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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations in endnotes are translated from their original language, we will use the abbreviation ‘TOQ’ at the end of the note to indicate that readers can find the original citations in the other language version of the Journal.
EDITOR’S CORNER

Welcome to yet another frosty winter edition of the Canadian Military Journal. Since these words are being penned during our annual period of national remembrance, I believe our cover image merits special attention.

During the spring of 1945, at the end of April, a large pocket of resistance in western Holland, deliberately bypassed and sealed off by the advancing Allied land forces, was still under the control of the Germans. Many of the estimated three million Dutch citizens contained therein were close to starvation under the control of the Germans. Many of the estimated three million Dutch citizens contained therein were close to starvation. In due course, a truce was arranged with the local German occupation forces, who designated ten acceptable drop zones, and also acknowledged the need for additional truck convoys carrying supplies after the air drops were accomplished. The first of the drops occurred on 29 April at the village of Waardenburg on the Waal River, and although the river bank bristled with flak emplacements, restraint on both sides prevailed, and there was no enemy action on this inaugural day of Operation Manna. From 29 April to 7 May, Bomber Command Lancasters made 2835 relief sorties to the beleaguered area, delivering 6672 tons of food by air before the Germans surrendered. The truce held throughout, and subsequent drops were carried out on The Hague and Rotterdam.

The cover image is Operation Manna by the British Columbia artist John Rutherford. This painting, generously gracing our cover courtesy of both the artist and the Canadian Bomber Command Museum in Nanton, Alberta, was commissioned for the museum’s Operation Manna Commemoration in July 1995. The aircraft depicted in the foreground over the Waal River is a 625 (RAF) Squadron Lancaster flown by Flying Officer Joe English. Currently a resident of Nanton, Mr. English and his wartime crew were aboard one of the lead aircraft on the opening day of the operation to Waardenburg. They were unanimous in their agreement that, to them, this raid truly was “…the best raid of the war.” This also was, by any yardstick, bombing with a gentler purpose.

On to our rather eclectic current issue… ‘Taking the point’ this time out, Dr. Louis-Philippe Rouillard, the Defence Ethics Programme’s Conflict of Interest and Programme Administration Manager, continues the debate on ethics, human rights, and their relationship to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Herein, he offers a proposal to reframe legal-ethical thinking, and proposes a method “… by which to achieve implementation through the existing international legal system, including the collective security system, the LOAC, and international human rights.”

He is followed by Captain Tyler Wentzell, an infantry officer and aspiring lawyer, who proposes “…that the interplay between human capital and local ownership dictate the organizational model [that is] best suited to the development of security forces.” Wentzell believes that these two key factors, “…offer a useful tool in the selection of models available in the development of host nation security forces in humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and high intensity operations alike.”

In the first of two submissions from our American friends in this issue, US Navy Lieutenant Dan Green draws upon personal experience in theatre to offer several pragmatic solutions “… for addressing the corruption challenge of Afghanistan, informed by [American] experiences there, and enriched by the best practices of previous counterinsurgency efforts.” Needless to say, past and future applications to Canadian experiences make for compelling reading.

With respect to military planning, retired US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Daniel McCauley, currently a National Defense University assistant professor teaching at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in Norfolk, Virginia, opines that today’s complex operational environment “… requires planners to take a much broader approach to planning, to include a whole-of-government approach to these types of operations.” He acknowledges that the US (and allies) have shifted focus to a ‘shaping’ strategy that attempts to influence today’s events in an attempt to make future combat operations unnecessary. McCauley further suggests: “Design will never overcome uncertainty or chaos, but it will help the planner understand the interactive and changing nature of types of environments within which US forces will operate in the future.”

Our historical section is honoured to present a submission from Jack Granatstein, one of Canada’s most respected historians, and a frequent contributor to the Canadian Military Journal. This time, Jack takes an in-depth look at Canada’s participation in the Cold War in the wake of the Second World War. He maintains: “…Three streams of opinion shaped Canada’s Cold War: internationalism, continentalism, and nationalism,” but concludes that it was continentalism that ultimately held sway over the other competing ideologies.

In our Views and Opinions section, Ryan Clow, an RMC graduate with a Masters in War Studies and currently a civilian employee with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, strongly advocates that: “Non-compromised victory should be the only resolution we in the West seek in the war against terrorism.” Next, Dana Batho, a recent RMC graduate, budding Intelligence Officer, and presently, a post-graduate student in International Affairs at Carleton University, discusses the challenges of working in a foreign nation or culture, and makes a strong advocacy case for how much cultural awareness can be acquired through foreign language acquisition. Chantal Beauvais, the rector of Saint Paul University, Ottawa, in a reprint of a Convocation address she delivered at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean last May, then presents her views on military life and service. In the words of Major-General (ret’d) Daniel Gosselin, the former commander of the Canadian Defence Academy: “It is short but superb in its simple messaging.” With the issues of ethics and values resurfacing by virtue of a few recent incidents and the aforementioned dialogue and debate, her message is a very important one to young officer aspirants.

Martin Shadwick has chosen to examine Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Andrew Leslie’s recently-released Report on Transformation 2011, complete with many recommendations to “…reduce overhead and improve efficiency and effectiveness,” but also “…some disturbing findings and thought-provoking recommendations…” Finally, we close with the usual potpourri of book reviews for consideration by our readers.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
Canada’s three military valour decorations, namely, the Victoria Cross, the Star of Military Valour, and the Medal of Military Valour, were created by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, on 1 January 1993. All the decorations may be awarded posthumously.

The Victoria Cross is awarded for the most conspicuous bravery, a daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice, or extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.

The Star of Military Valour is awarded for distinguished or valiant service in the presence of the enemy.

The Medal of Military Valour is awarded for an act of valour or devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.

Additionally, the Mention in Dispatches was created to recognize members of the Canadian Forces on active service and other individuals working with or in conjunction with the Canadian Forces for valiant conduct, devotion to duty, or other distinguished service. Recipients are entitled to wear a bronze oak leaf on the appropriate campaign or service medal ribbon. Like the military valour decorations, the Mention in Dispatches may be awarded posthumously.

On 9 September 2011, His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, announced the awarding of six Medals of Military Valour to members of the Canadian Forces who displayed gallantry and devotion to duty in combat.

The recipients will be invited to receive their decorations at a ceremony to be held at a later date.

**RECIPIENTS/CITATIONS**

**MILITARY VALOUR DECORATIONS**

**Lieutenant Guillaume Frédéric Caron, MMV, CD**

Rimouski, Quebec

Medal of Military Valour

As part of an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team in Afghanistan from April to October 2009, Lieutenant Caron contributed to the battle group’s operational success. While supervising an Afghan National Army company, he distinguished himself during combat operations through his courage on the battlefield, notably when he led the difficult recovery of an Afghan helicopter that had been shot down. Through his leadership, combat skills, and tactical acumen, Lieutenant Caron has brought great credit to the Canadian Forces.

**Corporal Bradley D. Casey, MMV**

Pugwash, Nova Scotia

Medal of Military Valour

On 18 February 2010, Corporal Casey risked his life to provide treatment to a wounded Afghan National Army soldier. With bullets striking around him, he provided critical treatment and transported the casualty to the medical evacuation helicopter. Despite being under constant fire, Corporal Casey never wavered from his task, ensuring the provision of exceptional medical care to a fellow soldier.

**Private Tony Rodney Vance Harris, MMV**

Pennfield, New Brunswick

Medal of Military Valour
On 23 November 2009, Private Harris was at Forward Operating Base Wilson in Afghanistan, when insurgents unleashed a mortar attack. Without regard for his own safety, he ran to the scene of the impact and provided first aid to American soldiers. Noticing another soldier trapped inside a burning sea container, Private Harris went to his aid, single-handedly pulled him to safety, and rendered life-saving first-aid as rounds continued to fall. Private Harris’ courageous and decisive actions under fire that day saved several lives and brought great credit to Canada.

Captain Michael A. MacKillop, MMV, CD
Calgary, Alberta
Medal of Military Valour

As commander of a reconnaissance platoon from October 2009 to May 2010, Captain MacKillop disrupted insurgent activities in a volatile sector of Afghanistan through his courageous and relentless engagement of the enemy. Often facing fierce resistance and fire from multiple directions, he remained composed during intense battles, calmly providing direction and constantly looking to gain the advantage. Captain MacKillop’s exceptional leadership under fire and his ability to get the most from his soldiers were critical to consistently defeating insurgents in Afghanistan.

Master Corporal Gilles-Remi Mikkelson, MMV
Bella Coola, British Columbia
Medal of Military Valour

On 1 November 2009, a member of Master Corporal Mikkelson’s joint Canadian-Afghan foot patrol was severely wounded by an improvised explosive device. During the ensuing ambush, Master Corporal Mikkelson selflessly crossed through intense enemy fire to provide life-saving first-aid to the critically wounded Afghan soldier. Despite the danger, his outstanding courage saved a comrade’s life and brought great credit to Canada and the Canadian Forces.

Sergeant Marc-André J.M. Rousseau, MMV
La Sarre, Quebec
Medal of Military Valour

On 3 August 2010, while Sergeant Rousseau was conducting an exercise with a group of civilians at the Kandahar Airfield, insurgents blew a hole in the fence in an attempt to force their way inside. Despite being under heavy fire, Sergeant Rousseau led two companies over exposed ground, occupied a nearby vehicle, and aggressively engaged the enemy. Without regard for his own safety, Sergeant Rousseau demonstrated outstanding leadership and courage, which proved vital to winning the battle and saving countless lives on the airfield.
ETHICS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

by Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard

Introduction

Occasionally, there is a view echoed by some ‘operators,’ the ‘real soldiers,’ that the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) does not lend itself to effective application in operations. They view the law devoid of any value in itself. As a result, they act in a manner consistent with the minimal letter of the law, but eschew its spirit. By doing so, their actions might meet the legal requirements to avoid prosecution, but do not fully respect the intent of the law and the values that it encompasses. Sometimes, a given situation does not meet even the minimal requirements. Examples from the last few decades abound, and do not need retelling here. This article will counter that the LOAC is not a ‘stand-alone benchmark’ requiring a minimal ‘pass or fail grade,’ but rather, it is a wider set of law that incorporates the values of professional soldiers and of society-at-large. I will demonstrate this in three parts. First, I will show the link between the LOAC, professionalism, and ethical obligations. Then, I will demonstrate how this translates into firm obligations for service members to conform to legal norms that are applicable at all times, such as international human rights. Finally, I will conclude with a demonstration of the application of ethical values and principles in operations through the prism of the law.

Professionalism, Ethics, and the LOAC

The Canadian Forces (CF) is established under the authority of Parliament through the National Defence Act.1 All its members are subject to the authority of the chain of command, up to and including the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).2 Since Canada does not have conscription,3 it is a ‘professional army,’ that is, a volunteer army serving in accordance with terms of service out of which an individual can elect to continue or not, and the institution can decide to re-enrol the individual, or not. This means that an individual member’s constant training gives them a continuous professional development. While the terms of service of the Reserve force is separated by classes of service, the idea of a continua-

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The military ethos, understood as “… the foundation upon which the legitimacy, effectiveness and honour of the Canadian Forces depend,” and of which they consist:

- Unlimited Liability
- Fighting Spirit
- Teamwork
- Discipline
- Duty
- Loyalty
- Integrity
- Courage
- Democratic Principles
- Peace, Order and Good Government
- Rights and Freedoms
- Respect the Dignity of all Persons
- Obey and Support lawful authority
- Commitment of leadership
- Honouring the past
- Guides education and training
- Supportive policies
- Supportive environmental sub-cultures
- Conditions and values essential for military effectiveness
- Provides Philosophy of Service shaped by Canadian Values
- Performs Conduct
- Sustaining the Ethos
- Ethos Shapes Professionalism
- Beliefs and Expectations about Military Service
- Canadian Military Values
- Canadian Values, Expectations and Beliefs
- Performing Duty with Honour

Figure 2-1. The Military Ethos

This military ethos reflecting national values and beliefs leads to a unique Canadian style of military operations - one in which CF members perform their mission and tasks to the highest professional standards, meeting the expectations of Canadians-at-large. This is where the CF differs from many other armed forces. They are not only expected to abide by the military ethos, but also to apply a common set of values it shares with another institution responsible for the national defence of Canada, the Department of National Defence (DND). Established under Article 3 of the National Defence Act, DND exists under the responsibility of the Minister of National Defence, who is vested with power over the management and direction of the CF and all matters relating to national defence. Thus, the interaction between the two necessitates a common set of values under which to act. Since DND is composed of civilian public servants who fall under the rules of the Public Service Employment Act, they are held to the values of the Public Service (PS) of Canada, as affirmed in the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service. To reconcile the two, the Deputy Minister of DND (DM) and the CDS jointly established the Defence Ethics Programme (DEP) in 1997. The DEP produced a Statement of Defence Ethics, which combines both Canadian Military Values and Public Service Values in a set of principles and obligations to which CF members and DND employees must adhere. While the terminology may be different, this alters in no way the fundamental values by which military members must abide in their official duties. For example, if the concept of duty encompasses as much the obligation of responsibility of the Statement of Defence Ethics, the concept of unlimited liability that underlines this obligation for CF members continues to exist. It is only because responsibility does not imply this concept for public servants that the concept of responsibility is accepted as the common shared value of the two institutions. Still, in no way does this abrogate the military values to which serving personnel are expected to conform.

Some past authors argued that military morale and its values have been eroded by the “... transference of civilian values and management techniques to the Forces.” However, even proponents of having a different set of values in the 1980s recognised that “... an ethos which resulted in alienation of the Forces from the Canadian public or the civil service is regarded as highly undesirable.” There are good reasons for this. The military ethos is composed of, amongst other elements, Canadian values. If it was otherwise, a divide would be created, and the armed forces would be defending Canadian ideals, basing itself upon its own set of values for doing so, and not upon the wider set of beliefs and expectations that the nation’s citizens hold. This is a fundamental aspect of the bond of trust that must exist between all citizens forming civil society, and its citizens in uniform. This trust is a capital, much like money in the bank. Trust is a function of two things: character and competence. Character includes one’s integrity; one’s intent toward and among people. Competence includes one’s capabilities, skills, and generated results. Trust equates to confidence. Each time competence or character is tainted by an event, we withdraw some of our capital. When too much is withdrawn, it can result in moral bankruptcy.
This bond of trust between citizens and uniformed citizens impacts upon the ‘social capital’ of a nation, affecting performance, retention, recruiting, and the devolution of resources to the armed forces, further impacting competence and morale. Once in this vicious circle, the bond of trust further dissolves and may take decades to rebuild. An example of this is the ‘military covenant’ between civil society and the military. It originates from the British Army Doctrine Publication 5 entitled ‘Soldiering: the Military Covenant.’ It is described as the moral basis of the [British] Army’s output. It describes how the unlimited liability makes soldiering unique, and what a soldier should expect for surrendering some civil liberties.

The Canadian Forces has adopted a similar concept to that of the military covenant, but calls it a ‘social contract.’ Both are understood as a ‘moral commitment.’ As a result, under the terms of the Oath of Allegiance, a CF member can expect fair and respectful treatment, for which society expects an output, including sending its uniformed citizens in harm’s way in order to support government policies. Serving personnel have a reasonable expectation that this will be done with due care and attention. If one is injured, one expects to be cared for by the society that required this sacrifice. Yet, commentators speak of an unravelling of that moral commitment and a disconnect between the military and society. In the same breath, it is argued that Western societies do not like the use of force, as it is by nature antithetical to their liberal outlook, and that if they must enter a fight, their armed forces do so in a manner that reflects their own core liberal values, which question the legitimacy of the use of force. Furthermore, these societies have become more intolerant of casualties, especially when perceived as being unnecessary due to misguided foreign policies.

A proposed answer to this new framework is that society’s expectations have increased and are now on par with its education, making its own judgement on the use of public resources. This includes prudence and legitimacy prior to entering conflicts, and expectations that the conduct of military personnel in a conflict will conform to society’s values. Such values must form part of the armed forces’ values, and the military cannot depart from them or the social contract would be nullified. The application of these values for armed forces therefore becomes military ethics: the right and wrong actions of an armed force, and its very real consequences upon human lives.

In the past, societies have expected its military to behave with honour, but nonetheless, have often ‘turned a blind eye’ to less-than-honourable behaviour. But societal expectations have grown; hence military ethics, a species of the genus of professional ethics. As with any other professional ethics, one criterion for its existence is that it answers to a specific conceptual framework, including a legal and regulatory cadre. For military ethics, this legal framework is formed by the LOAC. Yet, ethics concerns itself, not with the legality of an action, but with the notion of knowing whether this action is morally right or wrong. Since law is not concerned with the right or wrong of an action, but solely with its legality, how does one reconcile the two?

Military Ethics, the LOAC, and Human Rights

The LOAC is not a new concept. The customary approach to law taken through religious text, has underlined the morality – or ethics – to apply to battlefield situations, even in ancient times. Throughout history, a tradition of ‘Just War’ evolved, comprised of two sets of principles: one governing the resort to armed force (jus ad bellum), and the second governing conduct in hostilities (jus in bello). While a tradition and not a law, based upon the attempts of philosophers to describe its provisions, it has shaped much of Western military doctrine. Therefore, following the precepts of the Just War tradition, and adapting to the formal legal context of the post-Second World War, the use of armed force is now more under scrutiny than ever – both for entrance into a given conflict, and for conduct during hostilities.

This flows from the consequences of the Second World War, but also in a large part from its preparatory phase, preceding the entrance of the United States into the conflict.
The then-President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had announced in his Annual Message to Congress on 6 January 1941, his concept of “Four Freedoms”: freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world; freedom to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world; freedom from want, meaning economic security and healthy peacetime life for all inhabitants everywhere in the world; and freedom from fear, translating into world-wide reduction of armaments so that no nation should be capable of physical aggression.33 This statement of an implied act of support for the United Kingdom clearly demonstrates a policy that the Americans intended to pursue. It did not remain as a message to Americans. On 10 August, 1941, Roosevelt met with Prime Minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland. From their ‘meeting at sea’ emerged, on 12 August 1941, the Atlantic Charter, which became, for all intents and purposes, the policy stating at sea’ emerged, on 12 August 1941, the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt met with Prime Minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland. From their ‘meeting at sea’ emerged, on 12 August 1941, the Atlantic Charter, which became, for all intents and purposes, the policy statement of the entrance into war of the United States.

Its clear statement of alliance of the Anglo-Saxon world is undeniably made against “aggression” and the “Hitlerite Government of Germany,” calling “…after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny (…) assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want” and that respect for “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live.”34 This might seem a simple declaration, but as American historian and lawyer Elizabeth Borgwardt has declared, when you state a moral principle, you “humanize” a reality,”35 raising the concept of humanity as the proportionate application of military force, in an effort to “humanize” a reality,”35 raising the concept of humanity as grounds for a fight. The Atlantic Charter provided for a statement of political rights as core values of the reason why the war would be fought, a vision of individuals in a new system of collective security as opposed to the previous one composed solely of the interests of states and emphasizing the application of these principles domestically as much as internationally. All these elements “continue to inform our conception of the term ‘human rights.’”36 The Allies defined its war in terms of humanity; a fight for human rights. The Axis did not. Therefore, the Allies gained the higher moral ground from which to operate.

At its roots, the principle of humanity rests precisely upon the very first right of “all men in all lands”: the right to life. The status of “men,” understood as “persons” in the Just War tradition, is woven into the LOAC in the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the latter of whom pose no threat.37 Yet, as opposed to international human rights where the right to life cannot be arbitrarily denied,38 the LOAC does provide for arbitrary deprivation of this right. This applies to combatants and non-combatants alike through the criteria of proportionality, whereby an attack on combatants that is deemed a military necessity becomes justifiable if it provides for economy of force, even if collateral damage in terms of non-combatants is expected. The criteria of proportionality, demands that the military advantage gained from the attack is superior to the expected non-combatant casualties. With respect to the realities of combat where miscalculation occurs and/or collateral damages are much greater than anticipated, these are not at issue: it is the expectations prior to an attack being executed that matter. As long as non-combatants were not directly targeted and the expectation of proportionality was respected, it is permissible to deny arbitrarily non-combatants of their right to life.39

Here is where the professional soldier must think beyond the narrow confines of the LOAC, even though he is trained precisely in its application in the course of his professional activities. A professional soldier must remember that, while subjected to the LOAC, the professional also remains an agent of the State, and must continue to apply international human rights laws, which are not suspended from their application during an armed conflict, with the exception of the provisions that are permitted to be suspended under customary and treaty law, and that have been clearly stated as being suspended.

For Canadian Forces members deployed abroad, the LOAC certainly applies, but so does the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It clearly states that certain rights continue to apply, even in times of public emergencies threatening the existence of the nation. Among these, the right to life is paramount. Some positivists argue that the Covenant only applies to “…State Party to the present Covenant [and thereby has them] undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”40 Their interpretation of this sentence is that both conditions must be in force for the provision of the Covenant to be applicable.41 In true—but-debunked Alberto Gonzalez fashion,42 this interpretation conveniently ignores previous decisions by the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is the international body responsible for the implementation of the Covenant, clarifying this sentence and affirming: “… a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if not situated within the territory of the State party.” Further, that the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories recognized that the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, but concluded that the Covenant extends to “… acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its own territory.”

If a final doubt existed as to the application of human rights during armed conflicts, one only needs to read the International Court of Justice decision in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, to which such recognition is fully adhered. Furthermore, applications of the concepts of human rights law are recognized through international criminal law. Canada has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and that of the Rome Statute, and rendered opposite to its agents by means of the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act. For Canada, the Act recognizes three types of crimes under international law for which its agents might be prosecuted: genocide; crime against humanity; and war crimes.

The final element that allows for the interaction of the LOAC with international human rights law is the LOAC itself. Through the Marten’s Clause in the Hague Convention of 1899, which was slightly modified in the Hague Convention of 1907, and reprinted in another modified form in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it states: “Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” While there remains a debate as to whether this is to be interpreted liberally or restrictively, the statement links the LOAC with the precepts of public conscience – therefore, of morally acceptable conduct. As a result, it is clear that personnel must know the requirement to apply the norms contained in such law. Training pertaining to the LOAC is provided in most armed forces, but very little is said of human rights obligations. Yet, this is important. As explained above, entrance in an operational theatre is, for liberal democracies, most often justified on the very premise that armed forces are sent to stop gross and widespread violations of human rights and to guarantee the future exercise of these very human rights though the establishment and support of a democratic government. In short, the justification is provided on a moral – not solely a legal basis. When carried out within the collective security system, this provides political and legal legitimacy, as well as a moral justification for the use of force and the possibility of arbitrary denial of the right to life, and other infringements of physical integrity and of personal or public property, in accordance with applicable legal norms under the LOAC.

For military members to comprehend their obligations under international human rights law is to comprehend something more: the moral justification for their deployment.
in the first place. This creates the moral context framing the thinking of deployed personnel, and it represents a framework for the mission. Instead of a political statement issued stating the political goal of the use of armed forces, it becomes the moral and legal basis upon which their role in the deployment rests. This, in turn, ensures the alignment of the moral and legal goals in all actions and decisions taken on the ground. Framed in this perspective, international human rights law becomes the overall frame of operations, and the LOAC the operative legal basis within the bounds of which armed forces are to conduct themselves in the attainment of the larger objective of guaranteeing the exercise of human rights. This provides the moral guidance under which all operations are conducted.

If decisions made in operations contradict the stated aim of bringing a larger enjoyment of human rights, or if the methods proposed to bring this enjoyment contradict human rights, the stated political goal is dissonant with public conscience and/or the decisions taken in the attainment of these goals are dissonant with the public conscience. The link between this understanding and unethical behaviour cannot be overstated. If a conflict is framed in a manner that does not include human rights, the thought process of military planners will also be framed through another prism that will influence decisions with diminished consideration for the norms applicable to conduct, and may lead to unethical conduct.

The Importance of the Ethical Climate and its Setting by Those with Vested Authority

The reasons why acts of unnecessary violence are committed in an armed conflict are more or less broadly understood. Some reasons are general in nature. David Grossman, in his books, On Killing, and On Combat, claims that one percent to two percent of society’s members are sociopaths or psychopaths of varying degrees. It stands to reason that some may be drawn toward the military. Yet, soldiers are not permitted to stray from a unit’s mission and go on a personal rampage. We can deduce that authority and discipline work to constrain such tendencies.

But authority does not prevail at all times. Yale’s Milgram Experiments have clearly shown the propensity of persons put in position of authority to become brutal even without the influence of outside pressures, apart from boredom - even in a fictional context. And sub-culture can be a factor. Some psychologists contend that humans are ‘herd animals;’ that in groups, the individual “… is submerged in group acts” in which they have little investment, creating a ‘group mind.’ In plain language, peer pressure is intense. In the case of ‘specialist units,’ it is argued that “… externally directed aggressive behaviour, which enjoyed a maximum of group approval, tended to relieve the individual of any feeling of vulnerability.”

The issue, then, resides in knowing what preventative measures can be implemented. This can be couched in theo-


But there is a more practical method, namely, the instil-
lation of the highest moral standards and indoctrination 
through applied ethics. In Canada, this is the approach taken, 
adopting a values-based programme of indoctrination. This 
correlates with proposed theories, such as 
that of Jim Frederick in his book, Black 
Hearts, and to the four factors leading to 
unethical conduct, as subscribed to by 
Brigadier-General H.R. McMaster:51 namely, 
ignorance, uncertainty, fear, and combat 
trauma. The premise that the environment 
influences the risk of unethical conduct is 
subscribed to by both authors, and it is also 
the belief of this author that together they 
form a large portion of the factors contributing to a permi-
sible context. To inoculate soldiers against potential unethical 
conduct, McMaster proposes a concerted effort in four areas: 
- applied ethics or values-based instructions; 
- training that replicates as closely as possible situations that soldiers are likely 
to encounter; 
- education with respect to the culture and historical 
experience of the people among whom a conflict is 
being waged; and, 
- leadership that strives to set the example, to keep soldiers informed, and to manage combat 
stress.52

There is no doubt that training will help reduce fear and 
combat trauma, while education will address ignorance. 
However, uncertainty is not entirely covered, in and of itself. 
Certainly, keeping soldiers informed reduces uncertainty. And 
yet, it is perhaps not only the uncertainty in the conflict that is 
so much at play, but also uncertainty with respect to the rea-
sons of a given mission, and the commitment of personnel that 
have a part to play.

