FROM THE EDITOR

In this issue you will find an update to the July-September 2009 and April-June 2010 MIPB articles on Army doctrine (and particularly MI doctrine) restructure. This update describes the ways MI doctrine will meet the intent of Army Doctrine 2015 as well as updating the available and projected publications. Look for another update in the October-December 2012 issue on this fluid and dynamic topic.

We have several articles which are in the lessons learned arena. From RC-East Afghanistan, three articles discuss the development and operations of the Regional Information Fusion Center from network targeting to the incorporation of a Human Terrain Analysis Team. Two articles speak to operations in the drawdown in Iraq. One summarizes principles of operational assessments and relates how a Joint Interrogation and Detention Center in Iraq used qualitative and quantitative assessments to improve operations and apply them to adapt and maintain efficient operations during the drawdown. The second focuses on the intelligence support to sustainment operations during the final push of personnel and equipment out of Iraq in 2011. Back to Afghanistan, another article relates the issues and eventual success story of a partnership between Romanian and U.S. intelligence personnel. Rounding out the topic of lessons learned is a summary of CIA functions and its relationship with the DoD.

From USAICoE, the Learning Innovation Office gives us a look at its digital training investment to support the Army Learning Model 2015 and the launch of its new learning management system.

Throughout 2012, the MI community (USAICoE, INSCOM, DA G2, and FORSCOM) will be commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the MI Branch and the 25th anniversary of the MI Corps. Activities are planned to educate as well as build professional interest in the history and heritage of Army Intelligence starting with the American Revolution through experiences and events throughout the year. In keeping with this, we are pleased to include in this issue an expanded biography of MG (R) Oliver Dillard, an inductee into this year’s Hall of Fame. MG Dillard’s career spanned 36 years, beginning as a drafted enlisted soldier in a segregated Army during World War II to retiring as a major general in an all-volunteer Army in the Eighties.

Look for the July-September 2012 50th anniversary commemorative issue published in collaboration with Lori Tagg, USAICoE Command Historian and Michael Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian, (coming in September.)

Suspenses for next year’s MIPB are:

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The Future of Intelligence Doctrine

The Army now finds itself at a watershed moment in how we conceptualize, organize, develop, and disseminate our doctrine. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has grappled with how to improve Army doctrine since 2009, and in February 2011, started planning the Army Doctrine 2015 initiative. Doctrine 2015 is the concerted effort to better support Army education, training, and operations by providing a more effective body of doctrine. Implementation began in October 2011 with the release of ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations. Ultimately, the intent of Doctrine 2015 is to provide Army professionals with a solid doctrinal foundation. This effort is especially important as we head into an uncertain future. The Army will have fewer and shorter doctrinal publications, make the process more collaborative, and make doctrine more accessible.

Army Doctrine 2015 includes some significant structural changes to our body of doctrine. The Army will structure doctrine within a new hierarchy containing four levels of publications: Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs), Army Doctrinal Reference Publications (ADRP), Field Manuals (FMs), and Army Techniques Publications (ATPs). The Army will place content online with supporting applications and multimedia capabilities to ensure our doctrine is more accessible and useable. Additionally, new wiki capabilities will allow a greater degree of collaboration and will facilitate timely changes to ATPs.

The key timelines are as follows: all ADPs and ADRPs completed by 31 August 2012, all FMs completed by 31 December 2013, and all ATPs completed by 31 December 2015. The Army will release fifteen ADPs and ADRPs to include ADP 2-0, Intelligence, and ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, during the Fall AUSA Conference in October. In concert with, or shortly after, the Army will also provide a number of articles, briefings, and supporting products.

As a part of this, the Intelligence Center of Excellence (CoE) has launched a comprehensive effort to consolidate and improve our military intelligence doctrine. We will more effectively organize our doctrinal content and reduce our publication count to a manageable number. Less publications and a more concentrated grouping of doctrine allows intelligence professionals to more efficiently find and use intelligence doctrine. Additionally, we will work diligently to quickly revise MI doctrine to remain relevant and meet new requirements.

We had to make some tough choices and exercise discipline in our approach to Army Doctrine 2015 in order to meet Chief of Staff of the Army and CG, TRADOC guidance and to posture ourselves for a resource-constrained future. The Intelligence COE will implement Army Doctrine 2015 while still ensuring that we maintain all content necessary to conduct operations. We will reduce the publication count from 53 to 21 publications by October 2015. For a list of those publications and more information on Army Doctrine 2015 and our implementation plans see the article “Implementing Army Doctrine 2015” by Captain King on page 4.

We are less than a year into this effort but we have already taken steps to better articulate intelligence doctrine within ADP and ADRP 2-0. These publications will serve as the foundation for all subsequent intelligence publications. During the development of these publications we have reached out to engage a broad cross section of the Army intelligence community. As a result, we feel the quality of these publications has improved. These publications include some new concepts to include—
Intelligence core competencies.

Leveraging the intelligence enterprise.

Fusion Centers.

Intelligence operations as a part of information collection.

Complementary intelligence capabilities which are comprised of biometrics-enabled intelligence, cyber-enabled intelligence, forensics-enabled intelligence, and document and media exploitation.

Processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) activities as an important aspect of intelligence operations.

The Intelligence CoE had made a significant effort in recent years to better respond to operational requirements by developing timely publications covering topics such as the Company Intelligence Support Team, the Multifunctional Team, and CI Support to FOBs. However, we recognize that beyond the fundamentals and general processes, operational Army units and organizations are best postured to develop detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for many specific intelligence tasks. The Army, to include our Doctrine Division, is looking at various ways to tap into your expertise to capture those operational TTPs.

While we develop intelligence doctrine, you have to “fight” that doctrine and in many cases you have the expertise. Tapping into your expertise is both our challenge and your challenge. Over the next year I ask that you use and assess our doctrine and participate in the doctrinal development process. Engage with us so we can improve Army intelligence doctrine together. If you need any information or want to engage with our Doctrine Division please contact Craig Sieting, Chief, Writing Branch, Intelligence Doctrine at craig.t.sieting.civ@mail.mil, or by phone at commercial (520) 538-1018/DSN 879-1018.

Always Out Front!
Implementing Army Doctrine 2015

by Captain Kenneth T. King

Note: This article is an update to “Doctrine Reengineering and WIKI Pilot Program” and the “MI Doctrine Update” in the July-September 2009 and April-June 2010 issue of MIPB respectively.

“The goal is to create a top-to-bottom hierarchy, or echelon, of publications and manuals that provide top-level, easy to read doctrinal principles, with supporting references that increase in length and depth of information. Doctrine 2015 will make those references available at the point of need through interactive media such as mobile

–General Robert W. Cone, Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

The Army has embarked on its most ambitious doctrinal effort in decades. As mentioned in MG Potter’s column on page 2 the intent of Army Doctrine 2015 is to have fewer and shorter doctrinal publications, to make the process more collaborative, and to make doctrine more accessible. To better appreciate this effort you first have to understand the new hierarchy of publication types (See Figure 1):

- Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) provide the most fundamental doctrine that all Army professionals must master to posture the Army for an uncertain future. These concise publications are usually no more than 10 to 15 pages and the Army will publish them in a 6” by 9” printed format.

- Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) expand on the content in each equivalent ADP and more completely covers that topic area. These publications fully cover all related fundamental doctrinal concepts and are usually no more than 100 pages.

- The purpose and scope of Field Manuals (FMs) is now more specific. FMs focus on the conduct of operations, execution of tactics, and supporting procedures. The bodies of these manuals are usually no more than 200 pages while the appendices (with no page limit) will contain procedures.

- The majority of Army doctrine will reside in Army Techniques Publications (ATPs). These publications are developed and approved by the various Army doctrinal proponents to provide the operational force with a broad library of doctrinal content on many specialized topics. ATPs will contain much more information than is now found in FMs, TCs, ATTPs, and other types of publications. There is no page limit on these ATPs.

![Figure 1. Doctrine 2015 Overview.](image)
If necessary, proponents can develop their own publications outside of official doctrine (i.e., Training Circulars or General Service Technical Manuals) to inform the force of specific technical topics. For example, in the future we plan to update MI Publication 2-0.1, Intelligence Reference Guide.

Figure 2. ADP and ADRP Status.

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<tr>
<th>ADP 1 The Army</th>
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<td>ADP 8-22 Army Leadership</td>
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<td>ADP 5-00 The Operations Process</td>
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Figure 3. Available and Projected FMs.

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<th>FM 3-07 Stability Operations</th>
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<td>FM 3-09 Reconnaissance, Security, and Enabling Tasks</td>
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<td>FM 3-39 Military Police Operations</td>
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</table>

Figure 2 lists all ADPs, ADRPs, and Figure 3 lists all available and projected FMs. The supporting ATPs will provide more depth to our body of doctrine. This hierarchy is designed to allow quicker doctrinal revisions without degrading our enduring doctrinal principles.

**Wiki Capabilities**

In order to improve doctrinal collaboration the Army is using a wiki capability (on the existing milWiki network) to gather field comments to help improve existing doctrine. Any approved user can access doctrinal publications at https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Wiki/Portal:Army_Document. Once a doctrinal publication is put on the milWiki site it is then considered Draft/Not Approved and all users have the ability to make wiki changes to that document. Each proponent will then assess the validity and urgency of any single or group of changes. When necessary those comments will be used to make a quick change or full revision to the official/authenticated doctrinal publication through the approved doctrinal process. The addition of digital collaboration to the doctrinal development process should draw recently deployed Soldiers and the Army doctrinal proponents closer together than ever before.

**Other Technological Enablers**

Another exciting aspect of Army Doctrine 2015 is the development of applications and other multimedia in order to enable Soldiers to access doctrine information in a repository through a digital device (for example, a smart phone or tablet). The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is currently looking at a number of projects to better disseminate doctrinal information to Soldiers.
Some examples include:
- **Doctrine Video Book**: A 1 hour video presentation designed to highlight the key points of each ADP.
- **Interactive Media Instruction Products**: 1 hour of interactive graphic content with narration, pictures, and video clips to provide instruction on the key points for each ADRP.
- **Doctrine Knowledge Map**: An intuitive graphic interface that links Soldiers to the most important doctrinal topics and a search engine that provides key word searches for doctrinal topics.
- **Numerous Soldier applications that are only constrained by the imagination and resourcing.**

CADD is in the early stage of developing these technological enablers. More information will be provided through the Army’s Doctrine 2015 communications plan.

**Transition to Doctrine 2015**

There were a number of different intelligence doctrinal efforts underway when the Chief of Staff of the Army and CG, TRADOC approved the Army Doctrine 2015 effort. We had recently completed or started the development/revision of over 40 different FMs, TCs, ATTPs, and MI Publications. Thus, as we were starting implementation of Army Doctrine 2015 we were also trying to complete as many ongoing publications as possible. Therefore, we realize the current doctrinal status and three-year transition to our intelligence doctrine endstate will be a little confusing. For example, previously FM 2-0 covered our most fundamental intelligence doctrine but the next version of FM 2-0 will comply with the Doctrine 2015 guidance by exclusively focusing on intelligence operations and supporting tactics across the different echelons. In the next issue of MIPB we will provide a comprehensive status of all intelligence doctrinal publications.

**Intelligence Doctrine 2015 Endstate**

Army Doctrine 2015 will intellectually posture intelligence professionals for the next fight. The intelligence doctrine endstate is set and we are implementing Army Doctrine 2015. We have undertaken a comprehensive effort to consolidate and improve our doctrinal publications as part of Army Doctrine 2015. By October 2015 we will reduce the publication count from 53 to 21. Of the 21 publications, 16 will be ATPs. Figure 4 lists and logically groups our 21 endstate publications.

We will embed all relevant current intelligence doctrinal content within those publications listed in...
Figure 4. As a result, we will have to move some doctrinal content and embed certain topics within these 21 publications. Certain topics will no longer have their own publication (for example, we will move weather doctrine from FM 34-81 and embed it within a number of intelligence publications). Another example is that we will take the doctrinal discussion of IPB in the urban environment that currently resides in FM 2-91.4, Intelligence Support to Urban Operations TTP and move it to the new ATP 2-01.3, IPB. This approach will discuss doctrinal content within the context of the most fundamental doctrinal topics in order to minimize any redundancy, minimize the number of doctrinal publications that intelligence professionals must find, and to facilitate the training of fundamentals.

Additionally, we will use a more deliberate structure for our ATPs by organizing most of those publications into three parts. The first part will cover the most basic aspects of the topic, the second part will cover the general processes or tasks, and the third part will cover unique considerations for specific operations, missions, or environments.

Your Participation

As MG Potter stated, “tapping into your expertise is both our challenge and your challenge.” In order to meet the intent of Army of Doctrine 2015 we need your participation. Participation can include:

* Answering critical questions before the development of each publication that ensure we focus the publication on the proper purpose, scope, and issues.
* Involvement in subject matter expert workgroups to develop the text for certain key portions of the publications.
* Initial and final draft reviews of the publication as a normal part of the development process.

We will notify a select list of operational and doctrinal units and organizations via email of all staffings and final approvals of our intelligence publications. Draft intelligence doctrinal publications are available for your review at https://ikn.army.mil/apps/workgroups/workgroups.cfm. **Note: these publications are not official Army approved doctrine.** When authenticated, all official Army doctrine is available at the Army Publishing Doctrine website at www.apd.army.mil. When we receive final approval of our intelligence publications, we will notify personnel, units, and organizations via email and through announcements on Army professional forums and informal forums (e.g., milBook, Intelligence Social Network, and INTELST).

Please let us know if you would like to contribute to the development of intelligence doctrine in any of these important ways. If you need any information or want to engage with our Doctrine Division please contact Craig Sieting, Chief, Writing Branch, Intelligence Doctrine at craig.t.sieting.civ@mail.mil, or by phone at commercial (520) 538-1018/DSN 879-1018.

**Conclusion**

Doctrine 2015 is a significant departure from the way we have developed doctrine in the past. Changing times, technical advances, demands from the field, and the ever changing operational environment have necessitated these changes. Army Doctrine 2015 facilitates developing and teaching both enduring principles and new operational concepts.

“Doctrine 2105 affords the Army well defined enduring principles, tactics, and standard procedures—the basics of our Profession. Additionally, through the use of technologies, we will rapidly update techniques due to the changing conditions of the operational environment and the needs of operationally deployed forces.”

—General Cone

CPT King received a BA in Economics from Truman State University and an MA in Military Studies: Asymmetric Warfare from American Military University. He is currently completing a second MA in Intelligence Studies and is a student at the Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course with a follow-on assignment to the 1st Armored Division.
“Sable comes in various shades of brown, from the lightest tans to the darkest brown tones.”

