Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 2014

Canadian Military Journal / Revue militaire canadienne is the official professional journal of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, Canadian Military Journal, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on condition that appropriate credit is given to Canadian Military Journal. Each issue of the Journal is published simultaneously in print and electronic versions; it is available on the Internet at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

ISSN 1492-465X

Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 2014 • Canadian Military Journal

CONTENTS

3 EDITOR’S CORNER
4 LETTER TO THE EDITOR

CANADA IN THE WORLD
5 Task Force 151
   by Eric Lerhe
15 Back to the Future: Canada’s Re-Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region
   by Bernard J. Brister

PERSONNEL ISSUES
25 Combating the Impact of Stigma on Physically Injured and Mentally Ill Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Members
   by G. Robert Arrabito and Anna S. Leung
36 Military Individual Readiness: An Overview of the Individual Components of the Adam, Hall, and Thomson Model Adapted to the Canadian Armed Forces
   by Dave Blackburn
46 Canadian Armed Forces’ Chaplains as a Primary Source of Spiritual Resiliency
   by Harold Ristau

INFORMATION OPERATIONS
53 Three Practical Lessons from the Science of Influence Operations Message Design
   by M. Afzal Upal

VIEWS AND OPINIONS
59 Wounded Soldiers: Can We Improve the Return to Work?
   by Simon Mailloux
64 Can Praxis: A Model of Equine Assisted Learning (EAL) for PTSD
   by C. Randy Duncan, Steve Critchley, and Jim Marland
70 Change for the Better – The Canadian Defence Academy, Future Plans, and Moving Forward
   by Bill Raider, Phil Hoddinott, and Jason Barr
74 Intervention from the Stars: Anecdotal Evidence
   by Roy Thomas

COMMENTARY
79 The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy and the ‘Ambition-Capability Gap’
   by Martin Shadwick

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
82 Strategy and Strategies
   by Bill Bentley
84 BOOK REVIEWS
How to Contact Us
Canadian Military Journal / Revue militaire canadienne
Canadian Defence Academy
PO Box 17000, Station Forces
Kingston, Ontario
CANADA, K7K 7B4
Fax: (613) 541-6866
E-mail: cmj.rmc@forces.gc.ca

Editor-in-Chief
David L. Bashow
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6148
bashow-d@rmc.ca

Publication Manager
Claire Chartrand
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6837
claire.chartrand@rmc.ca

Editor-in-Chief
David L. Bashow
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6148
bashow-d@rmc.ca

Can Praxis: A Model of Equine Assisted Learning (EAL) for PTSD

Wounded Soldiers: Can We Improve the Return to Work?

Editorial Board
Dr. Douglas Bland
Major (ret’d) Michael Boire
Major Sylvain Chalifour
Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Douglas Delaney
Dr. Rocky J. Dwyer
Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Michael Goodspeed
Major John Grodzinski
Dr. David Hall
Professor Michael Hennessy
Colonel Bernd Horn
Professor Hamish Ion
Philippe Lagassé

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) David Last
Dr. Chris Madsen
Dr. Sean Maloney
Professor Brian McKercher
Dr. Paul Mitchell
Dr. Nezih Mrad
Dr. Scot Robertson
Professor Stéphane Roussel
Professor Elinor Sloan
Chief Warrant Officer C.J. Thibault
Colonel (ret’d) Randall Wakelam

Translation
Translation Bureau, Public Works and Government Services Canada

Commentary
Martin Shadwick

Editorial Advisor
Michael Boire

Oversight Committee
Chairman
Major-General J.G.E. Tremblay, Commander, Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)

Members
Mr. David L. Bashow, Editor-in-Chief, Canadian Military Journal (CMJ)
Colonel Marty Cournoyer, representing Chief of the Air Staff (CAS)
Dr. H.J. Kowal, Principal, Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC)
Commander Hugues Canuel, representing Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS)
Colonel Dalton Cote, representing Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)
Brigadier-General A.D. Meinzinger, Commandant Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC)
Major Andrew Godefroy, representing Chief of Staff Land Strategy
Lieutenant-Colonel Mack Gendron, Director Canadian Forces Military Law Centre (CFMLC), Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)
Ms. Hanya Soliman, representing Chief of the Defence Intelligence (CDI)

NOTE TO READERS
As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
EDITOR’S CORNER

Welcome to yet another frosty edition Canadian Military Journal. It is billed as the spring edition, but as I pen these words at the end of January, spring is nowhere in evidence in the Great White North. In fact, most of the nation has been gripped in a polar deep freeze the likes of which we have not experienced for years. Even the Great Lakes are mostly frozen over. Hopefully, by the time this issue ‘hits the streets,’ we will have seen the last of the ‘white stuff’ for a while.

Quite a potpourri of content this time out, but first, a few words about our cover. In a continuation of paying tribute to our young nation’s participation in the War of 1812, we feature yet again the splendid art of the internationally renowned Canadian marine artist Peter Rindlisbacher. Peter has captured on canvas The Battle of Lake Erie, which took place on 10 September 1813. What is specifically portrayed here is part of the larger engagement between the American forces of Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry, and the British squadron commanded by Commander Robert Barclay. In the early stages of the battle, the lead British ship General Hunter was stationed between the larger Queen Charlotte and another British warship, the Detroit, shown here on the extreme left and right respectively. In a continuation of the battle, the damaged General Hunter would drift out of the line shortly thereafter.

Further on a maritime bent, our first major article of the issue, written by Commodore (ret’d) Eric Lerhe, is a historical recollection of Canadian-led maritime coalition operations conducted in the southern Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz sector during the ‘war on terror’ in 2002. However, it also provides valuable lessons for the conduct of any such operations which may be conducted in the future. Next, Major Bernard Brister takes a fresh look at Canada’s past, present, and, most importantly, its future engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Brister opines that Canada’s economic and security interests are shifting away from the primary North Atlantic (European) relationship, “…and even from the traditional post-Second World War relationship with the United States.” However, he believes there are myriad opportunities for engagement in Asia, particularly as a supplier of long-term, stable energy supplies. He also maintains that such a strategy of engagement “…should be supported by diplomatic and security policies that build upon the Canadian brand in the region, and support the maintenance of a peaceful stable environment.”

Moving along, defence scientist Robert Arrabito and audiologist Anna Leung discuss how the Canadian Armed Forces is attempting to combat the impact of stigma upon our physically injured and/or mentally ill members. They discuss five current CAF programs that incorporate interventions designed for stigma reduction, assess their relative value in helping to change our military’s culture, and finally, they “…present personal actions for reducing stigma directed at members who become physically injured or mentally ill, and [also] for able-bodied members.” In a continuation of personnel issues, uniformed mental health specialist Major Dave Blackburn explores the world of military individual readiness. While Blackburn opines that there is “…no real consensus on either the concept of operational readiness or its functional definition,” he presents an IR model developed by researchers Adam, Hall, and Thomson that he believes is adapted to the requirements of the CAF. Blackburn is followed by CAF Padre Harold Ristau, who maintains that while there has been a decided increase in secularism within Canadian society that has lessened the influence of traditional religious communities, an interest in and desire for spirituality is still strongly supported by its members. Ristau further suggests that “…the CAF chaplaincy offers a ‘special support community,’ including spiritual care, pastoral counselling, spiritual direction, and support, which is indispensable to the operability of members of the three elements of the Canadian military and their civilian Defence Team members.”

The last major article for this issue concerns Information Operations. Afzal Upal, a senior defence scientist and the leader of the Effects and Influence Group at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), explores the world of information operations (IOs) message design, citing examples of how failure to effectively communicate an intended message to target audience members can drastically affect the outcome of psychological operations. Upal “…dissolves the results of recent psychological research on effective message design into three practical steps that can be followed by practitioners in the field in order to design effective messages.”

Four very different opinion pieces in this issue… Taking the point, infantry captain Simon Mailoux, who lost a leg during combat in 2007 in Afghanistan, recounts his rehabilitation experience, which ultimately led to a second tour of operational duty in the country. Mailoux maintains that the majority of wounded soldiers want to come back in line with their comrades-in-arms. Further: “The medical branch has accomplished outstanding successes over the years by developing new medical procedures, and by designing new prostheses. The next step is to integrate these advancements with the military ethos to achieve even better results.” Next, Randy Duncan, Steve Critchley, and Jim Marland take the veteran rehabilitation step in a further direction by exploring the world of equine assisted learning (EAL) as an innovative recovery tool for the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These researchers conclude that their trials, “…support the notion that appropriate PTSD-tailored EAL programs…be considered in the long-term mental health strategies for veterans and members of other military and paramilitary organizations exposed to combat operations.” Then, Bill Raier, Phil Hoddinott, and Jason Barr provide an update on where the Canadian Defence Academy’s Future Plans and Modernization section is headed with its mandate to develop innovative techniques, technologies, and practices in order to chart the way ahead for Individual Training and Education in the Canadian Armed Forces. ‘Hot button’ items include ONGARDE – the Security Sector Knowledge Network, the Learning Support Centres, and the CAF Campus initiative. Finally, highly experienced Canadian peacekeeper Roy Thomas recounts a personal experience from war-torn eastern Bosnia in 1993, and offers recommendations as to how similar operations could be more successfully accomplished, should they be required in the future.

Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 2014 • Canadian Military Journal
In this issue’s Commentary section, Martin Shadwick examines the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS), and while he acknowledges that the reviews of the initiative to date have been “commendably solid and encouraging,” countless challenges remain to be addressed.

In closing, our own Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Bill Bentley presents a very informative comparative book review essay on military strategy, and how various distinguished authors have approached this complex subject, and we then wrap with a number of individual book reviews that we hope will pique our readership’s interest.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal

In Volume 13, Number 4 (Autumn 2013) of the Canadian Military Journal, Major Garrett Lawless argues that the nature of war has changed in the nuclear era. Indeed, he asserts that classic war between major powers is dead. He supports the argument for this fundamental change with several points, including by asserting that the ‘new’ result of war is certain extinction, and that the decision to go to war is based upon a militaristic culture. It appears that Major Lawless is arguing for a global utopia, where human beings have learned to live prosperously in a harmonious, interconnected, and liberal democratic global society. While I wish that Mr. Lawless was correct, I fear that all human history argues against him.

The nature of war (or why we fight wars) is a human condition that has not changed since the beginning of recorded human history. Thucydides concluded that human beings fight war for “fear, honour, and interest.” However, the character of war (warfare, or how we fight wars) changes and reflects the strategic context of the times. Jan Bloch’s conclusion that war was impossible was clearly wrong. However, predictions for changes in warfare accurately reflected the shift from pre-industrial to industrial society, and the associated impact upon warfare. But previous changes in warfare were all pre-nuclear era events. So, how do we assess the impact of the threat of certain extinction on the nature of war?

The nuclear era has seen conflict between nuclear-to-nuclear, nuclear-to-non-nuclear, and non-nuclear-to-non-nuclear states. While there have been no direct, unrestrained inter-state wars (similar to the First World War or the Second World War) between two nuclear capable nations, there continued to be wars that fall into the last two categories. The fear of Mutually Assured Destruction has also changed the character of war between two nuclear capable nations. The result is often proxy-war, or warfare lower on the spectrum of conflict. Thus far in the era of nuclear weapons, we are neither peaceful nor all dead.

Major Lawless also argues that encouraging (assisting?) certain countries to acquire nuclear weapons will reduce the possibility of war. Even if the last part of the statement is correct, the hard question remains: “Who is allowed to determine which nations are suitable recipients of nuclear proliferation aid”? The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recognizes five states that possess nuclear weapons and has non-proliferation as its central goal. It concludes that no nations are suitable candidates for nuclear proliferation aid. Indeed, it can be concluded that if a nuclear capable nation extended overt nuclear aid to an affiliate nation, it is probable that an opposing nuclear capable nation would extend similar support to their proxy/ally. And the cycle continues. Perhaps this is not the best recipe for the end of war.

Finally, the argument that the decision to go to war is based upon a militaristic culture avoids the interdependent nature of war and warfare. Like dancing, war ‘takes two to tango.’ Even the most pacifist culture may be forced to fight war based upon the decisions of other states (or opposing factions within the state). It would be ideal if all the world’s problems and conflicts could be solved through diplomatic negotiations. However, human nature and history demonstrate that fear, honour, and interest continue to motivate people to fight. War is not over, but warfare will continue to evolve, based upon changes to the strategic context.

Major Kyle Solomon
Royal Canadian Engineers
Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) cruises in close arrowhead formation.

Task Force 151

by Eric Lerhe

Commodore (ret’d) Eric J. Lerhe, OMM, MSC, CD, PhD, served in the Royal Canadian Navy for 36 years. After two ship commands, he served as Director Maritime Force Development and Director NATO Policy at National Defence Headquarters. Promoted to commodore and appointed Commander Canadian Fleet Pacific in 2001, in that role, he was a Coalition Task Group Commander for the Southern Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz sector during the ‘war on terror’ in 2002. His PhD was awarded in 2012, and he continues his research into security issues at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University.

Introduction

The Canadian naval contribution to the War on Terror attracted little attention at the time, and what did make it through was usually negative. Admitting that reporting events at sea is fraught, this lack of attention is still surprising. Canadian officers were in sole charge of an operating area that stretched 500 miles from Oman all the way to the central Persian Gulf. From October 2001 to July 2003, they commanded over 70 warships, of which 50 came from allied nations. Those ships conducted over 1000 boardings and hundreds of safe escorts of military shipping through the Straits of Hormuz, despite a rising number of maritime terrorist attacks elsewhere. These forces were also able to capture four mid-level al Qaeda operatives, and, more importantly, were credited with preventing hundreds of others from escaping Afghanistan to the Gulf States and Africa. In fact, the US credited the efforts of the Canadian-led coalition naval force in the Gulf of Oman and Straits of...
Hormuz with preventing the seaward escape of the alleged 20th 9/11 attacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh long enough for the CIA to capture him in Karachi in September 2002. Rear-Admiral Kelly, the overall US naval commander, told the Canadians that “... you people were instrumental in facilitating the arrest by being out here doing the patrols and doing your hails and boardings.”

Despite all this, what dominated media reporting at the time was the repeated suggestion that Task Force 151 was covertly assisting the US war in Iraq, despite the Chrétien government’s public stand against any participation in it. At the same time, the US viewed TF 151’s unwillingness to assist them as sufficiently upsetting; “the last straw for the White House” it was claimed, that it resulted in the cancellation of the US President’s planned visit to Canada in May 2003.

These contradictory views are probably sufficient reason to probe this operation. Other reasons to dig deeper would include the need to investigate the related charge by Stein and Lang in The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar, that the Canadian military leadership “created a trap for the government by urging Canada lead the TF 151.” This stratagem involved the military seeking government approval in early February 2003 for Canada to lead this formation in the hope, it was alleged, that it would encourage the government to then approve joining the larger American plan to invade Iraq:

And initially, before Chrétien had made his decision on Iraq, Canada’s generals and admirals probably thought that taking on TF 151 would “help” the politicians make the “right” decision. Surely Canada could not continue to lead this task force and not be part of the Iraq coalition.

Stein and Lang also hint that once Canada had both assumed command of Task Force 151 and decided it would not participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military likely strayed into supporting the latter:

Whether or not Canada’s ships in TF 151 actually carried out any duties directly related to the war in Iraq will probably never be known. Yet according to the official record, the Canadian navy somehow managed the seemingly impossible. It ran and participated in a double-hatted naval task force but it did not get involved in command or operational responsibilities related to one of these hats.

According to Stein and Lang, the overall result was that “…command of TF 151 … undermined the coherence and integrity of Canada’s policy on the war in Iraq.” They had some support for their claims with Dalhousie University’s Frank Harvey arguing the Canadian ships “…did not and could not separate the roles between terrorism and the war on Iraq.”

As a result, the first step for this article will be to present the competing narratives, and then assess the extent to which the case is made for the Canadian military laying a ‘trap.’ Then, it will examine the actual conduct of the Task Force 151 mission to determine whether the government’s directions and policies were flouted by its navy. If nothing else, a detailed review of events might supply some lessons with respect to strategic command in complex operations.

TF 151 as ‘Trap’

The account of this issue by Stein and Lang is brief, and almost all of it is heavily disputed by the key participants. The sole area of agreement is that both the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) recommended in early February 2003 that Canada lead TF 151, a new command established by the US naval commander in the Persian Gulf. Up until this time, Canada had only directed Task Group (TG) 150.4, as the sector commander of the Southern Persian Gulf – Strait of Hormuz – Gulf of Oman sector. The Canadian commander, in turn, reported to Commander Task Force (CTF) 150, the at-sea commander of the USN carrier battle group that routinely operates in the Persian Gulf area.

Richard Gimblett, in his history of Canadian naval involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom, explains that the US military leadership fully recognized that there was a need to maintain Operation Enduring Freedom’s (OEF) maritime anti-terrorist and escort tasks in the southern Persian Gulf as American forces were diverted northwards towards Operation Iraqi Freedom. Therefore, Task Force 151 was created to continue the task of interdicting al Qaeda and escorting shipping through the Straits of Hormuz, as al Qaeda had attempted one attack within the Straits in...
2002, and had successfully attacked two ships near Yemen. The US area commander also fully realized that a significant number of those OEF coalition forces wished to continue their efforts against al Qaeda and support the US in its broader counter-terrorist effort without joining the war against Iraq.11 Task Force 151 thus had the potential to hold the broader international counterterrorism coalition together, keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and ensure the safety of both military and commercial shipping. The US offered the leadership of Task Force 151 to Canada, because we had the longest running coalition naval command experience in the area as commander of the Straits of Hormuz sector. An earlier, highly favourable US report had noted we were the “logical choice” for area command in this region, due to our specialized training and skills.12

Taking on the task had direct benefits for Canada. Ken Calder, DND’s Assistant Deputy Minister Policy, argued that this mission provided the government with the flexibility to declare them for either Operation Enduring Freedom, or Operation Iraqi Freedom, as the Chrétien government struggled over whether to aid the United States in a potential war on Iraq.

Our challenge was we did not know which way we would go. We had to be in a position where we could go either way, which when you’re dealing with deployed forces, can be a little tricky. We manoeuved ourselves into a position where basically with respect to the naval contribution, we could declare them as part of Iraqi Freedom, or we could say they were still part of Enduring Freedom. Therefore, we could switch either way without having to move Canadian resources.13

This is partially acknowledged by Stein and Lang, who refer to TF 151 as a “double-hatted” command, although it is likely not what Dr. Calder was describing.14 Rather than decisively declaring those forces for one operation, Stein and Lang state that the Minister understood that the Task Force would be providing support to Operation Enduring Freedom, while also providing “some as yet undefined support to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) once hostilities had commenced against Iraq.”15 They also point out that senior members of the department of Foreign Affairs, including Minister Graham, also joined by Deputy Prime Minister Manley, had argued for assuming the leadership of the Task Force. The government then agreed to the task, and, according to Stein and Lang, “would worry later” as to how Canada would manage to continue leading the task force after combat operations had begun in Iraq.16

The first ‘worry’ arrived before that. Stein and Lang claim that at the end of February 2003, less than twenty-eight days after they had argued for it, the Chief of Defence Staff and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff reversed themselves and claimed Canada must withdraw from the leadership of TF 151.17 They did this, it is asserted, when they both then realized the Chrétien government was not going to support the war on Iraq:

When they did, Henault and Maddison shifted gears. They told McCallum that Canada would have to pull out of the leadership of TF 151, which it had just assumed, if Ottawa was not going to participate in military operations against Iraq.18

This, then, is the ‘trap’ that Stein and Lang state the military laid for the government.19
There are several problems with both this narrative and its conclusion. General Henault has stated in interview that the interpretation by Stein and Lang of this issue is fundamentally incorrect.20 Here he is supported by two other officers who were directly engaged in this issue, Vice-Admiral Maddison, and Rear-Admiral McNeil.21 General Henault also claims that at no time in the Spring of 2003 did he recommend withdrawing Canada from TF 151 or its leadership.22 Yet, Stein and Lang also cite the Chief of Defence Staff as declaring: “The Navy needed a break in the operational tempo,” as the reason for having to withdraw.23 The CDS, after examining his personal notes of this period, has no recollection of making that recommendation, or of providing that justification.24

The statement attributed to the CDS may have its origins in some other context as the Stein and Lang text itself seems to suggest, with its stating that the Canadian Navy had only been involved in TF 151 “for a matter of days” when the CDS allegedly raised this operational tempo problem. Further, at that moment, the Navy was in the process of dispatching an additional frigate and a destroyer to join the two other Canadian warships in the Gulf, thus seriously aggravating its supposed operational tempo problem. In fact, Rear-Admiral McNeil makes clear that the Navy was fighting hard against the Minister’s opposition to sending the additional destroyer.25 With PCO support, the destroyer was sent, but again, it demonstrates that the Navy was not seriously concerned over the operational tempo in March 2003.

Rather than calling for terminating the leadership of TF 151, General Henault has stated that he sought to alert government that there was a significant legal debate now underway within the bureaucracy that would certainly require the Minister’s attention as well as, potentially, that of Prime Minister Chrétien.26 At the very minimum, the strategic direction the Prime Minister had issued in November 2001 had not envisaged that Canadian ships would be required to provide safe escort through the Straits of Hormuz while a major conflict was underway in Iraq. As a result, a change to the government-approved objectives in the theater was required. A confidential interview has confirmed that the required briefing note for the Minister with a letter to the Prime Minister dealing with TF 151, its objectives, and the new strategic environment, was prepared in mid-March 2003.27 These documents would ultimately become the new Canadian Forces strategic direction for the theatre.

Stein and Lang confirm the fact that the legal basis for the mission was now in question. They cite the fact that the Canadian Forces’ Judge Advocate General was of the opinion that in escorting American shipping bound for Iraq, Canada was in danger of being considered a belligerent in the conflict. They also report that he was “… not very popular” with the CDS as a result.28 General Henault has subsequently confirmed that he was less than satisfied with JAG’s interpretation, as he wished to continue having Canada command TF 151.29 He also noted that the contributing navies continued to support TF 151 and Canada’s command of the same. Moreover, those nations had no overriding legal issues complicating their participation. Further, Rear-Admiral McNeil has also stated that the governments of at least two of those nations specifically requested that Canada continue to lead TF 151.30

Subsequently, and entirely in accordance with the Chief of Defence Staff’s wishes, the issue was indeed brought to the Prime Minister’s attention, whereby he made the final decision to continue Canada’s command of Task Force 151. Anecdotally, the Prime Minister is reported to have acknowledged the legal complexity of the issues, stating that they could bring in 20 lawyers to resolve the issue, whereas the would argue for several years. Alternatively, he was prepared to make a decision right now, and did so in favor of continuing Canadian command of Task Force 151. On 18 March 2003, the day after he announced that Canada would not participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Prime Minister Chrétien then signed the revised strategic direction authorizing the
changed objectives, the escort mission, and Canada’s continued leadership of TF 151. Commodore Girouard, the designated Task Force Commander, acknowledges receiving that just-signed strategic direction authorizing the escort task, as well as other elements of the original Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Intercepting fleeing Iraqis was, however, forbidden.

Later, the Prime Minister argued that he endorsed this mission, “…because it was important to the Navy.” Indeed it was, but this does seem to be a curious rationale. The Stein and Lang narrative suggests the real reason as they outline how the Department of Foreign Affairs urged the government to retain command of TF 151, “…as a way to mitigate Washington’s inevitable displeasure” over our failure to join the Iraq War. It soon became clear via Wikileaks that the Department of Foreign Affairs continued to hold that position. On 17 March 2003, the day Canada announced it would not join OIF, the US Embassy in Ottawa reported that DFAIT’s Assistant Deputy Minister, Jim Wright, had informed them that:

....despite public statements that the Canadian assets in the Straits of Hormuz will remain in the region exclusively to support Enduring Freedom, they will also be available to provide escort services in the Straits and will otherwise be discreetly useful to the military effort.

He also advised that the Canadian patrol and transport aircraft in the region “are also prepared to ‘be useful.’” This analysis has not been able to determine the extent to which Wright’s message to the US was authorized by Ministers. However, Foreign Minister Graham is on record as endorsing the Canadian leadership of the task force, stressing the ill-effect it would have upon Canada-US relations if we pulled out, arguing TF 151 was simply a continuation of our original mission, and noting that allies like the French had no legal problems with it. The mission also fell well within the curious ‘double-hatted’ construct accepted by the Minister of National Defence. Finally, the just-discussed strategic direction change sought from the Prime Minister, and then issued to Commodore Girouard, fully authorized the escort mission to continue, despite Canada’s decision to not support OIF.

Task Force 151 Doing the ‘Impossible’

The next section will attempt to assess how carefully Task Force 151 leadership remained within the government’s publicly stated intention that its role be restricted to supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Certainly, Frank Harvey of Dalhousie and Kelly Toughill of The Toronto Star had grave doubts this could be achieved, and they were ultimately convinced that the Task Force ended up assisting the Operation Iraqi Freedom mission. Stein and Lang carefully avoid declaratory statements on this subject, hinting instead that the extent to which TF 151 assisted OIF “…will probably never be known,” while suggesting that the Canadian Navy must have “…somehow managed the seemingly impossible” by claiming not to have done so. They also claim US complicity in this effort, arguing the blurring of the OIF and OEF roles was “…probably deliberately encouraged” by the US, who, in their view, “considered these operations as a single integrated mission.”
The mission thus begins with Stein and Lang asserting that the Task Force’s tasks were now limited “…to those that were legitimately part of OEF.” Significantly, their description of this phase skirts the fact that shipping escort was always part of OEF, and it would continue to be so under the terms of the just-signed revised strategic direction. Similarly, the Defence Minister continued to state publicly that Task Force 151 worked “…exclusively on Operation Enduring Freedom” without ever mentioning the escort function even when he was specifically asked by the media what tasks might be involved. Stein and Lang also concluded somewhat surprisingly that “…the policy with respect to TF 151 was now clear,” and that it was “the Navy’s responsibility to make the policy work.”

A series of media interviews by naval officials certainly made clear that they thought the escort function was central to the TF 151 task. A DND spokesperson at Central Command Headquarters repeated the Government’s policy on 11 February 2003, stating the Task Force would indeed be “…sticking exclusively to Enduring Freedom.” However, the resulting Globe and Mail article confirmed this would include escort operations, protection of shipping, and interception of suspect vessels. On 14 February 2003, Commodore Girouard, its commander, made clear to the media that he would be coordinating the escorts of “undefended ships and tankers,” and particularly so in the Straits of Hormuz. However, the key to assessing whether he remained within the government’s orders requires a detailed breaking down of his sub-tasks.

Under Operation Enduring Freedom, these involved interdicting fleeing al Qaeda and Taliban leadership figures, escorting military shipping, and providing close escort to the US carriers in the region whenever such was required. The Canadian naval task groups were also authorized to track down and arrest Iraqi oil smugglers running the UN embargo, but that illicit activity had largely ended by 2003. The warships’ presence in the area also contributed to ensuring the safety of other shipping in this heavily-traveled area, but this task was not formally stated.
Of these assigned sub-tasks, only the escort of shipping was initially contentious, and this became so well before the formation of TF 151. Under Commodore Murphy’s command of the Canadian Task Group in late 2002, the build-up of American forces in Kuwait and elsewhere preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom was beginning to involve the use of commercial shipping to carry the needed military material. Under the earlier Operation Enduring Freedom rules, these would not receive a close escort through the Straits of Hormuz, as only naval shipping was considered to merit that dedicated protection. All this unfolded without incident, until the US commander requested close escort be assigned to a particular commercial vessel, triggering the Canadian commander to request its type of cargo.44 When this was not forthcoming, he declined to assign an escort from within his multinational formation, and the US commander then had to assign a USN warship to the task. The unstated Canadian logic here was that the OEF status quo applied wherein commercial vessels, even if there was a high likelihood they contained valuable military cargo, did not get close escort, but benefited from the area support of the coalition warships, as did all other shipping in the area, be it related to the coalition or not. Also unstated by the USN, the Canadians and the other naval coalition members had a general sense that providing close escort to commercial vessels with likely OIF-bound cargo was ‘a bridge too far’ for the coalition’s non-US membership. Almost all the governments contributing ships to the coalition had declined OIF participation, and none likely had issued rules of engagement authorizing direct support to it. As has been shown, Canada’s political leaders in particular avoided any public mention of the escort task, preferring to fall back upon the claim that Canada was simply continuing its OEF functions.

The second sub-task flowing from the original OEF mandate was the interdiction effort against the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Problems only arose here with media supposition that the task force would stray into the task of rounding up fleeing Iraqi officials. Kelly Toughill, reporting for The Toronto Star, extended this quite a bit further and argued, correctly, that Canadian ships passed the crew lists of all the suspicious vessels they encountered to the US master terrorist database.45 As senior Iraqis were also on the list, Toughill then concluded that “…Canadian sailors are actively hunting Iraqis at sea on behalf of the United States,” and that, “If any are found, they are turned over to US authorities.” This was completely incorrect, although Toughill attempts to reinforce this claim by pointing out that two such “suspects” were captured by the Canadian Navy using such a list, and that they were turned over to the US in July 2002.

