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Let Me Tell You about the Birds and the Bees: Swarm Theory and Military Decision-Making

The Need to Advance: The Battle of Chérisy and the Massacre of Québécois Troops (August 1918)

NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to yet another summer edition of the Canadian Military Journal as we continue our commemoration of the two major global conflicts of the 20th Century. With that in mind, renowned Canadian artist David Craig graces our cover with his celebratory montage of victory over the Axis powers during the Second World War.

With respect to our current issue, Major-General Éric Tremblay, Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, and Dr. Bill Bentley, the Senior Staff Officer Professional Concepts and Leader Development at the Academy, combine forces to explore Canada’s historical and present strategic culture, or how “…the nation views the world, including threats to its security, and then influences the response to that perception.” This is, and has been, reflected in our nation’s understanding of the utility of military force as it interacts with other nations, that is, specifically, what is the role of military force in pursuit of our national interests, as opposed to non-military actions, in the face of various threats to our sovereignty, security, and national stability?

They are followed by independent academic journalist Adam MacDonald, who discusses the new political paradigm that has emerged in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War. However, MacDonald notes that over the past decade, “…the pendulum [is] swinging back towards a more strategic-military orientation,” in a manner characterized by some as a ‘militarization’ of the region. The author examines these trends in some detail, concluding that: “Managing the selective inclusion, not complete exclusion, of military aspects into the Arctic regime is warranted to support and not derail efforts that address the complex challenges confronting the region.”

Next, American infantry officer Major Ben Zweibelson examines the periodic interest displayed by Western military organizations as to “…whether the emergent behaviour of decentralized systems, commonly referred to as ‘swarm theory,’ or ‘swarm behaviour,’ might be relevant in military applications.” Fad, or legitimate alternate source of military applications superior to existing traditional methodologies? Read on and judge for yourselves.

In our historical section this time out, Professor Carl Pépin of Université Laval chronicles a portion of the late-First World War Allied offensive known as the ‘Hundred Days,’ and specifically, the Canadian Corps’ tasking to capture the city of Cambrai through three German defensive barriers, most notably, the last and heavily-fortified Drocourt-Quéant (DQ) Line. The French-Canadian 22nd Battalion was specifically tasked to penetrate the sector of the defensive barrier facing the village of Chérisy, resting as it did at the very heart of the overall Hindenburg Line. “The first hours of the assault seemed promising, but it ended in disaster for the French-Canadian soldiers and the English-speaking soldiers who were part of the same brigade.” Pépin’s article examines this ultimately-failed portion of the offensive in considerable detail.

We then move on to our two opinion pieces, which are very diverse in their subject matter. First, artillery officer Major Mike Draho examines a potential Canadian Armed Forces initiative to ‘incentivize’ physical fitness test results in our military. In short, Draho brings forward “…two specific concerns that combined generate a third regarding the unintended organizational climate that incentivized fitness could create in the long term.” Next, postgraduate scholar of military history and strategy Ryan Goldsworthy tells the story of the many young Canadians who voluntarily enlisted in the US armed services to fight in the Vietnam War, and chronicles the rationale for the general lack of official commemoration in Canada for Canadians who so served.

After a brief one-issue hiatus, our own resident commentator Martin Shadwick is ‘back in the saddle.’ This time out, Martin tackles Canadian public opinion as it applies to defence matters.

Finally, we close the issue with a timely book review essay of three well-written and worthy recent publications dealing with strategic thinking, and then offer a brace of regular book reviews to further pique the interests of our readership.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal

A CF-18 Hornet soars above the clouds over Iraq before commencing the next mission during Operation Impact, 23 January 2015.
In his article, “Intelligence Models in Practice: The Case of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter 2014), William Wilson writes: “The National Security Council (NSC) was also created at this time; its Executive Committee (ExComm) being led by the President.” (p.48). The author seems to be suggesting that the NCS was established at the time of the Crisis in October 1962.

The National Security Council was established in 1947 by the National Security Act of that year. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy created ExComm by the National Security Action Memorandum 196 on 22 October 1962, largely to manage the crisis, although it continued to meet afterwards.

Sincerely,
Joel J. Sokolsky
Professor
Royal Military College of Canada
Canada’s Strategic Culture: Grand Strategy and the Utility of Force

by Major-General Éric Tremblay and Dr. Bill Bentley

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Grand strategic practice is not the mere application of techniques that could be applied anywhere by anyone – it is always the expression of an entire culture.

~Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire

Strategy is cultural, period.

~Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy

Introduction

The strategic culture of a nation shapes and reflects how that nation views the world, including threats to its security, and then influences the response to that perception. Reduced to its essentials, strategic culture is a reflection of the nation’s understanding of the utility of military force as it interacts with other states. That is, what is the role of military force in achieving political ends as compared to other actions in pursuit of national interests on the global stage (and occasionally domestically) in the face of threats to its sovereignty, physical security, and internal stability?

Strategic Culture

Strategic culture, sometimes described as a nation’s ‘way of war,’ informs a nation’s grand strategy and, consequently, military strategy, so policy-makers and national security practitioners need to appreciate its nature and characteristics. The concept refers to the socially transmitted habits of mind, tradition, and preferred methods of operations that are more-or-less specific to a particular country or security community. It is the product of a particular historical experience that has been shaped by a geographical context. Each strategic culture is inclined to create what purports to be general theories with respect to the basis of national experiences and circumstances. Strategic culture can, therefore, be more precisely defined as:

An integrated system of symbols (argumentation, structure, language analogies, metaphors, etc) that acts to establish pervasive...
and long-term strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in political affairs. The strategic culture thus established reflects national preoccupations and historical experience as much as it does purely objective responses to any given threat environment.2

Strategic culture is a long-term, slow growth phenomenon. Its influence upon how nations view the role and utility of force over time is usefully elucidated in three excellent case studies – Basil Liddell-Hart’s *The British Way of War* (1957), Russell Weigley’s *The American Way of War* (1973), and Robert Citino’s *The German Way of War* (2005).

Four main factors contribute to the evolution of a strategic culture.

- **Geography**: The size and location of a nation are crucial determinants of the way policy-makers and strategists think about security and strategy.
- **History**: Historical experiences influence strategic culture almost as much as geography.
- **Culture, religion, and ideology**: Taken together, these three elements comprise something the Germans have captured in a single expressive word – *weltanschaung* – a worldview or outlook on the world. The influence of this concept upon strategic culture is both elemental and vast.
- **Governance**: The structure of government, military institutions, and the nature of civil-military relations play a crucial role in the development and operation of a strategic culture.

**Grand Strategy and Military Strategy**

As already noted, strategic culture is the pervasive and ubiquitous context within which a nation creates and pursues its grand strategy. Grand strategy has been defined as “…the comprehensive direction of power (any or all assets of a security community) to control situations and areas in order to obtain an objective.” This is satisfactory, however, for the purposes of the current discussion that of Colin Gray’s is used in preference as it explicitly includes the political dimension. Thus, grand strategy is “the direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a security community in support of its policy goals as decided by politics.” The theory and practice of grand strategy is the theory and practice of statecraft itself, it is the calculated relationship of means to large ends.4

One leading strategic theorist advises, “…all states have a grand strategy whether they know it or not.” It is the intellectual architecture that supports and lends structure to foreign and defence policies, as these policies are articulated within a particular strategic culture. Leaders who are developing grand strategy are not just
reacting to events or handling them on a case by case basis. Rather, grand strategy is a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so. Grand strategy requires a clear understanding of the nature of the international environment, a country’s highest goals and interests within that environment, the primary threats to those goals and interests, and the ways that finite resources can be used to deal with competing challenges and opportunities. It is, according to Barry Posen the Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the Director of MIT’s Security Studies Program, the theory, or logic that guides leaders, in peace and war, seeking security in a complex and insecure world.6

Nested within grand strategy is military strategy, defined here as, “… the direction and use of force, or the threat of such use, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.”7 It is, in fact, the direction and exploitation of action at the operational and tactical levels. Operations and tactics are action behaviours, albeit ones requiring ideas, doctrine, organization, and plans. Strategy is the translation function, in theory and practice, of operational and tactical action into strategic consequences, ultimately for political effect.

**Canada’s Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy**

Viewed through the lens of the four factors described above, it is clear that geography looms exceptionally large as an influence upon Canada’s strategic culture. Canada is a huge country, well endowed with natural resources and adequate agricultural capacity, but also comprising very large expanses of quite inhospitable territory, posing great challenges to nation-building. Beyond that, and, in some respects, more importantly, is the fact that Canada sits atop a country, the United States of America, whose geographical position protected by two vast oceans facilitated its constant inexorable growth, from a union of 13 disparate colonies, to the most powerful nation in the history of mankind, all over the course of the last 239 years.

The two factors of history and culture are inextricably entwined in Canada’s case. First and foremost, the country began with two founding non-indigenous cultures finally merging as a Confederation in 1867. From the British victory in 1759 at Québec, through the Quebec Act (1774), the Constitution Act (1791), the Act of Union (1840), the British North America Act (1867), the Statute of Westminster (1931), and on through the 20th Century; a central political, social, cultural, and economic preoccupation was how to make this union work and prosper.

At the same time, the American Revolutionary War and the establishment of the United States of America (1776-1783) meant that first, the Canadian colony, and then the Canadian nation, was poised between a Mother country from which Canadians would progressively seek autonomy and independence, and a dynamic, expansionist nation, whose power – military, economic, and cultural – would pose an ever present challenge in one form or another to Canadian sovereignty. From 1776 until the dawn of the 20th Century, Canada would look to Great Britain to shield and parry various pressures from the south. After the American Civil War, however, it became very apparent that British power could not counter the American behemoth, even if the British wanted to do so, which they did not particularly relish. Other policies and strategies would be required. By the turn of the 20th Century and then the First World War, the challenge was transformed from a primarily military challenge to more benign, but nonetheless potent, economic and cultural threats.

In terms of governance, Canadian preoccupation was always toward increased autonomy without alienating the Mother Country, managing the bi-cultural, bilingual nature of the nation while expanding West and North, always pursuing growth and prosperity. Firmly anchored in the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy, these goals were achieved through statesmanship, compromise, and patience, and almost invariably, through peaceful means.

Canada’s ties to the British posed a particular complication with regard to civil-military relations, with significant ramifications for the evolution of the Canadian strategic culture. From 1867 until 1904 it was a British General Officer Commanding (GOC) at the helm of both British regulars and the Canadian Militia. Relationships with successive Canadian governments were often strained as the Government navigated between the quest for greater independence whilst recognizing the need for British protection on land, and especially at sea, from the uncertain threat from the South.8 With the abolition of the appointment of Commander-in-Chief in England in...
1904 and the passage of the 1904 Militia Act, the post of a Canadian Chief of the General Staff was created. The 1904 Act also established a Militia Council with wide powers under the Minister.

At the same time, the authorized strength of the Permanent Force was increased to 2000 personnel. According to Jack Granatstein, the Minister, Sir Frederick Borden, tried manfully to support the Regular Force as best he could, even though it, unlike the Militia, had no political constituency. Canada’s strategic culture was significantly shaped by these experiences and would continue to be so for years as policy-makers sought autonomy and freedom from entanglement in British imperial problems, while Canada’s military pursued as close a relationship as possible with British (and later American) forces.

As established above, the concept of a strategic culture is primarily concerned with the utility of military force in the political affairs of a state, both domestically, and, in terms of national security, internationally. In Canada’s case, the preeminent, indeed, primordial political objective was the creation, maintenance, and growth of a transcontinental, bicultural parliamentary confederation. In this regard, the essential thread of Canadian history was the necessity of keeping the double majority of French and English together on certain key issues, and of balancing the British and American influences, while steadily enhancing the strength and independence of Canada.

In fact, there have always been essentially three threats to this objective against which the utility of force had to be measured – disintegration, absorption, and, to a much lesser degree, after 1867 at any rate, an external military threat to the homeland. It was in response to these circumstances that a Canadian grand strategy was conceived and pursued over the decades. Although it may be that many avoid the terminology of grand strategy when talking about Canada, preferring the phrase national security strategy, most still point to the existence of a uniquely-Canadian strategic culture that informs and guides policy makers on crucial matters of national security.

**Disintegration and Absorption**

The crux of grand strategy, as explained by the British historian and strategist Paul Michael Kennedy, lies in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in peacetime as well as war) best interests. It operates at various levels, political, strategic, operational, and tactical, all interacting with each other to advance the primary aim. In Canada’s case, the non-military elements usually ‘trumped’ the utility of force, demonstrating that grand strategy transcends military capability.

Against the first threat, countering disintegration meant, and still does, carefully managing the bicultural nature of the country through such crises as the Manitoba Schools question and the conscription flashpoints in 1917 and 1944. Keeping Nova Scotia in Confederation in the early days, expanding west as rapidly as possible to tie the country together on an East-West axis, and dealing with the less obvious but potential threat of Western alienation, all occupied successive Governments. And lest the reader imagine that the problem of Quebec separatism has receded into history, it is salutary to recall what political scientists Professors Christian Leuprecht and Joel Sokolsky refer to as the “near death” experience of the 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty. And even more recently, the 2014 provincial election, wherein it appeared that only the utter ineptness of the Parti Québécois’ campaign assured an overwhelming federalist win. The utility of force in achieving and maintaining national unity was always minimal.

With regard to absorption, or, perhaps more accurately, assimilation, the relationship with the United States since even before Confederation has called for grand strategy of the highest order.

The earliest signs of such a Canadian grand strategy to counter the pressure from the south began to emerge at the time of the Treaty of Washington in 1871, which contributed significantly to the demilitarization of the Canada-US border. Sir John A. Macdonald participated as a member of the British delegation negotiating this treaty. Canada’s first Prime Minister was disappointed in the British failure to strongly promote Canadian interests, but was acutely aware that the best guardian of Canada’s security in the wake of the American Civil War was Anglo-American amity.

A similar scenario was replayed during the Alaska Boundary Dispute at the dawn of the 20th Century. President Theodore Roosevelt was determined to prevail and remarked to his British friends in Washington: “I am going to be ugly,” showing his determination to have his way by dispatching additional troops to Alaska. Six Commissioners were appointed to adjudicate the dispute – three Americans, two Canadians, and one British. On 20 October 1903, the Commissioners came down four-to-two in
favour of the US on all counts; the two Canadians having voted against the decision. The land was handed to the United States. Prime Minister Laurier was furious, and the general sentiment in Canada was that they had been double-crossed. For not the first or last time, Canadian interests were sacrificed for the sake of US-British friendship. However, Canada still inhabited a bi-polar world, and of the two poles, the US continued to raise issues of territory and jurisdiction, restrained largely by the deterrent power of the British, whose will to deter was waning significantly.¹⁵

The atmosphere changed rather radically over the next few years. The last British military presence departed Halifax in 1905, and in the same year, Elihu Root became the US Secretary of State. He had been one of the American Commissioners during the Alaska Boundary Dispute, but was now determined to resolve a variety of irritants between his country and Canada. Over the next seven years, Canada and the US systematically confronted and solved most of the outstanding grievances in their relationship. Eight different treaties and agreements were established to cover boundary questions, inland fisheries, North Atlantic fisheries and the fur seal trade on the West coast. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 symbolized the spirit of this massive exercise in accommodation. The accord gave birth to the International Joint Commission (IJC), made up of three representatives from each country. This body has been celebrated ever since as an example of the genteel way in which Americans and Canadians do business. In terms of grand strategy, O.D. Skelton, the Deputy Minister at the Department of External Affairs (1925–1941), observed at the time from his perch at Queen’s University that serious friction between the two democracies that halve the continent will from now on be almost as inconceivable as a clash of arms between Alberta and Saskatchewan or New York and New Jersey.¹⁶

The Boundary Waters Treaty initiated a process that has essentially been pursued continuously until the present. The two countries have negotiated and implemented the Auto pact, the Columbia River Treaty, the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Free Trade Agreement, and the North American Free Trade Agreement, plus a huge critical mass of other agreements that have deepened economic and commercial interaction.

Basically, after 1909, relations between the two countries would be managed through diplomacy and mediation. Threats to Canadian sovereignty from the neighbor to the south, however, remained a matter of continuing concern in both the economic and cultural domains. On the other hand, in the security domain, the impending war in Europe in the late-1930s led to an agreement and process that fundamentally altered the relationship with long term consequences. In a speech at Queen’s University in 1937, President Roosevelt declared: “I give you assurance that the people of the US will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.”¹⁷ By August 1940, this evolving relationship
resulted in the Ogdensburg Agreement, and the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). Consultations on the Board since its inception have covered a broad range of security and defence issues and would lead, during the Cold War, to the formation of NORAD.

What then can be said about the utility of force with respect to the threat of assimilation? Clearly, after the American Civil War, the question of generating enough military force to successfully oppose a plausible American invasion was a virtual ‘non-starter.’ With the withdrawal of British forces from North America, this conclusion was simply reinforced. In terms of Canadian grand strategy, the utility of armed force revolved around two considerations unconnected to a direct military threat from the south. First, as Canada pursued greater independence and autonomy from Great Britain, a military establishment of some kind was required as a symbol of emerging sovereignty. The size of such a force to satisfy this criteria, in the absence of any other realistic threat, was almost completely discretionary.

Second, a major consideration with regard to the American relationship was not, as already discussed, to resist an irresistible assault, but increasingly, as a means for ‘defence against help’ to mitigate a possibility of unilateral US actions to safeguard their security, which could, in turn, endanger Canada’s sovereignty and economic prosperity. This was less discretionary and it would become a very salient consideration during and after the Second World War.