As the Atlantic 
Charter and its inser-
tion in the moral and 
legal continuum 
framed the conflict it 
addressed, certainty 
as to the moral foun-
dations of a conflict 
has its part to play, 
and it transcends the 
concept of humanity 
found in the Just War 
tradition. And this 
humanity is trans-
posed, not only in 
dealings with the 
general population 
and with enemy 
forces, but also in the 
humanity required of a state’s 
own armed forces.

One of the responsibilities of persons vested with author-
ity is to preserve their troops. This includes preserving the 
individuals forming a given unit; the preservation of their 
humanity.

As previously written,53 and admittedly without empirical 
data, there is a contention that whether justified or not under 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the act of killing damages one’s 
humanity.54 In order to protect against this, it is the responsi-
bility of leaders to act in a manner that guides 
personnel, even in the most dire situations, 
taking a proactive stance, and enacting orders 
that acknowledge the context in which they 
must act, and that clearly state the constraints 
imposed by a values-based ethical system.

It is not a coincidence that many unethical 
acts during operations were committed because orders were unclear. It is the impreci-
sion of commands issued that frequently resulted in unethical 
actions at the tactical level that undermined the strategic objectives of a mission.55 Therefore, above all else, the primary 
element that must be in place to prevent unethical behaviour is to 
create the proper ethical climate. A leader in command will 
show commitment to the ethics of waging warfare within a 
framework of reference that will truly circumscribe the opera-
tions he or she commands in terms of its effects upon support-
ing and enabling the exercise of human rights, fully respecting 
the legal obligations of the LOAC but further reinforcing the 
applicability of its jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles, 
and thereby protecting his or her subordinate’s humanity. He or 
she will demonstrate fortitude and courage, even in the most 
difficult situations, to enforce the values for which the armed 
forces are committed to the fight, thereby preserving the mis-
sion and preserving the personnel deployed. By doing this, 
such a leader will have created and will maintain the ethical 
command climate that will guide the mission.
Conclusion

This article is solely a proposal to reframe legal-ethical thinking when looking at applied ethics in operations, and in regard of the applicable body of law as a framework that must be coherent with its primary objective and its means of implementation. It has also intended to propose a method by which to achieve this implementation through the existing international legal system, including the collective security system, the LOAC and international human rights.

An incoherent mission contradicting this aim will create uncertainty and a faulty ethical command climate, wherein mission success means acquiring a piece of ground or destroying enemy forces, but does not met the concerns of the political and strategic aims of the use of force.

Such a faulty ethical climate creates a permissible context. Embarking upon such a flawed-structure mission will not only leave a state with armed forces diminished through casualties, but will destroy the very humanity which its armed forces are supposed to protect and help enforce. In such interventions, the best one can expect is an “….honourable end to hostilities;” a signature phrasing that usually means failure to attain mission success.

Even when there is convergence between the framing of the goals and the values underlying them, the means of implementation of these goals must respect the LOAC, in a larger form, as accepted by the public conscience. The means must be aligned with the goals, and must therefore respect our values within the confines of the proper ethical command climate.

Whether at home or abroad, uniformed citizens are vested with great responsibility through the devolution of trust by their government and their fellow citizens. Their values, as indoctrinated to reflect those of our society, must be their first guidance, and it must be reflected in their application of legal norms.

NOTES

2. Ibid. at Article 18.
7. Duty with Honour, Note 5, at p. 34.
8. Ibid.
12. The three ethical principles are: respect the dignity of all persons; serve Canada before self; and obey and support lawful authority. Its six ethical obligations are: Integrity, Loyalty, Courage, Honesty, Fairness and Responsibility. Available at; <http://www.dep-ped.forces.gc.ca/dep-ped/about-ausujet/stmt-enc-eng.aspx>, accessed 25 January 2011.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Duty with Honour, Note 5, p. 44.
23. Ibid., p. 419.
29. Ibid., at p. 93.
33. The Atlantic Charter, 14 August 1941.
35. Borgwartz, Note 33, at p. 506.
36. McMahan, Note 31, at p. 695.
38. Ibid., at p. 188.
40. Solon Solomon, Note37, p. 104.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
49. Ibid., at pp. 187-188: ignorance, uncertainty, fear, and combat trauma.
50. Ibid., at p. 188.
51. Rouillard, Note 44 at Chapter 13.
53. McMaster, Note 52 at p. 189.
Introduction

Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) working with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have recently brought attention to a key element of counterinsurgency operations: the development of host nation security forces. This process, known as Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) in Canada, and Security Force Assistance (SFA) in the United States, is the predominantly military contribution to the wider Security Sector Reform (SSR) process. The Canadian Forces’ (CF) counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the utility of developing and working with host nation security forces due to their local knowledge, the perception of legitimacy they bring to the campaign, and, ultimately, their key role in providing lasting local solutions, thus allowing our own forces to withdraw. Their involvement is not, however, a cure-all. Inept, corrupt, or cruel indigenous security forces can be as much of a hindrance in counterinsurgency as effective forces can help. These forces will require varying degrees of guidance and direction. Afghanistan has proven to be an extreme example of this. Given the nation having endured decades of conflict, the human capital required for a professional police and army had been almost completely eliminated. More than the reform of the security sector, the Afghan campaign has required the nearly-total creation of a security apparatus. In the absence of the required human capital, intervening nations are forced to fill the void. This requirement, however, is at odds with another key element of SSR: the requirement for local ownership. This article proposes that the interplay between human capital and local ownership dictate the organizational model best suited to the development of these security forces, as illustrated at Figure 1.1. Although sublime elements such as local culture and traditions ensure that no two situations will be alike, these two key factors – human capital and local ownership – offer a useful tool in the selection of the models available in

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the development of the host nation security forces in humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and high intensity operations alike.

Local Ownership and Human Capital

Local ownership is a strongly held concept among proponents of SSR. As one author defines it, “...the principle of local ownership of SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather than external actors.” The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Handbook on SSR, the pre-eminent document on the subject, identifies local ownership, democratic governance, service delivery, and management and sustainability as the four goals of SSR. If we accept that any given military intervention abroad should eventually end, then local ownership is an obvious objective and a clear requirement for success. All military actions, particularly those directly involved in the development of host nation core security forces, should support this objective. Nonetheless, although ideal SSR activities will occur entirely on the initiative of and with the consent of the host nation, reality is somewhat different. First, as was the case in Afghanistan, the catalyst for SSR activities may be an invasion. The principle of local ownership becomes less clear when the SSR effort is also pursued in order to achieve donor-driven agendas. Second, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces reasonably asks, “...which locals?” Reforms may be resisted by the ruling elite who do not act in the best interests of their population, or in accordance with the values of the intervening nations. Third, the reforms required to bring about adequate and enduring security may simply be beyond the grasp of the host nation, due to a lack of human capital.

Human capital is the sum value of any organization’s competencies, knowledge, and skills. These skills are ultimately held by individual members within an organization, in this case, a host nation. As such, human capital differs from other forms of capital in that it can not only be destroyed, but it can also be displaced by the mass emigration that often accompanies violent conflict. The security sector requires considerable human capital. This includes bureaucrats to run the ministries, and lawyers and judges to maintain the judiciary. Most important to the discussion at present, human capital also includes the soldiers and policemen who not only hold the skills to exercise the state’s monopoly on violence, but also to implement the rule of law and to provide for the security of both the state and its people. In the case of Afghanistan, the human capital required for an effective security sector had all but been eliminated by the Soviet invasion and the ensuing civil war. An Afghan police force that enforced the rule of law was a long distant memory, and, in spite of the persistent fighting, the planning skills required of a modern professional army had similarly been wiped out. The reform of the Afghan security sector has therefore been intensive. Other interventions where the security sector holds greater human capital will require less dramatic development. It should be noted that the process of developing human capital should avoid the pitfall of ‘mirror-imaging.’ Although the donor nations have expertise to offer, the optimal security infrastructure for the host nation, and therefore, the required human capital, may be very different than that of the donor nations. The presence of greater human capital among the core security forces of the host nation will allow for increased local ownership that can be reflected in the force development model selected.

Five force development models based upon the relationship between human capital and local ownership are proposed. They are leadership, apprenticeship, partnership, mentorship, and technical support and training, and although they are not doctrinal terms, they each represent valid methods of developing security forces with historical precedents. These five models are offered as a spectrum (Fig. 1.1) to demonstrate that, as human capital is increased through training, experience, and education, local ownership can be increased as donor involvement in reform decreases. However, numerous other factors play a role. In the past, the models selected were primarily a reflection of other factors, including degree of compliance within the host nation, domestic support within the donor states, the resources of the donor states, the nature and regenerative capabilities of the enemy, and the presence and strength of donor state forces in theatre. Nonetheless, all other things being equal, the ideal development of a security force would be characterized by a smooth transition between models to increase local ownership as human capital increases. Such a transition would not only ensure maximum local ownership, but would reduce the risks of the host nation developing a dependence on the donor nations. Transition between models reflects this shift. An obvious problem with such an arrangement is that quantifying human capital and local ownership is a difficult if not an impossible task. This evaluation will be necessarily subjective, depending upon the specific characteristic of the theatre in question. The remaining sections will discuss the five models offered, making use of historical examples.
Leadership

The European powers of the 18th and 19th Centuries gained considerable experience in the processes of developing indigenous security forces. This development was born out of necessity. There simply were not enough European soldiers to go around, particularly in cases like The Netherlands, whose constitution prohibits sending conscripts on overseas assignments. Recruiting local soldiers and ‘officering’ them with Europeans ensured economy of effort and maintained maximum control over the force’s operations and general conduct. A widespread sense of racial superiority by the colonizers over the colonized contributed to a belief that the locals did not, in any event, hold the capacity for such responsibility. Such pompousness varied from one national experience to another – the French, for example, did not seek to ‘Europeanize’ their colonial soldiers and embraced the traditions and dress of their African colonies – but generally, the local forces were subordinated. The development of more-or-less European-style forces in the colonies was primarily a mechanism to maintain long-term control, and not to develop a given force’s capacity to plan and conduct independent operations.

The first model to be explored is leadership. In this model, the donor nation draws upon the manpower of the host nation, but supplements it by providing the leadership to command and to control the organization. Such a model allows for security forces to develop and become increasingly effective in many ways, but does not develop the leadership and planning capability to allow that force to stand on its own. Local ownership, even at the tactical level, is completely absent. Strong examples of this model were manifested in standing organizations, such as the German Schutztruppe, the British Indian Army, and the King’s African Rifles, and in hasty creations such as the European and American-officered Ever Victorious Army in China through the 1860s. In the British Indian Army, ‘natives’ could serve as Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs), but they mostly fulfilled a liaison role. In spite of moderate reforms, such as allowing ten Indians per year to attend Sandhurst from 1918 onwards, and the 1932 opening of the Indian Military Academy, even as late as 1946, the officer corps of the Indian Army remained overwhelmingly British. Similarly, all officers in the Gurkha regiments, actually part of the British Army, were strictly British or Commonwealth.

In the German Schutztruppe, European leadership stretched even deeper, including not only German officers, but also two German non-commissioned officers per company. Such colonial armies were not only effective in quelling internal uprisings, but also assisted in expanding their respective empires and defending the European homeland as late as the Second World War.

Regardless of the expediency and efficiency of the leadership model, it holds considerable shortcomings. The model may be useful in cases where human capital within a given security sector is exceedingly low. However, this model makes no investment in the creation of the human capital required for indigenous and sustainable security, short of the development of basic soldier skills. Unless transition towards the other models is pursued, the force created will be ill-prepared to provide its own security. Take, for example, the case of Uganda, where this transition did not occur. In 1962, the King’s African Rifles had only two Ugandan officers. Idi Amin, virtually illiterate and already accused of human rights violations in Kenya, was one of those two officers. Uganda abruptly lost the skills and experience of the British officers, and lacked the human capital to compensate. The lack of human capital, and therefore, competition among the military leadership, played no small part in Amin’s meteoric rise to power. The progressive development of human capital in order to facilitate local ownership is an obvious requirement of SSR.

This brings us to the second model: apprenticeship.

Apprenticeship

Apprenticeship is similar to leadership in most respects. As with the leadership model, the host nation provides the bulk of the manpower, while the donor nation provides the leadership to these forces. The difference is that the intervening nation intends upon developing and training the local leadership and surrendering control when the security situation and the human capital within the force permits. The desired end state is stability, not necessarily control. The overlap and eventual transition from leadership to apprenticeship is obvious. Probably the best example of the apprenticeship model was exhibited by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) during its various interventions throughout Central...
of the most important functions of the intervention.” The permanent arrangement. The creation of a constabulary “… is one have probably disintegrated. This will not, however, be a per-

country. As such, it must fulfill the security functions nor-

try, the government of the United States takes responsibility for the protection of the citizens and the property within that country. The effectiveness of the constabulary model was institutionalized by the timeless 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual.

This manual dedicates an entire section to the constabu-

lary model. It states that, upon intervention in a foreign coun-

country, the government of the United States takes responsibility for the protection of the citizens and the property within that country. As such, it must fulfill the security functions normally performed by police and military organizations that have probably disintegrated. This will not, however, be a permanent arrangement. The creation of a constabulary “… is one of the most important functions of the intervention.” The officers of the constabulary will initially be Marine Corps or Navy officers, or senior non-commissioned officers, until, “… as the domestic situation becomes tranquil and the native members of the constabulary become proficient in their duties, the United States officers of the constabulary are replaced by native officers.” The constabulary model certainly offers an appealing option for short-term stability and medium-term capacity building, particularly in a host nation without a tradition of standing security forces, or where the leadership of these forces is unacceptable to the intervening nation. The donor nation holds significant control over the selection and training of the force’s leaders, potentially sidestepping significant issues such as the institutionalization of a meritocracy, and the eradication of corruption and nepotism. Its downsides, of course, are not insignificant, including potential stunting of the growth of the local military leadership, the perception that the forces are nothing more than ‘puppets’ of the donor nation, and the domestic public perception of an ‘imperial’ agenda.

The remaining three models – partnership, mentorship, and technical support and training – have risen to prominence since the end of the Second World War. This is largely due to domestic resentment of actions viewed to be imperial in nature, and also the Cold War requirements for coalitions and of engaging in warfare by proxy. Following the Second World War, the United States established Military Assistance Groups (MAGs) and Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (MAAGs) in Greece, the Philippines, Taiwan, Iran, Japan, and Korea in order to bolster their security sectors. Additionally, Foreign Internal Defence (FID) became one of the six core tasks of the US Army Special Forces; a dedicated American unit assigned the task of developing host nation security forces. The Soviet Union pursued similar initiatives within their sphere of influence. Even as late as the tenure of Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet advisors and trainers were heavily involved in developing the security forces in Syria, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. Soviet allies, in turn, pursued similar missions elsewhere, such as the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, and Cuban involvement in the crises in Angola and Mozambique. By September 1965, in response to increased American involvement in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union had more than 1500 advisors in North Vietnam, and more than 2600 North Vietnamese personnel were sent to the USSR for training. Wherever a flare-up occurred during the Cold War, American and Soviet advisors could surely be found, and generally at arms length.

Partnership

The next model to be discussed is partnership. This is a more nebulous concept than the other models offered. A partnered unit, in American doctrine, “… is a unit that shares all or a portion of an area of operations with a host nation security force unit.” Partnering as a concept has recently become very popular in Afghanistan and in Iraq. It implies a certain synergy that is very attractive, and it certainly falls within the spirit of existing counterinsurgency doctrine. In a recent directive, the Commander ISAF, General David Petraeus stated: “Partnership is an indispensable aspect of our counterinsurgency strategy. It is also an indispensable element of the transition of security responsibility to ANSF.” True partnership, however, where two groups ‘share everything,’ is problematic. Ultimately, unity of command requires that one of the commanders is the final authority for all decisions made. Collaboration in these decisions is certainly possible, but will primarily be the result of the personalities involved and the relationships they form. Consequently, true partnership will be generally unachievable, although degrees of partnership remain a valuable tool in the development of security forces. Partnership, in many respects, constitutes a pseudo-command relationship between two forces.
Partnership can occur at numerous levels, and it remains suitable for host nation security forces with varying levels of human capital, hence the length of its representation at Fig 1.1. On one hand, partnership may be suitable for an indigenous force of extremely low human capital. Partnering with a similar, more developed force permits the local forces to access a larger number of trainers, as well as their partner unit’s fire, intelligence, and logistic support. This support will be significantly greater than what can be provided by a comparably small, embedded, mentor team. Conversely, in a more advanced security force organization, such a level of support may not be necessary. Planning responsibilities and intelligence may be shared, but fire and logistic support will occur via two distinct but parallel chains.

One of the most noteworthy examples of partnership can be found in the USMC Combined Action Program (CAP) during the Vietnam War. Under this program, a squad of Marines was embedded in a roughly platoon-sized grouping of South Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) soldiers, locally recruited soldiers with limited training. The Marines were initially hand-picked for the assignment, ensuring the right personality types were selected for a task which required the two groups to ‘share everything.’ They lived together, worked together, and fought together, and although casualties among Marines in the program were statistically higher, so was their likelihood of requesting extended tours.23 This grouping was impressively successful in developing formidable bonds among the soldiers and the populace. Also, from anecdotal evidence, it appeared to be successful in increasing the government’s hold over the regions where the program was in place, and in improving the competence of the PF.24 Although this is how the model is best remembered, between 1968 and 1970 this ‘static’ CAP model gradually changed to a ‘roving’ CAP, wherein the USMC squads would rotate among two-or-more villages and PF units. Although the rationale for this shift was the reduction of available resources, such a shift in models could be used in the future in response to the developing capacity of the host nation security force unit.

**Mentorship**

The development of the partnered host nation security force is unlikely to be the only task assigned to a unit. Modern counterinsurgency campaigns are characterized by numerous parallel lines of operation. Commanders may find themselves in the difficult position of juggling a full set of assigned and time sensitive responsibilities, while simultaneously striving to fulfill their long-term standing task of developing their partnered host nation security force unit. Success in implementing this balancing act is no mean feat. Thus, it has shown beneficial for these partnered units to establish dedicated mentor teams, or for mentor teams to exist under a separate command. Such teams, in the form of NATO OMLTs, or American Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) in Afghanistan, and various forms of Transition Teams in Iraq, have met with success.

Mentors or advisors will conduct operations with an assigned host nation security force unit.25 There is no command relationship: progress through mentorship will be made through perceptions of credibility, mutual respect, and the development of positive personal relationships.26 Mentorship normally consists of embedded teams of specialized trainers with the experience and skills necessary to develop the human capital of the organization while conducting operations. Mentorship on its own poses less of a burden on manpower than partnership, and due to the small size of a typical mentor team, the risk of the host nation unit developing a dependence on foreign aid is lessened. However, dependence upon certain modern enablers held by the donor nation remains an acute danger, particularly when these same enablers are not developed within the host nation security force. One of the most famous examples of mentorship, with no shortage of bribery and bluff, was the case of T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia). Less romantic but probably more applicable examples also exist.

The conflicts in Korea and Vietnam provide illustrative examples of the mentorship model. In South Korea, the United States created the Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) to develop the capacity of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). KMAG provided mentors that initially assisted their ROKA counterparts in the development of an internal defence capability, and participated in ROKA combat operations against guerrillas. However, when North Korea invaded the South in June 1950, the mentors
were ordered to withdraw, although not all of them did so. Subsequent events resulted in a new mandate that allowed the trainers to function as mentors in the conventional conflict. KMAG fulfilled its mentorship and liaison task throughout the war, maintaining its “advise-and-assist, do-not-command” policy, even during the darkest days.23

In an intriguing blend of methods, the ROKA was further developed through other means. As one aspect, the United States provided the overall leadership for the war. With South Korean permission, the United States military took command of the war effort, and it has maintained command of the ROKA ever since, until the expected handover in 2012. The American Field Training Command was established in July 1968. The relation between the American military and the RVNAF therefore changed frequently over the course of the war, and although the ultimate outcome of the conflict makes it popular to overly criticize the mentorship effort, it should be noted that the task was not without its successes, such as the aforementioned USMC CAP and the US Army Special Forces’ development of Civilian Irregular Defence Groups (CIDGs). Additionally, many of the elite Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units fought surprisingly well during the Tet Offensive in 1968. Nonetheless, the effort to develop the RVNAF suffered from serious divisions. As the war evolved and American combat forces were introduced, RVNAF units were increasingly given a simpler pacification task, while American units pursued combat operations. Unlike in Korea, the US Army did not formally take command of the war effort, and integration between RVNAF and American units was limited. Until the “one war” was pursued, they very much fought separate wars. The overall effect of this neglect was evident during the failure of Operation Lam Son 719, the 1971 incursion into Laos. American mentors and combat units alike could not accompany the RVNAF, and the operation indicated that the RVNAF had grown dependent upon their counterparts. It was a tragic taste of things to come.

The mentorship model shows certain strength and weaknesses. Mentors operating in isolation have decreased influence over their counterparts. Personality is critical whenever working with host nation security forces, but it becomes especially critical in the mentorship model. Also, it appears that in cases where the human capital of the host nation security forces is low, mentorship is complimentary to partnership. In Korea, American and ROKA units shared common tasks. In Vietnam, for the most part, they did not. Even if not partnered in the formal sense, working together provides the host nation security forces with an example to emulate and support to draw upon while the mentors focus upon their specific tasks. In Korea, this unity of command was facilitated by the existence of a single, overall commander. The two armies functioned as one. From the examples provided, it is also important to note that mentorship can occur at any level. The RVNAF had grown dependent upon their counterparts. It was a tragic taste of things to come.

The Vietnam War offers a similarly useful example of mentorship. The American mission began as it ended, with teams of trainers and mentors. Beginning with US Army Special Forces teams, the mentorship effort was marginalized when the war was ‘conventionalized’ in 1965. Mentorship operations returned to the forefront in 1968, when General Creighton Abrams instituted his “one war” policy, calling for the development of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and better integration with American units. In 1969, the newly elected American President, Richard Nixon, instituted his policy of ‘Vietnamization,’ a policy aimed at putting the war back in the hands of the Vietnamese. The relationship between the American military and the RVNAF therefore changed frequently over the course of the war, and although the ultimate outcome of the conflict makes it popular to overly criticize the mentorship effort, it should be noted that the task was not without its successes, such as the aforementioned USMC CAP and the US Army Special Forces’ development of Civilian Irregular Defence Groups (CIDGs). Additionally, many of the elite Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units fought surprisingly well during the Tet Offensive in 1968. Nonetheless, the effort to develop the RVNAF suffered from serious divisions. As the war evolved and American combat forces were introduced, RVNAF units were increasingly given a simpler pacification task, while American units pursued combat operations. Unlike in Korea, the US Army did not formally take command of the war effort, and integration between RVNAF and American units was limited. Until the “one war” was pursued, they very much fought separate wars. The overall effect of this neglect was evident during the failure of Operation Lam Son 719, the 1971 incursion into Laos. American mentors and combat units alike could not accompanies the RVNAF, and the operation indicated that the RVNAF had grown dependent upon their counterparts. It was a tragic taste of things to come.

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Technical Support and Training

Not all efforts to develop host nation security forces will necessarily require involvement in combat operations. Indeed, most will not. This brings us to the fifth and final model: technical support and training. This model is most effective when employed with a host nation security force with high human capital – the effort being mostly to refine their existing skills – or when a low-cost and low-risk intervention is desirable. Most technical support and training missions will be characterized by teams, or even individual specialists who provide the host nation security forces with training and instruction. This interaction will occur within a secure area, the specifics of which will change depending on the absence or presence of a conflict and its intensity. In general, training missions are relatively low-cost and low-risk, making the endeavour an appealing method of shoring up security in a specific region. Although these trainers may go ‘outside the wire’ from time-to-time, their primary role is not in the conduct of operations – although they may assist in planning – but in the conduct of training. Although the low cost and risk of these operations is certainly attractive, there are several limitations that are well-illustrated by the case of the American training efforts in El Salvador during the insurgency of the 1980s.

Largely due to public fears of ‘another Vietnam,’ American trainers in El Salvador were restricted to a technical support and training role. Additionally, the Salvadoran military held high human capital, making the force seemingly well-suited for a high degree of local ownership. The El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) had a long history of a standing army, and a professional, in most senses, officer corps. It also had a long history of human rights violations and control of the central government, a critical failing that required reform. The American Military Advisory Group’s (MILGP) task was to provide training and specialist support to the ESAF from within the confines of secure camps. Such a restriction required that high numbers of Salvadoran personnel attend training in the United States, at the School of the Americas in Panama, and at the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras. Through such training, the MILGP was able to improve the ESAF’s competence as a force, and to reorient the ESAF’s actions towards the conduct of counter-insurgency operations. Nonetheless, corruption and nepotism remained commonplace, along with numerous human rights infractions. In 1981, more than 10,000 political murders occurred at the hands of the ESAF or affiliated death squads. By 1990, that number had been reduced to 108, a reduction that can likely be credited to American trainers. The ‘death squads’ de-legitimized the ESAF in the eyes of their own people, and eroded American public support for the mission. There can be little doubt that such actions could have been reduced sooner, had American advisors been able to mentor their ESAF counterparts on such actions. By 1990, that number had been reduced to 108, a reduction that can likely be credited to American trainers.