As the author was commanding the task group that made those first two al Qaeda captures, I have some familiarity with the process, and it was not as automatic as Toughill provides. Richard Williams explains the process well in his analysis of naval operations in the Persian Gulf, wherein he points out, first, that “…the USN was willing to let Canadian legal opinions dictate the terms of reference” for the seaborne interdiction operations.46 Second, Canada insisted the US provide not only the basis for claiming the suspect’s al Qaeda affiliation, but also his specific terrorist activity or role. Finally, if that data was not convincing, we would not detain, and on at least two occasions, we refused a US request to detain someone who was on their list. Commodore Girouard continued to apply this principle and in addition received specific instructions from Ottawa within his new guidance to not turn over any fleeing Iraqis to US forces.47 When he confirmed this in a media interview, Ambassador Cellucci claims he was “stunned” and “flabbergasted” by this approach, and later called the Canadian position “incomprehensible.”48 Citing an unidentified source, Robert Fife of The National Post argues that Canada’s decision on not intercepting Iraqis was “…the final straw for the White House” in its decision to cancel the President Bush May visit to Ottawa.49

Commodore Girouard then quickly confirmed the extent to which he intended to follow the government’s often-less-than-clear direction. Soon after combat operations had begun in Iraq, he received reports of potential Iraqi commercial vessels flying false flags heading south toward the Strait of Hormuz with mines.50 When one was discovered near the Strait, he alerted NDHQ, and then ordered the HMCS Montreal to do a consensual boarding, which the master granted. During that boarding, they discovered five Iraqis sufficiently

Figure 2 – Chart of CTF 150 and CTF 151 Areas of Responsibility.
fit and equipped to be considered potential Special Forces members, but no mines or associated equipment. He alerted the US naval commander’s staff as to his increasing suspicions, but, to his surprise, the US command staff ordered that the vessel be released. The *Montreal* then withdrew her boarding party, only to have the US staff change their mind thirty minutes later, and request the Canadians remain aboard. At that point, Commodore Girouard interceded, and informed them that *Montreal*’s team had departed, and could now not return to the vessel. He explained that he had previously enjoyed the right to investigate the vessel, based upon the possible threat it posed shipping in the Straits of Hormuz. Now, however, it was clear that the vessel posed no such threat, and the only possible reason for returning to it was to interdict Iraqis – a task he was not authorized to do. The US commander reportedly fully understood Canada’s position, and assigned a USN vessel to conduct the boarding.

That incident and many others also argue strongly against the Stein and Lang suggestion that the United States viewed this as “a single integrated mission,” and attempted to blur any distinction between OIF and OEF. As has been demonstrated, the US split the naval vessels in the Persian Gulf area into two distinct task forces under separate commanders: TF 150 supporting Operation *Iraqi Freedom* in the North, with TF 151 conducting OEF in the southern Gulf. As Figure 2 shows, they were also geographically separated by the 28 degree, 30 minute north latitude line. Finally, they put the two task forces on separate communications plans with separate intelligence support, with only a single High Command voice link joining CTF 150 and CTF 151.

This separation did not seriously hamper Commodore Girouard’s ability to maintain effective control of the Canadian, French, New Zealand, Italian, Greek, and, frequently, US ships in its task force. His monitoring of the only link to the other force, the Area High Command Net, did, however, provide occasional snippets of data on the Iraq campaign, while at other times, it was clear that data potentially critical to his forces was being denied. When the commodore reported elements of the first to NDHQ, he found that he was immediately accused of becoming enmeshed in forbidden OIF planning, and was told to desist. On the other hand, when the High Command Net revealed that a potential chemical weapons attack was underway, his attempts to determine its location were met by a most disturbing silence as the American-British-Australian discussion of the event was quickly moved to OIF-only nets.

This was one more example of the extent to which the US, rather than attempting to blur the distinction between OEF and OIF, was actively separating the two. Commodore Girouard then further reinforced that division in publicly and privately rejecting suggestions that his ships intercept Iraqis. In fact, whenever the US requested a task that was on the limits of the OEF mandate, the data was passed back to Canada for review by the DCDS, where it was then rejected when appropriate by the CDS, who then briefed the Defence Minister accordingly. In judging the extent to which this effort was successful, it is interesting to note that Girouard was heavily critiqued by Stein and Lang and the Canadian media for doing too much for the Americans, just as the American Ambassador complained he was doing too little. In fact, the only votes of support the Canadian Navy received for its efforts in Task Force 151 were from the Allied navies that very much wanted Canada to lead them in OEF. France was particularly enthusiastic about the way the Canadian Navy was able to maneuver between multiple competing political demands. On completion of Task Force 151, the head of the French Navy sent a letter to Canada praising its theatre commanders for their successful management of operations and rules of engagement “…dans un environnement mouvant et complexe.”

**Conclusion**

Regrettably, this analysis was not able to provide a conclusive finding as to whether the ‘trap’ allegation was justified. This is because the participants are split into two camps who disagree over how the events unfolded, and there is a lack of released government material to back up either claim. Circumstantial evidence supports the Chief of Defence Staff’s position that no trap was involved, and that he never recommended withdrawal from the mission. Rather, the more logical conclusion is that he sought to apprise the Prime Minister of the developing legal issues brought on by Operation
Iraqi Freedom running currently with Operation Enduring Freedom, as it was his duty to do. Stein and Lang themselves confirm the seriousness of the developing legal problem. That the Prime Minister was briefed and new guidance issued further buttresses his case. So does the ongoing effort to prepare further ships for Task Force 151 and to attract allies to it. It is hard to see one doing this if the underlying plan was to scupper the mission.

The sheer complexity of mounting this kind of conspiracy in Canada and with allies also argues against the ‘trap’ allegations. Any plan for an international military operation involves an extended series of negotiations within DND, with other federal departments, and, finally, with allies. This makes mounting a conspiracy difficult. Even within a single department such as DND, there would be difficulties. Ken Calder, the Assistant Deputy Minister Policy, and a major participant in these negotiations over many decades, puts this well:

The whole business of Task Force 151 and the kind of convoluted account of that in the Stein and Lang book about how, you know, this was done in order to ensnare… Quite frankly, things like that are too complex for most people in National Defence to manage.55

One also has a particularly difficult time accepting that France, a vigorous opponent of the US effort in Iraq, would have joined TF 151 and encouraged Canada to lead it if there was any hint that this was a ‘backdoor’ way of getting Canada, or any other nation, seduced into the US-led, anti-Iraq coalition.

This analysis was able to be more definitive with regard to the attending claim that once the task force mission had been approved, the military disregarded political direction and “…undermined the coherence and integrity of Canada’s policy on the war in Iraq” by assisting the United States.56 Rather, the evidence is overpowering that the Canadians within Task Force 151 were entirely successful in following the government policy of remaining “exclusively within Operation Enduring Freedom.” This is not to say that their efforts, and particularly their efforts in escorting military shipping, did not support Operation Iraqi Freedom. They certainly did. However, it is clear that the Chrétien government fully understood the escort task was implicit in the OEF mission, while also avoiding any public mention of that task or its increasingly obvious connection to OIF. In this particular regard, the Stein and Lang claim that “…command of TF 151 … undermined the coherence and integrity of Canada’s policy on the war in Iraq” can only be viewed as astounding as there was no cohesion within the policy, nor was there intended to be.57 The DFAIT view that Canada’s performing this mission would offset the damage to US relations caused by our refusal to join OIF was the source of that incoherence. The Chrétien government then endorsed that aim, and via a process Harvey has aptly described as “dishonest denials,” attempted to suggest otherwise to the Canadian public.58 Only in the last paragraph of their chapter on TF 151 do Stein and Lang finally confirm that the policy also lacked integrity:

The story of Canada’s policy on the war in Iraq is also a story of political leadership that spoke with one “principled” voice to Canadians and another, quite different, “pragmatic” voice in Washington. Fortunately, few in the public could hear the two voices at the same time.59

In spite of this, this narrative does underline that at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, Canada was the Task Force commander of choice. The Canadian readiness to lead those allies who would not join Operation Iraqi Freedom was quickly accepted. Moreover, the other participating governments urged us to continue leading it. One must, however, be cautious here. That is, those governments that joined us probably did so largely to signal support to the broader war on terror, to show they did not desire a complete break with the US, and that they may have, like Canada, considered contributing to Task Force 151 as a side payment for not joining the OIF. On the other hand, no other nation enjoyed Canada’s high interoperability with the US, none ever challenged us for that leadership over the five years we were in the area, and the US never suggested a command change while also sending its ships to Canadian-led TF 151. That the US government did so in spite of its unhappiness over our public refusal to take any part in Iraqi leadership interdiction efforts may suggest it had few options, other than to have Canada lead. At the tactical and the operational level, however, US officers were generous in their praise of Canadian at-sea command, as were the French.
5. Ibid., p. 83.
6. Ibid., p. 87.
7. Ibid. Stein and Lang make clear that our policy of allowing Canadian exchange officers to serve with US forces in Iraq also contributed to this problem.
9. Stein and Lang, p. 79.
11. Ibid., p. 108.
14. Stein and Lang, pp. 63, 80. Stein and Lang do not seem to use the term ‘double-hatted’ in its traditional sense. A ‘double-hatted’ command is normally one where its commander figuratively wears two hats. That is, he enjoys command responsibility over two-or-more organizations, and thus wears a different ‘hat’ when commanding one or the other. What Stein and Lang probably meant was that the task force was ‘dual-tasked’ in having simultaneously two missions – counterterrorism and escort. Later, they would claim that the TF 151 “…would only wear one hat: the OEF hat,” (p. 85), but for reasons that will soon be made clear, this was a less-than-convincing claim.
15. Ibid., p. 80.
16. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
17. Ibid., p. 82.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 90.
20. General Raymond Henuault, E-mail to author, 11 December 2011.
21. Vice-Admiral Maddison, E-mail to author, 29 January 2012, and Rear-Admiral McNeil, E-mail to author, 18 March 2012. McNeil, Interview with E.J Lerhe, 11 June 2011, Port Stanley, ON, p. 13, also covers this.
22. Henuault, E-mail to author, 11 December 2011.
23. Stein and Lang, p. 82.
24. Henuault, E-mail to author, 11 December 2011.
26. Henuault, E-mail to author, 11 December 2011. This is corroborated by McNeil, E-mail to author, 18 March 2012.
27. 1st Confidential Interview, by E.J. Lerhe, 6 Oct 2011, Ottawa, p. 8.
28. Stein and Lang, p. 82.
29. Henuault, E-mail to author, 11 December 2011.
31. 1st Confidential Interview, p. 8.
34. Stein and Lang, pp. 81-84.
36. Stein and Lang, p. 80.
39. Stein and Lang, p. 87.
40. Canada, DND, “Scrum Transcript.”
41. Stein and Lang, p. 85.
43. HMCS Ottawa successfully intercepted, boarded, and delivered to arrest the Iraqi oil smuggler MV ROAA in May 2002.
44. Murphy, p. 4.
45. Toughill, p. A01.
46. Richard Williams, Weighing the Options: Case Studies in Naval Interoperability and Canadian Sovereignty, Maritime Security Occasional Paper. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2004, p. 82. Williams also comments favourably on Commodore Girouard’s ability to remain within his OEF tasks at his pages 76-78, and 81-83.
47. Ibid. See also Gimblett, Operation Apollo, p.116.
50. Girouard, p. 2.
51. Ibid., p. 3.
52. Ibid., p. 4. The reported attack turned out to have been a false alarm.
53. This process was personally confirmed by General Henuault. Interview, p. 15.
56. Stein, p. 87.
57. Harvey, Smoke and Mirrors, 206.
58. Stein and Lang, 90.

Hamid and Harun lead HMCS Regina and HMNZS Te Mana in the Arabian Gulf, 6 May 2003.
Back to the Future: Canada’s Re-Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region

Bernard J. Brister

Canadian interests have long been influenced by events and developments in the Asia-Pacific region. The direct connections to and periodic engagements with the various sub-regions and individual states of the region go back more than a century, and in a number of cases, the nature of those relationships serve as startling contrasts to how many Canadians see themselves as icons of multiculturalism.

The nature of the modern relationship in the post-Second World War era was both unique and innovative in terms of western engagement with the region, until a deteriorating domestic fiscal situation forced a shortsighted retrenchment in policy. This was followed by a pre-occupation with and the dedication of scarce resources for international engagement to the stabilization of Afghanistan in the post-9/11 period.

More recently, however, as Canadian commitments in South Asia approach their conclusion, there appears to be a renewed interest on the part of government and business in the development of relationships in the region that serve the needs and interests of Canadians in the 21st Century. The genesis of this interest has roots in both Canada and the Asia-Pacific region itself (of which Canada is a part), and it can be considered from both economic and security perspectives.

Notwithstanding the recent conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union, the focus of Canadian trade and its economy had long ago shifted away from Europe. Focused upon the United States in the post-Second World War era, trade with Europe has been on the decline for several decades. The European economic linkages that are now second place to those that have been developed by Canada with the United States will shortly fall to third place as they are supplanted by linkages with Asia. As the decline in European trade continues, commerce with Asia continues to grow. In terms of the future, projected growth in the three global economic centres is
The prosperity and security that Canadians have traditionally drawn from their economic relationship with the United States may also be in for a fundamental change. A number of observers have noted that the benefits to Canada flowing from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have pretty much run their course. They contend that the potential for growth in the Canadian share of the American market is on the wane, and it may be an opportune moment to begin considering of what the ‘next big idea’ might be in the Canadian economic strategy that will generate the same magnitude of benefits that were generated by NAFTA over the last couple of decades.

Even the energy component of the Canada-United States economic relationship, a fundamental building block for decades as America continually sought ever-increasing volumes of energy from secure sources, is now entering a new era. Advances in recovery technology have increased recoverable domestic supplies of both oil and gas in the United States, such that America will potentially be self-sufficient in energy by 2015.

At the same time that supplies of energy are increasing both north and south of the border, the North American energy transportation infrastructure, in terms of pipelines and refining capacity, has not kept up. The Canadian energy industry has always been focused exclusively upon its biggest customer, the United States. The vast bulk of Canadian energy exports go into a pipeline system that runs north-south to its major customer, and also to the most cost-effective refining facilities that are located in the United States. With the increasing glut in domestic American energy production, and the Canadian marketing infrastructure running one-way into the United States, Canadian companies are forced to sell their product at discounts approaching $30/barrel in order to get it to market. Some estimates put the cost of this deep discounting at approximately $20 billion dollars per year in terms of lost revenue to the Canadian economy.

With issue of national energy security resolved at least temporarily for the United States, the American people and the administration of President Obama have adopted a much greater concern over the relative environmental impacts of various energy sources. Strangely, they have elected to focus upon the environmental effects of Canadian oil sands production, even as they continue to use the much dirtier coal to provide approximately 40 percent of their power needs. The net effect of this process of energy politicization will be the perpetuation of the deep-discount
phenomenon to which the Canadian energy industry is being subjected. The prioritization of American production access to American refining facilities, and then to markets both domestic and foreign, threatens to marginalize Canada as a budding energy ‘super power,’ and limit the extent to which Canadian national and international interests are served by a continued reliance upon American downstream energy infrastructure. It may be time for a change in strategy…

In terms of Canadian geostrategic security, the evolving story is not much different from the economic story. For most of the past century, Canadian security concerns have been focused upon political stability and the balance of power on the European landmass. After two world wars, and then the Cold War, which lasted almost half a century, it appears that Europe is at long last approaching a degree of stability. The military threat from the USSR has disappeared, and the use of energy by Russia as a coercive tool in European politics appears to be one that can be controlled by the European Union (EU). Europe, at least for the moment, appears to be in a position whereby the United States is not compelled to control European security affairs, and Canada does not feel obligated to participate in them by virtue of its history and heritage. While Canadian internationalism will probably involve some degree of participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the future, the trend in Canadian strategic multilateralism appears to be swinging toward interest-based coalition operations involving one-or-more partners of what is known as the “Five-Eyes” Community (Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand).

Similar to the European situation, security concerns on the North American continent seem to have stabilized into a steady state that could represent the long-term future. The realignment and reorganization of defence and security relationships within and between Canada and the United States, resulting from the end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11, appear to be effectively addressing the security and political concerns of both countries. The Cold War security infrastructure represented by the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement has been re-oriented towards a more comprehensive security mission, even while it has become part of a wider process of change and integration.

The changes that were undertaken within the NORAD agreement as a result of security events over the last two decades have been accompanied by the establishment of Canada Command (Canadacom) and Northern Command (Northcom). These two organizations are intended to improve national security in Canada and the United States, and to harmonize bilateral security efforts on the continent of North America. While the debate regarding the primacy of NORAD over Canadacom in the management of the cross-border security relationship is ongoing, the overall comprehensive security focus, based upon the existing infrastructure, appears to be relatively stable and capable of addressing future security continental security concerns.
Why Asia?

Similar to the discussion of the roots of change originating in Canada, the impetus for change in Canadian economic and security policy emanating from the Asia-Pacific region can be understood when considered from both an economic and a security perspective.

The transition of the region from a third-world source of raw materials and cheap labour in a colonial era, to the global centre of population and economic growth in the 21st Century has been nothing less than revolutionary. Of the three global economic centres (North America, Europe, and Asia), Asia will shortly become second largest behind North America, and it already possesses the greatest potential for future growth.

Asian states that include China, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and India already dominate major portions of global trade, and with rates of growth that have only recently dropped from double-digits to the high single digits, they represent the most lucrative global economic opportunities in the future. Where Europe can be seen as a competitor to Canadian commerce, Asia should be viewed as a customer. It represents the greatest potential for growth Canadian markets and the national economy, ahead of North America and far ahead of Europe.

The Northeast Asian triad of China, Japan, and South Korea is of particular note in this regard. Some estimates have China surpassing the United States as the world’s largest economy by as early as 2017. Historical and political differences aside, the integration of the three economies in Northeast Asia is proceeding apace, and even now, it represents one of the largest economic entities on the planet, with the potential to become the global centre of trade and commerce, and thus, a global locus for the demand for raw materials and services.

While much attention has been focused upon the extent to which the manufacturing function appears to be concentrating in Asia at the expense of countries such as Canada, the shift of first-world economies (including Canada) into the more lucrative service sector has received relatively little notice. The percentage of the Canadian economy devoted to manufacturing has been in decline for several decades, and its transition to the provision of services and the growth in the provision of raw materials, including those related to the production of energy, is not widely known or understood.

The potential for growth in the Canadian economy, particularly in the service and resource sectors, resulting from trade with Asia, represents the single greatest opportunity for the pursuit of Canadian economic interests in the post-Second World War era. Competing with Canada for business in the region are both the European Union and the United States.

While Canadians can and do compete effectively with their American and European counterparts in the service sector, possibly the greatest potential for growth in trade with Asia lies in the resource sector. Social and political stability in the region is contingent upon continuing and stable economic growth. Underpinning the sustenance of this growth is the acquisition of sufficient and secure supplies of energy. Canada is uniquely positioned (gifted?) to play a major role in the maintenance of economic growth and political stability in the region with its abundant supplies of key strategic energy resources, such as oil and gas.

A Greenpeace protester hangs from an oil storage tank at Kinder Morgan Energy's pipeline terminus in Burnaby, BC, 16 October 2013.
The major obstacle preventing the Canadian economy from capitalizing upon this opportunity is access to the markets for energy in Asia. With the major focus of the Canadian energy transportation infrastructure being upon feeding past American demand for oil and gas, the Canadian potential for opening new markets in Asia is limited and even controlled by the United States. Approaching American energy self-sufficiency will soon transition into a need to find export markets or surpluses, and as such, it will place American companies in direct competition with Canadian companies. Limited Canadian access to foreign markets is presently controlled by pipelines and the refining capacity existent in the United States. Recent resource, political, and environmental developments in the United States indicate that it is not in the political interests of the President or any number of environmental groups, and not in the business interests of American resource companies to take decisive action to remedy this Canadian problem.

The solution to the Canadian economic dilemma appears to be in gaining access to ‘tidewater’ via a transportation system controlled by Canadians to serve Canadian interests. Unfortunately, for the moment, the reconciliation of these interests among the various domestic groups involved (federal and provincial governments, First Nations, business and environmental groups) does not appear to be possible any time soon. Until that time arrives, Canadian economic interests and prosperity cannot be maximized and the potential for Canadian influence and participation in regional and global affairs will not be realized.

In contrast to the complexity of the economic issues involved with Canadian re-engagement in Asia, the security issues and rationale for a Canadian presence are relatively simple and straightforward.

The underlying objectives of Canadian internationalism have always been the maintenance of a peaceful and stable global environment. Such an environment facilitates Canadian security and prosperity by allowing the development of political, security, and economic relationships throughout the world. The increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region to Canada and the world in terms of trade, environmental issues, and human development relative to other regions simply serves to underline the need for Canada to focus and prioritize the allocation of its meager political, diplomatic and security capabilities on this region in order to maximize its own national interests.

There are a number of regional issues that might disrupt the peace and stability of the region, and thus interfere with the pursuit of Canadian interests. These issues include the resolution of Cold War enmities in Northeast Asia associated with North Korea. A thorn in the side of American interests in the region for decades, the antics of the Kim regime in North Korea had worked in the best interests of its primary sponsor and benefactor, China until recently. Now, as China becomes increasingly integrated in the Western economic system, the utility of the North Korean regime in the achievement of Chinese interests is on the wane. The problem now is how to remove the North Korean regime as an impediment to regional progress in the face of its development of nuclear weapons.
Another critical issue involves the resolution of ongoing disputes over territory between historical enemies in the region. The disputes involve relatively isolated, and, until now, innocuous pieces of rock claimed by China, Japan, and South Korea in the sea space known as the East China Sea by China. The disputes between China and South Korea and South Korea and Japan are relatively low-key affairs that simply serve to underline the historical political and social enmity between old empires dating back thousands of years.

The disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea and some states of Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia), and China in the South China Sea are different in that they pose real and proximate threats to regional peace and stability. Until recently, these long standing disputes had been collectively set aside by the states involved in order to pursue mutual self-interests by virtue of the development of peaceful relations in the region.

A growing demand for energy to feed economic development that will ensure domestic political stability has brought these disputes to the forefront of regional relations. A complicating factor is the rise of virulent nationalism in a number of the states involved that interferes with or even prevents the effective resolution of these disputes through the use of diplomacy and compromise. The increasing tensions among the states threaten regional peace and stability, which, in turn, inhibit the economic development and integration of the region, a process vital to the satisfaction of Canadian interests.
Perhaps as critical to the peace and stability for the region as good international relations is the issue of domestic social and political stability within the states themselves. A case in point is China. The amazing economic performance of this nation in the past two decades draws attention away from the fragile and incomplete social, economic, and political infrastructure that has supported it. The transition from Maoist economic policies to an ongoing experiment with a centrally controlled free-market economy has resulted in amazing advances in the wealth and welfare of the Chinese people. At the same time, it has created increasing demands upon the regime by and from those same people to provide social and political programs, as well as the economic support systems that are present in first-world free-market economies.

The Chinese Communist Party must balance the development of new and unfamiliar economic and financial structures and policies in order to ensure uninterrupted financial growth with the control mechanisms necessary for them to remain in power. They must also simultaneously develop and implement the social welfare and political support systems required of any first world economy and state. All this must be accomplished at a breakneck pace for the largest population of any state on the planet in order for the regime to retain the social permission of the Chinese people to rule the land. The number and complexity of the Gordian Knot of problems associated with this process are staggering, and the threat of domestic collapse and chaos is ever-present. The support and participation of regional partners in the development of the mechanisms for social, political, and financial governance in China will be critical to the nation’s survival, as well as the prosperity and stability of the region in general, and possibly, even the globe.

A final issue pertaining to regional security concerns the fabled ‘pivot’ or re-balancing of American attention to the region. It is difficult to clearly establish the direction of American policy with respect to it. It appears to be centred upon a vague policy combination of Cold War-type containment to keep China out of the Western economic and political system, and a more enlightened one of engagement intended to facilitate its integration with that system. Complicated by domestic political maneuvering and financial restraint in a time of economic recovery, the American approach to its Asia-Pacific relations worries its regional allies and supporters, as well as its regional competitors. Chinese officials contend that if American policies are not aimed at China, they most certainly are about China, and they bristle at what they see as inappropriate American intervention in regional affairs and relationships. American allies and supporters in the region attempt to balance the advantages of American support in the region with their own sovereignty and the benefits of developing a relationship with China. Both China and the United States are vying for power and influence in the region. The other states in the neighborhood are reluctant to take sides, and they have singularly refused to do so up to this point.

The Canadian Past in Asia

The extent to which Canadians can ‘weigh-in’ on these regional economic and security issues in the pursuit of their own interests as well as regional peace and stability is influenced to a great extent by their past engagement in the region.
As mentioned earlier, Canadian engagement in the region has not always fit well with the egalitarian, multicultural image many Canadians have of themselves. The Canadian government pursued policies that were both anti-immigration and explicitly racist towards Asian peoples from the early days of nationhood, and well into the 20th Century. Entry of Asians to Canada was initially restricted to males for work on the railroad, with the understanding that upon completion of their contract, they would be returned to their homeland. Later on, immigration was allowed, subject to the payment of a head tax and the segregation of Asian immigrants into their own communities. Japanese Canadians were removed from their homes and businesses in British Columbia during the Second World War, and kept in a series of internment camps. This policy was carried out in spite of an RCMP determination that they posed no threat to national security at the time. Upon their release, they were left to fend for themselves to rebuild their lives and fortunes.

Early Canadian participation in regional security issues included limited engagement in Hong Kong, Burma, and the Pacific during the Second World War, peacekeeping in India-Pakistan between 1949 and 1989, and participation in the Korean War between 1950 and 1953.

Politically, Canada has, on occasion, played a leading role in the development of relations with China after the success of the communist revolution. Recognizing the potential influence of the new regime in the region, Lester B. Pearson tried to generate political recognition of China by Canada as early as 1949, obtaining the passage of a Cabinet resolution before ultimately failing in his attempt. Later in the 1960s, when there was widespread famine in China as a result of the failure of Mao’s land reform policies, Canada provided China with millions of tons of wheat – on credit. In 1970, China did finally receive formal recognition by Canada in the face of American pressure not to do so. The next year, 1971, Canada sponsored China for membership in the United Nations.

In other parts of the region, Canada participated in a “Track 2” diplomatic process intended to bring North Korea into the regional diplomatic process. This initiative was called the “North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue,” and it was undertaken over the period from 1989 to 1993. Another diplomatic initiative was a partnering with Indonesia in the mid-1990s in the “South China Sea Workshop,” an attempt to address the territorial disputes in that area. In the mid-1990s, Canada was admitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, an organization devoted to the improvement of peace, stability, and good governance in that part of the world.

Notwithstanding these post-Second World War examples of security and political engagement, there has never been a coherent strategy of engagement undertaken by Canada in the region. Much of the formal government policy has focused upon economics, with the most visible aspect of these policies being the “Team Canada” trade expeditions of the 1990s.

What strategies, policies, and programs of engagement that did exist were discontinued in the mid-1990s, when political funding and attention turned inward to address a worsening domestic economic situation. Later, when economic circumstances did improve, national attention and resources were focused upon Canadian security commitments in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Most recently, the government, with no corporate memory of engagement with Asia or China, was reluctant to re-establish relations in the region, even in the face of an already shifting economic and security landscape. Time passed, however, and the federal government gradually warmed to the idea of engagement and recognized the potential benefits of doing so. There now somewhat belatedly appears to be a great amount of political and economic enthusiasm for re-engagement in the region in general, and specifically, with China.

There is recognition that not only does the region hold the greatest potential for economic engagement, but it is also one of the most lucrative sources of the $660 billion dollars of foreign direct investment that Canada will require in the next ten years to develop its economic and energy infrastructure. From a domestic political standpoint, the Asian diaspora in Canada is not only getting larger, it is also becoming more affluent and politically active, and, as such, it is pressing government to address regional issues and concerns that have the potential to influence Canadian political, security, and economic interests. Given all these factors, and both the reality of and the potential for Asian social, political, and economic development, Canadian re-engagement in the region seems not to be a question of ‘if,’ but ‘how.’

The Canadian Future in Asia

The first factor in the determination of the ‘how’ is consideration of a social/cultural factor. Asian people and their governments value consistency over time, and the establishment of personal
relationships. The Canadian track record for consistency in its Asian relationships is a poor one, and it will take time to establish a degree of credibility in the region before the benefits of a relationship can be realized. Patience and perseverance, not necessarily Western political or business virtues, will be required for success.

Having said that, there are economic advantages for Asian partners in the relatively rapid development of economic ties to Canada. Among these is long-term access to large volumes of energy from a politically stable and economically reliable partner. If Canada is able to address and overcome the domestic obstacles to the establishment of an energy infrastructure oriented to the Asian market, there appears to be more than enough Asian capital to finance its expeditious development on the basis of long term supply contracts, a ‘win-win situation’ for Canada and its regional partners.

