centers on the fact that women in uniform are not representative of their proportions in society. After all these years, the female presence in uniform remains a relatively-token existence, not only in the Canadian military, but it is also reflective of militaries throughout the world. As such, the CAF remains a fundamentally male dominated space, which suggests that gender barriers, either real or perceived, continue to act as deterrents to recruitment and retention. In short, why are women still under-represented in the military?

The Numbers Game

In order to address the central question regarding female participation in the military, one must first investigate their numerical representation in the CAF. The CAF’s labour pool employs approximately 68,000 Regular Force personnel. Augmenting these active soldiers, sailors, and aviators is a Reserve Force consisting of 27,000 part-time personnel, thereby amounting to a military that is ‘slightly shy’ of 100,000 people.

As of 2013, women represented 14.8 percent of this overall total number. This percentage is reflective of female military service in other nations. Looking back to the turn of the century, the Committee of Women in the NATO Forces produced a report detailing the percentages of active female personnel in NATO militaries. The United States (US) was at the top of the spectrum, with a women’s military participation (WMP) rate of 14 percent. Following in second was Canada, with a WMP rate of 11.4 percent. The remaining NATO countries, such as France, the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, and Belgium, fell below 10 percent WMP. Other nations that fell below 5 percent include Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Poland. Collectively, the total WMP of all NATO countries in Year 2000 was roughly 13 percent. The most significant observation to make is that this report was produced well over a decade ago. Has there been any progress in NATO WMP over the past 14 years?

Over the course of the past decade, many NATO countries have introduced legislation and public policy in order to actively engage in marketing the military as an employer of choice for young women. Based upon this initiative, one could assume that the statistics relating to WMP in NATO Forces should show promise. In 2007, Hungary and Canada were tied in first place at 17.3 percent WMP. WMP in France and Norway rose to 14 percent and 8.3 percent respectively, whereas WMP remained stagnant in Belgium, the UK, and the Netherlands. Luxembourg and Denmark remained somewhat stagnant, only just cresting 5 percent. Poland experienced an increase from 0.1 percent to 1.5 percent. Notable increases include from 4.3 percent to 17.3 percent for Hungary, and from 3.1 percent to 12 percent for Turkey – all within the span of one year. In contrast, Romania lost over half its women in uniform between 2007 and 2008, experiencing a decrease from 6.4 percent to 3.2 percent. The US also suffered a considerable reduction in female human capital, falling from 15.5 percent to 10.5 percent between 2005 and 2006. Although Canada is a global leader in gender integration, it also suffered a loss of female representation, falling from 17.3 percent to the current 14.8 percent. Despite this decrease, Canada still “…stands out as the best example of successfully recruiting and retaining female personnel in the armed forces in NATO.”

This optimistic statement in-itself should engender a sense of pride for Canadians, both in and out of uniform. However, such optimism should be cautionary in nature. The fact remains that, after decades in military uniform, WMP remains at a relatively modest 15 percent. Does this suggest that women in the military are merely tokens?
The problematic issue that remains is that female representation in the CAF is not commensurate with their broader representation in the societal workforce. The Canadian labour market consists roughly of 50 percent women, which is not reflective of the military workforce. What does it mean when a representative group falls below 15 percent? Academic literature suggests that this figure represents a threshold for a distinct group to be considered as a token group. The concept of tokenism implies that a small and distinct group, based upon its very limited proportion within a much larger group, will be susceptible to and influenced by the social hegemony of that larger group. As such, the more dominant group dictates the overall organizational culture, either officially or unofficially. Such a situation is a fair representation of the military, in which men are represented in a much larger proportion than their female counterparts. Is it fair to suggest that token representation alone is a significant reason for low WMP? Are women reluctant to join the armed forces simply due to the fact that there are so few women already serving? These questions point to a social and cultural understanding of gender, which will be explored later in this article. Before doing so, let us explore the pragmatic reasons as to why WMP remains low in Canada.

**Contributing Factors**

Has enough time evolved for WMP to reach a substantial level in Canada? At first glance, one could argue that once formal restrictions were lifted, the controlling variable for WMP was time itself. The crux of this argument is that as women joined the forces, the more accepted their presence would become. Thus, the simple quantitative presence of women would attract even more women and would affect the way in which the broader organization functioned. However, empirical results do not support this view. For instance, the overall representation of women in the CAF grew by less than one percent, from 9.9 percent to 10.8 percent, between 1989 and 2000. Further evidence points to the fact that WMP in the CAF has risen by only 3 percent since 2000. Such a slim rise over the course of half a generation suggests that time does not directly correlate to WMP. Therefore, one should be cautious when correlating time with progress.

It is important to note that military recruitment coincides in a world that is governed by economics and politics. WMP becomes affected by legislative policy and pragmatic fiscal constraints that may not necessarily be discriminatory, but may hamper the employment of women in military uniform. Looking back to the Canadian experience, the relatively modest WMP increase of 1 percent during the 1990s was eclipsed by economic insecurity that resulted in massive budget cuts to the CAF. Growing public debt overshadowed the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, and, subsequently, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien. DND’s budget was heavily curtailed, which resulted in a substantial reduction of personnel. Active military troop strength in 1989 was 89,000 members. However, the CAF’s effective strength plummeted to almost 50,000 by the end of Prime Minister Chrétien’s tenure. In addition to the debilitating...
fiscal atmosphere that enveloped the defence establishment, it is important to note that this was also a post-Charter of Rights and Freedoms era that was characterized by ever-increasing rhetoric of gender equity and female integration into the workforce. A 1989 Human Rights Tribunal chastised the military for its slow progress in increasing female participation. This tribunal also ordered that all military positions be opened to women. However, the fiscal challenges of the day, coupled with the en masse decrease of service personnel, did not necessarily produce an environment conducive to meaningful recruitment of anyone, let alone women.

In observing WMP since 2001, one notices that there has been a threefold increase in women’s recruitment in relation to the 1990s. The prominent marker for this increase is the significant post-911 security environment that led to the War on Terror, and to the mission in Afghanistan. These developments effectively drew both social and political attention back to the CAF, which was much in need of both financial and human capital. In order to address gender inclusion, DND engaged in an aggressive marketing campaign that was positioned to attract female recruits. This campaign resulted in a threefold boost in female recruitment levels in comparison to pre-911 women’s enrollment. While such an increase should not be trivialized, WMP still remains at token levels. In order to address tokenism, it is important to examine the factors that may act as its precursors. Do any biological factors exist which may suggest that women are less suited for military service?

In the absence of policy barriers to women’s military service, how can one explain that the military remains a male dominated space? In an attempt to investigate this issue, one must question the role of nature versus nurture. Scientific research indicates that some male biology traits can serve as preponderance for the largely male presence in war, such as size and strength. However, while these biological influencers have some empirical support, they are not sufficient enough to explain the extent to which militaries remain subject to male dominance. As it stands, modern warfare is largely a technical undertaking. Therefore, size and strength play a more limited role in contemporary combat. Even under an (erroneous) assumption that all men are stronger than all women, it becomes difficult to find credibility in the physical strength argument, because many combat occupations involve either complex weapon systems or firearms that are operated using one’s fingers and mental acuity, rather than through brawn and brute force. The biological argument also falls short even in the context of intense training regimens that have been adopted by those in the Combat Arms, Special Forces, Clearance Diving, and Search and Rescue. Although small numbers of women are represented in these specialized fields, their presence alone implies that women are more than capable of enduring the physical challenges that are entrenched in elite, specialized units.

What role does testosterone play in the question of WMP? Does testosterone equate to an increase in aggression? Science suggests that testosterone may cause aggressive genes to be expressed, which thereby make the link between males and war a plausible theory. However, both men and women carry these aggressive genes, and both men and women produce testosterone, albeit at different levels. Even though testosterone may account for aggression, this does not necessarily account as a reason why men dominate the military ranks. Aggression is not necessarily a fundamental trait for military personnel. Rather, modern advances...
in warfare require soldiers, sailors, and aviators to remain calm and collected in battle. Regardless of the situation, whether it is an Army infanteer engaged in combat, a Navy Weapons Officer firing a missile, or an Air Force pilot caught in a dogfight, all these personnel must engage their senses and suppress emotional impulses in order to destroy the enemy. Joshua S. Goldstein is an interdisciplinary scholar of war and society, currently Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University and a Research Scholar at the University of Massachusetts. As he notes, modern warfare has actually become better suited to women, since women “…typically show greater speed and agility at fine motor skills… Success and survival now depend much more on the ability to execute rapid sequences of small motions.” In closing on this subject, the biological narrative does not provide adequate explanation as to low levels of WMP.

If nature does not constitute a probable explanation to the under representation of women in military occupations, then one should also consider the nurture side of the debate. What roles do culture and society play in this regard? I submit that a credible explanation of gendered war roles relates to the problematic cultural imposition of masculinity specifically upon males, whereas femininity is imposed solely upon females. As such, girls and young women are raised in micro and macro environments that socialize them to perceive the military as a masculine/male domain. Before developing this argument, there must be a clear distinction between the concepts of masculine/feminine and male/female. Masculinity and femininity are socially constructed definitions that relate to gender. Therefore, these concepts relate to socially accepted norms of what is determined as generally acceptable and normal behaviour for men and women. Sex, on the other hand, refers directly to one’s male or female anatomy. Due to the relative diversity of masculine and feminine traits in both males and females, it is problematic to apply the terms sex and gender under the same rubric. However, the concept of the military as a marker for manhood permeates across different culture boundaries throughout the world. Thus, a masculine hegemony tends to exist in the Profession of Arms. In doing so, the concept of a masculine protector exists in a dichotomous relationship with the feminine, which requires protection. If this is the case, then how does culture contribute to the perception of the military as a masculine space?

One plausible contributor to WMP centers upon a cultural notion that the military is a place where men are made. In the book War and Gender, Joshua Goldstein notes that the military represents one of the last remaining bastions in which young men can achieve a socially-encoded “artificial manhood.” As such, the military institution serves as a place where a man learns to “deny all that is feminine and soft in himself.” Thus, the military becomes protected by cultural norms as a place in which manhood can be achieved. Within a larger context, the political opening of doors to women in the military, especially in combat roles, has acted as a crucial step in affecting change and in challenging these gender norms. Yet, doing so brought the cultural definition of male masculinity under attack. Women are no longer constrained by their gender, and no longer required to fulfill feminine roles related to the home and reproduction.
Although political boundaries have been lifted, the statistical reality of female tokenism in modern armed forces suggests that social boundaries remain firmly in place. This suggests that the socialization of girls and boys, coupled with an engrained cultural segregation narrative of gender, could serve as the schema unto which children are raised. By the time one is an adult, these gender schemas become entrenched, and thereby difficult to erode. Therefore, when a woman joins the military, it may generate a sense of identity uncertainty. A telling comment by Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Chief Petty Officer 2nd Class Alena Mondelli reinforces the idea that gendered boundaries continue to exist: “I felt that in order to survive in the navy I had to give up my femininity… Our culture still needs to play catch up with our policy and doctrine.”

As such, the slow evolution of women in military roles suggests that Goldstein’s analysis regarding socialization may continue to ring true.

The socialization argument rests upon the notion that children are raised in accordance with socially acceptable gender schemas, which encourage certain gender norms that socialize girls within the confines of a submissive feminine role, while boys are directed towards a dominant masculine archetype. This culturally constructed narrative places a considerable burden upon boys, because at some point they are required to pass some form of cultural test in order to attain manhood. To be sure, various cultures do acknowledge that variances exist in the masculinity and femininity of both males and females. However, to some, the presence of feminine qualities in a man serves to make him less of a man. To a lesser extent, this may apply to women as well - to have less feminine qualities makes one less of a woman. However, such an inference only seeks to reinforce gendered roles, because it implies that men have to attain a higher standard of manliness in order to mitigate the perceived competition from women with masculine traits (for example, those women who join the military). There is a perception that women in the military may lose some of their femininity as a result of their military service.

It would be prejudicial to accuse women in uniform as undeserving of feminine qualities. Today’s women in uniform have been granted social license to pursue non-traditional occupations and to retain feminine qualities that are associated with their gender. For example, Hollywood has provided many movies in which there is a tough yet feminine female heroine. A notable example is the action blockbuster *G.I. Jane*. Released in 1997, this movie was an early illustration that epitomized gender issues in the military. In addition to movies, girls are socialized, based upon the toys with which they play. Women who currently serve in the military might have been exposed to dolls such as *Marine Corps Barbie*, which was released in 1991. In sum, movies and toys are select examples of marketing that encourage girls and young women to embrace the existence of both masculine and feminine traits.

In order to investigate other factors for low WMP, one must look beyond the numbers in order to research the quality of female experience in the military. For example, what role does harassment...
play in the military workplace? Military culture in Canada discourages harassment [especially since the tabling of the Deschamps Report and the launching of Op HONOUR ~ Ed.]. However, this does not mean that it does not exist. Between 2002 and 2012, a total of 513 harassment complaints were recorded in a central complaint tracking system. Of these, 31 were sexual in nature, but only 11 were determined to be legitimately founded. These promising figures suggest that, in a military with an effective strength of 100,000, only 0.01 percent had experienced harassment during a 10-year period. Depending upon how one reads these statistics, such figures are either encouraging or misleading. These admittedly-dated statistics suggest that Canadian military culture is effectively devoid of harassing behaviour. But does this tell the whole truth? A recent survey of 9100 CAF Regular Force members implies that harassment still occurs in the military workplace. Sixteen percent of the respondents reported that they had experienced harassment relating to race, religion, physical attributes, or sex. Therefore, it is apparent that harassment exists and that not all incidences lead to formal complaint channels.

Alternative dispute resolution can and does occur within the military, which means that issues are resolved through self-help, supervisor intervention, and mediation. While these may prove to be satisfactory methods, they are only successful as long as the harassment ceases to continue and that the aggressor is suitably educated as to the emotional harm that has been inflicted. In addition, such alternative resolution methods must be what the victim actually wants - not what is imposed by a supervisor. Furthermore, if alternative resolution serves to adequately address issues of harassment, this shows positive reinforcement of overall organizational attitude. It implies that those at the bottom have internalized the ethos that has been enforced from the top. While it is apparent that harassment may not be systemic in the CAF, it cannot be denied that it exists. This fact alone may foster a perception by the public that some level of harassment is condoned. As such, optics may act as a barrier to recruitment, thereby preventing more women from actively pursuing the military as an employer of choice.

Much in the same manner as harassment, we also must acknowledge that CAF personnel are not immune from sexual assault. As a caveat, it is crucial to state that one sexual assault is one too many. However, I would argue that this type of assault does not plague the CAF to the same degree as it does in the US, but the mere perception that the military institution is a place where sexual assault is epidemic undoubtedly serves as a barrier to WMP. In Canada, between the years of 2007 and 2010, there were an average of 171 sexual assault incidences reported to CAF Military Police (data before 2007 and after 2010 was not readily available on the DND website). There is no civilian oversight, but both civilian and military police may lay concurrent charges

A female medical assistant on foot patrol in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
in relation to a criminal offense. Thus, an offender can be subject to both the civilian and military court systems. However, specific data is difficult to compile, because information is spread across both civilian and military departments. Within the Canadian Armed Forces, convictions related to offenses are archived and available on the website of the Office of the Chief Military Judge. However, they are not compiled in a manner that readily provides statistics regarding how many of the average 171 cases actually result in conviction. Unless such information becomes available to the public in a clear format, it becomes difficult to objectively claim that sexual assault is not an issue in the CAF. Therefore, support for the notion that the CAF has relatively low sexual assault rates becomes one founded upon speculation rather than upon empirical evidence. As such, the CAF has much room for improvement regarding the collection and representation of sexual assault information for the public.

Thus far I have addressed potential biological and cultural influencers that may affect female recruitment and retention. These influencers can act as barriers to the quantity of women in the military. Looking beyond quantity, what is the quality of the positions that women occupy in the military? A critical fact to bear in mind is that women in the CAF are underrepresented in many occupations. Additionally, women are not distributed equally across all three branches. This phenomenon is by no means limited to Canada. NATO countries ‘across the board’ show a trend that serving women generally cluster in support occupations, and are grossly underrepresented in technical and operational occupations.

An additional striking correlation between Canada and other NATO countries is that women are found in proportionally greater numbers in the Air Force and Navy than in the Army. What explanations relate to the high numbers of women in service trades and in sea/air elements?

A suitable response to this phenomenon is challenging to provide. Given the breadth of theories already covered, more questions arise than answers to them. Is this trend reflective of a wider set of cultural norms that have developed as a result of the way we socialize girls and young women? In other words, are we unwittingly reproducing a gender narrative that envisions females in service vocations, such as heath and logistics? Does the lack of women in combat and technical roles stem from the fact that so few women serve in those occupations? In other words, why would women join those positions if they were going to be in the extreme minority? Conversely, are women collectively smarter than men, and so choose occupations that might transition to a civilian equivalent? This may pose as a plausible explanation when applied to combat trades, but it loses authenticity when considering technical and engineering trades, which are in high demand by the civilian sector. Could it be that women are generally more peaceful? The military is an interesting organization in the sense that it exists to provide protection and intervention, but it does so with the explicit threat and production of sanctioned violence. Is it possible that women would rather sustain the military through support functions than be the ones who participate in actual killing?
The notion that women are inherently peaceful is a problematic concept that needs to be addressed. If peace is a feminine construct, then one could argue that war is a masculine construct. As such, women become synonymous with peace, while men are linked to war. The correlation between women and peace reproduces a gendered text that espouses women as a collective entity that requires protection. In addition, women are rarely placed into the protectorate category alone, as children often accompany them. The oft-recurring political discourse that lumps women-and-children into the same category effectively ‘infantilizes’ women. In doing so, women become a group without agency that is dependent upon men for protection. This style of thought is reproduced in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325.

UNSCR 1325, entitled “Women, Peace and Security,” was a major breakthrough for women across the world. Adopted in 2000, it is a resolution that recognizes that women have collective interests and concerns regarding international peace and security, and that they are not solely victims in need of protection. To be sure, women (and children) are most often the recipients of violence in inter-state and intra-state conflict. However, placing them under a category of ‘peace’ may feed into a belief that all women must be peaceful, and therefore all women must be treated as actual or potential victims of their own womanhood. Not only does UNSCR 1325 fail to adequately address male behaviour, it does not even mention men at all. This is critical due to the fact that men are predominantly the key factor in the victimization of women. Thus, the main focus of the resolution becomes one of acknowledging only the victims (women) without addressing the need to change collective behaviors and attitudes of men. Despite this criticism, UNSCR 1325 is a crucial document because it encourages women’s representation in the international security apparatus, at all levels. This leads to a noteworthy question: where are the female generals and admirals?

Women have attained positions as unit commanding officers. However, higher command postings generally remain few and far between. In reality, women are largely absent from senior staff positions and flag officer rank. This is in part due to the occupations most women have chosen to pursue. Service occupations have less access to high-level command positions, which are normally held by those in combat occupations. In addition, reaching flag rank requires considerable time, effort, and mobility. A flag officer’s career often spans several decades of service, many deployments, long hours at work, as well as multiple moves across the country and abroad. Therefore, military service places a significant burden on the families of service members. As women progress in rank, there may come a time when they want to start a family. Often, this coincides with the added responsibility and time commitments that are requisite of senior positions. Thus, some women may feel as if they have only two packaged options: parent or career. Balancing the responsibility for both may not be realistic for some. In this context, entrenched cultural expectations require women to choose between paths that are not mutually exclusive. These cultural expectations reflect the biological role of the woman as a bearer of children, and the gendered role that promotes women as the primary caregivers of children. It is crucial to note that society does not place such expectations upon men, who are not generally expected to assume the responsibilities of childcare once a baby is born. Therefore, a woman’s career can be subject to a motherhood penalty.