The Direct Threat

A direct threat to the territorial integrity of Canada, other than from the US, is the third major threat that Canadian policymakers and strategists have had to consider over the years. Such a threat for many countries has represented the main factor shaping their assessment of the utility of force, and hence, their grand strategy. Indeed, such a threat, from time to time, was existential, for example, Prussia in 1806, and Poland in 1939. Until the Second World War, this manner of threat was virtually non-existent in the Canadian case, and it was not until the Cold War and the dawn of the nuclear era that a direct threat from outside the North American continent became a matter of considerable concern.

On the other hand, British imperial policy continued to pressure Canada after 1867, along with other members of the Empire, to be prepared to contribute military forces to imperial conflicts and wars around the globe. Theoretically, this could have led to a grand strategy that accepted this demand and prepared for it by maintaining large forces to respond when requested. This did not happen. Thus, at the outbreak of the Boer War in South Africa in 1899 pressure mounted on the Laurier Government from both Westminster in London, as well as from the Canadian branch of the British Empire League to provide assistance. This pressure was skillfully met and ‘finessed’ by the Government agreeing to transport voluntary contingents of mainly British patriots to that theatre of war.
The situation was quite different in 1914. Although there was certainly no direct threat to Canadian territory, it was a virtual certainty that if Great Britain was involved in a major war in Europe, Canada would participate. In fact, Canadians readily accepted that when Britain declared war on 4 August 1914, Canada was automatically involved. There was no separate Canadian declaration of war. As was the case in all European countries, war euphoria swept through at least English speaking Canada and most expectations were for a short, decisive conflict reminiscent of the wars since the Crimean War in 1854.

By 1918, most were fully aware of the horrors of the previous four years and particularly the 60,000 dead Canadians. The country had, nonetheless, come of age politically and on the international stage, and it was accorded its own seat at the peace conference in Versailles. The bloody experience did not, however, significantly alter the Canadian view of the utility of force for the long term, and as the well-known Canadian historian Desmond Morton has noted: “…safe behind the Atlantic, protected as much now by the new US navy as by the British fleet, Canadians would go crusading no more.”

This attitude led to a strongly held position with regard to the key Article X of the Charter of the League of Nations, of which Canada was a founding member. Article X pledged that signatories undertook to protect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all state members of the League. The Canadian representatives involved in drafting the Charter at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 made clear their opposition to the Article, which, in their view, virtually dictated that Europe’s future wars were going to be Canada’s wars. The Canadian goal throughout the 1920s was to subvert the Article. The rationale for this was made clear by Senator Raoul Dandurand in 1924, when he stated unequivocally: “We live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.”

To be sure, there was no element of pacifism in this policy, or grand strategy, nor did it reflect an inclination for neutrality or non-alignment. In fact, pursuing this latter policy would have forced a significant change in Canada’s strategic culture and grand strategy with regard to the utility of force. The examples of Sweden and Switzerland among others indicate that a credible declaration of neutrality usually requires a significant military force to back it up. The policy was, nonetheless, distinctly isolationist and would remain so, alongside the US, until the Second World War, notwithstanding Canada’s membership in the League. In fact, Mackenzie King, Prime Minister for most of the period between 1920 and 1939, never entertained the slightest hope that the League would prevent war after the US declined to join it. He bluntly stated in May 1936, that: “…collective bluffing cannot bring collective security.”

This policy of non-entanglement was, however, somewhat contested by the Canadian military which remained in close contact with their military colleagues in the UK. O.D. Skelton was particularly upset when he discovered in the 1930s that the Canadian General Staff was drafting mobilization plans for an expeditionary force to support Great Britain in any future European war. It was pure folly, Skelton declared, for the Canadian Army to use the pretext of a major war as the ordinary and permanent design and strength of its peacetime organization. Major wars, he argued, were rare events to be dealt with if and when they occurred. “If the General Staff continued to wander in the realm of the extraordinary and unpredictable there was good reason to question whether a Canadian soldier need bother thinking at all.”

“...safe behind the Atlantic, protected as much now by the new US navy as by the British fleet, Canadians would go crusading no more.”

It is interesting, and very relevant to the theme of this article, to note the apparent disconnect between policymakers and Army planners in the late-1980s, a recent dynamic, but reminiscent of civil-military relations in the 1930s, and suggestive of the continuity that inheres in strategic culture. Rejecting the Government’s policy of a modest, even token force in Europe, the Army continued to fight against policy and planning guidance, and pressed for a mass mobilization plan, while also advocating its ‘big army’ Corps 86 and Corps 96 force structure. The attempt to design an army so far removed from political and financial support can only be described, according to Professor Peter Kasurak of Canada’s Royal Military College, as a bizarre episode of magical thinking. The Government simply ignored the Corps exercises or was not even aware of them.
With the inexorable approach of the Second World War in 1938–1939, there was again little doubt that Canada would support Great Britain. When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, Prime Minister King summoned Parliament to decide Canada’s response to the European crisis, with no suspense about the outcome, but emphasising that Canada would decide for itself whether it was at peace or war. As King’s Quebec lieutenant, Ernest Lapointe stated: “By doing nothing, by being neutral, we would actually be taking the side of Adolf Hitler.” Canada declared war on Germany separately from Great Britain on 10 September 1939, with only a few Quebec MPs and J. S. Woodsworth voting against participation.24 Over the next six years, Canada fielded a force of over one million personnel from a nation of only 11 million. The army, navy, and air force fought valiantly in Sicily, Italy, and continental Europe and in the Far East. By war’s end, Canada had fully emerged from the Great Depression, and, in fact, its economic prospects looked bright indeed. In addition, Canada’s navy was the fourth-largest in the world, with a large combat ready field army and a seasoned air force. Canadians justifiably viewed the war effort as righteous, but were in no way inclined to maintain such a force in peacetime. In fact, Mackenzie King quickly reduced the 478,000 army to 19,000 personnel by 1947.

Canada’s grand strategy for the post-war environment was based instead in large part upon the ‘functional principle,’ or at least, the Canadian version of David Mitrany’s functionalism first articulated in 1943 in a widely read paper entitled “A Working Peace System” (later expanded to a book). It became a fundamental principle of Canada’s policy towards post-war international organizations and inter-state relations to ensure that in whatever institutions and regimes might be created to keep the peace, member states other than great powers should not be indiscriminately lumped together without due regard for the important differences by which they could or ought to be distinguished. In other words, there should be a differentiation between secondary powers and lesser powers. The distinction that concerned Canadians was not between the US and Canada, but between Canada, and, say, El Salvador.25 This was the genesis of the concept of ‘a middle power.’

Implicit in this version of functionalism was the need for a rules-based regime internationally to provide space for middle powers to operate. This regime must be accorded legitimacy by the community of states. It was hoped this might constrain unilateral actions by the major powers, and the UN was viewed as a model of such a legitimizing regime.

As a founding member of both the United Nations and NATO, and as a middle power, Canada sought a status commensurate with the contribution this country could make to world peace, diplomatically and economically. Until the Korean War, however, policymakers and strategists did not foresee great utility in Canadian military force to prosecute Canadian grand strategy. However, the conflict on the Korean peninsula, and the crisis created by the Berlin Blockade and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia led, not only to a Special Force to fight in Korea, but to the commitment of ground troops to Europe – initially on the understanding that the Canadian Brigade would be a token force and a temporary expedient until the Western European economies revived sufficiently to ensure their own security. In fact, once the Soviet Union achieved a significant nuclear capability, politicians and civilian officials lost whatever belief they had had in the utility of land forces in Europe to provide anything more than ‘trip wire’ defences. With this in mind, Defence Minister George Pearkes turned down the Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General S.F. Clark’s proposed army of three mechanized brigades because he did not see how Europe could be reinforced once a war had gone nuclear.26

By 1952, the international landscape had changed radically. The ‘Iron Curtain’ was firmly in place, and the bi-polar confrontation between the two ideologies of liberal capitalism and Leninist communism had taken shape. There was no doubt which side Canada was on and the question now was – what was the utility of force, and how much of it in this new context. With the massive deployment of American troops to a now militarized NATO, Canada was locked in to a permanent forward presence, although the size of such a force was cut in half by the early-1970s, leaving a small brigade and three fighter squadrons in theatre. It was at this time, in 1971, that the Government declared that there was no obvious level of defence spending in Canada’s situation.27 The sense of wide discretion concerning this question was and remains characteristic of Canada’s strategic culture. By the early 1950s as well, the ‘over the pole’ bomber and then missile threat to the North American continent created the requirement to actively participate in a large scale air defence enterprise (NORAD), in part to counter the Soviet threat, but also to forestall a significant, if benign, threat to Canadian sovereignty from the US. For the first time in Canadian history, a significant professional standing force was created and maintained.
Canada’s participation in the United Nations also called forth the requirement for a relatively large military force in Canadian terms in order to make a meaningful contribution to peacekeeping. This role served Canadian grand strategy in several ways. First, it made a very ‘functional’ contribution to international security and stability in a niche that the US, Russia, China, and, to a large extent, past colonial powers could not fill. Second, in most cases, peacekeeping helped diffuse crises that otherwise may have led to direct confrontation between the US and Soviet Union, with perhaps disastrous consequences. Third, Canadian efforts often directly assisted allies, individually and/or collectively. Canada’s leading role in UNEF 1 in 1956 is a prime example that helped extricate the US, British, and French forces from a very awkward situation during the Suez crisis. The 30-year mission in Cyprus was primarily designed to reduce the chances of a collapse of NATO’s southern flank should a war between Greece and Turkey ensue over the ownership of that island. Finally, the peacekeeping role resonated strongly with Canadians domestically, which rounded out the success of this element of grand strategy nicely.

Throughout the Cold War, Canada’s military posture remained fairly stable although gradually shrinking in terms of numbers and as a percentage of GDP, despite persistent demands for a greater effort from NATO, as well as a vocal pro-defence lobby domestically. Neither influence, however, had an appreciable impact upon the strategic culture shaping foreign and defence policy and consequent grand strategy. By the mid-1960s, one prominent Canadian scholar would conclude: “…the main and overriding motive for the maintenance of the Canadian military establishment since the Second World War has had little to do with our security as such. It has had everything to do with underpinning our diplomatic and negotiating positions vis-à-vis various international organizations and other countries.”

More recently, Joel Sokolsky and Christian Leuprecht, completing the analysis to the present, and referring to what they term traditional Canadian grand strategy, concluded:

“Canada’s participation in the United Nations also called forth the requirement for a relatively large military force in Canadian terms in order to make a meaningful contribution to peacekeeping.”

Ironically, Canada’s approach to grand strategy has left little room for the military strategic component of this construct. Throughout Canadian history, Canada’s military contribution to operations has always been at the tactical level. Even the Canadian Western ally without endangering the economy and social programs by spending more on defence than was absolutely necessary.”

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Corps in the First World War, and the First Canadian Army in the Second World War must be viewed as operating at the tactical level in the context of the armies and army groups prosecuting allied strategy. To be sure, the performance of these troops was always as proud professionals and fierce warriors, but the military strategy directing their use was made in London, Washington, Brussels, and even in New York. The then-young Canadian scholar Colin Gray coined the phrase “strategic theoretical parasitism” to describe Canada’s penchant for relying on the strategic thinking of its erstwhile great power partners. In 2000, another scholar in the field of national security studies observed that Canada has shown a strong inclination to forgo the strategic planning function altogether, preferring instead to place emphasis upon Canadian values rather than to admit that this country could have something as unseemly as self-interested aims in foreign policy.

One important and pernicious result of this situation is that military strategy per se has been and remains little studied outside the frameworks established by the US and the UK during the professional development of the Canadian officer corps. This must be assessed as professionally and intellectually debilitating, since military strategy is, arguably, the most difficult of all the levels of war and conflict – political, strategic, operational, and tactical. Furthermore, as Colin Gray advises: “...because strategy is uniquely difficult among the levels of war few are the people able to shine in the role. Their number can be increased by education, though not by training and not at all reliably by the experience of command and planning at warfare’s operational and tactical levels.” Going forward, national security professionals will need to ‘Canadianize’ the study of strategy, and eliminate Gray’s ‘parasitism.’

To be sure, Canadian strategic culture has also caused senior civilian security officials to neglect the serious study of grand strategy, Canadian or otherwise. The military officer thus tends to bring tactical and operational perspectives to the table, while the civilian national security professional tends to undervalue the utility of force in their conception of strategy, focussing instead upon diplomacy and other non-military elements of national power.

To fully appreciate the nature of Canadian grand strategy during the period discussed by Gray and Professor David Haglund of Queen’s University, it is instructive to consider carefully the metaphors embedded in Canadian strategic culture used to describe Canada. Canada routinely referred to itself, or was characterised by others as a “fireproof house” and later as a “helpful fixer,” a “linchpin” or an “honest broker;” all roles that tended to de-emphasise the utility of force in its foreign and defence policies. This becomes starkly clearer when compared to metaphors such as “the arsenal of democracy,” or the “global cop,” as they have been applied to our closest ally.

The end of the Cold War ushered in, not a new world order, but rather, 25 quite tumultuous years where the comforting metaphors of the past no longer seemed particularly relevant. For a very brief period, however, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the utility of force seemed even less than at any time in Canada’s history. An unduly hasty withdrawal of stationed forces in Europe was implemented, and a distinct turn to UN peacekeeping was executed. The first Gulf War was unexpected and Canada’s contribution was minimal, despite the fact that it was conducted under a UN Mandate. In this case, the US was most interested in maximum diplomatic support,
as they were fully prepared to do the heavy lifting militarily themselves. There was now an explicit expectation by both Mulroney’s Conservative Government and Chretien’s Liberal Government that a “peace dividend” was due. A more diffuse but palpable sense that this was the case was reflected in Canadian public attitudes as well.

This grace period was very short, as classic peacekeeping missions in Mozambique, Angola, and Haiti evolved into much more difficult and dangerous missions in the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. At the same time, successive Governments were determined to balance the federal budget and the Department of Defence and the Canadian Forces were subject to a series of drastic budget cuts. There was, nonetheless, no indication that Canada would revert to isolationism. Since 1945, Canada had become a member of the G7/8, had repatriated the Constitution (1982), and was thoroughly integrated into the international system through its membership and involvement in myriad multi-national organizations and agreements. Canada’s strategic culture, however, had not evolved appreciably, and the main preoccupation of successive governments remained national unity, national prosperity, and a guarded, though close and friendly attitude towards the world’s sole remaining superpower to the south.

9/11 and its aftermath would seriously test the nature of the country’s long-term strategic culture, and it pointed to the possible need to reassess its grand strategy and view of the utility of force. The attack produced a very real and visceral feeling that we, along with our American cousins were vulnerable as never before to a direct threat at home. There was consequently very little doubt that Canada would participate in the campaign in Afghanistan, especially given its legitimacy by virtue of UN authorization. Our involvement was probably as non-discretionary as one could conceive. It also reflected a sense that the threat had to be met and contained at arm’s length, namely, overseas. Notably, and with important ramifications for grand strategy going forward, the Afghan campaign involved a serious effort to build and sustain a Whole of Government approach to operations both in Ottawa and in theater to effect nation-building in that country. Canada sensibly declined to participate in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, unconvincing that invasion offered a better solution than continuing containment. In addition, the campaign lacked legitimacy in the view of the Government and most Canadians without a clear UN mandate. Limited participation in the air campaign against Libya, on the other hand, enjoyed widespread support because it was viewed as an expression of a commitment to the UN’s Responsability to Protect doctrine, to which Canada had contributed a great amount of effort to craft and to promulgate. Libya’s subsequent instability after the air campaign has served to remind strategists that complex geo-political security problems may require persistent long-term solutions.

The Future

Looking back over the course of Canadian history one would look to believe that Canada’s grand strategy has been a resounding success resulting in a secure, prosperous and vital liberal democracy envied to varying degrees the world over. From the standpoint of early-2015, of the three threats to Canada that have shaped strategic culture and grand strategy, two clearly appear to have receded in importance. Disintegration, in particular Quebec separation, seems more unlikely than ever but it would be imprudent to conclude that the movement is dead. In terms of assimilation, a mature, confident Canada remains in an amicable relationship with the US, although a recent survey indicates that a majority of Canadians (76 percent) say that the country needs government policies to protect Canadian culture from being subsumed by the US.34

In terms of a direct physical threat, the past is not prologue, and the future poses new threats and challenges. Demographically and socially, Canada is now a multi-cultural nation interacting with the world in the context of ever-increasing globalization. This has important implications for how Canadians view this world. Which threats resonate, and to what degree, may well be changing.

The threat from ISIS, and the broader threat from a variety of non-state actors using terrorism as their main coercive means have Canadians upset to be sure, and also supportive of military efforts to disrupt and contain these forces. The degree to which this translates into a major alteration in the perception of the utility of force, and how much force, to be reflected in Canada’s grand strategy remains to be seen. At this stage, according to one assessment, although nearly 50 percent of Canadians feel less secure than two years ago, only 9 percent think that terrorism and national security should be the top priority for the Government. The usual suspects of the economy (89 percent), health care (87 percent), jobs (81 percent), and the environment (75 percent) all rank much higher.35
With all this in mind, and reviewing the period since 1989, it seems as though successive Governments, up to the present, have still been pursuing the ‘peace dividend’ apparently on offer at that time, through some difficult periods. Spending on defence as a percentage of GDP fell from 1.9 percent to 1.1 percent in 2000, despite the number and intensity of military operations. After 9/11, according to the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, the percentage has continued to decline from 1.2 percent in 2001 to 1 percent in 2014. This is the percentage spent on defence by New Zealand, Belgium, Latvia, and the Slovak Republic.

Is Canada, therefore, still an “easy-rider,” and, if so, this metaphor should prompt a reassessment of grand strategy going forward. Defence White Papers since 1964, at least, have always postulated three main and largely discrete missions – defence of Canada, continental defence, and international stability. Given the potential strategic reach of current adversaries, these three missions perhaps should be conflated and viewed more holistically.