A relationship that truly addresses all Canadian interests, however, including those of a diaspora growing in both size and domestic political influence, must address more than the purely economic aspects of an engagement strategy. It must also involve components that utilize the diplomatic and security levers of international power and influence.

Diplomatically, Canada can play on its reputation as an even-handed arbiter of disputes to assist the states involved in regional disputes in the development of solutions to those disagreements in either the long or the short term. What remains of its international reputation for diplomacy and the reality that it has nothing to gain or lose from a given solution to any issue (the Canadian interest would be in the peaceful resolution of the issue, not in one side or the other gaining any advantage) would make it a valuable resource for the preservation for peace and stability in a region beset with historical suspicions and animosity.

One drawback in the current strategy of re-engagement in the region has been the singular failure of Canada to gain access to any of the more useful and effective regional governance organizations. Specifically, Canadian membership in both the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM+) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) has been denied, at least for the time being. This is undoubtedly a consequence of the historically inconsistent Canadian engagement policy and its long absence from the region. Only perseverance and continuing attempts at the provision of diplomatic utility to the region will overcome this obstacle and enable political access to the more influential organizations of regional governance.

Another useful avenue of influence development that falls within the realm of diplomacy is assistance in the development of best practices and good governance in the evolving economic and political infrastructure of the region. Assistance and stabilization of the rapidly growing and developing social, political, and economic infrastructure of countries such as China is an essential element of regional peace and stability. Canada can be a source of the expertise required to assist in the development of the needed infrastructure in this regard, and the use of its experience and expertise in these areas carries none of the ‘political baggage’ that would accompany an American offer to do the same thing.

With respect to American interests in the region, the parallel nature of those interests with those of Canada would mean that Canadian relationship successes in the region would also be American successes. Further, as with other times and other regions, Canada and Canadian diplomats can sometimes be employed as interlocutors on issues where direct interaction is deemed inappropriate for either domestic or international political reasons.
Lastly, the presence on many of the regional fora of a long-time friend and ally with similar interests in the region would be welcomed, and this nuanced aspect of Canadian participation in the region, in and of itself, may provide some benefits in terms of the Canada-United States relationship.

Of the three main avenues of re-engagement, that of security is perhaps the most limited for Canada and the resources it has available for its internationalist agenda in the region. The Canadian military is relatively small, and in general, its capabilities must be husbanded for use in the direct security of the state in accordance with the Canada First strategy. However, there are a number of ways that the Canadian Armed Forces can contribute to the success of a Canadian strategy of re-engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.

The first would be through the employment of the humanitarian assistance/disaster response resources held by the military. Timely and effective contributions to domestic stability after a disaster are not quickly forgotten, and in addition to the demonstration of Canadian values, they can contribute to the satisfaction of Canadian interests in the longer term.

Another contribution by the military could be through participation in what are known as “Confidence Building Measures,” or CBMs. These measures would initially be based upon participation in scenarios using military assets involving the common good, such as search and rescue and anti-piracy endeavours. Some of the scarce Canadian military resources could be contributed on a case-by-case basis to CBMs in order to initiate or foster military-to-military relationships between states that may find themselves in a confrontation with each other in the future. If such confrontations were to occur, the leaders on both sides would benefit from a mutual knowledge and understanding of the other’s tactics, techniques, and procedures that could be used to defuse a given situation before an actual engagement were to occur.

A third use of the military with respect to the development of a Canadian re-engagement strategy for Asia would be an educational/training variation of the CBM approach to relationship development. Acquiring knowledge of the region, its politics, and its security concerns is essential for effective government and military engagement. To this end, Canadian military educational and training institutions, at all levels and in all services, could make slots available for use by selected regional clients and allies. The opportunity to attend a Western military educational or training institution would be of value to the foreign military involved in learning to work closer with friends, or to understand potential adversaries, and the Canadian military could use the same opportunity to make itself familiar with the workings of Asian governments and their militaries.

The Road Ahead

Canadian economic and security interests are undergoing a period of fundamental change that involves a shift in emphasis away from the historic North Atlantic relationship, and even from the traditional post-Second World War relationship with the United States. The impetus for these changes lies in the deterioration of relationships in Europe, the stagnation of relationships in North America, and the budding opportunities to pursue Canadian interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Canadian legacy of engagement in the region is inconsistent, and establishing the value and credibility of Canadian contributions to the economic progress, as well as the peace and stability of the region, will take time. One strategy to achieve this objective, while simultaneously pursuing Canadian economic and security interests, is to lead with an economic policy that encourages the development of Canada as a secure, long-term and stable source of energy supplies to support regional prosperity. The central economic thrust of this strategy should be supported by diplomatic and security policies that build upon the Canadian brand in the region, and support the maintenance of a peaceful stable environment.
Combating the Impact of Stigma on Physically Injured and Mentally Ill Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Members

G. Robert Arrabito and Anna S. Leung

Military service is often physically and psychologically demanding. Physical injury and mental illness causing significant functional impairment are not uncommon when military duty is performed in Canada and abroad. When a member becomes physically injured or mentally ill, the objective for all concerned is to facilitate the return to health and full productivity of the member.

The CAF provides necessary services and programs to restore physically injured and mentally ill members to health and optimal functioning. The successive phases of rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration of the member into the CAF involve creating an active partnership among the member, the health care/support staff team, and the command/supervisory team. This partnership enables the CAF to encourage treatment and improve health outcomes that would get treated members back to health faster, and possibly retain them longer in the military. Early recognition and intervention with physical and mental health problems generally leads to better health outcomes.

If a physically injured or mentally ill member cannot resume employment in his/her military occupation, the CAF will retain the member in an alternate military occupation, provided that the member meets minimum operational standards related to universality of service. The government of Canada provides the assistance necessary to make new lives for physically injured and mentally ill members, should they be unable to resume military service. For
those who are able to resume military service, the CAF operates the return to work (RTW) program for members of the Regular Force and the Primary Reserve. The objective of the CAF RTW program is to facilitate the restoration of the physical and mental health of physically injured or mentally ill members by helping them reintegrate into the workplace as soon as medically possible. Work is an important part of human life. Return to work has benefits for both the employer and the employee. Employers retain valued employees and reduce the costs of training replacement workers. For employees, returning to daily work and life activities can help with their recovery and reduce the chance of long-term disability. In fact, studies have shown that employment is beneficial for promoting health and subjective well-being.

Physically injured and mentally ill members have a better outcome of navigating the successive phases of recovery, rehabilitation, and return to military service if there is a reduction in stigma (i.e., negative and erroneous attitudes). Stigma is sometimes more difficult and time-consuming to address than are problems associated with the rehabilitation process. It can interfere with the creation of a supportive work environment, which is critical for unit cohesion, morale, and ultimately, for operational effectiveness. The CAF is actively promoting awareness, education, and training in order to effect lasting cultural change in reducing the impact of stigma on physically injured and mentally ill members.

This article will discuss how the CAF is combating the impact of stigma on physically injured and mentally ill members. We begin by defining stigma, and then highlight five of its harmful effects. Next, interventions in a civilian context for stigma-reduction are discussed. This is followed by five CAF programs that incorporate interventions for stigma-reduction. The value of these programs is highlighted through the progress made in changing the CAF culture during the last ten years. Finally, we present personal actions for reducing stigma directed at members who become physically injured or mentally ill, and for able-bodied members. Our objective is to provide a balanced discussion of the impact of stigma on both physically injured and mentally ill members, based upon publically available data, and to advocate that personal actions of individuals can reduce stigma.

**Stigma**

Stigma is a mark of disgrace that sets a person apart from others. Stigma exists when there are elements of stereotyping, labeling, and discrimination. Stereotypes are commonly-held beliefs about the shared traits or characteristics of a group of individuals (i.e., elderly, ethnic, and racial minorities, and persons with disabilities). They are typically based upon misunderstanding and overgeneralization. As such, they can be positive or negative in nature. Negative stereotypes are
beliefs that attribute undesirable or negative characteristics to a group. For example, there is a misperception linking violence to mental health. Persons with a mental illness are no more likely than anyone else to commit a violent crime. The conditions that increase the risk of violence are the same regardless of whether a person has a mental illness. In fact, people with a mental illness are more likely to be victims than perpetrators of violence.6

Stereotyping generates the use of labels. People assign labels such as ‘psycho,’ ‘loony,’ ‘crazy,’ and ‘nuts’ to describe a person who has a mental illness. These labels can hurt. Labels deny the stigmatized person the right to be judged as an individual with likes and dislikes, strengths and weaknesses.

Labels lead to discrimination. Discrimination is the behavioural reaction of unequal or unfair treatment of a person that occurs on the basis of an attribute of the stigmatized group.7 Although discrimination may not always be obvious, it exists, and it hurts.

Impact of Stigma

Stigma can lead others to discriminate against persons with disabilities (PWDs) in many situations. Five of these are highlighted in this section: denial of disability, reluctance for persons with a mental illness to seek medical treatment, avoidant behaviour toward PWDs, stigma by association, and stigma as a barrier to employment of PWDs. Any of these could negatively affect the reintegration of physically injured and mentally ill members into the CAF, or their transition into civilian life.

Denial of Disability

Some disabilities are more easily concealed than others. Individuals who could describe themselves as having a disability must weigh the costs and benefits of disclosing their disability (i.e., traumatic brain injury, mental illness). People are less likely to accept their disability if they perceive social discrimination.8 PWDs may deny the disability by attempting to conceal it. They may try to ‘pass’ as an able-bodied person by hiding or downplaying their disability. In this manner, it may be possible to deliberately pass as an able-bodied person in order to exert some control over the negative impressions that others may have.

Concealing a disability via secrecy and suppression carries an emotional cost for the stigmatized person. Attempts to pass carries an able-bodied person may lead to feelings of isolation, fraud, and fear of discovery.9 In an effort to hide their true identities, those with concealable stigmas can become obsessively preoccupied with daily thoughts of their stigmas (i.e., having to remember what was shared with whom), which can have detrimental effects upon their physical and psychological well-being.10 Individuals who attempt to conceal their stigmas often experience difficulties with respect to the development and maintenance of social relationships, as self-disclosure is a necessary ingredient for having a meaningful relationship.

Reluctance for Persons with a Mental Illness to Seek Medical Treatment

Mental illness is the Number One cause of disability in Canada. In fact, one-in-five Canadians will likely suffer from a mental illness in their lifetime.11 Mental illness can afflict anyone regardless of sex, age, race, culture, wealth, career, ethnic origin, or social status. Mental illnesses have a bewildering array of symptoms that can lead to debilitating lifelong conditions. A mental illness is not a sign of weak will or a lack of moral fibre. Rather, mental illness can be as debilitating as physical injuries.12

The effective diagnosis and treatment of a mental illness can occur only after it is self-reported. However, people are generally reluctant to talk about a mental illness. As reported in the 2008 Canadian 8th Annual National Report Card on Health Care, only half of Canadians would tell friends or co-workers that they have a family member suffering from a mental illness (50%), compared to a greater majority of Canadians who would discuss diagnoses of cancer (72%) or diabetes (68%) in the family.13

This reluctance in sharing information with respect to a mental illness with others can have a negative impact upon an individual seeking mental health care services. Of those Canadians who indicated that they have experienced symptoms associated with mental illness in the past year, one-in-five (21%) did not seek help.15 In a large 2002 survey of the CAF, of those who did not seek mental health care services in the past year (but acknowledged a need for them), approximately one-third stated fear of stigma as a perceived barrier to treatment-related services (information, medication, and counseling/therapy).16 Avoiding or delaying treatment is unfortunate because most mental illnesses can be treated.17 The mental fitness of members is as important as physical fitness for successfully accomplishing tasks in the CAF.

Avoidant Behaviour toward Persons with Disabilities

Persons with a physical disability or mental illness are often socially exiled or avoided by able-bodied persons. Distinguished psychologist/sociologist and Dartmouth College Research Professor Emeritus Dr. Robert E. Kleck and his colleagues, in a number of laboratory experiments, demonstrated that able-bodied participants engage in avoidance behaviors when interacting with a left-leg amputee (simulated using a specially designed wheelchair).18 Included in such behaviors are: standing at greater speaking distances, terminating conversation prematurely, and smiling less.

Survey data reports on social distance from people with mental disorders by able-bodied persons. The majority of Canadians (55%) said they would be unlikely to enter into a spousal relationship with someone who has a mental illness, as reported in the 2008 Canadian 8th Annual National Report Card on Health Care.19 Data from the 1996 General Social Survey showed that a majority of Americans are unwilling to work next to, spend an evening socializing with, or have a family member marry an individual with mental illness.20 Of the respondents from the National Stigma Study – Children (NSSC), approximately one-in-five adults declared themselves unwilling to
have a child or adolescent with mental health problems live next door, be in his or her child’s classroom, or be his or her child’s friend. The majority of NSSC respondents also reported stronger preferences for social distance from children and adolescents with mental health problems, as compared to those with physical illnesses.

**Stigma by Association**

Not only does the PWD have to face the debilitating effects of stigma, but stigma tends to spread to family members and others with whom the stigmatized person associates. Some parents whose child marries a PWD dread the reactions of their friends and neighbours, and some parents whose child marries a PWD believe a disability is the outward sign of an internal flaw that will affect the marriage or their future grandchildren. A caregiver for someone with depression may be viewed with suspicion; indeed, it is not unheard of for people to inquire whether one can catch depression in the same manner as the common cold. For families, stigma by association involves feelings of fear, shame, anger, and perceived helplessness. These views can be damaging to family members who are already struggling under challenging circumstances.

**Stigma as a Barrier to Employment of Persons with Disabilities**

Stigma negatively affects the employment of PWDs. Many individuals believe that PWDs are not employable. As such, PWDs experience prejudicial attitudes when seeking employment. Survey data show that, compared to their able-bodied counterparts, PWDs have lower employment levels, are employed more often in part-time jobs, and have a lower annual income. However, having a physical injury or mental illness does not preclude an individual from being productive or even from being a superior employee. PWDs need to be judged upon the basis of their capability with any given accommodation (i.e., making facilities wheelchair accessible, and requesting flex hours to seek medical treatment for a mental illness), and not upon the basis of their disability.

**Interventions to Reduce Stigma**

The impact of stigma upon a PWD may be as harmful as the direct effects of the disability. Various government agencies, charitable organizations, and advocacy groups rely upon a variety of strategies to reduce the impact of stigma upon PWDs. This requires interventions to replace negative stereotypes with more enlightened views of disability that will hopefully enhance the quality of life for PWDs. This section presents three stigma-reduction interventions: protest, education, and contact. Although these interventions are presented separately, they are not always conducted in isolation from one another.

**Protest**

Protest is a reactive strategy designed to reduce the impact of stigma upon PWDs. Forms of protest include writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper, or lobbying Members of Parliament. Advocacy groups may protest hostile and inaccurate representations of disabilities, such as those portrayed in the media or in movies. For example, The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
and their families, who are affected by an operational stress injury in close proximity to bases across Canada. The program provides effective interventions for stigma reduction. These programs incorporate education and contact, which are upon the quality of the contact, because negative experiences can increase stigma. Contact with PWDs may augment the effects of education in reducing stigma. For instance, facilitating face-to-face interaction between able-bodied persons, and persons who have a mental illness, provides an opportunity for the public to meet persons with disorders such as schizophrenia, for example, who are gainfully employed, or who live as good neighbours in a community. These contacts can reduce the stigma associated with a mental problem. Instructors or facilitators who have a mental illness can discuss their experiences. The public can learn about the disability experience and challenge their preconceived notions. However, much depends upon the quality of the contact, because negative experiences can increase stigma.

Programs for Combating Stigma in the Canadian Armed Forces

The CAF has programs whose goals include reducing stigma and maximizing operational effectiveness in both the short- and long-term. Five of these programs are presented in this section: Operational Stress Injury Social Support, Mental Health and Operational Stress Injury Joint Speakers Bureau, Road to Mental Readiness, commemorative events to celebrate International Day for Persons with Disabilities, and Soldier On. These programs incorporate education and contact, which are effective interventions for stigma reduction.

Operational Stress Injury Social Support

The Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS) program is a network of peer support coordinators located in major cities and in close proximity to bases across Canada. The program provides confidential peer support and social support to CAF members, veterans and their families, who are affected by an operational stress injury (OSI). An OSI is broadly defined as any persistent psychological difficulties (i.e., anxiety, depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder) resulting from operational duties performed by CAF personnel in Canada or abroad. This support is offered by individuals who have themselves experienced an OSI, and by family members who fully understand, through their own experiences, OSI issues.

The OSISS program was founded in 2001 by Lieutenant-Colonel Stéphane Grenier, Special Advisor on OSIs, who suffered an OSI resulting from his deployment to Rwanda. The goal of OSISS is to increase knowledge and understanding of non-visible injuries and illness, thereby changing attitudes and behaviours toward mental health that can help erode stigma.

Education

Education provides accurate information about mental illness, so that the public can make more informed decisions with respect to a disability. This can help challenge inaccurate information perpetuated by common stereotypes applied to persons with mental illness (i.e., incompetent, irresponsible, dangerous, unpredictable, at fault for their illness, or unlikely to recover). The information can be dispensed through public service announcements, workshops, brochures, posters, and websites. However, the success of educational efforts largely depends upon the type and method of information that is disseminated.

Contact

Contact with PWDs may augment the effects of education in reducing stigma. For instance, facilitating face-to-face interaction between able-bodied persons, and persons who have a mental illness, provides an opportunity for the public to meet persons with disorders such as schizophrenia, for example, who are gainfully employed, or who live as good neighbours in a community. These contacts can reduce the stigma associated with a mental problem. Instructors or facilitators who have a mental illness can discuss their experiences. The public can learn about the disability experience and challenge their preconceived notions. However, much depends upon the quality of the contact, because negative experiences can increase stigma.

Programs for Combating Stigma in the Canadian Armed Forces

The CAF has programs whose goals include reducing stigma and maximizing operational effectiveness in both the short- and long-term. Five of these programs are presented in this section: Operational Stress Injury Social Support, Mental Health and Operational Stress Injury Joint Speakers Bureau, Road to Mental Readiness, commemorative events to celebrate International Day for Persons with Disabilities, and Soldier On. These programs incorporate education and contact, which are effective interventions for stigma reduction.

Operational Stress Injury Social Support

The Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS) program is a network of peer support coordinators located in major cities and in close proximity to bases across Canada. The program provides confidential peer support and social support to CAF members, veterans and their families, who are affected by an operational stress injury (OSI). An OSI is broadly defined as any persistent psychological difficulties (i.e., anxiety, depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder) resulting from operational duties performed by CAF personnel in Canada or abroad. This support is offered by individuals who have themselves experienced an OSI, and by family members who fully understand, through their own experiences, OSI issues.

The OSISS program was founded in 2001 by Lieutenant-Colonel Stéphane Grenier, Special Advisor on OSIs, who suffered an OSI resulting from his deployment to Rwanda. The goal of OSISS is to increase knowledge and understanding of non-visible injuries and illness, thereby changing attitudes and behaviours toward mental health that can help erode stigma.

Education

Education provides accurate information about mental illness, so that the public can make more informed decisions with respect to a disability. This can help challenge inaccurate information perpetuated by common stereotypes applied to persons with mental illness (i.e., incompetent, irresponsible, dangerous, unpredictable, at fault for their illness, or unlikely to recover). The information can be dispensed through public service announcements, workshops, brochures, posters, and websites. However, the success of educational efforts largely depends upon the type and method of information that is disseminated.

Contact

Contact with PWDs may augment the effects of education in reducing stigma. For instance, facilitating face-to-face interaction between able-bodied persons, and persons who have a mental illness, provides an opportunity for the public to meet persons with disorders such as schizophrenia, for example, who are gainfully employed, or who live as good neighbours in a community. These contacts can reduce the stigma associated with a mental problem. Instructors or facilitators who have a mental illness can discuss their experiences. The public can learn about the disability experience and challenge their preconceived notions. However, much depends upon the quality of the contact, because negative experiences can increase stigma.

Programs for Combating Stigma in the Canadian Armed Forces

The CAF has programs whose goals include reducing stigma and maximizing operational effectiveness in both the short- and long-term. Five of these programs are presented in this section: Operational Stress Injury Social Support, Mental Health and Operational Stress Injury Joint Speakers Bureau, Road to Mental Readiness, commemorative events to celebrate International Day for Persons with Disabilities, and Soldier On. These programs incorporate education and contact, which are effective interventions for stigma reduction.

Operational Stress Injury Social Support

The Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS) program is a network of peer support coordinators located in major cities and in close proximity to bases across Canada. The program provides confidential peer support and social support to CAF members, veterans and their families, who are affected by an operational stress injury (OSI). An OSI is broadly defined as any persistent psychological difficulties (i.e., anxiety, depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder) resulting from operational duties performed by CAF personnel in Canada or abroad. This support is offered by individuals who have themselves experienced an OSI, and by family members who fully understand, through their own experiences, OSI issues.

The OSISS program was founded in 2001 by Lieutenant-Colonel Stéphane Grenier, Special Advisor on OSIs, who suffered an OSI resulting from his deployment to Rwanda. The goal of OSISS is to increase knowledge and understanding of non-visible injuries and illness, thereby changing attitudes and behaviours toward mental health that can help erode stigma.

Mental Health and Operational Stress Injury Joint Speakers Bureau

The Mental Health and Operational Stress Injury Joint Speakers Bureau (JSB) was formed in 2007 when the OSISS Speakers Bureau joined together with the then-CF Health Services Group Headquarters. The JSB is an educational program based upon effective strategies aimed at health promotion, mental illness prevention, and upon decreasing stigma. It takes a two-pronged approach. First, the JSB operates by improving the mental health literacy of individual soldiers and their families, and by recommending concrete actions to improve mental health. Second, the JSB targets leadership to create a supportive environment, to improve morale, and to increase operational effectiveness through unit cohesion.

An example of an effective JSB strategy is the mental health continuum model, which was developed by the then-CF Health Services Group in collaboration with the U.S. Marine Corps Department of Psychiatry. The model describes four mental states, ranging from healthy to ill, and provides indicators that may be manifested during these states. These stages of behaviour follow a continuum, with movement in both directions, indicating that there is always the possibility for a return to full mental health and functioning. Steps are also included in the model designed to provide support to persons experiencing mental health problems.

A key component of the JSB is a partnership between peers and mental health professionals at all levels of the organization to establish credibility and connection with participants. The peers are military members who have recovered from an OSI, trained to speak to CAF personnel about their own experience with respect to OSIs. Their real-life experience elicits emotional reactions and produces a strong effect upon attitudinal change. The inclusion of experienced mental health professionals is important in developing and delivering mental health education. They have up-to-date theoretical and practical knowledge of mental health issues, and they can serve as credible sources when speaking to an audience.

The JSB has a rigorous screening and selection process for both peers and mental health clinicians. By combining peers’ personal accounts of OSIs and information delivered by mental health clinicians, the JSB can promote stigma-reduction of OSIs and potentially can increase the likelihood that a military member will seek care, which results in better treatment outcomes. Preliminary data suggest the JSB curriculum is having short-term effects on shifting attitudes and increasing knowledge.
Road to Mental Readiness

In 2010, the CAF launched the pre- and post-deployment training program known as Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR). The goal of R2MR is to improve short-term performance and long-term mental health outcomes for CAF members and their families. R2MR has four key learning objectives. These are: (1) understanding stress reactions; (2) identifying challenges of deployment and their impact; (3) learning and applying strategies to mitigate the impact of stress; and, (4) recognizing when and where to seek support. In this manner, R2MR hopes to improve mental health literacy to benefit individuals struggling with mental illness, but also to ensure that leaders who recognize the signs provide a supportive environment that fosters recovery.

R2MR is delivered in six phases over the deployment cycle: (1) pre-deployment; (2) reinforcement; (3) family pre-deployment; (4) third-location decompression; (5) home-location decompression; and, (6) post-deployment follow-up. Additionally, key concepts presented in the R2MR curriculum are being integrated into the CAF leadership training.

Commemorating International Day for Persons with Disabilities

The Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) commemorates the International Day for Persons with Disabilities (IDPWD) on 3 December annually, as proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1981. It aims to promote an understanding of disability issues and to increase awareness of the benefits society has to gain from the integration of PWDs in every aspect of social, political, and economic life. Commemorative events are held throughout DND/CAF in early December to create awareness of disability issues and their solutions, and to recognize the achievements and the valuable contributions made by DND employees and CAF members who have a disability.

There is a designated theme each year to commemorate IDPWD. For example, the 2011 IDPWD was commemorated under the theme One Destination, Many Paths, inviting DND employees and CAF members to learn about and reflect on concrete actions they can take in their day-to-day business for both military members and civilian employees who use different paths to get to the same destination. Previous events to celebrate IDPWD include motivational guest speakers, demonstrations, a sledge hockey game between the Canadian Paralympic Sledge Hockey Team and the Edmonton Garrison, Yoga Warrior class (a pilot project at Canadian Forces Base Borden to help members cope with post-traumatic stress disorder), workshops, lunch and learn sessions, and information kiosks.

Soldier On

The Soldier On program strives to aid in rehabilitation and to improve the quality of life of CAF members and veterans who have a physical injury or mental illness, through physical fitness activity, recreation, or sport. It was founded in 2006 by Warrant Officer Andrew McLean, a CAF Search and Rescue Technician and marathon runner, and Mr. Greg Lagacé, the Paralympic Development Manager with the Canadian Paralympic Committee.

Not only does physical exercise improve health, persons with a physical disability who exercise may reduce the stigma associated with the disability by creating a positive impression on others. Participants in a laboratory study were asked to read a description of a man or woman with a spinal cord injury who was described as an exerciser, non-exerciser, or control (i.e., no exercise.
information was provided for the person with a spinal cord injury), and then rated the person being described on 17 personality and nine physical dimensions. The study demonstrated significantly more favourable ratings for the exerciser than both the non-exerciser and control on almost all dimensions.48

Culture Change in the Canadian Armed Forces

The CAF actively promotes awareness, education, and training through the aforementioned programs that incorporate interventions for stigma-reduction in order to affect lasting cultural change. Senior leadership recognizes the importance of reducing stigma. The former Chief of Defence Staff, General (Ret’d) Walter Natynczyk, officially launched the mental health awareness campaign on 25 June 2009 as part of a new strategy to combat the stigma associated with mental illness in the CAF.49 The CAF Health Services Group has an active research program that regularly surveys attitudes toward mental health care, develops promising approaches to changing attitudes, and validates the effectiveness of these interventions. The Individual Behaviour and Performance Section at Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto is studying the process of post-deployment reintegration (in the work, family, and personal domain), and is exploring the factors that may hinder or facilitate reintegration.

There is evidence that the CAF programs and policies are fostering a culture of understanding and acceptance of physically injured and mentally ill members. For example, Captain Simon Mailloux is the first CAF amputee to redeploy to Afghanistan.50 He lost the lower portion of his left leg when the armoured vehicle he was commanding struck an improvised explosive device. His return to Afghanistan was justified by proving he was physically and mentally fit to handle the rigours of redeployment.

The positive shift in culture in stigma-reduction is an important activity for the CAF as its members continuously identify and respond to deficiencies in the well-being of physically injured and mentally ill members. In order to appreciate the state of present-day culture in the CAF, stigma is less of a problem now than ten years ago, according to the DND/CAF Ombudsman, who reports publicly on significant matters affecting the welfare of the Defence community. The 2008 DND/CF Ombudsman special report stated that the stigma associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other OSIs remains a real problem at a number of military establishments across Canada.51 The Ombudsman noted that a culture change is still needed. Ombudsman McFadyen found that following the completion of the original 2002 DND/CF Ombudsman investigation, CAF members diagnosed with PTSD were often stigmatized as being fakers, malingerers, or as being weak and incapable. Moreover, when CAF members were
diagnosed with mental health problems, they frequently felt shunned and sidelined. As well, military families had little, if any, support available to help them understand and cope with these problems. As a result of this widespread stigma, military members suffering from PTSD or other OSIs were often reluctant to seek help.52

While the CAF had made progress in treating members who have a mental illness as reported in the 2009-2010 DND/CF Ombudsman report, the Ombudsman stated that there are a large number of current military sufferers and an even larger number of anticipated sufferers that demand additional review and evaluation by the Office of the Ombudsman.53 More recently, the 2010-2011 DND/CF Ombudsman report states that the CAF is making some progress in reducing the stigma of mental illness.54 However, the stigma associated with OSIs and other mental health issues is still very much a concern, especially among more junior members who worry about the impact of a diagnosis upon their careers. Moreover, several military spouses mentioned that their partners chose not to seek treatment, due to stigma. Spouses were also concerned that their partner would be released from the CAF due to an OSI.