Conclusion

The five models discussed are not mutually exclusive. A great amount of flexibility is required as circumstances change. More than one model can be employed simultaneously and at various levels, depending upon the competence of the host nation security forces being developed. Take, for example, the Korean experience. The ROKA was developed through a combination of all five models, and has developed into a modern and professional force. A ‘one size fits all’ approach is unnecessarily restrictive, and it does not allow the flexibility required to permit a host nation security force unit to develop its capabilities. When creating a strategy for the development of a security force, all of the aforementioned models should be considered, taking into account the human capital held by the host nation. Logically, a host nation and its security forces possessing high human capital will require less training support than a mediocre one. Additionally, the competency of a security force is unlikely to be uniform. Perhaps one unit will be in such disrepair that it will require partnership with a coalition unit down to the platoon level, drawing upon the coalition force’s logistic support in the short term, while a second unit requires
nothing more than an embedded mentor team at the battalion level. Ultimately, the goal of host nation security force development is to create a force that is capable of conducting independent operations and bringing about enduring security. This will only be achievable if host nation security force units, as they graduate from one milestone to the next, are encouraged and allowed to take on increasing degrees of local ownership.

The development of host nation security forces is not a new development. Military professionals have been called upon to develop other armies since antiquity; such duties should be viewed as standing tasks, and not as aberrations. With growing experience in the field of host nation security force development, and the ability to draw upon the experiences of our allies, the methods of developing these forces merit further examination and discussion. This discussion should not shy away from the difficult debate regarding the competence and human capital of the security forces with whom we will work. Clearly, if they were proficient, they would not require reform. An honest and open evaluation of the calibre of these forces is necessary in order to determine the level of assistance required. Five potential models for this development process have been proposed. Using an honest assessment of human capital, these models can be applied in a phased manner so as to permit the greatest amount of local ownership possible, and to increasingly develop the host nation’s capabilities without creating undue dependence. The relationship between human capital and local ownership is a reality of security force assistance that must be addressed and constantly re-evaluated throughout the process.

NOTES

21. Note that although mentorship may sometimes refer to personnel who do not conduct operations with their host nation counterparts, the term is used here to denote operational mentorship, thereby distinguishing them from trainers.
24. Ibid., p. 9.
30. Alternatively, specialist support may consist of providing enabler support to the host nation security forces on operations, such as the American provision of Forward Air Controllers to Saudi units during Operation Desert Storm. However, this is primarily an example of assistance, not development.
33. Ibid.
Social injustice, bullying by military or police, and corruption must be seen as grave weaknesses in the defense of a country, errors that can lead to its downfall and eventually, as our friends are eliminated, to the downfall of the United States.


I believe that a high and unwavering sense of morality should pervade all spheres of governmental activity.

Former Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay  
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Introduction

One of the central goals of counter-insurgent forces is to secure the loyalty and support of the population to their government through good governance and positive administration. Official corruption strikes at the heart of this objective, and, if unchecked, can slowly erode the support of the people to the point where they no longer defend the government against insurgent incursions, or, more ominously, join with the insurgents to fight the state. But corruption does not just manifest itself in bribes to government officials; it also takes the form of arbitrary killings, theft, abuse, neglect, and the appropriation of public property for private purposes, among other offenses. In Afghanistan, the struggle against corruption has taken on renewed importance as part of a comprehensive strategy to defeat the insurgency. Even though the Taliban certainly committed many of these same abuses when they were in power, the memories of the Afghan population with respect to this period have been colored by their recent experiences with the Afghan state. Faced with a government that has all-too-frequently ‘turned a blind eye’ to the depredations of warlords, and has done little to stop official corruption, some elements of the Afghan population have begun to reluctantly turn to the Taliban as a source of justice, and as a means of addressing past wrongs. But any anti-corruption effort must recognize that corruption is not simply a law enforcement activity, but it has political, economic, and tribal

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aspects to it that must simultaneously be addressed. The key challenge for U.S. forces in Afghanistan in implementing an anti-corruption plan is striking a balance between the limiting nature of Afghan sovereignty and their uncertain commitment to anti-corruption efforts, and our responsibilities to the Afghan people as their military and diplomatic partner. This article will set forth several pragmatic solutions for addressing the corruption challenge of Afghanistan, informed by our experiences there, and enriched by the best practices of previous counter-insurgency efforts.

What is Corruption?

In many developing countries where government administration and rule of law is weak and political coalitions are often patronage-based and centered on ethnic, tribal, or sectarian identity, it is not uncommon for a certain level of corruption to exist, and for it to be generally accepted by society. Because business and political relationships in these countries are typically governed by human connections where power is personal, and there has not yet been a transition to impersonal bureaucratic processes, bribes are a means by which people get things done. In a strange way, it is a fee for service. This small-scale corruption in the service of a burgeoning state focused upon service delivery to the population is viewed as an appropriate cost when most residents are not typically taxed, and when revenue sources for the government are usually from high value resources, such as oil, or from outside donors, such as international organizations. But this 'street level bureaucracy' that touches the daily lives of citizens, such as paying a bribe for a driver’s license, stands in marked contrast with the large-scale graft of multimillion dollar contracts, and the unaccountable violence that states sometimes perpetrate against their own populations. In these respects, corruption takes on a more invidious tone where the basic human rights of the community are habitually violated, and the collective good is harmed through shoddy, incomplete, and dangerous work that is often significantly overpriced. The ability of the population to hold officials accountable in these situations is severely limited because the components of government that would typically be appealed to in confronting these problems, such as the judiciary and representative bodies, are either embryonic or non-existent, or they have become compromised. In these kinds of situations, corruption is no longer part of simply ‘getting things done’ and doing the odd favor for someone, it has now transitioned to a wholly different level where the interests of a minority faction have become, not only diametrically opposed to the public good, but have indeed become detrimental to the public good. When situations have reached this level, where the state is no longer allied with the people but arrayed against it, corruption has become a threat to the continued survival of the government, and it must be actively confronted.

While the weakness of the state can create a culture of corruption, in many respects, however, it is its strength that most contributes to the problem. In many countries that have adopted autarkic, protectionist, or interventionist economic policies where the state plays an active role in the managing of the private economy, asymmetries exist between market rates for goods and services, and artificial prices established by the government. Because the difference between the market rate and the government rate is often so pronounced, an underground ‘black market’ exists that is beyond the control of the state, and it creates opportunities for corruption because it is unregulated. It is not uncommon for official corruption to become enmeshed in these markets because of their need for protection from state regulation, as well as for government officials to take advantage of these market rates to sell ostensibly state-owned goods. While many of these policies have been adopted in the service of bolstering indigenous business enterprises, they are also pursued for domestic political reasons. In many developing states, for example, the government plays an active role in setting the prices for basic commodities and foodstuffs as part of a patronage-based governance strategy. Unlike many first world political parties that are often based upon philosophical differences, many of the parties in the developing world exist to facilitate jobs for their members, and to increase government largesse. These political systems reinforce patron-client relationships where one’s ability to dispense favors is directly related to the power they acquire in politics.
However much corruption is a part of daily life in the developing world, there are types of corruption that are particularly threatening to a government trying to fight an insurgency that must be reduced or eliminated. Any corruption that calls into question the basic capacity of the state to meet the needs of the people, and is seen as anathema to their basic rights and interests, is an unacceptable level of corruption. The key aspect of what is and is not ‘acceptable’ corruption has everything to do with the perception of the population.\(^1\) The views of the people are the surest indicator of what is and is not appropriate when it comes to the behavior of public officials. Discerning, aggregating, and acting upon these views will ensure that the people are not divided against their government and align with the insurgency.

**How Did Corruption Get so Bad?**

In the course of supporting the Government of Afghanistan, U.S. military units, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and District Support Teams have often unwittingly fostered corruption through their hiring practices, contracting methods, and partnership strategies. It was not uncommon, during the early years of PRTs, for example, for Coalition Forces to turn to local government officials, interpreters, and Afghan Security Forces for recommendations with respect to development projects, contractors, and building locations. This was often done quite deliberately by PRT officials because it was viewed as supporting the Government of Afghanistan, and because these employees and officials often knew the local communities better than a given Provincial Reconstruction Team. Additionally, there was a great amount of pressure to initiate development projects in the early years of the war, which placed a premium on speed and completion versus consultation and partnership. One of the unfortunate side effects of this approach was that, all-too-often, government officials and ‘local hires’ directed the business to their tribe and supporters, or took it themselves and pocketed the proceeds, or ‘got a cut’ by acting as a middleman. While these practices were not necessarily detrimental to anti-corruption efforts, the fact that most contracts tended to be ‘captured’ by these officials, and did not get widely circulated among the population created a perception of PRT bias and led to inflated prices, due to an artificially constricted contractor pool. Additionally, there was a strongly-held view among many U.S. officials that corruption, or, at least, low-level corruption, was simply the Afghan way of doing business, and was an ‘internal’ government problem in which U.S. forces should not or could not interfere. These views generally manifested themselves into an attitude that there was an ‘acceptable level of corruption’ that the Coalition Forces could tolerate. Furthermore, because PRTs were often underresourced and unable to effectively monitor government behavior and U.S. combat units were mostly involved in security operations, official corruption went unreported, unchecked, and unknown. In the interest of ‘getting the job done,’ units often turned to the *easy solution* versus the *right solution*, although this was not always apparent at the time, and focused upon the expediency of getting a project finished versus spending the required time consulting with local communities, and reaching beyond official government channels and interpreters for contractors.

Our early strategy of partnering with warlords often proved disastrous to combating corruption, because in addition to monopolizing contracts from the local PRT and maneuver units, they also committed grievous human rights violations and tended to prey upon the local population. Additionally, because there was no local way to check their power, either through an active judiciary, or through a representative body, they also tended to use money and equipment from the central government for their own private benefit. Because the security forces of many of these warlords became legitimate following the collapse of the Taliban, such as by virtue of becoming the local Afghan National Police Force, for example, their actions and predatory behavior upon the population had the imprimatur of government sanction which further developed the view among the people that these actions were official. Many of these relationships became even more important when the Taliban’s presence increased in 2006, deepening our reliance upon these same abusive forces, when the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was still inadequate. Even if a member of the community wanted to move against official corruption, or sought to confront these warlords, it was largely impossible because of the threat of violence from that same warlord. It also became customary among U.S. government officials to ‘turn a blind eye’ to ‘ghost’ police officers on payrolls, because their ‘pay’ was often used as either an operating fund for Afghan police, or covered unanticipated costs, such as going on missions with the U.S. military. While great strides have been made to address these and many other issues, these various practices created a general tolerance for corruption among U.S. officials because it was often seen as addressing underlying weaknesses of the Afghan state, or were in the furtherance of other U.S. goals. Additionally, our ‘hands off’ view and surface-level understanding of the human terrain only served to encourage a culture of corruption, and frequent rotations among units caused efforts to fight it to ‘fall between the cracks.’
While certain practices of the Coalition Forces and early partnering strategies encouraged corruption, the political structures of local government in Afghanistan have also fostered its growth and limited the ability of the people to confront it in an effective manner. Afghanistan’s ‘democracy deficit’ at the provincial and district level inhibits the creation of a dynamic government accountable to its people, and able to address the corruption challenge in a comprehensive manner. Because provincial officials are appointed by the central government, and are thus indirectly accountable to the people, and often lack direct budget authority and the ability to ‘hire and fire’ local officials, they are ever-mindful of maintaining political connections in Kabul, and do not have to be overly concerned with local sentiment. Additionally, local officials who might be focused upon combating corruption usually find accountability mechanisms weak due to an over-centralization of government whereby the Provincial Council, for example, does not review directorate budgets, and governors lack the power to fire the heads of these same departments. Because the people are unable to hold corrupt officials accountable, outside of utilizing contacts in Kabul that most communities lack, they often turn to the Taliban to address injustices, or to right the balance of accountability at the local level. Furthermore, this system of government encourages corruption because accountability and responsibility are disconnected, and, lacking a viable judiciary and political party system, local residents have no realistic way of addressing complaints. In this gap between garnering the disapproval of officials in Kabul, and with it the fear of getting fired, as well as the ability of local residents to actually hold leaders accountable, presents a huge opportunity for corruption to take place with few, if any, consequences. Additionally, because the central government of Afghanistan is reluctant to take a stand against corrupt officials, and because the president often pardons them and puts them back in to office, it can be very demoralizing to anti-corruption advocates, and it only serves to embolden corrupt officials. How then can we contend with corruption in a serious way when informed by how our own behavior has often fostered it in Afghanistan?

A Holistic Approach to Fighting Corruption

With this history in mind, and with a basic understanding of the limits to mounting a successful anti-corruption effort, it is essential that we adjust our behavior to reduce or remove opportunities for official corruption, and bolster the government’s capacity to confront it, while enlisting the population in our efforts, and prompting the Afghan Government to move decisively against it. In general, our strategy should have six aspects to it that stress transparency, monitoring, reporting, and accountability. In order to be effective, we should consider the following strategies: (1) advertise and publicize; (2) report and investigate; (3) understand and leverage the human terrain; (4) embed with government and security forces; (5) empower Afghan institutions, and (6) enlist the population. Corruption opportunities exist wherever the government buys, sells, or regulates something, and it is exacerbated when accountability is weak and transparency is limited. But corruption is not just about taking a bribe or stealing a public good. It is also the choice of not enforcing the law, due to tribal connections, or to governing in a biased manner that excludes certain groups. It is as much a negative behavior against something as it is a positive behavior in favor of something.

Changing Our Behavior

The first adjustment we must make to our behavior is to broaden the number and types of local contractors we use when conducting development and reconstruction work. While it is still advisable to share some contracting opportunities with our local allies, it is essential that we reach beyond the confines of Afghan officials and local employees, and partner with communities in as broad a manner as possible. If we actively collaborate with local villages and rely upon contractors from those areas, we will have broadened the opportunity for development work in the area, and reduced the public perception that the PRT’s business only goes to privileged tribes and personalities. Additionally, it will likely reduce the prices for development work as the potential pool of contractors widens. If this approach is supplemented by advertising for bids over local television and radio stations, this will also increase the transparency of the PRT’s operations and encourage broader participation by the community. Additionally, smaller scale opportunities to engage with communities, such as working with local shuras and jirgas, will empower the population to actively participate in project development and implementation. Furthermore, if the community contributes some portion of the money for the project as a means for them to have a stake in its completion, this practice will inevitably lead to lower prices along with greater long-term sustainability.
**Utilizing Representative Bodies and the Media**

Because government accountability mechanisms are incomplete at the local level, or may have been undermined, it is imperative that opportunities be created for officials and the community to compel honesty from their government. One method of doing this is for local officials to give presentations to representative bodies such as jirgas, shuras, and Provincial Councils with respect to their activities. This can be facilitated by the PRT and Coalition Forces by providing rides to the officials, and by privately encouraging them to attend. These sessions should then be reported on by local radio and television stations, where they exist, to bring public pressure to bear upon these officials to give a full accounting of their activities. A key aspect of this approach is to standardize these reports and to create the expectation that all public officials must address community forums on a regular basis, or risk being embarrassed publically or removed from office. Because the commitment of the Government of Afghanistan to effective anti-corruption is weak, it is essential that corrupt officials be so thoroughly marginalized through public approbrium that the government is all but compelled to remove the official. This kind of work, of using public opinion in orchestrated settings to bring corrupt behaviors to light can be fraught with risk, but the benefits of enlisting community representatives in this kind of work is invaluable to giving Afghans the sense that they are in control of their own communities and destinies.

**Dedicating Staff to Fight Corruption**

While using Afghan institutions, such as representative bodies and the media to check corruption can mitigate some abuses, absent a legal ability to compel compliance and to investigate abuses, there is only so far that public opinion and moral authority can go to ‘reining in’ recalcitrant officials. In these situations, it is imperative that a viable and effective judiciary and prosecutorial capability be created and supported to pursue charges against corrupt officials. Coalition Forces also need to dedicate staff in their intelligence, civil affairs, and legal sections to work against corruption ‘full time.’ Depending upon the politics of an area, it may be advisable to start on smaller scale corruption first, building a body of experience among Afghan staff, and learning to deal with the inevitable attempts to intimidate them. These crucial first lessons will be vital as corruption cases ‘move up the political chain’ to more powerful officials with connections in Kabul. In these situations, where the threat of violence from these officials or ‘suspicious’ run-ins with the Taliban may take place, local anti-corruption officials and their family members will need ‘around-the-clock’ protection and political ‘top cover’ in Kabul. It is essential that local anti-corruption efforts be known by the U.S. Embassy or higher military headquarters, so they can be prepared to mitigate any efforts in the Afghan Government to thwart anti-corruption cases. These prosecutorial efforts will need to be sustained, imaginative, and well protected, because corrupt officials are not without resources that will be brought to bear on those who threaten their prerogatives. We are seeking to move beyond a culture of impunity to a culture of law. It does not come quickly, but it can never start if we do not make the effort.

**Active Partnering**

Regardless of how beneficial in-depth training, frequent visits from mentors, personal examples, modern equipment, and other attempts to professionalize members of the Afghan Government are in helping them resist corruption, there is no greater antidote to corruption than actively partnering with them, and living with them continuously. By actively mentoring Afghan civil, police, and military officials, one gains a depth of understanding of who is genuinely corrupt, and who is dedicated to following the law. Additionally, through one’s presence and close observation, one may be able to stop corruption and serve as check upon it, because the local population can appeal to mentors to stop abusive behavior. At many police checkpoints, for example, it is not uncommon for local police to exact a bribe from local villagers, and to abuse those they dislike. One possible way of mitigating this abuse is to co-locate a coalition or an Afghan Army unit at the same checkpoint to monitor behavior and to serve as recourse to residents if they are abused. Additionally, if Afghan officials know mentors are required to report abuses, they will be less likely to commit them. However, this may prompt them to be more secretive. In parts of government administration that require a certain level of literacy, such as the processing of cases for adjudication, calculating budgets, and hearing the petitions of villagers, it may be helpful for a member of the coalition to assume responsibility for some component of this process as a way of reducing abuses against illiterate villagers. Serving as advocates for the illiterate, weak, poor, and dispossessed is a crucial function for reducing official corruption. During the Philippine Government’s successful campaign against the Huk Communist insurgency in the 1950s, for example, the government assigned army lawyers to represent poor tenant farmers against large land holders. Active partnering and forceful advocacy of the interests of the weak will do much to reduce corruption opportunities for government officials. By serving as a check on the more abusive elements of the Afghan government, and by giving the people an opportunity
to hold these same officials accountable through your presence, we will have done much to eliminate the forms of local corruption that alienate people most.

Enlisting the Population

No matter how much we are actively engaged in the community and seek to understand the human terrain of Afghanistan, the Afghan people know more about who is involved in corruption and its scope than we will ever know. If we can enlist the ‘eyes and ears’ of the population in our anti-corruption efforts, we will go a long way towards denying the Taliban a source of grievance upon which they can capitalize. One possible way of doing this would be to create an anonymous reporting system whereby the people could regularly inform on tribal and government officials who abuse their authority. The United Kingdom experimented with this approach in Helmand Province by having an anonymous telephone number made available to people to report abuses. Another approach is one successfully used by the Philippines in the 1950s in their conflict with the Huk Communist insurgency. Philippines President Magsaysay inaugurated a system of postcards whereby people could report abuses of authority directly to him in his effort to provide positive government to his people. His staff would then investigate the claims and take prompt action, thus putting all government officials on watch by never knowing who would inform on them. This strategy could be adapted to Afghanistan by creating an anonymous reporting system, such as a telephone number and a postcard reporting system. For the postcard system to work they would have to be distributed throughout an area at bazaars, mosques, government buildings, and so on, and, when completed, anonymously dropped off at boxes erected at area mosques, or directly given to a Coalition Forces member. The hope is that, because most Afghans regularly attend a mosque, their pattern of life of going to the mosque to pray would not identify them as ‘trouble makers’ and thereby make them vulnerable to reprisals. Because the population is mostly illiterate, each postcard could have a series of symbols indicating various abuses of authority or corruption, such as a picture of a hand with money in it for bribery, and colors for each checkpoint where a local could indicate where an abuse had taken place. This process must be effective and produce results and the Coalition Forces must play a central role in its operations if we hope to maintain the support of the people.

Building the Afghan State

Local government officials in Afghanistan face a number of challenges in providing communities the leadership, governance, service delivery, and justice they desire. Threats from the Taliban complicate their work and exacerbate temptations for corruption by creating an atmosphere of illegality and instability where short term strategies of survival prevail. Additionally, low salaries, insufficient training, poor leadership, and a predominantly-illiterate staff often make the temptations of corruption too difficult to resist. The fact that most local government is not directly accountable to the people they are ostensibly charged with serving only reduces the incentives for honest and positive administration. Even with all these challenges, efforts must be undertaken at the local level to improve the administration of civil government. While the central government’s Independent Directorate for Local Governance usually removes corrupt officials, and has also undertaken a number of capacity building projects for civil servants, local initiatives must also be undertaken to build the Afghan state. An active literacy program
any corruption is unacceptable, and it must be confronted by NATO/ISAF forces. The key to effectively combating it in Afghanistan, however, is by determining how the community perceives it. We also have to recognize that the cumulative effect of small bribes can also cause systemic problems and so will also need to be addressed. We must proceed carefully when trying to establish an anti-corruption program where the threat of retaliation from those who benefit from corruption is real.

3. An earlier version of this paragraph was published in “Defeating the Taliban’s Political Program,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2009), pp. 18-21, 36-37.
4. This quotation is taken from Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay (http://www.rmaf.org.ph/): “I believe that a high and unwavering sense of morality should pervade all spheres of governmental activity.”

Conclusion

Official corruption strikes at the heart of efforts by indigenous governments and counter-insurgent forces to promote good governance and positive administration as part of a strategy to secure the loyalty of a population to their government. If we adopt a multi-pronged approach to anti-corruption by changing our behavior, partnering with communities, utilizing representative bodies and the media, dedicating staff to fight corruption, actively mentoring the Afghans, enlisting the population in our efforts, and building the Afghan state, we will have effectively dealt with a substantial portion of the corruption challenge in Afghanistan. If we undertake this program informed by our past experiences, sensitive to the needs of the population, and consistently focused upon serving the public good and making sure we try to instill an ‘unwavering sense of morality’ in Afghanistan’s public servants, we will have removed a central source of grievance the Taliban use against the government. While our efforts will be crucial to helping like-minded Afghans confront corruption and government abuse, it is only by empowering them and helping the community place honest officials in positions of authority that we will be able to prevail in the long run.
“For all cases, the CCDR [combatant commander] must work to frame the problem with the best information available and be prepared to reassess the situation and reframe the problem, as required.”

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

Introduction

The current strategic operating environment in which US military forces operate has changed significantly in the past 20 years. The US military has shifted its strategy from a reactive, conventional-planning focus to one that encompasses a proactive, shaping strategy that focuses on a broad array of threats. Inherent within this shaping strategy is the requirement to set environmental conditions that directly or indirectly support US goals and objectives. To develop and execute a successful strategy, an in-depth understanding of the social make-up of the environment, to include the cultural, historical, religious, economic, and political aspects of that social framework, is necessary. Today’s military strategists and operational planners must be able to visualize the environment in all of its complexity to understand the competing actors and interests required in a shaping strategy.

This ability to visualize actors and trends in time and space is known as operational art, further defined as the application of creative imagination by commanders to design strategies, campaigns, and military operations to organize and employ military forces. To apply operational art, the commander draws on characteristics such as judgment, perception, and character to visualize the environmental conditions necessary for success. In today’s environment, the commander must be able to integrate US military, Department of State, and other US governmental organizations, allies, and host nations to properly ‘shape’ the environment to attain US goals and interests. Some officers can perform this intellectual process intuitively, but most must rely upon a framework or process that informs and guides the understanding, design, and development of strategies and plans.

DESIGN AND JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

by Dan McCauley

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operation planning process (JOPP) provide a framework that staffs and planning groups can use to give strategic leaders, commanders, and warfighters a better understanding of the nature of the problems and objectives for which we are committing, or planning to commit, American forces.

Our current processes tend to be product-oriented, and can lack a focus on understanding the environment, specifically the proper identification of the problems causing undesirable environmental conditions. Because of this, a new effort is afoot to instill greater intellectual rigor and imagination necessary when planning for military operations that have their root causes within a complex social environment. The new effort is currently called ‘design,’ and focuses upon efforts to better understand the full range of socially-complex, interactive problems that face planners. Design originated in a concept developed in the early-1970s by Professors Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber from the University of California, Berkley. Rittel and Webber were urban designers who originally coined the term ‘wicked’ problems to describe the intensely challenging ill-structured, complex nature of social problems that traditional linear systems approaches of the early industrial era inadequately address. The US Army recently adopted this concept to underpin its current doctrinal thoughts that address the types of problems associated with stability and reconstruction efforts and irregular warfare operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

Design is not new. In fact, commanders and staffs have performed deliberate or hasty intuitive design since the inception of military operations. The ‘new’ approach to applying design refocuses our efforts on identifying the underlying problems in the environmental conditions contrary to US national interests. This renewed focus on irregular warfare, the shift in strategy to proactively shaping the environment, and missions that encompass stabilization and reconstruction efforts require planners to think in a more thorough strategic context. That more detailed context includes social, political, economic, religious, and cultural considerations, among others, and stresses the importance of understanding whether the actions taken are the right ones for the interconnected environment within which we live. As most problems are essentially social, much of the background and many of the concepts that form the basis for design in military planning are adapted from the concept of ill-structured, socially complex or ‘wicked’ problems. This increased understanding of the environment requires planners to take a much broader approach to planning, to include a whole-of-government approach, to these types of operations. The concept of design, its method, and applicability to operational level planning provides for a better understanding of the mutually supporting relationship of design and planning and requires further examination.