Over the longer term, but starting now, Canada’s grand strategy must also fully address the development and security of the Canadian Arctic. With the opening, year round, of all three northern passages (the North West Passage, the Northern Sea Route, and the Transpolar Route) the circumpolar region over the next 20–30 years will equal or even exceed the importance of the world’s traditional maritime passages/straits/chokepoints. The competition for resources, tourism, criminality of all types, social stability, and potentially direct military challenges will require a much larger military capability, both stationed, and in reserve in the south. These forces, while combat ready, will not be intended for aggressive purposes, but rather, to enhance security, to assist with robust policing, and to ensure unequivocal sovereignty.

To properly and effectively prosecute these strategic missions, it is imperative that the strategy be firmly based on a Whole of Government approach that integrates all elements of national power. A few years ago, then-Senator Hugh Segal advocated an approach based upon the ‘3Ds’ of defence, diplomacy, and development. “We need to develop a grand strategy for a small country that integrates military, diplomatic and foreign aid instruments that preserves security and opportunity at home, advances leverage with our allies and responds in an integrated way to the threats that are real from abroad. These need to be built into real plans and models that maximize the ability of each to engage constructively.”

Since then, the theory and practice of Whole of Government, or as they are called internationally, Comprehensive Operations, have advanced significantly. In the future such operations will call for the integration of numerous departments and agencies planning and operating with a high degree of unity of effort. In fact, what is required is the development of a robust ‘community of practice’ of national security professionals. This cadre, operating at both the level of practitioner and policy analysts, must, as recently advocated in a RAND study on the topic, “integrate and educate.” Military doctrine on strategy and planning should be revised to reflect actual practices, and, in particular, the dynamic and iterative nature of the process and formulating of policy and grand strategy. Civilians, as part of this community of practice, should receive a solid education in the fundamentals of national security strategy (i.e. grand strategy).

What is required now is that national security policy makers, civilian officials and military professionals alike understand the nested nature and coherence of strategic culture, grand strategy and military strategy. Only then will there be a reasonable consensus with respect to the true utility of force.
The aurora borealis shines above a Vuntut Gwitchin smokehouse.

NOTES

1. Key national security practitioners include the DND/CAF, Public Safety, CSIS, DFAITD, CBSA, CCG, the RCMP, and the NSA.
8. An excellent account of this issue can be found in Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia (1868-1904) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
14. Walter Faiieber, The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), p. 241. The nub of the Alaska issue was access through its long, narrow southern panhandle to Canada’s Yukon gold fields. If the American claim was upheld, Canada would own none of the water routes inland.
15. See Conrad Black, Rise to Greatness: The History of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2014) for an extended discussion of this dynamic.
33. Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge..., p. 138. The work of Carl von Clausewitz is almost completely absent from Canadian military schools despite the fact that both Gray and Bernard Brodie have argued that Clausewitz is the closest that strategy’s theorists have come to the status of Newton and Einstein. On War offers dicta that approximate the theories of gravity and relativity.
34. Ishmael Duro in the Ottawa Citizen, 12 March 2015.
The Militarization of the Arctic: Emerging Reality, Exaggeration, and Distraction

by Adam MacDonald

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Introduction

With the end of the Cold War and the softening of a geopolitical lensing of the region, a new political paradigm emerged in the Arctic, based upon institutional frameworks supporting and facilitating cooperation on mutual interests and challenges. However, over the past decade, the Arctic potentially is once again at an inflection point with the pendulum swinging back towards a more strategic-military orientation. This is most evident by the augmenting presence, capability development, and employment of military forces by all Arctic-Five (A-5) states; a phenomenon characterized by some commentators as the ‘militarization’ of the Arctic. These analyses, however, are more of a detailed description and cataloguing of military activities, and they stop short of intensively investigating their underlying explanatory components. Instead, there is a simple narrative made that militarization stems from an emerging perception in the region that relations are becoming more confrontational and hostile, specifically over contested maritime exclusion zone claims. Opening accessibility and resource potential in the region, it is commonly argued, is driving the latest (and last) great scramble for sovereign control in the world.

The presence of military forces does not in and of itself necessarily signal a shift to more adversarial approaches in diplomacy. Moving beyond descriptive accounts, examination of the use and intentionality of military power in Arctic affairs reveals three distinct trends impacting the regional landscape. First, the increasing training, capability development, stationing and employment of military forces in the North are an emerging reality. Second, the current discourse with respect to the militarization of the Arctic exaggerates both the military build-up and the intentional underpinning of it. Power projection capabilities of the A-5 states remain limited beyond their own borders, and most training and exercise scenarios are focused within national boundaries developing a broad base of competencies. Furthermore, certain capability developments, although residing within the Arctic, have extra-regional causes. Third, as has been demonstrated by past events, the introduction of military forces into Arctic issues...
regardless of their rationales) may alter relations onto a more competitive stance. In this respect, the larger geopolitical relationship between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – of which the other four A-5 states are members – must be carefully addressed to ensure military developments do not become a distraction to the continued functioning of the Arctic regional regime. This is particularly relevant within the context of degrading military relations between Moscow and NATO following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and ongoing turmoil in Eastern Ukraine, issues which may produce negative ripple effects impacting Arctic diplomacy and co-operation.4

In addressing these issues, forums, either within existing institutions or in new venues, need to be established. Their purpose is not to dissuade the use of military forces in the Arctic, as they are legitimate power resources, but to explain their political underpinnings and deter employment in regional disagreements. Managing the selective inclusion, not complete exclusion, of military aspects into the Arctic regime is warranted to support and not derail efforts that address the complex challenges confronting the region.

Emerging Reality

The Arctic is an augmenting strategic priority for the A-5 states. Over the last decade, all of them have promulgated multi-dimensional strategies that explicitly state that their primary (although not only) interest is exercising sovereignty over their northern territories and achieving other national security interests, including a stable regional order. Furthermore, some, such as the United States and Russia, have created Arctic-specific defence policies. It is evident from these documents that the military emphasis in the region will increase, although there is careful consideration to portray their presence and employment in non-confrontational terms.

A relatively recent interception of a Russian Tupolev TU-95 Bear bomber by a USAF F-15 Eagle from the Alaskan NORAD Region. Relations of late have become more strained and Russian aircraft have resumed their testing of NORAD air defences.
Canada’s Northern Strategy, published in 2009, promises to put “…more boots on the Arctic Tundra, more ships in the water, and a better eye in the sky.” Recent Danish defence policies focus upon the changing geo-strategic significance of the Arctic and promulgate the establishment of a new Arctic military command headquartered in Nuuk, Greenland. Norway’s 2007 Soria Moria Declaration asserted that the Arctic is their strategic priority in national defence and led to the associated redeployment of most military headquarters from the south to the north of the country. Russia’s Arctic strategy emphasizes the region as the country’s primary area for natural resources by 2020, and the concomitant need for a strong regional military component. Finally, the United States, over the past year, has revamped both its Arctic and Arctic Defense policies with plans to become more active and to modernize certain capabilities, such as ice breakers.

Stemming from these policy declarations, all A-5 states have increased their military training, capability development, and employment regionally. Of these, Russia has been the most active, resuming regional naval surface and air patrols in 2007-2008. Furthermore, the planting of the Russian flag at the bottom of the North Pole in 2007 not only stirred sensitivities over ownership of the Arctic, but it demonstrated Moscow’s capability advantages over those of their neighbours. Russia conducted the region’s first ever amphibious assault as part of a larger military exercise in 2012 involving over 20,000 soldiers. In September 2013, a ten-ship naval armada made the 2000 nautical-mile journey via the Northern Sea Route from Severomorsk (home to the Russian Northern Fleet) east to the New Siberian Islands in support of refurbishing and opening old military facilities. Furthermore, there are plans to expand these projects to Russia’s other northern islands, including Franz Joseph Land and Novaya Zemlya. These developments signal a particular focus upon combat readiness and mobilization.

Canada has been active on a number of fronts to augment its military presence and experience in the region as well. Since 2007, Canada has conducted annually Operation...
**Nanook**, a multi-service training exercise designed to protect and to exercise capabilities within its Arctic national borders. The continued development of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, although somewhat uncertain of particulars, is a new region-specific capability for the Canadian Navy. Plans for new surveillance systems, including satellites and underwater aspects, further demonstrate Ottawa’s determination to increase its monitoring of Arctic movements in its waters.

Also contributing to the regional trend, Denmark has been building its capabilities in the construction and use of naval platforms. The *Thetis*, *Absalon*, and *Ivar Huitfeldt* class frigates are combat capable vessels which are increasingly being used to patrol Greenland’s waters. F-16 fighters have also been redeployed to Greenland, a first for the Danish military. Likewise, Norway has built a number of offshore vessels and frigates capable of being equipped with advanced combat systems, such as the American designed *Aegis* air-defence system on their *Fridtjof Nansen* class frigates. Oslo also hosts the bi-annual Exercise *Cold Response*, aimed at increasing operational and survival knowledge in the Arctic. The least active of these countries is the United States, which has largely avoided Arctic specific capability development, but the continued basing of F-22 aircraft in Alaska, the ice breaking capable *Seawolf* and *Virginia* class nuclear attack submarines, provides Washington options in the region.

**Current Exaggeration of Arctic Militarization**

The actual extent of capabilities and operations of military forces in the Arctic, while growing, is still limited largely to within the A-5 state borders. Even the much-hyped Russian armada in September 2013 occurred during ideal weather conditions, and close to shore. Furthermore, many military exercises, such as *Nanook* and *Cold Response*, occur in the summer months, due to the difficulties of conducting them in the weather extremes, which characterize much of the year.

Procurement and financing issues in building and maintaining such capabilities are also a limitation for some Arctic states. Developing regional expertise and experiences with respect to equipping, training, and stationing forces is a major challenge, and they compete with other military and spending priorities. For example, despite its triumphant tone, some of the procurement and military aspects outlined in Canada’s Northern Defence Strategy have not come to fruition, such as the building of a refueling station in Nanisivik. The Arctic offshore patrol vessels (AOPS) are running over time and budget, most likely implying a smaller number will be completed than originally forecasted, and with fewer capabilities, (although a contract was signed with Irving Shipbuilding in January 2015 to manufacture five-to-six AOPS at a total cost of $3.5 Billion – Ed.). Such budgetary restraints have been explicitly stated within the United States’ Arctic Defense Strategy, acknowledging that the current state of fiscal...
The Norwegian supply ship Normand Pioneer, used to carry a British LR5 deep sea submersible craft to the Barents Sea, after Russia, in the wake of initially resisting foreign assistance, had formally asked Britain and Norway for help in rescuing 118 Russian sailors trapped in the submarine Kursk on the seabed in the Barents Sea during August 2000. When Norwegian divers finally entered the shattered hull seven days after the onboard explosion, the Kursk was found totally flooded. There were no survivors.
austerity combined with the American military ‘pivot’ to East Asia may derail their renewed strategic approach in the region.\textsuperscript{19} Even Russia, with steadily increasing military budgets, is faced with decades of infrastructure development in some of its harshest and neglected regions.\textsuperscript{20}

Beyond capability gaps and challenges, militarization implies that military developments have come to dominate the regional discourse, driven by changing and augmenting threat perceptions that the future security environment will become more hostile. Such analyses give a parsimonious, mono-casual picture of the forces behind these issues, which are, in reality, varied and interlinked. The growing military focus upon the region by some A-5 states has more to do with the geographic positioning of the country than with an increasingly pessimistic view with respect to future regional cooperation. Norway and Russia have large portions of their states, including ample natural resources, residing in the Arctic, and thus it makes sense in part why they place military emphasis therein. Concerns remain on the part of Norway regarding Russian posturing in the region, but the 2010 agreement by the two settling their dispute over the Barents Sea demonstrates that positive political and legal action and compromise is possible, even in an environment where strategic suspicions exist.\textsuperscript{21}

Further, the nature of some military exercises are not simply oriented towards developing combat capable forces, but in building and strengthening governmental capacities within these remote areas. For example, with respect to Canada, Operation \textit{Nanook} conducted in 2013 was devoted to non-warfare scenarios, including evacuations due to natural disasters, coordinating missing person searches, and aviation disaster response. In these, the military operated in a largely constabulary and support role to other domestic agencies. Furthermore, the inclusion of other A-5 states in such exercises, the United States and Denmark in Operation \textit{Nanook}, and numerous NATO countries in \textit{Cold Response}, demonstrate a desire to coordinate Arctic knowledge and to develop common operating procedures.

Finally, some military developments in the Arctic are based upon larger, extra-regional factors. Having the United States and Russia in the region, given their wider strategic relationship, blurs the lines between developments which are Arctic specific vice those of a more global nature. For example, the placement of interceptor missiles in Alaska by Washington is not designed to counter some Arctic threat, but that of North Korea’s expanding nuclear missile arsenal. The rebuilding of Russia’s Northern Fleet, particularly its nuclear ballistic submarine component, while conducting operations in the Arctic is designed to upgrade Moscow’s largest Fleet for global operations and to shore up its nuclear deterrent.\textsuperscript{22} Also, the use of multi-role combat naval ships in the region by the smaller A-5 states – Canada, Denmark and Norway – may not be driven by an augmented security posture as much as by necessity, due to the limited availability of platforms. These nations do not have the luxury of regionally defined fleets, leading them to build and use multi-purpose vessels in a variety of global operational theatres.

\textbf{A Detrimental Distraction}

The only territorial dispute (not to be confused with maritime zone claims) ongoing in the Arctic is that of Hans Island between Canada and Denmark.\textsuperscript{23}
resources was low key and non-threatening. All this changed in 2003 with the introduction of naval vessels by both sides to the island, alongside planting national flags and visits by senior government officials, which stifled relations and greatly antagonized the issue onto a zero-sum geopolitical grounding.23 A 2005 agreement was reached by Ottawa and Copenhagen in New York to cease the regular military visits to the island and to return to the status-quo: one of dispute, but now of low political importance.24 This is perhaps the greatest demonstration of the manner in which the introduction of military forces, regardless of the underlying intent, can generate hostility and tensions, creating a chain reaction of ‘tit-for-tat’ uses of military power greatly inflaming what was historically a non-issue between the two nations. Therefore, with the increasing presence of military forces in the region, the potential remains for them to become a detrimental distraction away from the needed regional cooperation and engagement to tackle the plethora of real and complex challenges at hand.

All A-5 states must continue to clearly define their rationale for the employment of military forces to the North, but it is the lack of clarity regarding Russia’s geopolitical perception which generates the most concern. A 2013 study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded the Russian military was not prepared to ‘repel aggression’ in the region.25 The unclear threat in this circumstance was further clouded when, a day after Canada submitted its official United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) exclusion zone claim (including the North Pole), President Putin ordered the Russian military to redouble its efforts in the Arctic, making the region a military priority.26 As a result of the timings of such a move, it is uncertain how Russia will incorporate and utilize its growing military power in the Arctic. Will it be employed for exercising authority and defence within its territories, or for supporting regional political and economic claims, perhaps in a confrontational manner?

Russian perceptions, however, also stem from their wider relationship with the United States and NATO. Moscow is concerned with respect to NATO’s growing interest in the region, especially since the other A-5 states are all alliance members. Therefore, individual, uncoordinated, and national specific military actions by them may be interpreted as a larger, intentional NATO strategy, altering the balance of power at the expense of Russia.27 NATO and its Arctic members must be mindful and empathetic to such strategic suspicion. Russia is an outlier in Arctic military cooperation, as the other A-5 members are increasingly working together via military exercises. In particular, Canada and Denmark, in the wake of the early-2000s flare-up over Hans Island, have developed a strong military connection with regular exercises, exchanges, and port visits between their navies and coast guard forces. However, even within NATO, there is disagreement with respect to the organization’s future involvement. Norway advocates it would positively contribute to regional security, but Canada is wary that non-Arctic members in the alliance would get an unfair voice in the region at the expense of the Arctic states.28

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and ongoing unrest in the Ukraine has cast a chill in military and strategic relations between Moscow and NATO, which threatens to spill over into the Arctic region. NATO states have committed military forces to
Europe for training and ‘presence operation’ purposes, shoring up support for NATO’s Eastern European members wary of a more assertive and potentially militarily aggressive Russia. However, due to the geopolitical realities of European dependence upon Russia for natural gas, the intensity and commitment of these responses varies by NATO states, with Germany and France remaining largely mute on the matter, but Canada being the most vocally critical of the Putin regime. Further, NATO members are trying to determine whether territorial aggrandizement in Crimea is a product of regional specific factors, or a new direction in Russian foreign policy which may impact how Moscow conducts its Arctic affairs. Norway, for example, is increasingly calling upon NATO to focus and establish an alliance regional presence to counteract such a potentiality, but Canada remains concerned with respect to any NATO role in the region, coincidently congruent (but for different reasons) with Russia’s position. However, tensions in Canada-Russia relations may motivate Ottawa to reconsider such a stance.29

So far, the ‘ripple effect’ in strategic relations with Moscow has not dramatically impacted the Arctic regional regime, with member states publicly stating their desire to keep regional relations separate from others around the world. That said, Ottawa’s boycott of the April 2014 Arctic Council meeting in Moscow demonstrates how the region is not hermetically sealed from disputes and tensions with respect to other aspects of the Arctic states’ relations.30 It also remains unclear whether a NATO presence in the Arctic would stabilize or inflame relations, placing the region on a more confrontational military setting with extra-regional issues increasingly influencing Arctic policies and diplomacy.