The CAF is paying attention to the challenges that remain in stigma-reduction. Significant culture change takes time in a large organization like the CAF. This demanding mission has been made easier by the leadership at the national level that champions culture change. Most notably, the mental health awareness campaign was launched by the Chief of Defence Staff, General (Ret’d) Walter Natynczyk, as part of a strategy to combat the stigma associated with mental illness in the CAF.55 Without this strong and committed leadership, culture change is much more difficult to initiate, and it takes even longer to fully implement. The CAF is fortunate to have dedicated mental health professionals at military establishments across Canada delivering support and doing as much as they possibly can to help members suffering from PTSD and other OSIs. While recognizing that more needs to be done to reduce stigma, at the same time, it is also important to celebrate the positive shift in culture.

**Personal Actions to Reduce Stigma**

Reducing the impact of stigma depends highly upon the personal actions of individuals. An important principle is to treat physically injured and mentally ill members as they would want to be treated. To help guide behavioural decisions, recommendations for stigma-reduction directed at members who become physically injured or mentally ill, as well as able-bodied members, are presented in this section. We compiled
these recommendations by consulting websites pertaining to persons with disabilities (PWDs; see Table 1).

The following are recommendations for stigma-reduction directed at physically injured and mentally ill members:

- Do not be ashamed to ask for help;
- Never apologize for your disability;
- Share your experiences;
- Educate others about your disability;
- Dispel myths or stereotypes about PWDs; and
- Have a positive attitude

The following are recommendations for stigma-reduction directed at able-bodied members:

- Know the facts
  - Learn more about stigma, discrimination, and disability
  - Recognize and challenge myths, stereotypes, and inaccurate information with respect to disabilities
  - Listen to the stories that PWDs have to share
- Monitor your attitudes and your behaviour
  - Be aware of your attitudes and behaviour toward PWDs
  - Avoid prejudging or stigmatizing PWDs on the basis of stereotypes
- Focus on the positive attributes of PWDs
  - Be inclusive of PWDs and be cognizant of their needs
  - Empathize with PWDs by trying to ‘walk in their shoes’
- Resist common, negative stereotypes about disabilities
- Be proactive
- Speak up about stigma
- Choose your words carefully – certain terms or expressions can depersonalize PWDs, such as referring to a person as depressed for a diagnosed mental illness of depression, rather than by the person’s abilities, skills, or qualities
- Talk openly about disabilities in a respectful manner
- Provide an environment that includes and accommodates the needs of PWDs

Conclusion

Members who become physically injured or mentally ill have a better chance of navigating the successive phases of recovery, rehabilitation, and return to military service if there is a reduction in stigma. Stigma is real, and the associated psychological and emotional pain hurts physically injured and mentally ill members, their family and friends. I, G. Robert Arrabito, (the first author of this article), can attest to the harmful impact of stigma as I have a disability. I was diagnosed at birth with an eye disease that eventually resulted in total blindness. I experience stigma and discrimination from time-to-time in various facets of my life, but these instances are infrequent and have little impact upon my subjective well-being. In many cases, I attribute people’s disrespectful behavior to ignorance, and I take the opportunity to educate people on my capabilities in an effort to reduce stigma. I accept my disability, and I am not ashamed to ask for help when necessary. Similarly, if physically injured and mentally ill members are to live fulfilling lives in the service of Canada, they should have the expectation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Resource</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Addiction and Mental Health</td>
<td><a href="http://www.camh.ca/en/education/Patients-Families-Public/Resources/Pages/default.aspx">http://www.camh.ca/en/education/Patients-Families-Public/Resources/Pages/default.aspx</a></td>
<td>Mental health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Human Rights Commission</td>
<td><a href="http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/eng/content/resources">http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/eng/content/resources</a></td>
<td>Canadian Human Rights Act and information on disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Living Canada</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ilcanada.ca/article/independent-living-library-120.asp">http://www.ilcanada.ca/article/independent-living-library-120.asp</a></td>
<td>Independent living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Amps</td>
<td><a href="http://www.waramps.ca/nac/resources.html">http://www.waramps.ca/nac/resources.html</a></td>
<td>War Amps resource booklets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1– Websites of organizations for persons with disabilities.
of seeking treatment without fear of stigma, and returning to previous military occupations whenever possible.

The return to work of physically injured and mentally ill members has benefits for both the employer and the employee. The understanding and acceptance of physically injured and mentally ill members can open doors to new ways of thinking, and, ultimately, can enhance CAF operational effectiveness. An important principle is to treat physically injured and mentally ill members as they would want to be treated.

The CAF is making significant inroads in fostering a culture of understanding and acceptance of physically injured and mentally ill members in order to effect lasting cultural change. It continuously evaluates the effectiveness of programs and policies that incorporate components of stigma-reduction, and responds to deficiencies in the well-being of physically injured and mentally ill members. Steps to overcome stigma must be taken, not only by able-bodied members, but also by physically injured and mentally ill members. In particular, better health outcomes require the physically injured and mentally ill member to be an active participant in the recovery effort.

Combating stigma cannot cease, as undoubtedly, CAF members will continue to undertake perilous new missions in Canada and abroad. In preparation for at least a continuance of physically injured and mentally ill members (particularly mental health issues) in the years ahead, the goal is to diminish stigma so that CAF members feel as comfortable coming forward as early as possible in talking about their mental health problems as they do when discussing their physical health problems. The earlier a mental health problem is identified, the sooner one can intervene and improve health outcomes. The silent suffering of members with a mental illness takes a toll upon their lives, and ultimately, upon military readiness and effectiveness.
NOTES

1. DAOD 5023-1 – Minimum Operational Standards Related to University of Service.
2. ADM(HR-MIL) Instruction 05/03 Canadian Forces – Return to Work Policy and Guidance.
15. Ibid, p. 4.
23. DeLoach and Greer, p. 104.
33. Corrigan and Penn, p. 768.
34. Ibid, p. 768.
35. Ibid, p. 769.
37. Ibid, p. 768.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid, p. 768.
40. CANFORGEN 093/08.
47. Ibid, p. 151.
51. Ibid, p. 16.
Military Individual Readiness: An Overview of the Individual Components of the Adam, Hall, and Thomson Model Adapted to the Canadian Armed Forces

David Blackburn

Major Dave Blackburn, B.Soc.Sc, M.S.W., Ph.D., RSW, holds a doctorate in social sciences with a specialization in sociology of health, and a master’s degree in social work. He has been posted to the Mental Health Directorate of the Canadian Armed Forces Health Services Headquarters since September 2011, where he works as a staff officer in the Mental Health Training and Education Cell.

Introduction

There are several functional definitions of military individual readiness (IR). Some researchers define military IR from the individual’s point of view, based solely upon cognitive dimensions. Other researchers approach the concept from a more holistic perspective and include social factors. Nevertheless, in the scientific literature in general and the military scientific literature, there is no consensus on the definition of military IR. Tucker, Sinclair, and Thomas feel that there is no real consensus on either the concept of operational readiness or its functional definition.

Nevertheless, within the scientific community, certain aspects of the readiness concept are areas of consensus: for example that IR is the state of being mentally or physically prepared for an experience or action. That definition has the virtue of emphasizing mental and physical aspects as key elements of readiness.

The Individual Readiness Model Adapted to the Canadian Armed Forces

Adam, Hall, and Thomson, using all the findings that are currently available in research on individual readiness, created an IR model adapted to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). For them, military IR is a product of factors that include the units, the family, and the individual. The model includes the processes at the organizational and unit levels that influence factors that include or define individual readiness according to the authors. Individual readiness is a precursor to optimal performance and efficiency. IR therefore becomes an end in and of itself as well as a factor that contributes to an outcome (i.e., ‘performance’). The authors recognize the limitations of their model, specifying that it may or may not fully capture
readiness, as it is possible that the concept is more than the sum of the factors presented. From that point of view, individual readiness is much more than simply a sum of factors. Rather, it is a basic ability that extends beyond all those factors. Another limitation is the fact that the model does not consider all the potential factors identified in the literature, such as the differences between individuals (hardiness or dispositional optimism). Those concepts should be studied in future in order to explore whether or not they are relevant enough to be integrated into a future model of individual readiness.

This model is the first to focus upon the Canadian Armed Forces. Figure 1 presents the Adam, Hall, and Thomson model and its various factors.

It maps the elements and factors put forward in research. The model, which is adapted to the reality of the Canadian Armed Forces, seems promising, even though its validity still needs to be proven. A discussion on the conceptualization of individual readiness is therefore required, as are future research projects on the subject. An investigation of the individual components of the model makes it easier to understand the model itself and the issues that surround the military IR concept.

### Individual Components of the Model

#### Factors arising from organizational structure

As an organization, the CAF plays a role in military individual readiness. Because its organizational structure is based upon a large number of policies and directives, a regimental system and leadership at various levels of the hierarchy, there is reason to believe that the CAF as an organization is able to influence individual readiness (Figure 2).

- **Organizational citizenship behaviours**

  Organizational citizenship behaviours (OCBs) are, in short, behaviours that (a) are beyond the basic requirements of the job, (b) are to a large extent discretionary, and (c) benefit the organization. Their value to the organization is explained by the fact that they are voluntary behaviours and are not subject to any type of institutionalized reward. Paillé states that researchers have empirically defined and identified a number of citizenship behaviours. Civic virtues, team spirit, conciliation, courtesy and altruism are considered to be OCBs.

  In a military context, the work of McGonigle et al. has made it possible to state that OCBs such as discipline and motivation can prevent negative behaviours. Discipline leads soldiers to follow the...
rules, to not abuse substances, and to be punctual, while motivation enables soldiers (or members) to continue to accomplish tasks in difficult situations or circumstances. OCBs influence military IR by limiting negative behaviours and eliciting positive behaviours. Gurbuz’s study of 301 members of the Turkish Army established that certain pre-existing factors (job satisfaction, organizational commitment, organizational justice, and confidence in superiors) are positively correlated with OCBs. Research by Tabarsa, Esmaelli, and Esmaelli on factors that have an impact upon the OCBs of nurses in military hospitals has shown that only job satisfaction has a positive impact.16

**Organizational commitment**

According to the Canada Research Chair in the Management of Employee Commitment and Performance, organizational commitment is defined as the nature and strength of the bond that ties an employee to his or her organization.18 Organizational commitment is a complex psychological state that involves at least three elements. The first element is affective commitment, which is an individual’s attachment to or identification with his or her organization. The second element is the normative commitment, which is a feeling of loyalty and moral obligation to the organization.19 The third element is continuing commitment, which is an individual’s need to remain within an organization as a result of a lack of alternatives, or as a result of the investment that he or she has made within the organization.

Research has delved deeper into two elements of organizational commitment, on both the individual and organizational level. Positive correlations have been found between affective commitment and the following variables: professional satisfaction and performance, cohesion within the unit, career opportunities, intentions to leave the organization, adjustment to the military lifestyle, preparation for combat, and psychological well-being. Conversely, continuing commitment has been negatively correlated with work performance and psychological well-being.20

**Identification**

The CAF influences the mechanisms by which its members identify with their organization. According to Boucher and Morosse:

…[trans] A feeling of belonging relates to an individual’s sense of belonging within a group, an organization or an institution. Feeling good or comfortable at school, feeling useful in a group and feeling a sense of solidarity with others are indicators of a person’s sense of belonging. The stronger an individual’s sense of belonging within a group, the more he or she tends to adopt the values, standards and rules of conduct of that group.22

As a factor that could potentially influence military IR, belonging to the organization that is the CAF plays a critical role, according to MacIntyre:

[…] military units can only function effectively when all of the members carry out their responsibilities in a collective manner. This means that every person in uniform, regardless of occupation, rank or operational status, has a role to play to ensure mission success. This also means that the most proficient militaries will be those with a cohesiveness that bonds them together in a unified sense of purpose and belongingness.23

For Adam, Hall and Thomson, there are at least two aspects which characterize belonging. The first is that the soldier identifies as a member of the CAF, as a member of a regiment, or as a member of a unit. The second is that the soldier accepts and identifies with a specific role within the organization.24 Reineck’s study showed that identification was a key component of collective
training. For example, at Royal Military College Kingston, “... measures of national indoctrination and nation-building have always been important [...].” By adhering to a strict schedule, a code of discipline that applies to everyone, similar dress standards, and so on, soldiers develop a feeling of identification with the CAF. The studies consulted show that there is a link between identification and military IR. In trying to categorize the readiness of nurses in the US Armed Forces, Reineck and Reineck, Finstuen, Connelly, and Murdoch have developed a questionnaire titled “READI” that has a section on group integration and belonging. The questionnaire was validated by the authors, and it has been shown to be reliable for use in evaluating nurses before a deployment. According to the authors, belonging appears to be an essential element to evaluate in measuring military IR.

- **Job satisfaction**

Job satisfaction has been the subject of numerous scientific studies since the 1930s, and a number of definitions have come out of those studies. The one put forward by Locke makes it possible to understand the concept as a pleasant or positive emotional state resulting from the evaluation of the work or the work experience. It is based upon workers’ perception of the contributions and benefits that their organization brings them with respect to the professional factors they consider important. Büssing’s model attempts to explain satisfaction and dissatisfaction at work through the interaction of four variables: 1) comparison between the actual work situation and the aspiration level; 2) subjective level of control over the work situation; 3) changes in level of aspiration; and 4) problem-solving strategies. According to Cambon, “...concepts that were classically associated with satisfaction are (positive elements) job performance, commitment to the organization, commitment to the work and (negative elements) turnover (leaving one’s employment) and absenteeism.”

Within the CAF, a recent study concerning the job satisfaction of members with the rank of lieutenant-colonel indicates that:

Army lieutenant-colonels are highly engaged in their work and that they experience a number of key job satisfiers, including the opportunity to command, the ability to influence the CF/Army and the opportunity to develop soldiers. However, the study also revealed a number of job dissatisfiers among Army lieutenant-colonels, including those related to promotion criteria and opportunities, leadership and other organizational issues as well as concerns about post-command employment, workload, operational tempo and quality of life.

It is suggested in the literature that the relationship between job satisfaction and individual readiness is underestimated because job satisfaction measures are generally based upon cognitive rather than affective dimensions. In individual readiness, job satisfaction becomes a key concept and is probably a predictor of high performance at work, according to Adam et al.

- **Support provided by the organization**

For Eisenberger et al., the support provided by the organization is defined as follows: “perceived organizational support is the extent to which an employee perceives that the organization values his or her contributions and takes care of his or her well-being.” Military research has placed emphasis upon the support provided by the organization at the military unit level and upon the military
organization in general. The scientific literature also identifies the positive impact of support offered to the individual and to the organization. The study by Dobreva-Martirova et al. concluded that support is directly related to job effort and satisfaction and the organizational commitment of Regular Force members of the CAF. The support provided by leaders or work colleagues is also associated with self-esteem, job satisfaction, and retention of soldiers (members) in the US Navy. An analysis of the different organizations that provide social support to soldiers and families highlighted the link with members’ attitudes at work. With respect to combat operations, Martin noted that support provided by unit leaders buffers the negative impact of a traumatic event on the psychological well-being of Regular Forces soldiers in the US Army. The yearly survey within the CAF entitled “Your Say” has not shown a correlation between the support provided by the organization and an individual’s readiness.

Factors arising from professional training

Professional training such as training, trade courses, and leadership courses makes it possible for members to develop or strengthen professional and personal skills, and, in so doing, contribute to military IR. Three factors arise from professional training (Figure 3).

- **Technical competence**
  
  Technical competence is cumulative, and may be acquired through professional training and through specific and non-specific tasks at work. Having technical competence means having the knowledge and practical skills required to successfully complete an undertaking, job or task.

  As Beardsley has remarked, technical competence is essential in career soldiers because, “…as a professional advances in rank, responsibilities and appointments, the study of the professional body of knowledge will be much more substantive and intellectually challenging.” The author goes on to state that soldiers who are hired to practise a specialized profession (in addition to the profession of arms), such as social workers, doctors, dentists and lawyers, also have to include the study of the professional body of knowledge related to their other profession. Reineck’s research on military IR with a group of military nurses has contributed to the development and understanding of the concept. Griffith’s studies have also made it easier to understand the effects of those factors on military IR. For example, simply learning to fire a machine gun makes a soldier better prepared for deployment in a theatre of operations.

- **Self-efficacy**
  
  Self-efficacy is the confidence an individual has in his or her ability to act in order to achieve the desired results. The concept was theorized by Albert Bandura, for whom the term ‘self-efficacy’ was defined as a person’s sense of being able to shape his or her own experiences through self-reflection, self-regulation, and sustained effort.

  For soldiers, a feeling of self-efficacy means believing that, when the time comes, they will do everything it takes to reach the goals they have set (individually or collectively). Both individually and collectively, professional training gives soldiers experience and an opportunity to succeed in preparation.
for their future mission. It enables them to build confidence with respect to their sense of self-efficacy.48 For example, Cossar posits:

Learning about Rules of Engagement (ROE) is one area where knowledge of the material is required to respond appropriately in an infinite number of possible scenarios. Still, such skill training through repetitive exposures increases the soldier’s sense of self-efficacy, which will, in turn, enhance motivation and goal perseverance.49

Self-efficacy is associated with motivational focuses, such as increased effort, selection of increasingly challenging goals, and perseverance in the face of stressors. In a military context, it is necessary for soldiers to put operational needs first, and it is from the perspective of recognizing efforts that performance recognition and reward policies are established within the CAF.50 For Cossar, “…people who are rated as being high in self-efficacy are more likely to adopt problem-focused coping strategies as they accept the challenge and develop solutions that will shape the outcome.”51

• Coping skills

The last factor related to professional training that can potentially influence military IR is the ability to adapt to a series of stressors and situations. For Lazarus and Folkman, having coping skills involves making cognitive and behavioural effort to manage specific requests deemed to be arduous or beyond a person’s ability.52 Experience, professional training and other types of training make it possible to develop and strengthen coping skills.

Thompson and McCreary are of the opinion that just as much emphasis should be placed upon soldiers’ psychological readiness as upon their physical readiness; the psychological aspect is malleable and can be improved through professional training.53

Within the CAF, all soldiers who are called upon to be deployed in a theatre of operations must take a training course called Road to Mental Readiness that includes a component on stress management and covers the four major adaptation strategies (self-talk, goal setting, arousal control, and visualization). In addition to training soldiers to recognize stressors, impacts, and symptoms, this training helps them adopt the different strategies (positive and negative) to adapt to situations. Road to Mental Readiness also provides soldiers with training on mental resilience as part of the leadership courses. The program is currently undergoing a validation study by a team under the leadership of Deniz Fikretoglu, Ph.D.

The Battlemind initiative, implemented within the US Army, is a comprehensive mental health training program that was established to prepare soldiers for the requirements and challenges of military life and combat.54 This program is a foundation for building psychological resilience in soldiers during pre-deployment and post-deployment. The impact of Battlemind on military IR is currently being discussed. Based upon a validation study of pilot groups, the authors state that the program is effective.

Novaco, Cook, and Sarason have shown that using the Making It video to help Marine Corps recruits in the United States can have a significant impact upon their coping skills by helping them to adjust to military life and the stress of basic training.55

Factors arising from personnel support programs

The personnel support programs try to meet a broad range of objectives, both with respect to soldiers and their family members. Within the CAF, the support programs exist, “…to enhance the morale and welfare of the military community, thus contributing to the operational readiness and effectiveness of the Canadian
Forces.” Such a program, which includes deployment support, family services, health promotion, physical fitness, sports and recreation and the operation of the mess and newspapers, has a significant impact on the three factors that can potentially affect military IR (Figure 4).

- **Physical fitness**

  Physical fitness is definitely an element of military IR, and there are numerous studies available on the topic. Physical fitness refers to physical activities aimed at improving a person’s level of fitness and life hygiene. It is very important, as:

  Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members must be physically fit to meet military operational requirements, to perform under a wide range of geographical and environmental conditions, to cope with the stresses of sustained operations and to be ready to respond on short notice.  

  The former CDS of the Canadian Armed Forces, General Rick Hillier, said, “I am convinced that adherence to a physical fitness program will not only increase strength, energy and endurance but also improve an individual’s ability to cope with mental and emotional stresses.”

  Despite the fact that Canadian military authorities are well aware of the importance of physical fitness, it appears that fitness levels are not high enough within the CAF. Based upon the results of the Canadian Forces Health and Lifestyle Information Survey 2004 – Regular Force Report (between 2000 and 2004), the number of CAF members who exercise has dropped while the obesity rate has increased slightly. The CAF personnel support program has put in place a series of programs, activities, documents, and tools in an effort to reverse that trend. Adam, Hall and Thomson have observed that decreased levels of physical fitness for CAF members can potentially impact military IR. In the United States, a number of studies have also shown links between military IR and physical fitness.

- **Family adaptation**

  Family support is an integral part of the personnel support programs. The family adaptation concept has been developed by McCubbin, and is intended to be a process that involves active use of available family resources (internal and external) to prevent and reduce stress as much as possible. Family adaptation requires family resources (internally within the family), such as the ability to integrate, adapt, and devise adaptation strategies or behaviours. Burr and Klein have identified a list of the possible family adaptation strategies, which they have classified into seven categories: 1) cognitive (i.e., accepting situations);
2) emotional (i.e., expressing feelings and affection); 3) relationships (i.e., increasing cohesion); 4) communication (i.e., being open and honest); 5) community (i.e., seeking help and support from others); 6) spiritual (i.e., increasing one’s faith); and 7) individual development (i.e., developing autonomy). Family adaptation is also related to other concepts such as family well-being, work–family balance and family resilience.

Among the most significant works, Orthner and Bowen’s review of the literature on family adaptation in the American military community found that family adaptation was related to factors that vary, depending upon the individuals, families, work and characteristics of the community, such as the informal support network, support services for soldiers and their families, and support from military leaders.

The preliminary results of Sudom’s research bring to light major elements concerning family adaption to a military environment: 1) spouses are important to the CAF; 2) many spouses have made professional sacrifices for their partner’s military career; 3) nearly half the spouses use the services offered by the CAF during deployments; 4) the post-deployment services offered by the CAF are used by only five percent of spouses; 5) spouses perceive that known personal problems could have an impact on their partner’s military career; and 6) most spouses are in favour of a career within the CAF and of deployments.

• Work–life balance

A challenge for soldiers who must serve their country and put military needs before any personal considerations is to achieve work–life balance. Like all Canadians, they have the challenge of fulfilling numerous roles. They are workers, parents, spouses, partners and friends; they care for their aging parents, they volunteer in their communities, and they must find time to see to their own physical and mental well-being. Work–life balance is a key factor in individual preparedness.

The concept of work–life balance is defined as [trans] “…a person’s ability to balance the obligations of his or her professional life with his or her family responsibilities and personal commitments.” Duxbury and Higgins have shown that a large body of scientific literature exists with respect to the subject of work–life balance and conflict.

Conflict arises when professional and family obligations are incompatible and it therefore becomes difficult to perform one role without failing in another. The conflict between work and personal life has two main components: 1) the practical aspects associated with overloaded schedules and work conflicts; and 2) the feeling of being overwhelmed by events.
Based upon results cited in the *Canadian Forces Health and Lifestyle Information Survey 2004 – Regular Force Report*, 15 percent of participants stated that they had trouble achieving work–life balance, and 25 percent said they had missed family activities as a result of work commitments.71

Work–life balance tends to influence and impact individual and family functioning.

**Conclusion**

An individual’s military readiness is influenced by a series of factors that arise out of the organizational structure, the impact of training and preparation, and the personnel support programs. A review of the literature reveals that research on military IR has developed over time in a non-systematic way. Certain factors that influence military IR have been studied more than others, and rarely have they been examined from a global perspective. The Adam, Hall, and Thomson model that has been adapted to the Canadian Armed Forces is part of this scientific approach of developing knowledge of the components that influence military IR. It is important to validate that approach and pursue further research.


9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 85.
25. Reineck.
32. Ibid., p. 4.
Canadian Armed Forces’ Chaplains as a Primary Source of Spiritual Resiliency

Harold Ristau

In light of the presumption that Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) chaplains are primarily responsible for offering religious services to members of the Canadian Defence Team, their role as key agents of support for resiliency resulting in more psychologically equipped and ethically conscious members, is often overlooked. There is no question that maintaining a resilient military is crucial to the success of any military task or mission. In peacetime or during an operation, chaplains are instrumental in assuring spiritual resilience is maintained, not only through crisis interventions, but also through a proactive and deliberate ministry of presence. This capability is reflected in the Chaplain Branch’s strategic plan, which emphasizes the necessity and obligation of unit chaplains to foster the spiritual needs of all CAF members, regardless of any formal religious affiliations.

It is no secret that the religious associations of Canadians are changing. In light of this phenomenon, and coupled with the new financial realities that require rethinking the economic feasibility of some trades in the CAF, some have called into question the necessity of maintaining the CAF chaplaincy at its current capacity. After all, the argument goes, if chaplains are primarily focused upon delivering religious services to CAF members, would it not be more economically wise to simply contract out these tasks to civilian clergy? This question is rooted in a misunderstanding of the *raison d’être* of chaplains.

Despite an obvious increase of secularism in Canadian society, resulting in a lessened influence of traditional religious communities, interest in and desire for spirituality has not dissipated.

Although the growing number of Canadians who claim no religious affiliation may be seen by some as an indicator that religion itself is waning in significance to Canadians, religious and demographic research has found that spirituality and religion remain important.

The CAF chaplaincy offers a “special support capability,” including spiritual care, pastoral counselling, spiritual direction, and support, which is indispensable to the operability of members of the three elements of the Canadian military and their civilian Defence Team members.
Chaplains’ Role in Fostering Resiliency

While serving as a rear party chaplain at Canadian Armed Forces Base Valcartier, Québec, during Operation Athena, one chaplain participated in various briefings to spouses of CAF members who were deploying. The intention was to strengthen their ability to manage the psychological and practical stresses during the lengthy period of absence of their partners. During the chaplain’s briefings, he addressed the question of the reality of death and injury during a mission. Many of his non-chaplain colleagues believed that opening up a dialogue on the subject matter was unwise and dangerous. Although they made reference to the notion by references such as, “...if something were to happen....” they refused to name the word ‘death’ in their presentations, believing it to be detrimental to the coping mechanisms of military personnel and their families. To their surprise, several spouses voiced their sincere appreciation for the chaplain’s blatant honesty. He recalls one military spouse saying: “Padre, you say what all of us are already thinking... I felt a load come off of my shoulders the instant you spoke about death.” She continued by expressing how the hesitancy by other military representatives to speak openly about death appeared to betray their own fears about the notion, resulting in a lack of credibility and decreased confidence in the system by CAF spouses. In short, openly speaking about the issue had the opposite effect than what was expected by some. The chaplain talking freely about matters of God, life, and death, resulted in spouses feeling stronger, not weaker. Incidentally, for this same reason, chaplains are mandated to be present at Next of Kin (NOK) notifications, while informing a family member of the death or injury of their loved ones.

In moments like these, chaplains realize the profound importance of their ministry to the operation of the CAF. Often, people, including chaplains, believe that the Chaplain mandate is to protect the religious freedoms and rights of CAF members, or to assure that their religious expectations are being accommodated. In a time of budget restrictions, it would appear that a chaplain trade that simply existed in order to provide religious services would be difficult to justify. However, my argument is that this role is secondary to a chaplain’s mandate. Chaplains are hired primarily to spiritually support a member’s resiliency, since, where spiritual resiliency is maintained, military personnel are more effective, stable, secure, and ethical in carrying out their tasks, whether in times of war or peace. When people are spiritually resilient, they reflect more hope, optimism, meaning, and purpose in their lives, and are better equipped to practice their vocations. Moreover, recent studies have shown that addressing a person’s spiritual concerns is often central to the process of healing from Operational Stress. In addition, individual spiritual resiliency is a contributing factor to healthy group/unit morale.
Although chaplains are not the only significant agents in affecting spiritual resiliency, they are, according to their trade, the most appropriate facilitators of it. Due to their accessibility by and to all levels of the Chain of Command (CoC), their specialized abilities through chaplain-specific counselling and intervention techniques, and, in many cases, their ministry of presence uniquely on the ‘front-line’ as helping professionals, chaplains are indispensable to the Canadian Armed Forces’ operability. For this reason, they are a force multiplier. No other trade can duplicate their capabilities or reproduce the results of their efforts. For instance, other helping professionals, such as Mental Health representatives, are obliged to record interviews with clients in great detail. Although a required procedure in effectively achieving the goals of their trade, this process often dissuades members from seeking mental and emotional support or direction, due to concerns with respect to career implications. Unique to the chaplain trade is the chaplain’s ability to gain the trust of members, due to the development of personal relationships, proximity to, and presence amongst, the troops in a unit. Moreover, the most effective interventions often occur in an informal setting. Because of the stigma often associated with mental health,… a chaplain offers military personnel virtually the only confidential and non-judgemental resource for emotional and spiritual help outside the normal chain of command.8

Accordingly, there is no stigma attached to talking to the padre. Padres are simply neutral brothers- or sisters-in-arms—other soldiers by appearance and behaviour, but separate from the operations-oriented aspects of the military culture. There is no need ‘to go to’ the padre. He or she is already there with the personnel…9

Visiting a chaplain is often considered to be a ‘safer’ first option when a member is unsure of the best course of action to follow. The chaplain then functions as a filter in the subsequent referral process. In other words, the chaplain is often the first step in a member seeking help. One soldier states: “You have a problem and you talk to a social worker…. There is more of a sense that (chaplains are) a normal part of your life.”10 Part of this can be attributed to:…closeness to and support of personnel (which) suggest they may be an important resource for helping some people overcome the sense of alienation one can experience as a member of a large impersonal institution…”11

This alleviates a member’s feelings of a lack of normalcy and isolation in their struggles. The Chaplain Branch’s strategic plan highlights the reason underlying Chaplain support and care for CAF members and their families: to reinforce their spiritual aptitudes,12 i.e., to make them more resilient.