“All they wanted was an opportunity to show the world that America was their country too and that they would and could defend it as well as any other. In return they simply wanted to be equal.” Doctor Krewasky A. Salter I, a retired Army Colonel, wrote these words in his 1996 dissertation, Sable Officers: African-American Military Officers, 1861-1948, to describe the journey that Blacks encountered in wanting to serve and defend their Nation. Major General Oliver Williams Dillard, U.S. Army Retired, is one such officer—the forgotten Sable officer. He worked his way up from private in the segregated Army during World War II to major general in the all-volunteer Army, defending America for almost 35 years.

General Dillard’s story starts as many did for young Southern Blacks in the early 40s—segregated and limited. Young Oliver’s father was a school teacher who was educated at Tuskegee Institute. Society limited educated Blacks in the South to becoming teachers, lawyers, doctors, and occasionally ministers. While Oliver’s hometown, Margaret, Alabama, was a dying coal mining town with a population around 2,000 people, he made the best of it and finished high school as its valedictorian at the age of 15. Although World War II had already begun, he looked forward to attending Tuskegee Institute, and following in his father’s footsteps as a Business Education teacher. The war would be over soon enough...he wishfully thought.

The Army started the Tuskegee Airmen program in June 1941 at the Institute, and Oliver knew the Army Air Corps’ 99th Pursuit Squadron was training there. He looked forward to meeting, and possibly, becoming one of them. Tuskegee had a history of officer training, and at the beginning of the school year 1941/1942, it established the Senior Infantry Unit (ROTC), building on the tradition that Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Sr. had started in 1920. When asked if he was familiar with the Airmen, General
Dillard responded, “We were all envious of them; the girls all fell for them.” Oliver wore the ROTC uniform with pride, and after completing the mandatory two-years of training, he continued as an advisor to the unit.

Having received a draft deferment in 1944, Oliver was not so lucky in 1945. Even though the war was winding down, Private Dillard and a large group of Blacks reported to Fort McClellan, Alabama, for basic training in June 1945. The Japanese surrender in August 1945 further emboldened his hopes of returning to Tuskegee for his senior year. As Oliver’s train carried him and his fellow graduates east to board ships headed to Europe, he eventually resigned himself to making the best of his new life as a Soldier.

Army troop transports delivered Oliver and his group of Black replacements to Bremerhaven enroute to Weissenburg, Germany, and an assignment to 349th Field Artillery Group. The Sergeant Major assigned Private Dillard as an Administrative Specialist to the 351st Field Artillery Battalion headquarters in southern Bavaria. On 2 January 1946, Oliver woke up for his first day in the “real Army” at six a.m. Falling out in the cold, Oliver and the other new arrivals were confronted by Battalion Sergeant Major MacAdory who quickly informed the formation, “I am your new top noncommissioned officer, and you are here so that I and others who fought the war can go home.” Oliver’s new boss was about 5 feet 2 inches, but he had a commanding presence, which gained the attention and quick response from all within the sound of his voice.

Sergeant Major MacAdory asked if anyone could type. Having been told early in his training not to volunteer for anything in the Army, Oliver reluctantly raised his hand. Six others in the group also signaled that they could type. The Sergeant Major instructed this little group of seven to go and change into Class A (service) uniforms and to rejoin him in the battery streets. When Oliver and the group rejoined the Sergeant Major, he appointed them to be the five battery clerks, an operations clerk, and the mail clerk for the battalion. Oliver became the Headquarters Battery Clerk.

Oliver worked very hard in his new job, and quickly concluded that he would need to work on his minimal typing skills and his knowledge of Army personnel regulations and procedures. The battalion headquarters staff and leadership took note. The temporary commander, Major Linton S. Boatwright, a White officer and West Pointer, had been the youngest major in World War II at the time and a highly decorated veteran. He often came by the office late at night and always saw Oliver working there. He complimented Oliver on his diligence and determination and suggested that Oliver had a bright future in the Army. Major Boatwright pushed hard to get Oliver promoted to warrant officer or to receive a direct commission to second lieutenant, but to no avail, because the Army was downsizing after World War II.

In his efforts to qualify for a warrant or a commission, Oliver successfully completed the Officer Candidate School (OCS) selection process and was approved for attendance at the Infantry OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia, but he was hesitant. Letters from his family constantly reminded him that his goal was to return to Alabama and complete his degree at Tuskegee. Now a technical sergeant, Oliver told Major Boatwright that when he went back to the States on leave, he would talk with his father before deciding whether or not to go to OCS. The senior Dillard thought it was a good opportunity; there weren’t many opportunities for a young Black man back in 1947. Consequently, with his father’s blessing, Oliver took the first step toward becoming a Sable officer in a segregated Army. In the process of doing so, he contributed to the giant first step America made toward establishing an integrated Army, where any young man of any color could rise above what others would call his normal station in life.

Oliver was one of the few Soldiers to graduate from the “Benning School for Boys,” as OCS is affectionately known in Army circles. After graduating, Second Lieutenant Dillard took his Associate Infantry Officers Basic Course by storm, emerging as the number one graduate of the class—its Honor Graduate. Thrilled by Oliver’s graduation, the Dillard family came down from Margaret to see his graduation ceremony. Traditionally, the Infantry School publically recognizes the number one student of the graduating class, and normally does so with a great deal of fanfare. In Oliver’s case, however, the School did not announce any designation of honor graduate for his class. One won-
ders whether or not this was an effort to slight the outstanding performance of a Sable officer in the South. One will really never know. We do know that this was another situation that Oliver Dillard would have to tolerate, but not forget. Now over 65 years since the event, he still remembers.8

The headquarters of the Regiment assigned Oliver to Company L, 3rd Battalion. In a few days, Oliver’s platoon led the battalion’s attack to secure the vital road junction of Yechon. His company commander, Captain Bradley Biggs, charter member of World War II’s famed 555th Parachute Battalion, the “Smoke Jumpers,” complimented Oliver’s use of speed and aggressiveness in capturing the town.12 After Captain Biggs was injured and evacuated, Oliver assumed command of the company just before a major North Korean attack to seize an area west of the town of Sanju. If seized by the enemy, this area would provide excellent avenues of approach to Pusan and the surrounding areas in the South.13 From 26 to 31 July 1950, Oliver and the 24th Infantry Regiment held against continuous North Korean attacks. On 2 August 1950, the regiment withdrew to Masan, a town some 30 miles by road west of Pusan.14

Emerging from his one-year tour in Korea, Oliver had fought in five campaigns, earned the coveted Combat Infantryman’s Badge, the Silver Star for heroism, and two Bronze Stars for Valor, and received the Purple Heart for a combat wound. For his actions in the defense of the area west of Sanju, he was reportedly nominated for a Distinguished Service Cross. Oliver did not receive this award, however, because the new regimental commander,
who assumed command several weeks after the action disapproved the recommendation, indicating that he would not approve it because he had not personally witnessed the event. Was this another effort to slight the outstanding performance by a Sable officer? We will never really know. Oliver, however, still remembers.

Oliver returned to Fort Benning for the Infantry Officers Advanced Course, where he graduated 4th in a class of 184 students. Instead of returning to the line, he served as an assistant professor of Military Science at North Carolina Agriculture and Technology (NC A&T) in Greensboro from 1952 to 1954. His experience as an ROTC cadet at Tuskegee Institute and as a leader of men in combat served him well in training cadets at NC A&T State to be leaders of Soldiers in the military. Oliver remembers coaching future Major General (Retired) Charles Bussey, future Chief of Public Affairs for the Army, as a cadet and mentoring him later in his career.

Oliver’s return to Germany in 1954, offered an opportunity for him to punch the all-important company command ticket with the 4th Infantry Division, a frontline unit. His command of Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment—one of the first integrated infantry companies—ended after a short four months, when the Regimental Commander, Colonel (later Major General) Kenneth W. Collins, moved him to the position of Regimental Communications Officer stating, “I need one of my best officers in this position because of the criticality of communications in accomplishing the regiment’s defensive mission.” Oliver adjusted to this new development, because he was a team player who trusted his bosses and their planning.

Following his Germany assignment, Oliver attended the prestigious Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), where he was one of only three Black officers in his class. He graduated in the top third of his class. After CGSC, he attended the University of Omaha in Omaha, Nebraska, under the Army’s Bootstrap Program, and received his bachelor’s degree.

An assignment to Headquarters, First Army led Oliver to a choice assignment to the U.S. Military Mission to Monrovia, Liberia, initially as deputy Chief of Mission and later as the Operations Officer. Oliver received unprecedented access to the Liberian Defense Forces operations and intelligence planning process. He became a valued coach and mentor to Liberian officers and assisted them in integrating advanced staff techniques and processes into their planning. Leveraging Oliver’s experiences in Korea, Germany and Africa, the Army assigned him to the Army Staff’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) to lead the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Section, Special Warfare and Foreign Assistance Branch.

The Army selected Oliver as its first Black officer to attend the National War College, an indicator of future high-level assignments. After graduation, he stayed in the D.C. area in the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command’s Institute of Special Studies at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. It was there that Oliver received news that he had not been selected for Colonel. After enduring a lecture by a senior White officer that Blacks did not deserve to be officers, let alone colonels, Oliver watched as senior White officers questioned the process that did not adequately reward his obviously exemplary performance.
Both Oliver and his Branch Assignments Officer were amazed that Oliver had not been selected for promotion to Colonel. During conversations between Military Personnel Command leaders and senior officers, Oliver’s case was questioned and a relook resulted. A special board convened and selected Oliver for Colonel, which was also considered as a normal terminal grade for Black officers. As quickly as the Army had made its mistake, now Major General Collins supported Oliver’s assignment to command one of his battalions in the 5th Combat Support Training Brigade at Fort Dix and later the Brigade, for a year. Oliver’s career had new life, and he had more opportunities to show his mettle.

In Summer 1969, Oliver reported for duty with U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAC-V), as a Province Senior Advisor (PSA) for Kontum Province. The Washington Post’s Peter Jay documented Oliver and his Advisory Team 41’s success in Military Region II as the example for how to build a close relationship with the Province Chief and a civilian deputy, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) employee. Together, they grew the Provincial and Popular Forces to defend the Province and organized the villages and hamlets—Vietnamese and Montagnard—to feed and defend themselves. Oliver contends that this article brought him into the public eye, sometimes a key factor in flag officer promotion.

After two years of distinguished service in the PSA Program, in 1971, Oliver returned to the Office of the ACSI, where he served as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence—the first Black officer in this position. In this position, he was promoted to Brigadier General—the fifth Black general in Army history and our first Black Intelligence general officer. At the behest of General Frederick Weyand, Oliver returned to Saigon for duty as MAC-V Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), the precursor to the counterinsurgency program used in Iraq. Oliver worked closely with General Weyand and Ambassador William Colby on CORDS plans and operations throughout Vietnam. Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords and as American and third country forces began withdrawing from Vietnam, Oliver left Vietnam on 29 March 1973 when MAC-V disbanded.

As part of Operation STEADFAST, Oliver served as the first Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) for the new U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) at Fort McPherson, Georgia. He and his staff addressed inadequate analytical capabilities in the units, a lack of collection assets at the lower levels, inadequacy of secure communications support, and the “unwanted guests” mentality since the Intelligence units were attached, not organic.

In 1974, Oliver returned to his Infantry roots to assume duties as the 2nd Armored Division’s Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver at Fort Hood, Texas. Having had recent Intelligence assignments, Oliver worked diligently for operations-intelligence integration as the division prepared for its return of forces to Germany (REFORGER) mission, and their annual REFORGER exercise supporting the Army’s operational plans.

Oliver returned to Germany as the new DCSINT, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and Seventh Army in Heidelberg, Germany, with a promotion to Major General on 1 August 1975. He would lead the Army’s Intelligence effort, which played a significant role in
the defense of Europe from 1975 until 1978. His use of U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command assets ensured a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding and countering Soviet forces at the height of the Cold War.35

As his final assignment, Oliver served as the Commanding General, U.S. Army Readiness Region II at Fort Dix until 1980, when he retired. In that assignment, he used his knowledge of combat arms and the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System to assess and train Reserve Component units assigned to First Army.36

General Dillard’s story ends as many did for Sable officers in the all-volunteer Army: integrated and with fewer limitations. Oliver was the exception not only for Blacks, but for all officers entering into the Army in 1947. Historically, less than one percent of all officers entering the Army attain flag rank. Oliver seized opportunities to show that Blacks would and could defend America as well as members of any other race. Things were not always “equal” for Oliver. He developed three coping mechanisms early in his career that served him well: competency, attitude, and determination.

Dr. Salter would do well to add Major General Oliver Williams Dillard to a future revision of Sable Officers: African-American Military Officers, 1861-1948. Oliver worked himself up from a private in the segregated Army during World War II to major general in the all-volunteer Army. He started the journey in 1945 and defended our Nation for almost 35 years, serving as a standard bearer for all Americans. He should no longer be the forgotten Sable officer. Oliver remembers...so should we.

*Author’s Note: The author emailed Dr. Salter on 1 July 2011 about his use of the term Sable Officer. Dr Salter replied, “Sable is a range of colors from brownish to dark black, which emulates the various range of hues of color Black Americans.” He captured the idea of “Sable Officer” from Dudley T. Cornish’s book Sable Arms about Black soldiers during the American Civil War. Dr. Salter thought the identification of “Black” and “African-American” was overused.

Major General Dillard was selected to the 2012 Military Intelligence Hall of Fame.

Endnotes
2. MG Oliver W. Dillard, USA, Retired, Little Old War Stories and Other Stuff, unpublished personal memoir notes, received from the author on 10 August 2011.
3. MG(R) Oliver W. Dillard, telephone interview by author, 1 June 2011.
5. MG(R) Oliver W. Dillard, telephone interview by author, 6 June 2011.
6. MG(R) Oliver W. Dillard, telephone interview by author, 1 June 2011.
27. MG(R) Oliver W. Dillard, telephone interview by author, 1 June 2011.
30. MG(R) Oliver W. Dillard, telephone interview by author, 1 June 2011.
32. MG(R) Oliver W. Dillard, telephone interview by author, 6 June 2011.
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What will matter to the military forces of the United States in the 21st century is how well American leaders at all levels understand their opponents: their history, their culture, their political framework, their religion, and even their languages.” –Williamson Murray

Introduction

In May 2011, the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) headquarters deployed to Afghanistan to assume duties as the Headquarters for Regional Command–East (RC-East) during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) XII. Although the division had completed three successful deployments to Iraq, this was the first mission to Afghanistan. At the strategic level, OEF XII was a critical moment for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the Afghan people. ISAF began to transition security primacy to GIRoA and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through the tranche process.