The career penalty for motherhood is an issue that transcends national boundaries. Even though military policies prohibit discrimination with regard to gender, it is an undeniable fact that pregnancy hinders upward mobility in the armed forces. Being pregnant is treated as a medical condition that requires one to be excluded from operational status. While it is important for the health of both mother and fetus to be removed from the potential hazards of military operations and deployments, doing so can effectively exclude women from being considered for promotion. This pregnancy penalty does not apply to men. Thus, while DND policy is not designed to be gender discriminatory, it remains so. The crucial time related to early childhood care
is a subsequent factor that acts as a barrier to upward mobility. This is a time when work/life balance becomes paramount in many servicepersons’ decision whether to remain employed in the military or to release. Twenty-six percent of releasing US servicewomen cited this as the most important factor in their decision to leave the military, whereas only 14.5 percent of servicemen cited the same reason. However, in both cases, this was the top-cited reason for release. What is telling, however, is that career advancement was the women’s second-most cited reason for leaving, but this factor did not appear at all for men. The same issue regarding work/life balance affects retention of women in the CAF, and it is recognized as the most prominent reason why women release from the military. Therefore, I would submit that pregnancy and early childhood care are very important factors generating low WMP. In addressing this issue, Lieutenant-Colonel Krista Brodie eloquently describes the problem as such:

“We are desperate for some of those innovative HR policies… We need those flexible employment arrangements and those flexible terms of service, and that Leave Without Pay option that will entice not only talented women but talented men to stay in during that critical juncture between the age of 30 and 35/36 where we grapple with managing the work/life balance and we hemorrhage talent.”

In addition to developing innovative solutions and policies, it is also important for men to take a leadership position regarding childcare. For instance, there are many service couples in which the wife is of higher rank than the husband. The wife’s increased potential for promotion, coupled with the promise of higher pay, should be an incentive for the husband to release in order to allow the wife to climb the military ladder. A prominent example of this is embodied in the success of Major-General Christine Whitecross. An engineer by trade, General Whitecross attributes a sizeable portion of her success to a supportive husband who had the strength of character to release from the military in order for her to contribute fully to the Profession of Arms. In sum, work/life balance is a crucial issue that disproportionately affects military families. It is cited as the most important reason for female attrition in the CAF. Therefore, it should be addressed in order to mitigate low WMP.

Conclusion

This article has explored some possible reasons as to why women are under-represented in the military. Biological factors may loosely contribute to WMP. However, empirical evidence related to biology does not substantiate why the military is predominately a male-dominated institution. Cultural factors related to socially constructed gender norms are considered as plausible factors that attribute to this under-representation. Also, the perception of systemic sexual harassment and assault may influence recruitment. There is no evidence to suggest that the perception of harassment and sexual assault deter female recruitment.
in Canada, yet it remains reasonable to assume that these issues may adversely affect WMP. Biology and culture aside, evidence points to motherhood and work/life balance as disproportionate factors that negatively affect WMP. In conclusion, I argue that the motherhood penalty, in conjunction with work/life balance, is a critical reason as to why women’s representation in the military does not reflect their relative proportions in society. It is essential to attend to this issue through a change in policy and a revolution in culture, because the defenders of this country should actually reflect the society that they have sworn an oath to protect.

NOTES


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26
Linear and Non-Linear Thinking: Beyond Reverse-Engineering
by Ben Zweibelson

“When does this happen in the movie?”

“Now. You’re looking at now. Everything that happens now is happening now.”

“And then?”

“We passed then.”

“When?”

“Just now. We’re at now, now.”

~ “Spaceballs” 1987

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Introduction

Opening with a quote from a Mel Brooks movie might be risky for the topic of military strategy. Yet in his sci-fi comedy ‘Spaceballs,’ Mel Brooks lampoons modern military industrial complexes for desiring technology and absolute control of chaotic and complex conditions. In many ways, Brooks is insightful (while inciting) with how our modern military institutions seek to think about complexity and time, as well as how we think about thinking about complexity and time. This article is not about lampooning the military as a proxy of Spaceballs, but an effort to foster serious discourse on how we think about military actions organized in time and space. While the follies of the ‘Spaceballs’ militant organization operates entirely in a science fiction setting, perhaps there are some metaphors that open unorthodox insights into the real foolhardiness of modern military planning and control. Perhaps recent engagements with the Taliban, al Qaeda, al-Shabaab, the resurgence of Russian proxy wars, and the sudden rise of ISIL demonstrate that our institutionalized ‘sensemaking’ strategies are far less prescient than we expect them to be.
Timelines are something we often take for granted when considering how we make sense of military problems and develop plans for action. Seeing the world unfolding as a sequence of isolatable events makes such linear thinking habitual (our retrospection) to us. It indicates a reducible (i.e. analyzable) chain of causation. However, this simplification of reality tends to miss the complexity of interactions that have taken place in dynamic and chaotic conflict environments. Military planning doctrine tends to assume we can both reduce problems into isolatable chains of causation (we call lines of effort) and sequence these as planned events in linear time (from a start point to an end point). For this article, I term this the analytic-linear worldview.

Institutional artifacts of this belief system are plentiful - how we conduct mission analysis, construct campaign plans, decisive points, targeting cycles, and so forth. At a deeper level, this analytic and linear reasoning process dominates overarching national points, targeting cycles, and so forth. At a deeper level, this analytic and linear reasoning process dominates overarching national strategies and decisions for war as taught in our war colleges. My argument is that our exclusive analytical approach and linear style decision making opens us up to vulnerabilities and creates barriers to a more critically reflexive practice. Our institutionalized habits focus only upon analytic and linear models and are unreflective in exploring critically why we think this way and what alternative ways of thinking may be available. I propose a non-linear approach to ‘sensemaking’ termed holistic non-linear worldview as one alternative paradigm to the analytic-linear world view.

Analytic-Linear Worldview

- Objective reality – universal laws can be tested, proven, and remain valid everywhere.
- Complex problems can be broken down, solved, and then reassembled back into larger and complex things.
- Complex situations become controllable and stable over time as more information is gained.
- Time becomes irrelevant as analysis and scientific methods allow us to “fast forward” and “reverse” scenarios for planning.
- All other worldviews are unscientific and irrelevant.

Figure 1: Linear and Non-Linear Worldview Characteristics

Holistic Non-Linear Worldview

- Multiple worldviews have relevance provided we acknowledge their paradigmic processes.
- Narratives are social constructions that “preconfigure” time and action into plots and stories.
- Paradox is essential; nonlinear applications harvest them and expect emergence and adaptation as the norm.
- Complexity is observer-dependent and context-dependent, so nothing is universal and valid everywhere.
- Complexity cannot be broken down into manageable chunks without losing understanding.

Linear Planning Equates to Linear Causality

Linear thinking itself is a metaphor, where stringing ideas occur in a line that we can consider in sequential order. Analytical reasoning works best where ‘if A, then B’ approach becomes burdened outside sterile laboratories and academic exercises with the natural messiness of human complexity and war. Unlike hard science topics, the dynamic and complex nature of human societies (to include warfare) prevents us from relying exclusively upon analytical reasoning as the main foundation to the discipline itself. Newton’s laws of motion seem to work because they routinely appear reliable, measurable, and universal for physical things. Yet, military institutions have sought analytical applications to the art and science of warfare beyond the utility of these logics in complex warfare. The ‘if A, then B’ approach becomes the main foundation to the discipline itself. Newton’s laws of motion seem to work because they routinely appear reliable, measurable, and universal for physical things. Yet, military institutions have sought analytical applications to the art and science of warfare beyond the utility of these logics in complex warfare. The ‘if A, then B’ approach becomes burdened outside sterile laboratories and academic exercises with the natural messiness of human complexity and war. Unlike hard science topics, the dynamic and complex nature of human societies (to include warfare) prevents us from relying exclusively upon analytical reasoning to understand reality.

It is reasonable to embrace linear reasoning for tactical military action because of how we physically experience space and time. Biologically, we experience in a measurable, constant and linear rate. Thus, synchronizing watches for tactical operations makes sense to us, as do linear strategies that begin with an invasion, and predict total surrender after a series of campaigns and objectives. As you read each word in this very sentence, time moves at a constant rate, your heart continues to beat in your chest, and your eyes blink. Life appears to move according to a linear time, where humans experience the world as Saint Augustine and other philosophers phrased “temporal beings.” We ‘shuffle along this mortal coil’ as Shakespeare penned, where we experience some very clear limitations in that time moves forward as our biology interprets reality. Attempting to predict the future becomes as problematic as really understanding the past. We often imagine the past, and remember the future without realizing it. In other words, our military tends to predict future events based upon flawed reasoning where we misunderstand past events. Yet, our longing
for certainty and our preference for the analytic approach to sense-making crafts our entire planning methodologies, doctrine, and practices into a rather limiting linear production. 14 Our inability to see alternative ways of strategizing occurs because of the seductive nature of analytic and linear constructs for military organizations.

Figure 2 illustrates the sequential process where military planners take the guidance from higher authorities and craft a ‘desired end state’ in the nebulous future. 15 Working in reverse-engineering fashion, we subsequently construct the campaign plan backwards from this future end-state, crafting objectives, effects, centres of gravity, and elaborate lines of effort back to the present date. 16 Each line of effort gets a myriad of metrics (differentiated between measures of performance and measures of effectiveness), as well as decision points sprinkled upon them within projected time and space. Once complete, we implicitly expect a complex, dynamic conflict environment to obey this plan (with branch plans accepted for major predicted developments). We expect that over time, we will gain more information and become more precise, with less surprise and increased control and stability. Progression through analytical planning promises us greater certainty and less of the ‘open-endedness’ of chaos and complexity. 17 Supposedly, things get better over time, as long as the flood of data continues to feed the analytic-linear world view.

These linear and reverse-engineered approaches function from the highest strategic levels down to the immediate tactical level in what planners term a ‘nested’ approach. Even the concept of ‘levels of war’ is an abstraction within that particular world view, as are ‘centres of gravity’ and ‘lines of effort.’ Yet, repeatedly in multiple military conflicts, this purely analytical and linear approach often fails to make useful sense of reality. More often than not, we are surprised at things emerging in ways we did not expect, be they political developments, military coups, the assassination of an ambassador, or the sudden rise of a new adversarial force. While our analysts quickly rationalize continuing with the same concepts using 20/20 hindsight for new justifications, there seems to be a pattern of our continued surprise at linear strategies going ‘off the rails’ rather quickly. 18

Confronting planning failure, the initial reaction is to re-configure the methodology, or adjust the familiar tools (lines of effort, centres of gravity, end states) within the confines of the analytical approach. 19 I term this the ‘Jominian Hindsight’ effect after the highly influential principles of war penned by 18th Century military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini, although Jerome Bruner (psychologist) uses ‘processes of inference’ in a similar manner. 20 According to Jomini, a military leader would win any military conflict with the proper combination of his principles, be it mass

![Figure 2: Analytic-Linear Worldviews and ‘Reverse-Engineering’ for Plans](image-url)
and surprise and speed, or perhaps x, y and z.  

21 If any commander applied them and failed, the ‘Jominian Hindsight’ responds with, “You did not apply my principles correctly.” These endless cycles of methodological tinkering remain superficial, in that they fail to address the deeper issues that plague accurate sense-making and anticipation of complex military scenarios.22 We are most apt to critique (or fire) the military leader, fiddle with the methodology, and reboot with the same processes in play wearing slightly different clothing.

Thus, we become trapped in a world view where we argue over how the problems we will encounter must match the tools we are equipped with and unwilling to let go. 23 We want Russia to behave like the Soviet Union, and we expect ISIL to operate similar to al Qaeda or even Hamas. For the analytic-linear strategist, the tools can solve any problem, provided we match the right problem to the right tool. There are alternatives to this, if we are willing to break with our powerful institutionalisms.

How Does Non-Linearity Work in the Now-Now?

Although a controversial position, I view non-linearity as a concept that can function within the analytical world view, but also function distinctly beyond that world view. 24 Non-linearity need not conform to merely analytical processes; it can express existential, post-modernist, and constructivist worldviews that all are in conflict (and incommensurate) with the analytical perspective. However, non-linear approaches cannot be ‘broken down into manageable chunks’ with the intent of re-assembling them into a linear sequence that maintains the essence of non-linearity. In other words, we cannot establish non-linear understanding of ISIL or Russia and then fracture it down into something linear without losing quite a bit (despite our institutional desires to do this very thing). Non-linearity resists analytical approaches, and subsequently must be appreciated outside of any world view that requires linear visualization for strategy. This requires patience and reflexivity, as well as a willingness to let go of cherished patterns for sense-making. We critically question how and why we employ end-states, lines of effort, and other linear constructs, and edit them frequently.

Consider once again the introductory quote from Mel Brooks’ movie, as it provides useful metaphoric value in explaining non-linearity. The movie scene (for those unfamiliar) has the main villains searching for the heroes by using amazing and hilariously-paradoxical technology. Within the movie, they get an advanced copy of the movie before it is done being ‘made.’ Using it in a linear fashion with a VCR player, they simply fast-forward to the future point they need to gain information on the heroes, and then continue pursuit in a far more specific manner. Essentially, there is no difference between the movie on tape and reality for them within the movie. The video tape is not a ‘crystal ball’ or ‘magic mirror,’ but a measurable and predictive tool that eliminates uncertainty from the future for these characters that also recognize they are within that movie. 25

Metaphorically, this illustrates our tendency to construct elaborate linear strategies and expect a complex environment to match the plan as things unfold. Complex situations routinely reject linear thinking, yet our traditional linear planning methodology continues to plod along. 26 We publish our extensive campaign plans, operations orders, and subsequently manage their upkeep and relevance through a massive volume of data and metrics that somehow reinforce original concepts. 27 ‘A does lead to B, which forms C’ as we force observations and events to continue to support initial campaign intent and objectives. Sociologist Karl Weick explains: “Bureaucracies see what they have seen before and they link these memories in a sequential train of associations… [They] tend to imagine the past and remember the future.” 28 This highlights a dangerous output of linear causality in that our military tends to predict future events, based upon flawed reasoning where we misunderstand past events.

Even the planning term ‘course of action’ implies a direction to set our course with, providing conceptual framework for linear visualization. We are a military institution desiring the infallibility of a copy of the movie within which we are currently inside, to aid us in predicting how to solve the problems we encounter. Instead of seeking to construct linear strategies where military forces simply ‘connect the dots’ from point-to-point and achieve planned end-states, we need to consider non-linear applications, and how they differ dramatically.
Non-Linear Applications: Turning Squares into Lines

For strategic non-linear applications, we should consider that critiquing the traditional linear world view creates an implicit and powerful desire to fill the void with something similar. Henry Ford’s maxim of “you can have a Model T in any color, as long as it is black” is analogous here. We do not willingly discard the linear construct where any potential replacement strategy must be pre-configured and forced to adapt linear processes (has to be black). This also generates strong institutional bias against world views and approaches that generate entirely novel and dissimilar strategies; threatening established doctrine and institutional traditions is quite dangerous.29

The ‘semiotic square’ offers a useful non-linear construct for building strategies and exploring the interplay between conflicting world views.30 By embracing paradox, conflicts and similarities, the strategist should remain reflexive to recognize institutionalisms and the different languages of distinct world views. There are numerous other approaches for non-linearity in strategy; however, for purposes of brevity, the semiotic square will suffice for this article.31 Any non-linear approach including the semiotic square produces outputs that lack the systematic, ‘if A then B’ analytical content and form familiar in linear strategy-making.32 Non-linear strategy is emergent, not prescriptive. This aids in critiquing many linear planning concepts.

Figure 3 provides an illustration of how a semiotic square operates. There are several methods for employing semiotic squares, but all involve the critical element of paradox. Figure 3 seeks an ‘A’ notion where the ‘B’ is in paradox. Consider a common institution such as a bank to illustrate this process. Your bank wants customers to save their money in savings accounts so the bank has capital to use, which can represent the ‘A’ of Figure 3. Yet the bank also wants customers to spend, to take out loans so that the bank can profit off interest and transactions. The spending is ‘B,’ and is in tension with the thrifty nature of ‘A’. A semiotic square builds upon this paradox by inviting notions of ‘both A and B,’ as well as ‘neither A nor B’ in opposing corners. Paradox builds upon paradox, and most banks feature a combination of contradictory objectives where customers need to save, invest, spend, and so on. Banks are a useful example for introducing how semiotic squares function, yet, can we offer a military example in strategy or planning?
In 2012, as a lead operational planner for NATO (NTM-A) in Afghanistan, I employed semiotic squares in several occasions for strategic and operational goals. In one case, we applied in the design portion of developing reduced Afghan Security Force projections for 2017 and beyond. In another, semiotic squares were applied during initial design and sense-making for developing an overarching synchronization plan for NTM-A, transitioning all training bases and infrastructure to the Afghan Forces by 2014. Figure 4 is a reproduction of the semiotic square used in the NTM-A transition planning. Here, primary colors work metaphorically by associating with each paradoxical construct. Notice that the square follows color theory for combining or eliminating colors. We applied these squares in theoretical strategic work for both the Boeing Company (a co-authored design chapter

![Figure 3: The Semiotic Square (non-linear approaches to planning)](image)

![Figure 4: Applying the Semiotic Square within ISAF Strategic Planning (2012)](image)

**W1:** conservative; doctrine-centric, traditional, static-uniformity driven; historical structuring within a linear and logico-scientific chronology.

**W2:** liberal (apolitical), experimental, improvisational, paradigm breaking within ‘W’, critical and creative thinking. Non-conforming.

**W:** western logic
- adaptive/innovative
- event driven/universal laws
- high skill/high tech
- values aligned to western societies
- reductionist

**Y:** bricolage of useful elements; mimicry, adaptation into new and novel forms. Also maintains the limitations of both W1 and W2 and tensions between them.

**U:** non-western values, neither nested in doctrine nor available western theory. U becomes the space where all western “masters” become ignorant school teachers.
for a book on emergent thinking) and a co-authored monograph offering various non-linear considerations. 35 Pursuing non-linear planning (in these situations with semiotic squares) before getting tangled in traditional linear causality offers strategists the ability to break out of the prescriptive and often limiting mindset that fails to appreciate complexity.

Semiotic squares are an example of non-linear planning, yet they have, by lacking the familiarity of linear sequencing, major conceptual hurdles to overcome for any future in wider applications. The squares aid in generating a deeper understanding of multiple world views, the tensions between them, and insight into how a complex environment functions. However, without the linear qualities, it is akin to directions on a map that do not get you from Point A to Point B. This will be troublesome for many, and rather repugnant to some. Non-linear outputs generate narratives and rich pictures, but these also cannot fill the conceptual void where linear planning functions. 36 In order to nudge an organization toward truly non-linear critical thinking, they must be willing to be highly critical of cherished linear tools (at least for strategic considerations). Subsequent operational and tactical level linear plans ought to feature those familiar concepts, as tactical applications routinely require linear and analytical content and form.

Non-Linear Applications and Integration

At the tactical level, modern military organizations still demand a largely linear and highly analytical output in order to synchronize military action. 37 This is not only a result of our organizational structure (hierarchical), but also the unfortunate dominance of the analytical worldview at every level of professional development and education. 38 Yet, at the strategic level, the benefits of non-linear approaches may exceed those that are strictly linear, particularly in the ongoing complex developments confronting western societies. This is a steep challenge to change strategic outlooks, because it threatens an entire world view that is entrenched across the entire political, educational, and professional disciplines. 39 Sadly, failure is the greatest teacher; continued strategic failures may open the door to exploring alternative concepts, such as non-linear approaches. Arguably, a fusion of strategic non-linear thinking with interplay between that world view and the traditional linear approach for tactical applications may offer the best option. This article does not offer a checklist or guide book for what to expect in such a scenario, but there are a few landmarks to consider.

First, the non-linear interplay should largely function at the strategic levels, and gradually evaporate at the tactical levels, with linear and analytical approaches operating in mirror fashion. Critical reflection is essential at every level of warfare, however, non-linear critical inquiry might function best at the strategic and operational levels where concepts often transcend tangible and explicitly defined characteristics.

Second, within what modern military doctrine terms the ‘operational level of war’ is where transitioning between non-linear and linear applications should occur. This makes for some very challenging intellectual ‘hoops for planners to leap through.’ These military professionals must therefore be proficient in critically approaching and challenging accepted linear processes and providing useful non-linear concepts. They also must be able to ‘interplay’ between them, working with paradox, conflicts, and compatibility issues, and producing relevant deliverables in both directions for both audiences. Our current professional education models are rather one-sided towards the analytical world view, creating planners that apply linear and analytical (quantitative) thinking at every level exclusively. When we do float the term ‘non-linear,’ we do so often in confusing or misapplied ways that pervert the meaning.

Third, no world view should dominate the institution, or any subordinate organization. A single world view creates imbalances and fractures the ability for interplay between two different ways of interpreting complexity. But the mere suggestion of this will ‘upset many apple carts,’ as entire organizations have established powerful fiefdoms within our military organizations where the sole world view must employ linear and analytical processes.