The potential for security dilemmas and arms races in the Arctic is not only an academic observation, but one explicitly acknowledged by some of the regional actors, including the United States and Canada. In Washington’s Arctic Defense Strategy, for example, it states: “Being too aggressive in taking steps to address anticipated future security risks may create the conditions of mistrust and miscommunication under which such risks could materialize.”31 The universal agreement by the A-5 states that security matters exist in the region, and that military forces
can be employed in part to address them, must be balanced by the challenges of how to use them in a manner which does not in and of itself cause unnecessary hostility and tensions, ultimately inhibiting the ability to address the issues they were originally designed to combat.

The 2008 Ilusissat Declaration signed by all A-5 states proclaims the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework of the region and the instrument through which their conflicting exclusion zone claims shall be concluded and governed. Over the past decade, maritime disputes – including exclusion zone claims and the legal status of major transport routes – have augmented in priority for the A-5 states as the increasing accessibility and potential resource
profitability motivates them to secure access and control to the furthest extent. As a result, competitive arenas, largely absent in the 1990s, are beginning to emerge. This is not surprising or unexpected, but the manner in which these competitions, including those conducted between close allies such as Canada and the United States over the status of the Northwest Passage unfold will have major ramifications to the wider regional relationship, especially since final adjudication on many of these issues will not be forthcoming any time soon.

The creation of the annual meeting of Northern Defence Chiefs in 2012, attended by senior military officers of the Arctic states, has to date been the most substantive endeavour to include military issues into the regional framework. However, these meetings, while discussing common security interests and solutions, avoid raising matters that are contested between the aforementioned states. There remains, therefore, the need to include, not just senior military officers, but political and defence officials to discuss the strategic and political dimensions driving their current policies and actions. Reforming existing or establishing new venues to create this diplomatic space would assist in easing misunderstandings and also create mechanisms to address tensions and uncertainties. Allowing members to voice strategic concerns, for example, Russian concern with respect to a greater NATO interest in the region, would contribute towards providing meaningful levels of security to all Arctic states.

Conclusion

The Arctic regional regime and its membership must create room for the inclusion, not exclusion, of military matters. Military forces are a valid and needed resource, particularly as they are possibly the only government organization with the capability to operate in the harsh regional environment and to provide services such as search and rescue and human and natural disaster assistance. The stationing and establishing of military units and centres may also be useful as logistics and transportation hubs, and could create much needed regional infrastructure which can be used for other purposes, such as for shipping.33

The inability or unwillingness to include and address military matters permits the danger that the augmenting use of military power, regardless of its original purpose, leads to the militarization of the region. To that end, the reasons for their employment changes from addressing national and transnational issues – search and rescue, maritime and aviation disasters, and possibly illegal activities, such as smuggling and terrorism – to that of responding to the military designs and initiatives of each other. It is not clear that it is changing threat perceptions which are driving current military developments, but it is accurate to predict that their increasing presence may result in changing threat perceptions if they are not addressed in an open, transparent, and reciprocal manner.

Explaining the presence of combat capable forces in the region, acknowledging extra-regional influences upon military developments, and deterring any use of naval and air patrols over contested exclusion zone claims are the most immediate military-diplomatic challenges which confront regional leaders. In the end, the overarching objective is to ensure that the regional security discourse is not dominated by traditional balance of power calculations, the territorialisation of the Arctic Ocean, and boasts of sovereign pride compromising the cooperative and multilateral approaches that have been established to address transnational issues, which demand a coordinated, region-wide response.

2. The Arctic-Five (A-5) states are those which border the Arctic Ocean: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States. These nations are the most active in the region in terms of military developments, and when combined with the various maritime dispute claims between them in the Arctic Ocean, these elements shall constitute the focus of this article. The three other Arctic countries – Iceland, Finland, and Sweden – that are full members of the Arctic Council (for they reside in part north of the Arctic Circle) do not border the Arctic Ocean and have no outstanding claims with any other Arctic state.


9. Wezeman, p. 11.

10. Singh.

11. Drennan.


17. Drennan.


20. Drennan.


23. Huebert, p. 11.


25. Drennan.


30. Leyden-Sussler.


33. Zysk, p. 110.
Let Me Tell You About the Birds and the Bees: Swarm Theory and Military Decision-Making

by Ben Zweibelson

Major Ben Zweibelson, an American infantry officer, has over 21 years of combined service in the United States Army, to include four combat tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. Extensively published, he has recent design articles in the March-April 2015 issue of Military Review, and the March 2015 issue of the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. He is currently assisting development of design and operational design programs for the Royal Netherlands military, the Canadian Armed Forces, and USSOCOM’s Joint Special Operations University.

“No single person knows everything that’s needed to deal with problems we face as a society, such as health care or climate change, but collectively we know far more than we’ve been able to tap so far.”

Thomas Malone (MIT’s Center for Collective Intelligence)

Introduction

Since the 1990s, Western military organizations have demonstrated periodic interest in whether the emergent behavior of decentralized systems, commonly referred to as ‘swarm theory’ or ‘swarm behavior,’ might be relevant in military applications. Defence innovators such as the RAND Corporation sponsored multiple studies on swarm theory in the past decade and a half, and recent popular books such as The Starfish and the Spider offer tantalizing prospects on decentralized organizations for future military applications. Clearly, the notion of alternative organizational intelligence and decentralized problem solving has sparked the interest of military academia. Is this another techno-centric fad, or does swarm theory offer military applications superior to traditional methodologies? Can the joint military community gain anything from considering swarming constructs?
Perhaps the deeper question is whether the ‘buzz’ of an exotic theory missed a larger point of reflecting upon the hierarchical and centralized organizational structure that define virtually all Western military organizations today. Can swarm theory, something that functions in the antithesis of centralized hierarchies, be of any use to our militaries? Is there anything beyond literal adaptations of swarm theory for robots and technological applications – can we convert General Officers into “Queen Bees” for certain complex situations, and would this do us any good? Can we make military decisions in any process other than the hierarchical, centralized, and dominant form that permeates our doctrine, education, and practice? Lastly, can we gain perspective with respect to how our military hierarchy drives organizational decision-making to create environments that are rigidly inhospitable to introducing swarm constructs?

This is not an article about how to tactically employ swarm theory as a form of maneuver, or a simplistic trick on getting squads to attack an objective while making decentralized decisions in a swarm-like manner. ‘Slamming’ two dissimilar ideas in linear and simplistic construction represents a hazardous and largely uncreative way to go about innovation. Instead, we need to address the overarching topic of how the military makes sense of different environments, and subsequently makes decisions that lead to actions. While tactical leaders might find these concepts interesting, strategic planners, inter-agency and joint operators, as well as governmental and contractor organizations that work closely with the military, may gain some insight with respect to how swarm theory and modern military organizations function.

First, let us define what swarm behavior is as a construct for organizational decision-making and emergent behavior, so we might frame the potential paradoxes and tensions between decentralized decision-making and how we, as a military profession, tend to approach most every decision in a conflict environment. Potentially, swarm applications offer some revolutionary innovations on the horizon, which tend to draw military interest initially – although largely the interest has remained decidedly technological and tactical in a literal sense. This article offers some immediate opportunities in both a pedagogic (thinking about how we teach) sense, and through an epistemological (thinking about how we know what we know) reflection upon military decision-making as a profession of arms. Thus, joint and combined military operations in a wide variety of applications are applicable here, whether discussing air, land, or maritime operations. To incorporate any swarm constructs into how we make decisions as a military force, we may need to alter, albeit temporarily, some deeply held institutionalisms.

Swarm Theory: Decentralization and Local Conditions

Why does research about the organizational structure of bees, ants, and other non-military organisms matter for serious military debate? ‘Swarm Theory’ overlaps into many disciplines, to include evolutionary biology, mathematics, and computer modeling, as well as numerous sociological adaptations over the past several decades. Often, it happens around us without us even realizing it. The next time you are driving in highway traffic at night and you notice a pattern of red brake lights from cars well ahead of you, observe how waves of traffic respond without anyone directing us to brake. The next time you enter a crowded elevator, notice how people shift and maintain fairly even distance while decreasing space to let more people in, without anyone saying a word. These are simple examples for what in nature we see organisms that are often simplistic, such as ants or bees, and yet collectively, there is something far greater occurring that promotes complex problem solving at the organizational level. Essentially, emergent behavior and complex system adaptation occurs through a ‘swarm intelligence’ despite the organization being comprised of many often simplistic individuals that respond only to local conditions in a highly decentralized span of control. To understand the ‘strangeness’ of swarm, we also need to look inward at how traditional military organizations work to illustrate the contrasts. These are things we often take for granted.

Unlike a traditional military hierarchy where the general gives orders, and at the base of the organizational pyramid, many units follow these orders, in swarm structures like an ant colony or beehive, the queen bee issues no orders at all. The worker bees follow no directives from higher, and merely respond to local conditions and the immediately surrounding bees. The queen has no idea what the rest of the colony is doing, and focuses only upon her own local tasks. Collectively, the entire colony generates collective intelligence that demonstrates ‘synergy’ in that the whole is greater than the mere sum of the parts. Local decisions drive impressive organizational responses. For instance, an ant may switch from scouting for a food source to retrieving food from a discovered source once a certain type and number of other ant pheromone trails are established in the ant’s local environment. No ant leadership directed him. Instead, local conditions coupled with various instinctive triggers govern the actions of many simplistic organisms.

Deceptively simple, swarm intelligence provides an ant colony some amazing abilities to confront many complex and emergent problems in an entirely non-hierarchical way. This is in strong contrast to the linear, sequential, and hierarchical approach employed by most governmental, business, and military organizations where extensive ‘top-down’ planning and managing drives collective actions. Both constructs tackle complex environments, both adapt and respond to emergence in the environment, and both make sense of their environments in order to subsequently transform them. Yet, a military force and an ant colony do things remarkably differently. While ants are unable to change from swarm organization to anything else, we as humans have the luxury of considering whether our preferred centralized and hierarchical process is most effective, or whether we might adapt some lessons from our swarming friends.

This distinction in structure between centralized hierarchical and decentralized swarm-thinking organizations transcends the methodologies of the institution; essentially the rules and principles for accomplishing tasks and making sense of an environment.
Ultimately, this distinction addresses at the epistemological level (how we know to do something) how an institution knows to organize, decide, act, adapt, and learn. Figure 1 illustrates the traditional military hierarchy of command and control, where information flows up and decisions flow back down. Formal decision-making models, such as the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP), rely upon these rigid hierarchical structures for directing information, conducting analysis, focusing staff functions, and directing subordinate activities towards the organizational objectives. Other governmental agencies and associated contractors follow similar structures with subtly different language, concepts, and identities. Military professionals likely know only this one methodology with respect to how to plan and organize actions. We also take this for granted.

What is extraordinarily different from centralized organizations, such as the military institution, is how swarm intelligence functions. While a hierarchical organization might develop complex campaign plans and extensive planning and analysis to determine the most effective supply routes in an assigned area, an ant colony solves this complex problem using decentralized organizational approaches with absolutely no directives or hierarchical decision-making. Yet, through localized conditions, chemical sensors for communication, and individual decision-making, an ant colony rapidly establishes the shortest routes for frequently changing food sources, and readily adapts to changes to the environment. Birds, bees, and other animals in nature offer variations of swarm intelligence, although swarm theory expands beyond nature into other constructs. An ant might detect a chemical trail that says: “Hey, there is food down this path,” but if that ant senses that there are more than four ants nearby that are already heading to the food source, that ant may automatically switch to “…return to the colony and assist with food storage” instead. No ‘ant leader’ is on the ground directing them- the ants switch behaviors and adjust chemical trails to communicate locally with nearby ants only. For military personnel that have conducted individual land navigation training, similar patterns emerge around land navigation points that they are trying to find. Without anyone communicating, groups of navigators tend to vector in collectively on the same point and adjust their navigation, based upon proximity to other students moving in a similar direction. At difficult locations, students swarm while playing off other students’ successes or frustrations until one student finds the illusive point, and then only those close enough to locally observe him will follow suit without anyone being in charge or providing direction. Swarm works with simplicity at the local level, yet remains capable of solving complex and adaptive problems at the organizational level without centralized decision-making.

Modern network and internet companies, as well as NASA, are investigating and building swarm-smart approaches to real-world human problems where traditional approaches are currently insufficient or inefficient. Figure 2 offers an illustration of how decentralized swarm organization differs from the traditional military hierarchy.
Figure 2: Swarm Intelligence and Decentralized Decision-Making

- There is no hierarchy
- Information remains localized
- Pre-existing “rules” govern individual reaction
- Localized actions cumulatively impact entire organization
- No one “sees the big picture”
- No “boss” or “Commander”

Figure 3: Swarm Construct Applied in a NATO Planning Team’s Work in Afghanistan

Local conditions drive collective decisions... each wargame team did not know what other teams were doing in other wargames. Planners evaluated results holistically (like a hive).
Conceptually, the differences between *centralized* and *decentralized* organizations confronting decision-making are significant. I do not suggest we abandon the traditional military hierarchy and begin imitating an ant colony, as deliberate metaphorical applications only confuse and misinterpret what swarm potentially offers. However, some aspects of military decision-making could improve with the integration or substitution of swarm’s decentralized constructs for ‘wicked’ problems in complex military environments. In 2012, as a lead planner for a complex NATO problem on how to conceptually reduce the Afghan National Security Forces from 352,000 soldiers, police, and airmen to an unknown post-2015 size, I inserted a swarm construct into the traditional military ‘war-gaming’ methodology for decision-making. Our conceptual work was specifically for policy makers in Washington. However, the unclassified results would subsequently drive follow-on planning by numerous incarnations of various plans and branch plans at the national level for military forces in Afghanistan and continue to this day. Drawing from observations on how a bee colony selects new colony locations through scouts that never examine other sites besides the one they examined, I constructed the NATO planning team’s war game sessions around similar decentralized constructs. Each of the five ‘mini-teams’ only war-gamed their particular security force option, all the courses of action had a combination of positive and negative traits, and the local conditions of the ‘mini-team’ and their war-game became relevant for group discussion. Figure 3 uses an illustration from the unclassified results of that project.

As our groups collaborated in a non-traditional war-gaming approach to discuss each mini-team’s localized findings, the overall group began like bees in the hive to drive two of the five courses of action to the top. Largely devoid of traditional hierarchical processes, and lacking the ‘run through every course of action as a group’ turn-based methodology in standard military war-gaming, our ‘swarm construct’ in military decision-making demonstrated success as the results were accepted by NATO nations and implemented in 2012 by ISAF for subsequent security force development.

In this example, we did not use robots equipped with ‘swarm programming,’ or run the courses of action through software that eliminates our hierarchical methodology. Instead, by addressing our epistemological framing of *how we make decisions* as a military profession, we consciously selected a swarm-centric construct as a substitution to traditional turn-based war game approaches. There are myriad applications for swarm where military planning teams might infuse decentralization and local-conditions with collective collaboration, but I would like to highlight a few key tensions that emerge in practice when attempting to insert swarm applications into military problem solving.

**Turning Soldiers into Bees: Gaining Decentralization in Decision-Making**

There are several organizational hurdles that exist for any professional seeking to integrate swarm constructs into the traditional military decision-making approach. First, the dominance of the military hierarchy absolutely governs the flow of information up and decisions down. In any swarm application, this centralized decision-making construct must be tempered in a measurable way. While it is problematic for any organization to view a boss as anything but the boss, a planning team composed of a variety of professionals should be able to operate democratically with the senior decision-maker absent from the swarm application. Planners must set aside the centralized military hierarchy, even if just within the confines of a small planning team’s work area, to allow the epistemologically different construct of swarm theory to function.

Second, in order for local conditions to support a swarm construct, all the planning teams must agree upon fundamental ‘instincts’ or ‘triggers’ for action – this enables a planner to support swarm intelligence by acting only upon local conditions and in ignorance of the ‘bigger picture.’ For war-gaming multiple courses of action, each ‘pod’ of planners need not know what other planning pods are doing with other war-gaming efforts, provided that all the pods are prepared to make localized decisions, based upon a shared collective decision-making construct. Establishing decision support criteria, using a specific and agreed-upon language, and using the same quantifiable information across all the war games provided our planning pods the proper ‘instinct’ structures for group decisions. We all must agree what a positive or negative decision criterion means in general, to allow localized and context-specific decisions to occur in a decentralized swarm approach.

Third, the plural democracy of a decentralized organization must operate uninhibited by the traditional military hierarchy in order to accomplish best results in planning for the period where swarm disrupts the traditional hierarchy. When multiple planning pods collaborate to discuss findings and make recommendations, one must downplay a single senior leader or influential member from dismantling the decentralized process. In the NATO project, our planning group assembled, and metaphorically, each mini-team presented a ‘bee dance’ to brief where they considered their course of action should fall. Over time, those teams that provided effective arguments swayed more planners to their position, and collectively, the entire ‘hive’ eventually settled upon one course of action out of an original five. One negative aspect to consider is simply human nature. Humans are not simplistic organisms, and dominant personalities might easily upset a swarm approach by reinserting the military hierarchy in order to achieve other agenda-s- even subconsciously. The group has to recognize and prevent this iteratively in reflective practice.

Fourth, military planners might reject swarm theory outright, or unconsciously resist it if expressly told so prior to the planning effort. If a planning team is not familiar with swarm theory, or the lead planner anticipates that a swarm construct might better function without the participants implicitly aware, one might couch the decision-making modification without using the term ‘swarm theory,’ or even revealing the deviation. I applied this in the NATO project due to limited time constraints and the wide range of actors in our group. However, by using familiar military terms and maintaining traditional products, such as the decision support matrix, the planning pods remained unaware and still functioned in a swarm approach to deliver a selected course of action. By framing the war-game in familiar terminology and aspects of doctrinally...
accepted planning concepts, our planning team readily entered into a swarm-like approach without any resistance. This does have an element of deception to it. However, due to limited time and other constraints, we were not prepared to give the team a crash course in swarm theory and other design considerations. With the framework in place, the teams shifted into a decentralized and local-conditions manner of problem solving, and later, they were able to shift back into traditional decision-making without issue.