The commander of the 1CD, then Major General Daniel Allyn, placed more importance on combined operations with the ANSF and standardized partnership across the board. At all echelons, there was much greater emphasis on ANSF assuming the lead for planning and conducting tactical operations. Similarly, the Civilian Stability Platform, responsible for governance and development initiatives in concert with GIRoA, began to show progress at the provincial, district, and sub-district levels in select portions of RC-East. The 1CD G2 played a critical role through the entire deployment cycle, from pre-mission training to execution to transfer of authority to the 1st Infantry Division (1ID).

The heart of the 1CD intelligence enterprise is the Analysis and Control Element (ACE), a multi-source team comprised of Soldiers from the all-source intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and targeting disciplines. While the ACE is an able independent section, the Division G2, LTC Pendall, recognized the need for enhanced capability in order to better understand the entirety of the Afghan operational environment (OE). He envisioned a greatly expanded G2 in general and the ACE specifically, which included enablers from across the larger intelligence community. Numerous trips were made to the Washington D.C. area where he leveraged connections across the intelligence community to include their participation in the 1CD's deployment. Additionally, he went to great lengths to educate the command group and senior staff on the value these enablers would provide to the division’s mission success.

Figure 1 displays his plan to develop an all encompassing approach to collecting, recording, analyzing, disseminating, and turning information into actionable intelligence. This process was not limited to select Regional Information Fusion Center (RIFC) sections, but involved all elements of the Combined Joint 2 (CJ2) and, through the Seven Layers approach, ultimately the RC-East staff. A key point of this model is that the analyst is central to, and involved in, the entire process which provides predictive analysis of the OE. This is not a linear model where each step rigidly follows in a sequential order, but is a living system where multiple actions will occur simultaneously. To be certain, there are regularly occurring requirements such as the daily intelligence summary or products supporting the four week targeting cycle. The model, however, is highly flexible, providing the CJ2 ability to anticipate or respond to the dynamics of the RC-East OE. Finally, it is not exclusively focused on the insurgency itself, but allows analysts to view the whole of the battlefield.
ACE Transition to the RIFC

Apart from the name change, the RIFC also greatly expanded in personnel, including a number of enablers normally not normally associated with an Army ACE. In addition to the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines authorized by the joint manning document, the RIFC incorporated representatives from across the larger U.S. intelligence community such as the National Security Agency (NSA), National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Center (COIC) and Central Command’s (CENTCOM) Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) Center. Additional analysts came from the contracting world, many of whom are retired military with previous experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere.

By itself, an Army ACE is a critical intelligence multiplier—but the RIFC structure afforded new capabilities which made it more effective, efficient, and lethal. It was internally organized to develop a holistic common intelligence picture for the CJ2 enterprise and provide the command group with well informed guidance for future operations. The RIFC added a Theater Intelligence Group liaison officer (LNO) and an RC-East NGIC analyst to enhance analytic efforts throughout the intelligence community. The RIFC refocused and reorganized the enablers such as the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, NEXUS, governmental/developmental (GOV/DEV), NRO, NGA, COIC, and the Stability Operations Information Center to be full partners in the organization supporting senior leaders, subordinate units and the greater intelligence community. Many of these professionals led working groups or analytic
teams and briefed the commanding general (CG), senior staff, and VIPs.

Borrowing from the model developed by the 101st Airborne Division during their time in RC-East, the RIFC geographically oriented the Fusion section into two teams: the provinces North of Kabul (NoK) and South of Kabul (SoK). The geographic areas matched the operating areas of coalition brigades and Afghan partners. The teams were mirror images of each other with All Source, targeting, and SIGINT military personnel in addition to GOV/DEV and COIC contractor analysts. Each team is focused on their respective areas to fuse information for a holistic understanding of their area of responsibility (AOR) and gave the analysts predictability on separation of duties.

GEOINT provided support to both teams using one NGA analyst, with a reachback to the rest of the section focused on RFI completion. This proved to be extremely beneficial in our support to the RC-East Joint Operations Center during battle drills such as mass casualty events, personnel recovery missions, and large combat operations. The ability to activate one team of experts for a particular area and keep the rest of the RIFC on task ensured we never lost oversight of the entire AOR. Additionally, the wealth of enablers ensured RIFC leaders could leverage their reachback capability or analytical skills during a battle drill event.

In its RIFC configuration, the ACE became an integrated military, contractor, and interagency all-source information element responsible for receiving, processing, and understanding intelligence and information pertaining to the RC-East AOR and the command’s four lines of operation: Security, Governance Development, Economic Development, and Information Operations. The RIFC’s primary function was to provide short, mid, and long range predictive analysis to inform the decision making processes of the RC-East CG, command group, staff and echelons above, adjacent to, and below. The RIFC was responsible for the analysis, production, presentation and dissemination of hundreds of standard and ad-hoc products per week including daily and weekly intelligence updates to the command group, daily and weekly intelligence summaries, innumerable requests for information (RFIs), lethal and non-lethal targeting information and a host of other products. These products are routinely shared with the greater U.S. intelligence community, and international coalition partners. Additionally, the RIFC provided analysis and comment on intelligence products from CENTCOM, ISAF, IJC, and numerous other intelligence organizations.

By design, RIFC products were kept relevant to the RC’s operational focus and what the command group needs to know (i.e., Shapefile situation templates vs. drawings on Powerpoint). Restated, we did not create products not directly contributing to operations or answering a commander’s critical information requirement. We strove to find product efficiencies through the use of standard templates, using one product to answer multiple audiences or multiple RFIs, and updating existing products instead of continually creating new briefings. For example, the weekly security commander’s update brief (CUB) slide had the same content as that used to brief CENTCOM during a AfPak VTC held on the same day. The GOV/DEV CUB was prepared and presented by a GOV/DEV expert and used in the Seven Day Assessment intelligence summary. Our daily Commander’s Update Assessment followed a standard format aligned on current threat streams and any pertinent updates of great importance to the command group.

To assist incoming units in understanding their future AOR, the RIFC produced and periodically updated provincial overview papers reflecting the current situation with respect to governance, development, security, and threat to the district level. We kept daily running estimates of five critical provinces to maintain situational awareness and inform their guidance to subordinate commanders. Best practice methods and products were created and reused on a routine basis for briefings to distinguished visitors. This alleviated stress and supported short notice or unannounced VIP visits. This last point cannot be emphasized enough. In its yearlong deployment, the RIFC supported visits by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, NSA, NGIC, COIC, NGA, NRO, DIA, multiple congressional delegations, three Army division commanders and innumerable other visitors.

How was this transition accomplished? One of our first steps was to clearly outline expectations and initial standards to the entire RIFC team. We drew no distinction between military and civilian person-
nel—all were afforded the same opportunities, were equally resourced, and held to the same high standards of intelligence production and analysis. Our primary intent was to prevent an “us and them” mentality between the uniformed and civilian personnel or the formation of small cliques of perceived elites. For example, nearly every intelligence product the RIFC developed was peer reviewed regardless of the author’s position or rank. The civilian enablers attended all key meetings with their military peers and were encouraged to provide opinions, insights, thoughts, and analysis. The RIFC’s shift change template included input from all sections, and afforded sufficient flexibility for any enabler or analyst to contribute observations and insights.

**The 7 Layers of Analysis Approach**

A critical element of the CJ2’s vision was the incorporation of the Seven Layers of Analysis into our methodology. Within the first 60 days of deployment, the CJ2 implemented the Seven Layers within TerraExplorer, integrating data from the DCGS-A architecture, TIGR, staff elements, and various other data sources into one common operating picture. TerraExplorer became the geospatial program of choice throughout RC-East as it showed clear and more frequently updated imagery, required little bandwidth, and was available by download rather than purchasing a specific system or license. TerraExplorer’s applications were limited only by the imagination of the end user. For example, our GEOINT section created 3D fly-through presentations to support multiple investigations for Afghan border incidents, overviews for visitors, and AOR orientation for incoming subordinate units. In February 2012, the RC-East TerraExplorer Field Service Representative attended a USAREUR level conference to demonstrate the Seven Layers concept and capability.

Instead of analyzing only the kinetic aspect of the insurgency, the CJ2 made use of a far more holistic approach incorporating input from across the RC-East staff. Any staff element could include their individual or section data sources into the overall intelligence picture. This data was geospatially displayed via the TerraExplorer geospatial software program on both SIPR and Centrix networks affording access to all coalition partners. Many of the data sources were updated dynamically, allowing TerraExplorer and the Seven Layers to be used in virtual real time in response to events on the battlefield as they happened. Figure 2 (left) shows macro layers, and a portion of the micro layers which users could access by simply turning individual layers on or off as required.

TerraExplorer was the perfect choice to launch this initiative as the software is intuitive, quickly installed and easy to learn. No longer were analysts forced to try and merge data sets from different (and all too often incompatible) sources into one coherent picture. Using the Seven Layers approach with TerraExplorer provided hundreds of layered information sources, intelligence professionals could devote the bulk of their time to thought and analysis rather than data mining. As well, this information was available globally, to analysts at any level from the company intelligence support team through ISAF.
Externally, RIFC personnel participated in numerous RC-East staff working groups, boards and meetings. We aligned a representative to several staff elements or assigned parts of the RIFC against recurrent problem sets to ensure continuity and increased efficiency of support. For example, early in our pre-deployment training at Fort Hood, the G2 recognized the need for dedicated support to both the G3 Future Operations and G5 Plans staff sections and created a Lead Support to Plans position within the ACE. A chief warrant officer from the section assumed this role and effectively bridged the operational planning requirements against the needed intelligence products.

The concept worked so well, that we kept the position in theater, despite reduced manning levels imposed by our higher headquarters. In fact, we expanded upon the idea when we assigned a reserve MI officer from an attached Civil Affairs (CA) battalion, as the RIFC Deputy for Governance and Development Support. He led a small team developing daily and weekly products through interaction with the CJ9, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), Civil Affairs Teams, Agricultural Development Teams (ADTs) and the RC-East Deputy Commanding General for Afghan Development. Apart from the daily contact via email or meetings, he and his team traveled to Afghan government offices or PRT and ADT locations for in-person visits. They focused on answering RC-East host nation information requirements by analyzing reports from CA teams, PRTs, Intelligence Information Requirements and atmospherics reflecting a group of people and truly became a medium for lower tactical level governance and development issues to be brought to the command group.

**Network Targeting**

The CJ2 made use of other concepts to better portray and understand the complex social terrain of RC-East. Based on a system originally developed by 3rd Brigade, 1CD in Iraq, the CJ2 implemented network targeting which increased non-lethal targeting such as neutralizing/prosecuting criminals, narcotics traffickers, financiers, corrupt GIRoA/ANSF officials, and insider threats to ANSF/CF combat outposts and forward operating bases. The robust RC-East Social Network, a diagram that portrays eight overarching insurgent sub-networks and six criminal patronage networks, makes justification for ISR assets simpler when communicating targeting efforts to the staff, command group and higher headquarters. Network targeting resulted in higher value nodal targeting for kill/capture operations and the ISAF Joint Prioritized Engagement List process, and created the ability to have common understanding of networks in RC-East between the RC HQ and BCTs. (*More on this in our 3rd article “Effective Network Targeting”*)

Given the increased emphasis on non-kinetic targeting, the RIFC teamed with other intelligence teams dedicated to attacking the burgeoning corruption, narcotics and negative influence in in RC-East. Although the insurgents were certainly the most visible enemy of the Afghan people, they were not necessarily the most dangerous. To truly effect change, RC-East needed to address the threat posed by corrupt GIRoA officials (many of whom were tied to the insurgency), narcotraffickers, and criminal patronage networks. Many of these individuals enjoyed political protection, which necessarily required a non-lethal, evidence based targeting approach.

To that end, the RIFC incorporated a number of enablers, bringing much needed capability to “see” the scope of the problem. These organizations included NEXUS (counternarcotics), Shafafiyat (counter corruption), TF 2010 (counter corruption), Rule of Law (counter corruption), and the Negative-Positive Influencer Program which removed negative GIRoA or ANSF influencers and rewarded positive members. Each team was manned by subject matter experts from the intelligence, law enforcement, staff judge advocate, or illegal drug enforcement fields.

**Atmospherics and Assessments**

As the RIFC developed and grew, we recognized the need to standup or integrate new analytical cells to better understand the environment’s complexity. The Atmospherics Program–Afghanistan (AP-A), for example, was charged with obtaining “the man on the street view” from Afghan nationals. This particular lens was critical to understanding how Afghan locals reacted to GIRoA, ISAF, ANSF, insurgents, criminal groups and the events that occurred in 2011 and 2012. AP-A reporting was of great importance to our understanding of popular perception in areas transitioned to GIRoA control, or following major events such as civilian casualties, cross borders incidents or high profile insurgent attacks.
Similarly, the RIFC worked closely with a four-man Human Terrain Assessment Team (HTAT) comprised of social scientists to examine the complex human terrain within RC-East. As with many of the enablers, this partnership actually began several months before the division deployed to Afghanistan, as HTAT members attended our pre-deployment training. Early integration provided numerous advantages including team building, information sharing, and process development – all of which allowed the RIFC a “hot start” in combat.

The CJ2 stood up an internal assessments section within the RIFC, and aligned with CJ5 Assessments, to write “deep dive” products or perform long term analysis. CJ2 Assessments were responsible for the development of the weekly Seven Day intelligence summary, which included predictive analysis up to 60 days out, assisting the command group and subordinate units with operational planning. The assessments team was led by a senior all-source chief warrant officer and included a sergeant major and contract analyst. We consciously chose to move the assessments cell out of the RIFC to a quieter area affording time and space to think, read and analyze, and not be drawn into current production requirements. This is not to imply the assessments section was uninvolved in the RIFC’s intelligence process. Assessments cell members attended every RIFC meeting and had frequent interaction with analysts throughout the deployment.

The CJ2 also created a Partnership Cell responsible for the intelligence training of our Afghan partners, as well as ensuring Afghan analysis was fully integrated. To that end, the G2 held weekly VTCs and quarterly “intelligence shuras” with senior ANSF intelligence officers. He encouraged the free flow of information and thoughts in both venues to enhance the overall understanding of the Afghan OE. While the Partnership Cell was not a formal section of the RIFC, they worked in the same office space, attended all RIFC meetings and were considered full partners.

**The RIFC Extended Footprint**

Our personnel footprint extended beyond the RC-East headquarters at Bagram through the assignment of intelligence LNOs at critical locations across the battlefield. While most of the LNOs positions were enduring requirements, we regularly reviewed the need for each. LNOs assigned to our French, Polish, and Afghan counterparts, for example, were enduring requirements providing invaluable insights throughout our mission. Other LNO positions, such as two MI soldiers assigned to assist with the deployment of 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division to Ghazni Province, were temporarily manned until the needs were met. In some cases, LNO support began before coalition units arrived as the RIFC sent personnel to attend both French and Polish military readiness exercises at their home station. The officers and NCOs were charged to represent the entire CJ2 and prepare the units.