The Concept of Design

In the context of social problem-solving, there are typically two types of problems: well-structured (tame) and ill-structured (wicked). Well-structured problems belong to a class of similar problems, are relatively well-defined, and have a stable problem statement, limited solutions, a definite stopping point,
and a specific end-state. Typically, planners can objectively evaluate solutions as ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ Well-structured problems often permit planners to make many attempts at determining a solution without changing the nature of the problem – in short; they can try and abandon solutions at will. Well-structured problems can be complex, but because of their inherent logic and stable problem statement are typically ‘solved’ over time.

Ill-structured problems, which include most social problems, do not generate a specific answer with any certainty. In ill-structured problems, multiple systems and actors interact, and, as such, information is often in conflict or inclusive. The relative position of the actor to the issue defines the nature of the problem. Stakeholders may recommend different solutions to the problem, many of which are in direct opposition to one another. There are no clarifying traits of these wicked problems and they are, at best, poorly defined. These types of problems rely upon “judgment” for resolution and, thus, are never solved – only re-solved time and again. Ill-structured problems are typically complex, and it is this combination that the design concept is intended to address.

In the past, ill-structured problems were the purview of relatively few individuals. Today, social problems underpin all military operations, and are at the forefront of any planning effort. The notion of wicked problems attempts to reconcile the dilemmas posed by social planning problems. Rittel and Weber posited that there was a whole realm of social problems unsuccessfully treated with traditional, linear, analytical approaches. Scientific formulas for addressing social problems are doomed to failure because of the interactive nature of the problems.

In the case of wicked problems, the search is not for the truth, but rather for an acceptable solution that will improve some characteristics of the world within which we live. War or conflict is ultimately the result of inherently complex social problems. When we put them into the contexts of groups, tribes, sects, nation-states, or regions, the social complexity reaches staggering proportions. Add into the mix history, culture, religion, and any number of other factors, and the concept of a wicked problem emerges. Understanding the nature of these problems will not guarantee the ‘correct’ solution to an undesired condition, but will enable the planner to define the problem and to perhaps determine a ‘better’ or acceptable solution.

Relatively tame problems, when applied to conventional military operations, underpin typical military problem-solving. Although there is a level of complexity, an inherent and deterministic logic underpins traditional warfighting operations. Planners can apply certain principles to contingency planning for traditional warfighting. Once planners understand relationships between the parts of the problem, they recognize that every action has a consequence, and although some actions reinforce the adversary system’s power, others degrade that power. The typical wargaming method of action, reaction, and counteraction significantly contributes to this oversimplification of combat, which, after all, is a human endeavor and thus subject to fog and friction. Traditional wargaming is an extremely useful tool, but planners must understand that whereas the wargaming outcome is deterministic, combat is not. In complex, ill-structured problems, wargaming is still required, but the real benefits do not necessarily come from the results. The far greater benefits are derived from the discussions of possibilities and probabilities from the interaction of systems and actors within and between systems.

Design is a methodology for applying creative and critical thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems, and to develop approaches to solve them. Design is a focused inquiry that enables the commander and staff to make sense of a complex situation, capture that understanding, and share the resulting cognitive map. Commanders use design to frame the environment, identify conditions contrary to US national interests, and describe the tensions resident in potential future conditions that describe a problem we must solve or manage. From that understanding of the environment, a critical analysis of the problem compared to the desired outcome based on projected future conditions occurs. The products of environmental and problem framing lead to the development of potential solutions. The design method is iterative, relies upon constant inquiry, and is inherently nonlinear. Systems thinking and discourse based upon learning and assessments enable design and continue throughout planning and execution. For example, in Kosovo the desired political solution (essentially a Serbian-free Kosovo province) was developed in isolation from the realities of the environment. The strategic end state failed to consider the existing conditions, the potential actors, the tendencies within the environment, internal and external relationships, the patterns of resistance, as well as the opposition to or support of any proposed solutions. The 78-day bombing campaign was thus constrained and distorted by a clear lack of vision of the desired solution based upon competing interests and a poor understanding of the environment and the problem therein. Whereas the air component had sufficient forces to punish the Serbs, it did not possess enough to halt unilaterally the ethnic cleansing, resulting in an extended campaign. It was only after senior commanders essentially redesigned the campaign that NATO was able to attain the desired end state.

A plan is defined as “a for achieving an end” or “an orderly arrangement of parts of an overall design.” Typically, planning is broken down into two smaller related processes: a design component and a detail component. The design component provides the general framework of the desired end or objective, a common statement of the problem or issue, the relationship of the problem to the environment, and a general description of the ‘ways.’ The detail component specifically addresses the ways and means to achieve the desired goal or end state. Any number of problem-solving models may be used in a planning process, but the JOPP enables planners to address both the design and detail components simultaneously. During planning, these components overlap and there is no clear demarcation between them. As commanders and staffs progressively address their concept of an operation, they further refine the design and incorporate it into the plan. An ensuing visual understanding of the environment necessitates a cognitive map that depicts the complex relationships at work within the environment.
One of the first questions that comes to mind is why should we study design? The primary reason is the almost singular focus on the operational level of war since the conclusion of the Second World War may have clouded our ability to see problems outside of a conventional warfare context. The environment and the actors within the contemporary environment are difficult to understand, and, as a result, solutions or potential solutions to problems are difficult to develop. Linking the actors within the environment to a comprehensive understanding of the environment itself requires the ability to think strategically. Strategic thinking is difficult, partly because the majority of our professional careers are spent developing tactical expertise in which linear thinking and relatively well-structured problems and solutions exist. Strategic thinking requires an ability to think in a non-linear and imaginative fashion that is outside the majority of most of our comfort zones. As future operations will most likely be within the irregular warfare or hybrid warfare realms, the dilemmas posed by complex problems will frustrate conventional thinkers.

As the military is more frequently asked to solve problems that have their basis in social inequity or competition, the complex social patterns and underlying root causes resident in the strategic environment create a difficult task for today’s planners. The involvement of a multitude of actors – some supportive, some adversarial, and others neutral – in these types of settings, as well as an understanding of their motives and whether they are in opposition to our own motives, adds an almost overwhelming level of complexity to these problems. The actors within the strategic environment operate within a social mosaic that is difficult to understand – the social structure and norms, religions, classes, tribes, relationships, histories, and other considerations add yet more levels of complexity. We must thoughtfully consider the impact of all of these complexities on our desired actions as we integrate all elements of US and multinational power in a unified effort.

**Design Methodology**

Three distinct elements collectively form a design concept. These three elements, –environmental, problem, and solution frames – constitute a learning methodology that corresponds to three basic questions to answer to produce an actionable design concept:

- What is the context in which the design will be applied? (Environmental Frame)
- What problem is the design intended to solve? (Problem Frame)
- What broad, general approach (es) will solve the problem? (Solution Frame)

During design, the commander and staff consider the conditions, circumstances, and factors that affect the desired conditions or our ability to act within the environment. It is through the understanding and synthesis of both the current conditions and desired conditions that staffs develop approaches that aim to satisfy those desires. As potential solutions are developed, commanders and staffs may realize
that their initial assessment of the problem was inaccurate or incomplete so they continue to frame the problem, which, in turn, requires adjusting the solution.23

**The Environmental Frame**

Environmental framing involves organizing, interpreting, depicting, and generally attempting to make sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for subsequent frames. It incorporates everything within the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) construct, plus history, culture, and all the relationships contained therein. It also includes identifying the environmental actors and trends, competing strategies, and inherent tendencies within the system. Environmental framing must also include the reason for the strategy or plan. This frame facilitates hypothesizing or modeling that bounds the part of the environment and initially describes the problem under consideration. For example, the decision to launch Operation *Iraqi Freedom* should have not only addressed the removal of Saddam Hussein for his possession of chemical weapons and potential to support terrorist organizations, but also articulated other reasons his regime’s removal was necessary. Specifically, the decision should have addressed the repercussions for failing to remove Hussein; the political, religious, and social systems that supported or opposed his regime; potential supporters and competitors within and between those systems; external actors and their strategies; and a description of the future role of Iraq within the region. Furthermore, considering factors such as the identification of US interests in Iraq, in the region, and globally at that time, along with the risk associated with acting or not acting, would add additional granularity to the environmental frame.

Understanding the operational environment begins with analyzing the context of the situation in accordance with guidance and direction from a higher authority. An understanding of the current and projected environment, why some aspects of it are unacceptable, and the desired outcome are necessary to a valid design. Commanders and their staffs review relevant directives, previous guidance, and missions and inform their higher authority of new information or differences in the initial understanding of the environment. Commanders and staffs also confirm the desired end state, if provided by the higher authority, or propose their own.

When discussing current conditions in relation to desired conditions, the dynamic nature of the environment must be understood. Left alone, the environment would progress toward some future condition, either in rational and predictable ways, or else in irrational and chaotic ways. Some environmental conditions would be desirable from a US perspective, whereas others would be undesirable or perhaps neutral. The shift in US strategy to ‘shape’ those future conditions sets in motion the requirement for US forces to conduct operations worldwide. These operations or activities are attempts to reinforce positive environmental conditions, and mitigate or eliminate undesirable ones. Our actions, predicated upon national interests and acceptable risk, are re-evaluated over time as conditions change.

Just as the US desires certain conditions, individuals, groups, organizations, and other nation-states have similar desires based upon their own particular circumstances and interests. Some of those desired conditions parallel our own desires, whereas others diverge or are in direct opposition. As
the US acts in its self interest, the environment (depending upon the interactions between the interests in question) reacts or responds accordingly. Hence, the environment and the environmental frame are in a constant state of flux. Depending upon the nature of the environmental change, planners may need to re-evaluate the problem and solution frames.

**The Problem Frame**

The problem frame refines the environmental frame, and defines the areas for action to transform existing conditions into desired conditions. The problem frame extends beyond analyzing interactions and relationships in the environment. It identifies areas of tension and competition – as well as opportunities and challenges – that commanders must address to transform current conditions into desired conditions. Tension is the difference between the existing conditions and the desired conditions, which are most likely in conflict with others’ desires as well as the natural environmental tendencies. This tension is further exacerbated by the resistance or friction between actors or within the environment that often provides the basis for the problem’s root
cause or driver identification. The commander and staff identify the root causes by analyzing the relevant actors’ tendencies and potential actions.

In the problem frame, analysis identifies the positive and negative implications of acting upon the root causes in the operational environment given the differences between existing and desired conditions. When the commander and staff take action within the operational environment, they may exacerbate the root cause. Root causes identification is vital to transforming existing conditions and is exploited to drive change. If left unchecked, other tensions may undermine the transformation and must be addressed appropriately. As tensions arise from differences in perceptions, goals, and capabilities among relevant actors, they are inherently problematic and can both foster and impede transformation. By deciding how to address these tensions, the commander sets the problem that the design will ultimately solve. The root cause may not be solvable in the proposed time frame nor may the resultant conditions of its removal be acceptable. As a result, commanders must be willing to take an indirect approach to the problem by addressing conditions that minimize the effects of the root cause.

**The Solution Frame**

The solution frame is a conceptualization of the general actions that will produce the conditions defining the desired end state. In developing operational approaches, commanders consider the direct or indirect nature of interaction with relevant actors and operational variables in the operational environment. As commanders consider various approaches, they evaluate the types of defeat or stability mechanisms that may reduce the tensions between potential conditions that can define the end state. Thus, the solution frame enables commanders to visualize and describe possible combinations of actions to reach the desired end state given the tensions identified in the environmental and problem frames. During courses of action development in detailed planning, the solution frame provides the logic that underpins the unique combinations of tasks required to achieve the desired end state.

One method to depict the solution frame is to use the elements of operational design, specifically logical Lines of Operations (LOO), which depict the links among tasks, objectives, conditions, and the desired end state. Design offers the latitude to portray the solution frame in a manner that best communicates its structure through a graphic depiction. Ultimately, the commander determines the optimal method to address the solution. To ensure the operational approach is understood, a detailed narrative must accompany the LOOs. For example, further clarification of a LOO entitled **Engage Libya** explains the current political, social, and military conditions within Libya that necessitate current and future engagement with the ultimate objective of developing Libya as an active US partner in the region. The LOOs and associated elements facilitate the visualization of a detailed cognitive process.

**Design as Applied to Strategy and Planning**

Strategies and plans are a reaction to or are in anticipation of a potential adverse environmental stimulus, and link ends, ways, and means to address identified problems. As such, the application of the design methodology to either a strategy or plan is appropriate. In fact, design, with its foundation squarely derived from the concept of ill-structured problems, is most appropriately applied in the strategic context.
One of the key elements to understanding the nature of the environmental and problem frames is a comprehensive understanding of a requirement for the strategy or plan in the first place. The President or Secretary of Defense must make a value judgment that something within the environment is significant enough to require the use of one or all of the elements of national power. Along with that value judgment should be a description of the breadth and depth of the intended strategy or plan. Without a clear understanding of the inherent relationships and tensions within the environment and an appreciation for the level of national interest and associated risk, a poorly-scoped mission intended for a short duration can quickly become a long-term effort costing lives, resources, and opportunities. Subsequently, this limits the ability to act within the environment when more vital national interests are at stake.

Applying Design to Operational Planning

How design is accomplished is the fundamental question. In the environmental frame, value judgments determine whether a problem exists, and are made again when considering a response. Understanding that the level of interest of those espoused values can change over time due to a number of factors will affect the very nature of the environmental frame.

The first step is to frame the environment by describing the context of the current situation. Using a framework such as PME3, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment helps provide an initial structure to build a cognitive map of the environment.26 As planners understand systems and relationships, they can develop a common understanding by using maps that visually depict those relationships. Inherent within the current environment is the concept of time: history provides an understanding of current actors and their relationships and an understanding of environmental trends provides possible futuristic scenarios. Considerations incorporated within this framework include US domestic and international factors, including worldwide operations and the level of interest and risk associated with each.

An analysis of strategic direction must occur as that guidance applies value to specific aspects of the environment. Guidance provides the limits of the operational environment by applying constraints, restraints,27 and other limitations through the issuance of orders, policy, and law. The current conditions, strategic guidance, stated values, and desired end state assist in establishing the limits of the environmental frame.

As a result of the analysis and assessments performed in the environmental frame, the problem frame is a natural continuation of that process. The difference between our desired conditions and the desired conditions of others provides the breadth and depth of the problem. In some instances, keeping the status quo is desired, whereas in others, given time and resource constraints, only a subset of those desired conditions can be addressed. The environmental frame describes the actors, trends, tendencies, potentials, and relationships within the environment that have equities in any potential solution. As planners address the differences in potential conditions, those tensions create patterns of support and opposition to any proposed solution. The participants’ relationship to the problems defines the level of support or opposition to any proposed solution.

If the problem frame is acceptable to higher command authorities, the solution frame is addressed by planners. Any potential action must take time, space, resources, risk, level of national interest, and purpose into consideration when developed. Given those variables within any solution, the planner may determine that there is insufficient time or resources available to create the desired conditions or that their cost is excessive. If so, modification of the guidance must occur in some form, to include limiting desired expectations, dedicating additional assets and resources, or reevaluating the costs, benefits, and risks. For example, if the planners for Operation Iraqi Freedom had determined that the US would still be in Iraq eight years later at the cost of hundreds of billions of dollars, perhaps strategic leadership would have re-evaluated the costs, benefits, and risks and determined that more limited objectives may have been more desirable.

Figure 1 represents a visual depiction of the relationships between the frames and some of their major components. Describing and understanding the existing conditions within the environmental frame is the first step in the process. As consideration is given to the problem and solution frames, planners must keep in mind the relationship to and the impact upon the environmental frame of any activity and the subsequent impact upon those two frames.

An Approach to Design Application28

Developing these three frames through a problem-solving framework forms the basis for a strategy or plan design concept, and will provide the necessary details for the narrative and graphics needed for a fully fleshed out plan. The problem statement generated during problem framing communicates the commander’s understanding of the problem upon which the organization will act. Together, these three frames are part of an iterative process that occurs throughout strategy or plan development.

Framing and Reframing

The concept of design uses the terms ‘framing’ and ‘reframing’ to describe the process through which one attempts to apply some order to the environment, problem, and potential solutions. An iterative process that considers the interactive and reactive nature of the environment, as well as the effects any proposed or actual actions have on that environment, connects these frames. The very nature of this process requires an in-depth deductive analysis or framing of the environment to identify and understand the basic components of the system in question and the supporting or connected systems. The initial framing of the environment and the value judgments applied to the level of acceptability of current conditions constitutes the “framing of the problem,”29 and occurs in the mission analysis step of JOPP.

As planners identify potential problems and consider potential solutions, there is a need for increased specificity of the environment to meet those demands. As a system is broken
down for greater understanding, inconsistencies and ambiguities are found that render our previous understanding inaccurate or false. Just as it seems chaos is the only result of this process, the modification of the system imposes order. This modified system pieces together patterns and ideas into a generalized concept that enables greater understanding of the underlying chaos. This cyclical process could continue in perpetuity in pursuit of ‘perfect’ knowledge, so commanders determine the degree of knowledge necessary to satisfy the basic goal.

Reframing occurs when any change in the environment or understanding of the problem significantly refines or causes one to discard the hypotheses or models that form the basis of the design concept. Just as the environmental frame is always evolving, the problem and solution frames must also evolve. Reframing criteria support the commander’s ability to understand, learn, and adapt—and cues commanders to rethink their understanding of the operational environment, the problem, and potential approaches.

Problem Framing/Reframing as Applied to the Elements of Operational Design

To understand ‘conditions’ and related terms as used here, a few definitions are in order. Conditions are not currently an element of operational design nor is the term defined in Joint Publication 5-0. Conditions are, however, defined in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance.” Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, does not use the term ‘conditions’ when describing the environment, but does use the phrase “characteristics of the operational environment.” In short, when contemplating the use of the current elements of operational design, conditions are those characteristics that exist within the environment.

The elements of operational design may be used in part or in sum in any of the three frames. For example, in the initial framing of the environment, the assessment describes the current conditions and desired end state. The problem frame further incorporates many of the design elements, such as objectives, termination criteria, center of gravity, and some of the decisive points (DP). The solution frame forms the operational approach and will typically use many of the remaining elements, such as effects, DPs, direct/indirect approach, LOOs, and others. The symbiotic nature of the operational approach to the problem and environmental frames, however, requires the planner to apply the elements of design in an iterative fashion as the frames are addressed. In addition, as each situation is essentially unique, planners may need to creatively adapt some of the terms to fit the situation, which represents the flexibility and adaptability required within complex problem-solving.

The Relationship between Design and Assessments

Assessments are defined as “… a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplish-
Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Assessments, an integral part of design and any planning effort, historically have focused upon the adversary and have failed to address the population, the economy, and other aspects of a dynamic environment that make up a wicked problem. Typically, only after the planners have developed potential courses of action and the commander has selected one for execution is an assessment strategy developed. By that point, planners have missed not only the opportunity to provide the right mechanisms for assessing the outcomes of the planned activities, but also the opportunity to further understand the environment and nature of the problem through operational research. Typically, planners view assessments as a formal ‘after-the-fact’ activity. In reality, assessments are made throughout the entire planning and execution processes. For example, an initial assessment of an undesirable condition within the operating environment requires a prior baseline assessment to make a value judgment that will drive operations. Assessments come in many forms: formal, informal, internal, external, subjective, and objective, to name just a few.

Assessments are a critical component of design because they are the only way to define the initial problem and to anticipate, create, and recognize change, opportunities, and transitions. Throughout the design process and any operations planning process, planners must recognize and exploit assessment opportunities. Understanding the iterative nature of both the design concept and the operations planning process will provide planners myriad opportunities to frame and reframe the problem to ensure they are solving the right problems.

Conclusion

Without a peer competitor on the immediate horizon, the US has shifted its focus to a shaping strategy that relies upon influencing events today so that major combat operations are unnecessary in the future. Inherent within this strategy is a need to understand the global strategic environment, the actors, trends, and other influences either in support of or in opposition to our efforts. By far, the majority of future military operations will encompass complex ill-structured problems. Commanders and staffs must be able to integrate the whole of the US Government to shape the environment properly in pursuit of US goals and interests.

The concept of design relies upon systems thinking and offers a way to apply strategic thinking to more accurately visualize the operating environment. Through its three frames, design assists the commander and staff with a better understanding of current and desired conditions so that operational art can be more effectively employed in the development of force employment options. The iterative nature of the design method – intrinsic to the traditional planning processes – provides the commander with a continual assessment of the environment, problems, and solutions and their interactive relationships focusing efforts on solving the right problem. Without the unique perspective offered by design, the linkages between the environment, problem and solution within a complex environment are typically poorly or improperly defined.

Design will never overcome uncertainty or chaos, but it will help the planner understand the interactive and changing...
nature of the types of environments within which US forces will operate in the future. Knowing how to apply these concepts in the development of a strategy or plan and understanding the symbiotic relationship of design elements will go a long way in ensuring that a plan, although perhaps not ‘right,’ is at least not making the situation worse. Often when addressing wicked problems ‘good enough’ will be as good as it gets. We may not, however, even reach ‘good enough’ if we fail to embrace the process of design.

NOTES

4. Joint Publication 5-0, iv-3.
5. Joint Publication 5-0, xvi.

8. Ibid., pp. 157-160. Rittel and Webber discuss the meaning of ‘wicked’ and explain that it is intended to convey a meaning similar to “tricky (like a leprechaun)” or “vicious (like a circle)” and is not intended to imply maliciousness.
9. The most recent published document is the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, The United States Army Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, Version 1.0, 28 January 2008. The soon-to-be-released DRAFT Field Manual 5-0 incorporates these ideas and further expands upon them. The initial draft of Joint publication 5-0 incorporates many of the same concepts and ideas.
10. Rittel and Webber, p. 160. Rittel and Webber use the term ‘wicked’ to describe problems that urban planners typically encounter, specifically social and/or policy planning, and the elusive search for solutions to these ill-structured problems. They identified at least ten distinguishing characteristics of planning-type problems and apply the term ‘wicked’ to illustrate the complexity of the issues.
11. Jeff Conklin. Rittel and Webber first used the term ‘tame’ to describe those problems in contrast to wicked problems, but did not provide a definition or examples of such problems. Conklin defined a tame problem and provided the six characteristics of such problems mentioned above.
12. Rittel and Webber describe social problems and other governmental planning issues as public policy issues, p. 160.
13. Ibid.
15. Rittel and Webber, p. 155.
18. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, p. 6.
20. Ibid., p. 97.
23. The 11 December 2009 DRAFT Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, depicts another school of thought on “framing and reframing” and takes the position that reframing occurs only after a significant change to the environment or that the potential solution and the potential solution being implemented and the hypothesis of action upon which the solution is based is shown to be invalid or incomplete, III-20 – III-21.
25. Ibid., p. 39.
29. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 defines “frame” as 1. To form, constitution, or structure in general; system; order; 2. To contrive, devise, or compose, as a plan, law, or poem: to frame a new constitution; 3. To conceive or imagine, as an idea.
32. Conditions should be added to the list of elements of operational design because of this central feature that they play in design and in the definition of other elements. In addition, the understanding of effects would be greatly enhanced as it would limit the use of effects to one definition and one contextual application.
34. Joint Publication 5-0, III-57.
GOUZENKO TO GORBACHEV: CANADA’S COLD WAR

by J.L. Granatstein

Introduction

For Canadians, the Cold War was a matter of great importance—some of the time. For them, it began in September 1945 with the defection of Soviet embassy cipher officer Igor Gouzenko and revelations of major Soviet spy rings in Canada. Moscow’s brutalist policies under Stalin did nothing to ease growing concerns. Because they shared a continent with the superpower leading the democracies, their largest trading partner and ‘best friend,’ they soon found themselves living under the flight path for bombers and missiles from the Soviet Union, and that sharpened the collective mind and pushed them toward continued military cooperation with the United States. At the same time, Canada’s two mother countries, Britain and France, and nations such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy that Canadians had fought to liberate, were under threat from what was generally perceived as an expansionist Soviet Communism. These and economic concerns led to a newly internationalist Canada being an enthusiastic supporter of a North Atlantic Treaty, and the first peacetime stationing of troops abroad. In Asia, the Hong Kong debacle of 1941 aside, Canada had never been active until the Korean War opened another front in the ‘Cold’ War. Again Canadians participated with troops.

Defence spending rose sharply in a booming economy, but very soon, pressures began to arise. There were widespread concerns about U.S. policy, Canadian nationalists and anti-Americans began to ‘kick against the pricks,’ and demands for expensive and expansive domestic social welfare policies led to pressures for defence cuts. By 1968 and the advent of Pierre Trudeau as prime minister, the calls for foreign policy change had become unstoppable, and until the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev and the subsequent demise of the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of limited cooperation with Alliance partners, defence spending cutbacks, and planned military obsolescence. The Cold War if necessary, therefore, but not necessarily the Cold War, or, at least, not all Cold War all the time...

Beginnings

The Canadian view of the origins of the Cold War was stark and focussed. “The chief menace now,” Lester Pearson said in 1948, the year he left the foreign service to enter the

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Cabinet as Secretary of State for External Affairs, “is subversive aggressive Communism, the servant of power politics… Our frontier now is not even on the Rhine or rivers further east. It is wherever free men are struggling against totalitarian tyranny,” wherever the “struggle of free, expanding progressive democracy against tyrannical and reactionary communism was being fought.”1 Pearson had a subtle mind, but to him, the conflict was one painted in black and white. “Western democratic governments have no aggressive or imperialistic designs,” he said a decade later. “This is as true of the most powerful, the United States of America, as it is of…Iceland…. Americans are not by nature or desire wandering empire builders….They are homebodies, and their ‘westerns’ give them an adequate if vicarious sense of adventure.”2 For remarks offered in 1958, these might charitably be described as naïve or at best hopeful, and Pearson knew better.