Conclusions

We can nudge the institution away from devote or exclusive linear thinking. This makes for great debate and reflexive thinking. This requires not only profound institutional change for the military at every level, but sensitive and knowledgeable caretakers at each level that prevent these institutionalisms from wreaking havoc. 40 We need to recognize how our military institution remains rather seduced by analytical approaches for every-and-all problems. Linear logic, coupled with a flawed appreciation towards complexity makes for reverse-engineered approaches for planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This works well enough for many simplistic and routine challenges, but forcing a ‘one size fits all’ cognitive framework upon all challenges does not prepare our military for success in the 21st Century.


6. Bruner, p. 97. On the notion of ‘recursion,’ Bruner writes: “It is impossible to account for thoughts on thoughts, thoughts on thoughts on thoughts, up to whatever level of abstraction is necessary.”


10. Aaron Jackson, *The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), p. 52. Jackson observes: “Mechanistic ideas, such as the ‘linear battlefield,’ continued to exist alongside other (newer and hence more prominent) ideas belonging to more recent scientific regimes, long after the mechanistic sciences had ceased to constitute the dominant regime.”


14. Bruner, p. 93. While Bruner uses the fields of philosophy and psychology, I add the military discipline as another similarly positivist fixated institution here. Although psychology has moved on from positivism since the 1950s (Bruner describes the ‘Cognitive Revolution’ in Chapter 7), the military has not.


20. Bruner, pp. 89-92. Bruner observed subjects changing the definition when confronted with a ‘wrong answer’ during his experiment on guessing patterns of information based upon illustrations of social interactions. For the military, we tend to do the same with Jomini’s principles of war in retrospect. There are also aspects of ‘recursion’ operating here, where we loop our logic back upon itself to form the foundation for further theorizing.


25. Another frequent Mel Brooks gag within this scene is how the characters realize that they are ‘wrong answer’ during his experiment on guessing patterns of information based upon illustrations of social interactions. For the military, we tend to do the same with Jomini’s principles of war in retrospect. There are also aspects of ‘recursion’ operating here, where we loop our logic back upon itself to form the foundation for further theorizing.

26. Ryan, King, Bruscino, Cox, p. 249. See also: Jeff Conklin, Wicked Problems and Social Complexity (CogNexus Institute, 2008) p. 4. Assem Ibrahim, Afghanistan’s Way forward must include the Taliban, (Los Angeles Times Opinion Online, 9 December 2009). Last accessed on 9 December 2014 at: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/09/opinion/la-oe-ibrahim2009dec09. Ibrahim quotes General McChrystal’s opinion on the past decade in Afghanistan, “…looking at the war in simplistic Manichean terms—such as many good guys as possible while taking out as many bad guys as possible—was a mistake.”

27. Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare, pp.128-129. Bousquet discusses the evolution of military concepts from ‘command’ to ‘command and control’ where this suggests a process where the commander might capture all information from the environment, process it, and transmit it back in a ‘feedback loop’ that promises total control of a battlefield with predictability and precision. For a discussion about applications of this concept to military doctrine, see: Aaron Jackson, The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), pp. 52-53.


36. Although I do not think that we should always revert to linear and analytical procedures.

37. Although I do not think that we should always revert to linear and analytical procedures.

38. Karl E. Weick, “Improvisation as a Mindset for Organizational Analysis,” Organizational Science (Volume 9, No. 5, September-October 1998), p. 531. Organizations follow “the chronic temptation to fall back on well-rehearsed fragments to cope with current problems even though these problems don’t exactly match those present at the time of the earlier rehearsal.”

39. Karl Weick, “Drop Your Tools: An Allegory for Organizational Studies,” in Administrative Science Quarterly, (Vol. 41, 1996), p. 307. Weick uses the metaphor of firemen ‘dropping their tools’ as a metaphor for adaptation of organizations. On failure, he writes: “To drop one’s tools may be to admit failure. To retain selective Manichean terms—as many good guys as possible while taking out as many bad guys as possible—was a mistake.”

40. Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare, pp.128-129. Bousquet discusses the evolution of military concepts from ‘command’ to ‘command and control’ where this suggests a process where the commander might capture all information from the environment, process it, and transmit it back in a...
Transforming Commander’s Intent: Leveraging Individual Initiative in a New Battlespace

by Ryan Kastrukoff

A military commander cannot possibly know all things at all times. The military commander can and should, however, have a goal that is then communicated to their force as the commander’s intent. Providing intent instead of specific missions creates space for subordinate commanders and soldiers to use their initiative to achieve the goal once battlefield conditions change. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has embraced this philosophy in Canadian Military Doctrine, calling it mission command leadership. Major advances in information technology have changed the battlespace and now require an adaption in organizational structure to best focus and leverage individual initiative, especially in the information battlespace. Three small case studies are first presented to highlight the inefficiency of using the current organizational structure, particularly in the information battlespace. A proposed organizational change is then presented that incorporates features of crowd-sourcing and collaborative online workspaces to improve the acquisition, development, and implementation of fast-evolving complex technologies used by the Canadian Armed Forces.

Captain Sutherland, an infantry company commander during Operation Desert Storm, discusses the origins of commander’s intent by following the changes in German doctrine from Befehlstaktik to Auftragstaktik during the First World War. In Befehlstaktik, the “commander literally selected where he was going to attack; he focused his reconnaissance forces there and shoved them through the chosen area. Maneuver forces followed.” To break the ‘trenchline stalemate,’ there was a shift to a new doctrine called Auftragstaktik that allowed “reconnaissance forces to find the best point for the attack…the maneuver forces focused on the discovered weak point.” For Auftragstaktik to succeed, “… these [recce] troops needed to know exactly what the commander had in mind—that is, his intent.” The rapid increase in computing capability has created a new information battlespace that while technologically more complex than the fields and ridgelines of the past,
they are similar enough that similar principles can apply. The proposal below would effectively create reconnaissance troops in the information battlespace evolving the principles of Auftragstaktik into something that could be called Mengenquellentaktik (crowdsource tactic).7

Case 1: Aerospace Simulation

Lieutenant-General Blondin, former-Chief of the Royal Canadian Air Force, stated his intent to “achieve better training through simulation and achieve operational savings.”8 During a tactical electronic warfare course, the author was tasked to work towards achieving this commander’s intent. After presenting a paper to the course, the author was further tasked to try and implement the suggested changes to aerospace simulation. At this point he was struck by the inability to push highly technical suggestions back up the chain of command. Eventually, through contacts met while on course, he was able to make a few contacts and began developing a network of subject matter experts (SMEs) related to modelling and simulation. Through this network, he was eventually connected to a major-general that could be reached to help implement the proposed changes. After a year-and-a-half of effort, the ‘grass roots’ network of aerospace simulation SMEs discovered remained at just three people, none of whom are particularly well positioned to implement most of the changes that could meet the commander’s intent.9

The underlying issue here is that there is no way to pass highly technical information back up the chain of command to be used in a systemic solution. The underlying issue here is that there is no way to pass highly technical information back up the chain of command to be used in a systemic solution. Translating the situation from the information battlespace to the more familiar ground battlespace, this is akin to deploying reconnaissance troops with no radios and no ability to pass information back to the maneuver forces. Using the commander’s intent, the reconnaissance troops go out and find weak points in the adversary’s defences, but then watch helplessly as the maneuver forces charge headlong into the adversary’s strengths. In the case of aerospace simulation, the ruling doctrine is effectively Befehlstaktik, relying upon very specific direction from higher authority. However, the commander is not likely familiar with the technical intricacies of software design. The ‘missing link’ in this case is the ability to pass information back up the chain of command to provide a solution to meet the commander’s intent.
Case 2: Tactical Data Links

This author has not been able to determine the commander’s intent with respect to the development and use of tactical data links. Similar to the case of aerospace simulation, while on squadron, he was tasked to become a subject matter expert on tactical data links. Over the years that followed, the author was able to connect to a SME network and through annual meetings, e-mail and SharePoint websites has been able to help develop tactical data link capability. The technology and processes have developed to the point where tactical data links could become a significant force multiplier for the Canadian Armed Forces at both the tactical and operational levels. However, the organization currently lacks the mandate required to realize this potential.

Effectively, the situation is reversed from that described for aerospace simulation. For aerospace simulation, the commander’s intent existed, but there are few personnel working on the problem. For tactical data links, there are personnel working on the problem, but there is no commander’s intent. The net effect, however, is the same. The reconnaissance troops in the information battlespace can find the adversary’s weak point, but they are unable to prevent the maneuver forces from attacking the adversary’s strengths. The missing link in this case is the ability to pass information back up the chain of command to change the commander’s intent.

Case 3: Arctic Operations Support

The commander’s intent for Arctic operations support is to ‘not fail,’ and to support the missions assigned within the allocated budget. The missions assigned are reactive by necessity with little-to-no notice. Budget reductions, however, have made the status quo unsupportable. As the operations representative, the author was tasked to coordinate as required to ensure mission success. Since the commander’s intent was vague, he was given ample space to take the initiative. After surveying the operation and conversing with the related subject matter experts, it became apparent that process efficiencies were the only method to ensure the mission would not fail while operating under the reduced budget. To achieve these process efficiencies, an informal and ‘grass roots’ network of subject matter experts was created on the air wing. This network used the currency of favours to identify and fix inefficiencies. As the operations representative, the author became the facilitator for these improvements by connecting those with technical problems to others with technical solutions. As more favours were exchanged, the network became more robust and effective. The most sweeping and enduring of efficiencies that was created through this process was the creation of a SharePoint site where all relevant information was made available to all relevant personnel at all times. This central repository of information managed by the operations facilitator ensured that during no notice rapid deployments of personnel, all relevant personnel had immediate access to the up-to-date information that they required to complete their sub-tasks.
It is worth noting that few of the tasks completed through the favour network were specifically tasked by the applicable commander. Instead, the requesting member would identify a problem with or without a solution. Then, through the network, they were connected to another member who could implement a solution. The requesting member would then propose the tested solution to their commander for final approval, although often, this would occur after the solution had already become standard practice. This favour network is not in keeping with the spirit of the chain of command, where tasks and direction come from the top down, and not from the bottom laterally, and then up. In his article about commander’s intent, Captain Eric Downes, then-Commanding Officer of Company D, 4th LAI Battalion, USMC, notes:

If we continue to teach our Marines that mission accomplishment is the most important objective of leadership, and in the chaos of the fight that mission loses its viability, then only those smart enough to disobey the order and lucky enough to find an alternate way to win on their own will prevail.11

The favour network has become a success, significantly improving efficiency and reducing costs for Arctic operations support. This paradigm is applicable to other problems, specifically, the integration of technology (in this case, SharePoint) combined with the presence of an appropriate facilitator with ready access to the appropriate commander allowed members with problems to connect to members with solutions and leveraged individual initiative in the new information battlespace. The efficiencies gained in the information battlespace translated directly into efficiencies in the support of air operations in the Arctic, while maintaining standards and reducing costs.

Background

Chain of Command

The Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine states:

“Fundamental...is the ability of commanders to provide their intent to their subordinate commanders in a timely fashion... Line and staff functions must be clearly delineated. Furthermore, a distinct and unambiguous chain of command that coherently integrates strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters, and elements, needs to be in place.”12

The administrative process today, however, is too slow and cumbersome to keep up with the rapidly changing information battlespace. Each battlespace has an internal clock that operates at a different speed and requires input from commanders at a different rate. Aircraft flying cover more ground faster than soldiers walking. Satellites orbiting move faster than aircraft flying. The information battlespace moves the fastest of all. The faster the battlespace clock moves, the fewer links in the chain of command there must be between the commander and the end-user to remain effective and timely. Therefore, since the information battlespace has the fastest clock, there should be the fewest steps between the commander and the end users. Fortunately, e-mail, websites, and other information technology exists that effectively allows the commander to speak directly to all end-users, shrinking the chain of command to one link.

Since the commander can potentially task all end-users simultaneously, there is an even greater requirement for the commanders to effectively pass along their intent. Note that the Commander is not tasking specific missions to all end-users simultaneously. Rather, the Commander is informing the individuals that make up the Canadian Armed Forces of the intended direction for the Canadian Armed Forces. This intent must be straightforward and it must include as few limitations as possible. As Downes suggests, this intent must also replace the mission as the most important objective in the battlespace.13 This does not mean that all Canadian Armed Forces members need to know the Chief of Defence Staff’s intent in all things. In this article, the focus is upon the information battlespace. The method for sending information back up the chain of command will not be as simple as sending an e-mail directly back to the Chief of the Defence Staff, and this issue will now be developed herein.

Initiative

The Canadian Armed Forces are committed to leveraging individual initiative. The Canadian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine states that the chosen leadership philosophy “…demands the aggressive use of initiative at every level, a high degree of comfort in ambiguity, and a tolerance for honest failure.”14 Furthermore, “[c]ommanders must always make their intentions clear to subordinate commanders who, in turn, must make decisions on their own initiative based upon their understanding of the senior commander’s intentions.”15 Without the ability to leverage the initiative of subordinate commanders and soldiers, armed forces take longer to make decisions. As US Army Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Leser, then a member of the Combined Arms Center Commander’s Planning Group at Fort Leavenworth notes: “[w]ithout rapid decision making, war tends to become indecisive. It is rapid decision making that transforms defeat into routs or attacks into pursuits.”16 Fundamentally, the problem is a lack of time, and the solution is individual initiative.17

Modern communications technology allows information to be passed up and down the chain more quickly. However, during periods where timely information passage is particularly critical, many links in the chain of command are routinely bypassed. During combat operations in Afghanistan, the Battle Group Commander would talk to all units on the radio net when time was critical, bypassing the links in the chain between him and the patrolling troops. During air operations in Libya, the Force Commander could use the radio net to re-task specific aircraft to a time critical mission, bypassing the entire chain of command between the general and the flying pilot. In stark contrast, the research, development, and acquisition phases have even more links in the chain of command, including Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), the Treasury Board, and the larger political processes while they all operate in the information battlespace, which is arguably the fastest paced battlespace. This lack of decision speed
for research, development, and acquisition phases, especially in quickly-evolving, complex technology fields, means that when the commander does finally make his decision, “...the battlefield has changed to a degree that makes the decision inconsequential at best, or dangerous at worst, for his forces.”

Downes notes “[s]ome commanders have a tendency to accept a mission and never broaden their perspective beyond that point... The remainder of the order-writing process is a series of microscoping steps, ending in the assignment of tasks and coordinating instructions.” The purpose of moving away from Befehlstaktik towards Auftragstaktik was to leverage the timely local knowledge of troops in the field. If subordinate commanders and troops accept their mission and never broaden their perspective, then local knowledge is wasted. It is therefore incumbent upon subordinate commanders and troops in the field to broaden their perspective and redefine their mission in accordance with the stated commander’s intent. In the information battlespace, this means that all personnel should use their particular skill sets and interests to help define and refine how the Canadian Armed Forces evolves with technology. The life experiences of our personnel present a plethora of different points of views and skill sets that could provide faster, better, and cheaper solutions to known problems if and only if we leverage them properly. It is important to note that not all decisions made using individual initiative are correct. There is still a requirement for commanders at all levels to ‘sanity check’ the ideas being passed up, and to ultimately ensure that the initiative generated in the field is harmonized with both the commander’s intent and relevant stakeholder units.

**Harmonizing Initiative**

Maintaining the message integrity of the commander’s intent is problematic. During previous positions, this author has been privy to the initial direction given by the force commander and also privy to the message passed later to the lowest levels. Often, these messages would not be the same. The ‘telephone game’ that has been played in elementary schools for many years is funny, due to this exact process. To encapsulate, as the message passes through each new person it is modified slightly, often unintentionally. However, the number of small changes eventually sums to significantly different orders going into and coming out of the chain of command. Writing down the commander’s intent is the simplest method to fix this problem and to ensure that the message reaches all as originally intended.

Any guidance developed prior to execution was based upon what we thought the battlefield would look like. As reality does not match the anticipated picture, the guidance is basically flawed. Any hint of control measures, guidance or specific instructions only limits a subordinate’s ability to find a new solution to current battlefield realities. Commander’s intent should be broad, and it should minimize limitations or suggested paths for solutions.

Successful execution of initiative requires communication with one’s peers, which include individuals, units and higher commanders.”
know what is going on. Only the applicable commander should define the vision for the CF, but the subject matter experts should be able to quickly pass changes back up to the applicable commander for approval and continued execution as would recce troops in the field.

As Leser notes, the intent is not for uncontrolled initiative since that could easily lead to chaos:

If the commander does not believe his plan is failing, or the subordinate provides an incorrect assessment and these two viewpoints are not reconciled, then we have introduced another vision into the battle and chaos is created. There is a fine line, which can only be answered through experience and experimentation.20

It is imperative that the ‘good idea fairy’ does not supersede the commander’s intent. The foregoing issue has already been discussed in CAF Joint doctrine:

Command structures must always take into account the delicate balance between delegation and direction. Although freedom of action and application of initiative are encouraged, they must be balanced with an appropriate sense of responsibility and accountability...The best response to this dilemma is to encourage initiative at the lower level of commands but provide appropriate, clearly articulated, unambiguous guidance to commanders to ensure that the higher level commander’s intentions are well understood and not open to interpretation.21

Evolution Required

Fundamentally, research, development, acquisition, and technology processes are different than the strategic, operational, and tactical employment of military assets. Therefore, the same command and control structure designed specifically for the latter will not be ideally efficient for the former. In addition, the rate of change of technology and its impact upon research, development, and acquisition in the fast-paced information battlespace should make this the most flexible of command and control structures.

The CAF Joint Doctrine notes that subordinates must be provided with sufficient resources.22 Often, the resources available are fixed and insufficient to maintain the status quo. An alternative to more funding is a more efficient solution, and subordinates are often best placed to find these efficiencies.

Downes notes that the central issue is control: “[w]hat you command you will want to control, and that which you cannot control you would rather not be responsible to command.”23 Further he notes that “…chaos and loss of control are the norm, not the exception. In fact, we [Marines] have won more often by the preparations made before battle than by any efforts to exert control once the fighting has begun.”24 By evolving the command and control structure in the information battlespace, we can better prepare the CAF to adapt quickly to changing technology. As research, development, and acquisitions processes transition to combat ready equipment, we can improve our capabilities in combat.
Proposal

Analysts with access to the applicable commander are assigned to research, development and acquisition projects. There are subject matter experts in and related to the CAF that can provide relevant information to these analysts. All that is required is a way to connect the subject matter experts with the analysts. A collaborative on-line workspace and a central site with easy-to-follow links can connect the CAF at large to these specialized project groups. The collaborative on-line workspace will allow the easy creation of a community of interest related to any particular project in play. The on-line workspace will, at minimum, contain information posted by the analyst including the commander’s intent, and will become a forum for open discussion. The analyst then becomes the moderator of the community and can decide what to take to the commander from that on-line community. This also removes the burden for the analyst to be the sole source for the technical solution. Instead, the analyst becomes a facilitator, connecting technical problems to people with technical solutions. This is a form of crowd sourcing, where those primarily in the National Capital Region can connect and crowd-source solutions with those in and outside the National Capital Region.

Maintaining the community is not the analyst’s primary task, and it is up to the analyst and their commander to decide how much time should be spent moderating the forums and informing the community. Even without the analyst, the communities can develop like many on-line communities related to achieving specific goals. With respect to the technology sector, the development of the Linux operating system is the best example of how a geographically-unconnected group of people can become a community on-line and develop effective technical solutions.

Already, many units and sections have begun moving their archives to collaborative online workspaces including some research, development and acquisition projects. For those projects already with an on-line community, the only requirement is to advertise the community’s existence to the larger CAF community, so that we can better leverage the abilities of interested CAF members.