Battlefield circulation and in-person analytical exchange were key components to the RIFC’s ability to know and understand the battlefield. Virtually every soldier and civilian assigned to the RIFC participated in trips to outlying brigade or battalion headquarters, as well as ISAF and IJC. On occasion, RIFC soldiers traveled to outlying units for analytical exchange. This allowed our soldiers to see the battlefield firsthand and comprehend brigade or battalion S2 level capability. Similarly, it afforded the subordinate S2 teams to meet our soldiers, further developing relationships between echelons. The RIFC also contributed to Afghanistan-focused intelligence seminars or meetings in the US and Europe.

Internally and externally, RIFC leaders made use of available information technology (IT) platforms to provide shared understanding of RC-East on a truly global level. The Deputy RIFC Chief, revamped all CJ2 web pages to become more user friendly, displaying the most recent intelligence battle rhythm products customers would commonly seek up front. Completed products such as analytical papers and focused-topic CG intelligence updates followed a standard naming convention sorted by the geographic area (Province_Topic_Date), making it easier to navigate to historic products. Section internal/administrative files were placed in section folders at the bottom of the page. The RIFC battle captain disseminated and published all completed desk notes and RFI responses.

Virtually all RFIs, regardless of requestor, were submitted via an electronic form on the RIFC portal pages. Only a handful of key staff officers were allowed to ask ad hoc RFIs for two reasons. First, it allowed RIFC leaders to carefully review each RFI and ensure it was clear, concise, and relevant. Unclear or poorly written RFIs were rejected or returned for
more information. In some cases, face-to-face dis-
cussion was necessary to best understand the re-
requirement. Second, the RFI portal allowed RIFC
leaders to prioritize the work load for each section.
Had the RIFC been less disciplined in the RFI pro-
cess, our analysts would have been rapidly over-
whelmed by confusing, and sometimes redundant
requests. To expedite requests, the RIFC portal au-
tomatically sent an email alert to the RIFC HQ, who
then tasked the responsible section.

Further, the RIFC Chief distributed a daily email
to all RIFC leaders and CJ2 HQ directors highlight-
ing the non-routine tasks and their respective sta-
tus to maintain shared awareness. Each section
OIC was required to send a daily update of their as-
signed tasks. Over time, the email served as an his-
torical record used to find previous products, tasks,
or key dates. The RIFC Chief also sent the task list
to the 1ID G2 and ACE leadership as our relieving
unit. Although the task list was a relatively simple
product, it afforded the 1ID team advanced situa-
tional awareness on key tasks, the volume of pro-
duction, and the products themselves – which they
could access for their pre-deployment training.

The RIFC SIGINT section made good use of tech-
nology based efficiencies by establishing the ACE
Block II Single Source system – a first in RC-East.
The system automatically transferred classified re-
porting from high side to the SIPR network where it
reached a much larger customer base. It also pro-
vided more time for SIGINT analysts, increasing
their analytical workload by 50 percent. IT derived
advantages were particularly important as ISAF be-
gan to reduce its military footprint and redeploy
personnel back to CONUS.

Conclusion

There is no “one size fits all” solution to develop-
ing an intelligence enterprise to address strategic,
operational and tactical requirements. The unique
aspects of the commander, unit, mission, and OE
will drive how the enterprise is formed. Regardless
of these factors, certain characteristics must be
present. The RIFC’s success during OEF XII was
built upon clearly articulated standards, flexibility,
creativity, initiative, drive, and professional com-
petence. Every analyst, regardless of rank or mili-
tary/civilian status, was afforded equal opportunity
to contribute and participate in the analytical pro-
cess. Including the entire RC-East staff through the
seven layers approach ensured intelligence prod-
ucts were not solely threat focused thereby allow-
ing the unit to see the whole of the OE. While no
amount of analysis or collection platforms will elim-
inate the fog and friction of war, the RC-East RIFC
structure greatly improved the commander’s ability
to see the battlefield. The lessons learned and rela-
tionships forged in Afghanistan will continue to pay
dividends in future conflicts and operational de-
ployments. The RC-East CJ2’s plan fully supported
the unit’s mission requirements and should be con-
sidered as a model for other intelligence profes-
sionals to follow.

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Systems from Michigan Technological University.
The ‘War on Terror’ brought with it the introduction of targeting in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. When the U.S. military entered Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in COIN campaigns and discounted the relevance of insurgency network indicators during the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. Only recently have conventional forces incorporated and formalized network targeting practices in a COIN environment. While serving in Mosul as the Analysis Control Element (ACE) Chief, the 3rd Heavy Brigade “GREYWOLVES,” 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) was responsible for Ninewa Province. Our Brigade Combat Team developed a comprehensive insurgent link diagram enabling us to identify and develop targets key to the unit’s success. More recently, the 1CD further refined and adapted successful network targeting methodology throughout the Regional Command-East area of operations in Afghanistan. The 1CD’s CJ2 Regional Network Effects Cell developed an expanded social network database for Eastern Afghanistan, including “other” individuals beyond the insurgency that could be engaged, influenced, leveraged or positively reinforced—thus taking a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach to targeting.

–CW3 Julieann Mazak, Chief, Intel Targeting, RC-East, Afghanistan

Targeting Methodologies

• Network Targeting requires a full appreciation of the overall social network structure.
• Key Nodes developed from Social Network Analysis techniques enables comprehensive targeting:
  • Lethal-Nonlethal.
  • Information Operations.
  • Key Leader Engagements.
  • Positive and Negative Actions.

Figure 1. Regional Command/Division Level Network Effects and Focus graphic.
In order for targeting to be effective, analytical and operational elements need to take a holistic view of the social network when developing their engagement methods. These methods should include both lethal targeting (capture or kill) and non-lethal engagements (leader meetings and increased governance/development/security). The capability to action an individual target due to its simplicity and availability seldom renders enduring effects against insurgent groups and can unintentionally invoke other actors that ultimately hinder the mission. Information Operations (IO) must also be structured and synchronized to achieve a measurable impact on positive and negative and lethal and non-lethal engagements in support of the overall mission. Individual-based targeting operations do not have the lasting effects on the social network required to gain time and space to allow host nation security and governance programs to separate the insurgency from the local population.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, a prioritized and focused effort across the entire insurgent network has demonstrated an overall greater positive effect than individual-based (personality based) targeting. A broader view of the human social network underpins effective targeting and provides the all important context, connections and opportunities for effective engagement. Effective network-based targeting identifies the available options, both lethal and nonlethal, to achieve effects that support the commander’s objectives. While lethal targets are addressed with operations to capture or kill; non-lethal targets are best engaged with civil-military operations (CMO), IO, negotiation, political programs, economic programs, social programs, and other non-kinetic methods. Non-kinetic targets are equally important as kinetic targets in both COIN and high intensity conflict; they are never less important. Positive non-lethal engagement and focused messaging increase the support to the mission and also achieves complementary network effects. See Figure 2 for examples of the integration of lethal targeting and non-lethal engagements:

The right tools must be applied across the network’s key nodes. Individuals are viewed as nodal components of the broader network—not as simply individuals. It is all about what the individual represents to the network in terms of influence, skill, leadership, and relationships.

The ‘Attack the Network’ approach includes actions and activities designed to reduce the network’s effects and interrupt the enemy’s activities by identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities and enabling offensive operations.

While there is no question that the F3EAD (See Figure 3) methodology works extremely well, if not applied holistically across a network, the process can generate disproportionate attention on indi-
individual threat actions at the expense of key nodes which generate broader threat network capabilities.

The aggressive network targeting disrupts the enemy’s decision cycle and buys time for friendly forces and host nation governments to generate governmental and security capacity to further separate enemy influences from the local population. Network nodal targeting is accomplished through intelligence, reconnaissance, IO, counter-improved explosive device targeting, technical and forensic exploitation, disposal of unexploded and captured ordnance, and persistent surveillance directed toward defeating the network capabilities or bolstering positive social actors and friendly network capabilities.

Attacking a network requires leaders and analysts to understand the link between an enemy’s critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities, as well as indicators reflecting that an enemy action has or will occur. Analysts, staff members, and leaders should understand how an insurgency attempts to impact the population, the center of gravity (COG) in a COIN fight. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and targeting strategies are focused on the enemy’s critical capabilities, critical requirements, and refines the critical COG analysis. Targeting therefore can determine vulnerabilities or weaknesses and not solely threat strengths (See Figure 4).

Nodal targeting in its most basic elements involves analysis of high value individuals (HVIs) and the associated tasks they perform or relationships they embody. This allows commanders to determine which individual(s) will be engaged and will have the greatest overall effect on the network—the key nodes. Using doctrinal and situational templates and a modified Staff Synchronization Matrix as well as Social Network Analysis (SNA) and diagrams, the staff can better understand the insurgent networks operating in their area of operations, concurrently synchronizing ISR assets against the known or suspected vulnerabilities of the key nodes or their lead in associates.

SNA further feeds this analysis by identifying the relationships of interest. Rather than a named area of interest for individual entities as a start point, named relationships of interest (NRI) support network targeting. Once NRIs are assessed, key nodes are identified. Key node targeting then requires specific analysis on the essential elements of information related to the key node, followed by collection operations to confirm social and physical or geographic attributes related to the key node.

**Incorporating Social Network Analysis**

SNA, commonplace within the fields of law enforcement and national security, is identified as the disciplined inquiry into the patterning of relations among social actors, as well as the patterning of relationships among actors at different levels of analysis (such as persons and groups). The terms Network Analysis, Association Analysis, Link Analysis, and Social Network Analysis are often used interchangeably. SNA focuses on the structure of relationships, ranging from casual acquaintance to close bonds, and assumes that relationships are important. It maps and measures formal and informal relationships to understand what facilitates or impedes the knowledge flows that bind interacting units. It determines who knows whom and who shares what information and knowledge and by what communication media.

SNA is built upon aggregated database analytical techniques that seek common denominators and closely bound behavior (patterns of activity that seem related) that
link what appear to be on the surface unrelated individuals, companies, and transactions. A particularly important application of SNA is to uncover patterns of criminal behavior such as smuggling, drugs or money laundering. It is the discovery and linking of these criminal behaviors which allow analysts to affect an element using multiple war fighting functions. Because it is primarily a visual method, most analysts (and the decision makers they support) immediately grasp the value of this method. SNA becomes another key toolset for the commander.

Effective targeting is fundamentally about understanding entities and the relationships between them. As a result, this method has a number of variations within the intelligence community ranging from use of association matrices through link analysis charts up to validated mathematical models. It is most commonly used as a way to picture a network. However, while SNA is a very powerful method, intelligence professionals rarely take advantage of its full potential. In Figure 5, the social network and related sub-network or cell with key nodes is identified, in context.

- Compromised of over 5,000 entities.
- Entities are arranged by geographic location.
- Is used in conjunction with social analyst tools, reporting and subordinate unit input in order to determine the key nodes in each sub-network.

**Figure 5. Social Network Sub-network.**

Analysis of networks attempts to answer the question, “Who is related to whom, what is the nature of the relationships and what are the individuals’ nodal/functional roles in the overall network?” The development of a social diagram provides the needed visual depiction and value analysis of the node. Initial development of the social network should include all available sources of intelligence. The various elements are combined, validated with additional information, and social ties are established. This initial diagram allows analysts to not only further expand the diagram detail but also confirm the identities of a network’s key nodes. There are software tools, such as Advanced Network Analysis and Targeting and Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA), available to assist analysts to designate assessed key nodes and the anticipated secondary and tertiary order of effects when removed or acted upon.

ORA is a risk assessment tool for locating individuals or groups that are potential risks given social, knowledge, and task network information. Essentially, one first uses information about people to “connect the dots.” The ORA tool then examines the network and finds those dots—those people who represent a
risk or vulnerability to the overall system if removed or de-linked. These tools bolster the already robust F3EAD process by using SNA to objectively identify targets and provide immediate effects analysis. The tool assists analysts by enabling predictive insight through social theory and providing a bit more science or math to the problem set. Network Analysis has proven to be highly effective in helping analysts identify and understand patterns of organization, authority, communication, travel, financial transactions and other interactions between people or groups that are not apparent from isolated pieces of information.

While we never advocate removing the human analyst from the loop, a secondary analytic tool such as ORA assists in bolstering the human analysis with an objective measure. The richer development and deeper understanding of these networks through SNA tools, focused collection, and broader ingest of social entities enables a more robust targeting, comprehensive network effects, and enhanced network effects assessments.

**Attacking the Network**

Concurrent with the development of the social network, the analyst must identify the significant nodes and interactions made by these nodes. Analysts must look for and characterize similar behavioral social clusters, social cliques and functional cells. Once the social network and sub-branches are developed and characterized, analysts should identify and highlight persons of interest and separate according to lethal or non-lethal actions as well as which nodes should be positively reinforced for desired network effect. In addition to identifying key nodes and “leadership” functions, analysts will also identify sub-nodes (individuals) whose removal would have a substantial and lasting effect on the network. This analysis will include recruiters, facilitators and financiers for sure, but may also include political cadre, security elements, trainers and couriers as well. Once this is done, analysts will work with multiple staff sections (i.e., Fire Effects Cell, CMO, IO, PSYOPs/Military Information Support Operations, etc.) to prioritize the individuals and build the High Value Target and HVI lists.

This should include lead-in targets (close associates to key nodes) as well as multiple avenues (kinetic/non-kinetic, positive and negative actions) to achieve desired network effects. Once approved by the commander, this becomes the High Payoff Target List/High Payoff Engagement List. Units and action arms charged with delivering effects through specified kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities then focus collection efforts, operations, key leader engagements and resources to effectively operate within the network for desired effect.

As analysts gain and evaluate information and intelligence resulting from holistic network attacks or other operations, this feedback provides new information on the networks behavior and structure. While the network diagram is continuously expanding, it should not be viewed simply as a blueprint for “what is” but also a dynamic influence flow chart to support additional focused target development. Through this network targeting approach, analysts will be able to assist operational units to shift from the “whack a mole” process of hitting individual targets as they emerge to a methodical, focused form of comprehensive network engagement. If certain key nodes are not vulnerable to engagement due to lack of information, current disposition or lack an actionable trigger, the network diagram can identify the next best node for desired effects or make the key node more accessible or vulnerable for action. Again, we are focused on the overall network effect and not specific targets, be they positive actors whom we should reinforce or insurgents who should be removed from the network.