The usefulness of chaplains in the aftermath of a crisis intervention, and their role in the healing process remains undisputed. However, they also play a key role in equipping members for those critical events, making them more effective in all their tasks and duties. Establishing resiliency is as relevant in a post-war setting with no foreseeable major deployments in sight, as it is during a major high-stress operation.

A Definition of Spiritual Resiliency

What is resilience? It has been described as an individual’s ability to withstand the effects of trauma or disaster, whether by having the capacity (a) to remain unaffected, (b) to readily bounce back from whatever effects there are, and/or (c) to bounce back to a new way of being that is shaped positively more so than negatively.13

“Quantifying spiritual resiliency is an even greater challenge as it touches on questions of a very personal and subjective nature.”
Although all people have the capacity to be resilient, it needs to be developed as it involves behaviours, thoughts and actions that can be learned over time. Building resilience — the ability to adapt well to unexpected changes and events — can help us manage stress and feelings of anxiety and uncertainty related to war. We all can develop resilience.

In its most general terms, one could call it ‘strength’ or ‘inner strength,’ which derives its source of energy, momentum, and power from the human spirit, soul, and psyche. Often, the influence of one trusted and faithful helping professional is the catalyst to a member fully harnessing this inner capacity rooted in spirituality.

We cope with crisis and adversity by making meaning of our experience: linking it to our social world, to our cultural and spiritual beliefs, to our multigenerational past, and to our hopes and dreams for the future.

Naturally, resiliency is a difficult variable to measure. Quantifying spiritual resiliency is an even greater challenge as it touches on questions of a very personal and subjective nature. However, its non-empirical nature does not preclude its importance. In one study, it was determined that over 75 percent of Americans surveyed wanted to be able to express spiritual concerns to their physicians and helping professionals. The Canadian context may indicate a lower, but equally significant statistic.

Beliefs, then, are the foundation for spiritual resiliency, and are not a specific possession of people who practice organized religion. For instance, active church goers or members of CAF chapels are not the only ones seeking chaplain services. Chaplains provide service, ministry, and support to all members of the CAF. Spirituality involves an active investment in internalized beliefs that bring a sense of meaning, wholeness, and connection with others.

Beliefs come to define our reality, and they set the parameters of how we interpret, manage, and react to the most difficult and stressful parts of our lives. Although a belief system may be ‘part and parcel’ with a religious system, they are not the same thing.

Belief systems broadly encompass values, convictions, attitudes, biases, and assumptions, which coalesce to form a set of basic premises that trigger emotional responses, inform decisions, and guide actions.

Beliefs come to define our reality, and they set the parameters of how we interpret, manage, and react to the most difficult and stressful parts of our lives. Although a belief system may be ‘part and parcel’ with a religious system, they are not the same thing.

Belief systems broadly encompass values, convictions, attitudes, biases, and assumptions, which coalesce to form a set of basic premises that trigger emotional responses, inform decisions, and guide actions.

Beliefs, then, are the foundation for spiritual resiliency, and are not a specific possession of people who practice organized religion. For instance, active church goers or members of CAF chapels are not the only ones seeking chaplain services. Chaplains provide service, ministry, and support to all members of the CAF. Spirituality involves an active investment in internalized beliefs that bring a sense of meaning, wholeness, and connection with others.

Beliefs come to define our reality, and they set the parameters of how we interpret, manage, and react to the most difficult and stressful parts of our lives. Although a belief system may be ‘part and parcel’ with a religious system, they are not the same thing.

Belief systems broadly encompass values, convictions, attitudes, biases, and assumptions, which coalesce to form a set of basic premises that trigger emotional responses, inform decisions, and guide actions.

Beliefs, then, are the foundation for spiritual resiliency, and are not a specific possession of people who practice organized religion. For instance, active church goers or members of CAF chapels are not the only ones seeking chaplain services. Chaplains provide service, ministry, and support to all members of the CAF. Spirituality involves an active investment in internalized beliefs that bring a sense of meaning, wholeness, and connection with others.

Beliefs come to define our reality, and they set the parameters of how we interpret, manage, and react to the most difficult and stressful parts of our lives. Although a belief system may be ‘part and parcel’ with a religious system, they are not the same thing.

Belief systems broadly encompass values, convictions, attitudes, biases, and assumptions, which coalesce to form a set of basic premises that trigger emotional responses, inform decisions, and guide actions.
in light of the emphasis upon the “serving all” part of its motto. A ministry of presence expressed at the unit level connects the chaplain to both those who do practice formal religion and to those that do not. Ministry in chapels and multi-faith centres is still a valid and important source of spiritual resilience to many CAF members, and, for that reason, ought not to be neglected. However, the chaplain has a greater impact upon overall resiliency in his or her units through counselling and a ministry of presence, due his or her access to a greater pool of personnel of various religious and spiritual convictions. For instance, during training, chaplains are encouraged to engage in faith questions, in order to assist members, regardless of their particular belief system, to draw strength and support from it, utilizing it as a resource in countering fear and as a motivator in behaving ethically. “One cannot replace faith by courage, but neither can one describe faith without courage.” 25 Consequently, by teaching and example, chaplains are instrumental in strengthening a member’s overall performance, and assuring that they are well equipped to overcome the inevitable crisis and dangers in their military life:

...[since] affirming beliefs—that we are valued and have potential to succeed—can help us to rally in times of crisis....Some beliefs are more useful than others, depending on our situation. 26

I have begun to explore the idea that the hardship and privations of war (among other human existential trials) often precipitate a spiritual experience…….In light of this reality and the fact that those in theatre are especially sensitive and receptive to such spiritual movements and existential meetings with God it seems altogether crucial that padres continue to circulate among our troops and to offer their comfort and guidance to those who find themselves overwhelmed with the trauma of war... One wouldn’t want to go too long without the comfort and communion of the Lord’s ministers in this sort of scenario. 27

There has been hesitancy among some to recognize and encourage an increase in the role of chaplain service due to contemporary doubts regarding the societal and personal benefits of religion. Most of these criticisms are rooted in misunderstandings on the goals and role of religion. For instance:

...[the secularist paradigm sees religion as a major factor in causing and intensifying conflicts around the world because religious ‘absolutizes’ and sacralises differences over issues, leaving little room for compromise. 28

Accordingly, the CAF may be uncomfortable with the specific term “spiritual resilience,” as opposed to resilience in general. Yet, although religion may appear to play a part in some international conflicts, there is a tendency to isolate religion from the cultural picture. For example, ethnicity has proven to be a greater threat to political stability than religion. If one controls for the variable of religion in any number of current global conflicts, war still presides. Therefore, religion cannot be the main cause. Admittedly, theocracies, such as those in the Middle East, complicate one’s ability to make such determinations. Yet, again, the sweeping claim that spiritual beliefs are the cause for most wars is unfounded. Over the last decade, the CAF has demonstrated a new appreciation for the positive contribution of religious and spiritual beliefs in efforts at establishing peace at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This is most concretely displayed in recent developments in policy regarding the engagement of chaplains in religious dialoguing. 29

Chaplains are key players in facilitating their client’s ability to maximize the utilization of their most ‘useful’ beliefs to their trade and vocation as military personnel. When chaplains counsel, they affirm beliefs and help people access and harness that inner strength for the sake of their individual and common good. Whether their faith is in God as traditionally defined, or simply to a higher source of power, is irrelevant to the process. Through the technique of coaching, our chaplains are instructed to help others utilize their own sources of hope, instead of implicitly encouraging them to embrace those of the chaplain. The development of this capacity to find strength in one’s own belief system is particularly crucial for the mental well-being of those who work in stressful and dangerous environments. A former social worker for the Canadian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-Commander (ret’d) R.J. Nurnberger, presently conducting doctoral research at the University of Ottawa, observes:

Certainly, just as any gift is susceptible to abuse, religion is no exception: “[r]eligious beliefs may become harmful if they are held too narrowly, rigidly, or punitively.” 30 And yet, even in the case of religious extremism or abuse, a chaplain is the most appropriate person to engage in these issues. Through personal relationships of trust with members, a chaplain is often the only member in the unit who can address these challenges, acting as an agent of change in transforming those beliefs for the good of the team. This is particularly evident when discussing ethical behaviour and conduct as part of the CAF effort at fostering healthy leadership in all military environments.
A Positive Correlation between Spiritual Resiliency and Ethical Behaviour

Spiritual resilience (in contrast with resilience in general) not only enables military members to be ‘stronger,’ it also results in a more ethically-inclined individual. Many of our foundational beliefs are rooted in religion and spirituality. These beliefs inform our ethical world views. Although religions are organized belief systems that are expressed in various moralities, all of them hold virtually identical ethical norms. Those with strong religious and spiritual beliefs are more inclined to act ethically and in accordance with the principles of the military ethos. Gratefulness, forgiveness, and altruism are only some of the ethical consequences of a spiritual resiliency. In short, spirituality provides meaning to vocation, resulting in a more ethical person.

Operationally, where spiritual resiliency has been fostered, there has been a direct impact and indirect influence upon the military system and mission, due to the positive correlation between leadership qualities and ethical principles. Through the support of chaplain ministry strengthening a member’s ethical inclinations, the leadership qualities and principles of efficiency, trustworthiness, good judgement, putting forth a good example, perseverance, self-discipline, and sacrifice are further developed, resulting in all for which the CAF strives: higher mission success, external adaptability, member well-being, and commitment.

The Operational Importance of Chaplains ‘on the front line’

One need not look far to discover a plethora of examples regarding the key role of chaplains in maintaining a high level of spiritual resilience among members through their presence with them ‘in the field.’ They have been referred to as “agents of trust” by both foreigners and CAF members, primarily due to their non-combatant status in the case of the former, and their ability to subside ‘outside’ the CoC, in the case of the latter. That is, unit chaplains have direct access to any level in their CoC. The success of operational chaplains in building trusting relationships has resulted in new efforts of utilizing their skills in Religious Leader Engagement opportunities during an operation, as well as a heightened role in training and educating during the pre- and post-deployment phases (i.e., through Chaplain Hours, seminars, and advising the CoC in matters of culture and religion). Furthermore, there are innumerable examples in history of the mere presence of a chaplain being an indisputable source of inspiration to individual and group morale, as “…the goal of most Great War chaplains was the front.” The modern context has not changed this emphasis. Even as recently as Afghanistan, chaplain presence ‘outside the wire’ was not simply highly appreciated, but considered essential to operational success and stability, and not only by believers. Even soldiers who were agnostic found the symbolic presence of the Divine a necessary motivating element in undertaking and justifying their stressful and difficult jobs. Spiritual beliefs transformed their perception of the facts in a positive way, with a noticeable impact on morale. The simple presence of chaplains was a source of support to a member’s level of resiliency, and a visible call to act ethically.

Conclusion

The impression that the chaplain’s primary goal is to provide religious services to CAF members, public prayers, chapel services, and so on, is difficult to justify when surveying the daily and weekly tasks of any unit chaplain. In addition, in light of the decline of interest in organized religious services, other, equally important duties of chaplains have become more apparent. A future scenario in which the majority of military personnel practice a form of spirituality which is less connected to traditional faith groups, does not imply that the chaplain role is less essential to the military system. Their role in supporting and developing spiritual resiliency within members has always been primary, although, until the Chaplain Branch’s strategic plan was tabled, it was often understated. Spiritual resiliency has a direct bearing upon the value that CAF members place on their vocations, their ability to stay strong under pressure, their capacity to effectively prepare for and cope with stresses, and their desire to behave ethically, whether in peace time or during a major operation. An effective, strong and resilient CAF and leadership cannot underestimate the role of military chaplaincy in its support, not only as a Special Material Expert in matters of religion and spirituality, but also as an equally respected member of the team, engaging with fellow military personnel ‘on the front line.’
Artemis ceremony during Operation while deployed in the Arabian Sea, 11 November 2012. DND photo ISX2012-0047 by Lieutenant Chris Walkinshaw

Chaplain Nigel Tully and Commander Jason Boyd, the Commanding Officer of HMCS Regina, prepare to lay a wreath at the onboard Remembrance Day ceremony during Operation Artemis while deployed in the Arabian Sea, 11 November 2012.

NOTES


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 2.

5. See also Joanne Benham Rennick’s, Religions in the Ranks, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), pp. 168-169, for further discussion on the preoccupation of religious and spiritual questions among military members who claim not to be religious.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p.124.

10. Rennick, Religion in the Ranks, p. 78.

11. Ibid., p. 77.


16. Ibid., p. 76.


19. Ibid., p. 58.

20. Walsh, p. 49.


22. Walsh, p. 49.

23. See Wright et al.

24. Walsh, p. 73.


26. Walsh, p. 50.

27. Lieutenant-Commander (ret’d) R.J. Nurnberger, personal communication, 6 May 2013.


30. Walsh, p. 74.

31. Koenig, pp. 60-64.


34. Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine, (Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), p. 19.

35. Ibid., p. 4.


38. Alex Bouzane, “Leadership Lessons Learned,” in Dr. Emily Spencer (Ed.), ’Grass Roots: Perspectives of Senior Non-Commissioned Officers on Operations,’ (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), p. 46.


Three Practical Lessons from the Science of Influence Operations Message Design

Afzal Upal is a senior defence scientist and leader of the Effects & Influence Group at Defence R&D Canada's Toronto Research Centre. After receiving his PhD in Computer Science from University of Alberta in 1999, he worked as a professor of Computer Science at Dalhousie University and the University of Toledo and as a professor of Cognitive Science at Occidental College in Los Angeles. His research interests include Social Media Information Operations, Human Terrain Visualization and Simulation, and Religious Radicalization.

Introduction

“There is a funny story in regard to the Peace Dove depicted on some of our leaflets. Many of the Afghans believed the symbol to be some type of chicken and they assumed that the leaflet could be used as a coupon that entitled them to a free bird or meal provided by the Partnership of Nations.”

While stories like this are by no means the norm for information operations (IO) carried out by allied forces, a vast majority of which are carefully planned and professionally executed, such incidents do occasionally take place. In his article entitled “PSYOP Mistakes?”, US Army Sergeant-Major Herbert Friedman lists dozens of examples of IO activities drawn from a variety of military campaigns, ranging from the First World War to the recent Libya campaign, that failed to communicate their intended message to their target audience (TA) members. For example, there was the incident of the “ghost at the dinner table” leaflet distributed during the Korean War in 1951.

“The text on the front is, ‘Your place will be empty.’ Text on the back is, ‘Because Communists officials continue to stall at the Armistice talks – YOURS WILL BE THE EMPTY PLACE AT YOUR FAMILY’S NEW YEAR REUNION. Because Communist leaders compel you to continue this hopeless war – IN THE HEARTS OF YOUR FAMILY THERE IS GREAT EMPTINESS.’
This leaflet confused the Chinese... Who is the person with the bones showing through? This is not a traditional way to show a ghost in China... The Chinese did not understand the wealth depicted on the leaflet, and truly believed that the family of a soldier would be poor. The leaflet served no military purpose and failed in its attempt to demoralize the Chinese Army. The Americans were thinking Thanksgiving dinner, and the Chinese had no clue.  

Friedman cites other examples of IO products failing due to cultural misunderstandings, including: the US practice of leaving the ace of spades cards on the bodies of the North Vietnamese to terrify the enemy. These left the Vietnamese confused because they did not share the American notion of associating the ace of spades with fear and death. Similarly, Iraqi soldiers, unfamiliar with the use of a floating bubble over the head to represent the depicted individual’s thoughts, were left confused by US PSYOP leaflets relying upon ‘thought bubbles’ to convey their messages.

Such stories are familiar to experts in the field of cross-cultural marketing, who know that a symbol must be understood by the target audience, in the way it is intended, to ensure effective communication of a message. If the target audience members understand the message differently from the way intended by the message designers, then the message can have an unpredictable impact, as was the case with the peace-dove, ghost-at-dinner, ace-of-spades, and the ‘thought-bubble’ campaigns. Thus, the CAF’s Joint Doctrine Manual on Psychological Operations rightly points out that, “…the target audience analysis is necessary in the planning and conduct of PSYOPS operations,” that “…access to a thorough understanding of the customs, ethics, values, and goals of the target audience” is needed, and that “…the test is whether the message will get the desired response.” In a similar vein, the US Army PSYOP TTP document provides the following guidance for development of an effective PSYOP product.

“The product should also be approached from a culture’s perspective to ensure the product will have a cultural resonance with the TA. Culturally dictated modifications may be made automatically by a translator; questions should be asked that reveal such changes and then determined whether they convey the intended message.”

The concept of cultural resonance is also commonly invoked by cross-cultural marketing experts, both as an ideal for effective message design, and as a post-hoc explanation of the success or failure of a marketing campaign. At the time of writing, a Google search for the phrase ‘cultural resonance’ returns 26,200 web pages! Despite the widespread appeal of the intuitive notion of resonance, however, there does not appear to be a commonly agreed-upon scientific definition of the term. Drawing upon the analogy with physical systems, social scientists define an idea as culturally resonant if it ‘strikes a responsive chord’ with the target audience and ‘fits’ with the audience’s previous beliefs, worldviews, and life experiences. Social movement researchers Snow and Benford argue that, “…the greater the correspondence between values promoted by a movement and those held by potential constituents, the greater the success of the mobilization.”

University of Texas communication professor Hua-Hsin Wan defines resonance as, “…the achievement of a harmonious state of mind in an individual due to accordance between an external stimulus and relevant nodes stored in the long term memory.” She argues that this can be measured by seeing how well a message matches the expectations and values of a target audience member. The notion of ‘a fit’ and ‘a match’ between a target audience member’s beliefs and the message-content not only seems to capture part of the intuitive notion of resonance, but it also appears to have some theoretical merits. According to widely-accepted psychological models of information comprehension, in order for an individual to understand a message, one must be able to retrieve a similar schema from their memory. A schema is a mental representation of a packet of information about a concept or a commonly used procedure, such as visiting a restaurant or doing laundry.

Scientists have found some support for the notion that ideas that activate culturally familiar schemas are better remembered than ideas that are culturally unfamiliar. The eminent psychologist Sir Fredrick Barrett conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s in which he found that culturally unfamiliar concepts such as ‘a canoe’ were more easily forgotten and distorted by people, when compared with culturally familiar concepts. In a widely-cited study, psychologists Bransford and Johnson found that participants who had seen the title “washing clothes” better understood and recalled the following text, as compared to participants who had not seen the title.

“The product should also be approached from a culture’s perspective to ensure the product will have a cultural resonance with the TA. Culturally dictated modifications may be made automatically by a translator; questions should be asked that reveal such changes and then determined whether they convey the intended message.”

This leaflet confused the Chinese... Who is the person with the bones showing through? This is not a traditional way to show a ghost in China... The Chinese did not understand the wealth depicted on the leaflet, and truly believed that the family of a soldier would be poor. The leaflet served no military purpose and failed in its attempt to demoralize the
The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into different groups. Of course, one pile may be sufficient, depending on how much there is to do.

If you have to go somewhere else due to lack of facilities, that is the next step. Otherwise you are pretty well set.

It is important not to overdo things – that is, it is better to do too few things at once than too many. In the short run, this might not seem important, but complications can easily arise. A mistake can be expensive as well.

After the procedure is completed, one arranges the materials into different groups again. Then they can be put into their appropriate places.

Eventually they’ll be used once more and the whole cycle will have to be repeated. However, that is a part of life. So how do you do yours?9

Branford and Johnson hypothesized that the differences in comprehension and recall were due to inability of the participants who had not been given the title to retrieve the appropriate schema from their memory. Thus, for a new message to be understood, it must activate similar concepts in the learner’s mind. To look at an extreme case, consider watching an ad in a language that you do not understand. The ad may not even be understood by you much less appeal to you to be considered as resonating with you. Thus the reason that the family-dinner leaflet and the ace-of-spades card campaign failed is that the target audience members did not possess the appropriate schemas that the message designers had in their minds when they designed the ads. In the peace-dove episode, the target audience members not only failed to recall the appropriate schema but actually recalled a different one, namely that of a “free chicken coupon.” While grocery stores coupons are not a widespread phenomena in most of Afghanistan so it’s unlikely that they could have been the source of the “free chicken coupon” schema and thus is doubtful that a Coalition leaflet would have been confused with a grocery store coupon. Such a schema is more likely to have been acquired from the prior Coalition leaflets depicting promotional items such as radios, soccer balls, and T-shirts which were indeed given away by the Coalition soldiers even though their distribution would not have required the presentation of leaflets showing depicting their picture (although presentation of such leaflets probably would have helped convey the request more clearly). This suggests that after the initial research to learn about the target audience member’s shared beliefs, one cannot rest on one’s laurels and must keep up-to-date with changes in TA’s mental knowledge, some of which may be caused by our own IO campaigns! This also illustrates the pitfalls of relying solely on the advice of expatriates or cultural anthropologists or other subject matter experts who may not have been to the area of interest recently.

Lesson 1: Rise Above Your Own Cultural Schemas and Learn Your TA’s Cultural Schemas to Design an Understandable Message

Traditionally, it is thought that the hard part of designing PSYOP messages for target audiences in an expeditionary environment is learning a foreign language and immersing oneself in a foreign culture. While learning about the schemas of the target audience groups is not easy, being able to overcome one’s own cultural schemas is equally difficult. Indeed, the very mark of a culturally successful idea is that it seems so obvious, so intuitive, and so natural to its adherents that they cannot imagine a world where it may not be so. Marketing researchers Chip and Dan Heath call this the “curse of knowledge” and suggest that it particularly afflicts teachers who find it so hard to imagine what it was like before they became subject matter experts!10

Successful message designers must realize the limitations of their knowledge by being able to recognize mental schemas that are specific to their own culture, and to resist the temptation to assume that it must be universal because it just seems so obvious. They should ‘pilot test’ their messages on any available locals to see if they react in expected ways, prior to mass production and distribution. USAF Major Norman D. Vaughn’s Korean War story illustrates this point well. Major Vaughn and his team wanted to design a campaign to convince North Korean soldiers to surrender by showing them that they would be treated humanely by UN soldiers. They designed a leaflet depicting, “...a handsome, smiling soldier, wearing a distinctive UN uniform. He was on one knee and had picked up a little girl’s doll. He was putting the arm back on the doll while a little girl standing next to him is crying.” Even though the leaflet seems to employ universal messages that do not appear to be Western culture specific, Major Vaughn had the good sense to show the leaflet to a group of North Korean prisoners. Their reaction surprised him:

“The first one snorted, letting us know it was awful. Another pretended to spit on the floor, which was his way of showing disapproval. The other two nodded in agreement. The officers had the same response. Through an interpreter, we asked, “Why is this so terrible?” Their answer was, “To hell with little girls. We only care for boys. And our girls don’t have baby dolls anyway.” The next day we presented revised artwork. The child was now a crying boy. The doll had become a cart, and the soldier was fixing a wheel that had come off. All the test prisoners smiled their approval. It was a good leaflet.”11

Perhaps recognizing how difficult it is to learn a TA’s cultural schemas and to rise above one’s cultural schemas to design a message that is understandable for the TA, most PSYOP message design guidelines stop there. Unfortunately, recent research in the science of message design shows that designing a truly culturally resonant message requires some additional work.

Lesson 2: Get the TA’s Attention

Have you seen the TV ad where the fries talk to the ketchup and call it their best friend? How about the insurance ad featuring the curiously British-accented gecko? Have you ever wondered as to why so many ads feature talking objects, animals, and other counter-intuitive entities? In 2007, I collected a random sample of 100 TV ads from the ad database adcritic.com, and then had two research assistants analyze them for the presence of counter-intuitive objects and events. They found that one out of every four TV ads featured either a counter-intuitive object or a counter-intuitive event.12 The French American anthropologist Pascal Boyer studied the cultural and religious beliefs of people around the world and found that a
large number contained a number of ideas that would seem counter-intuitive to an outside observer. Boyer further argued that most of these counter-intuitive ideas were only minimally so. He called them minimally counter-intuitive (or MCI for short) i.e., ideas such as “a rock that eats,” because they violate a small number of intuitive expectations of the category. This is unlike the maximally counter-intuitive concepts, such as “a rock that eats and exists on Tuesdays and thinks,” that violate a larger number of intuitive expectations associated with members of that category. Boyer hypothesized that MCI concepts have transmission advantages over other types of ideas because MCI ideas are remembered better than other types of ideas. A number of subsequent studies have largely confirmed Boyer’s findings.

While traditionally, PSYOP messages do not appear to have exploited MCI objects and events to the same extent as consumer ads have done, but they have been used to gain a TA’s attention in some successful campaigns. For instance, during the Israel-Lebanon war of July 2006, the Israeli Defense Forces developed a number of leaflets depicting Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah with his characteristic beard and turban on an animal body.

Expanding on Boyer’s work, I have developed the notion of culturally counter-intuitive concepts as concepts that violate shared expectations of a target audience. I believe that the notion of cultural counter-intuitiveness not only allows one to understand why socio-cultural ideas are always evolving, but it is also more helpful for developing messages that will prove ‘catchy’ for specific segments of a target audience.

Imagine that you are an official in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) tasked to promote campaigns for de-radicalizing British and Commonwealth Muslims, a majority of whom seem to believe that the West is at war with Islam. This is despite the fact that many Western leaders (including the US President, the British Prime Minister, as well as various British Ministers) have repeatedly denied the suggestion, pointing out numerous scenarios where the West actually helped Muslims, including during the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s and in Indonesia following the 2010 tsunami. Clearly, Muslims have come to expect such assertions from the usual suspects, and have learned to ignore them. In 2008, the FCO decided to fund an ad campaign featuring prominent British Muslims, such as the Lord Mayor of Birmingham, talking about their success in simultaneously maintaining a positive Muslim and a positive British identity. Speaking in fluent Urdu, and sporting a beard, a Jinnah cap (the prayer cap favoured by the Pakistani imams), and a traditional sherwani coat, the Lord Mayor said:

“I am proud to be the Mayor of a multicultural city as Birmingham where 140,000 Muslims reside. My responsibility as a Mayor is to figure out how to reach out to a multicultural people to convey them the message of love and peace. In this respect, my religion helps me follow the path of self recognition. I am Chaudhary Abdul Rashid. I am Muslim. I am a British citizen.”
The culturally counter-intuitive message of “I am the West” campaign struck a chord in Pakistan, where the ad was aired on a number of national radio and TV channels.

**Lesson 3: Get TA to Self-discover Your Message as Insight**

Simply catching the attention of the target audience is not enough. To illustrate this point, consider two versions of Camlin’s “permanent markers” ad that were both posted to YouTube in March 2008 approximately a year after the ad’s initial appearance on Indian television. One version was 16 seconds longer than the other. The ad had won awards in India, had been wildly successful in India, but as cross-cultural marketing experts know, success in one market is no guarantee of success in another market (in this case, the Indian and non-Indian YouTube audience members from around the world). A check in February 2012 revealed that while the longer version received over 700,000 hits, the shorter version only attracted a meager 12,000 views. The shorter version starts with a bird’s eye view of an Indian village, and quickly zooms in on a thatch-hut where a barely breathing man lies on a bed with a candle on his bedside, which goes out just as the man’s breathing appears to stop. The camera zooms in on his sad wife, who is immediately surrounded by the professional mourning women, who quickly take off her bangles and try to erase the red mark on her forehead. As the women are unable to erase the *bindi* mark despite their best efforts, the man restarts breathing with a cough, and the smile returns to his wife’s face. The scene changes to the outdoors as the sun shines and the man, apparently fully recovered, uses a Camlin marker to make a *bindi* mark on the forehead of his smiling wife. The ad ends with the announcement “Camlin permanent markers. Really permanent.”

The ad is clearly culturally counter-intuitive for a non-Indian audience that may not know about the significance of the red bindi mark on the forehead, the role of professional mourners, or traditional expectations regarding the role of a widow in India. Thus, it is surprising that the shorter version of the ad did not attract even more attention from the international audience for whom it is even more culturally counter-intuitive than it is for the Indian audience. Why did an ad that so clearly resonated with an Indian audience, not resonate with an international audience? The answer lies in examining the extra 16-second preamble that is appended at the start of the longer version of the ad, which seems to have been much more popular with the international YouTube audience members. The preamble consists of the following text message.

“In India, Bangles, locket and a vermillion mark on the forehead are symbols of a married woman.