An argument against this kind of on-line community would be the potential wasted effort that the analyst/moderator would spend policing that community. Fortunately, the CAF is not the public-at-large, and the highly-technical nature of the projects should discourage all except those interested in furthering the cause. Ultimately however, this is a question of trust, and as J.L. Silva, a historian at the Baltic Defence College, notes:

*The superior trusts his subordinate to exercise his judgment and creativity, to act as the situation dictates to reach the maximum goal articulated in his mission; the subordinate trusts that whatever action he takes in good faith to contribute to the good of the whole will be supported by his superior.*

All those with access to the on-line community will be members of the CAF or the associated public services.
Conclusion

Political scientists Dr. Alberts and Dr. Hayes note:

Today’s missions differ from traditional military missions, not just at the margins, but qualitatively. Today’s missions are simultaneously more complex and more dynamic, requiring the collective capabilities and efforts of many organizations in order to succeed. This requirement for assembling a diverse set of capabilities and organizations into an effective coalition is accompanied by shrinking windows of response opportunity. Traditional approaches to command and control are not up to the challenge. Simply stated, they lack the agility required in the 21st Century. Fortunately, advances in information technologies have created a new space within which individuals and organizations can operate. Those individuals and organizations that have learned to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by operating in this new space have realized a significant competitive advantage over those that have ignored these opportunities.27

On-line collaborative workspaces have created the potential for the CAF to better leverage the collective capabilities and efforts of the CAF and related public service personnel. Now is the time for the CAF to take advantage of this new battlespace to challenge its personnel to provide better, faster, and cheaper solutions to meet the communicated commander’s intent.

NOTES

1. CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine, para 0408.
2. This article focuses primarily upon areas involving the acquisition and use of complex technologies that evolve quickly however the author plans to develop the more general case of operational and tactical use of the concepts in the future. Case Study #3 hints at the argument for the more general case of Mengengerquellentaktik.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
9. The author has since been promoted and posted to a flight training squadron. The army simulator staff in Kingston and a researcher at DRDC are thus far the only other personnel to show any sustained interest in the project. An article has been recently accepted for publication in the Royal Canadian Air Force Journal that attempts to increase the network of interested parties.
10. The author’s initial intent for this article was to examine and explore this favour network and how it did and should relate to the formal military chain of command.
12. CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine, para 0408.
14. CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine, para 0408.
15. Ibid., para 502.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
21. CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine, para 0503.
22. Ibid., para 0504.
23. Downes, p. 50.
24. Ibid.
25. A. Daniel Skepple Jr., in discussion with the author, talked about how as a consultant he had enough technical expertise to connect people with technical problems to people with technical solutions. December 2014.
27. As quoted in CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine, p. 5-2.
The Evolution of Transnational Revolutionary Organizations during the Islamist Era

by Jason Cooley

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Introduction

While the 16th Century was in progress, many Western nations started to seize control of territories across the globe. Once these areas were taken, indigenous parties encountered problems, ranging from economic injustice, to the spread of Western culture. Different political movements later emerged that were dominated by figures who were eager to eliminate these problems. During the early portion of the 20th Century, proponents of the international communist movement seized control of Russia. In the aftermath of this upheaval, the leaders of the new regime turned their attention to bringing people to power in other nations who would also be concerned about eradicating economic injustice. They eventually attempted to accomplish this objective by establishing the Communist International (Comintern), a transnational revolutionary organization that consisted of communist parties from numerous countries. The members of these parties worked assiduously to generate political change within their respective states, but a plethora of communist regimes never emerged while the Comintern was in existence from 1919 to 1943. Four years after the dissolution of the Comintern, Moscow developed another organization called the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). Between 1947 and 1956, the parties in this new transnational revolutionary organization frequently tried to engineer insurrections. However, none of these affiliates ever managed to overthrow the leaders, whom they detested.

As the international communist movement started to dissipate, another movement became quite influential on the world stage. The supporters of the Islamist movement shared the communist antipathy for the West, but they were not determined to eliminate economic injustice. Instead, they were more interested in halting the spread of Western culture in Muslim nations. This is not the only difference that can be found between these anti-Western
movements. While the Islamist movement was occurring, multiple transnational revolutionary organizations were created. Initially, these entities were controlled by a revolutionary state similar to the most formidable networks from the communist era. However, as more time elapsed, they began to function in an independent fashion. Within the pages that follow, it will be possible to chronicle this evolution by taking Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria into consideration.

Hezbollah

At the beginning of 2015, Islamic extremists conducted terrorist attacks in Paris, France. In the aftermath of these acts of violence, several news agencies brought analysts on the air to put them into perspective. During certain broadcasts, commentators mentioned how radicals like the ones in Paris are interested in establishing Islamic theocracies across the world. It cannot be denied that these extremists would like to see the emergence of more theocracies, but the analysts failed to emphasize how there is a major disagreement in the Islamist movement regarding what parties should be given the responsibility of leading these regimes. Some individuals are convinced that the Islamic theocracies should be run by Shiite Muslims. Meanwhile, others are of the opinion that they should be controlled by Sunni Muslims.

Many of the extremists, who are determined to bring Shiites to power, are affiliated with the group Hezbollah. A subversive entity like Hezbollah can be organized in multiple ways. One possibility is to have the organization operate in a centralized fashion. When power is centralized, a revolutionary state or an elite group that would be amenable to serving in a government at some point in the future makes all the major decisions in the organization. There is no need to present an example of an entity being dominated by the members of a revolutionary state since two illustrations were already provided for the reader when the Comintern and Cominform were being discussed in the preceding section. However, it would be advantageous to introduce an example of a network being controlled by a contingent operating outside of government. During the American Civil Rights Movement, several groups were attempting to enhance the living standards of black people in the South. One organization that attracted a considerable amount of followers in this part of the
As some members of the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah were attempting to bring an end to the Israeli occupation, others were trying to establish a new government. Many inside Lebanon did not realize that this entity was determined to create another regime until 1985. At the beginning of this year, Hezbollah figures unveiled an “Open Letter” to the public. Within it, they called “for the founding of an Islamic regime” in their nation. In 1986, a contingent traveled to Iran to meet with political officials about Lebanon’s future. While this meeting was in progress, the Lebanese delegation agreed that the new regime should be structured just like the one in Tehran.

Within Hezbollah: A History of the Party of God, Dominque Avon and Anaïs-Trissa Khatchadourian devote some attention to a major campaign that was supposed to set the stage for an upheaval on Lebanese soil. After Israeli forces arrived, Lebanese citizens were forced to deal with problems such as a lack of running water and inadequate medical care. A lot of them assumed that the government would introduce measures to eliminate these problems. However, officials never took any major steps to improve living standards. Some relief eventually emerged when Hezbollah elected to launch a social services initiative across Lebanon. One of the main beneficiaries of this program was farmers in the Lebanese countryside. For an extended period of time, these individuals were having a difficult time growing their crops. However, once they received tractors and fertilizers from Hezbollah, there was a noticeable rise in their production.

Hezbollah members were pleased to ease the suffering of their fellow countrymen. However, the social services program did not enable them to attract enough supporters to establish an Islamist government. Instead, they had to settle for gaining representation in the Lebanese parliament. After this turn of events transpired in the early-1990s, there was speculation that Hezbollah would continue to work assiduously to create an Islamic republic, but it no longer exhibited the same commitment to engineering an upheaval. In order to understand this evolution, it is imperative to take an important event in Iran into consideration. Following the 1979 Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was the Supreme Leader of Iran. Toward the end of the 1980s, this ardent proponent of generating political change in other nations was replaced by a moderate figure. Since this individual was not as dedicated to forming other Islamic republics, the members of the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah were encouraged to refrain from proceeding with their campaign to orchestrate an upheaval in their nation.

Hezbollah became less interested in constructing an Islamist government, but it did remain committed to bringing an end to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. In the 1990s, there were a number of setbacks on this front. On 3 June 1994, thirty operatives were killed when Israeli aircraft bombed a Hezbollah training camp in southern Lebanon. Israeli personnel who were operating on the ground also managed to kill members of this network. Five years after the airstrikes transpired, Israeli intelligence operatives detonated explosives outside Sidon, the third-largest city in Lebanon. Following this attack, it was learned that Ali Hassan Deeb, an influential Hezbollah leader, had died.

United States was the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the important decisions in this group were consistently made by a hierarchy that consisted of figures such as Martin Luther King Jr. If a network does not have a contingent at the top passing along various instructions, one can say that it is decentralized. Most of the time, decentralized organizations contain several cells that seldom interact with each other. A number of right-wing extremist groups inside the United States functioned in this manner, including the Phineas Priests.

Hezbollah is not structured like the Phineas Priesthood or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Instead, it is more reminiscent of the Comintern and Cominform. If a person wants to know how this transnational revolutionary organization came under the control of a revolutionary state, he or she needs to take a key event from the 1970s into consideration. During the last year of that decade, a contingent of radical Shiites assumed control of Iran. Soon after these extremists came to power in this Middle Eastern country, they became interested in engineering revolutions in other nations. As the 1980s commenced, the members of the Iranian regime took steps that were designed to create additional Islamist regimes. In 1982, they sent numerous troops into Iraq, a state that was run by a Sunni dictator named Saddam Hussein. They were hopeful that this invasion would prompt the Shiite population to revolt and form an Islamic republic in Iraq. While the military operation in Iraq was in progress, officials in Tehran made another crucial decision, which was to create Hezbollah.

A branch of a transnational revolutionary organization would prefer to concentrate entirely on toppling an unappealing regime. However, many do not have this luxury, since other problems are present in their respective countries, including military occupations. When the first Hezbollah branch emerged in Lebanon, soldiers from Israel were controlling the southern portion of this nation. Tel Aviv believed that this military campaign was justified, since Palestinian militants were using Lebanese territory to prepare for acts of political violence, but many prominent actors on the world stage considered Tel Aviv’s approach to be illegitimate. One of the most outspoken critics of the Israeli occupation was the United Nations. During one session, the members of the Security Council actually passed a resolution calling for an unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces.

The United Nations never went to great lengths to remove Israeli forces from Lebanon, but there were other external actors that were willing to engage in activities that had the potential to make this development transpire. The most important in relation to this discussion is Iran. Toward the end of 1982, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps constructed a base in Baalbek, a town just to the east of the Litani River. Several Hezbollah members eventually went to this location to receive instructions about how to plant explosives, utilize advanced weaponry, and so forth. Upon completion of these training sessions, they performed acts of violence against Israeli personnel who were in southern Lebanon. The first Hezbollah attack against the Israelis transpired in November 1982. During the middle portion of this month, truck bombs were detonated in Tyre, where the Israeli Military Governor was situated. In the aftermath of this operation, it was reported that 103 Israelis had perished.

Hezbollah: A History of the Party of God
Although Hezbollah lost several members during the 1990s, it was still able to see the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers at the beginning of the following decade. During the latter portion of the 1990s, Benjamin Netanyahu, a supporter of the occupation of Lebanon, was serving as Israel’s Prime Minister. An electoral victory in the final year of this decade allowed Ehud Barak, a critic of the occupation, to replace Netanyahu as Prime Minster. On 24 May 2000, Barak announced that Israel would be removing all its forces from Lebanon. After this withdrawal was completed, the United Nations and other key international actors were hopeful that Hezbollah would eschew partaking in future conflicts, but it became involved in multiple disputes during the early portion of the 21st Century. In 2006, a war broke out between Hezbollah and Israel when two Israeli soldiers were captured in a cross-border raid by Hezbollah members. Seven years later, operatives were sent to Syria to help Bashar al-Assad, a long-time supporter of Hezbollah and other Shiite groups, quell an insurgency.

The majority of this section has been used to discuss the Lebanese wing of Hezbollah. Since so much space has been dedicated to this branch, the reader can probably deduce that it was the affiliate that the Iranian regime provided with the most attention. This favoritism should not come as a surprise because some of the revolutionary states that preceded Iran also had preferred affiliates. During the introductory portion of this article, it was noted how the Soviet Union attempted to engineer other communist upheavals by forming the Comintern and Cominform. When the former was in existence, Soviet officials spent the majority of their time assisting the leaders of the German Communist Party. Consequently, the individuals at the top of other Comintern affiliates were consistently disregarded for twenty-four years.

There were multiple Hezbollah affiliates that were neglected by the members of the Iranian government, including one in Saudi Arabia. On more than one occasion, the Shiites within Saudi Arabia engaged in activities which were designed to topple a monarchy that was dominated by Sunni Muslims. However, most of their time was spent conducting acts of violence against soldiers from another country. During the early portion of the 1990s, the members of the royal family allowed American troops to use Saudi territory to prepare for a war against Iraq. Once this conflict ended, some U.S. soldiers remained inside Saudi Arabia to closely monitor the conduct of the Iraqi military. The leaders of the U.S. military became quite concerned about the safety of these soldiers. As a result, they decided to ameliorate the...
security arrangements outside the facilities that were being used to house the soldiers. Unfortunately, these enhancements did not keep the members of the Saudi wing of Hezbollah from killing American personnel. A lot of the Americans were staying at the Khobar Towers, a housing complex in the eastern portion of Saudi Arabia. In the middle-1990s, Terry Schwalier, a U.S. general in Saudi Arabia, ordered additional patrols at this facility. He also instructed the relevant parties to place more barricades around its perimeter. Although these changes were made, Iranian-trained operatives still managed to kill nineteen Americans at the Khobar Towers on 25 June 1996.

Al Qaeda

As detailed within the preceding section, it became quite apparent that Iran frequently provided individuals from the different branches of Hezbollah with instructions. The affiliates and cells inside the al Qaeda organization did not receive orders from the leaders of a revolutionary state. Rather, their commands usually came from Sunni extremists who had participated in the war effort against Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s. There were multiple factors that prompted Moscow to order a retreat from this central Asian nation in 1988. Among them was how Soviet helicopters were consistently being shot down by Sunni radicals as well as by other members of the resistance campaign. Since these extremists played such a pivotal role in the Soviet defeat, they started to consider that it would be possible to complete other daunting tasks, including overthrowing Western backed leaders in the Muslim world.

One individual who believed that Western allies could be removed from power was Osama Bin Laden. While the founder of al Qaeda was fighting in Afghanistan, he came into contact with Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Egyptians who were in favor of engineering upheavals. It did not take him very long to ask these individuals to sit on a council at the top of his group. During the final decade of the 20th Century, Bin Laden and the members of this council started to have various cells and affiliates perform terrorist attacks that were designed to generate political change. Some of the operatives from these cells and affiliates even traveled outside their respective countries in order to attend training sessions for these missions. At first, these sessions, which also consisted of further religious indoctrination, were provided in the Sudan, since Bin Laden was based in this country. However, once he left the Sudan in 1996, Afghanistan became the primary location for the training of al Qaeda operatives. Afghanistan and the Sudan felt obligated to allow al Qaeda to train operatives inside their borders because Bin Laden provided them with financial assistance to make much needed improvements in vital areas, such as infrastructure.
Not surprisingly, the Egyptians within the al Qaeda hierarchy were quite determined to topple the regime in their native country. A major operation transpired in the summer of 1995 that was supposed to overthrow the second leading recipient of American military aid. On 26 June 1995, Hosni Mubarak, the head of the Egyptian regime, was attending an Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. While his motorcade was traveling through the streets of this city, it was attacked by figures with ties to al Qaeda. Ethiopian security forces killed five of these individuals and three others were arrested. This development was definitely a setback for al Qaeda. However, it was not the most disappointing turn of events on this day since Mubarak was able to escape from the assassination attempt without being harmed. Consequently, a political vacuum never surfaced inside Egypt, and Islamists were unable to assume power.

Later in the decade, the figures at the top of the al Qaeda organization elected to expand their terrorist campaign. For many years, they had primarily ordered attacks that were intended to harm individuals who were associated with
unwanted regimes in Muslim nations. Just before the 1990s ended, the decision was made to begin conducting attacks in Western nations. It was believed these attacks would prompt Western leaders to terminate their support for the governments that al Qaeda wanted to remove from power. By this point, other Islamist groups had already utilized this strategy. During the early stages of 1993, a small contingent of extremists bombed the World Trade Center in New York City. Ramzi Yousef, an important figure within the group, was hoping that this bombing would have an impact upon American policymakers. Within a letter to The New York Times, he mentioned how he was furious about the political, military, and economic aid that secular regimes in the Middle East were receiving from the United States. Washington did not terminate its relationships with various secular leaders after this attack on the World Trade Center. In fact, some of them began to receive even more U.S. support following this event.

The United States was the first Western nation that al Qaeda targeted. In 1999, some Muslims, who were studying in Hamburg, Germany, traveled to Afghanistan to receive training in an al Qaeda camp. While they were in Afghanistan, the members of the al Qaeda hierarchy informed them that they had been selected to participate in an operation which entailed flying aircraft into major American landmarks. After receiving this assignment, the operatives traveled to America to enroll in programs at various flight schools. When they were in these programs, they acquired knowledge that would later enable them to fly hijacked aircraft into the World Trade Center and Pentagon on the morning of 11 September 2001.

In July 2005, individuals detonated explosives on subway trains and a double-decker bus in the city of London. Shortly thereafter, there were reports that al Qaeda leaders had nothing to do with it. For example, in August, an article inside a British newspaper said “no evidence of any al Qaida mastermind or senior organizer” could be found. A number of parties eventually contested the lack of credibility within these initial reports. Perhaps the most important challenge came from the British government. Investigations by bodies such as the Intelligence and Security Committee from the House of Commons indicated that the al Qaeda network actually played some role in the operation. This conclusion was primarily based upon intelligence revealed that certain bombers had met with al Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan prior to the attack. Mohammed Sidique Khan definitely spent the

“Later in the decade, the figures at the top of the al Qaeda organization elected to expand their terrorist campaign.”
most time in this country. This can be attributed to the manner in which he “… spent several months there between November 2004 and February 2005.”

The attacks in 2001 and 2005 impacted the conduct of officials in the American and British governments. However, these individuals did not respond in the manner that al Qaeda leaders had hoped. Rather than sever ties with rulers in Cairo, Amman, and so forth, they chose to work even closer with these allies in the Muslim world. There was another problem that Bin Laden and his associates had to deal with in the first decade of the twenty-first century. As the wave of attacks was commencing in the West, affiliates and cells within Muslim states were still failing to produce any worthwhile results. One affiliate who was having trouble generating political change around this time was Jemaah Islamiyah. The majority of this Southeast Asian affiliate’s acts of violence transpired inside Indonesia. On 12 October 2002, it conducted a major attack in Bali, a resort that attracts many Western tourists. Hambali, the man who was given the responsibility of executing this mission, received a lot of assistance from an operative named Amrozi. In addition to buying the minivan that carried one of the bombs that exploded, Amrozi purchased the chemicals that were used to make all the bombs that were detonated. The bombings did not set the stage for the downfall of the Indonesian government, but they did kill 202 people and injure another 200 individuals.

During the second decade of the 21st Century, al Qaeda’s affiliates continued to conduct terrorist attacks that failed to generate political change. However, these attacks were organized differently than the majority of the operations that were performed during the preceding decades. Within the prior paragraphs, we saw how most of al Qaeda’s acts of violence during the 1990s and 2000s were approved by the figures at the top of this transnational revolutionary organization. While the second decade of the 21st Century was in progress, the members of the al Qaeda hierarchy did not authorize the attacks that caught the attention of people throughout the globe. Instead, it was the leaders of the affiliates who sanctioned these operations. In order to understand why this change occurred, it is necessary to take some events from 2011 into consideration. At the beginning of May, Bin Laden was killed by American Special Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Six weeks after this assassination, al Qaeda announced that al-Zawahiri had been chosen as Bin Laden’s successor. It did not take very long to recognize that al-Zawahiri did not intend to work with affiliates in the same way as his predecessor. For years, affiliates behaved in an obsequious manner because Bin Laden consistently mollified them. When al-Zawahiri gained control of al Qaeda, he did not continue his predecessor’s policy of appeasement. As a result, the affiliates were no longer amenable to following the instructions that were being passed down by the hierarchy.
The declining influence of the al Qaeda hierarchy can be noticed while looking at the activities that preceded a major attack in 2013. Before the London attack was executed in 2005, operatives traveled to Pakistan to receive orders from officials at the top of the al Qaeda organization. Prior to the attack in 2013, operatives did not meet with members of the al Qaeda hierarchy. Rather, they met with influential figures inside a branch called al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Once they received instructions, they killed approximately fifty-six people at the Yemeni Defense Ministry in the city of Sana‘a.26

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

Towards the end of the last section, it was noted how a considerable amount of tension surfaced between al Qaeda’s affiliates and senior officials during the early portion of the 21st Century. Most of the branches managed to remain in this jihadist network once this friction emerged, but one in the Middle East was not this fortunate. At the beginning of 2003, the United States launched a military operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. It did not take very long for a resistance campaign to surface that was designed to force the American soldiers out of Iraq. After this effort commenced, al Qaeda operatives became quite active inside this Arab nation. These individuals periodically detonated explosives near facilities that were being utilized by U.S. troops and indigenous parties who were collaborating with them. However, they gained far more attention for conducting barbaric attacks such as beheadings. The leaders of al Qaeda were convinced that this brutality would alienate Iraqi Muslims as well as believers in other nations. Consequently, they told the Iraqi branch to refrain from performing savage attacks in the future. Upon receiving these instructions, it did not choose to behave in a docile manner.