**Conclusion**

Network targeting produces better effects in a COIN (and also a high intensity) fight than individual target focused operations. A variety of analytical techniques and software tools have emerged from Social Network Theory and science, proving their value in law enforcement, counterterrorism, and even commercial activities. At the root of the issue, it is about acting with greater sense of understanding and insight against a competing social structure—a human network. The approaches describe in this article are provided to foster a professional dialogue and for units to consider as they train and deploy into the Afghan theater of operations and any follow on operations the nation requires.

**Recommendations:**

- Develop courses which provide the knowledge and skills necessary to develop plans and operations to neutralize adaptive networked threats.
Incorporate network targeting methodology into professional military education at the NCO, officer and warrant officer levels, particularly the Intermediate Level Education, Senior Service Colleges, and Joint Operations Courses. Additionally, the Intelligence, Maneuver, IO, and Field Artillery Centers should adopt a Network Targeting Curriculum.

Expand upon and stress importance of Personality and Network Analysis in F3EAD and Joint Targeting Courses for specific staff elements and functionally specific training.

Sources

JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
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Non-traditional Intelligence Functions and the Use of Human Terrain Elements in Combat

by Lieutenant Colonel David W. Pendall (P) and Mr. Alec Metz

Introduction
During the First Cavalry Division’s (1CD) time as the command element for Regional Command East (RC East), Afghanistan as Combined Joint Task Force 1 (CJTF-1), a number of innovative initiatives were started within the CJ2. One of the most pivotal was the creation of the Regional Information Fusion Center (RIFC). This function which incorporated everything from traditional red-layer intelligence analysis from signals, human intelligence, imagery, etc., to analysts focused on governance and development, corruption, negative and positive influencers, atmospherics, as well as a Human Terrain Analysis Team (HTAT). It is our belief that this approach provided a holistic view of all the elements within the operational environment (red, white, green, and blue) in the RC East area of operations (AO). During the critical period of the surge and beginning of the troop draw down in Afghanistan, the RIFC at CJTF-1 made an enormous difference in how the regional command viewed its operational environment and mission.

Integrating the HTAT
Although small (at present the team has four personnel), the HTAT has proved an integral component of the RIFC. In a joint initiative between the 1CD CJ2 and TRADOC G2’s Human Terrain System (HTS), three HTAT personnel with remote support from HTS’ Research Reachback Center (RRC) at Ft. Leavenworth, embedded with 1CD during their home station training, providing socio-cultural context for the RC East AO and integrating with the division staff and G2 section prior to deployment. This provided two outstanding benefits to the RIFC—it allowed an enabling element to integrate before the chaos of deployment and provided an understanding of the socio-cultural environment of RC East to the RIFC, the CJ2, and the 1CD as the staff completed their estimates and command campaign plan. While the HTATs placement with the division was a relatively small affair in the course of the Afghan conflict, it is indicative of a successful and growing trend within the military to better understand all the dimensions (socio-cultural, historical, and enemy) of an AO before deployment, as has oft been quoted, there are “no cold starts” in combat.

In Fall 2010, HTS designated the nucleus of an HTAT to embed with 1CD during their train-up period and deploy with them in May 2011. In order to accomplish this task, a veteran team leader, Colonel Manolito Garabato (Ret.), with experience leading an HTAT in Iraq, led the home station training team. Mr. Alec Metz was selected as the team’s social scientist, having previously served on a Human Terrain Team (HTT) in RC East and at the HTS Theater Coordination Element in Kabul. Together
they formed the core of the HTAT element that was to train and deploy with 1CD. In addition, a former RC East HTAT member, Ms. Roya Sharifsooltani, accompanied us to all the training exercises.

As General Petraeus has often been quoted, “the human terrain is the decisive terrain.” Too often this element of the information preparation of the battlefield has been ignored. Units coming to Afghanistan were either unwilling or unable to commit more than a few classroom hours to understanding the culture, tribes, and history of the area to which they were deploying. This is reminiscent of much of the pre-9/11 military training which focused on traditional military foes as opposed to the fluid and dynamic counterinsurgencies in which the U.S. has been engaged in during the past decade. As Frank Hoffman noted in a recent article, “Unfortunately, these are exactly the kinds of conflicts we will be involved in for the next few decades…” Therefore, the onus is on conventional units to understand and utilize innovative thinking and assets, such as HTS. In doing so, units can better prepare themselves to enter into complex, layered operational environments.

As noted in the seminal “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan”

The Seven Layers of Analysis

1. Geo foundation: Always orient to terrain, everything is on a geospatial foundation. (Sources: NGA, Terra Explorer*)
2. Social Layer: Tribes and social hierarchy.
   - Grievances and conflicts (Sources: HTAT, CIM, APA*)
3. Infrastructure:
   - Roads, bridges, etc.
   - Economics (Sources: NGA, PRT, USAID*)
4. Political:
   - Formal (not all inclusive)
     - GIRoA leaders
     - Chiefs of Police
     - Tribal elders
     - Maliks
   - Informal (not all inclusive)
     - Power brokers
5. Developmental: completed, planned, and projected. (Sources: GIRoA, IA/NGO, CERP*)
6. Security: friendly locations and capabilities, COPs, FOBs, combined teams, areas of influence and persistent presence.
   (Sources: G3, G2 Ops, BCT/Bn/Co, ANSF Partners)
7. Threat: Insurgent networks/nexus, targets both kinetic and non-kinetic, Intelligence Collection and Ops

* Sources are not all inclusive

During the road-to-war training process, 1CD held three events in which the HTAT participated: a one-week capstone exercise (CPX), an academics week, and a two-week mission rehearsal exercise (MRX). Additionally, the G2 and I maintained a steady state of communications with HTS director Colonel Hamilton and the HTAT from November until the deployment in May. After initial contact between 1CD and HTS, Mr. Garabato and Mr. Metz engaged with 1CD elements undergoing training at Fort Leavenworth to plan the logistics of an HTAT embed, and securing the requisite systems and seats within the RIFC, where it was decided the HTAT would integrate. This allowed the HTAT to greatly influence the information preparation of the battlefield, adding tremendously to the social and political aspects of the Seven Layers (left).

During the CPX, the HTAT worked 14 hour days at Fort Hood, Texas as part of the RIFC, informing, educating, and assisting the CJ2 in understanding Eastern Afghanistan, and as part of the greater CJTF-1 staff, integrating, and shaping the processes of governance, development, information operations, and other staff elements. At the time of the CPX only 40 percent of the division’s key staff had experience in Afghanistan. Most of the Army units previously deployed had been from the
XVIII Airborne Corps (the previous command of RC East had been held by the 101st Airborne Division, and it by the 82nd Airborne Division). This meant that even basic Afghan cultural or historical information was foreign, and so in conjunction with the HTS RRC at Leavenworth, the HTAT worked to develop a series of area familiarization products, from briefs to maps, to assist 1CD in learning about its new area of responsibility. The HTAT’s work during that first exercise was appreciated and encouraged by the RIFC and 1CD leadership.

Upon returning to Leavenworth, Mr. Metz compiled notes, impressions, and recommendations for future embedded relationships with deploying units as well as with 1CD. I contacted COL Hamilton expressing the unit’s satisfaction with the HTAT element that had come to the CPX, and expressed the desire for the relationship to continue. One month later, as 1CD was about to undergo a week of classroom instruction on Afghan history, culture and Islam, Mr. Garabato, Mr. Metz, and Mrs. Sharifisoltani joined them again.

The academics week was conducted by the Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace Program from the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Mr. Metz had previously been a lecturer on Afghan history and insurgent dynamics for the program before joining HTS. The curriculum for the week included classes on Afghan history, economics, agricultural practices, COIN theory (as taught by former U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Commander General William Wallace (Ret.)), Pashtunwali, governance in Afghanistan, and the political economy of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). In RC East, knowledge of the neighboring FATA region is vital.

During discussions and breaks, the HTAT outlined past and current socio-cultural studies undertaken in Afghanistan as well as perception and atmospherics surveys from that country. When classroom sessions finished for the day, the HTAT and leaders from the CJ2 would conduct deployment planning. This integration of an enabling element before deployment made the movement to Afghanistan and the initial fusion efforts in the RIFC in Afghanistan much smoother than is often the case.

During the MRX the HTAT element again fully embedded within the RIFC, using previous experience, research and analytical skills, and the support provided by the RRC to deftly address a number of scenarios. The HTAT also operated outside the CJ2, assisting the CJ9, CJ7, and CJ39 in setting priorities and accomplishing operational tasks, from assessing development works to developing engagement strategies for Afghan governmental leaders. In this final exercise, much real-world data was accessed from the HTS archives, to include historical analyses, mapping files, and area-assessments to enable the RIFC, CJ2, and 1CD to enter their AO in RC East informed and prepared for the human terrain challenges they would face during their deployment.

Deployment

Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, the only member of the HTAT element that trained with 1CD and actually deployed with 1CD was Mr. Metz, the sole CJTF-1 HTAT social scientist for most of the deployment. The remainder of the HTAT on the ground at RC East Headquarters at Bagram was filled out by existing team members. This necessitated another integration of an HTAT within 1CD, although by this time the division was familiar with HTAT capabilities, and this HTAT was familiar with RC East. Additionally, between the pre-deployment exercises with 1CD and the actual deployment, HTS had decreased the size of HTATs, meaning that the seven-to-nine person team 1CD had been told it would receive upon deploying in the autumn of 2010 was a four person team at the transfer of authority to 1CD in May 2011.

The halving of the HTAT at the RC level has continued to impact the its ability to fully meet the division’s requests for information (RFIs) and research. Still, the integration of the HTAT and other enabling information/intelligence assets prior to deployment continued to pay dividends throughout the span of 1CD’s time as CJTF-1 in RC East. By informing and assisting the division before operations began and the fast pace of the deployed environment took over, the HTAT was able to shape the command and staff’s understanding of RC East before deploying, thereby ensuring that attention was paid to the human terrain even during the height of the fighting season.

During the deployment, May 2011 to April 2012, the HTAT answered hundreds of RFIs, briefed the command and staff regularly on socio-cultural factors affecting the AO, and consistently contributed
to RIFC estimates and predictions. Weekly, it briefed the staff on research and products generated by the HTAT and HTTs in RC East, and every morning sent out a slide of socio-cultural information to provide context for the division staff. Regularly reaching down to the HTTs embedded with the seven ground-holding task forces in RC East, the HTAT has also moved to standardize research designs and reporting, which in turn has led to a much greater visibility of local identities and perceptions in the 14 provinces of RC East at division level. This has brought greater granularity of the human terrain to the RIFC, and a better understanding of the operational environment to RIFC analysts, staff, and command.

The HTAT also fielded three large surveys within the regional command. One addressed popular perceptions in Eastern Afghanistan towards the security transition between ISAF and Afghan forces and faith in the Afghan. Another sought to identify the role and influence of Afghan women at home and in the community, in order to better ascertain the identity and power of an often ignored half of the population. Lastly, the HTAT has been studying ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces partnerships in order to identify friction points and recommend courses of action.

**Conclusion**

The integration of the human terrain and the HTAT with the RIFC model has been of enormous benefit to the division. Not only has this greatly helped CJTF-1, but it has given HTS a model by which to nest teams with deploying units in order to achieve maximum relevance. It is our recommendation, based on our unique experiences, that this practice be continued.

**Endnotes**


5. The placement of HTATs and HTTs is not predetermined by the HTS program. Depending on the view of the command to which the HTATs or HTTs are OPCON and TACON, the HTS elements may fall into any one of a number of staff sections, to include the CJ2, CJ9, CJ7, or special staff.

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Alec Metz is a Social Scientist with the Human Terrain System. He was previously a researcher at the Naval Postgraduate School studying and lecturing on culture and conflict in Afghanistan and Central/South Asia, and has worked, studied, and lived in the area. He has completed three tours in Afghanistan, at the brigade, ISAF, and most recently division levels.
**Introduction**

While most Americans have been exposed to basic place-name geography, few understand the central focus or analytical powers of the discipline. Despite its utility relative to spatial analysis, many think of geography as little more than the memorization of places on a map.

Whereas it is true that “chorography,” (the description of places) and “chorology,” (the study of the interrelationships between things and people), are among the oldest applications of geographic thought and knowledge, the central mission of geography focuses on spatial analysis. Just as history cannot be understood by simply looking at a calendar, it is also impossible to understand the nature of places by merely looking at a map.

History and geography are integrative disciples. History integrates the humanities and social sciences while geography integrates the social sciences and sciences. The unifying link for historians is time. For geographers, the transcendent theme is space.\(^1\)

Because most Army intelligence personnel are products of an educational system that does not stress spatial studies, it is not surprising that they have tended to pass over the potential utility of geography in favor of other disciplines (geographic information systems (GIS) and remote sensing are exceptions).

The purpose of this article is to provide a brief background of the nature of the discipline of geography, and to explain its potential for making significant contributions to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. An additional goal is to encourage Army intelligence professionals to seriously consider making greater use of the analytical tools of geography in the creation of actionable intelligence.

**Evolution of the Discipline**

American geography rests upon a solid foundation built by European geographers in the 17\(^{th}\), 18\(^{th}\), and 19\(^{th}\) centuries. In the last years of the 18\(^{th}\) and the early years of the 19\(^{th}\) centuries, Immanuel Kant (a German intellectual) sought to bring geography under the organizational methods and philosophies of scientific inquiry. In doing this, he called for the systematic grouping of facts and the temporal and spatial evaluation of information. Moreover, his call for the systematic grouping of facts led to the creation of academic disciplines organized around unifying themes. Additionally, his recognition that all observable phenomena occur in time and space es-
tablished the foundations upon which the modern disciplines of history and geography now rest.²

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, geographers continuously broadened the scope of their discipline by developing effective tools of analysis that are capable of predicting and depicting human spatial behavior. Such tools, when properly used, can become effective force multipliers for American forces tasked with combat engagements, peacekeeping missions, and nation building activities.

At the most elementary levels, basic concepts that explain human spatial behaviors and interactions do not require sophisticated and complex computations. Nevertheless, military personnel who understand these concepts are in a stronger position to make informed operational decisions than are those who do not. Additionally, the IPB process can be strengthened by the utilization of the more sophisticated tools of spatial analysis, including quantitative spatial modeling, GIS (computer-based spatial analysis and mapping), remote sensing (the interpretation of satellite imagery), and aerial photographs.

**The Utility of Understanding the Personality of Places**

Places have unique attributes and characteristics that give them identifiable personalities. They are constantly evolving in response to a multiplicity of environmental and human influences. Because places are in a constant state of change, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse, they greatly influence the lives of those who live in or near them.