Daily the husband applies the vermillion on the wife’s forehead as it is believed to be connected to his lifeline.

When the husband dies, Rudali’s (Professional Mourners) come and strip the woman of these symbols.”

What do these 51 words provide to a non-Indian audience member that causes the longer version of the ad to resonate with them?
The answer lies in better understanding why people pay more attention to messages that violate their expectations. Cognitive psychologists argue that this is so because expectation violations indicate learning opportunities. They indicate the need to improve one’s world model. But in order for one to actually learn something from a learning opportunity, one must be able to make some sense of the surprising situation. Without the preamble, non-Indian audience members are not able to make sense of the Camlin ad, whereas with it, they are. Having been equipped with the knowledge of the significance of the vermillion-mark on the forehead, the role of professional Rudali mourners, and traditional cultural norms regarding the role of an Indian widow, the audience members are able to make sense of the ad and derive the key insight needed to connect the events in the ad, namely, that the inability of the Rudalis to erase the bindi mark from the woman’s forehead brought her husband back to life. The initial expectation violation of the husband coming back to life after his apparent death make the puzzled audience members search their long term memory for a solution to this conundrum. The viewers of the longer ad (as well as Indian viewers of the shorter ad) possess the knowledge that allows them to resolve the apparent inconsistency. In order to make sense of the puzzle, the target audience members have to create the mental elaboration that the Rudalis were unable to erase the bindi mark because it was created using the “really permanent” Camlin markers. The ability to solve this mental puzzle makes them feel good about themselves. It is this positive effect, along with the fact that they feel that they have created the knowledge that the clever marketer wanted them to create (in this that Camlin markers are “really permanent”), that makes the ad resonate with them. Contrary to the view of cultural resonance as an expectation-fit or match, I have argued that a message only resonates with members of a cultural group if it violates their expectations, but then allows them to justify these violations by creating new insight and by experiencing the delight of having discovered something they did not know before. In order to avoid rousing people’s reactions and counter-arguments, it is critical that the ad designers allow the TA members to self-derive the key message. People are more likely to be affected by a message if they feel that they have derived it themselves, rather than being ‘spoon-fed’ a message by marketers.

Conclusion

Designing effective messages that resonate with a target audience is not an easy task, especially for soldiers working in expeditionary environments. This article distills the results of recent psychological research on effective message design into three practical steps that can be followed by practitioners in the field in order to design effective messages. The first step involves rising above one’s own cultural schemas, and learning as much as possible about a target audience’s shared cultural schemas in order to design messages that are understood by the target audience members as intended. The second step involves carefully placing surprising elements into the message to catch the target audience member’s attention. The third and final step further specifies how to use this attention to get the target audience members to infer the desired message as their own insight. Messages that follow all three steps resonate with a target audience, and they achieve their objective.

NOTES

2. Ibid.
11. H.A. Friedman.
14. The growing list of studies includes the following:
15. H.A.Friedman...
16. This view has been elaborated in the following articles:
Wounded Soldiers: Can We Improve the Return to Work?

Simon Mailloux

Introduction

To acknowledge that soldiers coming back from the battlefield with an amputation might require some form of special rehabilitation or adaptation is not new, nor is it particularly revolutionary. In the First Century AD, an early crude example of this practice is exemplified through a story told by Pliny the Elder, who details the experience of a wounded Roman general. The general had lost his arm, but, rather than let this be the end of his career, he had an iron prosthetic made to hold his shield up for when he returned to battle. Stories of such resilience abound in historical records, but they are usually brought about by a stubborn individual, or by unusual events requiring extreme measures. On no occasion were such rare achievements repeatable due to the medical knowledge of the time.

As advances in medicine progressed, the probability that a patient would survive multiple traumatic injuries increased, while his capacity to reintegrate into society as a productive member also experienced several advances. Major leaps forward coincided with intense conflicts, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, and the two World Wars. These events challenged contemporary knowledge. However, recent technological advances, coupled with the large samples of motivated injured soldiers that the recent conflicts have returned to Canada, have demonstrated that rehabilitation into the ranks as a career soldier is possible. A recent study of British amputees from Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2008 concluded: “...[that] amputation does not necessarily mean the end of a military career, and rehabilitation with vocational support can place these patients back at work.” With this complete return to work in sight, an important threshold has been set, which raises new challenges for the medical profession but which also allows soldiers to see injuries in a different light. Indeed, the concern of rehabilitation is not simply medical, but also operational as “amputation is one of the most feared injuries of warfare in Service personnel, and it is a particular concern that they will be left disabled, ending their military career and opportunities outside.” This concern can be significantly mitigated or reduced with the right support and training, but, most importantly, with the intelligent use of military ethos when treating injured men and women in uniform.

While the case of every injured soldier is inherently different, and every case follows a different path, I will endeavour to share my experiences in going through the rehabilitation process to delineate some lessons learned. To achieve this, I have divided this brief article into two parts. The first will summarize this experience, and the second will share some lessons learned.

Race participants Andrew Knisley and his wife Erin Moore head to the finish line at the 2013 Canada Army Run, Ottawa, 22 September 2013.
In spite of the enormous efforts by the medical teams in Kandahar Air Field Hospital Role 3 and Landstuhl Military Hospital, Germany, I was disarticulated through the left knee, below my broken femur.

Following my repatriation to the city of Québec, I was placed in the Intensive Care Unit of the Tertiary Trauma Center l’Enfant-Jésus.

Rehabilitation and recovery can be a competitive process for individuals accustomed to challenging military environments. As soon as I learned that my brother-in-arms next door had quit his morphine doses, I decided to stop using it as well. The pain endured was great, but my pride would have none of it. This decision decidedly assisted in my recovery, since I regained control of my memory and could make sound decisions and commitments. One such decision was to be released from hospital and to return home for Christmas. The medical staff had been debating the issue, concerned that discharging me around Christmas time would create a potential mental health risk. Doctors were also worried that I was losing weight, and that I was not active enough. Their judgment was calling for me to transition as an in-patient to the Institut de Réadaptation en Déficience Physique de Québec (IRDPQ), which was an all-encompassing civilian facility for rehabilitation from all kinds of injuries, ranging from muscle pains to severely burned patients.

The medical staff felt that they could not release me when my health, both physical and mental, was at risk. However, the answer lay in a completely opposite direction. I needed to be discharged and return home to gain weight, to raise my confidence in my abilities, and to find a mental balance. As the result of the decision to allow me to return home, I gained weight and muscle mass very quickly, while my sleep normalized and my morale improved.

The IRDPQ has a very collegial approach to the rehabilitation process. Although this particular centre has specialists from all disciplines of rehabilitation who schedule dedicated sessions with each patient, bi-weekly meetings were held to allow information sharing across specialities. These meetings, chaired by a medical doctor and attended by the physiotherapist, occupational therapist, kinesiologist, prosthetic technician, psychologist, and others, had, as their main objective, to facilitate the decision making with respect...
to recovery steps. This became crucial when the time for prosthetic fitment came about, as the team of specialists could vouch for the preparedness of the patient, and this allowed for the rehabilitation to be an empowering experience with all the specialists’ inputs, as opposed to something to which the patient passively submits.

The same brother-in-arms that helped me wean myself off morphine also followed me throughout the rehabilitation process. We were always challenging each other to ‘go the extra mile,’ and to push the physiotherapist and the kinesiologist to show who was the first one about to break in any given challenge. For example, we had a running bet as to who could achieve the highest score on the VO2 Max machine, which led us through a gruelling exercise schedule, and, in the end, both of us broke the IRDPQ’s all-time record. While this is quite counter-intuitive for a medical institution, such behaviour is quite common in a combat unit, and competition is fostered to take advantage of the pride of the members to push themselves beyond their known limits. While it needs to be tempered, the pressure to not disappoint your peers is sometimes what makes the difference between a rehabilitation that lasts months, versus one that lasts years. I believe this form of ‘competitive rehabilitation’ should be used whenever possible, since, in general, soldiers have shown that they respond well to this type of environment.

I left the IRDPQ in July 2008 after seven months of intense work. From there, I was posted to Ottawa as an Aide-de-Camp to the Governor General of Canada, and, with that move, I took on progressively more demanding work. Learning to run became important once I was able to complete a full week of work, and completing our physical fitness test was the next natural step. This phase of rehabilitation seemed so much easier to deal with because my life was not in a holding pattern any longer. I needed more time for the next steps of rehabilitation, but these steps *fit themselves into* my schedule, rather than *dictating* it. I completed a return to a truly functional state once I re-deployed as a combatant in November 2009, completing the battle fitness test, and I fulfilled my duties, even when they called for me to liaise ‘outside the wire.’

**Lessons Learned from a Soldier’s Perspective**

From this experience, I have learned some lessons that have allowed me to successfully come back from a crippling injury, and they are in line with University of Maryland anthropology professor Seth Messinger’s work that rehabilitation requires a “person centered approach,” as opposed to a “technology driven model.” This is even more important for programs geared towards injured soldiers, as the mental plane is what ‘makes or breaks’ a warrior, and it is generally not his equipment.

An injured soldier often has different stress and breaking points or indicators than those of a civilian patient, and, therefore, he/she should not be treated as such. The ‘patient phase’ of early medical evacuation and attendance to life-and-limb threatening emergencies is necessary to let the medical system do its job. However, early and regular communication should let injured soldiers know that they are still serving their country, and that it is expected that they give their utmost to re-integrate quickly with their peers, or to continue to work hard to ease their transition, should they choose another life path. These communications can take the form of a military liaison officer regularly visiting injured service-members at the hospital, leaving them their uniform at the bedside for them to see or wear during visits, and by using their rank when being addressed by medical staff. It is sometimes helpful to remember that soldiers injured from a traumatic incident will have lost consciousness on the battlefield while being part of a combat outfit that had a mission, leadership, and a sense of purpose. Awakening in a medical environment that deprives them of all that was part of the social construct of their daily life in operation exacerbates the trauma, and it creates chaos with respect to their social identity.
It is recognized that patients “…with traumatic limb loss construct new post-injury bodies and social worlds by focussing upon their relationships with other patients, [and] clinician.” Having a military presence to remind them of their strengths, but also of their identity as part of their unit, is crucial during this social identity reconstruction. Depriving him or her of a military affiliation at this juncture is wrong, even if the member’s plan is to release from service, as it diminishes his prospects of rehabilitation by removing the soldier’s bearings too early in the recovery process. Keeping this affiliation will help the soldier deal with mental health issues that can arise from guilt, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other trauma-related health issues during the rehabilitation.

A definite plan with challenges, goals, and achievements needs to be established for a successful rehabilitation program, and this is the responsibility of the medical staff, since they assume the leadership of the soldiers under their care. A sound plan gives peace of mind and assurance to soldiers, who then start to work on the tasks so assigned. This plan should be explained to soldiers and their families as early as possible in order to reduce the chances of depression and allow him/her to be reassured of their prospects and capacity to re-integrate into a normal life, even as soldiers.

Being recognized for their sustained efforts and dedication in the service of their country is also an integral part of the motivational process. Going through military rehabilitation should bear the same recognition as undergoing a demanding military qualification. New skills are required from the member to function as an amputee soldier, and the work and time spent in the rehabilitation centre is indeed in the service of his/her country, and it needs to be recognized as such. Soldiers in every NATO country take pride in what they have accomplished, be it a specialist qualification, a rank attained, an operational experience, or just by being a qualified soldier. This system of recognition of efforts is present throughout a military system, identified by and through badges, medals, the granting of positions of authority, acknowledgement of accomplishments, and so on. Rehabilitation programs should leverage this system of recognizing military achievements, and develop clear plans within the chain of command to facilitate rehabilitation into the ranks. While this may seem trivial at first glance, this system of recognition will achieve positive results, as it fosters hard work and it reinforces positive behaviour in many ways similar to combat operations. Soldiers are familiar with this process, and health services can leverage this very easily, provided they are not ‘medical achievements,’ but true ‘military achievements,’ recognized by their peers and controlled by the chain of command.

The motivation and willingness of injured soldiers to work hard has always been seen as crucial for a successful rehabilitation. Time and again, medical staff see two patients with “…similarities in their ages and injuries [which] might suggest the they would have similar outcomes, but in fact while...
they both achieved good clinical outcomes, measured against other considerations [such as return to work, usage of prosthetic and mental health] they fared quite differently.”5 The impact of motivation is supreme with respect to rehabilitation successes. This is in no way foreign to military operations, as morale has always been a critical component of war-winning strategies. In fact, factors such as pain, seemingly unattainable challenges, and physical exhaustion are present and normal in both domains. As such, the enormous advantage of military rehabilitation is that the soldiers will have already learned to overcome obstacles while maintaining high morale, provided they maintain the usual bearings upon which they are used to relying.

The goal of any rehabilitation program is to provide injured personnel with the opportunities to reintegrate where possible into their previous occupations. To this end, a clear connection with their unit and with their support network needs to be maintained, since it has been advanced that a “…disability is a social and not merely a physical phenomenon.”6 Severing all ties to one’s identity as a soldier during rehabilitation will lower one’s chances of re-integrating into his/her workplace and continuing his/her career. It may even hinder one’s prospect of recovery, as their identity as a high performing soldier will be compromised, and it may be replaced by an identity as a ‘crippled’ individual.

Most soldiers will have access to a strong network of family and friends, and they are vital for mental health. However, the military family also needs to be actually present with the recovering soldier, as this is critical to the return of the member to his/her optimal capacity. It is essential to make the injured soldier feel part of the work routine at the unit, and to be fully engaged in the career progression he or she has chosen.7 Indeed, soldiers will face new barriers and limits, but above all, they need to experience a reassertion of their social existence and self-worth, which is the foundation of a warrior’s confidence and motivation. To help the soldiers redefine their own social existence and also to promote positive perceptions of the wounded soldier’s capacities, exercises that emphasize the skills that injured soldiers have regained should be developed. Adventure training is a great example of an opportunity to test these skills, but contributing to their unit training, and ultimately, redeployment into a theatre of operations are the true thresholds.

**Conclusion**

Ultimately, the desire of most wounded soldiers is to brush off their injuries and to come back in line with their comrades-in-arms. Some soldiers may desire to transition to a civilian life or a different support trade, but all of them want to return to the same physical capacities that they held before the incident. I maintain that now, more than ever before, we are able to make this possible in even the most complex cases, and we can achieve the complete return of amputees to combat operations. The medical branch has accomplished outstanding successes over the years by developing new medical procedures, and by designing new prostheses. The next step is to integrate these advancements with the military ethos to achieve even better results.

Captain Simon Mailloux is an infantry officer who currently serves in the 1st battalion R22eR as a company second-in-command (2 I/C). He lost a leg due to an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in Kandahar in 2007, and, after undergoing rehabilitation, completed a second tour of duty in Kandahar during 2009-2010. Captain Mailloux holds an MSc in International Politics from the University of Glasgow.
Can Praxis: A Model of Equine Assisted Learning (EAL) for PTSD

C. Randy Duncan, Steve Critchley, and Jim Marland

Introduction

“While the Canadian Armed Forces use teambuilding, communications training, and leadership to prepare soldiers for war, Can Praxis uses them to help soldiers and their families to recover from it.”

– Steve Critchley & Jim Marland

The rehabilitation challenges faced by veterans suffering with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including operational stress injury (OSI), are monumental and exacerbated by unfinished business. The lack of deprogramming and support for veterans to transition from a combat role to a civilian role typically results in individuals who constantly maintain an edge, and who can, in a given moment overreact, becoming too angry, too aggressive, and/or too anxious. Consequently, this road has all too often led to a diagnosis of PTSD, which we believe is tantamount to calling a veteran ‘weak,’ and is perhaps the worst label one can attach to a soldier. So, veterans battling the dissonance between being labelled ‘weak,’ and wanting to be strong, are not well prepared to talk about their problems, to be emotionally connected partners in personal relationships, and/or to integrate back into civilian life. If veterans with PTSD are unable to find a way to communicate effectively within their civilian relationships, their comfort zone will continue to shrink until their relationships are beyond repair, or, worse yet, the only thing left for them is to be the next one to ‘lay down in front of a GO Train in Toronto.’

There has been rapidly growing interest in Canada with respect to the association of ‘horse therapy,’ or equine assisted learning (EAL), for treating individuals suffering from the effects of OSI. Subsequently, Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) has come under increasing pressure to fund appropriate and complementary treatment therapies for veterans in more conventional treatment tracks for OSI. The decision by VAC to fund a portion of the pilot testing of the Can Praxis EAL program in 2013 comes on the heels of a joint initiative of VAC and the Department of National Defence (DND) to develop a mental health strategy to enhance the supports and services provided to the growing number of veterans with OSI. In Canada, over the past decade, the number of VAC clients identified as having OSI has increased from 3500 to more than 11,000. Consequently, combat PTSD is the most commonly diagnosed mental health condition affecting Canadian veterans, derived from the reality of almost 60 percent of VAC clients having received a favourable decision for disability benefits having OSI.4
The EAL industry is uniquely positioned to provide an appropriate form of experiential learning therapy for veterans and their spouses/partners suffering from the effects of OSI. In general, the role of animal-human interactions has been postulated to promote wellness and to prevent illness. Through interactions with horses, people find profound opportunities to modify their behaviour by learning to trust themselves and to become empowered in ways that cannot be accomplished through just conversation. The idea of conventional PTSD therapy for many combat veterans is unnerving, because many therapists do not fully understand the military persona and/or are insensitive to the psychological aftershocks of intense trauma. Understanding the potential use of horses for behavioural modification, Can Praxis offers an innovative approach that combines EAL activities with a self-mediation process to leverage participant self-awareness of key communication and conflict resolution concepts.

To the extent EAL is uniquely positioned to help veterans recover from the effects of OSI, Can Praxis is uniquely positioned within the EAL industry itself. The founders of Can Praxis have developed an innovative PTSD-tailored EAL curriculum to meet the needs of veterans suffering with OSI. A key strength of the Can Praxis program is including the veterans’ spouses/partners in the experiential learning process to ensure that the more subtle but crucial communication skills (first attempts at making a conciliatory gesture) do not go unnoticed in the critical early days following completion of the EAL session. In addition, the two Can Praxis facilitators provide the following unique and crucial mediating effects on participant engagement and support during the program: 1), a registered psychologist who has over 30 years of intermittent experience in corrections; and 2), a veteran who has been deployed in combat zones and understands the military persona.

The need for veterans to recover from OSI is already evident. For spouses who are impacted by OSI, the symptoms of which tend to shred already fragile communication efforts, the need is of vital importance, and with a moment’s reflection, it is axiomatic. Effective PTSD therapy needs to draw upon activities which move the survivor toward increased awareness of self-knowledge, self-control, and self-help. The founders of Can Praxis maintain that mental health strategies for treating OSI require more emphasis upon programs that provide the experience empowerment activities that build effective communication skills in veterans to help them transition into civilian life. This perspective comes from experience with talking therapies, which suggests that while therapists are trained to talk to their clients, their clients, particularly military personnel, are not trained to talk to them.

A Model of EAL for PTSD

The Can Praxis program is intended to serve as a model of appropriate OSI therapy for both: 1), veterans already on an existing treatment track for OSI, and who are in need of positive behavioural modification therapy to complement their recovery; and 2), veterans who need to recognize the value of additional help through more formal treatment therapies. A
The key benefit of the enhanced communication skills in the Can Praxis PTSD-tailored EAL curriculum is the help these positive life skills provide to veterans with their other treatment therapies. The founders of Can Praxis propose that interpersonal communications training, combined with the use of horses, has enduring value in helping veterans transition back into civilian life and rebuild family relationships.

The Can Praxis EAL curriculum has been adapted to include the principles of effective communication and conflict resolution developed by Dr. Daniel Dana. The work of Dana provides a simple, straightforward approach to teaching self-mediation skills that works with experiential learning activities to promote healing through mindfulness, cognitive reframes, and somatic approaches.9 The use of horses in leveraging awareness and helping veterans resolve their relationship issues is supported by Bruce D. Perry, an internationally-recognized authority on children in crisis: “Beginning the recovery process for relational neglect can start with animals.”10 Further, the Can Praxis program promotes a family support model whereby effective dialogue requires both parties in a relationship to know and understand the rules of self-mediation; no conversation – no resolution.

The aim of the Can Praxis program is to have veteran couples leave the classroom and the horse arena with new self-mediation techniques ringing in their ears. This is facilitated by a process that affords the time to both demonstrate the self-mediation techniques using equine activities, and to practice the skills with their respective spouse/partner. At the end of the program, the extent to which these experiential learning skills and knowledge have been acquired (making a conciliatory gesture, creating a safe environment for solving conflict, shifting away from ‘me against you,’ among others) can be assessed in a way that supports an empirical evidence-base.

Can Praxis has benefitted from receiving funding from both Wounded Warriors (WW) and Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) in 2013 to begin pilot testing this model of EAL therapy for OSI. Can Praxis credits this initial success in acquiring funding to the following two key elements: 1), an EAL curriculum designed specifically to meet the needs of veterans and their spouses/partners suffering from the effects of OSI; and 2), the development of an empirical evidence-base to demonstrate the benefits of a PTSD-tailored EAL program for veterans, as quantitative studies in the EAL industry are rare. The goal of Can Praxis is to have this unique PTSD-tailored EAL program be established as an evidence-based practice, and included in the mental health strategies of organizations that support veterans and members of other military/paramilitary organizations.

Methods

Can Praxis is currently in the process of validating the following two self-report instruments to assess the benefits of participating in their PTSD-tailored EAL program: 1), the 35-item Horses Relieving Operational Stress Through Experiential Relationships (HOLSTER) Scale;11 and 2), the 34-item Benefitting from Experiential Learning Together (BELT) Scale.12 Both instruments include the following two dimensions: 1), the acquisition of interpersonal skills and knowledge toward using a self-mediation process; and 2), the perceived relief from PTSD symptoms during the EAL session.

The HOLSTER scale was independently reviewed by seven content experts prior to starting the pilot testing process. The reviewers had experience with treating individuals with PTSD, experience and accreditation in facilitating EAL programs, or, in two cases, experience in both domains that ranged from 15 to 35 years. The content review experts included registered psychologists, social workers, an addictions counsellor, a physician, and PhD researchers in both animal sciences and PTSD trauma. The content review process resulted in 35 best-fit items for pilot testing the HOLSTER, commencing in March, 2013. The BELT scale for the spouses/partners was adapted from the HOLSTER scale, and it was first released for the second pilot testing session in May 2013.
**Participants**

The *Can Praxis* pilot testing commenced in March, 2013 and as of October 2013, a total of 31 veterans and 27 spouses/partners have participated in seven EAL sessions hosted at the Can Praxis facility near Rocky Mountain House, Alberta. In one case, a daughter participated in the program along with her veteran father. Thirty of the veterans recruited for the *Can Praxis* program were male, and one veteran was female. All veterans had been diagnosed with PTSD, including OSI. These veterans have come from all across Canada, from British Columbia to Newfoundland.

**Results**

**Assessment Based Upon the HOLSTER Scale**

The relatively small sample of participants (N = 31) dictates that only a basic descriptive examination of the veterans’ EAL experience has been reported at this early stage of pilot testing. Therefore, the results based upon the HOLSTER were only examined for the following two subscales, as reported in Figure 1.1. The *Relieving Symptoms of PTSD* subscale has a maximum possible score of 54, and the range of scores was 23 to 54 (M = 46.3, SD = 7.6). The *Acquisition of Coping Skills* subscale has a maximum possible score of 48, and the range of scores was 35 to 48 (M = 45.8, SD = 3.5).

The early trends for participant benefits attributable to the *Can Praxis* EAL experience are very promising. First, as detailed in Figure 1.1, 87.1 percent (27 of 31) veterans reported very positive perceptions about relief from their PTSD symptoms during the EAL session. The remaining four veterans (12.9 percent) reported at least some reduction in their PTSD symptoms, based upon the EAL experience. Secondly, as shown in Figure 1.1, 100 percent (31 of 31) of the veterans reported very positive perceptions with respect to acquiring new or enhanced self-mediation coping skills during the EAL session.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization:</th>
<th>Relieving Symptoms of PTSD:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Acquisition of Coping Skills:</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Perceived Benefit</td>
<td>0–18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0–16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Perceived Benefit</td>
<td>19–36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17–32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Positive Perceived Benefit</td>
<td>37–54</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33–48</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.1 Assessment of Veteran’s EAL Experience Based on the Two Subscales of the HOLSTER
Assessment Based Upon the BELT Scale

Similar to the HOLSTER, the current sample (N = 25) dictates that only a basic descriptive examination of the spouses’/partners’ responses for the following three subscales of the BELT has been reported at this stage of the pilot testing: 1), the Spouses/Partners Own EAL Experience subscale; 2), the Veterans’ Relief of Symptoms subscale; and 3), the Veterans’ Acquisition of Coping Skills subscale. The valid sample for the descriptive analysis is only 25, as the BELT scale was not available to the three spouses/partners who participated in the first pilot testing session in March 2013 (see Figure 1.2).

The early trends for spouse/partner benefits attributable to the Can Praxis EAL experience are also very promising. As detailed in Figure 1.2, 96.0 percent (24 of 25) of spouses/partners reported very positive feelings with respect to their Own EAL Experience. This subscale of the BELT included 80.0 percent (8 of 10) of the items measuring their acquisition of coping skills (i.e., communication and conflict resolution skills), and 20.0 percent of the items measuring how safe and comfortable they felt overall in attending the EAL session. The Own EAL Experience subscale had a maximum possible score of 30, and the range of scores was 15 to 30 (M = 27.9, SD = 3.2).

As shown in Figure 1.2, 88.0 percent (22 of 25) of spouses/partners rated the veterans as having a very positive reduction with respect to PTSD symptoms during in the EAL session. This Veterans’ Relief of Symptoms subscale included 12 items that measured the spouses’/partners’ perceptions of the veterans’ observable behaviour specific to being more calm, feeling less fatigued, having less anxiety, being less depressed, being able to control the remembered sadness, and being ‘in the moment,’ among others. This subscale had a maximum possible score of 36, and the range of scores was 21 to 36 (M = 31.2, SD = 4.8).

In addition, Figure 1.2 shows that 92.0 percent (23 of 25) of spouses/partners rated the veterans very positively for acquiring the coping skills necessary to improve their personal relationships. The findings indicated that veterans had a positive emotional experience, tended to think before reacting to situations, used the new communication tools, were more aware of their own body language, and better understood personal boundaries. This Veterans’ Acquisition of Coping Skills subscale had a maximum possible score of 24, and the range of scores was 13 to 24 (M = 22.0, SD = 3.0).

Conclusions

Overall, the results from the seven pilot testing sessions provide initial support that the Can Praxis PTSD-tailored EAL program has been implemented as intended. The present study indicates that both veterans and their spouses/partners have acquired new skills and knowledge to implement a self-mediation process to help work through their relationship issues. Subsequently, 100 percent of veterans, and 96.0 percent of the spouses/partners reported learning new and/or enhanced communication and conflict resolution skills that gave them hope for improved personal relationships as they move forward.

“...as a wife, this is the first time I have felt like a part of the process & the solution. This Can Praxis program has given me faith that our marriage will work if we work on it with the tools & understanding we were given.”

Session 6 Participant

The findings also support the benefits of using horses in experiential learning to leverage awareness of the self-mediation concepts incorporated into the Can Praxis EAL model. The findings that 87.1 percent of the veterans reported reduced PTSD symptoms during the EAL session suggests that the horse activities elicited positive experiences. If the veterans were not able to get control of their
depression, intrusive thoughts, and/or hyper arousal and be ‘in the moment’ during the equine activities, making a positive connection with the horses would have been compromised. This suggests support for the proposition that repairing a neglected relationship can benefit from having a positive experience with an animal that has a non-judgemental listening ear. Therefore, the founders of Can Praxis remain confident that the interaction with horses helps to move people, “hardwired” to rely heavily upon language, to learn valuable non-verbal communication techniques through understanding their body language.13

This article serves as a seminal document for continued research to obtain an optimum level of empirical evidence to satisfy the requirements of the scientific community toward establishing appropriate PTSD-tailored EAL programs as evidence-based practices. This research also supports the notion that appropriate PTSD-tailored EAL programs, such as Can Praxis, be considered in the long-term mental health strategies for veterans and members of other military/paramilitary organizations exposed to combat trauma.

Randy Duncan is currently a Research Consultant with the Department of Sociology at the University of Saskatchewan. He is currently pilot testing several instruments designed to measure the benefits of Equine Assisted Learning for at-risk youth and adults. This has led to a partnership with Can Praxis to conduct a study of the benefits of EAL for veterans and their spouses/partners suffering from the effects of PTSD, including Operational Stress Injury (OSI).

Steve Critchley, a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces, is now an international consulting mediator and trainer. In addition to his work as a facilitator with the Can Praxis program, Steve has provided harassment investigator and harassment advisor services for the Canadian and US federal governments, as well as providing training in South Africa, Ghana, Milan, London, and Dubai.