In the second decade of the century, the friction between the al Qaeda hierarchy and this affiliate increased. The first inclination of some would be to presume that this rise was caused solely by the continuation of the brutal attacks. However, there was actually another factor that contributed to the increase. Toward the end of the discussion concerning Hezbollah, we saw how an uprising com-
menced in Syria during the second decade of the 21st Century. As this rebellion grew, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of al Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate, opted to establish a subversive entity in Syria called the al-Nusra front. For some time, the al-Nusra front remained the only al Qaeda branch inside Syria, but al-Baghdadi and other influential individuals in the Iraqi affiliate eventually traveled to Syria to partake in the insurgency. At one point in the spring of 2013, al-Baghdadi declared that his network and the al-Nusra front would be forming a new organization called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Following this announcement, the members of the al Qaeda hierarchy informed al-Baghdadi that this unification should not take place. Over an eight month period, he worked assiduously to convince his superiors to agree with him about the merger. This prolonged lobbying campaign did not lead to the figures in the al Qaeda hierarchy changing their minds. Instead, they elected to sever all of their ties with al Baghdadi’s Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

At various times in history, ardent proponents of the decentralization of power have existed within new transnational revolutionary organizations. Following the dissolution of the Comintern, a debate transpired between former members about why it failed to generate widespread political change. Multiple communist parties in Europe asserted that proletariat uprisings did not occur inside numerous countries because the Soviet Union possessed too much influence within the Comintern. When the Cominform was created in the latter stages of the 1940s, its founders were quite optimistic since they were not expecting the Soviet Union to play a significant role in its activities. Instead, “…the new agency was to be more inclusive, situated outside the USSR, and endowed with an air of the complete equality of the nine participating parties.” It would not be long before individuals in the European parties recognized that Moscow was quite powerful in this network as well.

There were not any contingents in ISIS following the split with al Qaeda that were tantamount to the European parties in the Cominform. In other words, it was not possible to find any factions which were insisting that this new network should be organized in a decentralized fashion. Since no supporters of decentralization were present, al-Baghdadi and other individuals at the top of the organization continued to wield a considerable amount of power. If we turn our attention to a series of events that transpired toward the end of 2014, we will be able to see how ISIS remained a centralized entity. During the month of September, a Frenchman named Herve Gourdel was abducted by Jund al-Khilafa in northern Africa. Gourdel’s friends and family members were hopeful that this ISIS affiliate would release him, but operatives elected to decapitate him in an undisclosed location. In the aftermath of this gruesome development, members of Jund al-Khilafa revealed that they had killed Gourdel because...
al-Baghdadi and other members of the ISIS hierarchy had been calling for attacks on French citizens ever since the French military had been participating in a bombing campaign against ISIS strongholds in the northern portion of Iraq.30

ISIS eventually welcomed more groups that were receptive to obeying the instructions of men like al-Baghdadi. Out of all of these new affiliates, the most prominent was Boko Haram, an Islamist group based in the West African country of Nigeria. The members of Boko Haram began to push for the establishment of an Islamic government within their nation in 2002. At first, they only attempted to generate political change by detonating explosives near military bases and assassinating government officials. However, as more time elapsed, they started to target individuals who were not even affiliated with the government they were interested in removing from power. In the spring of 2014, the group went so far as to abduct 276 school girls in Chibok, a town in the northeastern portion of Nigeria. Shortly after this turn of events, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, infuriated people around the world when he announced that he was planning on selling the girls into slavery. By the beginning of the following year, individuals outside Nigeria were no longer devoting much attention to Shekau’s remarks about these children. Instead, people in other countries were talking more about how his organization had “agreed to accept the authority” of the figures within the Islamic State hierarchy.31

Some used this increase in affiliates to argue that ISIS was becoming a formidable transnational revolutionary organization. Meanwhile, others turned to another piece of evidence to demonstrate how this Islamist network was gaining strength. In the months following the separation from al Qaeda, numerous Muslims from various parts of the globe began to travel to the Middle East to join ISIS. Because countless individuals were making this journey, political figures across the Middle East started to speculate in public about how many operatives were inside al-Baghdadi’s organization. During an interview with a British newspaper in November 2014, a member of the Kurdish contingent that was controlling areas of northern Iraq insinuated that hundreds of thousands of ISIS members were present in Iraq and Syria.32 Two months after this Kurdish official made this remark, Peter Neumann, an analyst with the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), presented a more veracious estimate with respect to the amount of ISIS operatives in these two nations. In article that originally appeared on ICSR’s web site, he indicated that there were actually thousands of ISIS followers situated on Iraqi and Syrian soil.33

Prominent figures within the ISIS hierarchy had these operatives perform some gruesome operations in Iraq and Syria. A considerable number of these operations transpired in Mosul, a city in the northern portion of Iraq. At one point in January 2015, ISIS captured two men in Mosul who were deemed to be guilty of banditry. In the aftermath of this development, operatives tied the men to a cross and executed them in front of a crowd of spectators. During the same month, ISIS killed two other Mosul males on suspicion of engaging in homosexual acts. Instead of shooting the men in public like the alleged bandits, this Islamist entity elected to throw them off the roof of a building.34

The barbaric acts by fighters within Iraq and Syria and the affiliates in other nations were supposed to coincide with a number of other developments. A turn of events that al-Baghdadi and other senior officials were very interested in seeing was the downfall of various unappealing governments. As the gruesome operations being performed, no major upheavals took place, but ISIS did manage to seize a considerable amount of territory inside Iraq and Syria. The first inclination of some would probably be to assume that this development should just be attributed to the brutal acts in these two countries. However, there were actually other factors that enabled this transnational revolutionary organization to assume control of this territory, especially the land in Iraq. Every nation in the international community wants to maintain a military that is capable of preventing outside parties from seizing territory within its borders. Around the time that ISIS was becoming a formidable network, the Iraqi military was in possession of several potent weapons. The problem was this contingent did not have enough soldiers who were willing to participate in battles against ISIS fighters. When individuals from ISIS approached military bases and checkpoints, most of the troops abandoned their posts in a rapid fashion.35 Since an adequate number of men were no longer present in these locations, the militants were able to gain control of them without much difficulty.

The majority of the operatives in ISIS were told to complete violent tasks. However, there were actually some individuals who were instructed to engage in more peaceful activities.

At one point in time, the residents of one northern city were having trouble getting food and gasoline. Consequently, members of ISIS developed a financial plan that made it possible for them to pay for these necessities.36 If this plan had not been created, these Iraqis never would have been amenable to ISIS controlling their city.

Conclusion

During the early and middle portions of the 20th Century, the supporters of the international communist movement exhibited a strong commitment to combating Western influence in the non-Western world. However, by the latter part of that century, these actors became less interested in confronting Western nations, such as the United States. Once the dedication of communists started to wane, the actors associated with the international Islamist movement assumed control of the campaign against the West. It is safe to say that the Islamist actors which caused the most trouble for Western states were transnational revolutionary organizations since they conducted terrorist operations that killed Westerners in Muslim countries, as well as in a number of Western cities.
Each of these transnational revolutionary organizations managed to become a security concern for Western nations, but there are several differences that can be found between them. One of the most important differences is the manner in which all of these entities did not function in the same fashion. Within the second section of this article, Hezbollah, the first transnational revolutionary organization that emerged during the Islamist era, was subjected to analysis. During this examination, it became quite apparent that this Shiite-led group was similar to the organizations that were linked to the communist movement, since it was controlled by the rulers of a revolutionary state. The analyses in the third and fourth sections helped us recognize that al Qaeda and ISIS, the Sunni organizations that came into existence after Hezbollah, were not led by the members of revolutionary states. Instead, they were run by elites who were situated outside the corridors of power in Muslim countries.

NOTES

9. Avon and Khatchadourian, p.34.
10. Ibid., p.60.
15. Ibid.
32. Fuad Hussein, Interview with The Independent, 2014.
An article entitled: ‘Is there a Role for CAF Chaplains in Ethics?’ that appeared in Volume 16, Number 1 of the Canadian Military Journal raised a number of ethical issues.

At the beginning of the article, the authors state: ‘During the creation of the Defence Ethics Program (DEP) in 1994, for reasons that still remain unclear, it was decided that military chaplains would not take an active part in the delivery of the new program.’ In 1994, I was the Chief Review Services (CRS). The ethics initiatives that led to the formation of PREP (Protection of Resources and Ethics Program) were of my doing, starting in 1990-1991, and well before the Somalia debacle. It was after 1995 that the name of the program was changed to DEP (Defence Ethics Program). That is why I was somewhat irked by the negative start of the article by Padres Pichette and Marshall. There was no nefarious intent on the part of CRS to disregard the Chaplaincy, as I submit below.

A cursory review of the 7059-29 (CRS) Implementation Plan – Protection of Resources and Ethics Program (PREP), dated 30 June 1994 and signed by the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) on behalf of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), would have clarified the incorrect conclusion drawn by the authors. The document clearly outlines the objectives of the program as: ‘A key objective of the PREP will be to raise the awareness of personnel that they have an obligation, which the nation has a right to expect, that Defence resources will not be wasted, abused nor used for personal gain.’ It went on to state: ‘Resource management ethics helps a manager not only to make the right decision but at the same time to ensure that it is seen to be the right decision. ... Resource management ethics is defined as a set of principles to guide each Defence Team Member to ensure that his or her management of Defence or Government resources will withstand the test of public scrutiny.’

The PREP, then the DEP, also pre-date but are aligned with the Values & Ethics codes of the Public Service and what other Government Departments devised for their respective ethos. The focus of the Chaplaincy is on the members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), which is fair and just, but the DEP must also focus upon those of the Defence Team who are not military, and thus the limitations that this imposes on the suggested outcomes.

At the onset, I wanted to develop a system to prevent ethical accidents that could cause damage to individuals and to the organization. My belief is that ethics and integrity are not just fads, as some cynics would say. Humans have been debating virtuous
behaviour and working for the good for at least 2500 years. Yet, we continue to fall short of doing what is required. Why is that? And what can we do to improve our performance? Those were the questions I asked then, and the questions I am still asking.

When looking at ethics as something distinct from a set of values based upon religious tenets I described it as follows: ‘It involves an intellectual process that can help us find the best way to live up to our core values and to our shared values in our social/cultural surroundings.’

Most importantly, with respect to decision-making, I suggested asking four simple questions:

Is it legal?
Is it ethical?
Is it reasonable?
Is it defendable?

Major Denis Beauchamp (PhD), a colleague of mine in the establishment of the Ethics initiative who retired in September of 2013 had written a paper entitled: “Fundamentals of Canadian Defence Ethics” (dated 1999). It is listed as recommended reading under “ethics training and learning tools/suggested reading/government ethics” on the DEP website. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-ethics/suggested-reading.page. In fact, it can be considered the definitive paper on the development of the program.

Those of us who were involved will remember that from very early on in the creation of the ethics program, and fairly frequently after that, some chaplains expressed a belief that either chaplains should take control of or play the lead role in the ethics program for the Canadian Forces (CF). (Editor’s Note: The term ‘Canadian Forces’ has recently been replaced with the term ‘Canadian Armed Forces.’) It was pointed out that the Canadian Forces Organization Order (CFOO) at the time made them the main, if not the exclusive, advisors to commanders on moral and spiritual matters affecting military personnel and their families. I note that the chaplaincy added the term “ethics” to the role of chaplains when the DEP was formed. The DEP was never meant and did not attempt to replace the chaplain’s role in moral and spiritual matters no more than it would have challenged the role of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) in matters of law. From the beginning, the DEP saw itself as existing and being justified only within the legislative framework of the Canadian Government and its laws.

The thrust was to move away from Abrahamic religions because at the onset, the program focused upon resource management ethics within a legislative framework and dealt with something more specific than the requirements of morality and spirituality based upon religion. The article in Volume 16 Number 1 “Is there a Role for CAF Chaplains in Ethics?” acknowledges that. CRS/DEP deals with – conflict of interest, administrative ethical decision-making, fraud awareness, and so on. These issues affect the whole Defence Team, whether its members have or are without any religious affiliation.
Ethics programs in liberal democracies generally are a relatively recent historical phenomenon dating back only to 1978 with the American “Ethics in Government Act,” followed in 1990 by the Defence Ethics and Fraud Awareness Campaign of the Australian Department of Defence. Ethics is the secular side of the application and practice of values in our democracies, in contrast to morality, which has tended to be the more religious side. Ethics is an integral part of leadership, management, and leadership responsibilities. The ethics programs that were created in Western democracies toward the end of the 20th Century, including the DEP in DND and the CF, were developed to address a vacuum that had existed in that domain concerning the ethical values that should be practiced by personnel. Since that time, the responsibilities of management and senior leadership, in both the public and the private sectors, have been made more and more explicit, responsibilities that include ensuring that personnel know and practice the values that must rule their behaviour in carrying out their duties.

The Air Force Journal article ‘Reflections and Questions on Ethics,’ the Volume 2, Number 2 issue (Spring 2009) expanded upon this theme. It is re-printed in Volume 4, Number 3 (Summer 2015) of the Royal Canadian Air Force Journal.

The DEP has, from the beginning, encouraged military leadership and management at all levels to take an active role in carrying out these “new” responsibilities concerning ethics in the workplace. None of this has challenged in any way the critical role that the military chaplaincy has played and must continue to play in addressing the moral and spiritual needs of military personnel. In fact, in delivering the DEP, a whole person approach to serving the needs of military personnel (i.e. matters pertaining to ethics, morality, and spirituality) would encourage the involvement of the chaplaincy. However, it should be kept in mind that the DEP applies to all CAF and DND personnel as they carry out their duties within the legislative framework of the Canadian Government and its laws, while the chaplaincy should, in a democracy, respect the fact that many today prefer not to deal with chaplains or organized religion.

The article in question does offer an interesting, succinct historical overview of the Chaplaincy in the Canadian Forces/Canadian Armed Forces up to now. From an Ethics program delivery point of view, 2016 is not 1994 by any standard. The Defence Ethics Program of today has developed far beyond the PREP of 1994, and it now includes all aspects of ethics involved in carrying out the mandates of the DND and the CAF. However, as it was back in 1994, it is still just as true today that it is better to work together than at cross-purpose. In today’s environment, Chief Review Services may very well want to consider the observations raised by Padres Pichette and Marshall.

Major-General (Ret’d) Marc Terreau, CMM, CD
Ottawa, Ontario
January 2016

Major-General Marc Terreau CMM, CD, had a lengthy career in air mobility culminating in command of Air Transport Group. A proud graduate of National Defence College, he spent the last six years of his career in National Defence Headquarters as Chief Review Services, where he initiated an ethics program applicable to both the Canadian Forces and civilian members of the Defence Team. Later, he became a consultant on applied ethics, chair of the Ethics Practitioners’ Association of Canada, sat on the Research Ethics Committee of an Ottawa hospital, and was a member of the RCAF Advisory Council and the Honorary Colonel of 429 Squadron. He continues to do volunteer work in various sectors of Canadian society.
Attrition and Retention in the Reserves

by Dan A. Doran

Introduction

The conventional thinking on attrition within the Canadian Reserves is couched on the premise that it is statistically similar to that of the Regular Force, and a problem that cannot be reasonably solved in any manner different than those approaches taken by the latter. This type of thinking ignores a fundamental difference in the nature of these statistics when examined in a more granular fashion, as well as the organizational and structural challenges faced uniquely by reservists throughout their careers. This article intends to lend additional thinking to this problem and suggest possible alternatives that would go a long way in mitigating at least some of these unique challenges through a more strategic outlook on human resource management within the reserves, and accepting hard realities on the perceived/desired vs. functional capabilities of the reserves.

To begin, one needs to look at the attrition statistics within the Regular Force as a baseline for comparison to that of its reserve counterpart. The turnover within the Regular Force averaged 7.75% between 2003 and 2010, with slightly higher annual percentages in the latter half of the data set. The higher numbers are attributed mainly to the predictable retirement of ‘Baby Boomers’ from the workforce. The majority of this attrition stems from members leaving at the normal retirement age, and to a lesser degree, members retiring in middle age after conclusion of their 20 or 25 year service contract. These numbers are very good compared to the private sector, where employee tenures can average as low as 0.8 years.

When one examines the statistics in the reserves, the numbers are not starkly different – average reserve attrition rates are around 10%, and this with a significantly larger margin of error, due to a far smaller sample set than the baseline regular force statistics. The difference with these statistics does not exist in the actual number but in the major employee types that make up these numbers. Close to 95% of releases within the reserve data set come from members with less than two years of military service at the rank levels of private and corporal. A regiment can lose close to 50% of an annual recruit intake within the first 24 months after they join, and this is due mainly to voluntary release. These statistics should not be surprising, as it defines one of the core characteristics of the reserve employee base. The career of most reservists rarely extends beyond the 4-5 years that the individual is in school, ending, for the most part, when they graduate from their respective programs and find full-time work. At any given time in a regiment, these employee groups represent close to 80% of the regiment’s active members, with the remaining 20% representing members with more than five years of service, and typically holding the ranks of master corporal and above.
This article, however, is not about the 80% majority, as these soldiers are a statistic that is hardwired into the training and organizational culture of the reserves. These soldiers are young and typically in school which makes part-time employment during the school year and full-time employment over the summers an excellent short-term fit to meet their income needs. It should also be noted that this is a key marketing angle used by recruiting centres to convince potential reservists to enlist; when the 80% group’s employment needs change, it stands to reason that they would forgo their reserve employment in favour of full-time work related to their field of study or interest.

Instead, this article focuses upon the minority 20% that decide to stay in the reserves, and who represent the essential leadership core of any reserve regiment. Without these senior soldiers, reserve regiments would simply grind to a halt as the unit would lose its planning, coordination, and leadership capabilities. These members represent a sub-group that has remained relatively unknown to most Regular Force members, since they rarely deploy on overseas missions (or if they have done so, it was generally early in their careers) or engage in full-time Class B service. These reservists have full-time civilian careers and lives, and they chose to serve despite the non-military commitments that lead most to release. Given their lack of visibility and voice, these individuals are poorly understood by the Regular Force leadership, and as such, this sub-group is often poorly served by training and work systems not of their making. This article hopes to clarify the psychology of this sub-set of soldiers, and explain why and at what point in their careers they are most at risk of releasing. Further, this article will propose solutions to mitigate these risks through re-aligning a system that is unintentionally designed to disenfranchise its most important human resource assets.

Discussion

In an attempt to visually represent a typical career for the 20% sub-set of reservists, Figure 1 illustrates the career of such a member. On the graph’s left vertical axis is the member’s relative level of commitment to the reserves with respect to time and effort. This axis maps the blue inverted parabolic line. The right vertical axis represents the number of hours in a waking day (16-hours) as a percentage. This axis maps the shaded areas that represent what a reservist is engaged in at various periods in his life – the shaded areas are labelled for easier understanding. The bottom horizontal axis and top horizontal axis correspond to the years of military service and age of the reservist respectively. Green dots on the upper horizontal axis indicate relative ranks attained by a member through their years of service, with vertical dashed red lines to demarcate key life events. The data used to fill out this table consists of a combination of anecdotal interviews with senior members of 34 Combat Engineer Regiment, as well as a written survey issued to unit members in 2014. The name of the figure – The Lambiris Curve, is attributed to the 34 CER member who inspired this article. He currently is living through the acute dip in the middle of the curve, and is at high risk of leaving the unit.

In moving through the graph, the typical reservist begins his military career with very little other than school and the military on his daily plate of events – this trend continues until the member completes his academic training and moves to the work force. As the member’s military, civilian, and personal life continues to develop, each element becomes more demanding on his/her
available time in a given day. As these demands become more pronounced, the member becomes progressively less involved with the unit’s activities and training, illustrated by the figure’s blue inverted parabolic line. In many cases, the member is forced to make choices to forgo progression in one professional career in favour of another. Given the reality that a reservist’s military career does not ‘pay the mortgage,’ it is usually this career that tends to suffer. The member then becomes progressively less involved, and in turn, less attached to the unit and its regular activities until said member reaches a decision point, whereby the member either accepts that he/she remains in the reserves at a rank and position below their actual level of competency, or he/she simply releases.