On the other hand, when he was asked if it were better to be ‘dead than red,’ Pearson sensibly refused to agree, something that was used by political opponents to paint him as soft on Communism for decades.

Pearson had been shaped by his personal experiences. He had served overseas in the Great War, and as a young diplomat during the disillusioning 1930s. He had watched the democracies crumble in the face of the dictators, and, as a senior official, he had cheered as the United States had stepped forward—with substantial help from the British Commonwealth, and, especially, the Soviet Union—to save freedom and democracy. To him, to his generation of Canadians, the only way democracy could be saved from the new totalitarian threat was if the Americans, sometimes much too reluctant in Canadian eyes, could be encouraged to accept their responsibilities for world power. If they could, Canadians and others would participate in helping to create a Pax Americana. The involvement of the United States was the sine qua non in preserving the free world—that was an article of faith.

Canadians knew this, but as neighbours of the United States, they had their concerns. Britain’s economic and military weakness in 1940 and 1941 had forced Ottawa into its first military alliance with the U.S., the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), created at Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940. That meant that the growing Canadian armed forces could put all their efforts into the defence of Britain, sure that the United States would protect their home base. A few months later, Canada’s Mackenzie King struck an economic arrangement with Franklin Roosevelt that let Canada avoid taking Lend-Lease, something no-one wanted for fear of the future economic power this would give Washington over Canada. Instead, FDR agreed to cover Canada’s shortage of American dollars, the only hard currency in the world, in other ways, notably by buying more raw materials. The result was much the same. By the coming of the peace, Canada’s only postwar commercial market was the U.S., with virtually all of the nation’s trade with other nations being financed by Canadian loans and grants.3

**Post-War Realities**

Ottawa’s post-hostilities planners had watched carefully as the strains on the wartime Grand Alliance festered and developed over issues such as Poland. They understood that if they developed into open antagonism, Canada’s geographical position and economic situation meant that neutrality was not an option. Nor could Canada any longer rely upon Britain for protection. Canada had to be aligned with the United States. The Gouzenko case made this clear.
Igor Gouzenko fled the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with a sheaf of carefully selected documents just weeks after the atomic bombs brought the Second World War to its ghastly end. His telegrams and memos made evident that the GRU, Soviet military intelligence, had spies in Parliament, the Canadian civil service, and the military, in the British High Commission, and in scientific establishments, including those working on atomic research. Gouzenko knew of additional spy rings run by the NKVD, he told his interrogators what he knew of rings in the U.S., and his accounts eventually led to the outing of Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.4

Gouzenko mattered. First, his defection and his documents, made public in February 1946, and the subject of an extraordinary Royal Commission investigation, demonstrated that the wartime friendship between the Soviets and the West was over. Indeed, it demonstrated that Moscow’s war against the capitalist democracies had not even been put on hold during the struggle against Hitler. Second, for Canadians accustomed to being a backwater of little importance, Gouzenko demonstrated that Canada was ‘a player,’ a nation worth spying upon for nuclear and scientific secrets, as well as for details on British and American policy. Third, his documents showed that the assumptions of loyalty and trust that had been assumed to bind those working for government had been misplaced. Now, ideas and ideology had to be probed; now, positive vetting had to be put in place; now, character weaknesses began to be rooted out. It took time to implement this modest variant of McCarthyism, but before the end of the 1940s, some public servants’ careers had been ruined, and some had been hounded out of the bureaucracy.5 One diplomat, Herbert Norman, the Ambassador to Egypt, had been driven to suicide by ‘witch-hunting’ U.S. congressmen, convinced—correctly—that he had been a Communist, and fearful he might have been a ‘mole.’6 By the mid-to-late-1950s, homosexuals also had been singled out and forced from senior positions, not least in the Department of External Affairs.7 There was some irony in this. The Department of External Affairs, believing that Stalinist Moscow was a posting too dreadful for married diplomats with families, had sent three successive single men—all closet homosexuals—to Canada’s embassy in the late-1940s and early-1950s. All had been targeted by the KGB, apparently with only limited success.8

The Gouzenko case had altered attitudes, helping to shift Canadians away from their heartfelt admiration for the Red Army’s extraordinary fight against the Wehrmacht. The revelations of spying had been manipulated to point to a Communist and Soviet threat. To be sure, the Royal Commission report on the Gouzenko case was written in a reader-friendly way (by an officer from External Affairs), the press making much of it, and anti-Communists and anti-socialists using it as a weapon. But Gouzenko was not a Canadian creation. Moscow had committed the espionage—and it publicly admitted this, however unlikely that might seem. Moreover, Stalin’s acts in Eastern Europe and his representatives’ actions in various postwar forums hardly stressed eternal friendship. There is blame enough to go around with respect to the origins of the Cold War, but Canada has none, and Moscow, of the Great Powers, carries ‘the lion’s share.’9

Moving Along

Those in Canada who had anticipated that the new United Nations could enforce collective security on an unruly world had seen most of their hopes shattered within a few years by Soviet obstruction and the wielding of the veto in the Security Council. That was depressing enough, but Moscow’s pressure on Iran and Greece, its swallowing of Eastern Europe, especially the crushing of Czechoslovakian independence, and soon, the triumph of Mao Tse-tung’s Communism in China, made all deeply concerned for the future. Josef Stalin’s speech in Moscow in February 1946, one week before the Gouzenko case became public, declaring capitalism and Communism incompatible, and pointing to the inevitability of another war, added to the growing unease.10 What frightened Canadians and others silly, however, was the fear that Communist parties might come to power in free elections in Italy and France. The West, the democracies, had to be spiritually rearmed and made ready to resist the ‘Red tide.’ Perhaps, just perhaps, the democracies could create a new alliance for collective security to replace the veto-prone ‘talk shop’ that the UN had quickly become.

The first stage in this process was the Marshall Plan. The European economies lay in ruins, their cities shattered, food scarce and rationed, and the will to re-establish pre-war patterns of life not much in evidence. Only the Communist parties flourished, and the view in the U.S. State Department - and in Ottawa - was that only American aid could turn the tide. The United States had already stepped in to
assist Greece, proclaiming the Truman Doctrine as the way to help a faltering government and to replace Britain, economically too impoverished by war and reconstruction, to continue its efforts there. On 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall told a Harvard University convocation that the European countries should create a collective plan for reconstruction, and he put a proposal for assistance before the United States. The road to Europe’s economic salvation had been discerned.

Canada’s as well. Like the U.S. and a few other countries that had not been devastated by war, Canada had emerged in 1945 economically and politically far stronger than it had been when it went to war. The nation’s armed forces had fought well, and that conveyed prestige and power. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had doubled, its industries boomed, and its well-fed people had money in the bank. But Ottawa knew this privileged position could not last without markets for the nation’s goods. The government had tried hard to re-build its British and European markets. A 1946 loan of $1.25 billion at two percent to Britain (especially when compared to the U.S. loan of $3.75 billion), and of $600 million to other trading partners was simply huge in Canadian terms, the country’s GDP being only $11 billion.

But American dollars, the world’s hard currency, again were growing scarce all over the globe. In Canada, the developing crisis was precipitated by soaring imports of everything from jukeboxes, to oranges, to consumer goods, as Canadians tried to spend the money that wartime wages and unlimited overtime had let them save. In 1947, Canada had no choice except to impose import restrictions upon American products to try to conserve its dollar supplies. The Marshall Plan, if the U.S. could be persuaded to allow ‘off-shore procurement’ in its provisions, could resolve much of the Canadian difficulty. France, say, which had too few dollars to buy Canadian goods, could pay with Marshall funds, and Canada would both sell trade goods and increase its holdings of American dollars. There was much struggle along the way, but off-shore procurement eventually ‘saved Canada’s bacon’ - and its wheat exports too - by authorizing purchases of U.S. $1.1 billion in Canada.

But for a superpower supposedly poised to step in to save the world and scoop up the rewards, the U.S. - at least according to the way Canadian diplomats in Washington saw it - seemed remarkably reluctant to approve the Marshall Plan. Senators and congressmen objected to bailing out the Europeans, and, if they had to do that, then, they said, every penny must benefit American farmers and workers, not Canadians. Still, events drove the agenda. The Communists seized control in Prague in February 1948. The next month, General Lucius Clay, commanding the U.S. Zone in Germany, sent a message to Washington that seemed to suggest war with the Soviet Union was imminent. In March, President Truman asked Congress to implement conscription, and overseas, the Brussels Pact was signed, linking Britain, France, and the Low
Countries. The Berlin Airlift soon began, with Canada declining to provide either aircraft or crews. The first preliminary discussions for a North Atlantic Treaty began. The drumbeats for war with the Russians were increasing in tempo. But Republican Senator Robert Taft and his isolationist friends still balked at American engagement in Europe, and Canadians feared the United States might yet fall back into its “prewar aloofness.”

Canadian Ambassador Hume Wrong, a man with a ‘steel-trap mind,’ and, as a lifelong friend of Dean Acheson, the very best of contacts in Washington, shrewdly observed in September 1947: “There is truth in the paradox that, to secure the adoption of a plan for world economic recovery, it is necessary to emphasize the division of the world between the Soviet bloc and the rest.” Frighten the American people, in other words. A few months later, the ambassador added: “The contest between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is providing the necessary popular foundation for a vigorous foreign policy and it has put those leaders who still possess strong isolationist leanings, such as Senator Taft and Speaker Martin, in the position of opening themselves to charges of lack of patriotism if they attack the general trend; they are therefore reduced to the role of critics of its details.” Wrong understood that the ‘whipping up’ of anti-communist hysteria was unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable in the American context. Certainly, such excesses were useful. For example, he reported to Ottawa: “... they are part of the price to be paid for the Marshall Plan.”

Enter NATO

Indeed, a trans-Atlantic alliance held out the possibility of resolving one of the great Canadian dilemmas. Norman Robertson, the Canadian High Commissioner in London and the most far-sighted of Canadian officials, wrote, in April 1948: “A situation in which our special relationship with the United Kingdom can be identified with our special relationships with other countries in western Europe and in which the United States will be providing a firm basis, both economically and probably militarily, seems to me such a providential solution for so many of our problems that we should go to great lengths... to ensure our proper place in this new partnership.” The North Atlantic Triangle was very much in Robertson’s mind.

The negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty is a large subject. What needs to be said is that Canada, perhaps instinctively, as suggested by Robertson, sought to broaden the discussions to include economic clauses. Robertson was the initiator of the idea of Article 2 of the Treaty. How could nations unite for defence, he asked, if they fought trade wars against each other? How much better if the new alliance included a clause binding the parties “… to make every effort... to eliminate conflict in their economic policies and to develop to the full the great possibilities of trade between them.”

A version of Robertson’s formulation eventually was included in the Treaty, a tribute to the negotiating skills of Ambassador Wrong in Washington. Lester Pearson noted that there were domestic political reasons behind Article 2: “We did not think that the Canadian people, especially in Quebec, would wholeheartedly take on far-reaching external commitments if they were exclusively military in character.” But no party to the Treaty other than the Canadians wanted Article 2, and the Americans, in particular, worried sick about what they saw as the almost insurmountable difficulty of securing public and Congressional support for a peacetime military alliance, wanted nothing to do with a trade clause that might threaten the treaty for no important benefit. As Dean Acheson, becoming Secretary of State at the beginning of 1949 put it: “The plain fact … is that NATO is a military alliance.” Article 2, to him, was “… typical Canadian moralizing that meant ‘next to
He was right, and Hume Wrong, the Canadian negotiator, knew it. For all the successful Canadian efforts, for all that Acheson began to characterize the Canadian demands as coming (with due deference to William Wordsworth) from “The Stern Daughter of the Voice of God.” Article 2, in the end, in fact, amounted to nothing.

War by another Name

Neither did the Canadian signature on the North Atlantic Treaty, at least not immediately. Signing on in April 1949, Canada did nothing very much to improve its armed forces, to rearm, or substantially to increase defence spending. The Defence budget in 1947 was $227 million, in 1948, $236 million, in 1949, $361 million, and in 1950, $493 million, satisfactory increases, but nothing to suggest urgency to create a great host. The Korean War, beginning in June 1950, changed everything, especially the Chinese intervention in December 1950 that drove the UN forces reeling to the south. The Communist attack, and the winter 1950-1951 defeat in Korea led to fears in Western capitals that the Soviet Union, now with nuclear weapons in its arsenal, was turning to military aggression to achieve its goals, and that Europe might be next. For Canada, that led to the dispatch of an army brigade group to Korea and a second brigade group and an air division of fighter aircraft, more than ten thousand troops in all, to Europe in 1951.

At the same time as it was fighting on the Korean peninsula, for the first time in its history, Canada began to create an effective, well-equipped, professional military. Defence spending in 1951 was $1.16 billion; the next year, it was $1.8 billion or 7.5 percent of GDP, and in 1953-1954, the Canadian Forces, now with a regular force strength of 118,000 personnel, received $1.9 billion, or 7.6 percent of Canada’s GDP of just above $25 billion. Such figures were huge for Canada, but small beside the enormous sums Washington was devoting to defence.

Clearly, Stalin had made a huge error in giving Pyongyang the go-ahead to strike south. As Escott Reid, a senior External Affairs official in Ottawa and one of the originators of the idea of the North Atlantic Treaty, told a journalist friend, there were two key events that had saved the world: “... the intervention in Korea and the defeat of the U.N. army. Had it not been for these events, the West would never have faced up to rearmament,” he maintained correctly.

At the same time, Canadian policymakers had real concerns about American leadership. Writing in May 1948, Pearson noted that, in the event of war, the United States would be the dominant partner, but, he said, if the Western European countries are not occupied, they will be able to make some effective contribution to the political direction of the war. “I have more confidence in the wisdom of their political views,” he said, “than in the wisdom of the political views of the United States....” NATO and the ‘police action’ in Korea had been designed to contain the Soviet Union. In Canadian eyes, however, containing the United States was also necessary, and disputes between Ottawa and Washington over the conduct of the Korean War, and the possibility of a negotiated armistice to end it, sometimes became very sharp. The Americans, bearing the heaviest burdens of the war, resented being told how the war should be fought by the Canadians, who had a single brigade and a handful of ships committed to the struggle. Pearson expressed the frustrations best in a speech in April 1951. The United Nations was not the instrument of any one country, and Canada had the right to criticize American actions, “... if we feel it necessary. The days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbour are, I think, over.” Now the Canadian concern was not “... whether the United States will discharge her international responsibilities, but how she will do it and whether the rest of us will be involved.”
The Liberal government led by Louis St. Laurent, a francophone lawyer from Quebec City, that had taken Canada into NATO and Korea, was genuinely committed to the alliance and to the Cold War. For a francophone prime minister to act this way so soon after the manpower crises of wartime was highly unusual, and it demonstrated, to use one Australian’s acerbic description, that he was not, “… a neurotically-introverted, isolationist Quebecois,” a “millstone perpetually limiting Canadian freedom of action in strategic affairs.” Far from it: St. Laurent’s internationalist foreign and defence policies were not cheered in a Quebec that historically was suspicious of the military and of overseas commitments, but his French Canadian compatriots trusted his judgment, and gave him big majorities in three successive elections. To the prime minister, the Soviets and Mao’s Communists were a threat to Canadian and Western interests, and, indeed, all three mainstream political parties in Canada agreed with this stance with varying degrees of enthusiasm during the 1950s. Moreover, despite its general lack of interest in Asia, the Canadian government saw it as a duty to respond positively when asked—without any prior notice from the powers involved—to send military officers and diplomats to Indo-China in 1954 to serve on the International Control Commissions. This burdensome quasi-peacekeeping role later proved a blessing when the Vietnam War exploded into a major confrontation, and Canada could say that the ICC, continuing to work ineffectually while the fighting went on, prevented it from joining the United States in the war. As it was, Canadians on the ICC provided intelligence to the U.S., and the nation’s diplomats carried ‘carrot-and-stick’ messages between Washington and Hanoi.

St. Laurent’s Canada believed that there were virtues in accepting reality. For one thing, despite opposition in Washington, it had been on the verge of recognizing Beijing when China intervened in Korea. It wanted to talk to the Soviets, and Foreign Minister Pearson was the first NATO leader to visit Moscow in October 1955, where he was abused roundly by Nikita Khrushchev for the sins of the West, while he and all his party ‘got thoroughly sozzled’ on the endless toasts offered by their hosts. And St. Laurent and Pearson worked hard at the United Nations to rescue Britain and France, mother countries and NATO partners, from the consequences of their folly in ineptly invading Egypt in collusion with the Israelis in the fall of 1956. As a Western power, as a member of NATO, Canada had a vital national interest in trying to repair the split between Britain and France, the aggressors, and the United States. Canada’s actions were directed as much to repairing the breach among allies, as to restoring peace in the area. Indeed, the two goals were positively inseparable. That the Suez Crisis occurred at the same time as the Hungarian revolt and the Soviets’ brutal intervention, that it took place during an American presidential election, only compounded the difficulties. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts at saving the world and, not least, the NATO alliance, but the Canadian public, unhappy that Canada had turned its back on London and Paris, voted the Liberals out of power at the first opportunity.
New Blood

The new Progressive Conservative Prime Minister, the lawyer and Prairie populist John Diefenbaker, was militantly anti-Communist. Unfortunately, he also proved to be virulently anti-American, falling into difficulties with President John Kennedy that turned primarily around nuclear weapons. In 1957-1958, Canada and the U.S. had created the North American Air Defence Command to combine and coordinate their air defences against Soviet bombers with their nuclear payloads. NORAD was readily agreed to by ‘the Chief,’ as he liked to be called, but this soon became the cause of political difficulty. Was it part of NATO, as Diefenbaker claimed, or was it not, as the Pentagon argued? Then, in 1959, Diefenbaker cancelled work on the CF-105 Avro Arrow, much to his political cost, and instead decided to acquire U.S.-made Bomarc surface-to-air missiles to defend Canada and the northeastern United States against Soviet bombers. The Bomarcs, as well as newly acquired surface-to-surface Honest John missiles and CF-104 Starfighter Strike fighters for the Canadian contingent in NATO, were effective only when armed with nuclear warheads. In 1959, no-one appeared to notice the warheads question. By 1962, however, Diefenbaker’s government, now a minority, began to be torn apart by the ‘nuclear yes/nuclear no’ question, and public opinion, pushed hard by peace groups, was divided, but still supportive of acquiring the warheads. The U.S. administrations of Eisenhower and Kennedy had watched angrily as Canada tried to scoop up the Cuban trade that U.S. companies lost after Fidel Castro came to power in Havana, and the Kennedy Pentagon was furious that there was a hole in their northern defences, while Diefenbaker delayed a decision with respect to accepting the nuclear warheads he had earlier wanted. Matters worsened dramatically during the sharpest crisis of the Cold War, when complete prime ministerial indecision during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 resulted in serious delays in putting Canadian interceptors in NORAD on alert. In fact, the Minister of National Defence (MND) acted on his own in ordering a full alert, while naval commanders put their ships to sea to shadow Soviet submarines on their own responsibility. The result, with White House approval, was the issuing of a press release by the State Department that delineated Diefenbaker’s wavering and parsed his speeches for inconsistencies and outright lies. Within days, the Cabinet splintered, the government fell early in 1963, and after a brilliantly mendacious anti-American campaign that almost carried the day, Diefenbaker was gone.

More Changes

The new Prime Minister, Liberal Lester B. Pearson, accepted the nuclear weapons, and everyone expected continental harmony to reign anew. But soon, Kennedy was dead, Lyndon Johnson was in office, and the Vietnam War became messier. Some of Pearson’s ministers were every bit as anti-nuclear weapons and anti-American as Diefenbaker had been, the Finance Minister Walter Gordon in particular. Gordon wanted to cut the flow of American investment into Canada, failed in his efforts when Canadian businessmen and the U.S. government protested vigorously, and then he turned to the war. Pearson, in fact, had called upon the U.S. to halt the bombing of North Vietnam in a speech in Philadelphia in March 1965, a futile gesture that earned him Johnson’s contempt. “Here are the loyal Germans, always with us when it matters,” LBJ told a gathering of diplomats in Washington, “... and then there are the Canadians...” Canada was not a totally compliant ally - had never been so - and Canadian nationalism, always drawing its strength from magnifying differences with the Americans, flourished. The nuclear stalemate, with its potential doomsday effects if war ever began, reinforced anti-Americanism in Canada, certainly more than it fed anti-Communism.

But Canada was still a ‘helpful fixer,’ ready to send in the peacekeepers when the West’s interests were at stake. In Cyprus in 1964, where Britain had bases and interests in a former colony, two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, were on the verge of war over the island they both wanted to control. Prime Minister Pearson initially was dubious about sending Canadian troops. “Let them cut each other up,” he told Paul Hellyer, his Minister of National Defence. “We certainly won’t go in just to help the British.” A war would have had disastrous effects on NATO’s southern flank, however, quite possibly destroying the alliance, and the Pearson government’s External Affairs Minister Paul Martin went to work on the telephones, calling foreign ministers around the world. The result was the establishment of a UN force. On 13 March 1964, Canada sent an infantry battalion, and UNFICYP, the United Nations Force in Cyprus, ‘hit the ground running.’ This served Canada’s desire to be a peacekeeper, already demonstrated in innumerable missions, but it also saved a critical part of the Western alliance, exactly as had occurred in 1956. Canadian foreign ministers from Pearson’s successor onward began to hope that, if they ‘called in their markers’ in the world capitals and at UN headquarters in New York, they too might create a peacekeeping force and help freeze a crisis. Then, perhaps, a Nobel Peace Prize just might come their way.
After all, it had worked for Lester Pearson, had it not? Did not the Peace Prize help him become Liberal leader and then prime minister? ‘Nobelitis,’ Canadians called it, and not in an unkindly way.

In the decade after Pearson’s Nobel Prize, as the Cold War continued, and as the United States became ever more embroiled in the morass of Vietnam, the Canadian public began to believe as an article of faith that peacekeeping was their métier. We were the world’s master peacekeepers, the indispensable UN players absolutely necessary for each and every mission. The Americans, always bumptious and too aggressive, fought wars, but Canadians, nature’s neutral middlemen, kept the peace. This became a mantra, a powerful idea that successive governments scarcely ever challenged. War was foreign to Canadian thinking, and peacekeeping was the natural role to play. For the public, peacekeeping was ‘do-goodism writ large,’ proof that Canada really was a moral superpower, loved by all. It was also a military role that differentiated Canada from the American focus upon nuclear deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). And if some worried that Canadians were not pulling their military weight in the Cold War, the easy answer was that the nation’s peacekeeping was useful, and it did not require huge armies, large fleets, and vast air forces. Governments liked that low cost factor. Being the globe’s pre-eminent peacekeepers was good for Canadian nationalism, peaking in a frenzy in 1967, the centennial of Canada’s creation, and, ironically, the year that President Nasser tossed UN peacekeepers out of his country, much to Canadian chagrin, just prior to the Six Day War.

The Trudeau Era

This nationalism would reach another peak when the charismatic, stylish, 48-year-old bachelor Pierre Trudeau succeeded Pearson in the spring of 1968. Trudeau opposed Quebec separatism, and he was skeptical of nationalism in all its forms. He was a new man, the fluently bilingual quintessential Canadian, or so many thought in 1968. What Trudeau was, in fact, was typically French Canadian in his attitude to the military, to NATO, and to the Cold War. He was no isolationist, but he was not one to believe in the military, or one to want to take on the difficult global tasks that kept the peace. Puzzlingly, given his views on nationalism, he would become a nationalist icon in English-speaking Canada. Predictably, he would be the key figure in weakening the country’s support for the verities of the Cold War.

Trudeau was a trickster, always looking to shock. As a young civil servant in the Privy Council Office in Ottawa, he opposed Canada’s joining in the Korean War, or sending troops to Europe for NATO. Then, after leaving the public service, he had visited Moscow to attend an economics conference in 1952, telling everyone he was a Communist, something noted by U.S. Embassy officials. He also, at age 41, had tried to paddle a canoe from Florida to Cuba in 1960. Just good fun, his biographer said, as if the fellow-travelling Trudeau had been unaware of U.S. hostility to the new Castro regime. Both of those actions suggested he knew little of the United States, although he had spent a wartime year at Harvard, and perhaps that he was far from convinced that the Soviet Union was a major threat to peace, although Moscow’s repression of the Czech ‘spring’ occurred soon after he took office. He was scornful of Canada’s ‘helpful fixer’ approach to the world, and he claimed to want to shape Canadian policy from national interests.

In fact, what Trudeau wanted was an end to Canada’s nuclear role, to get Canadian troops out of Europe, and to focus the Canadian public and policymakers upon domestic concerns, such as Quebec separatism. His efforts at reducing the NATO role came close to tearing his Cabinet apart in 1969. He and his ministers had examined all the options, among them, astonishingly, and ‘flying square in the face’ of geography, joining the non-aligned group of nations. Finally, the government announced a re-ordering of defence priorities, with NATO ranked third behind the protection of national sovereignty, North American defence, and just ahead of...
peacekeeping. Canada subsequently cut in half its NATO forces in Europe, and announced a phase-out of nuclear weapons. That was enough to gut the air force, and to turn the brigade group, well capable of ‘punching above its weight,’ and a key part of the NATO line in northern Germany, into a weak reserve formation in the rear. A man who had little regard for the military in general, Trudeau also cut the Canadian Forces by 20 percent to 80,000 personnel, and froze the defence budget at $1.8 billion. Ironically, when terrorism erupted in Quebec in October 1970, the military performed well in securing a volatile situation.