This leads to the next concern, where one could argue that the traditional military hierarchy is not only unwilling to knowingly tinker with the preferred method of centralized decision-making, it will openly attack any decentralized applications as being ‘not doctrinally sound,’ deviant, or incompatible. Part of this stems from a normal defensive posture against disrupting how our organization functions, but it also stems from some vulnerability within the overall strength of centralized management. Our strength in following orders becomes a weakness in adapting new and useful approaches to solving problems that resist our centralized efforts.

Buzz Words and Gimmicks: Swarms Eat Hierarchies; Hierarchies Eat Swarms

Our profession tends to stick to one epistemological construct where we know *how we problem-solve* because we follow our doctrine and use a shared lexicon of terms and principles. 18 The traditional military hierarchical approach favors a highly reductionist and sequential process where we attempt to break complex situations down into neat piles of facts, labels, and categories. When Napoleon (and later the Prussians) began using specialized staff elements, out of this, the modern military staff gradually emerged where the major components of military operations are categorized into special staff functions, such as administration, intelligence, maneuver, logistics, communication, and so forth. The Napoleonic Staff process itself is a self-reinforcing element where the military intelligence officer handles enemy information; the engineer addresses his specialized field, and so on. 19 While our traditional decision-making methodology remains a highly flexible and responsive process to push information ‘up the chain’ and to drive decisions down, a major weakness in this approach is a decidedly rigid outlook towards anything that changes this process, as well as the tendencies toward categorization, reductionism, and linear causality. 20 Swarm theory functions from an entirely dissimilar epistemological construct where decentralization reigns and things like reductionism are irrelevant. This ‘makes for strange bedfellows,’ and produces significant organizational barriers for any leader interested in applying swarm theory in our decision-making construct. 21

Often, injecting something like swarm into any established military practice quickly results in either the group sprinkling a misused term into traditional practice with a ‘buzz word’ fervor, or the profession outright rejects the attempt, due to the significant epistemological differences highlighted. For swarm theory’s decentralization element, this means that the highly
familiar “I say...you do” relationship between superiors and subordinates is suspended. Obviously, if poorly implemented, this will cause more harm than good. For swarm’s localized emergence element where a pod of planners do not know what the rest of the organization is doing, this means that ‘situational awareness’ and our normal gorging of over-information is also suspended. More significantly, for branch and service self-identity concerns, swarm’s localized emergence element largely rejects the categorization effect of the Napoleonic staff specialization. Planners are free to respond to conditions based upon the local environment, and not based upon specialization where the engineer “...has no business thinking about enemy capabilities because that is the Military Intelligence Officer’s lane.” For these numerous epistemological tensions, leaders cannot apply swarm theory ‘willy-nilly’ into any military decision-making just in the hopes of sparking a creative solution to a troubling problem. A senior leader does not saunter up to the group with, “…today, we are going to think like bees to finally figure out how to defeat an insurgency within a war-torn, economically stagnant, and ideologically dissimilar region.” Instead, any swarm application requires focused framing of the planning team, as well as ‘ground rules’ with precautions taken to mitigate the aforementioned obstacles associated with how our institution protects the hierarchical and centralized construct.

**Conclusions: Float like a Butterfly, Think like a Bee (from Time to Time)**

Revolutions in technology and information are changing how we make sense of military conflict environments. Some of our traditional approaches with respect to problem solving were more effective yesterday than today – but our institutions tend to retain some habits far longer than necessary. Nothing defines the military profession greater than our centralized decision-making process grounded in a hierarchy of rank, experience, status, and position. While I do not suggest that we should abandon the very constructs that make a military force a disciplined, self-sufficient, and flexible organization, there are benefits in looking to contrary organizing constructs for inspiration in complex problem solving. Generals should not become ‘queen bees,’ but a military staff might make sense of a particularly ‘wicked’ problem from a fresh perspective by taking a page from swarm theory. novel solutions, and we cannot assume a myopic stance that every single military problem will ultimately be ‘solvable’ by applying our preferred centralized hierarchy approach. If that were true, why would nature even entertain organisms using swarm at all? Plenty of other insects do not use it at all, and flourish alongside ant colonies and beehives. Unlike insects or other organisms, we can choose to modify how we make decisions – unless we are unwilling to do so.

As technology ushers in new concepts such as ‘meta-data’ collection, ‘flash mobbing,’ social knowledge construction (Wikipedia), cyber terrorism, and other human-driven endeavors that further complicate how the military ‘sense-makes’ in complex conflict environments, our traditional problem-solving methodology may prove inadequate, or possibly incomplete. Mission analysis, MDMP, or war-gaming may retain the sequential and reductionist procedures for general application. However, an adaptive planning team may chose at times to restructure aspects of any of these constructs to include swarm theory. As offered in
The Starfish and the Spider, hybrid organizations that blend centralized and decentralized aspects into a flexible organizational construct offer a better chance of adapting to future rivals. For military decision-making, this may include swarm components. Select applications, used judiciously and with reflective practice, may generate solutions for solving the right problem within an elusive and dynamic military context, rather than a continuous cycle of solving the wrong problems and creating new ones. A general or senior leader need not become a ‘Queen Bee’ and surrender the centralized authority of decision-making. However, planning teams comprised of many inter-agency and diverse partners might adapt ‘swarm-like’ constructs for sense-making and decision-making in carefully constructed planning environments. Under these conditions, even a ‘wicked’ problem might become less confusing and uncertain through a blending of decentralized and local-conditions centric thinking.

NOTES


9. Karl Weick, “Rethinking Organizational Design,” p. 42. Weick discusses how highly coordinated groups are “…the last groups to discover that their labels entrap them in outdated practices.”


12. Personal correspondence with fellow planners as of December 2013 while I was deployed to Afghanistan. Several planners contacted me personally on our group’s prior work because they were the planning team working the latest version of what the ANSF would look like in 2015-2016.


14. Zweibelson, p. 5. This article re-uses Figure 13 as Figure 3 in this article.

15. Thom Shanker and Alissa Rubin, “Afghan Force Will Be Cut after Taking Lead Role,” in The New York Times, 10 April 2012. Retrieved on 20 December 2013 at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/world/asia/afghan-force-will-be-cut-as-nato-ends-mission-in-2014.html?_r=0. “The defense minister, General Abdul Rahim Wardak, noted that the projected reductions beyond 2014 were the result of “…a conceptual model for planning purposes” of an army, police, and border-protection force sufficient to defend Afghanistan.” Wardak references the official results of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) reduction plan where we proposed a 230,000- size force. In my previous deployment to Afghanistan under NTM-A, one of my primary duties was to accompany the NTM-A Commander to all engagement with Minister Wardak, to serve as the “Afghan Army Portfolio Manager,” and to interface with the Department of State and Washington civilian policy makers.

16. John Molineux and Tim Haslett, “The Use of Soft Systems Methodology to Enhance Group Creativity,” in Systemic Practice and Action Research (December 2007, Volume 20, Issue 6), pp. 477-496. Molineux and Haslett cite numerous studies on creativity and group dynamics to argue that democratic (plural, not hierarchical) and collaborative leadership fosters increased creativity.

17. Karl E. Weick, “Improvisation as a Mindset for Organizational Analysis” Organizational Science (Volume 9, No. 5, September-October 1998), p. 551. Organizations follow “…the chronic temptation to fall back on well-rehearsed fragments to cope with current problems even though these problems don’t exactly match those present at the time of the earlier rehearsal.”

18. Gareth Morgan, “Exploring Plato’s Cave: Organizations as Psychics Prisons,” in Images of Organization, SAGE Publications, 2006, p. 229. “Thus, the bureaucratic approach to organization emphasizes the virtue of breaking activities and functions into clearly defined component parts…we manage our world by simplifying it.”


22. Morgan, p. 237. “A particular aspect of organizational structure…may come to assume special significance and be preserved and retained even in the face of great pressure to change.”


24. Brafman and Beckstrom. The authors entertain hybrid organizations that use both centralized and decentralized elements in their final chapter.

MILITARY HISTORY

The Need to Advance: The Battle of Chérisy and the Massacre of Québécois Troops (August 1918)

by Carl Pépin

The Canadian soldiers were victorious, but exhausted. They had delivered a severe blow to the enemy, but the end of fighting in that sector gave them little respite. By the end of August, the Canadian Corps had been deployed further north, in Arras–Lens–Vimy, a sector with which it was relatively familiar, the troops having fought there in the spring and summer of 1917.

There, the Canadian Corps staff were given a new mission, namely to help take Cambrai, the Allied Forces’ next objective in the Pas-de-Calais. The Canadians inherited a particularly difficult line of departure. Positioned to the right of the British First Army, they would ultimately have to attack one of the most formidable sections of the Hindenburg Line, the Drocourt–Quéant Line, named after the two villages that marked its ends. Those positions were considered to be unassailable, since the Germans had had time to build a network of trenches, fortifications and barbed wire as far as the eye could see. For whoever surveyed the German line in those locations, only one word came to mind: impossible. The objective was impregnable.

Of course, the Commander of the Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, was perfectly aware of this, but like the

Introduction: The Hundred Days Campaign (1918)

The Canadian Corps was deployed in Picardy in the early days of August 1918. It was included in the order of battle of the British Army and comprised four infantry divisions totalling 48 battalions along with their support units. The Canadians had just arrived from the Battle of Amiens, a victorious engagement that marked the first phase of the Hundred Days Campaign. Under the supreme command of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Hundred Days Campaign, for the Allies, consisted of a series of major offensives mounted without interruption until the armistice of November 11. The Battle of Amiens was the first.

Carl Pépin holds a doctorate in history from Université Laval and is a specialist in the history of warfare practices. As such, he has worked with different institutions including Université Laval, Université du Québec à Montréal, Royal Military College of Canada, and Historica Canada. His most recent book, published in 2013 by the Fondation littéraire Fleur de Lys, is entitled Au Non de la Patrie: les relations franco-québécoises pendant la Grande Guerre (1914–1919).

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Over the Top, Neuville-Vitasse, by Alfred Bastien. The 22nd Battalion attacked east of here in late-August 1918. Georges Vanier always maintained that he was the officer holding the pistol in the foreground of the painting.
French and British formations in the sector, he knew that he had no choice but to continue the offensive as quickly as possible. By attacking Drocourt–Quéant, he could maintain the advantage, even the pace of battle, over an enemy who was still suffering from the shock of defeat at Amiens a few days earlier. Currie hesitated, as did the British commander, but he had to advance, come what may.2

To take Cambrai, the Canadians had to cross no less than three German defensive barriers. Drocourt–Quéant was the last known barrier in the network, and the most heavily fortified.3

These were the conditions in which the 22nd Battalion (French Canadian) contributed to the offensive by trying to penetrate one of the sectors of this network facing the village of Chérisy, a hamlet between the Cojeul and Sensée rivers. The first hours of the assault seemed promising, but it ended in disaster for the French-Canadian soldiers and the English-speaking soldiers who were part of the same brigade.4 This short article will examine the failed offensive more closely.

The Battle of Chérisy in Numbers

What came to be known as the Second Battle of Arras began on 26 August 1918, at 3 o’clock in the morning. The village of Monchy-le-Preux, located on the first line of the enemy’s defensive network, was quickly taken. The outcome of the first day of the offensive seemed favourable, and the push was quickly taken up again the next day. The objective was to break through the second line, that at Fresnes-Rouvroy, which was much better protected and to which the Germans had retreated. Unlike the previous day, the element of surprise was no longer a factor, and resistance was fierce.

The battles on 27 and 28 August were terrible, and the 2nd Canadian Division suffered such alarming losses that they were forced to stop, and even to retreat in certain places. One of its battalions, the 22nd, was annihilated while attacking Chérisy, a village at the heart of the Hindenburg Line.

The soldiers of the 22nd Battalion, who had just fought at the Battle of Amiens, were ordered to attack on 27 August with the objective of taking Chérisy. However, heavy rain the day before led to countless logistical problems, in particular with respect to assembling the battalions in their attack sectors. Nevertheless, the 22nd Battalion’s attack started, albeit late, at 10 o’clock in the morning under a bright sky. The French-Canadian soldiers took their objective, but the next day, a violent counter-barrage of artillery and an enemy infantry attack pushed them back almost to their
original positions. Needless to say, Chérisy was hell on earth for the men of the 22nd Battalion.

Of the 650 men and 23 officers who had launched the attack on 27 August, only 39 remained at the end of the next day. All the officers were killed, injured, or reported missing. In the absence of commanding officers, the 39 survivors who reported for roll call after the battle were put under the command of a company sergeant-major. Subsequent reports established losses for the 22nd Battalion at 53 dead and 108 injured on 27 August, and 52 dead and 92 injured on 28 August.5

Analysis of a Massacre

In the light of these gloomy statistics, a number of factors can be put forward to explain why Chérisy was a massacre for the French-Canadian soldiers. First, as mentioned previously, the frenetic pace of the battle and the tactical order in which the Canadian battalions were supposed to take up their departure positions meant that the units of the 5th Infantry Brigade arrived in the sector haphazardly, and, more important, had to launch their offensive in broad daylight at ten o’clock in the morning.6 A seemingly trivial factor is that the sun rises in the east. In the battles of the 1914–1918 war on the Western Front, that meant that the enemy positioned defensively to the east would be attacked from the west. In other words, the attacker had to advance blinded by the sun.

In addition to the poor visibility for the attackers, another factor that probably had an impact on the cohesiveness of the 22nd Battalion as a tactical unit is the fact that the French Canadians had just fought at the Battle of Amiens two weeks earlier. During that successful attack, the battalion lost more than a quarter of its strength (approximately 250 men), and the reinforcements who arrived for the Battle of Arras included a good number of conscripts.7 These were men who had enrolled against their will as a result of the passing of the Conscription Act by the Canadian Parliament in the summer of 1917, an Act that was being enforced more rigorously by the authorities in early 1918.8

Which raises the question: do conscripts fight less effectively? Certainly not, especially since the first conscripts were men who had complied with the Conscription Act and had received proper training. The problem was that these men arrived in a unit already weary from years of armed struggle, which had gradually reduced the ranks of experienced commanding officers. To put it plainly, for a number of reasons related to morale, available personnel, experience, tactics and existing military technology, the 22nd Battalion that fought at Chérisy in 1918 was quite different from the one that had, for example, led the charge at Courcelette in 1916.

As historian Bill Rawling points out, the lessons learned at Amiens, essentially the ideas of tank–infantry co-operation followed by platoon-centred tactical advances (one platoon advanced while the one next to it covered the first one, and vice versa), were relevant, but the Canadians did not have enough time to fully assimilate them and use them two weeks later.9 In addition, in order for the advance to be possible while maintaining suppression fire at the enemy, the infantry, which made up the main body, would have had to be able to rely on fire support from elements such as tanks and auxiliary troops, especially trench mortar and machine gun gunners.

However, the losses of tanks at Amiens had been so heavy that at Arras, Canadian commanders used tanks sparingly. As for auxiliary infantry troops, the more difficult terrain and the
The problem of replacing their own losses at Amiens meant that they were not able to provide proper fire support. Such fire support, by definition very local since it was intended to support a small unit as it would a battalion, was essential, especially when the inevitable enemy counter-attack came. All things considered, these elements were lacking for a good number of Canadian battalions, including the 22nd Battalion.

Moreover, it is important to note that the problem of artillery (heavy and field) following the tempo of the attack infantry was a recurring one. In other words, in addition to the steep, muddy terrain of Drocourt–Quéant, the Canadians had another difficulty, which they had been able to handle the previous year at Vimy: the art of counter-battery fire. In the sector that interests us, that of the 22nd Battalion and the 5th Brigade, that meant that Canadian artillery had trouble locating and neutralizing the German batteries in the woods a few kilometres east of Chérisy—Upton Wood, as it was known according to the military toponomy of the day. It was precisely that effective counter-battery fire that mowed down dozens of 22nd Battalion infantrymen who were hiding in the ruins of Chérisy and on the opposite slope just west of the Sensée River. The French Canadians had to endure this horrendous fire continuously for some 24 hours.

**Chérisy: Sangfroid, Discipline and Heroism**

There were not only very heavy losses, but also many acts of heroism whose exact nature we will probably never know. A few examples of soldiers who won renown at Chérisy will suffice. Major Georges Vanier, future Governor General of Canada, lost his right leg, and the soldier who tried to help him was killed. The battalion medical officer, Dr. Albéric Marin, went so far as to remove his Red Cross badge and run to the front line to take command of what remained of the ‘officerless’ 22nd Battalion. He was also injured. From his command post, Brigadier-General Thomas-Louis Tremblay, who had commanded the 22nd Battalion for two and a half years, was leading the brigade in which that unit was operating. He watched helplessly as his former battalion was decimated before his eyes.

That brings us to another—still tactical—problem for the Canadians and Tremblay, among others: how one battalion should take over from another in the heat of battle. At that moment, on 28 August 1918, it was clear that the 22nd Battalion was in serious difficulty in Chérisy. It was being subjected to shelling from enemy artillery counter-batteries, as mentioned, and also effective fire from snipers and machine gunners on its flanks.

That raised the question of relief for the other brigade formations, which often had to quickly replace front-line units precisely when the enemy was mounting a counter-attack. It was this sudden concentration of troops in a specific location that made the enemy counter-battery so deadly, because relief was difficult to execute in numerous locations during the battle. Again, as Bill Rawling shows, discipline and the experience of the troops had a direct effect on a unit’s capacity to provide relief. In short, on this issue, the Canadian military machine in the Drocourt–Quéant sector had ‘sand in the gears.’