One of the greatest functional limitations that lead to a member’s degeneration to the low point in the graph is the need to attend career-related courses in the reserves that he/she does not have the time to attend, due to civilian work and family commitments. This is due, in large part, to the superimposing of regular force training paradigms on the Reserve Force in the form of multi-month residence based courses. In many cases, Reserve and Regular Force members attend the same courses concurrently. The Regular Force thinking is that this creates a consistency in training throughout the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and facilitates interoperability between the two components. The CAF has toyed with the scope of this approach, from aiming to have complete interoperability,6 to focussing upon maintaining “…a small number of Reservists at the same training level as the Regular Force.”7 This thinking is flawed for the singular reason of reserve skill fade. While a reservist can attend and succeed in regular force career progression courses, the reserve member simply does not practice these learned skills at a sufficient frequency and intensity at a reserve unit to be proficient in all of them, and to the same degree as his Regular Force counterpart. As such, the time, effort and money spent on giving these reservists equivalent and transferable training fails to achieve the objective of consistency within the system, while setting up impassible career barriers for members who wish very much to progress in their part-time military career, but cannot do so, due to commitments related to their civilian careers. This situations makes for a ‘lose-lose’ scenario for the CAF for a number of reasons. Firstly, the CAF loses out on the opportunity to develop motivated and competent leaders who have the will to be engaged, but not the means. Secondly, it leads to members being put into a position whereby they no longer feel engaged and at risk of release. And thirdly, it puts additional stress upon an already-stretched training system to run very time intensive courses for reservists who will more than likely only use a limited number of the skills taught, and then within a very specific capacity.
Given these factors, it would seem more realistic for the CAF to re-align training so as to achieve their reserve support needs while not sacrificing the career development of its members. What this means is that the CAF needs to better understand what purposes the reserves serve, and how best to gear the training system accordingly. If one examines the nature of reserve support to the Regular Force anecdotally over the past decade, it has consisted typically of: (1) junior rank support to battle groups in operation; (2) staff support in higher headquarters; and (3) backfilling positions throughout the CAF on a contractual basis. If one assumes these full-time reservist groups represent the majority of that subset, it becomes clear that Regular Force parity may not be required beyond the rank of private, as long as the individual is employed in a mainly-staff role (senior members), or in a non-leadership field role (junior members). This conclusion re-frames the entire needs debate related to reserve training, and forces one to consider the rationalizing of reserve training strategies and objectives.

What is the added value of a reserve captain attending a one-year grueling Army Operations Course in order to learn an operational planning process he may only rarely apply, and when he does so, it is in a very simplified form? Why does a reserve sergeant need to attend several trades and leadership courses that extend to multiple months of distance and residence training, only to learn skills he will apply in a very limited fashion one weekend a month? These questions become more salient when one asks the larger question of what are the roles and expectations of the reserves, and what is realistic to expect from soldiers that parade an average of 35 days-per-year, excluding summer training. The CAF would do well to examine the possibility of harmonizing capacities and needs, while being realistic with respect to the functional limitations in ability and availability inherent in any person that only periodically engages in military activity. This represents a significant challenge, due to the nature of the reserve power structure, which lends itself to creating a senior leadership group that is starkly different from its middle leadership group. More specifically, as a result of the current training and operations system, those that typically ascend to the highest echelons of the reserves are those individuals that: (1) are retired Regular Force members; (2) reservists who have spent the vast majority of their career in full-time service; or (3) have achieved a position more as a result of their availability to serve as opposed to their objective ability. These archetypes are rarely the best suited to discuss the real limitations of the reservists capacities because they simply have not lived them. The outcome of this leadership structure creates a training system that puts unrealistic demands upon members, and a command system that makes excessive operational demands upon its units. Combined, this creates a ‘perfect storm’ that compels some of the best members to leave as a result of no longer being able to adequately complete their job, and simultaneously, not wanting to do their military job in a poor fashion under unrealistic time constraints.

Conclusion

For this to change the training system and command direction has to understand the risks associated with their strategies which relate specifically to the mid-point in Figure 1, and the strategic implication of having so many members of their resource pool at risk of leaving at any time within that period. Should corrective action be taken to level the curve, one can see that in the right extreme of Figure 1, participation...
takes an upswing. This results from children being older and more autonomous, graduate studies having been completed, and civilian career progression levelling off. This is the ‘light at the end of the tunnel,’ and modifying business as usual approaches to instruction and command expectations will allow more members to traverse the ‘high risk’ period. In turn, it will better support the senior leadership needs of the reserves by deepening the resource pool and creating reserve leaders who can more easily navigate military and civilian professional success without having to choose one at the expense of the other, and it will more accurately represent the reserves through a more-uniform shared experience throughout its hierarchy.

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NOTES

I crossed paths with Corporal Jonathan Znack in the spring of 2015 when he was attending a Health Promotion course on Mental Fitness & Suicide Awareness. I was instructing the program with a colleague. Our first impression of Jon was that he was a young man on a leadership trajectory, ready to further his mark on the Canadian Armed Forces. He was polished, confident and friendly.

After introductions, the course began with the group digging into stereotypes about mental health. Participants teetered between ‘myth or fact’ regarding perceptions about suicide. Jon was engaged and respectful, sharing his opinions and thoughtfully considering the views of his peers. It wasn’t until we reached the statement, “once a person is suicidal they will never change their mind,” that Jon’s hand shot up: “Myth!” he exclaimed. I probed further, to understand what made him feel that way. “Well,” he said “I know because I changed my mind.”

For the remainder of the course, Jon was open and forthcoming about his struggle with depression and subsequent suicide attempt. As someone who had fought a mental health battle, and lived to tell the tale, his insight was invaluable to his course mates.

I followed up with Jon after the workshop and asked if he would be willing to share his experience with others in the CAF, and he graciously agreed. Below is the story of a soldier’s “free-fall into the abyss” of his mind and his subsequent recovery.

Corporal Jonathan Znack is originally from Chatham, New Brunswick, and the son of two military parents. He joined the Canadian Armed Forces in February 2007, starting his career as a supply technician in Borden. After his first trade course, he decided he wanted a career that pushed him further and would garner a “bit more out of life.” He remustered into the Parachute Rigger Specialization and was subsequently posted to Trenton. From August 2008 until July 2011, Jon was living his version of the military dream. His job was fast-paced and exhilarating, and his small team of riggers became like brothers to him.

During the summer of 2011, Jon again got the itch to try something new. He volunteered to be posted to Edmonton as a rigger. He was excited to learn a new aspect of the work that he loved. In his new role, Jon was half of the team of two responsible for providing, inspecting, and packing parachutes for the 3rd Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) jumpers, and he enjoyed every single demanding, challenging moment of it.
Jon’s mental fitness concerns began in the summer of 2013, two years after arriving in Edmonton. He noticed that his boundless energy had diminished. He began struggling to get through the work day. He was regularly having to encourage himself to “push just a bit more.” He needed “an extra little kick to get through” tasks that had previously felt “like a breeze.” Jon was exhausted and frustrated.

Around this time, Jon found that mental health pamphlets began “catching his eye.” At his unit he came across a pocket-sized summary of the Mental Health Continuum (MHC). The MHC is a tool that the CAF developed in collaboration with the U.S. Marine Corps. Rather than using a ‘black or white’ categorization system that labels people as either mentally well or mentally ill, it identifies a spectrum of behaviours in between. This continuum approach enables soldiers and health workers to recognize when issues are arising prior to them becoming ‘full on’ mental health crises.

When he reviewed the MHC, Jon noticed that his difficulty concentrating, exhaustion, feelings of worthlessness and anger were signs of decreased mental health. He quickly denied the idea that he could be mentally unfit. He wanted to believe that he was simply “extending his limits” for the line of work that he loved. Jon shoved the pamphlet in the top drawer of his desk and tried his best to push forward.

As Jon’s mental health began to falter, his work situation also changed. Jon had enjoyed an excellent rapport with his supervisor since arriving in Edmonton, and at a time when he craved stability, his boss was posted. Concomitant with the change in management, Jon had additional work responsibilities come his way. In addition to his overwhelming fatigue, he found himself making small mistakes and becoming forgetful. As Jon explains, “the parachuting world is not a place where one wants to make mistakes.”

Jon’s symptoms continued to worsen. He remembers staring at the wall of parachutes that needed to be inspected within a tight deadline and feeling complete worthlessness. “I thought, ‘I can’t even make one good decision,’ I was thinking about it constantly, and it was killing me.” And like many people suffering from depression, Jon hadn’t slept well for months. Despite his exhaustion, falling asleep felt impossible. If he did finally get to sleep, he often awoke to “insane nightmares about being strangled.” Jon’s appetite was non-existent. He was eating just one meal a day, and only then so that he could tell the people around him that he had eaten something. Jon, a previously social and outgoing soldier, had also begun avoiding his peers. A co-worker reached out after noticing that he had been looking “really bad” for a couple of days, but Jon denied that anything was wrong.
On 27 September 2013, Jon was called into the office of his new supervisor. His superior had recognized that Jon was in some type of trouble and challenged him on his claims that he was “fine.” Despite his denials, his supervisor pushed harder. At that moment, sitting at his new superior’s desk, Jon finally broke down.

Thankfully, Jon had a Medical Check appointment scheduled for that same day. His physician immediately referred him to the mental health section of the Garrison Health Services Clinic. In his early interactions with the Mental Health team it was still unclear just how difficult a time he was having. Although he still didn’t feel like himself, the safety net of mental health appointments made Jon feel like he wasn’t sinking deeper.

Shortly after Jon started treatment, his supervisor was required to attend a career course. Jon assured his new boss that he was up for the responsibility, and he was left in charge of the section. As the weeks dragged on, Jon struggled to find any motivation. After two months filled with health appointments, Jon was continuing to battle with his thoughts. His feelings of worthlessness were consuming; even more so when he was at home alone in the evening. Jon, a valuable and physically fit soldier, truly believed that he was damaged.

On the evening of 20 November, Jon received a message from his supervisor, who was still away on course. He asked Jon to complete a ‘brag sheet’ for his PER, essentially a list of his successes and accomplishments from the past year. Consumed by negative thoughts, Jon started to panic at the idea of completing this form. He remembers thinking “What do I have to brag about? My breakdown? My mental health appointments?” It felt impossible to come up with anything positive about himself or his work. The ‘brag sheet’ pushed Jon over the edge that he had been teetering on for months. As he sat alone at home that evening, he felt like he was ‘spiralling to hell’ in his own mind. His thoughts, or as he describes, the “deafening maelstrom of horrific ghosts” were tormenting him in his head. Jon spiralled further and further down for six hours, and felt completely alone. He became desperate for a way to escape his own mind. And in that moment he decided he would take his own life. Jon, alone in his bedroom, reached for his razor blade.

Jon attributes his survival instinct for what happened next. Through the torture of his thoughts, a small voice whispered “reach out.” He grabbed his telephone and tried to figure out who he could call. It was past midnight and he didn’t want to bother anyone with his “petty problems.” He tried to reach a friend, but there was no answer. When he turned to his platoon supervisor’s number, he thankfully got a reply to his call for help. His platoon supervisor called 911.

Jon’s memory of what happened next is fuzzy, but he recalls spending several days in the hospital. He was released by a friend, who asked him to come live with her as he recovered. Initially, Jon was bounced between the civilian and military mental health system. He remembers feeling overwhelmed by the process going on around him, but was driven to get better. He graciously accepted all the resources available to him. Jon was supported by the civilian system until January 2014, when he was assigned a social worker and psychiatrist at the St. Albert Occupational Stress Injury clinic. He notes that despite the military mental health “machine” taking a bit of time to get started, it was extremely reliable once it got moving.
Jon was diagnosed with depression, the most prevalent mental health concern in the CAF. The 2014 Mental Health of the CAF Report states that 8.0% of CAF Regular Force members will meet the criteria for depression over their lifetime. This is significantly higher than the 4.8% lifetime prevalence rate for age and sex-matched Canadians.1

Identifying depression can be challenging, especially in men. It was previously believed that women experience depression at twice the rate of men, but new studies suggest that depression is found in equal portions when looking for gender-appropriate symptoms. The stereotypical symptoms of depression, including feelings of sadness, crying, and lack of interest in activities, are better at capturing the way women present with the illness. While the most reported symptoms of depression in men are physical pain, including backaches, headaches, and sleep problems, anger that can range from irritability to road rage, abusive, violent outbursts, and reckless or compulsive actions, such as ‘workaholic’ behaviour, risky sexual encounters, drinking, and drug use.2 As a result, depression in men can often be mislabelled as substance abuse or anger management issues, and the core concern goes undiagnosed and untreated.

Once Jon’s depression was identified, a recovery plan was put in place. Jon used a mix of therapy, medication, and meditation classes to get back on track. He was supported by a treatment team, including a psychiatrist, a social worker, and his primary care physician.

Getting back to work was anxiety-inducing for Jon. Following his suicide attempt, his Chain of Command gave him a December Holiday block leave to decide what would be best for him from a career perspective. On his first day back to work in January, he was sent home due to a “massive panic attack.” On his second day, Jon made the difficult decision to quit the rigger world. His Chain of Command agreed that a calmer position would be a better fit for him at that time.

Jon was initially moved to the 3 PPCLI woodshop, and then transferred to the unit’s supply system. This change was a hurdle in his recovery. He recalls finding it challenging to adapt to his new work environment. With all the career changes, people were regularly coming and going from his life, decreasing stability. Also, having to relearn the basics of his trade didn’t help him overcome his feelings of worthlessness. He wasn’t finding his work rewarding, and kept comparing what he was before to who he was now.

Jon continued to struggle in his new role. In February 2015 he was approached by his Chain of Command and asked if he wanted to leave 3 PPCLI. Although difficult, Jon knew it was the right thing for him. He asked to leave as soon as possible, and two weeks later he was onto the next chapter in his military career with 7 Canadian Forces Supply Depot (7 CFSD) in Edmonton.

Jon had worried that experiencing mental health difficulties would cause him to be “shot-down from future promotion boards,” and that his career would become a “living hell.” This is a common concern among military members. A 2010 study examined the perceived barriers to mental health care across five nation’s armed forces: including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The most prevalent concern identified by military members was that the Chain of Command would view them differently if they were to disclose mental health concerns.3 This was echoed in the 2013 CAF Mental Health Survey, where 34 per cent of soldiers agreed or strongly agreed that seeking mental health services would harm their military career.4

Despite worrying that he would be “lynched” by his peers and superiors for his struggles, that wasn’t what Jon experienced. While in the depths of his depressive episode, Jon had concerns that his Chain of Command were acting in insidious ways towards him. Yet, in hindsight, he realizes how truly patient they were. Jon also recalls feeling that some within the CAF wanted him to recover instantly, expecting his illness to follow the soldier mantra of “problem arises, find a solution, solve it.” He understands that this was simply the military approach to addressing an issue, but in the moment, he struggled to explain that “healing and treatment take time.”

Getting healthy was a slow process. After a year of treatment, Jon’s depression was gone. Jon explains that the “fixing part is done” but he is still being followed to continue to learn new coping skills and fine tune the ones that he knows. Getting back on track required work, dedication, and energy. “But as anybody knows,” Jon explains “anything of value comes with a price.”
Jon is currently working towards his next promotion at 7CFSD. He says that it might take longer than at other units because of the slower tempo, but he likes it that way. It allows him to invest more time in his family: his new wife and the baby girl they have on the way. Jon is proud to say that his tormented thoughts have been replaced with ideas about paternal leave, raising a healthy baby, and finding a sustainable balance between work and home.

I am very grateful to Corporal Jonathan Znack for sharing his experience with depression as a way to help others. If it takes courage to ask for help, it takes exceptional bravery to share these personal struggles in a public forum. Jon encourages “anybody who feels any kind of concern for their mental health to go directly” for help. “If it’s a problem for you, you need to do something about it.” For more information, please contact your doctor or mental health team, and remember that the Canadian Armed Forces supports your mental fitness.

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NOTES

The Plains of Abraham, 1759: Where was the battle really fought?

by Earl John Chapman and R. Paul Goodman

Background

The battle on the Plains of Abraham, 13 September 1759, is arguably the most famous battle fought on Canadian soil. It still has major cultural and political reverberations exhibited by the ongoing debates over its legacy.1 One historian has expostulated that it took over five hundred years for the strong feelings of the Anglo Saxons with respect to the Norman Invasion of England to subside. Less examined, in recent and past publication, is the actual position of the British and French battle lines as they relate to the modern topography of Québec. Perhaps not surprisingly, the authors discovered that the placing of an historical plaque in Québec in 2009, commemorating the participation of the 78th Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders) in the battle, generated a controversy in the local Irish community. This brief article directs attention to where the battle was actually fought, since imprecise or erroneous depictions have been offered to historians, the interested public, and battlefield tourists over the last 180 years. Due to recent developments in computer geo-referencing, this imprecision can now be more accurately addressed.

As presented in the authors’ recent paper, “Québec, 1759: Reconstructing Wolfe’s Main Battle Line from Contemporary Evidence,” the surviving record of contemporary engineers’ maps of the battle (in repositories on both sides of the Atlantic) were studied and analyzed. The idea for a computer-generated map, as described herein, evolved from this study, and an attempt was initiated with a view to arriving at a higher degree of accuracy in pinpointing the location of the battle on the present topography of modern Québec. This is not a simple mapping proposition. Overlaying a historical map (even if drawn from actual survey by the best map making engineers at the time) with its modern topographic equivalent presents technical difficulties which will be discussed later. Fortunately, the authors were able to enlist the expert services of a geo-referencing specialist, Stéfano Biondo of the Centre GéoStat, Bibliothèque de l’Université Laval (Québec).3 His geo-referenced map uses one of the manuscript maps studied in our article referred to above. Before addressing the technical details of the geo-referencing process, and the conclusions which we can draw from Mr. Biondo’s map, a brief review of the previous attempts to locate the 1759 battle lines with respect to the modern streets of Québec is in order.
Position of the two main battle lines produced by the georeferencing process between a contemporary battlefield map (LAC, NMC 21345) and Québec, 21L/14-102 Série Topo, 1/20,000, with the modern streets.
Previous attempts to identify the site

There have been many early attempts to identify the precise site of the battle on the Plains of Abraham in 1759. In 1834, Alfred Hawkins determined that the battle was fought in the vicinity of the old race course, revising his findings in 1844 when he placed it a little to the east. In 1876, Sir James LeMoine jumped into the debate, placing the British line close to Avenue de Salaberry. Shortly afterwards, Francis Parkman placed the British line close to Avenue des Érables (formerly Maple). In 1899, Arthur Doughty picked up the challenge, basing his conclusions primarily upon eyewitness accounts. His paper included a map ("Plan A"), which was prepared in June 1899 by G.E. St. Michel, who was associated with the Québec Seminary (Séminaire de Québec). In this paper, Doughty criticized Hawkins, contending that the race course did not form any part of the battlefield, and stating specifically that the British line was formed roughly along Avenue de Salaberry, extending well north of Chemin Ste-Foy (the old St. Foy Road).

A few years later, (c.1901), St. Michel revised his map, now placing the British line slightly west of Avenue Cartier (and extending to Chemin Ste-Foy). He was assisted in his new calculations by Elzear Clarest, Architect and Engineer of the Province of Québec, and Louis A. Vallée, Director of Railways of the Province of Québec.