Trudeau epitomized the growing feeling in Canada that the Cold War had lasted too long, and it had distorted national priorities. For two decades, Trudeau said: “Canada’s foreign policy was largely its policy in NATO, through NATO.” That was no longer good enough. His government recognized China at last in 1970, and signed a Protocol on Consultations with Moscow, an agreement that Washington feared was a sign that Canada was sliding toward neutrality, a view shared by some in the Cabinet in Ottawa, which, extraordinarily, had not been consulted about the Protocol. As Trudeau put it in Moscow: “Canada has increasingly found it important to diversify its channels of communication because of the overpowering presence of the United States and that is reflected in a growing consciousness amongst Canadians of the danger to our national identity from a cultural, economic and perhaps even from a military point of view.” In Moscow, such rhetoric sounded different than it might have in Moosonee, but most Canadian nationalists loved it. So did the Russians. He visited Castro in Havana in 1973, and shouted “Viva Castro” to end one speech. He visited Beijing in 1973 and expounded on the wonderful system Mao had given his people. It was little wonder that some in Washington believed Trudeau a Communist sympathizer. Then, in 1982, in a speech at Notre Dame University, Trudeau suggested that Canada was edging toward equidistance between the two superpowers, an astonishing comment from the leader of a nation almost wholly dependent for its defence and prosperity upon the United States. That was a mistake. Allan Gotlieb, Canada’s ambassador to Washington who accompanied Trudeau to South Bend, wrote in his diary: “The Americans…don’t like the notion that they and the Soviets are equally responsible for world tensions,” and, Gotlieb added, it offends the policymakers and the elites, “… people we can’t allow ourselves to alienate.”

The period of détente, and the cooling of hostility between the West and the Communist world that Trudeau perhaps had some small part in fostering came to its end with the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the West’s subsequent boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980, and the Soviet shooting down of a Korean airliner in 1983. Trudeau’s response, his time in power coming to a close, was to launch a quixotic peace mission that entailed him travelling the globe, urging the nuclear weapons powers to reduce their arsenals. The Reagan administration distrusted Trudeau and his efforts, and one official at the Canadian embassy in Washington said the Americans “hated” Trudeau’s rhetoric that Canada was good, a peacemaker, and morally equidistant from the “naughty boys” with nuclear weapons. “A leftist high on pot,” one senior Administration official said undiplomatically after Trudeau’s visit to Washington on his quest.

Nonetheless, Trudeau’s pitch to Reagan was not ineffective. “You are a man of peace,” he told the President in the Oval Office, “but your peace signals are not getting through.” Yes, Reagan said, “The press has distorted my image…” There were some signs that presidential rhetoric cooled after Trudeau’s visit, although no American officials believed Trudeau had anything to do with this. Overall, however, the peace mission had little effect. When asked about his impact some years later, however, Trudeau said, with a characteristic shrug, “Well, there was no war.”

Arguably, the most important formative role Trudeau played in easing tensions with Moscow was the friendship he developed with Alexander Yakovlev, Moscow’s ambassador to Canada. Urbane and intelligent, Yakovlev spent a decade in exile in Canada, punishment for his sins in calling for more
effort to integrate Central Asian minorities into the USSR. In May 1983, Yakovlev arranged a ten-day visit to study Canadian agriculture for Mikhail Gorbachev, a rising Central Committee member. It was his first trip to Canada, and one of his few trips to the West, and Gorbachev reportedly was impressed by Canadian agricultural efficiency, and, said one Cabinet minister who escorted him around, by the quantities of food in and the opulence of Canadian supermarkets. Demonstrating that he was something different than the usual Politburo hack, Gorbachev even appeared before a joint meeting of a House of Commons and Senate Committee, a ‘first’ anywhere. The Russian amiably sparred with the Canadian parliamentarians, parrying their criticisms with admissions that the Soviet Union was not perfect. None of the Members of Parliament or Senators ‘laid a glove’ on him.

Trudeau also had lunch and dinner with the visitor, observing later that Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader with whom one could have a free-wheeling conversation. The Canadian defended his own (very reluctant) decision to allow the U.S. to test cruise missiles over Canada, and NATO’s policy with respect to the deployment of missiles in Europe to counter Moscow’s SS-20 deployment. Trudeau told Gorbachev that, while he found President Reagan’s rhetoric distasteful, it would be a mistake to believe that Reagan did not reflect American public opinion. “Trudeau the hardliner,” wrote Ambassador Gotlieb in Washington. “Go figure.” Gorbachev must have been puzzled that Trudeau had not behaved as his briefing notes portrayed him. Coming to power in 1985, the new Soviet leader brought his ambassador to Canada back to Moscow, and made Yakovlev, a proponent of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), one of his key advisors as the Soviet Union began to change course.

End of the Era

The Cold War was not yet finished, however, but Trudeau was indeed finished. He departed in 1984, the Canadian public cheering him to the echo for his still-born peace mission. There was not much reason to cheer, either for the short-term results, or for the long term effects Trudeau had generated. Arguably, his prime ministership—with almost sixteen years in power—almost put paid to Canada’s American alliance. His quasi-neutralist attitudes had led the Americans to all but write off Canada as an ally. The formal alliance ties remained intact, and the efforts by the Canadian Forces to increase interoperability with their American counterparts did not cease. But the sense that there had been a community of interests, that both nations shared a similar sense of the world and its dangers, was gone. To the U.S., to Margaret Thatcher’s Britain, and to NATO, Trudeau’s Canada had seemed to be heading towards neutralism.
Matters could still change, however. John Turner, Trudeau’s lacklustre Liberal successor, lasted only months before losing an election. In charge now was the Progressive Conservative Brian Mulroney, an Irish Quebecker, smooth, charming, unabashedly pro-American, and desirous of “good relations, super relations” with Washington. Mulroney negotiated a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., and won an election on the issue in 1988. He had also promised to restore the Canadian Forces, its equipment increasingly obsolete, its budgets constrained, and there were pledges aplenty made to the public and to the Reagan Administration with which Canada shared responsibility for North American air defence. But huge budget deficits constrained government actions. There were initially cuts instead of increases for the military, and by the time a bright young Minister of National Defence, Perrin Beatty, took over, the Cold War was drawing to an end. Beatty produced a Defence White Paper filled with sharp anti-Soviet language in 1987. Challenge and Commitment called for Canada to have a fleet of ten-to-twelve nuclear submarines ostensibly to protect Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic where American, French, British, and Soviet submarines roamed at will under the polar ice. But would Canadian submarines fire on the intruders? Would they try to sink the U.S. Navy ships? The idea of Canadian nuclear submarines, hugely expensive and sharply opposed by the Americans, who did not want to share their nuclear technology, yet feared Canada might acquire French power plants, ‘disappeared from the table’ as the Berlin Wall came down and the long Cold War drew to its end. So also did Canada’s commitment to the defence of Western Europe. Without consulting their NATO allies, the Conservatives in 1992 announced a total withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe, a process completed in July 1993 at a projected budgetary saving of $2.2 billion. Canada was now committed, but not present, insofar as NATO was concerned.

In fact, Canada had been committed but not psychologically present to the defence of Western Europe, and, indeed, of North America for years. The peace dividend had been cashed in and spent since Trudeau’s NATO cuts of 1969. 

**Summing Up**

Three streams of opinion shaped Canada’s Cold War: internationalism, continentalism, and nationalism. The diplomats, and some of the politicians who took Canada into the Western alliance, were internationalists who believed this was the way to foster a sane nationalism. They were aware, however, that Canada’s economic prosperity and its defence ultimately depended upon the United States, and the scarcity of American dollars and British economic weakness drove Canada southward. So also did Canadian business’ desire for rich, easy-to-sell markets, and a shared North American view of the world. Canadian nationalism, exemplified by John Diefenbaker, and especially Pierre Trudeau, however, looked upon the costs of defence with a wary eye, and resented the United States for the way it sometimes bullied the Dominion.

Diefenbaker fought with President Kennedy and was toppled. Trudeau wanted a Canadian foreign policy that served the national interests and peace, but he never appeared to understand that Canada was attached physically, economically, and militarily to the United States, and could not act as if it were an island. All Canadian leaders from Louis St. Laurent onward focussed upon peacekeeping, which sometimes served the interests of the Western alliance. But peacekeeping, because it alone was popular with the public and came to form a key component of Canadian nationalism, ultimately put paid to the nation’s psychological participation in the Cold War long before its end in Soviet collapse.

Curiously, however, it was continentalism that achieved dominance among the competing Canadian ideologies. By the end of the Cold War, a free trade agreement with the United States was in place, a huge proportion of Canadian trade went south, and U.S. corporations operated everywhere in Canada. That anti-Americanism was the key component of Canadian nationalism could not hide the reality of almost complete integration; nor could Canadian internationalism, strong among youth and NGOs, dispel the fact that Canada, from the 1960s to the turn of the century, received scant regard from its friends abroad, and none from its enemies. Canadians had forgotten that both reliability in foreign policy, and the ability to deploy force when necessary mattered. They had even forgotten that the ability to defend their own people and territory is the essential national interest for every nation-state. National interests have always mattered, and they still do.

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**NOTES**

12. Ibid., p. 203
14. Department of External Affairs, Records, file 264(s), Wrong to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 26 September 1947. These documents were examined at the Pearson Building, but are now in Library and Archives Canada (LAC). DCER, Vol. XIII, document 243, Wrong addendum to Hume Wright, “Influences Shaping the Policy of the United States to the Soviet Union,” 4 December 1947, attributed to Wrong to Pearson, 5 December 1947, at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/dcer.
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19. Ibid., p. 56; Dean Acheson, Present at the
on Canadian diplomacy during the Korean War
remains Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of
Constraint (Toronto: 1972).

20. A good history of the NATO brigade is Sean
Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO
Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: 1997).

21. Cuff and Granatstein, p. 224

22. Queen’s University Archives, Grant Dexter
Papers, memo, 22 February 1951.

23. Department of External Affairs Records, file
2-AE(s), Pearson to Wrong, 21 May 1948. This
file is now at LAC.

24. John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of

25. Neil James in Defender [Australia Defence

26. The best study is Douglas Ross, In the Interests of
Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-73 (Toronto: 1984). See also Shane B. Schreiber, The Road to
Hell: Canada in Viet Nam 1954-1973; Canadian
Army Journal, (Spring 2007).

27. English, pp. 98ff.

28. Ibid., Chapter 4; Granatstein, Man of Influence,
Chapter 10. For peacekeeping as part of the Cold
War, see Sean Maloney, Canada and UN
Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-
1970 (St Catharines, ON: 2002).

department/history/dcer, leave no doubt of the
decision to ‘go nuclear.’

30. See J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967
(Toronto: 1986), Chapter 5.

31. Ibid. See also Denis Smith, Rogue Tory (Toronto:
1995), Chapter 12. Cf. Diefenbaker’s memoirs,
One Canada, 3 vols. (Toronto, 1975-1977), especi-
ally Volume III.


33. Paul Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to
Unify Canada’s Armed Forces (Toronto: 1990), p.
65.


35. Foreign Policy for Canadians, a ‘six-pack’ of
policy pamphlets appeared in June 1970. They
rejected the ‘helpful fixer’ role, made economic
growth the focus of foreign policy, along with
social justice and quality of life. See J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette:
Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy
(Toronto: 1990), pp. 32-33.

36. Ibid., p. 25.

37. Ibid., p. 8.

38. Ibid., p. 195.

39. Prime Minister’s Office, Ottawa, Transcript of
Remarks at Notre Dame University, 16 May 1982.

40. Allan Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries (Toronto:

41. Richard Gossage, Close to the Charisma (Toronto:


43. Ibid., pp. 190-191. The Canadian press in
Washington were unhappy that Trudeau had not
attacked Reagan. “I have no sympathy with this
pose,” said Gotlieb. “Their problem is that they
are anti-American…All they want to hear is that
Trudeau dumped on Reagan.” Ibid., p. 192.

44. Author interview with Pierre Trudeau, Montreal,

45. On Yakovlev, see Christopher Shulgan, The Soviet
Ambassador (Toronto: 2008), and John English,
Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau
1968-2000 (Toronto: 2009), pp. 205, 469-470,
589-590.

46. Eugene Whelan and R. Archbold, Whelan: The
Man in the Green Stetson (Toronto: 1986).

47. Trudeau interview.


49. Ambassador Gotlieb supported the idea of nuclear
submarines. They would end Canada’s nuclear
virginity and the situation whereby the U.S. pro-
tected Canada’s Arctic. Ibid., p. 479.
**Introduction**

There is a protracted global war being fought. Like it or not, we are in it. It is not a war between the West and Islam; however, it is a war between Western nations and terrorists. While practically different from past wars in the way it is fought, philosophically, this war is no different. It is a war of ideology; both sides believing themselves justified.

Remarkably, some in the West feel comfortable in contemplating half measures in the war against terrorism. In an interview with *The Telegraph* (14 November 2010), the British Chief of Defence, General Sir David Richards, discussed containment of terrorism, rather than victory, as a ‘best-case’ scenario. This stance is generous, considering the chorus of observers who now openly bemoan a perceived or imminent loss in the war in Afghanistan. And yet, these views seem to reflect a broader willingness to essentially consider the most palatable form of defeat rather than to endure the requirements of victory.

Containment sounds like another failed attempt to avoid a decisive engagement, namely, appeasement. Non-compromised victory should be the only resolution we in the West seek in the war against terrorism. While victory in this war may end up looking different than past wars, the outcome must be the same. One side has to ultimately submit, and one side will ultimately submit.

**Their Strategy**

For many, al-Qaeda represents terrorism. While it is probably true that al-Qaeda is currently the main terrorist organization in the world, terrorism, even Islamic-based terrorism, did not start with al-Qaeda. It merely represents a crescendo in a violent ideological movement. Without decisive action against the phenomenon of terrorism, finding a solution to the terrorist problem has become more difficult.

Al-Qaeda has played an instrumental role in evolution of the terrorist problem. They have been the architect of an effective strategy enabled by a viral narrative. Their approach is *simple*, but not *simplistic*. Key messages have inspired resonance for the idea that the West has created an injustice in the world that disadvantages Muslims.

Western presence in traditionally Muslim lands is given as evidence of this injustice. The only resolution championed is the re-establishment of the Muslim supremacy in their lands.
by any means necessary. In this way, they have been able to inspire action on the physical plane as a force multiplying effect for their efforts on the moral plane. Regardless of whether this narrative will resonate in the future is somewhat a moot point, since it has created the conditions of a dangerous world that we presently live in.

Based upon this narrative, an equally simple yet effective strategy has been developed. Fighting two fronts, let alone two phases of war simultaneously, is not a desirable position. Yet, increasingly that is the position in which we find ourselves. Terrorists are limiting our option space.

A cornerstone of the terrorist approach is the effort to shift the fight to favourable ground. Taking lessons learned from places such as ‘circa-1980s’ Afghanistan, terrorists have come to realize that a Western invasion is not necessarily a disadvantage. This is especially true when there is no endur-
ingly tractable narrative to articulate our presence and purpose in Muslim lands.

Terrorists have seized opportunities in failed and failing states to develop the conditions that favour their fight. As we committed forces in various places, they leveraged their positions with a steady stream of men, money, weapons, and rhetoric. Their effective exploitation of the situation has caused us to ‘fix’ our forces in many locations, which reinforces their narrative and thus reinforces their strategy. It is an evolution of the old method of attrition.

More importantly, their approach has created coalescence between terrorists and a broader social milieu, providing weight to the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ theme of the terrorist narrative. A dangerous situation has been created. Due to the lack of a powerful Western counter-narrative, there is an open ended strategic question related to our true aim that has largely been left unanswered for many: are we trying to destroy terrorists or Islam?

There is a concurrent effort to open new fronts before the last battle is fought on the old front. Terrorists realize that, unless consolidated, their position in many countries remains tenuous. As both risk mitigation and probably an indication of the intent to progress a deliberate strategy, and with their narrative as their vanguard, they are setting the conditions to establish new fronts.

While one thrust of their strategy seeks to deny the opportunity for offensive action on our part, a more insidious effort seeks to remove the option to adopt a defensive posture. They are also attacking us from within. This reality speaks to fragility of the rationale for containment. Quite simply, the buffer of time and space is being compressed, and without decisive action, we are increasing the risk of having to fight the war within friendly lines. Likewise, an old spin on the method of divide and conquer.

By launching attacks – or simply creating the threat of attack – in Western nations, terrorists achieve a number of objectives. At a base human level, they create fear. Fear festers and turns to frustration, frustration turns to anger, anger turns to criticism, and over/unconstructive criticism generally leads to inaction. On a more ethereal level, their efforts then cause us to question our motives and our methods. Ultimately, this process turns us upon ourselves without prompting the recognition of the true cause of our introspection.
**VIEWS AND OPINIONS**

**Counter-productive Mindset**

Past wars galvanized Western populations. As watershed moments in the modern history of the Western world, they became known as ‘the Great War’ or ‘the war to end all wars.’ Our war against terrorism has made clear the increasing Western discomfort for the general concept of war. This discomfort results in a perceptible awkwardness with the way we now approach an immutable reality of human existence.

Whereas past generations rallied around a cause, and the nation adopted a war footing, this is no longer the case. Probably beginning with the generational shift post-Second World War, it is now the norm to have a highly polarized, highly critical public opinion expressed by Western citizens who are, on the whole, becoming increasingly disengaged from the fight. Our general reluctance to collectively encumber ourselves with the terrorist problem as past generations did with their problems, such as Nazi aggression, leaves the burden of the fight to be borne by fewer shoulders. Becoming unwilling participants *en masse* increases the risk of defeat.

Western nations now curb the language of war. Barely a decade after the worst terrorist attack on Western soil, few people want to use the lexicon of a “global war on terror” anymore. This is despite the fact that terrorists have affirmed their declarations of war on us, and despite the massive costs we continue to pay in blood and treasure on a daily basis. Allowing ourselves to become the victim of language indicates a shortcoming in our message to the world.

More to the point, Western nations have also curbed our participation in the war against terrorism, while paradoxically continuing to engage in that war. The ‘troop surge’ in Afghanistan, and, more aptly, it being viewed as an effort of last resort, seem to indicate that we may have collectively fallen out of touch with what it takes to effectively wage war. A number of questions have been asked. Amongst the most important: Are that many troops required to win the war or to rectify the situation in which we find ourselves?

**Unproductive Methods**

In many ways, the Western approach to the war against terrorism seems to be a ‘committee approach.’ We no longer seem to draw a distinction in the *roles*, and thus, the *unique effects* of the instruments of national power and their relationship *vis-à-vis* war. Rather, the attempt is made to meld their effects together across a singular continuum of time. Without distinct phases and distinct main efforts, it becomes difficult to establish or recognize the decisive points and transition conditions required to progress a strategy.

The emergence (or resurgence) of the counter-insurgency (COIN) body of thought may have unwittingly prolonged the
life of the committee approach, particularly as a rationale for the view of war as a singular time continuum. A transition condition was reached, and arguably passed, in Afghanistan in late-2001 with the culmination of distinctly counter-terrorism operations. By maintaining a presence without maintaining the initiative, it seems we slipped into COIN as a way to make sense of the complex situation in Afghanistan rather than having decisively entered into the next phase of a deliberate strategy.

An interesting ‘groupthink’ has now developed around COIN. Its doctrine is not the problem; COIN becoming fashionable (and probably misunderstood) is the problem. It seems for many that war is now synonymous with counterinsurgency. And, with every counterinsurgency, there is a demand for a population-centric approach. While not to be dismissed out of hand, a relevant population-centric approach to the war against terrorism needs to be examined.

Affected populations are always an important factor in war. Yet, the influence of the population on the outcome of any war cannot be characterized in nebulous terms. The role of the population must be understood, particularly in terms of motivations, overall influence, and receptivity, in order that it can be positively leveraged in any plan for war. We must get away from a highly generalized concept of ‘the population,’ if for no other reason than it seems an impediment to deeper inquiries about the causes of terrorism and the effects of our response to terrorists.

There is a trap in an ill-defined population-centric approach. That is, we run the risk of ceasing to think like ourselves and for ourselves. We also run the risk of fighting our opposition from a reactive posture, rather than from a responsive posture. In short, we will stop fighting our strategy.

There is also an increasing premium placed upon cultural awareness. In many cases, a lack of perceived progress at the various fronts in our war against terrorism has been blamed on a lack of understanding for the culture in which we operate. This notion of cultural sensitivity seems to have entered a state of cultural hypersensitivity. Invading a country, especially on a large scale for a sustained period, creates an abnormal circumstance. It should be no wonder that people do not welcome us graciously, especially over time, and especially when there is no tangible change in the life circumstances of the average person as a result of our presence.

The nature of our presence and the manner in which we conduct ourselves while outside our borders will ultimately determine how the world perceives us.

Strategic Re-set

The basis of a new approach could start with defining a more clear and powerful narrative. Borrowing language from Marshall McLuhan, the medium through which we express ourselves would then become the message. For this to occur, a change is required in the paradigm through which we view terrorism.

A revised strategic approach would make a meaningful distinction between anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. If ultimately successful, both labels would increasingly disappear, along with the predication of our interaction with the world, in many cases, being based upon terrorism. This does not de-value the lexicon of a war on terrorism. Rather, it brings it to a finer point.

In terms of anti-terrorism, the main effort would be to address a number of global conditions that enable the receptivity of the terrorist narrative, such as social, economic, and demographic factors that fester into grievances. The distinction should be significant enough to elevate the phenomenon of terrorism to the level of grand strategy. Western nations would then undertake anti-terrorism efforts as any other global issue, to be dealt with in a systems approach akin to the way we approach economics (and probably how we should think of the environment). An inability to effectively deal with the conditions that can precipitate terrorism is not then explained away as a failure of the war against terrorism, and rather, it makes it a matter of greater human dignity.

The death of Osama Bin Laden and the “Arab Spring” do not draw a curtain on the issue of terrorism. In fact, it places us at a decisive point. While these events are hoped to have positive consequences, there is also a potential for a negative outcome, especially where the ingredients for a potentially dangerous mix exist: core grievances that exist throughout the world not being addressed means that an opportunity to strengthen and evolve the alternative to the terrorist narrative is being missed.
The express purpose of the ‘anti-terrorism book end,’ counter-terrorism, becomes almost, if not, singular: eliminate the most dangerous individuals who choose to remain outside the legitimate fold. In plain terms, the main effort for this portion of the strategy is killing the terrorist. However, as we become increasingly successful in parsing the general conditions (and populations) from the core of malign actors, these operations would increasingly become limited engagements, based upon limited objectives, against a limited number of targets. As we progress this strategy, it would make offensive action a temporary condition.

Counter-terrorism does not simply become a treatise on killing. It actually aspires to less killing over time as an inverse axis to anti-terrorism. The ability to achieve decisive action against the terrorist becomes the measure of the victory in the war against terrorism, while our ability to positively affect the global commons becomes the measure of our improvement of humanity.

A key to this proposed approach will be to the ability to effectively balance anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism, to accurately identify the decision points and transition conditions that affect our ability to manage the initiative before we slip indecisively into action that is not a clear progression of our strategy. Practically, this means efforts, not predicated upon terrorism, to foster strengthened civil societies in those nations that desperately demand it. By doing so, a legitimate venue for discourse occurs.

In order to maintain relevance, terrorist organizations will be forced into the legitimate fold where their ideas are open to true inquiry by the masses. While the potential legitimacy of extreme ideas may seem a dangerous proposition to some, allowing malign influences to remain comfortably on the margins of the legitimate fold is a much more risky proposition, and a more powerful position for a terrorist organization.

Those who choose to remain outside the legitimate fold will then be unable to masquerade for anything other than being enemies of the state, and, in an increasingly globalized world, the enemies of the global commons. As part of this effort, we should focus upon providing help where it is requested, but should be prepared to remove that help when there is a lack of commitment. We must also recognize when a threat is prevalent and be prepared to remove those threats.

Getting from the current situation to the desired state is difficult to envision. It is probably not even possible as the next evolution. Rather, it is only likely to be realized through a series of incremental gains based, at least in part, upon our ability to manage the initiative in the war against terrorism, in turn based upon a more strategic paradigm. Going forward, a nuanced balancing of Western roles that mentor, enable, or, when required, direct the winds of change in the world is the way that the West will achieve victory.

**Victory**

Victory in wars past meant some extreme demands, hard fought progress over time, and some dark days endured in the process of victory. The concept of victory in the war on terror is not the childish notion of winning, but rather, in many ways, speaks to our existence as we know it. Preserving that existence should be only reason why we ask young people to die for us. We therefore owe it to them to approach any fight with the intent of emerging victorious.

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AM I SPEAKING JAPANESE? CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS IN LANGUAGE LEARNING

by Dana Batho

Introduction

Living or working in a foreign nation is a challenge for most, especially when the culture that one is immersed in is very different from their own. For the CF, the requirement for personnel to be culturally aware of the environment they are working or fighting in is essential to mission success. Whether on deployment to a combat zone or in an overseas staff position, cultural awareness training is a necessary component to allow CF members to succeed in their tasks and in their daily lives. Although language training is included in CF cultural awareness training, there is a common misperception that this is less important than training about how the enemy and friendly forces think and operate. However, “language and culture are intertwined,” and as such, language training is essential in understanding a culture, whether that be of the local population, the enemy, or the multinational forces that one may work alongside. As CF members can be called upon to work anywhere in the world, the cultural awareness that can be obtained by learning a foreign language is an issue whose importance needs to be understood by all CF members.

As an example of this, the process of learning Japanese will be used to demonstrate how much cultural awareness is automatically gained through foreign language acquisition. Any two foreign languages are going to have differences with each other, especially those that originate from very different cultures. The distinctions between English and Japanese are very noticeable, possibly because Japan’s culture is rooted very deeply in strong traditions, whereas Western culture is based on influences from all around the world and is quite fluid. Communication issues that are common when trying to communicate result from how Japanese is structured and cultural norms reflected in the language. This means that simply learning Japanese, a massive feat in itself, is not enough to be able to communicate effectively; cultural impediments must also be navigated.
Linguistic Issues

Written Japanese

For learners of Japanese, written communication is often one of the hardest parts of learning the language. They first must master hiragana, which is the Japanese phonetic script used to write words of Japanese origin. Then comes katakana, which is similar to hiragana but is used to write words of foreign origin, often English. There are 46 hiragana and 46 katakana characters, representing the Japanese 'alphabet.' In addition, kanji, or Chinese characters, are also extensively used in writing. There are approximately 10,000 kanji, but the average fluent adult only uses about 2000 of them.