The ‘sand’ also spread to battlefield communications. Generally speaking, during the 1914–1918 war, the three principal means of communication were runners, pigeons, and the telephone. But either the runners, like the pigeons, were killed, or the telephone lines were constantly severed by enemy fire. How then to assess the situation correctly and respond with clear orders?
That is what Lieutenant-Colonel William Clark-Kennedy, Commanding Officer of the adjacent 24th Battalion (Victoria Rifles of Montreal), had to do when faced with the gravity of the situation. His unit, which was initially to the left of the 22nd Battalion as an attack battalion, had to move off to the right. Clark-Kennedy himself rushed to the 22nd Battalion’s positions to rally, one by one, the survivors of the officerless French-Canadian battalion. His plan was to maintain a front slightly to the west of Chérisy in spite of the withdrawal of the 22nd Battalion, and to improvise a new mixed French-speaking and English-speaking battalion.

Knowing full well that progress was no longer possible at this stage of the battle at the end of the day on 28 August, and concluding that the 25th and 26th Battalions of the brigade would eventually arrive to provide support, Clark-Kennedy took the risk of stretching his own front to include the rest of the 22nd Battalion, which was then about the size of a platoon. Clark-Kennedy was awarded the Victoria Cross for having maintained his front.13

The mixed front of the 22nd and 24th Battalions constitutes the apogee of the Canadian sacrifice during this battle, because it was imperative to hold fast in front of Chérisy, if it was impossible to take the village. Then, what else could be done but order the men to dig in to protect themselves and gain time for the artillery and support units to reach the front line, while hoping that the superior commanders would finally get a clearer idea of the situation?

The same question arises as for Lieutenant-Colonel Clark-Kennedy: when and to what extent did Brigadier-General Tremblay understand that the 22nd Battalion was being annihilated at Chérisy? Probably the moment he heard the German batteries in Upton Wood open fire on the village. However—and this is the heart of the matter—when did Tremblay realize that the commanding officer of the 24th Battalion was setting up a very thin front facing the enemy to gain time and create the illusion that the Canadians were holding the line?

It is difficult to answer that question precisely, and Brigadier-General Tremblay had little to say on the matter, at least judging by his war memoirs published several decades after his death.14 However, the heart of the drama of Chérisy is that exact moment on 28 August when Lieutenant-Colonel Clark-Kennedy understood that he had to do all he could to maintain a front, however thin, facing the enemy, to allow reinforcements to arrive.

It was the sacrifice of the 22nd and 24th Battalions that enabled the other formations of the 5th Brigade and those of the 2nd Division to launch the final attack on the Drocourt–Quéant line on 2 September 1918. Contrary to expectation, German resistance on this third line was weaker. The Canadian attackers managed to break through the Drocourt–Quéant network, and the German army retreated behind the Canal du Nord.

**Conclusion: The Need to Advance**

This short article merely sketches an explanation for the tragedy that was the Battle of Chérisy, a tragedy that paradoxically made it possible to maintain pressure on the enemy so that it found itself weakened when faced with subsequent Canadian attacks. In the end, the final taking of the Drocourt–Quéant line marked the end of the Second Battle of Arras. It must be remembered that since 26 August, the Canadian Corps had made headway towards the east over nearly eight kilometres and had taken 3000 prisoners. The losses from 26 to 29 August amounted to 6000 men.15

The Canadians were hit hard on the way from Arras to Cambrai. Many battalions were in a pitiful state, and troops consisting of an increasing number of conscripts had had to be brought in immediately from England. This had already begun after the Battle of Amiens, but the number of conscript soldiers in the...
Lieutenant-Colonel William Hew Clark-Kennedy (left), commander of the 24th Battalion, and Lieutenant-Colonel Henri DesRosiers (right), commander of the 22nd Battalion, aboard the ship Olympic for their return to Canada at the end of the Great War, 1919.

In a patriotic period war poster, soldiers ride down a road paved with money from the Dominion of Canada, raised from patriotic citizens to hasten the return of their native sons to Canada.
Canadian battalions continued to increase right up to the end of the hostilities.

In the field, one of the battalions at Chérisy, the 22nd Battalion, tried to temporarily rebuild itself with English-speaking reinforcements in the two weeks following the battle, and then with French-speaking troops, most of whom were conscripts. Thus, two weeks after the battle, the 22nd Battalion returned to the line with reinforcements who had little battle experience, and other soldiers who still had physical injuries but had to return. The good news for the 22nd Battalion, under the circumstances, was that it was getting a new, experienced commanding officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Henri DesRosiers, who would lead the unit until the armistice and the occupation of Germany in 1919.

Further east, Cambrai was still in the hands of the Germans. The city was behind the Canal du Nord, where the enemy was strongly entrenched. The troops had no time to pause and even less to feel sorry for themselves because of the drama that had just unfolded. The Hundred Days Campaign was marked by this rapid, incessant pace of attacks, where ‘resting’ battalions had to, in fact, use the time to deploy for the following advance.

That is how the 22nd Battalion (French Canadian) got caught up in the whirlwind of rapid advances with the loss of many men, rearguard battles against a formidable enemy, and the integration of reinforcements for the next attack.

In that sense, the experience of the French-Canadian soldiers, as the Chérisy case study shows, was similar to that of the English-speaking infantry formations of the Canadian Corps at the end of the war.

NOTES

4. During the Great War, the 22nd Battalion (French Canadian) belonged to the 5th Infantry Brigade, which was part of the battle order of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. The 5th Brigade was made up of the following units in addition to the 22nd Battalion: 24th Battalion (Victoria Rifles), 25th Battalion (Nova Scotia Regiment), and 26th Battalion (New Brunswick Regiment).
5. With respect to the official list of soldiers of the 22nd Battalion (French Canadian) who died at Chérisy, the author compiled these few statistics from the unit’s War Diary, which is available at the National Archives of Canada and the Archives of the Royal 22e Régiment at http://www.ameriquefrancaise.org/media-3716/cimetiere_quebec_annexe1.pdf
6. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas-Louis Tremblay, Commanding Officer of the 22nd Battalion from February 1916 to August 1918, was promoted to brigadier-general and officially took command of the 5th Brigade two weeks before the Battle of Chérisy.
7. Archives of the Royal 22e Régiment, War Diary. 22nd Battalion. CEF. According to the 22nd Battalion’s war diary, the exact number of losses from 8 to 10 August 1918 was 234 men of all ranks.
10. For a detailed analysis of the tactical support fire problems within the Canadian Corps in the summer of 1918, we refer the reader to Bill Rawling’s study, Ibid., pp. 205–208.
An Alternate View of Incentivized Fitness in the Canadian Armed Forces

by Major M.J. Draho

The latest Canadian Armed Forces fitness test – The FORCE Evaluation – has recently celebrated its second anniversary. Separately but relatedly, I attended a question and answer session with Commodore Watson, the Director General of the Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services, who provided insight into some initiatives being contemplated or unveiled by his organization in the coming year. One involved trials associated with ‘incentivizing’ the FORCE Evaluation. In short, those who undertake the evaluation would fall into one of two categories – those who achieved the standard and those who did not. That former group would be subsequently divided into five levels: the majority being those who simply passed, with the remainder (exact percentages/targets to be determined) split into Bronze, Silver, Gold, and the top two percent achieving the coveted Platinum level. It was not clear whether that breakdown would be based upon the total population, or by some other criteria, such as rank. As it stands, the concept sees those select few Platinum achievers issued a pin of some type to be worn on their uniform as a visible display of their physical prowess. Additionally, it was intimated additional non-discretionary points would be awarded for Platinum level fitness at national ranking boards, with the exact number of points yet to be decided.

I believe the FORCE Evaluation is a fit-for-purpose program. It is designed to be representative of a spectrum of physical demands one may expect to encounter during one’s career within the CAF. It provides a measurable physical fitness threshold for compliance with our universality of service requirements. For the vast majority, I believe it is viewed in exactly that light – the minimum standard to be eligible for retention in the CAF. The operational fitness required to perform one’s specific job within the CAF likely (hopefully) exceeds that standard by some margin. Further I believe most of us in uniform understand, accept, and embrace that reality – the FORCE Evaluation is not the end-state for fitness, but rather, a start point. So why be concerned about rewarding physical fitness and incentivizing the FORCE Evaluation?

For my part, I have two specific concerns that combined generate a third regarding the unintended organizational climate that incentivized fitness could create in the long term. My first
concern relates to the relative importance of fitness in identifying our future leaders across the depth and breadth of the CAF. Awarding non-discretionary points for fitness at ranking boards serves to further erode the relative weight of performance, and, more importantly, potential scores and narratives, the latter of which should be of vital importance in selection for the next rank and appointment.

I do not dispute the need for leaders to be physically fit, or their need to lead from the front. However, it does not follow logically that the fittest individual equates to a better leader, and most worthy of promotion, particularly when the discriminator is an arbitrary tear-line separating the top two percent of FORCE Evaluation subjects from the rest. What is the qualitative difference between someone who scores in the second percentile of the FORCE Evaluation with someone in the third? I do not think it could be argued that the latter individual is not fit, or fit enough to lead. However, given the current scoring mechanisms at the boards, incentivized fitness will likely provide a numerical disadvantage of five or ten points – the number of points awarded for Platinum level fitness multiplied by the number of board members, which are usually five. So in real terms, prior to any consideration of performance or potential, someone scoring in the top three percentile of the FORCE Evaluation must overcome a five-to-ten point gap with someone who scored in the top two percentile. While I cannot speak definitively to all environments and branches, I offer that this is a reasonably significant barrier which seems completely arbitrary and within our ability to avoid.

Additionally if one were to ask not what is the difference between these individuals, but rather why the difference exists, the answer may cast incentivized fitness in a different light and highlight another potential source of concern. Perhaps the difference between the Gold and Platinum levels of fitness is the result of a slip at the start line, noted (or overlooked) protocol infractions, an inattentive invigilator, or simply deciding to undergo the evaluation while “under the weather” in an effort to set an example within one’s organization. Today, the implications of all of the above scenarios are harmless (as long as you still pass the evaluation). However, with incentivized fitness, the consequences are profound. So, how much weight should be attributable to fitness before it undermines other assessment criteria and potentially serves as a de-motivator to the majority?

My second concern relates to motivation. Examining incentivized fitness from the perspective of motivation is revealing. At its most basic, motivation is either intrinsic or extrinsic in nature. Intrinsic motivation is the internal motivation to act, and, once
resident, always present. As such, it is considered long-lasting and sustainable over time. Extrinsic motivation is an external motivator in the form of a reward or punishment, incentive, or rating that is not enduring. It is generally considered a short-term solution to motivation, and it is not sustainable because without the reward (or punishment), the motivation disappears. Further, keeping the reward (or punishment) at the same level will diminish the level of motivation over time, so it will wear off without additional or increased external motivational factors being added.

I believe we in the CAF should promote a culture whereby fitness is intrinsic – the need for fitness and its benefits are internalized – particularly in our leaders. The reward offered by incentivized fitness is most definitely extrinsic in nature and by extension fleeting. So, who do we want standing in front of that 500 person CAF unit – be it a ship, wing, or battalion? Someone who was externally rewarded for being incredibly fit? Or someone who intrinsically understands that value of fitness and can manage its requirement amongst a number of competing priorities? Fitness is important, and I would hope that our future leaders, whether junior or senior, officer or NCO, would have internalized the need for physical fitness rather than being externally rewarded for it via points at a merit board.

The foregoing two concerns, when combined, lead to my third and greatest concern with respect to incentivized fitness – its message and the subtle shift it imparts to our organizational culture over time. Not the intended and laudable message of promoting physical fitness, but rather, the unintended yet powerful message of rewarding fitness above so many other important professional development criteria. What appears at face value to be a worthy initiative may have the unintended consequence of creating an environment conducive to the promotion of attention-seekers, self-promoters, and those whose performance is driven by tangible rewards and incentives. Is it too far a stretch to suggest future leaders may be predisposed to transactional leadership, given its reliance upon reward and punishment rather than transformational leadership, which is far more reliant upon shared values? Such a shift in culture risks eroding our time-honoured tradition of selfless service and promoting the welfare and the interests of the organization ahead of oneself. Despite its intentions, I am not sure incentivized fitness will cultivate the correct culture, particularly among our leadership over time.

To be clear, I am an advocate of fitness, fitness testing, and gathering data to identify trends and target areas for improvement. Further, I believe that of all the fitness programs rolled out during the course of my 25+ years of service, the FORCE Evaluation is perhaps one of the better ones. But I believe incentivizing fitness carries with it detrimental effects that far outweigh its perceived benefits. Rather than promoting a culture of fitness, it risks, in the long term, promoting a culture that seeks personal recognition and undermines the weight of an assessment of one’s potential to work at the next rank.

By all means gather data, analyze it, and use it to best effect: namely identifying fitness trends that may emerge in relation to sex, age, environment, branch, region, unit, or rank. Use that data...
VIEWS AND OPINIONS
to refine or develop fitness programs (not tests) across these or any relevant cross-sections of the CAF to improve our overall fitness. But beyond that, I remain sceptical of the merits of an incentivized fitness program that includes awarding points at national ranking boards.

And for the record, I am 47 years old and consider myself fit. I offer all three of my FORCE Evaluation scores, not to self-promote, but rather, to quieten those tempted to suggest these views are the result of my lack of fitness. I am proud of my scores despite not knowing how they measure up against the rest of the CAF population in general, or my contemporaries specifically with regard to national ranking boards. However, I am quite confident my scores have very little to do with my ability to work at the next rank, nor do I think they are a viable discriminator between my contemporaries and myself in deciding who is best suited and able to work at that next rank level.

I offer these views in the hope that they precipitate discussion and debate in order that Armed Forces Council may render a fully considered and informed decision as it deliberates the implementation of this initiative in the near future.

Mike Draho joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1989, serving in the 3rd and 1st Regiments, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery; Headquarters 1st Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group; the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery School; and the Headquarters Director Royal Artillery and the Royal School of Artillery in the United Kingdom. Most recently, he serves in the Regimental Headquarters of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, where he is the Regimental Major.

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**The Canadian Way: The Case of Canadian Vietnam War Veterans**

by Ryan Goldsworthy

**Introduction**

For Canada, the mid-20th Century was a rather definitive era in shaping the nation’s identity in the realm of foreign affairs. Following the Suez Crisis in 1957, Canada’s international role shifted from participating in global conflicts as a belligerent to a role that primarily emphasised peacekeeping missions. Simultaneously, Canada also adopted strict non-proliferation and disarmament policies that it maintains to this day.

Perhaps Canada’s single most meaningful foreign affairs decision during this era was its refusal to participate militarily in the Vietnam War. Only a short decade removed from the familiar ‘battle against Communism’ waged in Korea, Canada, then led by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, would choose not to support the US and their military exploits in Vietnam. However, Canada’s very purposeful lack of official participation in Southeast Asia, and a law making it illegal for Canadians to participate (the 1937 Foreign Enlistment Act), did not prevent up to 40,000 Canadians from enlisting in the US armed forces during this era. That said, none of these Canadians who served in Vietnam were ever prosecuted for violating the Act.

The Vietnam War ultimately presents a unique challenge for Canada, as the number of Canadian citizens that participated therein likely represents the highest total in Canadian history for a war where the nation was not officially involved.

When many of these young Canadians who enlisted in the US returned home following their respective tours of duty in the Vietnam era, the public and private reception of their military service was perhaps not what they expected, and certainly not what many of these veterans had, from their viewpoint, understandably desired. Unlike past Canadian war veterans, even including the 1200 who fought in the Spanish Civil War, Canadian Vietnam War veterans “…never received a ‘welcome home’ parade or ceremony.”

Moreover, Canadians who served in the Vietnam War, with extra emphasis upon those who died or were killed, seldom have been formally recognized or commemorated in Canada. In fact, only since the mid-1990s have these veterans possessed the basic consent from the Royal Canadian Legion (following decades of refusals and alleged hostility) to seek legion membership and participate in remembrance parades as a unit. The general lack of official commemoration in Canada for Canadians who served in Vietnam has been a contentious and ongoing issue for these veterans, their families, and their organizations. A general outline of the brief historiography and the service of Canadians in Vietnam and the areas in which they have been deprived official commemoration and memorialisation is where this brief article now turns.

**A Brief Historiography**

Perhaps one of the most telling signs regarding the low level of recognition, and general cognizance, for Canadians who served in Vietnam is the distinct lack of literature dealing with the specific subject matter. The first and seminal volume on the topic is the aptly titled *Unknown Warriors: Canadians in the Vietnam War* (1990) by Fred Gaffen, who has assessed the state of the field and gathered dozens of first-hand accounts from Canadian Vietnam War veterans. Gaffen has succinctly summarized the situation faced by these veterans as follows: “While American Vietnam veterans were not given sufficient recognition for their sacrifices, Canadian Vietnam veterans

Mural dedicated to the Canadians in Vietnam, by Dan Lessard.
were forgotten.” In Gaffen’s follow-up volume, *Cross Border Warriors* (1995), he explains that there has not been significant change for Canadian Vietnam Veterans in the years following his first book (noting that they had been denied federal land in Ottawa to build a memorial), and he reaffirms the negative reception that Canadian Vietnam Veterans have faced in their birth country up to the present. In 1996, Tracey Arial published the similarly themed *I Volunteered: Canadian Vietnam Vets Remember*, a volume, like *Unknown Warriors*, that collected many first-hand accounts from Canadian-born servicemen in a further attempt to remedy the glaring absence in the historiography, and to give many of these veterans an opportunity to share their experiences. Although Arial has produced a commendable volume, it is quite clear that she is personally invested in the topic and does not compromise in her strongly-worded, but perhaps overstated, conclusion that “...the contributions that Vietnam veterans have made to Canada are immense, but they could do even more if we’d stop ignoring them and help.”