Jim Marland, a registered psychologist, has had a career that includes over 30 years of intermittent experience in corrections, which has given him a deep understanding of human nature, human needs, and human behaviour. More recently, he has combined his professional career with his 40 years of experience with horses. “For thousands of years, people have experienced the practical and profound contribution horses make to our lives,” said Marland. He uses horses’ instinctive responses to human body language to help teach participants communication, teambuilding, and leadership skills.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 37.
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 27.
8. Ibid.
Change for the Better – The Canadian Defence Academy, Future Plans, and Moving Forward

Bill Railer, Phil Hoddinott, and Jason Barr

Introduction

Change can be a good thing, and that is fortunate, because we often hear that change is a constant in life, and this is particularly true with respect to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Within the CAF, the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) is a change leader — CDA’s Future Plans and Modernization section is specifically tasked with developing innovative techniques — technologies and practices to map the way ahead for Individual Training and Education (IT&E) in the CAF.
The Future Plans and Modernization section has a wide spectrum of initiatives underway, and this brief article addresses two of our most promising examples, the Online Government Advanced Research and Development Environment (ONGARDE), and the Learning Support Centres (LSCs). These initiatives are maturing every day, and they will form integral parts of a consolidated plan to take the CAF to the forefront of IT&E modernization with an integrated, adaptive system of collaborative, innovative, initiatives developed to streamline and rationalize individual training.

ONGARDE – Security Sector Knowledge Network

During the Chief of Defence Staff’s change of command ceremony, Prime Minister Harper stated:

“The Forces must be restructured to ensure administrative burdens are reduced and resources freed up for the front line. The Canada First Defence Strategy must continue to advance, and as I’ve said before, with the constant search for more teeth and less tail. Within very real budgetary constraints, Canada needs to maintain a modern, general purpose, military capability.”

Collaboration platforms, such as GCPedia and GCConnex, open the doors to Government of Canada (GoC) cross collaboration. They cannot, however, meet the unique needs of the security-conscious Federal Security Sector.

As transparency and cost savings become more pervasive throughout the GoC, one recognizes the unique challenge of collecting the widespread activities and success stories related to Training and Education throughout the Security Sector. Specifically, Afghanistan and the 2010 Olympics highlighted the need for increased collaboration across the Federal Security Sector. This was followed by the GoC Strategic Review that mandated the need to ‘do more with less.’

In response to the above, the Future Plans and Modernization section’s Learning Technologies Team partnered with the National Research Council and Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto to develop a solution that would bring secure collaboration and information sharing to the Federal Security Sector.

The intent of ONGARDE is to provide the Federal Security Sector with an environment for connecting people within a collaborative platform that focuses upon training, education, and associated research and development. ONGARDE is the collective intelligence network, providing a supportive and secure social network for security professionals to exchange research, ideas, and solutions. It promises savings in both time and money, and collective advances in training and education.

With ONGARDE, one gets the right information to the right people at the right time. It is easy to locate people, content, and conversations inside the environment. It not only lets one search faster, it intelligently breaks down all areas of the system into...
categories in real-time. Collaborating ideas has come to mean much more than enabling the training and education community to create and to vote upon ideas. Through the sharing of research and digital resources across the ONGARDE network, organizations can accelerate project completion and lower overall development costs to members of the network.

Online environments have changed dramatically since organizations started enabling service-oriented communities on their website. Online communities break down barriers, answer questions among themselves, and develop real-time knowledge bases. ONGARDE not only connects one to experts, but also to relevant content, no matter what type. It makes it possible to pull in these conversations and to ensure that the in-house subject matter experts and knowledge bases continue to improve.

For more info on ONGARDE, contact Mr. Bill Railer (Bill.Railer@forces.gc.ca), or Mr. Mike Thompson (Michael.Thompson@forces.gc.ca).

Learning Support Centres (LSCs) and CAF Campus

CAF Campus is a performance-oriented, integrated training initiative currently being fielded by the Canadian Defence Academy. When fully implemented, CAF Campus will revolutionize the delivery of IT&E within the Canadian Armed Forces. Fundamental to CAF Campus, and a part of the initial phase of the CAF Campus operational framework, is the establishment of a network of Learning Support Centres equipped to provide a common baseline of integrated learning development services, IT&E specialist consultancy services, intelligent contracting, and the rationalization of IT&E.

Why establish LSCs? As a result of pan-CAF consultation by the CDA IT&E Modernization core team with Training Authorities (TAs) and Designated Training Authorities (DTAs), the following strategic gaps were identified as areas to be addressed at the LSC:

- inadequate resources to support the full spectrum of functions needed for effective IT&E: quality control (analysis, design, development, conduct, evaluation, validation) and quantity control (identify quantitative requirement, propose schedule, match, commission, administer, conduct);
- inability of current TE infrastructure to support the use of modern learning methodologies and technologies;
- inadequate exploitation of modern learning methodologies and technologies;
- inefficient use of resources, and a lack of synergy due to ‘stove-piping’;
- incomplete evolution of the CAF as a learning organization, one that facilitates member learning and continuously adapts to an environment of significant social, technological, and operational change; and
- lack of instructor and IT&E manager development.

Following consultation with IT&E stakeholders, CDA recommended the establishment of a network of LSCs. As a starting point, the agreement by all stakeholders was to establish these LSCs with similar common capabilities to what already exists at the Army Learning Support Centre (ALSC) in CFB Gagetown. Through this LSC network, CAF resources are aligned towards shared goals, including but not limited to:

- maximizing learning content productivity;
- improving the maintenance of course content;
- sharing best practices;
- standardizing content and activities for CAF learning within and between TAs/DTAs;
- minimizing the need for refresher training through the use of alternative methods and techniques that maintain knowledge and skills; and,
- increasing the use of a blended training approach within formal and informal training.

LSCs operate under the ownership of a Training Authority (TA). The TAs, (Army, Navy and Air Force) will utilize their LSC to manage IT&E for their respective environment, while Commander CDA will manage all CAF-wide IT&E. The establishment and evolution of the LSC network consistent with a CAF-wide
standard level of capability is a CDA HQ responsibility on behalf of Professional Development Council (PDC). Coordination is essential between the TAs/DTAs to ensure these LSCs address identified strategic gaps. The specific design of each LSC depends upon the intended scope of its IT&E activity, and is determined by a combination of factors, including the TA’s development and common service requirements, and the specialized capabilities that TA provides to the entire development network.

With the ability to leverage the CAF Campus Enterprise Engine, which constitutes the technical backbone to the CAF Campus, providing ubiquitous access to collaborative instructional environments and tools that support IT&E, the LSCs can be virtual, physical, or a combination thereof. In addition to the main LSCs, some development and common services will also be accessed at Satellite LSCs that are linked to a TA LSC and the entire development network.

Concentrating development expertise at an LSC is an effective and efficient approach that clearly separates the creation and maintenance of complex learning material from its delivery at training establishments (TEs). Additionally, this approach will ensure the appropriate allocation of time and resources within business plans for learning development. These TA-owned LSCs will work collaboratively to eliminate the duplication of learning content and, to the greatest extent possible, reuse or repurpose content along other TA/DTA lines.

What type of support should you expect to receive from this network of LSCs? The potential standardized development capabilities that would be available from an LSC include:

- face-to-face learning events and course content co-creation and maintenance;
- custom courseware creation and maintenance requiring advanced programming skills;
- rapid e-courseware co-creation and maintenance with TEs;
- multimedia development, creation, and maintenance;
- creation and maintenance of support tools;
- three dimensional (3D) content creation and maintenance;
- simulation creation and maintenance;
- creation of and support for collaborative environments;
- support and creation of instances for social networking for courses;
- creation and maintenance of performance support systems and electronic support tools;
- content creation for multi-use, multi-purpose, and multi-context capabilities;
- incorporation of emerging technology requirements into the creation and maintenance of content;
- creation and maintenance of learning events incorporating various levels of augmented reality; and
- creation of and support for social networking.

The LSCs will link TEs and TAs/DTAs with access to innovative and insightful resources to advise and assist them in providing tailored training resources to facilitate enhanced training experiences. Through the LSCs, TEs will have access to expertise, experience, and resources that they could not access individually. The LSCs will be a tangible embodiment of the combined and enhanced approach to IT&E inherent in CAF Campus.

In sum, the ONGARDE and LSC initiatives hold great promise, and CDA is the proud standard bearer tasked with bringing these initiatives to fruition.

Bill Railer is a Learning and Technology specialist at CDA Headquarters. He assumed the directorship of the Canada ADL Partnership Lab in 2008, and is responsible for promoting innovations in training and education, as well as developing and adopting global e-learning standards within DND and other Canadian federal departments.

Captain Phil Hoddinott is a Training Development Officer at CDA Headquarters who has been assigned to the Individual Training and Education Modernization Initiative since 2010. He is one of the authors of the CAF Campus Operational Framework.

Jason Barr is a staff officer with the CDA Individual Training and Education Modernization Initiative, based at CFB Borden. As such, he supports the integration and development of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as CMP/CDA networked Learning Support Centres.
Intervention from the Stars: Anecdotal Evidence

Roy Thomas

Introduction

Pistols and knives had come out on the Zepa drop zone (DZ) under starless night skies in disputes over aerial delivered food in February and March 1993.1 No one wanted to see such violence reoccur in the winter of 1993-1994. Indeed, the survivors in this isolated pocket had created a police force that among other duties would police the DZ.

Just over twenty years ago, from the side of the narrow road that dropped down into the hamlet of 36 houses that gave its name to this enclave, the author first viewed the mountain where the relief items were dropped. It is now time to tell how the ‘stars’ reached down to attempt to assist the estimated mix of 20,000 Bosnian ‘government’ soldiers, refugees, and ‘locals’ surrounded in the Zepa pocket. The ‘stars’ are those on the epaulettes of the generals who personally intervened with efforts to solve the challenges facing this community police force as the airdrop ‘season’ began.

Background

The so-called Zepa ‘safe-haven’ was among the three established by United Nations (UN) fiat 2 in May 1993 to shelter survivors of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign conducted by the Bosnian Serbs in Eastern Bosnia. Bosnians who were Muslims had been pushed into three pockets at Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde with their backs to the Drina River and Serbia.3 Although Srebrenica and Zepa were supposed to be demilitarized, the author occasionally observed fully uniformed males in Zepa supporting the UN assessment that Zepa was being used as a rest area for troops operating from the Gorazde and Srebrenica safe havens. The Bosnian Serbs had not tightened the three sieges with enough forces to seal them off completely, therefore, infiltration on foot between the enclaves, and in particular, between Srebrenica and Zepa, was ongoing.4 The fact that surplus military parkas had appeared to have been distributed as ‘winterization’ aid made distinguishing between who was a soldier and who was not difficult. Theoretically, the only armed personnel in Zepa were supposed to be wearing blue helmets…
The UN presence on the ground in Zepa only materialized in May 1993. The UN resources for securing this ‘safe haven’ consisted of a small mechanized company of Ukrainians (about 60-70 personnel), and an observer team of United Nations military observers (UNMOs), who never totaled more than ten during the author’s nine months in Sector Sarajevo. Like the Bosnian Government troops, both the UNMO team and the Ukrainian United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops were controlled from Sector Sarajevo proper. The Ukrainians had armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and the Zepa team had Toyota land cruisers. There was also one expatriate ‘permanent’ United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) employee, who was assigned from Belgrade to reside in Zepa, and who was supported by staff of locally engaged short-term UNCHR workers. The UNHCR had already been involved in the delivery of emergency food to the Bosnian Muslims in Zepa by airdrops and convoys since early-1993.

In addition to the restrictions imposed by the surrounding Bosnian Serb forces, winter snowfall increased the isolation of the Zepa pocket. In the author’s opinion, the Bosnian Muslims around the Zepa mountains had survived the Bosnian Serb Eastern Bosnian campaign primarily because the mechanized equipment that gave outnumbered Bosnian Serb forces an advantage were severely limited by the torturous mountainous roads and the steep hills of the terrain therein. Thus, even when the besieging forces permitted access, this topography frequently made the UNHCR truck convoys that were employed to deliver the bulk of the humanitarian aid unable to reach Zepa. The commencement of aerial delivery of aid to Bosnian enclaves, which had begun in February 1993, was to reach its highest levels in January, February, and March 1994, when an average of 16 sorties per night were flown, the majority by USAF C-130 aircraft.

All the airdrop sorties originated at Rhein-main Air Base in Germany, and they were executed at a height of 10,000 feet, using either Container Delivery Systems (CDS), or the Tri-Wall Aerial Delivery Systems (TRIADS). The latter method distributed US Army rations (MRES) in a so-called ‘flutter’ of ration packs all over the DZ. UNMO teams in both Gorazde and Zepa assisted in monitoring the drops, as well as the retrieval process. Tracking the distribution was a UNHCR function. The evidence of fighting over air dropped packages had not only identified a problem on the ground with this form of aid delivery, but in the case of Zepa, it highlighted a deficiency which needed external assistance, namely policing. Policing of this rural area had previously been coordinated from a central police station in Rogatica, now Bosnian Serb-held. The embryo Zepa police force reported through UNMO communications to Sarajevo.

Policing the DZ

The Seemingly Simplest Requirement

After observing a night drop of aid on 17/18 January 1994, the following morning, the author met with local leaders. Although the previous night’s DZ had been well-organized, the question of policing the DZ became a major agenda item. The requirement to continue to police the DZ with local police was seen as urgent. The help of the parent UNMO organization, UNMO Sarajevo, commanded by the author, was sought. In order to make the already-functioning local police force more effective, there were many requirements. Among these, the most likely need that could be met quickly was the request for uniforms that were clearly distinguishable from the Bosnian military or civilians wearing military apparel, particularly when viewed in the darkness on the DZ. Such a uniform would have to be warm in order to encourage substitution for the military parkas that appeared so prevalent. For night work on the DZ, such distinct parkas ideally should have fluorescent police identification. Clothing worn by Canadian or Scandinavian police provided examples of what was needed. The author took this requirement, among others, such as the need for radios, vehicles, and possibly, personal weapons, back to his headquarters in Sarajevo.
The author (second from left), with UN partners.

The First Intervention: Providing Winter Police Uniforms

Requests for police, or simply ‘security’ uniforms through UN channels on an urgent basis were unsuccessful. This was no surprise, as ‘locally employed’ interpreters, vital to survival of unarmed UN observers, were not initially supplied with either flak jackets or helmets, although all UN military personnel could be disciplined for not wearing their protective headgear or jackets. The fight for uniforms from UN sources had the potential to extend well into spring. The UNHCR did not see this as ‘falling into their lane’ under their mandate. The UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) headquarters in Zagreb had already been approached to visit Zepa and Gorazde to determine how ‘local’ police forces could be developed, assisted, or mentored, with no result to that point. There seemed to be no interest in either organization in the immediate issue of identifying police on the Zepa DZ with distinctive uniforms, or in any longer term project of further developing the local Zepa police force. However, it was apparent that the previous policing practices in the Zepa area had been completely sndered by the Bosnian Serb Eastern Bosnian campaign.

The Bosnian Government police authorities in Sarajevo, theoretically the next level of police command, had neither the resources nor the interest to assist in any way in this Zepa problem. It was, in fact, necessary for the author to ‘step outside his own lane’ and reach for the ‘stars.’

In the end, obtaining uniforms proved to be the easiest step, thanks to the first intervention of the ‘stars.’ A Canadian major-general who had served in the Former Yugoslavia, upon hearing of the requirement, arranged for a Canadian municipal police force to supply winter parkas. Within weeks of this ‘two star’ officer learning of this particular need, boxes of Canadian police parkas arrived in the Former Yugoslavia.

The Second Intervention: Transporting the Police Uniforms to Zepa

The problem of moving these boxes to Zepa was challenging in the winter of 1993-1994. A major obstacle arising from belligerent perceptions existed. Although clearly marked as ‘police’ parkas, this clothing would be viewed as military aid by all belligerents at every checkpoint on every road or track leading to Zepa. Indeed, the distinction between police and the military was blurred among all three Bosnian factions, as all sides drafted individuals skilled with weapons into fighting, not policing. Fighting, not fighting crime was every policitian’s priority. The idea of a small community creating their own police force to police their particular community was foreign to almost everyone. It is understandable that the former Communist politicians in the Bosnian Government in the capital, Sarajevo, appeared to have no interest in the creation of a police element that would not be readily susceptible to their central control.

The idea of the boxes of uniforms being carried on UNMO Sarajevo Toyota Land Cruiser vehicles was also out of the question. These unique parkas would attract attention, and, most likely, forcible seizure by those belligerents themselves suffering in the cold without warm clothing. Additional vehicles from the UNMO Sarajevo pool would have to assist with this task at a time when monitoring the Sarajevo February 1994 ceasefire and Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), as well as a doubling of UNMO Sarajevo manpower, was straining UNMO Sarajevo resources. This same ceasefire implementation meant that asking Sector Sarajevo for UN contingent assistance was out of the question. A military vehicle, even if one could be spared from a UN unit, would add to the suspicion surrounding the parkas.

However, the same flurry of activity that focused all UNPROFOR efforts on the ceasefire and TEZ in Sarajevo proper led to the intervention by yet another ‘star,’ or rather, ‘two stars.’ An American general involved in the air lift, including the air drops, regularly visited UNMO Sarajevo headquarters for briefings on the situation, which impacted so directly on the safety of aircraft maintaining the air bridge into the besieged Bosnian capital. After one such briefing, he asked if there was anything that he could do for the UNMOs. There was indeed! The boxes of uniforms, at his direction, were to be air dropped into the Zepa pocket.

Police Mentors: The Third Intervention

It was not enough to arrange for the uniforms to reach Zepa. A request that some UNCIVPOL element visit Zepa and Gorazde was still outstanding. Now, expert police mentoring was needed, as well as advice on the Zepa community’s identified requirements.
for their police force. Although some UN military observers from Scandinavian countries were police officers by virtue of their ‘day’ jobs, few were available in Bosnia, and none of these were in Sector Sarajevo. Learning of the need for police mentoring for the Zepa police that UNMOs hoped to see in time to help with the Zepa airdrop DZ, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, a ‘three star,’ intervened to arrange for two active policemen, presently serving as reserve soldiers with the Swedish battalion in the Tuzla sector of Bosnia, to temporarily be assigned for a few weeks to Zepa, supported by the Zepa UNMO team.

Epilogue

Unfortunately, the intervention of the ‘stars’ in the creation of a civilian police force may not have had any measurable impact. The February Sarajevo ceasefire and TEZ focused UN thought and resources onto implementing these two initiatives. Then, in the spring of 1994, the NATO air strikes at Gorazde re-aligned relationships between all the stakeholders in Eastern Bosnia, not just those in the vicinity of Gorazde.\(^{13}\) At the same time, the total number of air drops under Operation Provide Promise dramatically decreased from 16 sorties a day on average in January, February, and March 1994, to total of only 23 sorties during the entire month of April, shrinking to a total of ten sorties for all May, and a mere five in the month of June.\(^{14}\) As policing the DZ had been one of the motivating factors for assisting the local police force in Zepa, the momentum for helping with its development declined almost as dramatically. A year after the author left, events proved that Zepa was not a safe haven.

Conclusions

Assessment and Monitoring of the Air Drops

Warm weather and the air strikes brought back not just UNHCR truck convoys. Development of the Zepa civilian police force was now no longer considered an issue in talks between the Zepa UNMO team and Zepa community leaders. The final disposition of the cold weather police uniforms is unknown. This is yet another example of the weakness in tracking the distribution, and, equally important, the effectiveness of assistance, whether airdropped or convoy delivered.\(^{15}\)

Policing Aid Delivery

The Zepa community’s creation of a civilian police force for their enclave, motivated in part by the need to police the DZs, indicates that evaluating the condition of a target population’s ability to distribute must include ‘policing’ considerations, distinct from those related to ‘security.’ The intervention of the ‘stars’ throws light upon an oft-overlooked wider aspect of aid ‘policing.’ The crucial question is, just who has ownership or shared ownership of the policing lane among the ‘actors’ or ‘stakeholders.’ Assisting an isolated community of refugees and local inhabitants, who had lived under a Communist regime with the development of their own community police force, should have received a high priority by all the many non-military agencies purporting to provide humanitarian assistance to Eastern Bosnia.\(^{16}\)

Outside the Military Lane

The author wishes to record his personal thanks to ‘stars’ from three different national armies who stepped out of the so-called ‘military’ lane to assist in meeting the request for help from an isolated small safe haven with the development of their own ‘community’ police force.

Major (ret’d) Roy Thomas, MSC, CD, MA, a highly experienced Canadian Army peacekeeper, has served in seven different UN mission areas, including the Middle East missions of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force [UNDOF] and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [UNTSO], during the latter of which he was hijacked in South Lebanon.

2. *UNSC Resolution 824 (1993)* 6 May and *UNSC Resolution 836 (1993)* 4 June. Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/25939, dated 14 June 1993, noted that to implement UNSCR 836, about 34,000 additional troops would be required by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), but in fact, recommended that an initial ‘light’ option of 7500 troops be accepted.

3. *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of Combatants in the Former Yugoslavia, 1 August, 1993, USAREUR Combat Intelligence Readiness Facility, 66th MI Bde, Augsburg, Germany*, pp. VI-10 to VI-15, not only provides details of the campaign, but insight into the military positions and the terrain.

4. A then-Restricted UN intelligence document entered as Exhibit P2442 at the Galic Trial, ICTY, IT-98-29, pp. 0055276 and 0055777, contains this assessment as well as the evaluation that the Krusevo and Luka area of the Zepa enclave were under the operational control of Srebrenica. Both Eastern Bosnian enclaves were under the operational control of 1Corps in Sarajevo.

5. The author, as Senior United Nations Military Observer for Sector Sarajevo, commanded 120-200 officers from 38 different countries around Sarajevo itself in 12-23 team sites, in addition to UNMO teams in Gorazde and Zepa. Details can be found in the author’s “Commanding UN Military Observers in Sector Sarajevo 1993-94,” in *In Harm’s Way: The Buck Stops Here*, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), pp. 1-25.


7. Ibid., p. II-12.


9. The Zepa DZ appeared well-organized on that night that the author watched the reported drop of 41 pallets by three USAF C-130 Hercules aircraft. An American Operation Provide Promise Liaison Officer accompanied the author. Sixty people under control of the ‘local’ police chief had walked 15 kilometers up the mountain. The author left before the retrieval stopped at first light, and 39 pallets were brought down to the UNHCR warehouse to be inventoried a second time and then distributed. At no time could the local ‘crew’ securing the pallets be identified as police.

10. From the author’s notes, there was a long-standing requirement for a UN Civilian Police representative to visit the Gorazde and Zepa enclaves, since the centralized police force of Eastern Bosnia had been completely dismantled. The equipment requirements of winter clothing, boots, handi-talkies with base station, and vehicles, not to mention such simple items as office supplies, had already been raised by the UNMO Zepa team leader specifically on 27 December 1993. It was clear that in January 1994, a local police force was in being, and that it was not just an adjunct of the Bosnian Army. The DZ in Zepa appeared to be controlled by local police, not the local Bosnian military.

11. It was no surprise for the author to note that criminal activities flourished in the absence of ‘policing.’ The need for the presence of international police personnel in Bosnia at time of writing is, in the author’s opinion, one of the consequences of ignoring development of ‘community’ police forces to replace the former highly-centralized police force.


13. For example, a UNMO en route from Zepa to Sarajevo the day of the first bombing disappeared as a hostage for a week. The author’s “Bombing in the Service of Peace Sarajevo and Gorazde, Spring 1994,” in *Chronicles* online journal, at <http:www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/thomasrev.html>, and “From Gorazde to Kosovo: Aerospace Power in Peace Support Operations,” in Strategic Datalink #88, May 2000, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), discuss these air attacks on Gorazde.


15. Ibid. p. III-9 states that “weakness of the assessment and monitoring capabilities on the ground” deserves special focus.

16. The author encountered a similar difficulty in Haiti in his year with UNMIH and UNSMIH, when only government donors could be found to support improvements to the Haitian prison system.
The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy and the ‘Ambition-Capability Gap’

Martin Shadwick

The decision of the Harper government to ‘push the reset button’ on the fighter replacement program did much to temporarily anesthetize, or, at least, to divert, media, public, and political attention from the travails of Canadian defence procurement. The debate over the most credible successor to the CF-18 will, in due course, be rejoined, but in the meantime—and possibly long after the fighter dust settles—the spotlight has shifted to naval procurement. Much of this attention has focused upon specific projects within the broader National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS), including the Joint Support Ship (itself “reset” on multiple occasions over the years), and, most notably, our old friend, the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS). A not-unimportant initiative, given the growing geo-strategic and economic significance of the Arctic and the RCN’s lamentably limited ability to operate in the region, AOPS has nevertheless been derided by more than a few critics as an ill-conceived ‘slushbreaker’ of decidedly modest utility. Recent media accusations of wildly inflated design costs have further damaged its reputation. Criticisms of AOPS and JSS are not new, but it is noteworthy that the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, which, for the most part, generated rave reviews when it was unveiled in June of 2010 (Jeffrey Simpson of the Globe and Mail, for example, posited that the Harper government had broken with Canadian shipbuilding tradition—“50 per cent engineering, 50 per cent politics”—in “exemplary fashion”), is now receiving deeper and not always positive analysis. Further attention to the NSPS as a whole is neither inappropriate or unwelcome—it does, after all, embrace the rebuilding, at considerable cost, of almost the entirety of the RCN—but an even broader debate about ambitions, capabilities, and Canadian maritime strategy is arguably in order.

A representative sampling of the recent literature includes an audit of the NSPS in the Fall 2013 Report of the Auditor General of Canada (followed shortly thereafter by additional responses from Public Works and Government Services Canada), and a blunt December 2013 critique of the NSPS by Michael Byers and Stewart Webb (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Rideau Institute, Blank Cheque: National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy Puts Canadians at Risk). The latter was quickly followed by a no-less-blunt response from Seaspan ULC and Irving Shipbuilding Inc.

More technical, narrowly focused contributions to the debate have included two reports from the Parliamentary Budget Office: Labour Sensitivity Analysis for the Acquisition of Two Joint Support Ships (11 December 2013), and Feasibility of Budget for Acquisition of Two Joint Support Ships (28 February 2013). The latter drew considerable media attention with its assertion that “the cost of replacing the current [Protecteur Class] AORs with two analogous ships built according to Government procurement rules in Canada” would cost significantly more than the DND estimate. The PBO report also concluded, not surprisingly, that “producing a [third
AOR] does not significantly add to program costs, as most of the costs are incurred during the development phase.”

Generally positive, the Auditor General’s appraisal of the NSPS concluded that “National Defence, Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), Industry Canada, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada have designed and are managing the [NSPS] in a way that should help sustain Canadian shipbuilding capacity and capability. In addition, the NSPS should help the government to procure federal ships in a timely, affordable manner, consistent with the build-in-Canada shipbuilding policy.” On the naval front specifically, the OAG concluded: “National Defence and PWGSC—in consultation with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat—are, to date, managing the acquisition of military ships in a timely and affordable manner following the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.” The report also observed that the earlier “competitive process for selecting two shipyards that was led by PWGSC resulted in a successful and efficient process, independent of political influence, carried out in an open and transparent manner.”

The OAG’s report advanced three recommendations. First, that PWGSC “should review the [NSPS] request for proposal process, including the negotiations with the successful bidders, to ensure that lessons learned are captured, examined and considered for application in future complex procurements and strategic sourcing arrangements.” Second, that PWGSC, “…supported by Industry Canada, National Defence, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, should regularly monitor the productivity of the shipyards in terms of competitiveness, cost-effectiveness, and efficiency, including measuring progress against the target state.” And, third, that DND and PWGSC, “…working with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, should ensure information to Treasury Board ministers includes updated information on changes to costs, capabilities, and schedules and should request additional authorities, as required.” All three recommendations were accepted by the relevant departments. Indeed, the recommendations and findings from the OAG were cited with considerable frequency in PWGSC’s 26 November 2013 response to a series of Frequently Asked Questions, as well as in the Seaspan-Irving response to the Byers-Webb report.

Although the OAG’s report necessarily examines a wide variety of issues, its most fundamental point—certainly from a wider maritime strategy and defence policy perspective—quite correctly centres upon what could be deemed the ‘ambition-capability gap’. Noting that “complex developmental projects,” such as naval vessels, “require years to design and build,” the report stresses: “…[that] it is important that any gap between the government’s level of ambition and the Royal Canadian Navy’s capability is regularly measured and minimized. Canada’s last general policy statement on its expected level of ambition was in 2008, through the Canadian First Defence Strategy (CFDS). While the CFDS did outline the expected number of Navy ships and the core missions for the Canadian [Armed] Forces, it did not define the specific naval
capabilities required to fulfill the government’s level of ambition.” In the opinion of the OAG, “…a gap appears to be developing between the CFDS level of ambition, the evolving naval capabilities, and the budgets. National Defence should continue to monitor the extent to which it will or will not meet the government’s expectations for future military needs, and continue to report to ministers on expected capability gaps, allowing the government to make adjustments to expectations and capabilities.” The report also observes: “…[that] because budget caps were established early in the planning process, National Defence has reduced the expected number of military ships or their capabilities to remain within budget. As a result, cost/capability trade-offs need to be monitored and revisions made to project budgets, if necessary, to make sure that Canada gets the military ships it needs to protect Canadian interests and sovereignty.”