Places are the settings in which people experience life, develop relationships, and form their own unique identities. Human personalities do not form in a vacuum. Instead, they are a product of biology, family structure, and the nature of the places in which individuals live.

In addition to the concrete or absolute space in which places are situated, there are also places that are products of human hearts and minds. In fact, it is common to hear elderly people describe the places where they lived, loved, and worked many years ago, even though these places (as they once were) are no longer part of the modern landscape. Moreover, people are often emotionally tied to specific places. Consider the emotional attachment of most Americans to the site of the World Trade Center in New York City, or the powerful emotional and cultural symbolism associated with the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C.

Places do not usually elicit the same reactions from everyone. Whereas some people think of bucolic settings as ideal, others see them as primitive and uncivilized. Conversely, many see great beauty in the skylines of great cities, while others consider them to be blights on the landscape.

In some places, people are resilient and open to change, while in others, people are tradition-bound, and resist even the mildest cultural, social, economic or political changes. Such resistance sometimes results in conflict, violence, and even war. Understanding the degree to which a people are committed to preserving the status quo relative to the places in which they live should be a fundamental part of the IPB process, because conflict (even low intensity conflict), nation building efforts, and peace keeping missions all involve changing the nature of the places in which they occur.

Although places are unique expressions of human occupancy in time and space, most are also interdependent. This is because each place tends to fill a specialized role relative to the greater region in which it exists. Some places focus on primary sector activities including agriculture, mining, logging, and commercial fishing, while others serve as centers of commerce, processing, government, and/or manufacturing. All of these places must regularly interact with each other to survive. To fully understand the character of a given place, geographers must be able to identify these interdependencies, while at the same time keeping in mind the distinctive qualities that give specific places their unique personalities.³

In order to fully comprehend the long-range implications of operational plans in a contested area, professional military analysts must understand the importance of interdependencies between communities, nations, and regions. History is replete with examples of military actions that have resulted in far-reaching unintended consequences. For example, while closing a major regional transportation artery might bring short-term positive results to a specific place, it may also create great regional chaos for allies who depend on that network for vital shipments of food, fiber, and energy.
In the modern global environment, accurate descriptions of specific places are an increasingly important part of the IPB process. In the current atmosphere of asymmetric warfare and low intensity conflict, American war fighters need (and deserve) to have access to in-depth analyses of the personalities (including physical and cultural attributes), relative situations, and interdependencies of the places in which they may be called upon to operate. Developing a sense of place enhances the utility of the IPB process and the accuracy of intelligence estimates. Simply studying cultures, without also considering the spatial milieus in which they exist, will not result in a comprehensive evaluation of the nature of a region or place.

The Concept of Region

Geographers regionalize in order to organize and classify spatial information and data. The basic theme of a regional schema is dependent upon its purpose. The world might be regionalized by climate zones, economic conditions, political distinctions, cultural variables, or a plethora of other organizational groupings. Formal regions are structured in keeping with a set of highly homogenous features, while functional (nodal) regions exhibit an internal economic, social or political consistency.

Regionalization is a useful tool that can be successfully applied during the IPB process. For example, it may be useful to know the spatial boundaries within which a given tribal or religious group live and operate. Moreover, war fighters and analysts also need to predict and map core areas of conflict as well as larger spheres of influence.

Sectionalism. Most regions are at least to some degree, ethnically diverse. Even regions that, on the surface, may appear to be culturally homogenous include among their populations, sub-groups who hold different values, attitudes, and beliefs. Sectionalism occurs when a sub-group or sub-groups become zealously committed to their own unique cultural idiosyncrasies and/or geopolitical interests. This is an important concept, because in order to fully understand the nature of a region, it is necessary to map sectional enclaves of sub-cultural differences. The value of such knowledge relative to Afghanistan for example is obvious.

Irredentism. Sometimes when new boundaries are drawn, various ethnic groups find that they have been politically severed from the nation to which they had previously belonged. For example, this was the case after World War I when the boundaries of Europe were redrawn, and ethnic Germans found themselves living in the newly formed nation of Czechoslovakia. Several decades later, Adolf Hitler used this to justify his invasion of Czechoslovakia. Therefore, it is useful to know whether or not irredentism could be used as a justification for military actions. Often wars of liberation involve at least some degree of irredentism.4

Concepts and Tools of Spatial Analysis

Although it is often not directly mentioned, spatial analysis is central to the IPB process. The key foundational concepts of spatial analysis include location, distance, space, spatial interaction, and accessibility. Locations are both fixed and relative. The fixed location of a place is depicted on a map by its geographic coordinates. The relative location of a place relates to its physical attributes (site characteristics), and its situation (location relative to other places).

Distance. Distance can be measured in terms of kilometers or miles, but it can also be expressed in units of time, or even effort. Friction of distance is a measure of the level of difficulty associated with spatial interaction between places. The greater the level of effort involved, the greater the friction of distance. Moreover, as the distance (either absolute or relative) between places or phenomena grow, the greater the level of distance-decay. For example, Camel cigarette advertisements once featured a man stating that he would “...walk a mile for a Camel.” Perhaps, but is it unlikely that he would walk ten miles for a Camel? That is an example of distance decay.

Would it not be useful for intelligence analysts to know how far an enemy combatant might be willing to travel to carry out an act of violence before distance decay begins to dilute his/her commitment to the mission? In such cases, an individual’s perception of distance (cognitive distance) is also an important consideration. For example, people who live in remote parts of the American West think little of driving one hundred miles or more to shop. On the other hand, people who live in Holland generally think of a road trip of twenty kilometers as fairly long.
**Space.** Space may be thought of as absolute, relative or cognitive. Absolute space can be described mathematically via points, lines, planes, and areas; whereas, relative space requires less precise measurements because it deals with spatial relationships such as distribution patterns and routes. Cognitive space involves the ways in which people think about space. Differences in personal space requirements among people from difference cultures, illustrate this concept. Americans generally carry with them an imaginary personal space bubble that is fairly large, and most Americans become uncomfortable when they believe their personal space is being violated.

People in many other cultures however, are normally not bothered by cheek to jowl contact on public conveyances, and in other situations where such contact is unavoidable (consider the subway in Tokyo). Members of the modern American military are often called upon to interact with people who come from a variety of cultural backgrounds. In such multi-cultural situations, the success of a mission may turn on whether or not all involved understand each other’s attitudes, values and beliefs relative to the appropriate use of space.

**Accessibility and Complementarity.** The concept of accessibility is central to spatial analysis. Simply stated, inaccessible places are generally not very busy. Therefore assessing the ease of access associated with a place or community should be part of the IPB process. Of course, distance is a part of any accessibility measure, but it is not the only factor that should be considered. The accessibility of a place is also a function of its connectivity. Places that are well served by roads, highways, rails, and air are normally considered to be highly accessible. Conversely, places that have few connections are isolated.

Places cannot be interdependent unless each has a need for something that the other produces and/or sells. When two places are interdependent, they are said to demonstrate positive complementarity.

**Transferability.** Places cannot become interdependent without a sufficient level of transferability. This means that the items produced in one place, must be transferable to other places at a profit. High levels of transferability between places generally requires modern and efficient infrastructure.

Sometime the potential interaction between two places is interrupted by the development of an intervening opportunity. If they can, most people prefer to travel the shortest distance possible in order to achieve a particular goal. Thus, in order to travel less, they will often pay more for something at a location that is close by and easy to reach.

**Spatial Diffusion.** Concepts, ideas, innovations, diseases, and technologies do not normally spread from one place to another in happenstance fashion. Diffusion normal occurs as a function of statistical probability. Therefore, quantitative geographers can create statistical models that make it possible to map the probability of the spatial diffusion of a given phenomenon. Moreover, there are several different types of spatial diffusion.

Innovations often spread via expansion diffusion. Basically, expansion diffusion is a “snow-balling” process in which innovations catch on because people observe, and then begin to adopt them. Sometimes, the use of innovations may expand in a “leap-frog” fashion because they tend to jump from one urban area to the next, while skipping over the less-connected parts of a nation or region. Consider for example the use of the Internet in Afghanistan. Most major population centers have access to it, while people in very remote villages often do not. Would it not be useful to understand how long it will be before a given village or region in Afghanistan has access to the most modern forms of communication?

Sometimes ideas or practices are spread by hierarchical diffusion. For example, political concepts are often spread from charismatic leaders to the greater population through mass media and social networks. Thus, some leaders in Islamic states consistently encourage their people to believe that Western civilization represents an evil that must eventually be removed from the face of the earth. They know that to do this, they must first create a critical mass of people who believe their propaganda in order to spread it throughout the rest of the Islamic world.

Mixed diffusion is generally associated with the spread of contagious diseases over a region. That means a disease might simply spread from one person to the next and slowly migrate from its point of origin, or it might (given modern transportation sys-
tems) jump huge barriers to infest populations far from where it began without first infecting everyone located in between.5

**Quantitative Models and Spatial Analysis**

Over the past sixty years, geographers have built mathematical representations in order to create and test normative models of spatial relationships. Such models require the use of dimensional primitives with which researchers outline geographic phenomena. Primitives are independent variables such as areas, lines, and points that are used to describe spatial relationships. These elements are useful in defining spatial concepts such as direction, accessibility, distance, agglomeration, connectivity, relative location, size, and shape.

Although concrete space has long been the natural laboratory for geographic research, it is always difficult to control variables in natural surroundings. Conversely, conducting research using spatial models facilitates the control and manipulation of variables by creating a simulated homogenous environment in which movement can take place with equal difficulty or ease in all directions (unless otherwise specified). Therefore, geographers, through mathematical and computer modeling, can now test theories of spatial interaction in controlled environments.6

**Principle of Least Effort and the Gravity Model.** Whereas the scope of this article does not allow a detailed examination of the many models used by geographers, the following basic model provides an example of the value of spatial modeling. In 1929, W.J. Reilly postulated that the movement between the populations of two cities is proportional to the product of their populations, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. Later, in 1949, G.K. Zipf articulated the “principle of least effort in human behavior.” This eventually became known as the “gravity model.” The basic gravity model is expressed as:

\[ I_{ij} = \frac{P_i P_j}{d_{ij}} \]

Where \( I_{ij} \) = interaction between regions i and j

\( P_i, P_j \) = the size of populations in regions i and j

\( d \) = distance separating the regions.7

**Patterns.** Intelligence professionals seek to discover spatial behavior patterns that will help predict future activities and outcomes. When scientists look for patterns, they hope to establish explanatory and predictive theories and laws. Theories are formulated via induction (observations suggest theory), and deduction (when theories are tested by experiment).

Spatial analysts seek to identify departures from a given norm. For example, in most communities, people follow relatively predictable daily routines. People generally arise at a certain time, work at a certain time, attend religious activities on specific days and at specific times, and eat their meals at specific places and at specific times. Alterations in these patterns may suggest that something is wrong. Spatial analysts also seek to evaluate the power of effects. For example, it is clear that distance affects spatial interaction, but it requires additional research to determine more precisely the impacts of a given change in the friction of distance. Additionally, spatial analysis involves exploring data in order to identify patterns that might otherwise never be discovered.8

**New Technologies**

The power of spatial analysis was greatly enhanced by the development of aerial photography during the early years of the 20th century. About fifty years later, the availability of satellite imagery introduced remote sensing as a new sub-discipline of geography. Additionally, the development of computer modeling and mapping and the creation of GIS provided geographers with potent tools of spatial analysis.

**Air Photo Interpretation.** Cartographers, land-use planners, environmental protection specialists, border security personnel, law-enforcement agencies, and intelligence analysts are among the many professionals who take advantage air photo interpretation. Aerial photography provides analysts with an excellent vantage point of spatial realities on the ground, and it also provides a permanent record of spatial interactions and patterns. Moreover, aerial photographs, through a variety of applications, can detect spatial phenomena that are not visible to the human eye. For example, through the use of infrared photography, analysts can identify places where photosynthesis is occurring and where it is not. Therefore, infrared photography can help analysts detect camouflage efforts of combat-
nants in a given area, pinpointing the locations of personnel concentrations, storage facilities, and the like. In recent years, drone technology has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of aerial photography.

**Remote Sensing.** Remote sensing is the gathering of information about an entity from a distance. In order to gather this information, geographers rely on helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, standard aircraft, and satellites to serve as platforms. Remote sensors record information about an object by measuring its transmission of electromagnetic energy. Remotely sensed imagery has many uses including the mapping of soil types, forests, land-use patterns, geomorphological surveying, natural resources deposits, immigration routes, and operational area observations for the military.

Electromagnetic waves are radiated through space. When energy comes into contact with matter, it is reflected, absorbed, or transmitted through the object. Remote sensing utilizes the energy that is reflected by matter. The electromagnetic spectrum is the range of all possible electromagnetic frequencies. In its most basic form, remote sensing relies on cameras to record information from the visible and near infrared wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum. At more sophisticated levels, remote sensors gather information from reflected infrared, thermal infrared, micro-wave and radio wavelengths.

Over the years since satellite imagery has become readily available, geographers, and the practitioners of many other disciplines as well, have taken advantage of remotely sensed data to create useful maps and predictive models. Currently, remote sensing is widely used by intelligence professionals in order to gain information about spatial behavior and emerging patterns.10

**GIS.** GIS is computer software that connects spatial data and descriptive information. Unlike standard maps, GIS is capable of presenting multiple layers of spatial data. Each geographic data layer represents a specific theme or feature such as soil types, specific habitats, land-use types, roads, lakes, and so on. GIS technicians are able to utilize these layers to develop maps that clearly show how various spatial features relate to one another.11 For example, enemy combatants may demonstrate a pattern of finding cover or safe hiding places in specific types of environments. Normally, they will select such environments because they offer ideal hiding conditions. In rural areas, such attributes may include natural cover and concealment, access to food and potable water, and access to potential transportation and communications networks.

In urban areas, the desired attributes may include the potential to blend with the local population, ease of access, and numerous routes of escape. GIS technology makes it possible for specialists to produce maps that will highlight locations that would most likely be used by enemy combatants as hiding places and sanctuaries.

**Applied Human Geography and IPB**

Although modern tools of spatial analysis such as remote sensing and GIS are impressive, without expert analysis they are of little use to decision makers. In recent years, the American Intelligence Community (IC) has fallen in love with the analytical tools of Network Centric Warfare. Therefore, the IC has become expert in building time-event charts, link diagrams, and activities matrixes. These products however only partially achieve network-centric understanding because they do not fully incorporate human geography into the threat analysis process. The inclusion of human terrain mapping would go far toward giving decision makers the ability to clearly see operational areas from afar.