The first obstacle usually encountered in written Japanese is that there are no spaces between words. This makes deciphering where one word starts and another stops very difficult, and it makes using a dictionary frustrating. In addition, because katakana is used for foreign words (usually of English origin), the tendency is to sound out the word to discover the meaning. However, the pronunciation has usually changed dramatically.

An example is the katakana word マクドナルド (makudo-narudo). Only when you read the characters very fast does the English word become apparent – McDonald’s. Furthermore, kanji have their own complications. The sheer number of kanji can prove daunting to anyone, but kanji’s complexity mostly lies in the fact that each character has multiple pronunciations, which are not logical, and are dependent upon which word and where in the word the kanji is placed. For example, 一番上 (ichi-ban-ue) means ‘the top ...’ (cadet, floor, etc.), and 上級 (jou-kyuu) means ‘advanced level.’ The character 上 is the same, but the pronunciation is different in each word.

Despite these difficulties, kanji does have some advantages. As each individual kanji has a meaning attached to it, new words that are encountered in a written text can often be deciphered if the individual kanji are known. An example of this is 縞馬 (shima-uma), translating to ‘striped horse,’ which is a zebra. A written word that tends to make Western women cringe when reading it is 家内 (ka-nai), which means ‘inside house,’ or ‘wife.’ This combination of meaning-based and visual encoding can make remembering some kanji easier than others. Of course, if the various pronunciations for each kanji are unknown, the reader will not be able to say them, but at least the meaning is understood.

Spoken Japanese

One barrier to spoken communication in Japanese is the varying levels of politeness that must be used. There is common language, polite language, honorific language, and hum-
ble language. Common language is used for close friends and family, whereas polite language is for more formal situations. In addition, honorific language is used when speaking to or about someone’s actions that is higher in status than you, for example a teacher or a boss. Humble language is used when speaking to someone superior to you, but about your own actions. Each politeness level has a different form, and usually the verb is completely different for the honorific and humble versions. For instance, the verb “to say” in the common form is *iu*, in the polite form, it is *mousu*, in the honorific form, it is *ossharu*, and in the humble form, it is *moushiageru*. This creates difficulties, not only in learning how to use the different forms properly, but in the fact that almost any interaction with a Japanese person in a formal setting, such as in a retail shop or on the telephone to a company, will be conducted using the honorific and humble forms. If they are in a professional setting, Japanese people are unable to switch to less formal language forms, even if asked to speak more simply; they consider it too impolite.

Also, Japanese has words that are used exclusively or predominantly by one gender or the other. Words such as *ne* and *deshou*, or ‘isn’t it?’, tend to be used mostly by women. Men who learn Japanese from their girlfriend or wife use these words frequently, which make other Japanese speakers smile, as it is obvious how they learned the language. Another example of this gender differentiation is the word for ‘I’. Men would use *ore* or *boku*, and women could use *atashi*. Gender-neutral forms are *watashi* and *watakushi*, which is more formal. If a woman was to use men’s forms, she would come across as being harsh and rough. Similarly, men using women’s language sound effeminate. Thus, for a Westerner, learning to use these gender-specific words can become a minefield of (often humorous) miscommunication.

Cultural Issues

**Ishin-Denshin**

In addition to the structure, there are cultural hurdles implicit in how Japanese is actually used. Emily Spencer and Tony Balasevicius illustrate the military implications of the interplay between culture and language in communication:

Understanding the elements of culture at play ... will allow security forces to pick up nuances in speech and gestures that can provide valuable clues as to the possible location or intentions of belligerents. To this end, experience has shown that good interpreters can do far more than just relay verbatim translations to security forces ... seasoned interpreters in Afghanistan are able to explain nuances that are missed by those with only a basic understanding of the language. Moreover, they are able to translate these nuances into more meaningful messages ... [A message] might have less to do with what is being said and more to do with how it is being said.4

If one is unaware of the effect that culture has on language, mission success could be seriously jeopardized.
Compared to English, Japanese is a very vague and indirect language; this means that even if one understands the words, the meaning of the communication may still be unclear. A reason for this is that “... the Japanese ... have developed abundant non-linguistic codes.” This is called ishin-denshin, or “traditional mental telepathy.” Related is the cultural concept of enryo, which means ‘reserve’ or ‘constraint.’ It is not uncommon for a Westener to unknowingly place their Japanese counterpart in an awkward situation: “... because Japanese culture places a taboo on direct expression of one’s wishes, it is culturally inappropriate to ask other people directly what they want. ‘Brutal’ direct questions, such as, ‘... Do you want X or Y?’ force the addressee to violate enryo.” Further, “plain speaking ... tends to commit the speaker to a hard-and-fast position, and thus can easily provoke direct confrontation – which all Japanese dread.” This can be easily seen in a common response to a question – ‘Sore wa chotto...’ which translates to ‘That’s a little...’ In English, not fully answering a question can be seen as being deceptive or sneaky. But for a Japanese person, that is the only way that they know how to decline an invitation or request politely; to directly decline is unthinkable. In fact, because of enryo, the word ‘no’ is almost never used in Japanese. One exception is if a Japanese person is complimented. For example, if you compliment a concert pianist on her skill, she will invariably respond with “No, no, no, I only play piano a little.”

Even for those who are fluent in Japanese, understanding enryo can ‘make or break’ a business relationship: “… to Americans, the Japanese style of negotiation can be confusing and even maddening, just as our style can seem blunt and threatening to them.” This is why many companies hire consultants, such as People Going Global, to culturally train their employees; it is easier to build a good relationship than it is to try to repair one due to cultural misunderstandings. In a military setting where lives can be on the line, cultural understanding is even more critical.

Enryo is also a part of the actual structure of Japanese. An illustration of this is the lack of use of pronouns and subjects; conversations tend to be heavily based upon contextual clues for comprehension. For instance, in English, a telephone conversation might go, “Hi boss, I’m coming in to work today, I’m feeling better.” The same conversation in Japanese might be “Boss, today’s okay.” Implied is the fact that the boss knows the employee has been sick, and if today is okay to work, then he must be feeling better. However, if the listener
is an outsider to the conversation and is unaware of the surrounding context, it would be nearly impossible to understand what had just been said.

**Conformity**

Similarly, social influences also play a role in communication. Conformity is an obvious issue in Japan. In general, Japanese people are seen as models of conformity. For the Japanese, there are set rules of behaviour and speech for any possible interaction; however, as foreigners usually are not aware of these rules, interactions with foreigners are not as straightforward. As a consequence, in an interaction between a foreigner and a Japanese person, the Japanese person may freeze due to uncertainty, and thus be unable to react appropriately to what the Westermer is saying.

Conformity also allows some Japanese to discriminate against foreigners. Takeyuki Tsuda refers to an example of cross-cultural friction in the rental housing market: “... there are landlords who refuse to rent to Nikkeijin [Japanese emigrants], usually citing differences in ‘customs’ and communication.” From personal experience, even foreigners who are completely fluent in Japanese and are married to a Japanese national are often discriminated against when renting or buying housing. Even though problems such as these are unlikely to affect CF members directly, it is very important for them to be aware of the impact that language and culture can have on their daily lives as foreigners in an overseas posting.

**Intent**

Intent is also an issue in any communication. An illustration of this is in Joy Hendry’s article, in which she refers to a discussion between herself (a Western anthropologist) and an eminent Japanese linguist. After discussing whether she could understand the linguist’s ‘Japanese English,’ he states: “I’m afraid I find it a kind of psychological torture to speak to foreigners in Japanese. However good their lan-

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**Conclusion**

Thus, overcoming the intricacies of written and spoken Japanese are merely the beginning of a long road of learning to communicate with Japanese people. Cultural barriers, such as enryo, conformity, intent, tatamæ, and honne must also be clearly understood for effective communication. As these elements are based upon centuries of communication amongst only themselves, a form of ‘Japanese telepathy’ exists. Simply knowing the vocabulary and grammar is not enough to be able to communicate in Japanese; the cultural elements are equally important.

For military personnel, the implications of not being aware of cultural and linguistic issues are even greater: “Failure to understand [the populations’] beliefs, values, and attitudes, and how they view the world, is tantamount to mission failure.” It is sometimes difficult to see the cultural component in Euro-centric languages that share a base common culture with English and French, but the cultural component of language becomes very clear when learning languages that do not share the same linguistic genealogy. Therefore, an analysis of the cultural component of Japanese structure and usage provides a good illustration of the issues that may be faced by those who are deployed overseas. Even if CF members never become fluent in the local language where they are posted, an emphasis upon learning as much as possible is vital. Not only will this help them to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the local population, it will give them indispensable insights into the culture and minds of all those who occupy their operational space, leading to an increased likelihood of mission success.

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2. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Wierzbicka, p. 349.
10. Wierzbicka, p. 347.
13. For an example of this from the author’s personal experience, see http://awanderinglife.blogspot.com/2005/05/i-am-speaking-japanese-arent-i.html
16. Ibid., p. 627.
17. Tsuda, p. 320.
Colonel Maillet, Lieutenant-General Maisonneuve, distinguished guests, faculty members, family and friends, and graduates of Royal Military College Saint-Jean:

It was with great pride and humility that I accepted General Maisonneuve’s invitation to speak to you today, on the occasion of your graduation from the College. First off, I have a deep admiration for the work that is done at the College. I had the opportunity to meet the people who work here and see their great commitment to the education that RMCSJ provides. I felt their pride in belonging to this noble institution and their desire to help you reach your full potential—not just as students, but also as men and women whose human potential is worth developing.

Leadership

When I think about RMCSJ, the word ‘leadership’ immediately comes to mind. There probably exist thousands of definitions of the word ‘leadership.’ When I was in the Royal Canadian Air Cadets many years ago, we learned the definition provided by General Dextraze: “Leadership is the art of influencing others to do willingly what is required in order to achieve an aim or goal.” When I was a young cadet, aspiring to go up through the ranks, I naively thought that this was a very simple task. After all, all the leader has to do is explain what needs to be done and people will do it. However, as I was given to experience leadership roles over the years, I have come to the conclusion that leadership is anything but easy to implement! General Dextraze’s definition of leader-
ship is certainly clear and evident. But, as Hegel the philosopher would say, this definition needs to be ‘unpacked’ to appreciate the full extent of to what it actually refers.

For General Dextraze’s definition to work, a certain number of prerequisites must be present. Today, I would like to share with you three of those prerequisites—knowing, know-how and ‘soft skills’—which seem to me, at first glance, to be invisible in the definition. Paradoxically, however, they make it possible to fully understand the concept of leadership. Over the years, for me, these themes have become values that play an increasingly significant role in my personal and professional journey. Because of my position as rector of a post-secondary academic institution, they have also become matters of great concern.

Knowing

What is knowing? To what does “knowing” refer? As a philosopher, I must defer to the greatest master of all time, Plato, to broach this notion. To understand what it means to know, we must also understand what it means not to know. It is important to distinguish between truth and falsehood, knowledge and opinion, durable idea and form without substance. Regardless of what is your chosen discipline, I am sure that your studies here have helped you acquire the ability to think critically about the multitude of information circulating in the marketplace of ideas. Real leaders are able to keep a critical distance not only from what others claim to know, but also—indeed, especially—from what they themselves claim to know. Do I always know what I claim to know? Does my knowledge rest on a solid foundation, or does that foundation merely appear solid? Have I ever touted statements as knowledge when they were actually just opinions? These questions are important because they focus our attention upon the leader’s moral responsibility not to mislead others. To answer those questions, we must have enough humility to accept that most of the time, we don’t know. As Socrates said, “I know one thing: that I know nothing.” That is a sign of great leadership. All leaders must throw themselves into the quest for knowledge. The human mind needs to be nourished by ideas in order to develop, and it is able to judge the value of those ideas and create new worlds, as does an architect working with the finest of materials. A real leader is master of his or her own mind and knows that out of the millions of ideas circulating in the world, a very small number are eloquent and great ideas that are worth being entertained in the long term. That is what true study is all about: the long contemplation of fundamental questions leading to patience and serenity before the complexities of life.

Know-how

Now, on to know-how...When we think of know-how, we immediately think about artisans, those who fabricate objects with their hands. I think about my father who could imagine and build anything to which he set his mind. We have all had the pleasurable experience of using an object that was perfectly designed, whether a motorcycle, a shoe, or a musical instrument. We also know how frustrated we become when the object we are using is flawed: the Ross rifle used by Canadian troops during the First World War, a badly designed chair, an iPhone application that freezes all the time. Everyone in this room knows Descartes for his most famous quote: “I think therefore I am.” Descartes no doubt had a great preoccupation for theoretical knowledge, but what is less known is that he had an equal preoccupation for what was then called ‘human passions.’ This expression probably reminds us of a title of a ‘soap’ or novel, but it refers to the notion of self-control, or acting properly. Descartes insists that: “[...] to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is to rightly apply it.” Knowing is insufficient in itself. Leaders need to be able to rightly apply their minds to situations and problems. They need to be able to understand how things work, and to find creative solutions to problems. But the greatest achievement in the area of know-how is becoming the artisans of our own existence, i.e. working toward becoming a fully devel-
oped human being. As leaders, you will come to realize that your richest resource is your own humanity. You need to understand what will make you a better human being, and practice this art throughout your life. Contrary to other species, we spend a good portion of our lives finding out what we are supposed to be as human beings, and experimenting through trial and error. The highest achievement in humanity that leaders should aim at is the attainment of ethical wisdom. This kind of wisdom results from the constant integration of theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. It is also called having good judgment, and it would be a mistake to take it for granted. At some level, we have all experienced failures in judgment. Hopefully, we learn from our mistakes. But as leaders, we have a responsibility to think about the impact of our actions on close ones, our organizations, and society at large. Just as leaders need to take a critical distance with ideas, they are the best critics of their own actions. They know that their own human existence is calling them to increasingly higher standards. Hence, leaders always look for opportunities to learn to do better.

Soft skills

I have talked about knowing, where leaders come to know that they don’t know and are forced to become humble, and know-how, where leaders continually work on developing their own humanity and developing good judgment. Now, a few words with respect to ‘soft skills.’ A leader must know how to have relationships with others, and that requires emotional intelligence. That type of intelligence helps leaders help others realize their own potential. As a leader, it is impossible to influence others without cultivating an attitude of compassion. However, compassion is not spinelessness—true compassion is founded upon integrity. A real leader leads others to success. We can listen to others and come to understand the obstacles preventing them from succeeding but still push them to the new heights they are capable of reaching. To help others surpass themselves, we must be able to see them more clearly than they can see themselves. We must be able to picture others in the future. In other words, we must have vision. This ability to envision what others can become and to guide them to see that vision themselves is a sign of authentic leadership.

Back to General Dextraze

Influencing human beings requires an authentic knowledge of the human condition. It also requires an ability to know what to do, when to do it, and how to do it. Finally, it requires the ability to create a setting where people actually achieve themselves in achieving the goals. All of these skills are acquired through education.

The only way to achieve these skills is through education. To be more precise, it is the very aim of education. If you allow me a last reference to Plato: The aim of education is to form leaders who will build a just society.

You have just completed an important step in your academic journey, and I wanted to pay formal tribute to you by showing you the great importance of what you have just accomplished. It took courage and perseverance for you to obtain your diploma. And you have every reason to be proud today. For that, you deserve all of our admiration. I also wanted to show you that the road does not end here—true education is a lifelong task. Never stop wanting to learn more about yourself, others and the world around you. You will become better people and make others better people. Lastly, I wanted to share with you that if you are called upon to become leaders, you have had and will have the immense privilege of being supported by leaders throughout your journey. Your teachers, parents and friends are an integral part of your success. Never forget to recognize what you owe to the masters and wise people who have crossed your path. Now, it is your turn to become what they were for you.

I have shared with you some of the precious things that life has taught me so far in my own educational journey. I now wish you every success possible for the next phase of your educational journey. Be proud, and make your community proud! More than ever, our world needs your leadership.

Chantal Beauvais, B Ph, MA, Ph D, is the rector of Saint Paul University, Ottawa. Extensively schooled in philosophy, she is the first rector of the university who is not an Oblate. Even more significantly, she is the first rector who is neither a priest nor a religious official, and she is the first female rector of the university.
The report of the transformation team headed by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, established in 2010 with “the explicit goal” to “identify areas where we could reduce overhead and improve efficiency and effectiveness [so as] to allow reinvestment from within for future operational capability despite constrained resources,” was released - most regretfully without its supporting annexes - in September 2011. The report, which quite correctly pointed out that defence spending cutbacks almost universally tend to focus upon the front-line while preserving headquarters staffs - thereby confirming that bureaucrats have more finely honed survival skills than warriors - offered up some disturbing findings and thought-provoking recommendations, but just as quickly found itself embroiled in controversy.

The team’s data analysis, which spanned the period from the end of FY 03/04 to the end of FY 09/10, “revealed that considerable growth occurred outside of front-line, deployable, and operational units: the number of people employed in headquarters grew four times faster than the Regular Force did over the review period. The total number of civilian employees grew three times as fast as the Regular Force, and the number of civilians employed in the National Capital Region surged by 61 [per cent].” Simply put, “…we have too many headquarters, too much cumbersome process, too much overhead, too much tail. We are going to have to reallocate a significant number of people from within to meet the demands of the future, and we have to do all we can to protect and invest in the equipment, training and infrastructure needs of the front-line and deployable units.” The report consequently called for: (a) reducing the numbers of headquarters and staffs “by grouping like functions or accepting risk in the entire elimination of certain organizations;” (b) reallocating approximately 3500 regular force personnel into those areas identified for future growth or investing the funds elsewhere; (c) demobilizing the number of full-time reservists back to a “baseline of approximately 4,500”; (d) “reducing by up to 30 [per cent] over several years the $2.7 billion spent on contractors, consultants and private service providers and investing the funds in future capital programmes” as outlined in the Canada First Defence Strategy; and (e) “reinvesting approximately 3,500 civil servants into higher priority activities or investing the funds elsewhere.” Numbered among “future investment areas” were “new people and capabilities for the Arctic, an air expeditionary wing, the Canadian Rangers, investments in cyber defence, space, special operations forces, deployable all-source intelligence centres, human intelligence, counter IED, nuclear/biological/chemical defence, returning sailors to sea, returning reserve supervisors from full-time headquarters employment to part-time leadership roles on the armoury floors, and deployable support personnel.”
In total, the team generated some 43 recommendations, the most ambitious of which envisaged the creation of a Chief of Joint Force Support. This, argued the report, “has the highest potential to realize cost savings” through: (a) the “integration of policy, planning and management staffs within the command structure and concomitant reduction or wholesale elimination of redundant positions;” (b) greater coordination of “policy, procedures, standards and process resulting in the elimination of service overlaps and duplication;” and (c) the “regional optimization of Base and Wing support services, including supply chain management, material distribution, administration, transportation, infrastructure maintenance, and personnel services.” It also offered the “very laudable quality of extending upon the extremely potent operational focus that characterizes the success of the CANOSCOM model, which in turn reflects the positive and enduring impact of the 2005 Transformation on the CF organizational culture.” With considerable understatement, the report acknowledged that the creation of “a consolidated Force Support entity will not be easy,” adding that “…there has arguably not been a consolidation of such magnitude since the CF reorganizations of 1965-1968.”

Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie

Andrew Leslie, newly retired, provided further insights into the transformation team’s report in 3 October 2011 testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. A blend of candour, diplomacy, and wit, his comments echoed some of the themes identified in previous testimony. In March 2009, for example, Lieutenant-General Leslie, then Chief of the Land Staff, told the Committee that “…the establishment of new headquarters and non-deployable units has forced the army to fill several hundred positions that required highly experienced soldiers with considerable military knowledge. This organizational change occurred at a time when our soldiers are particularly needed within field units, regiments, brigades, and training units. We absolutely cannot do without these people if we are to increase staffing levels within our operational units as quickly as possible.” Given serious shortages of officers and senior non-commissioned officers, particularly in the army, he suggested that, in the short-term, “…the Canadian Forces will have to either reduce their level of operational commitment or reduce the number of people working within static, non-deployable headquarters. One other option might be to reduce the number of headquarters within the Canadian Forces.”

Leslie utilized his 2011 appearance to reiterate some of his team’s key findings, including, since 2004, the 11 percent expansion (approximately 6500 people) of the regular force (about half of whom went to the army), the 23 percent expansion (6651 people) of the reserves (“…most of whom are full time reserves in headquarters and not part-time leaders on the armoury floor”), and the 33 percent expansion (7300 people) of the civilian component (“…most of whom went to headquarters and headquarters support roles”). This, he stressed, amounted to a 10 percent expansion of the “teeth,” and a 40 percent expansion of the “tail.” In addition, “…consultants, contractors and professional service contracts consume about $2.7 billion of your taxpayers’ money, with at least 5,000 people providing individual staff augmentees in the National Capital Region and other headquarters around the land.”

“After a lot of hard work and second-and third-order consequence analysis, the team believes we can find in the order of $1 billion in administrative efficiencies with which to either pay some of the budgetary reductions or allocations that may well be assigned to us by the Government of Canada…or to pay off the “tax” that may be sent our way to help reduce the deficit.” This process would entail a “fairly dramatic” reduction in the number of headquarters so as to free up military and civilian personnel for new priorities, shift 3500 regular force personnel from their existing positions –mainly in headquarters - back out to the field, demobilize about half (4500 people) of the full-time reservists, and re-invest “…about 3,500 civil servants from what they are doing now to the demands of the future or investing the funds elsewhere.” Also envisaged, over a period of approximately three years, was the reduction of about 30 percent in the $2.7 billion spent on professional services, consultants, and contractors. The transformation report also called for the creation of a joint force support command “…to try and realize efficiencies overall for the next three to four years of around 12 percent, refocusing the strategic level headquarters on strategic things and not necessarily running things out in the field.”

Leslie emphasized: “…[that] transformation is more than reduction. It is a vision for the future. It seeks to take what we are doing now, build on that which we want to keep, which is essentially the operational output - the frigates, the battle groups, the aircraft that deliver supplies or drop bombs, the helicopters - and reduce the overhead to free up the resources,
both human resources and money, to invest in those things that we will need tomorrow, or even actually today… [We] cannot logically expect to go to the government and say, ‘Please sir, can we have some more?’ when we have such large numbers of people in headquarters as proven by the growth since 2004.” (Nor, one might add, would a bloated bureaucracy help to garner public support for a credible Canadian defence capability.) The numerical end state, Leslie believes, ideally would be approximately 70,000 regulars, 30,000 reservists (both full- and part-time) and approximately 25,000 or 26,000 public servants.

His testimony was, for the most part, well-received by the Committee, but senators voiced concerns with respect to the fate of the surplus full-time reservists, the call for reductions, without full analysis, in the civilian work force, and the report’s perceived criticism of the Hillier-era transformation. On the first point, Leslie stressed that substantial numbers of full-time reservists would remain, and anticipated that many would return to part-time status or seek to join the regular force. With regard to DND’s civilian work force, Leslie acknowledged that a separate “institutional alignment” process would address civilian numbers, but posited that his transformation team’s early research rendered the proposed reduction achievable. He acknowledged, however, that additional study could prompt adjustments in the proffered reduction number. On the third point, Leslie stated that the four operational headquarters established during the Hillier era “have been successful,” and that the Hillier “… transformation did not fail. It was actually very successful.” Nevertheless, future requirements could prompt adjustments in the proffered reduction number. On the third point, Leslie stated that the four operational headquarters established during the Hillier era “have been successful,” and that the Hillier “… transformation did not fail. It was actually very successful.” Nevertheless, future requirements could prompt adjustments in the proffered reduction number. On the third point, Leslie stated that the four operational headquarters established during the Hillier era “have been successful,” and that the Hillier “… transformation did not fail. It was actually very successful.” Nevertheless, future requirements could prompt adjustments in the proffered reduction number.

The Report on Transformation 2011 has generated a wealth of invaluable and thought-provoking data for civilian and military decision-makers, and has advanced a plethora of intriguing ideas, concepts, and recommendations. But it has also, inevitably, stirred up considerable controversy and serious doubts about the prospects for large-scale, as opposed to selective, implementation. Indeed, as Leslie himself noted in Senate testimony, “I think the only person who agrees with all my recommendations is me.” For some, the report’s sheer temerity in seeking substantial military and civilian staffing reductions in the bureaucracy is cause enough for ridicule and pushback. Others, such as former Chief of the Defence Staff Rick Hillier, have argued that headquarters reductions of that magnitude would seriously damage, perhaps even “destroy,” Canada’s armed forces. Some have expressed doubts about the viability of specific recommendations, while still others support the basic thrust of the transformation report, but worry that a financially hard-pressed Ottawa will simply pocket the savings and not utilize the freed-up resources to invest in vitally needed skill-sets and equipment. This fear is magnified when the potential ramifications of other, government-wide, spending reviews -from which DND is most assuredly not immune - are factored into the equation.

Any temptation to dismiss the transformation report out of hand must be resisted. Not every idea or recommendation enumerated in the report will prove viable or as attractive upon closer inspection, but there is much of merit in the report - both in terms of specific recommendations, and in terms of the vital overarching principle that the ‘teeth’ must be protected while downsizing the ‘tail.’ It is salient to add that the voluminous research behind the report could be gainfully employed in support of follow-on studies. The efficacy, or otherwise, of alternative service delivery in a Canadian defence context demands further attention.