The manner in which the ‘ambition-capability gap’ is bridged will shape the RCN and Canadian maritime strategy for decades to come. The report of the OAG also takes note of government declarations dating back to 2001 that Canada “would continue to procure, repair, and refit ships in Canada.” It consequently focuses its attention upon whether relevant departments “…have designed and are managing the NSPS to procure federal ships in a timely and affordable manner, in a way that will help sustain Canadian shipbuilding capacity and capability,” and does not explicitly enter the debate over domestic versus offshore sourcing. The PWGSC document of 26 November 2013, however, provided a staunch defence of domestic sourcing, arguing that the NSPS “…will bring predictability to federal ship building and eliminate cycles of boom and bust in the shipbuilding and marine industries,” and generate “…good long-term jobs in all regions of the country. In addition to ship construction, parts, sub-assemblies, equipment and specialized services will be required to develop long-term sustainable supply chains, creating significant opportunities for Canadian companies of all sizes. It is estimated that the [NSPS] will create 15,000 jobs and generate over $2 billion in annual economic activity.” Building in Canada, “…provides protection against risks, including through-life cost increases, availability of engineering information (for support/refit/upgrade work) and assured access to and security of future supply (sovereignty capability).” These are valid points. Indeed, the list could be buttressed by the assertion that offshore sourcing and the concomitant loss of Canadian employment would erode public support for defence spending and the retention of a credible navy. That said, recent foreign moves, such as the United Kingdom’s decision to build four BMT-designed Aegir Type replenishment vessels in South Korea, at an attractive price with prompt delivery, have drawn attention to the potential merits of offshore construction for naval vessels of some types. Norway has taken a similar route for its forthcoming replenishment vessel. The production locale of the two Queenston Class Joint Support Ships is now effectively moot, but as the NSPS progresses, one should anticipate ongoing (and important) debate over the quantity and quality of the Canadian employment opportunities generated, directly or indirectly, by systems integration, the production of electronic systems, sub-systems, and components, and the production of the myriad other components of a modern naval vessel.

In Blank Cheque, for example, Byers and Webb acknowledge that the stated goal of the NSPS to “provide long-term certainty” for Canada’s shipbuilding industry “might well occur, but only at a much greater cost than is necessary.” For the Harper government made a serious mistake by confining the only truly competitive portion of the NSPS to the choice of shipyards, which are both, effectively, also in the position of ‘prime contractors’ now. “As prime contractors, Irving and Seaspan will be free to select the ‘system integrators’ which coordinate various aspects of the procurement, including the selection and acquisition of communication, sensor, and weapon systems.” “[The] shipyards, together with tier appointed system integrators, will also select the various sub-contractors who design and equip the vessels. The only restriction on these selections will be that the designs and equipment must meet the requirements of the RCN and CCG—
requirements that in most cases have yet to be set. The selection of a sub-contractor need not be made on the basis of best value, but may instead be determined by other factors such as the shipyard’s ‘familiarity’ with a particular company. And those decisions, made by the shipyard, will have significant impacts on the ultimate cost of the ships. In essence, this means that the Harper government has issued blank cheques to Irving and Seaspan.”

In response, Seaspan and Irving Shipbuilding labeled the study “grossly inaccurate” and “misleading,” and pointed to “23 specific factual errors.” Further, the OAG “… concluded that, through the NSPS, the Government is managing the acquisition of military ships in a timely, affordable, efficient, and transparent manner that will support the shipbuilding industry for years to come. All of our contracts and agreements with Canada include performance and capability improvements milestones based on independently validated benchmarking; specific value proposition commitments that will benefit the Canadian Marine Industry; as well as a genuine commitment to open-book accounting.” Moreover, “detailed estimates for vessels are submitted to the Government, who then validate the information using third party expertise. Ships are fully designed before final quotes are determined so the greatest certainty is known in the costing. Fully designing the ship before start of production also reduces errors and rework, which reduces the overall vessel cost. We were well aware going into NSPS that if we don’t perform on-time and on-budget, Canada has no commitment to give us further contracts. This is a significant way for Canada to de-risk the project…”

At this comparatively early juncture, it would be imprudent to offer more than a preliminary assessment of the massive undertaking that is the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. The

reviews to date—in large measure anchored by the findings of the Office of the Auditor General—have been commendably solid and encouraging but, as the reservations registered by such analysts as Byers and Webb remind us, the breathtakingly stellar reviews that greeted the launch of the NSPS in 2010 were never destined to last forever. Nor is it less true for being obvious that countless challenges remain…and will endure over a protracted period of time. Should noteworthy issues, for example, develop with private sector contractors, their practices or their performance, or should future OAG reports identify noteworthy issues with NSPS management and governance at the bureaucratic level, the result could only be a serious, perhaps profound, loss of public, media and political confidence and support. If doubts should grow with respect to the quantity and quality of NSPS-generated employment in Canada, or about the level of technology transfer to Canada—particularly at a time when our broader manufacturing sector has already absorbed heavy blows—confidence in NSPS (and, in a broader sense, naval modernization) would again be eroded. Above all, we should take particular heed of the OAG’s references to a perceived ‘ambition-capability gap’. If credible measures are not taken to address that gap—and if the powers that be fail to convince the broader public of the merit and the need for those measures—the RCN surface fleet of the future could be confined to a handful of AOPS, two more-or-less standard AORs and a rump of Canadian Surface Combatants.

Martin Shadwick teaches Canadian defence policy at York University. He is a former editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, and the resident Defence Commentator for the Canadian Military Journal.
Strategy and Strategies
by Bill Bentley

Strategy: A History by Lawrence Freedman;
The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present by Beatrice Heuser;
The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice by Colin S Gray;
Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War by John Stone

Colin Gray has long argued that Strategy, ‘with a capital-S,’ is unchanging and external, whereas there are a variety of strategies – land, sea, air, joint, cyber, nuclear, etc. that do, indeed, change both historically and as required by their geo-graphics. In The Strategy Bridge, Gray concentrates exclusively upon the unchanging nature of strategy, and, in fact, sets out to articulate a general theory of strategy. The other three authors agree with Gray’s general proposition, but deal predominately with specific strategies.

Gray, Heuser, and Stone are dealing with strategy, whether in general or with respect to specific strategies, within the security/military control, whereas Freedman’s treatment is much broader. This is reflected in their respective definitions of strategy that serve to orient their subsequent discussion. Thus, Heuser and Stone basically agree with Colin Gray that strategy is the use of force, or the threat of such use, to achieve a particular political objective as decided by politics. Freedman on the other hand, defines strategy simply as “the art of creating power,” which opens the door to a much broader field of inquiry. The result is that one would do well to read Strategy: A History first to obtain the widest angle view of the subject before turning to what is, in effect, military strategy.

Lawrence Freedman has been a professor of war studies at King’s College in Britain since 1982, and he has written extensively on strategy-related subjects. His book, published in 2013, is a grand tour of the meaning, implications, and consequences of strategic thinking through the ages and in multiple contexts. The first section of the book deals with military strategy. The second section looks at political strategy, particularly efforts on behalf of the ‘underdog.’ The third section considers the development of strategies for managers of large corporations, primarily since 1945.

In keeping with the breadth of his subject Freedman’s book is long – 751 pages; which, in turn, allows him to go into considerable depth in all three chosen areas – military, political, and business. Unlike Gray and Stone, Freedman does not dwell upon Clausewitz, although the Prussian gets a chapter on his own, whereas other military theorists, from Sun Tzu to Liddell Hart, are dealt with more summarily. At the same time, Freeman agrees with Beatrice Heuser that if we consider strategy to be a particular sort of problem-solving, it has existed since the start of time. Nonetheless, the explicit use of the term ‘strategy’ in modern times does not occur until it is used by Paul Gédéon Joly de Maïzeroy in 1771. Thus, its origins slightly predate Napoleon and reflect the Enlightenment’s growing confidence in empirical science and the application of reason.

While discussing military strategy, Freedman identifies a perennial issue that is also pursued in some detail by both Stone and Gray. In brief, this is the relationship between politics (policy) and strategy. The issue is most clearly illustrated by Freedman by reference to Bismarck and von Moltke in the Franco-Prussian War during 1870-1871. According to von Moltke, the aims of war are determined by policy. Once fighting, begins, however, the military must be given a free
BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

hand – strategy, must be fully independent of policy. Bismarck responded by saying that to fix the objects to be obtained by war, and to advise in respect of them, is, and remains during the war; just as before it, a political function, and the manner in which these questions are solved cannot be without influence on the conduct of war. This difficult subject remains a source of considerable debate even today, and it is still difficult for uniformed military strategists and operational artists to accept that there is “no politics-free zone in war.”

Freedman goes on to take us through the 20th Century by turning to specific strategies and his treatment of revolutionary, counter-insurgency, and nuclear strategies is thorough and insightful. He concludes Section One with valuable thoughts on the evolution of maneuver warfare theory, especially the contributions of Colonel John Boyd and his OODA Loop (observe, orient, decide and act). The only omission in Strategy: A History, and it is a serious one, is the lack of attention paid to Russian and Soviet thinkers such as Suvorov, Svechin, Frunze, and Tukhachevsky.

Moving on to political and corporate strategy, Freedman deals effectively with the strategies employed by communistagitators, organizers, and leaders, from Bakunin through Trotsky and Lenin to Mao. These strategies are contrasted with those non-violent strategies inspired by Ghandi, employed by key actors in the civil-rights movement in the United States.

Beatrice Heuser’s book returns us to a fixed focus on military strategy. It discusses both Strategy and specific strategies concerning the employment of land, sea, and air forces. The Evolution of Strategy catalogues and analyses scores of military theorists and practitioners across the centuries. The author highlights the contributions, not only of the most widely read strategic theorists, such as Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Corbett, and Basil Liddell Hart, but also lesser known figures such as Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern, and Don Bernardo de Mendoza.

In fact, the very comprehensiveness of Heuser’s book constitutes something of a weakness because she tends to leave the impression that von Lilienstern, for instance, should be accorded the same attention as von Clausewitz. This Heuser seems to feel she must do as she is attempting to determine whether there has been a ‘Western way’ of thinking about war and about military strategy. This includes whether different approaches to strategy existed side-by-side, or if they succeeded one another. She is, in fact, testing Victor Hanson’s thesis in Combat and Carnage.

She maintains that a ‘Western way’ of war, strategy, and its prosecution exist on a distinctly continuous basis from Antiquity to the present. In doing so, she draws upon a broad and diverse set of sources, both primary and secondary.

Not to detract too much from the richness and historical relevance of Heuser’s work, it is necessary to remark on one last weakness in her treatment of the subject. This is a weakness that certainly does not occur in either Stone’s or Gray’s work. Strategy can only make sense when it is viewed in the context of policy, which, as we know, always emerges from some sort of politics or political, process. Heuser’s concentrated focus on strategy per se tends to obscure this vital link. Again, failure to appreciate this link discussed above, in contemporary terms, can still mislead serious students and practitioners of the subject. In contrast to Heuser, in Strategy: The Politics and Techniques of War, John Stone is at pains to reinforce the linkage between policy and strategy in war. It is the sole theme of this book. Stone seeks to explain why military strategy has not always been practiced very effectively over the past two centuries. He contends that, to be truly effective, strategy must faithfully reflect the political context within which it is formulated. Where strategy has failed, it is frequently because its practitioners have paid undue attention to, and reliance upon, military-technical matters at the expense of politics. By this he means that military strategists tend to default to issues concerned mainly with operational art and tactics; domains where they perceive, erroneously, that politics play no part.

To make his point, he examines Prussian, then German strategy during the Wars of Unification and the run-up to the First World War. His next case study considers US nuclear strategy from 1941 and then through the Eisenhower and Kennedy/Johnson administrations. Here is conclusion, succinctly put, that the only meaningful control that politics could exert over nuclear warfare was to prevent it from happening in the first place. This, one hopes, continues to be the politico-strategic perspective held by strategists and policymakers alike, today.

Stone concludes his argument with an analysis of the so-called ‘war on terror.’ He remains critical of the US-led strategy, asserting that history suggests that military techniques must be rather more than the mere application of force: they must be subordinated to wider political considerations via a decision making process that will always make heaving demands upon the judgement of all those involved.

Turning to Gray and The Strategy Bridge, it must be said that everything discussed above is, to a degree, a preamble to his truly impressive effort to construct a complete theory of Strategy – ‘with a capital – S.’ Gray is a Clausewitzian through and through; a position that he almost enthusiastically makes repeatedly. As he himself writes: “…for us as long as mankind engages in war, Clausewitz must rule.” Although he refers with due respect for other strategic thinkers such as Bernard Brodie, J.C. Wylie, and Harry Yarger, his work is unique and original.

Gray’s theory is constructed around what he refers to as ‘21 Dicta’ arranged in four categories as follows:

- Nature and Character of Strategy:
- Making Strategy:
  - Process, Values, Culture, Strategists
- Executing Strategy:
  - Friction, Strategy Types, Geography, Technology, Time, Logistics, Strategic Doctrine
- Consequences of Strategy:
  - Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Effect
An absolutely critical point made clearly by Gray is that strategy is an *abstraction*, and this leads him to declare that strategists can only be educated, they cannot be trained. By contrast, staff officers *can* and *must* be trained.

The strategic level is the planning for, and the direction and consequent exploitation of, action at the operational and tactical level. Strategy is not action at a higher level. Operations and tactics are action behaviours, albeit ones requiring ideas, doctrines, organizations, and plans. Strategy itself is not an action behaviour. It is the translation function (hence the bridge metaphor) in theory and in practice, of operational and tactical action into strategic consequences, ultimately for political effect. The immediate product of strategy is strategic effect. Gray absolutely rejects the concept of a politics free zone saying: “It is the duty of strategy to ensure that operational and tactical behaviour serves political needs. That behaviour is not self-referential”.

All the books reviewed here serve to educate the would-be strategist, and they have great value. However, if they were to be ranked, this reviewer would place them in this order of importance for practitioners: *The Strategy Bridge*, *Strategy: A History*, *The Evolution of Strategy*, and *Military Strategy*.

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Bill Bentley, MSM, CD, PhD, a former infantry officer and a frequent contributor to the Canadian Military Journal, *is currently the Senior Staff Officer of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Academy, Kingston, Ontario.*

**At What Cost Sovereignty: Canada-US Military Interoperability in the War on Terror**

by Eric Lerhe

Halifax, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Dalhousie University, 2013

397 pages plus Index, $C35.00 (pbk)

Reviewed by Paul Mitchell

The consideration of Canadian Defence policy is a relatively fallow field. R.J. Sutherland, in his classic essay “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” described the geographic constraints which considerably limit the flexibility of Canada in devising an “independent” defence policy, and Nils Orvik directly argued that all Canada needed in terms of its own was to provide minimal evidence to the United States that its northern neighbor would not permit its massive land mass to become a threat to American security (“defence against help”). Doug Bland has also well described the on-going indifference of the Canadian political class to the issue of defence. Despite the end of the Cold War, 9/11 and the War on Terror, and the slow withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is little to suggest that anything has changed in the Canadian strategic environment to alter the conclusions of these three assessments.

If there is anything that causes the political antennae of Canadians to twitch when it comes to matters of defence, it most certainly can be found in terms of our relations with the United States. Undeniably, the foundation of NORAD at the beginning of the modern era of Canadian defence in the 1950s raised concerns amongst Canadian politicians about both the strategic issue of American dominance and the civil/military issue of professional collegiality undermining Canadian political sovereignty. Both themes were front and centre in the debate that erupted following the events of 9/11 and Canada’s commitment to operations in both Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and more broadly in a global sense as Canadian security agencies reacted to a dynamically changed policy environment south of the border. In all these debates, the mythology of the small virtuous nation subverted by the overweening power of its neighbor is never far away.

Since the 1970s, Dalhousie’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (CFPS) has contributed numerous minor classics to the study of military affairs. Eric Lerhe easily falls into this legacy with his book *At What Cost Sovereignty?*, wherein he addresses the mythology of Canada-US military interoperability. Indeed, Lerhe himself is responding to an earlier CFPS work on interoperability, *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition*? The titles of both works illustrate the strength of the myth of pernicious American influence on Canadian independence.

In *At What Cost Sovereignty?*, Lerhe squarely addresses the long standing concerns of Canadian security policy independence through the lens of its actions in the War on Terror. What follows is a series of six critical case studies examining a set of rigorous hypotheses that emerge from the extent literature on Canada’s relationship with the United States:

Canada’s external sovereignty is violated:
When the Canadian government alters its support for international agreements and it senses US opposition to them;

When the Canadian government adopts, rejects or modifies domestic policies as a result of US pressure;

When the Canadian government adopts, rejects or modifies personnel policies as a result of US pressure;

When the Canadian government commits to US-led military coalitions despite the presence of disincentives; and

When Canada is prevented from joining non-US-led military coalitions because of its close interoperability ties with the United States.

Canada’s internal sovereignty is violated:

When Canadian officials advance military projects with the United States without government support; and

Canadian officials support the position of the US government over the Canadian position.

What follows is essentially a magnum opus examining not only the minutiae of each of these propositions within the context of the War on Terror, but also the first comprehensive review of Canada’s participation in that endeavor as well as a study on the practice of coalition operations from the perspective of a small military power. Several books have already explored Canada’s engagement in the War on Terror, most visibly, Janice Stein and Eugene Lang’s The Unexpected War, which established the early narrative on Canada’s return to offensive military operations after a break of nearly fifty years. What distinguishes Lerhe’s efforts from these other works is his extensive use of primary materials acquired from both extensive access to information efforts, as well as taking advantage of the treasure trove of documents released in the WikiLeaks scandal, and interviews with key Canadian decision makers. This, together with Lerhe’s personal involvement as a task group commander in the Persian Gulf and his subsequent role within the navy, gives him a unique perspective which he employs to full effect.

Lerhe interrogates the conclusions of multiple studies on Canada-US military interaction, an area that is poorly understood by most Canadians, and thus, is often viewed with considerable suspicion. Interestingly enough, Lerhe discovers that rather than American pressure dictating Canadian policy, the reverse frequently took place, replicating the findings of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their influential Power and Interdependence. In this, his chapter on detainee policy is eye-opening: “...rather than the United States pressuring Canada, the evidence is overwhelming that Canada, with other key allies, pressured the US. … Moreover, US documents show that Canada was the only country pressuring it on the law.”

The field of bureaucratic politics, despite the many valuable contributions it has made to our understanding of how policy develops, has often had a frisson of suspicion surrounding military advice. If so, then perhaps the most reassuring finding is that Canadian officers represent their nation loyally, as we should expect, rather than selling out in the pursuit of narrow technical and professional goals. As he notes, “…the broad thrust … that the Americans were misled by ‘hawks in our military’ is found to be one-sided if not outright wrong.”

Finally, Lerhe’s work is applicable outside the narrow confines of Canadian foreign policy or its relationship with its powerful neighbor. The selection of cases powerfully illustrates the political dynamics that exist within contemporary coalitions. Lerhe’s chapters on Canada’s rejection from ISAF and the debate over our involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom spell out the complex relationships between our close military partners, the heavy operational demands placed upon the Canadian military and the spillover effects they had for other international commitments, and the ‘cut-throat’ intra-coalition competition for a ‘special relationship’ with the United States in a world of security pygmies.

This is an important work. If there is any criticism to be had, it is that it is unfortunate that Lerhe released his study through the bespoke publishing of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, probably narrowly limiting the book’s distribution. This is a work that deserves to be read by all those concerned with Canada’s ongoing relationship with the United States, Canadian defence in general, and the conduct of contemporary international security operations.

Professor Paul T. Mitchell, PhD, is the Department Chair for the Department of Military Plans and Operations at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

---

**Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction**

by Elinor C. Sloan

**London and New York: Routledge, 2012**

151 pages, $37.25

ISBN 9780415777711

**Reviewed by Richard L. Bowes**
In this superb analysis of the current state of military strategic thought, Professor Elinor Sloan sets out to answer some key questions. Sparked by a graduate student’s curiosity – and, I would imagine, frustration on the student’s part at understanding the relevancy of the study of Clausewitz, Jomini, or Mahan to the contemporary era – Sloan seeks to not only determine if there are strategic thinkers today, but moreover, if strategic thought still matters.

To answer these questions, Sloan organizes the book along functional lines. In eight chapters, Sloan walks us through a discussion of strategic thought as it has developed through history to the present era, and across each of the relevant domains or dimensions. The more traditional sea, land, and air dimensions of strategic thought are covered first in the chapters entitled Seapower, Landpower, and Airpower respectively. The remaining five chapters then cover what one could argue to be the emerging domains of strategic thought in the 21st Century; namely, Joint Theory and Military Transformation; Irregular War; Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and New War; Cyberwar; Nuclear Power and Deterrence; and Spacepower. Each chapter concludes with a summary of the key tenets of strategic thinking and associated thinkers of note. Admittedly, while one could argue that nuclear deterrence theory has been with us going on seven decades, Sloan has a lengthy discussion on the current state of strategic thinking concerning nuclear proliferation in a post-Cold War period, in which the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) no longer applies.

Of particular interest are her chapters on Landpower and Irregular War. In the Landpower chapter, while Sun Tzu, Liddell-Hart, Clausewitz, and Jomini are appropriately given their due, Sloan devotes the balance of the chapter on a discussion and analysis of strategic thinking with respect to the use of conventional landpower, from the Cold War to the present post-9/11 period. Of real interest here is the tension she describes between those early disciples of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) such as Andrew Krepinevich, for whom faith in the combat multiplying effects of networked, distributed forces obviates the need for mass; to those counter-revolutionaries such as Robert Scales who, while recognizing the value of networked combat forces, nonetheless remind us of the immutable fact that the nature of land warfare is still one in which ‘boots on the ground’ are still required.

Similarly, in the Irregular War chapter, Sloan introduces us to the thinking of Mao Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, C.E. Caldwell and Robert Thompson among others, but soon focuses the reader toward the main strands of strategic thinking that have emerged primarily as a result of post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. As Sloan adeptly points out, considerable thinking has occurred over a very short period; particularly that which is focused upon the theories underpinning the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Martin van Creveld, William Lind, Thomas Hammes, and David Kilcullen are among the recognized cognoscenti in this field, with developed theories such as 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) and non-Trinitarian war. Sloan also provides a very useful synopsis of the US counter-insurgency field manual, FM 3-24, released in 2006. She concludes this chapter with the observation that the challenge for any nation in the conduct of counterinsurgency, “…lies in finding the patience and political will to sustain in practice, over time, the enduring elements of counterinsurgency theory.”

In this compact volume, Sloan has very much achieved her main aim of producing a contemporary body of work that not only determines if there are strategic thinkers today, but also if strategic thought still matters in our post 9/11 world. A particular strength of the work is its endemic sense of balance and focus. Balance is attained through her ability to thoroughly research each of the domains of strategic thought, and yet retain a very admirable degree of scholarly objectivity in the way she describes the tenets and principles of each of the theories and thinkers she introduces. Moreover, while it is understandable that most strategic thinking today comes from US sources, it is very obvious that Sloan has made a concerted effort to uncover and bring to the fore relevant sources of strategic thinking that are non-US in origin. In this regard, one can sense Sloan is very much Canadian in her perspective.

With the plethora of material and scholarship at her disposal, Elinor Sloan is able to home in on the very heart of the matter within each of the domains of strategic thinking. Her focus is what gives the book its value as an indispensable resource for use by senior military practitioners and students of military and strategic studies alike. While a read of each chapter provides a concise, objective synopsis of the topic, her endnotes and bibliography provide a very handy comprehensive reference for further serious reading and discussion of the field of study.

Elinor Sloan concludes her work by asserting that the principles and statements she has delineated in her work, “…mark the initial signposts in a twenty-first century understanding of the role of military forces in a nation’s security policy, that is, in modern strategy.” In this, she recognizes the very dynamic and prescient nature of modern military strategy. Sloan whets our appetite for more. Follow-on editions of Modern Military Strategy would be a welcome addition to the scholarship in years to come.

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Rick Bowes, CD, MA, MBA, is Senior Director Business Development for ATCO Structures and Logistics. He served as an officer in the Canadian Army from 1984 to 2003, and is a graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada and the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. Rick holds an Executive Master of Business Administration degree from Athabasca University.
Prior to reading William Dalrymple’s excellent Return of a King, this reviewer’s principal knowledge of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42) was derived from the eponymous novel of George MacDonald Fraser’s Flashman series. In Return of a King, Dalrymple examines the ‘perfect storm’ of British strategic interests, imperial policy, and personal animosities that precipitated the invasion of Afghanistan, an act which would have far-reaching consequences that continue to resonate today.

The scene is set in the early-1800s, as Britain’s East India Company continues to expand its holdings in the name of British economic prosperity. In fear of the competing empire of Tsarist Russia, Britain’s civil leadership comes to believe that Moscow has designs on India, necessitating the creation of an alliance with Afghanistan that will stymie any Russian attempts to seize or otherwise influence British-controlled territory on the sub-continent. This perceived strategic threat comes to a head in 1839 when, believing that the incumbent Afghan leader in Kabul, Dost Mohammed Khan, will be warmly receptive to an alliance with their Russian rivals, the British decide to replace his Barakzai regime. To do so, they place their hopes in restoring a deposed Sadozai king, Shah Shuja, to the throne from which he was forced to flee 30 years earlier. Accompanied by the Anglo-Indian Army of the Indus, Shuja is successfully re-installed in Kabul under the close advisement (read supervision) of the British Envoy, Sir William Hay Macnaghten. Over the next two years, it becomes apparent to all and sundry that the Shah is at best a weak leader, and at worst, a mere puppet of British interests. As collective Afghan anger towards the occupation of the British interlopers grows, so too does the armed resistance against the feringhees (foreigners), and in January 1842, the Army of the Indus is forced into a devastating retreat from Kabul from which few survive.

Dalrymple’s work can be seen in three sections. First, it is a historical sketch of Afghanistan and its monarchs, and the growth of British interests in the region, culminating in the restoration of Shuja to the throne. Second it chronicles the British occupation and disenchantment of the Afghan populace, culminating in the annihilation of the Army of the Indus. And finally, it covers the brutal punishment inflicted upon Afghanistan by the Army of Retribution and its aftermath.

Of the three, it can be argued that the middle section resonates best with the modern reader. Then, as now, Afghanistan is a fractious country, ‘dirt-poor’ and violent, with an unpopular, foreign-backed government attempting to establish functioning state organs while fighting a taxing insurgency. In both contexts, Dalrymple refers to Afghan anti-foreign forces as “the resistance,” suggesting that the current war in Afghanistan might be less a modern clash of civilizations than the continuation of a centuries-old blood feud, one that shows no signs of ending at any near moment in time.

Return of a King is well-written, relying upon a range of sources to give life to the central and supporting figures in the tragedy of the First Anglo-Afghan War. Dalrymple is fortunate in having access to Afghan recollections of the conflict, and he vividly presents the myriad growing frustrations, jealousies, and ideologies that finally exploded into the full-scale rebellion that began with the murder of one of the principal British agents in Kabul in the fall of 1841. Likewise, he gives a brilliant presentation of the Afghan recollection of the conflict: one of liberation from a hated, arrogant oppressor.

Dalrymple, a native of Scotland, is a Delhi-based historian with numerous works dealing with the history of South-West Asia to his credit. Having travelled the region since taking up residence in India in the mid-1980s, he possesses thorough first-hand knowledge of Afghanistan’s geography, culture, and political landscape. In particular, his knowledge of Afghanistan’s varied tribes contributes greatly to explaining its convoluted Gordian knot of inter-tribal politics in the context of the early-19th Century. Throughout Return of a King, his writing is clear and concise, yet dynamic enough to bring life to a wide array of politicians, soldiers, spies, and common people who found their lives irretrievably altered by the war.

This work is not without some flaws, but they are minor in nature. The collection of illustrations and portraits of the principal players in an important chapter of the ‘Great Game’ are first-rate. The maps leave something to be desired, and could perhaps do more to impart to the reader the great distances that lay between British outposts in their new imperial holding, while at the same time reinforcing just how tenuous was the life-line reaching back to India. For foreign forces currently waging the War on Terror in Afghanistan, the same rings true.

For those who would learn more about the history of modern foreign entanglements in Afghanistan, Return of the King is an outstanding place to start. At a far-distant point in the future, this reviewer would be intrigued to read Dalrymple’s account of the current war in Afghanistan. One can only hope that it will have a happier conclusion than the failed intervention of 1839-1842.

Captain Geoff Tyrell is a graduate of the Royal Military College. Currently serving as an instructor at the Canadian Forces Logistics Training Centre at Canadian Forces Base Borden, he served in Afghanistan from 2009-2010 with the Task Force 3-09 Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team.