This gap in the IPB process is a function of the fact that Military Intelligence (MI) organizations tend to rely heavily on technicians who have strong quantitative skills, but who are not generally trained to effectively apply qualitative data to the creation of a model that will accurately predict human spatial behavior.

Currently, the war effort in Afghanistan is hampered by the need for a better understanding of the human geography of various operational regions and areas. Accurate maps of tribal, ethnic and clan-ship boundaries are, of course, helpful. Additionally, however, it is also necessary to employ analysts who know what these boundaries mean. Cultural geographers have the knowledge and skills needed to explain the spatial and cultural significance of the phenomena shown on photographs and computer generated maps. In other words, they can interpret the human terrain of a region.12

Institutions of higher learning that offer courses in remote sensing and GIS are increasingly aware of the need to link these powerful tools of spatial analysis with applied human geography. For ex-
ample, Pennsylvania State University (through its on-line World Campus) offers a graduate degree in Homeland Security (with an emphasis in Geospatial Intelligence), recently added a course called “Cultural Intelligence, Applied Geography and Homeland Security” to the curriculum. According to Dr. Todd Bacastow, Professor of Practice for Geospatial Intelligence at the university, this course was needed to help graduates understand the cultural implications of the technical products they produce.

Conclusion

Currently, MI training programs tend to overlook the utility of geographic knowledge and concepts, and often ignore the potential contributions of cultural geographers. This is unfortunate because the discipline of geography is prepared to make substantial positive contributions to the IPB process. The application of the tools of spatial analysis developed and perfected by geographers can greatly enhance overall understanding of operational areas. Additionally, cultural geographers are able to identify, describe and explain the essence of the human terrain, and help intelligence analysts develop accurate predictions about immediate and future spatial behavior in combat areas.

As MI training programs continue to develop and evolve, educational planners should seriously consider adding specific human geography courses to the curriculum. Additionally, IPB teams should include analysts who are trained in applied Cultural Geography.

Endnotes


4. Ibid., 30-31.

5. Ibid., 2-29.


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Introduction
Meteorology, professional sports, financial markets, and military operations have important commonalities. They are all high stakes domains in which data is used to describe behavior and predict the outcomes of highly complex systems. They are also domains in which the misuse of data has led to tragic failures.

Non-military domains have robust bodies of specialized, skilled professionals whose purpose it is to provide quantitative analysis for decision makers. One such example is the professional sporting scout.

Sporting scouts are career analysts who work under the guidance of a coach. These analysts are rarely on career paths to become coaches themselves. During a professional football combine, scouts assess athletes according to a variety of quantitative measures (i.e., bench press, 40-yard sprint, long jump, vertical jump, intelligence test). Additionally, they consider qualitative measures such as game films, interviews, and attitude.

The scouts synthesize both quantitative and qualitative measures to generate final recommendations for athletes that support the coach’s vision and team philosophy. To a certain degree, these recommendations are predictions of future performance; however, they are more appropriately characterized as assessments of the athlete’s current suitability for the team’s needs. They also reaffirm the capabilities that scouts and coaches believe most likely lead to an athlete’s success.

The military’s investment in this type of analysis has been limited. Divisions, for instance, are authorized only two officers trained in Operations Research and Systems Analysis, and there are no authorizations for brigade combat teams or separate battalions. Consequently, there continues to be a skill and mindset gap between doctrine and practice with respect to operational assessments. Army and Joint doctrine prescribe continual assessment of operations. However, there are many skeptics who are uncertain about the utility of a formal assessment process in their operation. Examples of successful applications may assist in reducing this skepticism. This paper summarizes relevant principles of operational assessments and describes how the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) developed and used Measures of Performance (MoP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) to inform decision making and improve operations.

Background
Methods for assessing effectiveness are grounded in Systems Engineering theory, with early descriptions of MoE arising in the 1950s. In general, these theories suggest that systems are evaluated according to their ability to meet objectives with respect to the resources required. Noel Sproles provides several examples of MoE being used to improve the rigor of decision making in a variety of complex endeavors. These include the New Deal, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Combined Bomber Offensives in WWII, and waterway management in South Australia in the 1990s. “Well-formulated and considered MoE have the potential to save large amounts of resources.”

As systems have become more complex, systems engineers have developed and refined assessment theories. Current joint doctrine defines MoE as criteria “used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that [are] tied to measuring the attainment of an end state.” These are used with and/or derived from MoP which are criteria used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. The difficulty of developing, collecting, and analyzing relevant MoEs forces many units to focus on less informative, but more easily identified measures of performance.

Selection of appropriate analytical measures is an important aspect of the planning process. Researchers have noted seven criteria which are important for choosing analytical measures. Measures must be: mission-related, comprehensive, meaningful, measurable, sensitive to change, timely, and...
cost effective for those collecting and analyzing the
data. These criteria are echoed by joint doctrine,
which prescribes measures that are relevant, mea-
surable, responsive, and resourced. The dynamic
nature of real-world systems demands an iterative
evaluation process which continually refines the
analytical measures to ensure they remain appro-
priately diagnostic. In this way, even the process
of developing MoE can provide coordination op-
opportunities, prioritize tasks, and define objectives.
An iterative, continual assessment process serves
to orient an organization and encourage improve-
ments across echelons. “Measures of effectiveness
that adequately distill and accurately reflect reality
help decision makers make informed, timely deci-
sions. On the other hand, ill-considered or poorly
chosen measures have a multitude of negative ef-
fects.” Since organizations tune their behavior to
improve evaluated measures, MoE can also contrib-
ute to unintended consequences.

Failures associated with misused MoE have drawn
criticism and skepticism from U.S. and NATO lead-
ership. Examples such as the Hamlet Evaluation System and
body counts in Vietnam, U.S. Air
Force battle damage assessment
in the Kosovo bombing campaign
of 1999, and the metrics used
during the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah
conflict illustrate the misleading
effects of narrowly defined met-
rics. Zoltan Jobbagy reviewed
military theorists and concluded
that the frictional reality of war
allows for very low practical ceil-
ing for Effects Based Operations
(EBO). Kelly and Kilcullen ob-
ject to the notion that response
and actions can be reliably pre-
dicted. In a thoughtful and well-
supported memorandum, General J.N. Mattis, the
commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command notes
that “EBO has been misapplied and overextended
to the point that it actually hinders rather than
helps joint operations.” GEN Mattis goes on to
ban the use, sponsorship, or export of the terms
and concepts related to Effects Based Operations,
Operational Net Assessment, and System of System
Analysis in Joint training and doctrine. In general,
these critics argue that metrics can be misleading
and/or too complicated to be of benefit.

Unfortunately, such denunciations of metrics can
disappoint the use of data to inform decision mak-
ing. The acknowledgement that military operations
are dynamic and impossible to predict should not
preclude the thoughtful development and analysis
of MoE. Even General Mattis agrees that “…we
must retain and adopt those aspects of effect based
thinking that are useful.” Milan Vego argues against
EBO, and proposes an Objective Based Approach
which emphasizes objectives and tasks, rather than
effects. He argues that the current emphasis on
predictive metrics and indicators is errant; how-
ever, he acknowledges the importance of moni-
toring task accomplishment. The authors concur with
the criticism of predictive measures, and have also
found significant benefits from rigorously developed
and scrutinized quantitative data to inform qualita-
tive assessments of military operations. The process
and benefits of operational assessments in the JIDC
are described below.

The JIDC

The JIDC was a subordinate command to the
Deputy Commanding General for Detention
Operations (DCG-DO), formerly TF 134, in U.S.
Forces-Iraq (USF-I). Detention operations con-
sisted of care and custody as well as interrogation
operations, and are conducted to assess, reconcile
and transfer or release detainees consistent with the
November 2008 Security Agreement between
the U.S. and Iraq. The JIDC conducted unilateral and combined strategic interrogations at the theater internment facility in support of USF-I collection priorities. The JIDCs mission was to provide timely Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to support the theater and division commanders’ operations. Intelligence is information that can be used to reduce a threat and includes targets, resources, methods, intentions and threat networks. Threat network information further includes personalities, relationships and communication methods. Major General David Quantock, the Task Force 134 Commanding General, has commented on the criticality of focused interrogation operations. “Interrogation operations are a critical enabler to operations both outside the wire, enabling offense/defense/stability operations, and inside the wire. Focused interrogations not only informed the fight, they also helped determine whether we were dealing with reconcilable or irreconcilable detainees. This allowed us to focus our prosecution efforts against the irreconcilables.”

**JIDC Lines of Effort and MoP**

As a strategic HUMINT collection platform, the JIDC exercised four Lines of Effort—interrogations, document and media exploitation (DOMEX), analysis, and collection management and dissemination. Figure 2 depicts these Lines of Effort along with the objectives of each. The JIDC processed detainees and their property and generated intelligence reports.

The Joint Exploitation Cell (JEC) provided the first assessment of new detainees and their captured property. Detainees were screened to determine who were of potential intelligence value, and their property was analyzed by the DOMEX Cell. Both of these teams forwarded any intelligence information collected to the Fusion and Analysis Cell. Analysts in the Fusion and Analysis Cell coupled information from the JEC with pertinent reporting from the intelligence community at large to produce intelligence support packages that empower the interrogators. Interrogators and analysts in the Interrogation Control Element planned and executed interrogations and produced Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) which were reviewed and published by the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) Section. In addition to publishing IIRs for use by our consumers, CM&D received questions and feedback on reporting in the form of Source Directed Requirements, Requests for Information and Evaluations. Figure 3 illustrates this process. JIDC Liaison Officers further assisted with dissemination and facilitated quality feedback and requests from our consumer organizations (e.g., U.S. divisions, USF-I staff, and interagency partners).

The JIDC established metrics that described the effectiveness of inputs as well as outputs. In so doing, the JIDC focused its analysis on the DOMEX, ICE, and CM&D sections. Given the Lines of Effort and the process described above, the JIDC has four important MoP: interrogations conducted, detainees exploited, property exploited, and IIRs produced. These are the most informative indicators of workload within the JIDC. It should also be noted that if the system under consideration were, for example, just the ICE or DOMEX, these MoP would be MoE. However, for the JIDC, they fail to illustrate the degree to which our consumers were impacted, or how effectively the analysts were at targeting detainees of intelligence value.

The JIDC used both internal and external MoE. Internal MoE were metrics
that informed the commander about performance within the organization. Productivity, report rate and IIR quality were indicators of successful processes or the resource allocation that the JIDC commander could directly influence. External MoE were metrics that informed the DCG-DO and USF-I Commander about the JIDC’s performance with respect to its consumers or resources allocated to the JIDC. These MoE are defined below. It should be noted that these metrics were the result of three quarterly iterations of the JIDC assessment cycle. Each cycle helped to add, subtract, or refine the most informative metrics.

**JIDC Assessment Cycle**

The assessment cycle was driven by the orders, directives and collection emphases that were provided by our higher headquarters, USF-I. As indicated in Figure 4, the purpose of the process was to inform planning, resource allocation, the refinement of tactics, techniques and procedures, and the identification of training requirements. As discussed, the JIDC developed its MoP and MoE with respect to its Lines of Effort and with the JIDC system in mind. Benchmarking our data with past units helped to explain periodic fluctuations and depict the impact of operational or environmental changes. As the JIDC continued with successive iterations of its assessment cycle, it continued to note operational and situational changes which may impact effectiveness. Furthermore, as operational changes were made, the MoE were revised accordingly. Although this process is manpower intensive and complex, it has demonstrated its utility as the JIDC drew down along with other U.S. forces in Iraq.

Accurate assessments are made by external, independent review boards. The JIDC process was supervised and coordinated by the executive officer/chief of staff under the guidance of the Deputy Commander. Individual sections were responsible for maintaining databases of relevant information for their tasks, and an experienced analyst (GS-12, 1LT or SSG) was responsible for synthesizing the information. This division of labor kept the assessments independent of, but synchronized with, and supportive of operations.

The operational assessment process provided the JIDC Commander with feedback to assess interrogation effectiveness and prioritize resources accordingly. Specifically, it was helpful in three ways. First, it provided information on how well we were achieving our objectives. Second, the assessment process indicated areas for operational improvements. Finally, the assessment process provided feedback which served as an incentive for improvements within and outside of the JIDC. Two examples are illustrative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoP</th>
<th>MoE (Internal)</th>
<th>MoE (External)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interrogations conducted</td>
<td>Productivity 1: IIRs produced/interrogations</td>
<td>Cite Rate: IIRs cited by consumers/IIRs produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents exploited</td>
<td>Productivity 2: IIRs produced/detainees exploited</td>
<td>Throughput: Production Rate * Cite Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees exploited</td>
<td>Report Rate: detainees who report/detainees exploited</td>
<td>Productivity 3: IIRs produced/JIDC manning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIRs produced</td>
<td>IIR Quality 16: Quality distribution of IIRs produced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2009, CENTCOM ordered a reduction of all forces in Iraq from 140,000 to 50,000 by September 2010. This drawdown, along with the termination of the UN Security Council Resolution, which authorized combat operations in Iraq, reduced the number of new captures arriving at the theater internment facility. The JIDC's planning assumption for this period was that the detainee population would become increasingly difficult to exploit. Accordingly, the JIDC adapted in two ways: remissioning the Fusion and Analysis Cell to assess and select targets for the interrogators (previously, targeting had been done by the interrogators), and a phased withdrawal of interrogation assets to conserve interrogation resources for future deployments. Steady Production Rates and significantly improved Cite Rates indicated that the revised targeting process was an improvement. Additionally, declining IIR production supported the phased drawdown in resources. Similar analysis was helpful in determining the effectiveness of particular interrogation techniques, too.

Separation is an approved interrogation technique that prevents a detainee from cohabitating or interacting with other detainees and developing counter-interrogation techniques. Likewise, incentive living conditions (i.e., single rooms, unlimited recreation privileges, civilian clothes allowed) have existed at the Cropper Theater Internment Facility to encourage cooperative detainees. Although it was generally accepted that both techniques were effective in aiding interrogations, no data existed to describe their relative benefits. Comparisons of Production Rates and Report Rate with the general population indicated that the use of these differential living conditions resulted in interrogations which were much more effective. This data provided a critical cost-benefit analysis for the DCG-DO to justify the creation and retention of these spaces even as care and custody forces were drawn down.

Conclusion
Critics are correct to point out the poor cost-benefit tradeoff of using metrics to predict outcomes. However, the JIDC demonstrated how quantitative metrics can be used to enhance qualitative assessments and inform the planning process. The process proved equally beneficial for planners in the 4th Infantry Division conducting full spectrum operations as Multi-National Division Baghdad. Because this process encourages introspection and consideration of environmental changes, it also facilitates adaptation. Therefore, it is very likely that similar efforts in other organizations (intelligence or otherwise) would yield results of equal value. Furthermore, the data and analysis from this process serves as an important addition to enduring lessons learned. Most after action reviews (AARs) have no empirical evidence to support anecdotal observations. The JIDC has included these operational assessments in its AAR that was submitted to the Center for Army Lessons Learned. In this way, future interrogation organizations can use our data to benchmark and plan for their own operations. Thus, our process should also inform doctrine and training with data that provides empirical evidence.
for tactics, techniques, and procedures used during our deployment.