In 1901, with the assistance of G.W. Parmelee, Doughty refined his calculations but continued to disparage Hawkins and his "comparatively modern blunder" in choosing the race course as the field of battle, even though Hawkins had corrected his initial site. At this time, Doughty and Parmelee categorically stated that "... the British army was drawn up in battle array, facing the town, almost on the present line of de Salaberry street, and extending from near the heights overlooking the St. Lawrence, almost at right angles across the Grande Allée and St. John street..."9

A year or so later, not to be outdone, Philippe Baby Casgrain, a land surveyor and civil engineer in the Province of Québec, published a lengthy and rambling paper which criticized the work of Doughty and Parmelee. Casgrain's argument is difficult to follow, but he appears to put the original British line closer to the race course: "... the English army was formed into line across the race course and extended from the ridge of the cliff to and beyond the Ste. Foye [sic] road; that the opening of the battle on the English side took place when and after they had advanced on the eminence of the jail, where they awaited the fire of the enemy..."10

In 1903, Doughty "took another kick at the can," publishing Québec Under Two Flags with fellow librarian N.E. Dionne, and writing: "Wolfe’s line of battle extended almost from the cliff near the river St. Lawrence to the St. Foy Road, in a line with de Salaberry Street; and Montcalm’s army met in a parallel line separated by only a distance of 40 yards."11 This conclusion is essentially what Doughty and Parmelee wrote in 1901. Finally, in 1908, Doughty produced a large fold-out map which was included in a souvenir program for the Québec Tercentenary celebrations. This map confirmed his earlier calculations.12

Detail of Québec promontory showing the positions [dotted lines] of the battle lines in relation to the topography and fortifications. Drawn from survey and signed by Patrick Mackellar, Wolfe’s chief engineer, it is used as the contemporary source reference in the Biondo map.
Presently, the National Battlefields Commission, Plains of Abraham, has a panel in the park showing both the British and French main battle lines at the commencement of the battle in 1759. This reconstruction places the British main battle line between Avenues de Salaberry and Cartier.

As can be seen from this discussion, the site of the battle has shifted over the years. With the exception of the race course theory, the discrepancies presented amount to about 400 meters – not an insignificant distance. The authors of this article respect the contribution of the abovementioned historians, but new technology now allows for more precise analysis.

The maps utilized and the geo-referencing process

A contemporary manuscript battlefield map, produced by British military engineers shortly after the battle on the Plains of Abraham, 13 September 1759, had been previously digitized by Library and Archives Canada (NMC 21345). A commercial geographic information system (GIS) software package, ArcMap 10.1, was then used to geo-reference or ‘rectify’ this digital image. The rectification of a map involves three main aspects: the historical map, the base map, and a number of ground control points. In order to rectify a map, the user places these ground control points at similar locations on both the historical map and the base map. These control points are then paired to each other. By carefully placing enough of these control points, the user can manipulate the historical map to match up with the modern base map, in this case, a modern topographic map of Québec City. The rectification of the two maps reveals what is believed to be the most precise location of the British and French main battle lines as they relate to the modern streets of Québec.

Locating suitable control points can be a considerable challenge. In the case of this specific transformation, it was a relatively easy matter to anchor the first two points along the old military fortifications, portions of which still exist today (and which can be located on the modern topographic map). However, locating additional control points outside the fortifications (near the site of the battle) was a challenge, since there are virtually no reference points on the battlefield map which can be precisely located on the modern topographic map of Québec. However, a third ground control point – critical to the process – was eventually selected midway between the Musée national des beaux-arts du Québec and Wolfe’s Monument.

Extensive modernization projects west of the city fortifications has made the 1759 battlefield topography disappear. The only remaining topographic feature with any approximation to 1759 is the elevation formerly known as Wolfe’s Hill – although altered as well for the construction of the former prison, and later, the museum itself. Wolfe’s Monument, situated in front of the main entrance of the Musée, is generally considered to be the place where James Wolfe died on 13 September 1759. It is well documented that Wolfe was carried a short distance to the west after he was shot and before he expired. Thus, a point close to these structures must suffice for the purposes of this project.
Conclusions

What exactly does the computer generated georeferenced map illustrate? It shows the initial positions of the British and French main battle lines at approximately 10:00 a.m. on the morning of 13 September 1759, with each battalion shown by either a red (British) or blue (French) rectangle. Omitted from the British army are the en potence (to the north) and reserve (to the west) battalions. Omitted from the French army are the northern and southern militia and native skirmishers. This leaves the two main battle lines directly facing each other. Also depicted, in dotted black lines, the subsequent advance of the battle lines to the distance of 36.6 meters between the armies, from where the British delivered their devastating volleys of fire. The geo-referenced battalion positions come directly from the 1759 surveyed engineering map authorized or endorsed by Major Patrick Mackellar, chief engineer, and an eyewitness on 13 September.

In conclusion, the map presented in this article represents the most accurate rendering to date of the British and French main battle lines as they relate to the topography of modern Québec. This map places the right wing of the British line (at 10:00 a.m. on 13 September 1759) on the elevation where the present Musée national des beaux-arts du Québec is located (in 1759, Wolfe’s Hill). The six battalions in the line extend to the northwest at a slight angle from that point. The line bisects Rue Grande Allée continuing northwest and ending just a few meters from Rue Fraser.

This disposition corresponds with the authors’ recent findings regarding the British regimental strengths that morning that being only a total of 1,505 other ranks directly facing the French. Almost all modern secondary accounts of the battle disposition stress the “extended north/south” nature of the British line covering the promontory. The authors’ findings of the actual manpower of the British battalions, and the required space when drawn up according to 1759 practice, does not support this “extended” analysis.

The French main battle line, before the advance westwards and the commencement of the main battle, has its southern flank anchored in Battlefield Park just south of the intersection between Rue de Bernières and Avenue Taché. From this point, it extends to the northwest, terminating its northern flank at the intersection of Avenue Turnbull and Rue de Maisonneuve. Finally, the map projects the advance of both armies to the final point of contact, between Ave Cartier and Avenue Bourlamaque, where the main firefight took place that largely determined the outcome of the battle.

Earl John Chapman and R. Paul Goodman are both officers associated with the 78th Fraser Highlanders, a ceremonial regiment raised in 1965 by Montréal’s David M. Stewart Museum to perpetuate the history of the old 78th Regiment of Foot. Earl Chapman has published extensively on the Regiment’s brief history during the Seven Year’s War, and also is a specialist, with many publications, dealing with the early history of Canada’s Black Watch, up to and including the First World War.

The Death of General Wolfe, 1763, by Edward Penny [c.1763-1764]. A view of the British battle line, drawn up three deep, is pictured in the background of Penny’s near-contemporary painting.


4. Alfred Hawkins, *Picture of Quebec with Historical Recollections* (Québec: NP, 1834), p. 357: “... the severest fighting took place between the right of the race-stand and the Martello towers.” *The Quebec Guide, comprising an historical and descriptive account of the City and every place in the vicinity* (Québec: NP, 1844), pp. 144-145: “The position of the British army on the 13th of September 1759 may be easily recognized by taking this column [Wolfe’s Monument] as the position of the right wing...” The old race course was located just north of the Earl Grey Terrace.

5. Sir James LeMoine, *Quebec, Past and Present* (Québec: NP, 1876); *Picturesque Quebec* (Québec: NP, 1882).

6. Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, Vol II. (London: NP, 1885), p. 290: When the British line had formed, “Quebec was not a mile distant, but they could not see it, for a ridge of broken ground intervened, called Buttes-à-Neveu, about six hundred paces off.” This would place the British line between Avenues des Érables and de Salaberry.


13. This map panel was published in a brochure entitled “Historic Map: National Battlefields Park” (ND, National Battlefields Commission, Plains of Abraham, currently available at the Discovery Pavilion).

14. Based on pre-1999 research, the panel was revised in 2009 as part of a small exhibition at the Discovery Pavilion on the Plains of Abraham. Information received from the Commission indicates that, unfortunately, the person in charge of the project has since retired, and that they cannot guarantee the completeness of the sources used and the thoroughness with which the work has been done. This reconstruction places the British main battle line approximately 225 meters (about two and a quarter football fields) east from the location derived from this paper.

15. For a detailed description and analysis of this map, see the reference in Footnote 2.

16. *The New York Public Library* (NYPL) offers an on-line service to do this, which they term their “NYPL Map Warper.”

17. The documentary film “Bloodlines: Who Shot Wolfe?” (Toronto: Yap Films, 2007) used a process to identify “… the precise spot where Wolfe fell.” This process involved a computer-based overlay of a 1759 battlefield map (*Environ of Quebec with the Operations of 1759* by Capt. S. Holland, 1760; NMC 2736) with a satellite image of modern-day Quebec. This placed the left wing of the British main battle line just slightly north of Rue Fraser, extending southeastward towards the Wolfe Monument approximately between Avenues Bourlamaque and Des Érables. The Holland map is possibly a tracing from one of the larger and more detailed manuscript maps produced by British engineers shortly after the battle under the direction of Wolfe’s chief engineer, Patrick Mackellar. Not surprisingly, the two results (satellite overlay and georeferencing) are close, perhaps within 35-40 meters (115-131 feet). Therefore, one validates the other.

18. For the British line, from right (south) to left: 35th Foot, Louisbourg Grenadiers, 28th Foot, 43rd Foot, 47th Foot, 78th Foot, and 58th Foot. For the French line, from right (north) to left: Québec and Montréal Militia; La Sarre; Languedoc, Béarn, Guyenne, Royal-Rousillon, and Montréal and Three Rivers Militia.

19. To the north, the 15th and the 280th Foot; in reserve to the west, the 48th Foot; guarding the Foulon Path, the 306th Foot.

20. Contemporary accounts mention that the British and French main lines were only 40 yards apart when the British delivered their first volley.

21. It is important to note that the process always has a margin of error, it being almost impossible to perfectly align a historical map with a modern coordinate system. Several factors must be considered, including the accuracy of the historical map – mapping methods before the age of aerial photography sometimes imprecisely represented scale, angle, distance, and direction. Furthermore, the relative position of the ground control points increases the margin of error.

22. The actual length of the main British battle line (as determined from contemporary maps) is 490.15 meters (see Footnote 2). Many of the previous attempts, including the attempt by the National Battlefields Commission (Plains of Abraham), have projected the British main battle line to extend further to the north than this study indicates. Some of these attempts have extended the British main battle line as far as Chemin Ste-Foy, which is not reflected on any of the original manuscript engineering maps.
Writing early in the federal election campaign of 2004—which ultimately led to a Liberal minority government headed by Prime Minister Paul Martin—Nic Boisvert of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century expressed the hope that the “diametrically opposed worldviews” of the Liberal Party of Canada and the newly-created Conservative Party of Canada would help to make national defence “an election issue for the first time in decades.” That hope went essentially unrealized, but the election of 2004 did provide Canadians with some useful glimpses into the likely future shape of defence policy under a Conservative government led by Stephen Harper. In a speech given on 31 May 2004, Harper, fighting his first campaign as Conservative leader, argued that “the response of the…Liberal government to the new security environment has been underfunding to the point of strategic and moral neglect,” and pledged an immediate and substantial boost in funding for defence procurement and a phased increase in the strength of the Regular Force to at least 80,000 personnel. Also envisaged were a replacement for the Leopard 1 main battle tank, the acquisition of “at least two hybrid carriers” for helicopter support and sealift, and the renewal of the air force through CF-18 upgrades, new tactical and heavy-lift transports, and new maritime helicopters. More revealing, perhaps, was Boisvert’s observation that “the Conservatives see the world as a nasty, brutish Hobbesian construct requiring troops with true combat capabilities to project stability.” Multiple elections (i.e., 2006, 2008, 2011, and 2015) and numerous controversies later, how might one characterize the defence legacy of Stephen Harper?
One of the most fascinating developments of the Harper era is likely to remain the “warrior nation” hypothesis promoted by such academics as Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, and the extent to which it informed, or arguably, failed to inform, the Harper government’s approach to defence policy and defence procurement. For critics such as McKay and Swift, wrote Jennifer Welsh in the June 2012 Literary Review of Canada, “the tendency of the Harper government to elevate our experience in armed conflict and to depict the world as one marked by danger and epic struggle is part of a broader campaign to transform Canada into a ‘warrior nation.’” Orchestrated by elements within the Harper government, and aided and abetted by elements of the military, academia, and the media, the perceived “militarization” sought to “fundamentally shift how Canadians think about their country and its history.” Part and parcel of this campaign were attempts to marginalize and belittle Canada’s peacekeeping role and legacy, and, noted Welsh, “efforts to increase military spending, inculcate greater respect for soldiers and ‘martial values,’ rebrand Remembrance Day as a celebration of war, and instil more muscularity into Canada’s foreign policy.” Other perceived elements of the campaign ran the gamut from “militarization” of the Arctic, “militarization” of disaster relief, and an increased military presence at citizenship and national sporting events, to Ottawa’s efforts to commemorate the bicentennial of the War of 1812, the re-introduction of ‘Royal’ to the official titles of Canada’s navy and air force, and the “forcefully imposed establishment sentiment”—as characterized by Noah Richler—to “support our troops” in Afghanistan.

Fascinating accusations to be sure, and ones that contained, at certain junctures, a modicum of accuracy. It was, for example, patently obvious that the Harper government was no great admirer of United Nations or other peacekeeping operations, and utterly opposed to ‘stoking the peacekeeping coals’ that have left many Canadians with an exaggerated and mythologized sense of peacekeeping’s importance in Canadian foreign and defence policy. On those occasions when the Harper government did sanction participation in peacekeeping, as in the small-scale and short-term return to Haiti, or the more recent doubling of the Canadian complement assigned to the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO), the deployments not coincidentally received scant to non-existent publicity. One might add, as well, that the precipitous decline in the number of Canadian military personnel assigned to UN peacekeeping operations pre-dated the arrival of the Harper government. The charge that the Harper government sought to “militarize” the Arctic—a shaky argument from the outset—now looks positively bizarre, given the capability ‘walk-backs’ and delays that have plagued the northern training centre, the northern refuelling facility, and the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) project. Viewed in another light, it is also supremely ironic that the only new-construction naval procurement project of the Harper era on which steel is actually being cut is not a major surface combatant emblematic of a perceived “warrior nation,” but the decidedly more humble Harry DeWolf-class AOPS—a constabulary vessel that is very lightly armed even by constabulary standards. Similarly, would a government that sought to create a
true “warrior nation” have unceremoniously jettisoned Canada’s contribution to the NATO AWACS force—our last major in-theatre standing commitment to NATO—or abandoned its participation in NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program? On a lighter note, would a government leading a true “warrior nation” eschew the camouflage paint of its part-time VVIP Airbus in favour of a much flashier paint scheme? Surely a “warrior nation” would prefer camouflage.

The most telling indictment of the “warrior nation” hypothesis—and, ironically, of the Harper government’s broader approach to national defence—centres upon defence spending (or, more accurately, on the relative paucity of defence spending) during the Harper era. As Welsh reminded us in 2012, “there are real questions” to be asked about the financial sustainability of McKay and Swift’s “warrior nation project.” For “some inconvenient data, one need only consult the 2012 Harper budget, which illustrates that the regular rises in defence spending that have occurred over the past five years are at an end.” Surely a government that sought to create a “warrior nation” would provide, on a sustained and even generous basis, the commensurate level of funding for national defence. Jeffrey Simpson blended these themes in a trenchant Globe and Mail column of 28 June 2014, arguing that “Canada’s Conservative government loves the idea of the military; it just doesn’t always like the military.” The “idea of the military conforms to the Conservatives’ sense of the country and its history—‘true north, strong and free’—and the idea of the military fits the party’s political agenda. So we have monuments to the War of 1812, a National Day of Honour to recognize the Afghanistan mission, and [a variety of] military ceremonies at home and abroad…” Meanwhile, “while all this is being done for public consumption, the defence budget—which is, after all, what reflects any government’s real policies—is now smaller after accounting for inflation than in 2007, not long after the government was elected with a pledge to boost military spending.” For “a variety of reasons, [procurement] projects get delayed, run over budget or don’t get built at all. At each stage, the government looks bad.” The resulting headlines, argued Simpson, “got the government very annoyed at the military, as opposed to the idea of the military.” It is “still easier politically, and less costly financially, to be in love with illusions about the military and its past glories than with the hard realities of today’s military and its requirements.”

Those passing judgement on these aspects of Harper’s defence legacy are left with a number of options. Some critics will posit that the Harper government was, in reality, a ‘fair-weather friend’ of the military, long on pomp and circumstance and defence-affirming rhetoric (shades of the “warrior nation”?), but decidedly short on providing appropriate human and materiel resources. In that paradigm, the Harper government becomes merely the latest in a long line of Canadian governments who have failed to bridge the gap between stated defence commitments and actual military capabilities. A more charitable interpretation would argue that the Harper government genuinely desired a multi-purpose, combat-capable, and well-resourced defence establishment, but was unable to fully deliver due to the extent of the damage inflicted upon the Canadian Armed Forces by the “decade of darkness” associated with previous Liberal governments, the harsh realities of the global economic recession, serious deficit and debt issues, competing pressures on the public purse, and a plethora of problems in the inherited defence procurement system.
If one shifts more narrowly to the defence policy pronouncements of the Harper government, notably but not exclusively those outlined in the now-aged Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) of May 2008, the Harper record may appear sounder. In his preambles to the CFDS, Prime Minister Harper observed that “if a country wants to be taken seriously in the world, it must have the capacity to act.” Consequently, his government’s “comprehensive long-term plan to ensure the Canadian Forces have the people, equipment, and support they need to do what we ask them do,” would “…strengthen our sovereignty and security at home and bolster our ability to defend our values and interests abroad.” The three broad priorities of the CFDS would be the defence of Canada and the protection of Canadians at home, meeting Canada’s responsibilities for continental security, and being a “…robust and reliable contributor to global security and humanitarian interventions.” A follow-up CFDS document released in June 2008 reaffirmed the home defence, continental defence, and international security priorities and added six “core missions.” To discharge those missions, the Canadian Forces would possess the capacity to: (a) conduct “…daily domestic and continental operations,” including in the Arctic and through NORAD; (b) support “…a major international event in Canada”, such as the 2010 Olympics; (c) respond to a “major” terrorist attack; (d) “support” civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada, such as a natural disaster; (e) “lead and/or conduct a major international operation” for an “extended period of time;” and (f) deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world “for shorter periods.” The document envisaged a “…fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable” military establishment.

The CFDS, added defence minister Peter MacKay, included improvements in infrastructure and readiness, additional military personnel (for an end-state of 70,000 regulars and 30,000 reservists), and the continued recapitalization of the Canadian Forces. In addition to projects already completed, under contract or projected (i.e., four C-17A Globemasters, 17 C-130J Hercules, 16 CH-147F Chinooks, 100 Leopard 2 main battle tanks, assorted trucks, six-to-eight Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, three Joint Support Ships and modernization of the twelve Halifax-class frigates), the procurement agenda would now also include 15 “new surface combat ships to replace our aging fleet of destroyers and frigates,” 65 next-generation fighter aircraft to replace the CF-18, 10-to-12 new maritime patrol aircraft to replace the Aurora, 17 new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, and new families of land combat vehicles and systems.
The immediate media and academic reaction to the Canada First Defence Strategy, as this column noted at the time, was decidedly lukewarm. This reflected, not a distaste for the basic tenets of the CFDS—which were, in fact, reminiscent of the fundamentals outlined in previous Liberal and Progressive Conservative defence policy statements—but an intense frustration over the paucity of detail. The original document may have provided a shopping list of equipment, noted its critics, but it was essentially devoid of insights into the government’s broader strategy for defence. The 21-page follow-on document that surfaced in June 2008 was presumably intended, at least in part, to address such concerns, but it blunted rather than eliminated the criticisms of defence observers. Such concerns, it must be acknowledged, were not unique to the CFDS, and have appeared at various junctures in the history of Canadian defence policy, including the Pierre Trudeau government’s excellent, but insufficiently fleshed out, Defence Structure Review of 1975. The Harper government did add some supporting detail to its Canada First Defence Strategy in subsequent statements and in other fora, but sadly, no thoroughgoing update or replacement surfaced in the public domain during the later years of the Harper era. That failure, which became more glaring and more troublesome as the CFDS aged, did not add luster to the Harper legacy on defence.

The Harper government’s legacy on defence procurement was similarly mixed. There were, undeniably, success stories. Its decision to purchase a fleet of four (ultimately five) CC-177 Globemasters was genuinely transformational in terms of Canada’s military airlift capability, and a most welcome reversal of the curious and shortsighted stance of previous Liberal governments that Canada did not require an independent strategic airlift capability. The decision to acquire ex-American CH-147D Chinooks for use in Afghanistan was regrettable delayed, but nevertheless generated a vital capability that should have been acquired concurrent with the previous Liberal government’s decision to deploy substantial ground forces to Kandahar. The Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, although battered and bruised by critiques from seemingly all directions, will at least restore—after more than half a century—a measure of Arctic capability to the Royal Canadian Navy. The successes of the modernization and life extension initiatives for the Halifax-class frigates, and the army’s LAV III fleet are deserving of recognition as well. The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) today faces noteworthy challenges, but we would do well to remember that the Harper government garnered rave reviews when the NSPS was unveiled in 2010. That said, an inordinate number of projects—ranging from the new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft and the CF-18 replacement, to the Close Combat Vehicle (CCV), the new Standard Military Pattern truck, and the Joint Support Ship—encountered an embarrassing mélange of political, financial, bureaucratic, technical, industrial, and military setbacks. The extent to which these setbacks were attributable to decisions (or the absence of timely decisions) at the political level, or to systemic faults within Canada’s overall defence procurement system—itself seriously damaged by the rundown in project management expertise during the Chrétien years—will no doubt figure prominently in future analyses of the Harper legacy. It is demonstrably true that the procurement system functioned relatively well in many cases (i.e., C-130J, C-17A, CH-147F, Leopard 2 and M777), but as essentially ‘off-the-shelf’ purchases, those projects should by definition have gone relatively well.
Canadian Armed Forces pilots check their controls while piloting a CC-177 Globemaster III aircraft over Algiers, Algeria, 1 February 2013.