**Canadian Vietnam War Veterans – Service, Organization, Commemoration**

Despite the lack of literature, however, a mere cursory analysis of the facts and figures regarding the Canadians who served in Vietnam is quite telling to their not-insignificant contribution in the conflict. The statistic that is perhaps most startling is that the number of Canadians who served in Vietnam (somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000) is likely a higher total than the number of Canadians who served in Korea or Afghanistan and over 125 of these Canadians in Vietnam paid the ultimate price. One estimate by former US Senator Bob Smith holds that as many as 400 Canadians were killed and 4,000 wounded in Vietnam. Many of these Canadian-born men who served also won US military accolades, including the Purple Heart, the Air Medal, and the Bronze Star, and one Canadian in particular, Peter C. Lemon (a native of Toronto), won the Congressional Medal of Honor – the highest decoration awarded in the US Armed Forces. From the sweltering jungles of Quảng Nam Province, to the sprawling cityscape of Saigon, and from the Tet Offensive to Operation Rolling Thunder, thousands of Canadian-born men served in the most substantial armed conflict of the Cold War. Regardless of their personal motives for enlisting, there is certainly no individual who can refute the bravery and sense of duty that these Canadians possessed while serving in the US armed forces overseas.

In later decades, starting from the 1980s, a number of private Vietnam veterans’ organizations were established across Canada, notably, the Canadian Vietnam Veterans Association (CVVA), Vietnam Veterans in Canada (VVIC), and the Association Québécoise des Vétérans du Vietnam (CVVQ). In 1989, the CVVQ spearheaded the erection of a privately funded Canadian Vietnam veterans memorial (the first of its kind in the country), a monument which rests in Melocheville, Quebec, and is emblazoned with the simple yet meaningful phrase, “…dedicated to those who served, those who died, and those who are missing in action.” Similarly, in 1995, the Canadian Vietnam Veterans National Memorial was dedicated in Windsor, Ontario, to all the Canadian casualties of...
the war. This monument, however, was privately funded by the Michigan Association of Concerned Veterans (MACV), after a proposal to erect a national memorial on federal land failed to pass through the Canadian Parliament. In May 1994, the Chrétien Government’s justification for rejecting the proposal to place a Vietnam War memorial on federal land was that Canada did not officially participate in the war, and consequently, Canada does not memorialize those who served in such unofficial wars. Perhaps most powerfully, Michel Dupuy, then Minister of Canadian Heritage, further explained the government’s refusal to support a Vietnam War memorial by stating in the House of Commons: “We are going to respect Canadian Ways.” Although the term “Canadian Ways” is perhaps somewhat ambiguous, in this context, we can interpret Minister Dupuy’s words as a phrase which highlights the Canadian opposition to Vietnam, and as a reaffirmation of the nation’s strong diplomatic values established in the decades of the Cold War. Lastly, Vietnam Veterans are also not represented on the National War Memorial in Ottawa, a monument that ultimately commemorates all individuals who have died, or may die in the future, in the military service of Canada. Many of those Canadians who fell in Vietnam, however, have been immortalized on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C.

Canadian Vietnam War veterans have also been excluded from the seven Books of Remembrance located in the Peace Tower in the Houses of Parliament in Ottawa. These books record and commemorate every Canadian (and pre-1949 Newfoundlander) who has fallen in the major conflicts in which Canada has participated since 1884. The Seventh Book, entitled “In the Service of Canada” commemorates any Canadian military personnel who have died “while serving our country in uniform” since October 1947 (excluding the Korean War which has its own book). There is no prerequisite of having to have been born in Canada to have one’s name inscribed in the book. Based upon the sole criterion for inclusion into the Books of Remembrance, Canadians who fell in Vietnam do not belong, as those who died did so in the service of the United States. In a similar respect, Veterans Affairs Canada defines Remembrance Day, Canada’s official day of military recognition and commemoration, as a day for “…the men and women who have served, and continue to serve our country during times of war, conflict and peace. We honour those who fought for Canada…” Similar to the Books of Remembrance, the commemorative emphasis of Remembrance Day rests upon the service to the nation of Canada.

Although Canadian Vietnam War veterans have been deprived of an official war memorial, entry in the Books of Remembrance, and a general lack of veneration on Remembrance Day (both privately and publically), perhaps most meaningful has been their great difficulty in obtaining full service or medical benefits. Following the war, the Canadian government refused to provide veterans’ benefits for Canadian Vietnam veterans because...
“the reciprocity agreement [between the US and Canada] did not cover a war in which Canada did not participate.” In fact, it was not until 1988 (15 years after the US left Vietnam) that the Reagan Administration passed a law that extended service and medical benefits to any individual, regardless of nationality, who had served with the US military. This change seems to have been influenced by the lobbying of Canadian Vietnam veterans groups, and especially, their pilgrimage to the national memorial in Washington, DC in 1986. Service benefits are ultimately available from the US for Canadian-born Vietnam War veterans, and the Government of Canada has no obligation to provide additional benefits to veterans of a foreign war.

Conclusions

Perhaps in a microcosm of the official commemoration of Canadian Vietnam War veterans, the expansive Cold War exhibit of the national Canadian War Museum contains only one small glass display dedicated to the Vietnam War. Inside the lone Vietnam case there is but one period uniform on a mannequin with a brief explanation detailing that 30,000-40,000 Canadians may have served in the conflict. The War Museum is invariably one of the finest cultural institutions in the country, but this very small representation of Vietnam likely speaks to the general Canadian cognizance of these servicemen and their service.

A relatively comparable situation to the Canadian involvement in Vietnam is the American Civil War, where thousands of Canadians served on both Confederate and Union sides despite Canada’s official position as a non-belligerent. Still, these Canadian veterans of the American Civil War are not, and never have been, commemorated in this nation in an official capacity. Furthermore, before the US officially joined the First and Second World Wars in late-1917 and 1941 respectively, many Americans (35,000 during the First World War, and 29,000 during the Second World War) enlist in the Canadian armed forces, and those who served and fell are forever inscribed on Canadian memorials, plaques, and the pages of our history (including the Books of Remembrance). In terms of constructing an official monument on federal land to the Vietnam War, such an action could almost certainly establish a precedent of memorializing any conflict in which Canada was not involved, but where Canadian-born men and women happened to serve. Should Canada also construct a memorial to Canadians who served in the recent Iraq War (where many Canadian-born military personnel served)? What about with respect to foreign conflicts where Canadians may have served for a nation other than the US? If we place the Vietnam War in the context of these questions, the case becomes clearer that such a public monument should never be constructed. In sum, if an individual serves in Canada’s armed forces, regardless of their personal nationality, then they will be rightfully venerated and commemorated in this nation (during Remembrance Day and otherwise). The emphasis is upon the service to the nation. Canadian Vietnam War Veterans served in the US armed forces, and are thus included in the commemorations and memorials in that nation – the fact that they are nationally Canadian should be considered immaterial.

The other issue in commemorating and memorializing Canadian Vietnam War veterans in Canada, and one that cannot be overstated is Canada’s official stance of neutrality in the Vietnam War. The definitive statement not to participate in the conflict was a serious and important one taken as a Canadian sovereign nation. By officially honouring veterans of a conflict in which Canada was strictly opposed to participating, Canada’s resolute message and reputation in Vietnam would be invariably muddled and damaged. As a reiteration, it was also technically illegal for Canadians to serve in foreign armed forces in a conflict that Canada was not involved, and the legality of the service of these Canadians of Vietnam presents yet another challenge to offering official commemoration.
Ultimately, while Canadian Vietnam War veterans should be honoured and respected for their service, official commemoration of these veterans in Canada should remain in the status quo. Canadian nationals who have served in the US military should be officially venerated in the US, particularly during Memorial Day and Veterans Day. Those who have served and died in the service of Canada will continue to be commemorated in this nation – this is the Canadian way.

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NOTES
5. Ibid., p. 16.
7. Gaffen, Unknown Warriors, p. 32.
12. Arial, pp. 96-98.
14. Ibid.
18. Arial, p. 83.
Public Opinion and Defence

by Martin Shadwick

As tough economic times, faltering defence spending, and mounting questions over the fiscal sustainability of Canada’s existing national defence program prompt a renewed debate over the merits (or otherwise) of a multi-purpose, combat-capable defence establishment, a combat-capable—but niche—defence establishment, a constabulary defence establishment, or some form of quintessentially Canadian hybrid defence establishment, it is an opportune moment to reflect upon recent trends in Canadian public opinion and defence. It is no less true for being obvious that the standard approach to this subject commences with the time-honoured observation that Canadians, for the most part, rather like their armed forces, but are inclined, for a variety of reasons (many of them equally time-honoured), to take a decidedly parsimonious approach to defence spending. Simply put, what do Canadians think of their armed forces today? What priorities, both domestic and international, would they assign to the Canadian Armed Forces? Can generalized support for the armed forces be translated into public support for specific roles, missions, and capabilities, even those carrying hefty price tags, or must there always be a discontinuity in the relationship?

One particularly useful tool is DND’s annual tracking study, conducted for DND in recent years by Phoenix Strategic Perspectives Inc., to “explore Canadians’ perceptions of the Canadian Armed Forces and related issues.” The May 2014 tracking study generated some fascinating data, some of it confirming long-established trends, some of it providing very uplifting reading for the defence hierarchy in Canada, and some of it posing potential challenges for defence planning and prioritizing in Canada. Not at all surprising, for example, were its findings that Canadians have a “limited” overall familiarity with the Canadian Armed Forces and that “problems for veterans” and “soldiers returning home” were “top of mind for many Canadians when asked what they recalled about the [Canadian Armed Forces].” Approximately half, 51 percent, of those polled thought that the armed forces did “at least a moderately good job” of taking care of returning soldiers, but fully 38 percent thought that the armed forces did “a poor job” in this area. The tracking study found that traditional media, notably television news, was cited most frequently as a source of information about the armed forces, but noted, as one would expect, that the Internet was moving up quickly as a source of information. In 2012, the Internet ranked fourth behind television news, daily newspapers, and television in general. By 2014, the Internet was second only to television news.
“Canadians,” found the 2014 tracking study, “continue to hold positive views of the CAF. The vast majority (89 percent) have a positive impression of CAF personnel, with exactly three-in-five describing their impression as strongly positive. Strongly positive impressions have been steadily increasing over time. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was a 12 percentage point increase (from 34 percent to 46 percent in 2001) and an additional nine percentage point increase after the CAF was deployed to Kandahar (from 49 percent to 58 percent in 2006). Now, at the end of the Afghanistan mission, strongly positive impressions are the highest on record.” Moreover, “large majorities said they view the military as a source of pride (83 percent) and believe it is essential (80 percent).” These are strikingly impressive numbers, but two caveats must be noted. First, high regard for the armed forces does not necessarily translate into financial largesse from Canadians, and second, unforeseen events can quickly erode even the most stellar polling numbers. Canada’s armed forces enjoyed exceptional visibility and public acclaim in the immediate post-Cold War period due to the Gulf War, aid of the civil power requirements (i.e., the Oka crisis), UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, and other activities, only to experience deep and profound erosion of public esteem in the wake of the Somalia affair.

Particularly intriguing—and in some respects, potentially worrisome, given the fiscal and political environment for defence in Canada—was the finding that “Canadians are split on whether the priority of the Canadian Armed Forces should be domestic or international affairs. Just over two-out-of-five (43 percent) Canadians said the CAF should prioritize domestic issues, whereas exactly two-out-of-five (40 percent) think international issues should be top priority.” Compared to 2012, “Canadians continue to feel the priority of the CAF should be domestic rather than international, and this proportion has increased steadily since 2010, from 33 percent to 43 percent in 2014. Moreover, at 43 percent, it is the highest it has been since tracking began in 2005, when 36 percent of Canadians preferred that the CAF focus upon domestic affairs.”
The study also found that “Quebec residents were more likely than others to prefer a domestic focus.” The 2014 tracking study did not define or cite examples of “domestic” roles, but the much more voluminous 2012 tracking study, undertaken by the same firm, found particularly strong public support for military responses to domestic natural disasters, and, to a lesser degree, for the protection of Canadian sovereignty through border surveillance. Also appearing on the 2012 list were search and rescue (which 71 percent of respondents deemed very important), protection against terrorist threats, military assistance to law enforcement and other government departments, helping to prevent illegal immigration and human smuggling, helping to prevent illegal drug smuggling, and Arctic surveillance. Terrorism-related aspects aside, this list is highly reminiscent of the domestic preferences that surfaced in DND-commissioned public opinion polling during the early post-Cold War period. The significance of the domestic/international split identified in the tracking study is not so much the strength of the domestic faction, but the strong tendency to cast “domestic” in essentially quasi-military, non-military, and constabulary terms, rather than in military-centric “defence of Canada” terms.

The tracking study additionally reported strong support for international cooperation. Eighty-nine percent of respondents “…agreed that it’s critical that Canada and the United States cooperate for the defence of North America, with more than two-thirds saying they strongly agree. A similar proportion (91 percent) agreed that Canada’s membership in NATO is important for Canadian security, with more than half (59 percent) strongly agreeing with this statement.” Subsequent events in Ukraine and Crimea would presumably have reinforced such views.

On the fiscal side, the tracking study reported that “Canadians are most likely to think that Canada’s military is under-funded, not over-funded. Forty-three percent held this view, with 18 percent saying the CAF is significantly underfunded (up from 14 percent in 2012). Approximately one-third…of Canadians believe the CAF receives the right amount of funding. At the other end of

A Canadian soldier speaks to Enriquillo village police officers (exercise actors) to ensure good relations while providing security for the local inhabitants during Exercise Maple Resolve, Wainwright, Alberta, 3 May 2015.
the spectrum, 11 percent said the CAF receives too much funding. This year marks the end of the steady decline in the proportion of Canadians who believe the military is under-funded. From a high of 82 percent in 2004, the view that the CAF is under-funded dropped to a low of 36 percent in 2012. In 2014, this has increased by seven percentage points to 43 percent.” This data prompts two observations. First, the decline in the percentage of Canadians who perceived an under-funding of defence may have reflected a public assumption that Ottawa was busily, and expensively, recapitalizing the armed forces. Second, “thinking” that the armed forces are under-funded does not necessarily translate into measurable public support for additional defence expenditures.

In sum, the 2014 tracking study revealed that Canada’s armed forces enjoy an impressive reservoir of public goodwill, that Canadians are split over domestic and international defence priorities, over peacekeeping and peacemaking commitments, and over the appropriate level of defence spending, that those who favour a domestic focus for their armed forces are thinking in essentially constabulary terms, and that most Canadians value our NATO and continental security relationships. Some of these trends and indicators have no doubt been reinforced by subsequent events at home (i.e., the tragedies in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and at the National War Memorial) and abroad (i.e., Europe, Iraq, Syria). How might these findings influence Canada’s future defence priorities and force structure?

The general assumption in many quarters today is that the type of “multi-purpose, combat-capable” defence establishment explicitly endorsed by the Chretien government’s white paper of 1994 (but not delivered) and implicitly endorsed by the Harper government’s Canada First Defence Strategy of 2008 (partially delivered, with question marks over projected acquisitions) are simply not tenable, for both political and financial reasons, in the foreseeable future. As Jeffrey Simpson of the Globe and Mail has observed, “the core of the problem is that the Canadian military wants—and the government wants—to be all things for all situations (minus nuclear weapons, of course) on a budget that does not allow for those ambitions.”

The net result has been a renewed wave of interest in reshaping Canada’s defence commitments, and force structure, to best fit today’s political, fiscal, and international environments. As Bernd Horn noted in a thoughtful analysis for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) in March 2015, the “bottom line is that the CAF must maintain a number of generic combat capabilities in order to ensure it can meet the required remits. Yet to maintain a sharp operational edge the CAF may need to shed some of its legacy “baggage” that represents sunk costs that have little strategic return. For instance, the existence of large fleets of ships”—the RCN’s definition of “large fleets” would no doubt differ—“armoured vehicles, huge garrison footprints, etc., all mortgage readiness and deployability for quantity and generic capability.” Horn offers some intriguing thoughts on useful, and less than useful, Canadian military capabilities, but acknowledges the “risk of getting it wrong” and takes note of Sir Michael Howard’s cautionary observation in 2010 that: “No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to not be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed.” Quite right, but easier said than done.
An Aviation Systems technician prepares to remove a propeller from a CP-140 Aurora for maintenance during Operation Impact, 21 February 2015.

A crewmember from HMCS Fredericton engages a C9 machine gun while a .50 calibre machine gun team reloads in a simulated small boat attack during Exercise Joint Warrior, as part of their deployment on Operation Reassurance, 19 April 2015.
Can the impressive levels of generalized support for the armed forces evident in the tracking study be translated into meaningful public support for specific roles, missions, and capabilities, including those requiring substantial capital and sustainment expenditures? In and of themselves, no. Strong, broad-based public support remains an invaluable, indeed pivotal, prerequisite for a credible Canadian defence policy, force structure and defence budget, but transforming that general reservoir of goodwill toward the armed forces into more specialized and sustained support for specific defence policy choices and priorities will require much more—including clear, cogent, and compelling rationales for a realistic defence policy and defence establishment from the government, the military, and other relevant stakeholders. General-purpose ‘insurance,’ or ‘just-in-case’ arguments for the retention of a credible defence establishment will not, on their own, suffice. Pragmatic Canadians will also be looking for assurances that the defence policy of the future and its associated force structure—be it “multi-purpose, combat capable,” “multi-purpose, combat-capable lite,” “niche” or “niche-plus” combat-capable, or “constabulary with an attitude”—will represent good value for money, deliver sound management, and be devoid of gold plating. It should also be noted that the impressive level of public goodwill identified in the tracking study would dissipate in record time if the shedding of legacy “baggage” degenerates into bitter, internecine warfare between the services (and the SOF community).