Finally, one remains troubled by the notion - evident at several junctures in the report, at one or more junctures in Leslie’s testimony, and in a wide range of other statements by serving and retired members of the Canadian Forces - that Canada’s comparatively solid economic performance in grim global economic times, the Harper government’s demonstrated generosity in funding defence revitalization, the greater sensitivity of Canadians to security and defence in the post-9/11 era, and the closer attachment of Canadians to their armed forces in the wake of
noteworthy disaster relief operations at home and abroad, and, most importantly, in the wake of the professionalism and sacrifices associated with the mission in Afghanistan, will allow Canada’s armed forces to escape the type of Draconian cutbacks that have become the lot of many allied military establishments. These factors mitigate the risk, but they most assuredly do not eliminate the risk of significant reductions ‘at the sharp end.’ Even with the best will in the world, the Harper government may find it politically and financially impossible to invest the necessary funds to fully implement the Canada First Defence Strategy. Similarly, public respect and empathy for the Canadian Forces has reached most impressive levels - indeed, the Canadian Forces are part of the Canadian national psyche in a way that we have not seen in generations - but that is not an automatic guarantee of fiscal largesse if economic conditions deteriorate. Old, parsimonious habits with respect to defence spending do not disappear overnight. It is important to remember, as well, that while the Canadian Forces are enjoying reinvigorated linkages to the public, overall support for the combat phase of the Afghanistan mission remained tepid throughout. In such an environment, some Canadians - even those newly-appreciative of the labours of their armed forces - may seek to avoid future Afghanistan-style commitments by limiting the military capabilities and hardware necessary for such missions. This need not translate into a purely home defence and/or constabulary military, but it could pose challenges for those seeking a more robust, multi-purpose, and combat-capable defence establishment with global reach.

Major new shocks in the geo-strategic landscape would necessarily influence the Canadian decision-making environment, but it is equally clear that many of the older prompts for increased Canadian preparedness have disappeared. When, for example, the Trudeau government sought to diversify trade in the 1970s, European perceptions of a linkage between increased trade with Canada, and a demonstrated Canadian commitment to European security played a significant role in the Trudeau government’s decision to embark upon a thoroughgoing revitalization of the Canadian Forces. The trade diversification campaign accomplished relatively little, but it did help to bequeath a highly significant amount of new equipment - much of it still in service - to Canada’s armed forces. Today, the Harper government, to its credit, has embarked upon new trade diversification efforts in Europe and other regions. This time, however, the Europeans, many of whom have engineered very deep cuts in their own defence capabilities, have neither the motive nor the credibility to lecture Canada on increased defence spending. Indeed, it is supremely ironic that Canada has found it possible to sever two more of its diminishing security links with Europe: the Canadian component of the NATO AWACS operation, and the Canadian contribution to NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program. The Canada-Europe trade-defence dynamic of 1975 will not be repeated.

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BOOK REVIEWS

MILITARY JUSTICE IN ACTION: ANNOTATED NATIONAL DEFENCE LEGISLATION
by Mr. Justice Gilles Létourneau and Professor Michel W. Drapeau
Toronto: Carswell, 2011
1761 pages, $108.00
Reviewed by Richard Evraire

Book reviews can be useful beyond enticing someone to download, borrow, or buy and read a book, or allowing that ‘pretend’ reader to feign knowledge of a book without ever actually having read it. They can be extremely critical, of course, and/or spur authors on to greater heights, to greater accomplishments, whether or not the authors intended to follow their initial or latest outpourings with an updated or more elaborate sequel on the same or a similar subject. Emphatically, in the case of the book under review, which follows their publication, in 2006, of Canadian Military Law Annotated, the authors have been spurred on, adding a second publication to what can only be described as a dearth of Canadian military law research and scholarly writing; a puzzling situation, given that over a million Canadians are subject to the provisions of military law.

This latest book is intended, in the authors’ own words, “... to present jurists and the lay reader with a comprehensive jurisprudential survey of Canadian military law and provide a reliable, relatively complete and authoritative companion reference work to our earlier text covering the entire sweep of Canadian military law.” In a review published in the Canadian Military Journal in 2007 of the authors’ Canadian Military Law Annotated, it was suggested that, while effective in its attempt to fill what is acknowledged to be a huge void in the literature addressing military law, the book had, in the judgement of the reviewer, “both minor and major shortcomings,” some related to editing, and some, attributed to omissions of important points of military law. The reviewer concluded by expressing “… [the] hope that others will fill the gaps left by this first effort.”

The authors’ second tome on Canadian military law not only contributes in an important way to filling the void in the literature, it brings to the attention of those responsible for providing the best possible legal education to aspiring members of the legal profession the importance of military law as a valid component of a good legal education, and allows an ever-increasing number of aspiring jurists to undertake courses in it.

It is important for those who are subject to the Code of Service Discipline – the officers and non-commissioned members of the Regular, Special Forces and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces, and others – to have access to and understand the legal framework under which they serve and/or have a responsibility for the application of the provisions of the National Defence Act (NDA). In the 1761 pages of this hefty volume, they will find the complete texts of the NDA, the Queen’s Regulations and Orders (QR&Os) [Vol. 1 – Administration, Vol. 2 – Disciplinary and Vol. 3 – Financial], the Military Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada. A very detailed and user-friendly index completes the volume, and headings on top of each page of the book provide the reader a quick reminder of which section of the NDA is being discussed.

Those who consult Military Justice in Action will delight in the annotation (the inclusion of critical or explanatory notes and commentary) of nearly all sections of the NDA. This feature, the result of extensive research by the authors who reviewed some 400 court judgements, makes understanding of the provisions of the Act much easier than would otherwise be the case. It also provides the legislator, the military law specialist, the member of the military hierarchy, the pedagogue, and the student of the law with jurisprudence reference points that connect each annotated section of the NDA to Canadian law. This is a feature of the book that should be of particular interest to all members of the Canadian Forces, given the challenges that are being brought to some sections of the NDA by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and by other phenomena of societal evolution.

It is good to be reminded, as the authors do, that those who are subject to the Code of Service Discipline do not suspend, displace, or supplant their rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that any ‘limit’ to a given right or freedom must be shown by the Crown to be demonstrably reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society. In addition, readers of the book will benefit from knowing that, despite recent efforts to modernize sections of NDA, disparities continue to exist between Canadian common law and military law. For example, contrary to basic tenets of common law, Summary Trials conducted by the commanding officer of
a member accused of disciplinary or criminal transgressions do not require that the commanding officer be legally trained, or that records of proceedings be kept. Furthermore, legal counsel may not attend the proceedings, nor does there exist a right to appeal Summary Trial findings, despite the fact that a maximum penalty of 30 days detention can be given. In addition, a civilian who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline, and who is tried by a General Court Martial, would face a military judge, a military prosecutor, and a panel of five Canadian Forces officers. Were this same civilian tried by a criminal court, he would be judged by 12 of his peers. As the authors make clear in their ‘Word of Introduction,’ legislators face a challenge in finding a way to bring the NDA more in line with the common law and Canada’s Charter-protected rights and freedoms by, for instance, reducing to a minimum possible the disparities between military criminal law and civilian criminal law.

Pointing to errors of fact or omission is usually an indispensible part of any book review. Given the enormity of the task the authors undertook, and the time needed to assemble and have the book published, it is understandable that some, but remarkably little information contained in the ‘Commentary’ provided on sections of the NDA needs correcting or updating. The reader who, for instance, is intimately familiar with today’s Canadian Forces and its educational institutions and Service Associations will notice that no mention is made of the post-graduate and distance learning programs provided by the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) (p. 141), nor is mention made (p. 143) of the fact that Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Richard Evraire, C.M.M., C.D., is a highly experienced infantry officer who has commanded and served in high and varied appointments. In fairness to the authors, these ‘inaccuracies’ are of no consequence to the main objectives of this book.

Finally, and most importantly, it is to Canadian military legal doctrine that Military Justice in Action makes its greatest contribution; a field almost devoid of the written works (legal texts, professional journal articles, treatise, précis, etc., authored by jurists, in the penal, disciplinary, administrative, and organizational domains) that one would assume would exist in great quantity on the subject of Canadian military law, and that explain, interpret, analyse, or comment on legislation or on Court decisions. Because these doctrinal writings are in such short supply, legislators, our military and civilian jurists, as well as our law faculties, are denied the quantity and quality of tools needed to better understand the principles and theories that underpin Canadian military law, tools that would include judicial references needed to undertake research projects on Canadian military legal matters and the information required to study and/or resolve specific legal problems related to Canada’s military.

The authors are to be congratulated for having accomplished what can only be described as a highly welcome tour de force.


Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Richard Evraire, C.M.M., C.D., is a highly experienced infantry officer who has commanded and served in high and varied appointments. He is currently Chair of the Conference of Defence Associations, and Chair of the Board of Governors of Royal Military College Saint Jean.

by P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert
Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010
398 pages, $34.95 (PB)
Reviewed by: Major Tony Balasevicius

In 2009, the Canadian government unveiled a new policy for the Arctic with its Northern Strategy. The strategy is focused upon exercising Canada’s sovereignty while helping the Arctic realize its full potential as a healthy and prosperous region within Canada. Although there is general agreement that greater investment in the Arctic is long overdue, there are differences of opinion regarding the best method by which to achieve this goal. Specifically, there is concern among some analysts that the government is putting far too much emphasis upon the need for the Canadian Forces (CF) to re-establish sovereignty in the North at the expense of other more important developmental priorities.

In an effort to put this sovereignty debate into perspective, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, the Chair of the Department of History at St. Jerome’s University (University of Waterloo), has teamed up with Peter Kikkert, a Ph.D. student in History at the University of Western Ontario, to produce The Canadian Forces and Arctic Sovereignty: Debating Roles, Interests, and Requirements, 1968-1974.

The book is an edited work that chronicles the policy recommendations and debates with respect to the military’s role in Arctic sovereignty during the years leading up to, and immediately after, the introduction of the 1971 Defence White Paper. The book is divided into three sections, including an introduction, the documents that the editors have compiled, and an ‘afterword’ by a well-known authority in the field of Arctic security, Professor Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary.
The introduction provides an excellent overview of the issues, events, and debates that shaped the various policy papers being presented in this book. In the process, it outlines CF responses to government direction on Arctic military issues, and highlights divisions between the different departments with respect to how sovereignty should be established. The well-crafted analysis within this section is combined with a smooth writing style that makes for easy reading of the diverse issues.

The second section is the core of the book, and it contains 63 different documents. It commences with a review of the government’s initial attempts to define sovereignty, and then explores the role of the Canadian Forces in strengthening the nation’s claims in the north. It then pulls those discussions together into a case study as it examines the government’s perspective and reaction to the September 1969 voyage of the S. S. Manhattan through the Northwest Passage.

The next part of this section chronicles the Department of National Defence’s (DND) planning for Arctic operations. The editors have provided some unique insights into the efforts undertaken by the Department’s planners, which examined possible threats, roles, and resources that could be made available for the Arctic mission. Of particular significance is the Concept of Operations for the Canadian Forces Northern Region, dated 14 July 1970 that came about as a direct result of this exercise. The document, which was classified for many years, is a good summary on how the CF interpreted the previous debates, and the direction it had been given up to that time.

The section moves forward with some interesting background dealing with what is today commonly referred to as the Whole of Government (WoG) approach to operations. It examines the Canadian Forces’ relationship with other government departments, and provides some detail into how each might work together to achieve common interests. These papers highlight the fact that the WoG concept is not unique to the modern battle space, as the idea appears to have been well entrenched within government as far back as the early-1970s.

The section concludes by looking at the Department of External Affairs’ (DEA) reaction to the initial drafts of the White Paper on Defence, and examines a number of excerpts from the House of Commons debates and reports on what the military actually did in the Arctic during the period under review. At times these documents can be a tedious read. However, the editors have done an extremely good job of organizing the pertinent papers and debates within this section so that key themes are presented in a logical manner.

The ‘afterword’ section, written by Dr. Huebert, is interesting, and provides the reader with a different perspective on the analysis contained in the first section. Huebert highlights many of the contradictions inherent in the government’s response to the Arctic, and makes a compelling argument that those efforts were not as complete as they could have been because they were hindered by a philosophy of looking for low cost solutions to the Arctic’s problems.

In a number of respects, The Canadian Forces and Arctic Sovereignty is a compelling work that provides a nice balance between insight and analysis into the government’s decision making process with respect to Arctic sovereignty issues between 1968 and 1974. Lackenbauer and Kikkert have provided Canadians with a well-researched resource that will in all likelihood remain relevant for some years. As Huebert aptly points out, “… many of the arguments and debates that shaped the responses of the Canadian government in the 1960s and 1970s are eerily similar to the arguments that are being put forth today.” Much of the material contained within the book is still relevant to researchers, analysts, and policy makers today, simply because the debate over government priorities in the Arctic appears to have changed very little over the years.

Major Tony Balasevicius, a highly experienced infantry officer, was a member of the team that worked on the Arctic Integrating Concept, and is currently Team Lead for the Canadian Forces Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enabling Concept.
FROM COLD WAR TO NEW MILLENIUM – THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT, 1953-2008
by Colonel Bernd Horn
Toronto: Dundurn, 2011
496 pages, $39.95
Reviewed by Michael Goodspeed

In his newest book, From Cold War to New Millennium, The History of the Royal Canadian Regiment 1953-2008, Colonel Bernd Horn adopts a unique approach to the telling of regimental history. Most histories of this sort generally attempt to portray their subjects using a chronological stream of close-ups of regimental life in peace and war. This is not surprising, since regimental histories are, by their nature, tactical and personal examinations of a unit’s exploits. Variants of this conventional form of regimental history have been a tradition for the last century and a half, with all too often unit actions and personalities not only viewed at a very short focal length, but also in a uniformly complimentary light. However, From Cold War to New Millennium is different.

Horn has deliberately and successfully steered clear of this more predictable model of regimental history. In this, the most recent study of the RCR, he goes to considerable lengths to place the Regiment’s activities in light of their larger political, strategic, and operational context. At the same time, Horn provides sufficient detail to give his reader a thorough and inclusive understanding of the Regiment’s accomplishments over this period. The book is liberally peppered with quotes and anecdotes from a wide variety of Royals at all rank levels, and his description of the individual perceptions of events is sufficiently detailed so that the numerous dangers, challenges, frustrations, and triumphs of the Regiment are clearly portrayed. Anyone who served during this period will have little trouble relating his or her experiences to the narrative.

In addition to these very personal glimpses of the Regiment’s history, Horn has gone to considerable lengths to examine and assess the detailed background and the larger, overarching factors that served to shape the RCR in the post-Korea period. In combining the tactical and broader environmental perspectives in one book, From Cold War to New Millennium becomes as much a wide-ranging examination of the political and military mindset of the period as it is a Regimental narrative.

Although the book is divided into nine chapters, Horn effectively examines his subject within the confines of three periods: the Cold War, the Nineties, and the New Millennium.

In studying the Cold War, Horn covers the Army’s key tasks: national survival, the Defence of Canada, the nation’s NATO commitments in Central and Northern Europe, peacekeeping in Cyprus, and the debilitating double tasking and training problems that characterized Canadian based battalions during the leaner years of the Cold War. He also provides his own perspective on such varied subjects as unification, the disbandment of regiments, and the now-unthinkable doctrinal emphasis of the late-fifties and early-sixties of having infantry employed in the immediate follow-up exploitation of battlefield nuclear strikes.

In his assessment of the nineties, Horn analyzes the Regiment’s participation in the Oka Crisis, its limited participation in the first Gulf War, its extensive and distinguished service in the Balkans; and in addition, as viewed, at least in part, from the perspective of the RCR’s 3 Commando, he presents an examination of the Canadian Airborne Regiment’s experience in Somalia. Lastly in this period, he studies the post-Somalia crisis of confidence and trust in the Canadian Forces, its various manifestations, causes, and downstream effects.

In the New Millennium section, there are brief but comprehensive descriptions of operations in Eritrea and Haiti, as well as an assessment of the new post-Somalia spirit in the army. The book’s strongest element is Horn’s description of the Regiment’s participation in operations in Afghanistan. He assesses the RCR’s participation in the security of Kabul in the UN-mandated Operation Athena, and provides a well charted and illustrated synopsis of Operation Medusa. He is equally as good describing the actions of successive RCR Battle Groups and Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as the nature of Canada’s phase of the war shifted from conventional combat to counter-insurgency.

From Cold War to New Millennium has been created with an obvious effort to use primary sources wherever possible. The book is amply, but not pedantically annotated. Of note, in documenting his story, Horn frequently uses his endnotes to provide additional commentary or telling details. His references and endnotes are worth reading. The book has been well laid out; the photographs have been judiciously selected to give a sound representation of the period, and the maps and charts are simple, clear and in sufficient number. At $39.95 the book is admittedly pricey for a paperback, but not exorbitant.
Horn’s numerous useful insights into such varied subjects as the impact of unification, and the nature of ‘jointness,’ the defence of Canada and its North, the nature of peacekeeping operations, and counter-insurgency are matters of continuing concern to the CF and to Canada. From Cold War to New Millennium will be of interest first and foremost to members of the Regiment, but the book will also appeal to a considerably wider readership than is normally associated with this kind of volume.

There was not much in this book that I did not like. It is not a simple recasting of events, nor is it a jingoistic paean to regimental tradition. It is regimental history as it should be told. In writing this book, Horn gives his readers a thoughtful and thought provoking examination of the Regiment and its place in Canadian history. From Cold War to New Millennium is highly readable, informative, provocative, and probably as insightful a synopsis of this period of Canada’s military history as one will find. In this volume Horn has provided an irrefutable case for the Regiment’s value to Canada. It is a fitting account of the last fifty-five years of the RCR, for as the author has tacitly demonstrated, it remains one of Canada’s finest and most faithful institutions.

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THE NUREMBERG SS-EINSATZGRUPPEN TRIAL, 1945-1958: ATROCITY, LAW, AND HISTORY
by Hilary Earl
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009
xv + 336 pages, $91.95 (hardcover), $28.95 (trade paperback)
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Reviewed by Brian Bertosa

In 1941 and 1942 in the occupied Soviet Union, Germany’s notorious Einsatzgruppen (‘task groups’ or ‘task forces’), paramilitary units of the SS and police, were responsible for the killing of an estimated one million people, consisting of the mentally and physically disabled, Communist functionaries, Gypsies, and especially Jews. Employing, in the main, open-air shootings and carbon monoxide gas vans, by 1943, their activities had been largely superseded by the extermination camps, although at least one sub-unit still existed on paper into 1945. By 1947, the American occupation authorities had decided to prosecute 24 leaders of the Einsatzgruppen and their various sub-units as part of the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings, in what came to be known informally as the Einsatzgruppen case. Given its character as the only Nuremberg process that dealt exclusively with the Final Solution to the Jewish Question, it is somewhat surprising that no book-length study of this important trial had been published prior to 2009. In that year, however, Canada’s own Hilary Earl of Nipissing University made good this lacuna with a book whose reception can perhaps best be judged by the fact that it has already been reprinted twice—a fate that does not often befall a scholarly monograph.

The activities of the Einsatzgruppen have been dealt with at length in numerous works during preceding decades, and so, other than citing a handful of illustrative examples, the author concentrates instead upon a complementary, but quite different, set of topics. After a thoroughgoing introduction—it is here that an overview of the modus operandi of the Einsatzgruppen can be found—Chapter 1 provides a discussion of the legal basis of the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings in the context of rapidly worsening relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, and the gradual solidification of American war crimes policy, due to the realization that it would not be possible to prosecute as many individuals as had been envisaged prior to war’s end. Chapter 2 yields a fascinating account of Otto Ohlendorf, one of the leaders of Einsatzgruppe D, who freely (and naively) admitted everything to his British and American captors in the belief that he had done nothing wrong. His candid testimony made him one of the most high-profile defendants in the Einsatzgruppen trial.

Chapter 3 comprises a collective biography of the defendants, investigating what Earl calls their “route to crime,” and many readers may come to regard this as the centrepiece of the book. The author examines many aspects of their lives, including age—noting that many of the defendants came of age in the traumatic aftermath of the First World War—geographic origin, religion, occupation (one had been an ordained Protestant minister!), Party membership, careers in the SS, SD, or Gestapo (it is important to note that these were not military men), and education. This latter aspect is of particular interest. As the presiding judge, Michael Musmanno, put it, “...since the twenty-[four] defendants were charged with one million murders, one would expect to see in the dock a band of coarse, untutored barbarians. Instead, one beheld a group of men with a formidable educational background.” (p. 96).
Six of the defendants held doctoral degrees, and one of these, Otto Rasch, actually had two. While it may be thought that an advanced education can shield a person from susceptibility to radical ideologies, the peculiar conditions of Nazi Germany, as exemplified in the lives of these men, seem to suggest precisely the opposite.

The trial proper is covered in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, which examine respectively the strategies of the defence, how these fared at trial, and the judgment. A highlight of this part of the book, which may resonate with many readers in the military, is the discussion of the defence of superior orders, and how this was demolished by Musmanno. ‘In a nutshell,’ all the prosecution needed was for one defendant to admit that there were some things he would not do, even if given a direct order. Ohlendorf, arguably a leader among the defendants, was cool on the stand, hesitating only a little before stating that he would have executed his own sister if ordered to do so. Willy Seibert, on the other hand, was not as ideologically committed—or as willing to lie. When asked by Musmanno if he would shoot his own parents, he eventually, after a sleepless night during which the court was recessed to await his answer, responded that he would not. This destroyed the defence’s case. As the judgment would later note, “... some orders . . . may be disobeyed, and, because they could be disobeyed, the only reasonable conclusion [is] that the defendants had freely and with agency engaged in mass murder” (p. 206).

The final chapter provides an intriguing glimpse into the politics of early Cold War Europe, wherein the Americans were eager to enlist the Germans as allies against burgeoning Soviet influence. Strident demands by German nationalist groups led to the commutation of many of the Nuremberg sentences. Of the fourteen death sentences imposed in the *Einsatzgruppen* case, only four were carried out, and the last defendant was released from prison in 1958.

A brief conclusion rounds out the study.

Earl’s account is impeccably documented, yet her style is remarkably clear, with no more legal terminology than a television courtroom drama. For such a prestigious publishing house as Cambridge, however, the copy editing of this book appears to have been surprisingly uneven, resulting in, among other problems, instances of poor sentence structure, including the occasional sentence fragment. Minor quibbles over form, however, are hardly worth noting in a book whose content is so engaging and important. *The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial* is a work whose significance in the evolving historiography of the Holocaust and the Third Reich is surely only to increase with the passage of time.

Brian Bertosa is an independent scholar who resides in Cobourg, Ontario. His articles and reviews have appeared in the *Canadian Military Journal*, *the Journal of Military History*, and *War & Society*.
This is a brilliant book. Dr. Doug Delaney, an experienced former infantry officer and current associate professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada, has written an incredibly valuable book that delivers on several levels. First, it provides five great case studies of corps commanders in the Second World War; second, it makes a great argument for the utility and value of British staff college training of the period and its impact on interoperability within the Commonwealth; and third, its speaks to leadership and command.

_Corps Commanders_, as the title aptly states, is about five very different corps commanders during the Second World War. Two are British, Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks and General Sir John Crocker. The other three are Canadians, namely Lieutenant-Generals E.L.M. Burns and Guy Granville Simonds, as well as General Charles Foulkes. All were quite different. As Dr Delaney describes them, one was “…a consummate actor, one a quiet gentleman, one a master bureaucrat, one a brainy sort with little will and the last a brain with will to spare.” Delaney expertly tells their individual stories by delving into their personalities, how they were formed as commanders, how they interrelated with others, and how they fought.

Each case study is complete in every sense. The reader is given the inclusive picture and understanding of each of the respective commanders – the formative experiences that shaped their personality, their strengths and weaknesses, as well as the reasons for their success or failure. Delaney also walks the reader through their campaigns and major battles during their tenure as corps commanders with incredibly insightful analysis. Detailed maps provide added clarity to the narrative. By the end of each chapter, the reader cannot help but feel that they fully comprehend both ‘the man’ and ‘the situation.’

Not surprisingly, each of the case studies is extremely interesting, since all the corps commanders chosen for analysis represent such different characters. Some were good, some were great, and others were neither. However, by examining their strengths, weaknesses, accomplishments, and failures, Delaney dissects the concept of command and its central components. As a result, the book is almost a ‘how to’ guide to being a good commander. In essence, the reader is treated to a virtual primer on leadership and command. As such, the reader can easily draw great lessons with respect to successful command from the case studies. Nonetheless, these lessons are derived from both good and bad examples. In addition, the case studies also lay out simple soldierly truths that are timeless. For example, from Montgomery’s dictum that a commander must always radiate confidence regardless of circumstances, to the necessity of sharing hardship with the soldiers, these simple ‘truisms’ provide a useful reminder to leaders at all levels.

In the narrative process, Delaney also provides great insight into other key Allied personalities of the war, as well as the delicate issues of coalition warfare. In this respect, the book goes a long way in succinctly and logically describing and explaining the ‘atmospherics’ of the ‘politics’ of command. As many may suspect, ability, skill, and experience are not always the only, or key, arbitrator of promotion.

Throughout, the writing is crisp and flowing. The book is meticulously researched, and it contains impressive endnotes that provide excellent source material, as well as additional explanatory notes. The book also has a detailed index and impressive bibliography. Finally, 18 black and white photographs add graphic support to the narrative and put a ‘face’ to many of the characters mentioned.

In sum, _Corps Commanders_ is an important addition to the body of knowledge on the Second World War and the study of command. Although the war is arguably dated, the many lessons on leadership and command that emerge are timeless and are as relevant today as they were then. In closing, this is an outstanding book that should be read by all aspiring leaders and commanders, and as early in their careers as possible. It is also strongly recommended for all military members of any rank, as well as for historians and anyone who is interested in the profession of arms.

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