Members of a search and rescue team prepare equipment that will be parachuted onto a simulated crash site during a SAR exercise at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, 30 October 2013.
Preliminary thoughts on the Harper legacy? Mixed, as is the case with most Canadian prime ministers. Given the sobering realities inherited from previous governments—be they a ‘hot war’ in Afghanistan, or a growing backlog of aging and inadequate equipment—the Harper government arguably managed defence comparatively well in its earlier years. Additional funding, selected recapitalization, an apparently sincere interest in the Arctic, and at least some of the efforts to encourage Canadians to share a deeper understanding and appreciation of their armed forces, were pluses, not minuses. Nor—although one might disagree with the specific military, quasi-military, and non-military choices of the Harper government—could one accuse Canada’s armed forces of simply sitting around during the almost ten years of the Harper government. That said, a number of measures might have fostered a stronger Harper legacy on defence, particularly in its mid-to-later years: greater attention to providing adequate, and sustained, funding; more attention to the downsizing of bloated headquarters and infrastructure; enhanced attention to procurement reform, broadly defined; demonstrable successes on more of the challenging—as opposed to the off-the-shelf—procurement files; providing a thoroughgoing and timely update of the Canada First Defence Strategy; dramatically more transparency on defence; and devoting less attention to ‘photo-ops,’ politicizing and ‘pomp and circumstance,’ and devoting greater attention, as Jeffrey Simpson put it, to the “hard realities of today’s military and its requirements.” Perhaps it is not so much a case of a good or a poor legacy on defence, but of a legacy that, for a variety of reasons, failed to reach its full potential.

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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces
by Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley
Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2015
168 pages, $19.99 (PB)
ISBN 978-1-45972-784-7
Reviewed by Daniel Gosselin

This book tells the story of the reforms in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the profession of arms in the late-1990s and early-2000s that were triggered by the events centred upon the deployment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment to Somalia as part of a United Nations peacekeeping mission in 1992-1993, in particular the torture and killing of a Somali teenager in March 1993. The events in Somalia and the subsequent response of the senior leadership of the CAF and the Department of National Defence contributed to generate a serious crisis of civil-military relations in Canada and a loss of confidence by the government in the CAF, in particular, its officer corps.

Two competent authors provide the account and narrative in Forced to Change. Colonel Bernd Horn (now retired from the CAF Regular Force) and Dr. Bill Bentley both served as infantry officers, and spent well over a decade working on various aspects of professional development in the CAF. Both were involved from the beginning with initiating and implementing the reforms in the CAF starting in 1999 under then-Lieutenant-General, later Senator, Roméo Dallaire. In early 1999, Dallaire was appointed as the Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) with respect to Officer Professional Development (OPD).

Both authors have remained actively engaged in officer and non-commissioned member (NCM) professional development after their initial work with the Office of the Special Advisor, mainly through the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute and the Canadian Defence Academy. Horn has edited and written several books on military affairs, history, Special Forces, and leadership, while Bentley has been an active contributor to Duty with Honour and other key CAF doctrinal leadership publications that were published in the early-2000s. For their remarkable contribution to CAF professional development, both have received the Meritorious Service Medal. In sum, they are well qualified to tell this story, having had an insider’s perspective of the path to the reforms since the late-1990s.

This is a reasonably well-structured book, consisting of six short chapters and a foreword by Senator Dallaire. It is well written, with conviction, and generally pleasant to read. However, there is some repetitiveness throughout the book, in particular with the first two chapters, as the story moves back and forth in time, making it confusing at times. The book contains a Selected Bibliography; however, for some curious reason, all the key relevant reviews, studies, and reports of the period, such as the Somalia Commission Report, Minister Young’s Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management in the CF and Canadian Officership in the 21st Century, to name just a few, are not included in the bibliography. Fortunately, for those readers interested in finding more about those documents, some of the key sources are listed in the endnotes.

In the first chapter, which sets the stage of the remainder of the book, Horn and Bentley discuss the events that led to the crisis, explained through the prism of leadership culture, ethics, and education. They conclude, as many others have, that the CAF in the early-1990s, was dominated by a culture of anti-intellectualism that constantly reinforced experience over education. As the authors highlight, this way of thinking fostered an inherently conservative and traditional frame of mind that contributed to a myopic view of the world, and created an officer corps that was largely intolerant of criticism, self-scrutiny, or wider intellectual stimulation. The foundation of the officer corps was based upon personal character rather than professional knowledge, limiting the ability of senior officers to develop the skills necessary to provide sound policy advice to government, or to stay connected with a society that was becoming better educated.

The solution – or “missing link,” as the authors identify it – to address this “crisis in culture” lies in the higher education of the officer corps (graduate and post graduate studies in liberal arts). It should not come as a surprise that the authors, two officers who have completed doctoral studies, would be strong advocates for the need of higher education to shape the mind and to improve critical thinking and maturity of judgment. To reinforce this point, the authors devote a complete chapter of the book to the merit of education – particularly graduate-level education, for senior officers.

The authors are highly critical of the officer corps of the period, in particular the chiefs of defence staff, head of the profession of arms in Canada, who were in office during the 1980s and early-1990s. General and flag officers were unable to see the inherent flaws in the organizational culture of the CAF, contend Horn and Bentley, and thus failed to prepare the CAF strategic leaders for their important role in dealing with government and in adapting to the myriad changes that swept Canadian society. Moreover, the CAF senior leadership also failed to uphold a healthy military ethos and high military professionalism, elements that were critical in contributing to the crisis of the early-and mid-1990s.
The main argument of the book is clearly evident in its title, *Forced to Change*. Since the government had, by the mid-1990s, lost faith in the profession of arms to self-regulate, and in officers to account for their actions, it had to act forcefully to reform both the profession and the CAF. Three key activities comprise the main interventions of the government into the profession of arms: the establishment in 1995 of the Somalia Inquiry, raising doubts with respect to the ability of the CAF to self-regulate and to account; Minister Doug Young’s 1997 Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management in the CF, which became, with its 65 recommendations the main engine to drive the CAF reforms, particularly with respect to education, leadership, and accountability; and the Minister’s Monitoring Committee (MMC) on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, established in 1997 as an external mechanism to monitor the progress of the CAF in implementing the mandated reforms and initiatives. In addition to the MMC, new organizations were established to increase CAF and Defence accountability. In short, the crisis of civil-military relations forced the government to intervene quickly, and to “control” and “punish” the Canadian military, as the authors argue.

The research for the book is based largely upon the personal experiences of the two authors, who were active participants in the reform process, anchored by a detailed review of all key reports and studies conducted at the time. Many of the key and relevant recommendations of those studies, especially those elements dealing with education, accountability, leadership, and ethos, are repeated in the book for the benefit of the reader. To supplement those studies and reviews, the authors interviewed in 2010-2011 several principal decision makers who were intimately involved with the events, such as former ministers of national defence, chiefs of the defence staff, and deputy ministers. The result of those interviews is central to the development of the story in the book.

One of the main themes of the book, constantly repeated by those who were interviewed for the study, is that while many in the organization were speaking of change or pretending to support it, a number of senior officers were dead set against the changes, intransient in accepting the new realities facing the CAF, and were stalling and bureaucratically resisting at every opportunity. Two key chapters of the book discuss the strong institutional resistance to change and the gradual implementation of reforms that took place between 1998 and 2003.

There are many crusaders and ‘heroes’ in those chapters, principally those who were interviewed by Horn and Bentley and who were trying to move the institution forward and initiate reforms, and there are many villains as well, who constantly resisted the changes and tried to slow down change through bureaucratic tactics. Unfortunately, the authors only interviewed the ‘heroes’ in this study, and, as a result, there are few if any counter-perspectives to the storyline portrayed therein. Moreover, the interviews were all conducted 10-15 years after the events, and no primary source research beyond the existing public reports and reviews, such as original letters and correspondence, statements in Parliament, speeches, and other public statements, was used to complement (confirm or refute) the story told by the key witnesses in this account. Consequently, a significant part of the story is still missing, and will need to be told by future historians when they get access to key documents and correspondence of the period.

To close the book, Horn and Bentley critically review what has occurred in the CAF since 2003. On the one hand, the authors contend that higher standard of ethics, new CAF leadership doctrine, a cohort of officers experienced with complex operations (mainly from CAF operations in the 1990s, such as those conducted in the Balkans), better intellectually-prepared officers (from their attendance at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and increased graduate-level education), and the formation of the Canadian Defence Academy in 2003 as a centre of expertise to direct professional development in the CAF, all contributed to the CAF being able to deal effectively with operations in Afghanistan (largely devoid of scandals, criminal actions, and disreputable behaviour). As the authors highlight, the focused effort devoted in a few short years to attempt to change the culture of the officer corps of the CAF has indeed been remarkable.

Conversely, Horn and Bentley remain concerned with the ability of the CAF to sustain the remarkable change that took place in the decade 1997-2007, and argue that the war in Afghanistan has – again – put a premium on operational experience at the expense of higher education (especially for senior officers). They contend that there have been several “retrograde steps” in professional development since 2003, and the old culture of putting an excessive premium on training and operational experience over education is still present in many corners of the CAF. The “apparent underlying culture of discounting education runs deep [in the CAF],” lament the authors.

While it is true that at the height of the military campaign in Afghanistan, professional military education was not as ‘sexy’ as an operational tour in Afghanistan or elsewhere, the reality of today is that the new cohort of senior officers in the CAF is very well educated. Indeed, a large majority of senior officers have completed graduate studies – in liberal art – in the past decade, and all those who aspire to join the general and flag officer ranks must complete the 10-month National Security Studies Program in Toronto, or an equivalent program. These initiatives do not merely apply to senior officers: senior NCMs are also better educated. In short, the 2015 officer and senior NCM corps are both more experienced and better educated than those that were leading the CAF twenty-five years ago.

In the end, the authors close the book with some mild optimism based upon recent events and decisions, such as a CDS-initiated review in 2013 of senior officer professional development, and the implementation of the Leader Development Framework (LDF) within the CAF. The LDF is focused on intellectual development that provides a better balance between experience and education, contend the authors. Further, Horn and Bentley would be pleased to know that the new CDS, General Jonathan Vance, is planning a gathering of all his general and flag officers in late-spring 2016 to discuss exclusively the status of the profession of arms in Canada.
BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

In summary, this book recounts a narrative with which many officers who served in the 1990s are very familiar. This is not an impartial account, however, as both authors have been part of the initial Officer Professional Development team and subsequent organizations mandated to advance and implement the reforms. It is clear that this book reflects the passion and the close involvement of the authors in their efforts over a decade to implement many of the reforms directed by the government, particularly those associated with improving the higher education of the officers of the CAF.

Despite the limitations discussed above, this is definitely a book worth reading with attention. For one, the book is the first focused effort to capture in one manuscript the steps taken by many in the profession of arms, the department, and the government to transform the CAF and to change the culture of the organization, particularly in the realms of higher education, accountability, leadership, and military professionalism.

But Forced to Change is important for two additional reasons. The story in this book is a glaring reminder of the unique, privileged, and demanding responsibility trusted upon the officer corps as a professional body, and especially the CDS as the leader of the profession of arms in Canada, to remain vigilant and dynamic in exercising the stewardship of the profession. More critically, the book highlights what can happen when the government loses faith with the ability of senior officers to manage their own profession. It can and will intervene, swiftly and powerfully, and force the CAF to change.

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NOTES
1. In the Introduction, the book incorrectly dates the killing of the Somali teenager to 1992.
2. This is not a new argument. In fact, the authors are emphasizing the points that have been highlighted in many studies of the 1990s; this element is well discussed in the context of the Canadian Army by Peter Kasurak in his recent book A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000 (UBC Press, 2014).
3. Some of these new organizations, in addition to the MMC, included: the Office of the Ombudsman, the Military Police Complaint Commission, and an Education Advisory Board – all reporting directly to the MND.

BOOK REVIEWS

Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion by Jasen J. Castillo
Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 2014
308 pages, $57.95 (hardcover)
Reviewed by Peter Williams

For a long time, the reasons why soldiers, sailors, and airmen fight, often against all odds or even logic, has held particular interest for me, and thus, over many years, I’ve found that the shelves of my library have been increasingly taken up with accounts of World War Two Bomber Command and German U-Boat crews, as well as personal accounts of Commonwealth soldiers in the Great War. In all these cases, the participants suffered losses which would be totally unacceptable by today’s standards, yet they still kept fighting. Why? It was therefore with great interest that I came across this book in the National Defence Library, and decided to give it a read.

Jasen Castillo is an Assistant Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M University. His aim in writing this book is to propose a new theory to explore what binds fighting men and women together, which he refers to as cohesion theory. He also uses the following case studies of 20th Century armies to illustrate his hypothesis:

• Germany 1944-1945;
• France 1940;
• The Soviet Union 1941;
• North Vietnam (and here the author distinguishes this army from the Viet Cong); and
• The United States (US) 1968-1972.

At the heart of cohesion theory is the proposition that there are two key characteristics of a nation’s wartime armed forces: its capacity to fight on the battlefield, and the ability to resist internal pressures to collapse in cases where victory is increasingly unlikely. According to Castillo, military cohesion therefore is linked to the two variables of the degree to which the regime holds over its citizens, and hence, its armed forces, as well as the extent to
which the army in question is left free to focus on training for war. To further develop his case, the author contends that there are essentially four kinds of militaries, and the aforementioned case studies include all of these:

- **Messianic**, in which there is a high degree of regime control, yet the army is given much independence to train. The German Army case study is illustrative here;

- **Authoritarian**, where there is again a high degree of regime control, but without the freedom of action allowed to messianic armies. Here, the 1941 Soviet Red Army is held as such an example, although the author does state that as the war progressed, and victory became more certain, the degree of freedom to train was increased;

- **Professional**. A professional army, as the author defines it, is the opposite of an authoritarian one, with a low degree of regime control, but a high degree of independence to train. I did find it somewhat ironic that the Vietnam-era US Army, the basis of this case study, was not truly a volunteer army, and thus some readers might question the ‘professional’ sobriquet attached to it in the book; and

- **Apathetic**, the polar opposite of the messianic, with low degrees of both regime control and military autonomy. Here, the 1940 French Army is used as the case study.

For each case study, the author describes each army in terms of the cohesion theory variables, and attempts, through both narrative and data, to make his case. To a degree, he also sets out to show how other theories of military cohesion, such as primary group theory, which holds soldiers in battle, then fight for their comrades at the lower tactical levels (say, battalion and below), and not necessarily for grand causes, or even nationalism. In the cases of the German and French Army case studies, the author also compares their battlefield performance, and what Castillo calls their “staying power,” with the earlier versions which fought in the First World War, in which both armies were in the “professional” category, demonstrating that armies can greatly evolve in a relatively short time.

The book is well-researched with some 46 pages of notes and a bibliography which runs a further 23 pages, including much up-to-date scholarship. Throughout, the reader is presented with a series of charts and tables containing statistics on such areas as German and Allied battle casualties between September 1944 and May 1945 (in which the Germans overwhelmingly inflicted a greater ratio of casualties on the Allies, rather than vice-versa). There are some maps, but these are generally depictions of operations at a very high level. Those readers who may not be as familiar with some of the campaigns under consideration may wish to consult general histories of these actions first, to place Mr. Jansen’s arguments in a better context. This is a small point in what I found otherwise to be a very engaging book.

The challenge with books covering historical actions is that the reader is often at a loss to extract lessons that are relevant for modern experience, and one can often get caught up in reading accounts of wars past for the sheer excitement of doing so. Although the author’s style is quite engaging, Jansen does pose the question. “So what?” and offers some views about how the US defence and security community, in particular, might apply cohesion theory to combating potential adversaries: specifically, North Korea, Iran, and China, as well as enemies recently being faced in Afghanistan. I won’t spoil the ending by stating what he says, but one wonders if this book might become required reading within the higher echelons of the Pentagon?

The author’s style is such that the work reads very much like a textbook, and perhaps that was Castillo’s intent. At the outset, I found this somewhat distracting, but in the end, I found it to be an effective means for the author to make his points, and for this reviewer at least, I found his arguments in favour of cohesion theory quite convincing. Indeed, this work would serve as a useful text in officer training, and as I harken back to my days as a cadet at the Royal Military College (RMC), where one of our texts in the Military Leadership and Management course was Anthony Kellett’s *Combat Motivation* (which I still have, and which I understand is now somewhat rare), this volume would make an excellent addition to RMCs course material. Strongly recommended.

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**NOTE**

Stout Hearts: The British and Canadians in Normandy 1944, is an interesting and somewhat surprising book. The author, Ben Kite, is a serving member of the British Intelligence Corps with substantial operational experience, and, rather than provide yet another narrative examination of the Normandy Campaign, his book aims to explain “how an Army actually ‘works’ on operations.” He does this through a detailed examination of a specific Army in a specific campaign – the 21st Army Group in Normandy. Therefore, although the book is ‘about’ the British-Canadian Army in Normandy, its real focus is upon what that Army, and, by extension, what a modern Army in general, really is.

To accomplish this goal, the author relies upon two interconnected structures. The first is the use of the various components of the Army to provide the broad narrative structure. After a swift overview of the Normandy Campaign (dispatched in six pages, including a photograph) the book settles into ten chapters which examine, in turn, the major components of the Army, beginning with the infantry and covering the remaining combat arms, along with less commonly-examined components that make an Army more than the sum of its units: medical, intelligence, logistics, naval and air support, and staff and headquarters structures. Each of these chapters includes an overview of the role of the element within the Army and its major equipment and tactics. Some of these chapters, particularly those on less commonly-discussed elements, such as medical or intelligence support, contain interesting perspectives rarely found in other campaign histories.

What really makes the book interesting, however, is a very heavy reliance upon direct quotations from those who served in the campaign. The book is filled with lengthy quotes from a wide variety of personnel at all levels who served with the 21st Army Group in Normandy. Many of these are from previously unpublished sources. Without doubt, this approach provides the strength of the book, and helps draw the reader through what can occasionally be quite technical discussions. Rarely, one of the quotations does not land quite perfectly, or is not exactly ‘on point,’ and it disrupts the tempo or tone of the book. Overall, however, it is testament to the quality of the book that the vast majority of these lengthy quotes hold together extremely well, and they produce a coherent picture of both a generic Army on operations, and the Normandy campaign itself. The narrative is further supplemented through the liberal use of photographs, maps, and charts to provide further support for both the personal narratives, as well as the technical points made by the author.

These two interconnected structures allow the Normandy Campaign itself play out as backdrop to the two goals the book admirably achieves: to examine what a modern Army is, and to hear that directly from the soldiers who fought in Normandy. One minor weakness of the book is its conclusion. Although it satisfactorily closes off the campaign, some of the lessons identified, for example, the assertion that division is the critical level of warfare, do not flow smoothly from the remainder of the book. However, the conclusion is short and does nothing to distract from the enjoyment of having spent several hundred pages in the bocage of Normandy getting to know a modern Army. Again, this is the real strength of the book – breathing life into an Army on campaign.

Stout Hearts is well suited those seeking to develop a general understanding of modern land operations, but will also be of interest to those with more experience. Throughout the book, I was struck by how familiar the broad structures of 21st Army Group were, and I found it allowed me to bring my own experiences five decades later as a junior officer in 2 Brigade to better understand Normandy. By avoiding lecturing the reader with respect to the structure of an Army, but rather, providing an opportunity for comprehension to grow by examining the component parts in the words of those who served, Ben Kite has produced a fascinating perspective on an Army in operations.

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