It is evident, too, that the shedding or reducing of DND’s already much-diminished stock of quasi-military, non-military and constabulary roles would, from a public opinion perspective—and, indeed, from operational and other perspectives that have nothing to do with public opinion—be shortsighted and counterproductive. Strong public support in that area also suggests that it would be prudent to undertake a thoroughgoing and holistic examination of the synergies, or potential synergies, between the military, quasi-military, and non-military roles of Canada’s armed forces. Similarly, when viewed from the vantage point of public support for defence, it would be prudent to engage in both peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. The recent increase in the Canadian contribution to the MFO could prove a useful harbinger in that regard, but it is unfortunate that security considerations rendered the augmentation a move of which very few Canadian civilians are aware.

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Three Cheers for Strategic Thought (well, two cheers and a subdued golf-clap)

Reviewed by Bob Martyn

The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective
by Hew Strachan
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013
322 pages, $25.66 Softcover.

War from the Ground Up: Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics
by Emile Simpson
285 pages, $34.15 Hardcover.

Strategy: A History
by Lawrence Freedman
751 pages, $23.79 Hardcover.

Several like-minded friends — military, academic, public service — frequently lament the dismal quality of strategic thinking that informs our worlds. A comprehensive foreign policy statement has been limited to 2005’s self-congratulatory “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World,” while the military has not seen a formal defence White Paper since 1994. The Canada First Defence Strategy was quietly shelved before the ink was dry, being little more than an unrealistic shopping list rather than strategic guidance. In their absence, we are left with what can only be termed ‘hashtag activism,’ ricocheting from one ‘crisis’ to another with little thought given to their strategic relevance to Canada and Canadians’ national interests.

Almost as though responding to our collective despondency, three worthy books on strategy were published in close succession: Hew Strachan’s The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, Emile Simpson’s War from the Ground Up: Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics, and Lawrence Freedman’s Strategy: A History.

Scottish military historian Sir Hew Strachan is Chichele Professor of the History of War at All Souls College, Oxford. In The Direction of War, he has produced an eminently readable book on how strategy should guide action. An unapologetic Clausewitzian, Strachan provides a wide-ranging survey of historical examples to both explain strategy and to lament how it has been muddied by confusing it with policy. His most clearly articulated points being, a) the elevation of counter-insurgency, an operational method, into a strategic vision, and b) the strategically-illiterate expression “global war on terrorism” (GWOT), a policy statement bandied about as a strategy. Terrorism is a tactic; while he does not say so, GWOT is as nonsensical as declaring the Second World War a global war on blitzkrieg.

Strachan spends a great deal of the book articulating his views on civil-military relations. In so doing, it is a toss-up who he dislikes more fervently — Samuel Huntington or Colin Powell. Huntington, notably for his work The Soldier and the State, is ‘hauled over the coals’ for his “deliberately selective reading of history” in misreading Clausewitz in order to place the military in mute subordination to civilian control, removing any professional military advice upwards. Strachan holds this resultant forsaking of a necessary and iterative fusion of professional military opinion with political direction as a key reason for the lack of clear victory in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Informed by Huntington’s model, Powell is condemned for advocating a clear demarcation between strategy and policy in order to keep politics and the military as distinct domains. As but one example, he notes US Ambassador in Iraq, Paul Bremer, stating that his job was policy and General Ricardo Sanchez’s was the war. Strategy is where those spheres overlap. Demanding they remain distinct ignores the reality that while strategy is formulated from policy, effective strategy must also inform one’s policies. As policies inevitably change due to evolving events, those adjusting the policies must be conversant with the environmental realities; in a war-fighting context, it is the soldier who provides the lion’s share of relevant understanding.

For those familiar with Strachan and his work, there is a clear sense of déjà vu here. The book is based predominantly upon previously published material, notably in Survival, the flagship journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Although he has revisited and amended these articles, there is still a patchwork feel to the book as chapters tend to be driven by some prior occurrence, such as the 2010 resignation of General Stanley McChrystal. As is inevitable with prolific academic writers, some concepts are carried over from article to article, which produces some repetition between the chapters. Nonetheless, this is a very informative book, which is underpinned by a strong theoretical understanding of classical theorists and relevant historical examples.

Emile Simpson is a disciple of Hew Strachan. As such, there is unmistakable similarity in the intellectual foundations of War from the Ground Up. In addition to the great variety of historical events that illustrate his narrative, the book’s contemporary relevance profits from Simpson’s experience as an officer in the Royal Gurkha Rifles. His regimental service included three tours of Afghanistan, where he experienced the war from the perspectives of an infantry platoon commander, battalion intelligence officer, and advisor to the Commander within ISAF headquarters. Retiring from the military, he turned to the academic world where he is a King’s College London Doctoral candidate and a Research Fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.
At the risk of gushing, upon finishing this book I immediately re-read it. Simpson has produced a superbly readable balance of strategic theory, history, and contemporary warfare, or as he has framed it, "an interpretation of Clausewitz in the modern day." He does an excellent job of melding and reinterpreting the theories of our favourite 19th Century Prussian with the reality of globalized strategic audiences overseeing our conflicts.

Simpson addresses and further develops several of the same issues as Strachan, such as complex warfare’s nuanced political imperative down to the tactical level being unattainable within Huntington’s model of an intellectually-robotic officer corps. Strachan’s book cites General Petraeus’ doctoral dissertation, that while most military officers quote “Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means,’ many do not appear to accept the full implications of his logic.” Simpson uses this as his start point, going further in providing some excellent insights into Clausewitz. As but one example, the oft-quoted trinity of the government—the people—the army is expanded upon as the government being the source of policy—the rationale for war. The people are the emotional, passionate aspect of war—often the hatred, but also its moderating influence. The army represents war itself—both the strength and horror, as much as the play of probability and chance. Significantly for our understanding, strategy balances these three aspects, more than merely as “…an object suspended between three magnets,” but critically maintaining agility to keep actions related to policy’s aims while addressing human passion yet not allowing war to escalate beyond political utility.

The book’s greatest strength rests however in Simpson’s explanation of strategic narratives, to which he brings practical clarity. Starting from the simplistic avowal that strategic narrative is merely one’s strategy expressed in a narrative form, he emphasizes the significance of social media’s ever presence within contemporary conflict. As such, physical destruction matters less to war’s outcome because that outcome is increasingly defined by a diverse audience not directly subject to the warfighting. He then points out that “…effective, unifying strategic narratives that are alive in the minds of their protagonists are less common than distant, bulky tomes that few on one’s side have actually read, and fewer still are inspired by.” To cure such ineffective narratives, he turns to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and the role played by three persuasive devices: logos, or the appeal to rational argument; pathos, or...
emotional appeal; and ethos, or one’s own moral standing. As such, while most narratives contain strong elements of logos, policy- and strategy-makers are increasingly reliant upon pathos and ethos. This is because each persuasive means carries differing weight within the increasingly varied audiences. Simpson devotes several beneficial chapters specifically to strategic dialogue and strategic narratives, doing the subject eminently justice, as he does with the other topics he tackles.

It is starting with simple explanations to benefit the novice before delving into the more nuanced details for the experienced practitioner that make this such an excellent book. I cannot help but echo the recommendation of Sir Michael Howard, founder of the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, that the book be compulsory reading at every level in the military. I would go further and urge its reading by everyone in government involved with strategic thinking or military deployments, if not anyone with an interest in the nexus of policy, strategy, and military.

The third book published recently is Lawrence Freedman’s Strategy: A History. Sir Lawrence, Vice-Principal of Kings College London and “the dean of British strategic studies,” is a prolific author and former advisor to British PM Tony Blair. With this far-ranging volume, he may have produced his capstone on the topic. Weighing in at over 750 pages when one includes citations and index, it may well be intimidating to some.

It is, however, the easiest of the three books to read. It is all-encompassing, but often quite shallow with many of the personalities mentioned getting little more than a paragraph each. As such, it comes across more as an encyclopedic listing of people and places, rather than a historical narrative, which is slightly incongruous, given Freedman’s underlying premise that strategy is about the narrative – storytelling, if you will.

This extensive opus spans everything from chimpanzees’ territorial imperatives being “strategic intelligence” (Freedman’s quote) to business marketing. Approximately one-third of the book is devoted to what one would normally consider military strategy. The remainder is divided generally between political theorists and contemporary, overwhelmingly American, businesses. This broad span is facilitated by defining strategy as simply “the art of creating power.”

The military-focused portion, the “Strategies of Force,” is well done, primarily because that is where Freedman spent the majority of his academic life. In the follow-on sections of “Strategy from Below” and “Strategy from Above,” looking at political theorists such as Karl Marx and business management thinking respectively, he begins to lose traction. Perhaps because these latter chapters were unfamiliar territory, they had intriguing value despite some annoyances.

A key problem with the book is that, because it tries to include so much material, each section is generally limited to a series of brief sketches ending with conclusions that too often fail to live up to the evidence presented. The lack of any weighted analysis on what strategies worked best in differing circumstances was frustrating throughout the book, but was tolerable in the military section where I could fill in the gaps myself. With the business-oriented chapters, it proved exasperating.

The book’s major strength, beyond getting one to think in a broader sense about what strategy may entail, lies in its encyclopedic nature. As a compendium of various thinkers, whether ‘strategists’ or not, it makes an excellent start-point for further research. For good and bad, it has an almost Wikipedia-like quality to it.

The three books are all welcome additions to encourage and frame discussions of strategic thought. The overarching theme for both Strachan and Simpson is that current strategy within most Western nations is adrift. Strachan argues that this is due mostly to our being unable to chart a reasonable way ahead because we fail to learn from history of past courses. Conversely, Simpson appears to be saying that rather than historical ignorance, it is from our not understanding strategies’ underpinning theories. Freedman, however, does more to ‘muddy the waters’ simply because he includes pretty much everything under the rubric of strategy.

To aid in cultivating would-be strategic thinkers, I recommend Simpson’s War from the Ground Up to the widest possible readership audience, Strachan’s Direction of War particularly to those in military and political communities with a vested interest in strategic thinking, and Freedman’s Strategy as a reference textbook within an undergraduate Politics program primarily for its wide accumulation of disparate facts.

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The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914
by Margaret MacMillan
Toronto: Penguin, 2013
739 pages, $24.00, Soft Cover
ISBN 978-0-8129-8066-0
Reviewed by John Keess

The spiritual successor to her 2003 success, Paris 1919, The War that Ended Peace is Margaret MacMillan’s description of the characters, events, and forces which led to the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914. Written with a smooth, readable style, MacMillan tracks the rise in international tensions which precipitated the conflict by loosely following a number of key actors, such as Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, and the French socialist leader Jean Jaurès, as part of a general narrative about social, economic, political and technological developments occurring in the early-20th Century. Although her work is primarily descriptive, she does note early on that she holds Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia primarily responsible for the war. She is ultimately more interested with how the flammable material built up in the first place than in determining who lit the spark.

MacMillan begins with a general overview of Europe in 1900, starting with a description of the Paris Exhibition of that year. This is an interesting but fitting point of departure, showcasing the rival national exhibitions alongside the general themes of the optimism, self-assurance, and positivism that guided them. Moreover, the peaceful and progressive nature of the rivalries on display at Paris makes an interesting backdrop for the rise in tensions over the next decade. She then spends the next three chapters describing the complex, intertwined, and evolving policies of two world powers: an ascendant Britain, and a rising Germany. With perhaps a tinge of Anglocentrism, MacMillan chooses to describe these powers in their own chapters early on, with France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary getting further treatment in later chapters, usually as part of describing the evolving great power blocs.

As the narrative narrows down in theme and detail, MacMillan uses biographical sketches to form the core of her description of the issues. The naval arms race between Britain and Germany, for example, is given grounding and context by a close look at the chief engineers of Germany’s blue-water navy, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral Tirpitz. The increasingly close alliance of France and the United Kingdom is described partly though a look into the policies and priorities of Théophile Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, who largely engineered the entente cordiale between those two countries. The famous Schlieffen Plan is introduced through a biographical sketch of Schlieffen himself, followed by an in-depth look at the man who would carry out the modified in plan in 1914, von Moltke the Younger.

Although the biographically-centred approach has some shortcomings, it makes for compelling reading as the book gets into a more specific description of events, namely, the Moroccan crises of 1905-1906 and 1911, the First and Second Balkan Wars. MacMillan, by introducing some of the key players and the contexts in which they were functioning, makes complex events relatable and the story more engaging than a simple chronology. This being noted, she occasionally goes too far in trying to maintain the interest and understanding of the modern-day reader by drawing parallels between historical events and recent occurrences, often leading to comparisons which are not quite parallel or warranted. In one example, she explains Wilhelm II’s bellicosity as tied into his wish to differentiate himself from his relatively passive father. This is then made relatable by holding it next to George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003, on the premise his disdain for his father’s inability to “finish the job” in the 1991 Gulf War encouraged him to launch a war of his own. Besides both of these claims being difficult to verify independently, the ‘loaded’ examples create more problems than they solve in explaining the intricacies of early-20th Century European power politics to the modern reader.

Overall, the book is a detailed and readable account of the lead-up to the Great War. MacMillan provides a relatable and interesting narrative which is focussed upon human decision, and expands the interest and understanding of the modern-day reader by drawing parallels between historical events relatable and the story more engaging than a simple chronology. This is, above all, an excellent introductory text to a large lead-up to the Great War. MacMillan provides a relatable and interesting narrative which is focussed upon human decision, and holds firm to her thesis that the war was not inevitable, but was sparked by the actions of distinct and autonomous actors who either precipitated crises or failed to stop events from overtaking human agency. While this is a refreshing refrain from the historiographical current which seeks to attribute the outbreak of war to unaccountable ‘forces,’ the very humanity of the characters and MacMillan’s efforts to make them relatable leads to some academically difficult parallels. This is, above all, an excellent introductory text to a large and expanding body of literature dealing with the outbreak of the First World War, but it can also be a pleasurable read for those more well-versed on the topic.

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By Carl Pépin

Montreal : Fondation littéraire Fleur de Lys, 2013
434 pages, $29.95

Reviewed by Michael Boire

CARL PÉPIN

Au Non de la Patrie
Les relations franco-québécoises pendant la Grande Guerre (1914-1919)

Carl Pépin is an author with many talents. On his website, he describes himself as a museum curator, battlefield guide, public speaker, media commentator, writer, researcher, military historian, and university professor with time served at the University of Montreal, Laval and Royal Military College, Saint Jean. In this, his first major published work, Pépin has harnessed this impressive range of experience to the daunting task of turning his well-received doctoral dissertation into a remarkable monograph. He has succeeded. This is a book which both enlightens and entertains.

The title itself is a declaration of the book’s thesis. A subtle play on words, it translates as “no to the mother country” (France). Implicit in these words, as well, is a ‘no’ to Canada. This was Quebec’s answer to the prolonged but disjointed campaign mounted by the French government to mobilize Quebeckers for the war effort. Severely weakened by the immense losses of the first years of the conflict, the French realized that their salvation rested upon a complete mobilisation of all their allies’ military and economic potential.

Pépin’s interpretation is anchored in a proportioned and balanced assessment of many primary sources. Indeed, this is the book’s great strength. The author’s intention is clear: to fill a substantial gap in Quebec’s historical record. To this end, Pépin has crafted six tightly woven chapters exploring the commercial, political, social, cultural and military facets of the France-Quebec rapport during the Great War. Though the analysis throughout is rigorously analytical and produces many new insights, Pépin draws four important conclusions which advance the historiography.

First, from 1870 to 1914, Quebeckers gradually came to terms with the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war and subsequent establishment of the new Third Republic. Its insistence upon the separation of church and state did not sit well in a turn-of-the-century Quebec which remained largely rural, staunchly right wing, and firmly dominated by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

Second, at the turn of the 19th Century, diplomatic relations between the France and Quebec were at best rudimentary. However, there had been many cultural exchanges in the forms of conferences, meetings, and popular events sponsored by both sides. These fostered efforts to strengthen the bonds born of common language and ancestry. By the time the European war broke out, there was a shared sentiment, especially among the province’s intellectual elite, that this conflict could be an opportunity to improve relations with the mother country. Hence their support, initially at least, of Quebec’s war effort. Indeed, there was considerable sympathy for the plight of the French as they faced the German onslaught. As French citizens living in Quebec rushed home to enlist in the late summer of 1914, a number of their French-Canadian brothers accompanied them.

Third, Quebec’s (and Canada’s) commercial classes saw the Great War for what it was: an outstanding business opportunity. Rather modest pre-war trade between France and Quebec (and Canada) became significant, measuring in the hundreds of millions of dollars by the time of the Armistice in 1918. Not surprisingly, as the conflict wore on, a consensus emerged on both sides of the Atlantic which favored strengthening these fragile commercial ties after the war. Unfortunately that was not to be. During the war years, relations between Quebec, France, and Canada became fraught with tension and misunderstanding due largely to a failure to communicate and cooperate in the distribution of lucrative munitions contracts in Quebec and Canada.

Fourth, although the presence of the 22nd Battalion (later R22eR) and Laval University’s deployed military hospital created an expectation among the French that Quebec could warm to the idea of fuller participation, the conscription crisis dashed this hope for once and for all.

Thoroughly researched, tightly organized, and written with a flair for critical assessment, this book represents a significant contribution to our understanding of the complicated reciprocal relationships between Quebec and France during the First World War.

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