We have noted that other high risk domains have formally educated, career professionals to conduct assessments. The Army continues to assign these duties in less formalized ways. This contributes to a general lack of expertise in data collection, maintenance and analysis, and discourages even the formation of assessment workgroups. A formal quantitative and qualitative assessment provides commanders with a way to better understand how well they are meeting their objectives. Successful assessments result from commanders who provide useful guidance to skilled and empowered teams of passionate analysts. Without either of these elements, decision making in military operations will be under informed and less optimal.

Endnotes


3. John Green has conducted a more thorough history of the evolution of MoE theory.


5. Ibid., p. 256.


8. JP 3-0 Joint Operations, IV-33-34.


17. Specific impacts of both separation and incentive living arrangements can be found in the 14th MI Battalion’s end of tour AAR.

18. Taken from personal experiences from the second author, who was the Chief of Plans for 4ID from 2007-2008. The Plans Section of 4ID conducted assessments of operations as various as security operations, Iraqi security force training, and infrastructure improvements.
Intelligence Support to Sustainment Operations: Lessons Learned from the Iraq Drawdown

by Lieutenant Colonel Devon Blake and Chief Warrant Officer Four Deloye Meacham

From an intelligence perspective, there are some critical points to capture and several important lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown. This article will specifically focus on intelligence support to sustainment operations during the final push of personnel and equipment out of Iraq from 21 October to 18 December 2011.

Background

Before delving into the details, it is important first to have some background knowledge on the unit responsible for the retrograde operations. The 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) was activated on 18 April 2006 as one of three active duty theater sustainment commands (TSC) in the Army. This two-star command consists of approximately 22,000 personnel whose mission is to provide logistical support to the U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of operations. The 1st TSC operates two command posts: the main command post (MCP) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the forward command post (FCP) at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. In March 2012, the unit was assigned the retrograde mission for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and is establishing a third command post in Afghanistan.

Though the 1st TSC’s primary mission is sustainment operations for the CENTCOM area of responsibility, its primary focus became retrograde operations for Operation New Dawn (OND) in Iraq on 21 October 2011, the day that President Obama announced that all U.S. troops and trainers would be out of Iraq and “home for the holidays.”

At the time of the President’s speech, there were 24 major operational bases and over 86,000 personnel still in Iraq. This left the 1st TSC only 58 days to complete this retrograde mission! In order to meet the deadline, the Commanding General (CG) rallied his staff to develop a plan for this seemingly insurmountable task, comparable in stature to the Red Ball Express in World War II or the Cold War’s Berlin Airlift. It is appropriate to recognize and laud the efforts of the staff and subordinate units whose integrative endeavors, consistent communication, and contagious ambition resulted in achievement of the heroic feat. At the time of the President’s announcement, the second and third order effects on sustainment were overwhelming, yet viewed as a challenge worthy of devoting time, energy, and resources to ensure the safe return home of our brothers and sisters in arms.

Theater Sustainment Intelligence Operations during Retrograde

The 1st TSC G2 conducts split-based operations at command posts in North Carolina, Kuwait, and Afghanistan (as of May 2012) with a mission to provide timely, accurate and predictive logistical-based intelligence to the 1st TSC’s CG, his staff, subordinate units, war fighters, and civilian agencies across the globe. The section focuses on threats to trans-
portation carriers that provide crucial re-supply along Ground Lines of Communication, Sea Lines of Communication, and Air Lines of Communication, to sustain our forces throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, the Northern Distribution Network, the Horn of Africa, and Yemen. The G2’s Theater Sustainment Intelligence Center produces and distributes daily, weekly, and monthly intelligence to a comprehensive audience. In addition to a talented team of analysts who develop the products, the G2 also has organic counterintelligence (CI) agents who investigate and report potential threats to the 1st TSC mission.

In order to meet the CG’s intelligence demands for retrograde operations and the OND drawdown, the G2 deployed additional personnel from the MCP at Fort Bragg to the FCP in Kuwait. Important to recognize is the reality that the 1st TSC and subordinate sustainment brigades (SB) do not conduct lethal targeting nor do they own any organic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. The 1st TSC relies on operational environment owners (OEOs) and national level assets for ISR support. However, subordinate logistical units often provide critical intelligence via convoy debriefs upon mission completion. The drivers of these missions understand that they are intelligence sensors, familiar with their area of operations as a result of driving the routes daily and able to recognize and report alterations to the environment.

Two of the 1st TSC subordinate unit intelligence sections, the S2 from the Minnesota National Guard’s 1/34th Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) and the S2 from the Tennessee National Guard’s 230th SB, conducted convoy commander debriefs to collect pertinent information on criminal and insurgent activity, to include attack trends, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and local atmospherics. From this gathered information, the best course of action could be assessed. For example, logistics drivers could provide information on explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and improvised explosive device (IED) emplacement positions to include hiding techniques and positions. In order to further assist with the debriefs, the CI agents from the TSC developed and implemented a list of open-ended questions, intended to bolster discussion and trigger the drivers’ memory. As a result of these driver debriefs, OEO cross-talk, and daily intelligence sharing across the joint operating area, TTPs were formed to determine in which lane vehicles should drive in areas frequented with EFPs and IEDs.

Historically in Iraq, sustainment convoys drove as close to the center of two and three lane highways at high rates of speed to avoid being targeted by EFPs and IEDs typically planted along the shoulder of the road and to pass quickly through known elevated threat zones (ETZs). Insurgents observed this TTP and soon adjusted their practices accordingly. They began to precisely angle their EFPs to target drivers, gunners and known armor soft spots. To lower the risks to the logistics convoys, the unit S2s compiled selective data such as time of day, IED/EFP emplacement statistics, areas of increased activity and types of initiators employed. The S2s then provided briefings to truck and convoy commanders to raise awareness of the ETZs and recommended what lane to drive in for a particular length of the road. For example, if EFPs were generally set-up along a three-lane road in an ETZ to target a specific vehicle in the center lane, then the unit S2 would recommend the convoy vehicles drive either along the far side of the road or as close to the shoulder of the road where the EFP might be.

By driving on the far side of the road, the majority of shrapnel from an EFP will overshoot a designated target vehicle; the vehicles driving on the near side of the road will be impacted by shrapnel, but the aim would be off, affecting the lower areas such as the tires and wheel wells and preventing injuries to the occupants inside. To prevent insurgents from adapting to 1st TSC convoy lane changes, S2s routinely changed the driving lane TTPs, resulting in minimal damage, if any, to equipment and personnel. Computer-aided design software was used very effectively by the S2s in the 1/34th HBCT to rebuild attack models of recent IED and EFP detonations, giving a visual reference of insurgent TTPs to drivers.

1st TSC sustainment drivers were also critical in providing local atmospherics. A noted trend that caused concern for sustainment convoys, as well as for warfighting units, was rock throwing incidents along routes. The incidents occurred primarily in the vicinity of forward operating bases. Iraqis with anti-U.S. sentiments recruited Iraqi children, young adults, and occasionally local security forces...
to throw rocks at convoys waiting to enter military bases. On several occasions, there was significant damage caused to personnel and equipment, most often resulting in shattered windshields and windows. Intelligence indicated that insurgents paid the children and some adults to throw rocks at U.S. convoys in order to push soldiers into a defensive posture, ultimately resulting in the death of Iraqi citizens.

From the G2 perspective, one of the principal concerns was the potential shooting of a rock thrower in self defense by coalition forces. Another concern involved a scenario in which insurgents merged with volatile local crowds outside military installations, initiated an attack, then blended back in with the local populace as coalition forces returned fire in self defense. A third scenario consisted of a rock thrower tossing a homemade explosive in lieu of a rock, causing damage similar to that of a hand grenade. Any of these scenarios would lead to an Information Operations (IO) nightmare with insurgents undoubtedly and defiantly claiming that coalition forces egregiously fired upon innocent protestors. The end result likely would have been an increase in attacks and further dissent against U.S. forces.

At the time, primarily during the summer months of 2011, there was significant debate at the senior command levels with regard to the use of lethal and non-lethal force in rock throwing incidents. With consternation in the minds of some, it was decided that a lethal posture would cause undue media attention and launch a negative IO campaign. Utilizing non-lethal means, such as rubberized bullets, would be misconstrued by the media as a lethal posture and also cause damage to U.S. soldiers’ reputation.

In order to deter growing anxiety by the soldiers in the convoy vehicles, 1st TSC convoys were typically made aware of crowds gathering outside bases prior to their arrival. Despite the occasional damage to equipment and injuries to personnel, convoy members understood the importance of their actions. In every instance, they displayed complete professionalism, maturity, and remained calm without ever playing into the insurgents’ plan to spur a negative reaction.

Another effective measure in the case of the rock throwing incidents was the involvement of the OEOs in engaging the local leaders through a proactive IO campaign. By talking to heads of schools, city council and shura leaders, the children were soon discouraged by the elders from throwing rocks, and the activity in those areas ceased for several months. This took a large effort on the part of the OEO, but paid big dividends for the convoys.

Daily intelligence sharing between 1st TSC, U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT), U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I), the 364th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, 1/34th HBCT, 230th SB, 595th Transportation Brigade and the Military Deployment Surface and Distribution Command proved worthwhile and essential to successful retrograde operations. Measures were taken by the intelligence professionals within these units to ensure all-source intelligence was briefed down to the lowest level users on the ground, those driving the roads. As often as permissible, face-to-face visits occurred between the G2s and S2s, secure calls (SVOIP) were conducted, or intelligence analysis and assessments shared via SIPRNET. Additionally, it was paramount for intelligence officers and analysts to occasionally convoy with the drivers in Iraq, a key to truly understanding the threat, terrain and environment first-hand.

On a weekly basis, via Adobe Connect (software used on the SIPRNET to share information in a presentation format, with the capability of talking and listening to multiple persons in multiple theaters), the 1st TSC G2 hosted a joint intelligence synchronization meeting with theater intelligence subject matter experts from Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Fort Bragg. Tying in Afghanistan was essential for the discussion of potential migrating TTPs and other insurgent activity. Also key for information sharing, the 230th SB hosted a bi-monthly convoy commander’s conference attended by the 1st TSC G2, in-theater logistics unit staff members, convoy commanders and truck commanders (TCs).

It was not uncommon for a general officer from a higher headquarters to attend in order to get a true picture of the tactical logistics picture, and to hear from the soldiers who, quite literally, were right where the rubber met the road. Although there was an established agenda, the conference consisted of informal briefings, and open discussion was highly encouraged for everyone in attendance. Included as
part of this briefing were statistics from the latest criminal and insurgent TTPs. Potential methods to defeat these threats were shared, receiving immediate feedback from the convoy commanders and TCs regarding their thoughts, experiences and assessments. Occasionally they discussed an event or incident they may not have thought about reporting until that moment, but which often led to beneficial intelligence value.

**ISR during Retrograde Operations**

We would be remiss if we did not highlight the use of ISR assets during retrograde operations. To reiterate, the 1st TSC does not possess organic ISR or an assigned collections manager to facilitate and track ISR requirements. Additionally, since the 1st TSC was based in Kuwait during the Iraq drawdown, there was a widely held false belief that the TSC was not involved in combat operations, making it difficult to compete for ISR with OEOs in a combined/joint operations area already suffering from a deficit of available resources. The 1st TSC G2 team campaigned heavily with the USF-I J2 staff, explaining the mission of the TSC and the extent that the convoys traveled. Daily distances averaged approximately 360 miles along Iraqi roadways, targeted by insurgent networks. Different than combat patrols whose mission aimed at targeting and killing the insurgents, logistic and retrograde convoys preferred not to engage the fighters, but rather outrun them. Nonetheless, they were still targeted, often carrying critical resources such as ammunition, fuel, equipment and food for the warfighter.

Overall success regarding ISR utilization relied on relationship building and establishing trust between units. Sustainment brigades were granted direct liaison authority with OEOs as they traversed the routes. The TSC worked with ARCENT to include national and theater requirements into the Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management (PRISM) database, and advocated for their inclusion into the planned intelligence deck. This database is utilized within the intelligence community, specific to ISR requests and prioritization. National and theater requirements were satisfied, and information from items of interest was passed directly to units using Blue Force Tracker, resulting in direct exploitation center-to-end user distribution.

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that the combined efforts of the entire logistics community resulted in a stunning 58 day OND retrograde. The statistics are nothing short of mind boggling. During this time the 1st TSC safely conducted 481 convoy missions, using 3,600 trucks, retrograding 16,032 truckloads of equipment, all while driving a combined total of 11 million miles. As the history books are written, it can be added that there were no serious injuries or loss of life to the sustainment drivers. We think it can be said that the talented team of intelligence professionals within the 1st TSC had something to do with the outcome.

LTC Devon Blake is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. She holds a BS in Engineering from West Point, an MS in Engineering from Missouri University of Science and Technology, and an MA in Education from the University of Virginia, is also a graduate of the MIOBC. Her assignments include the Iron Brigade Combat Team Assistant S2, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea; Collection and Jamming Platoon Leader, 102nd MI Battalion; Aerial Exploitation Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, and Battalion S2, 224th MI Battalion, Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. She deployed with the 10th Mountain Division in 1999 to Bosnia-Herzegovina as the 2-15th Field Artillery Regiment S2. LTC Blake attended the Engineer Captains Career Course, followed by the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. Following that she served as the Battalion S2, 5th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Mechanized) and Commander, HHC, 1st Engineer Brigade. Her next assignment was back to West Point as the Education Officer. Upon completion of the CGSC, she served as the Brigade S2, 16th MP Brigade (Airborne) at Fort Bragg and deployed in this position to Afghanistan from July 2009 to July 2010, where she simultaneously served as the JTF 435 Forward J2. She deployed again to Afghanistan in January-February 2011, and then from June-December 2011 with a follow-on assignment as the G2, 1st TSC, responsible for retrograde operations out of Iraq. She is currently the Commander, 344th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade, Goodfellow, AFB.

CW4 Deloye B. Meacham Jr. is currently serving as the All-Source Intelligence Chief on the G2 staff of 1st Sustainment Command (Theater), at Fort Bragg. He most recently deployed to Kuwait in support of the retrograde mission from Iraq, September 2011 to February 2012. Chief Meacham has served for over 20 years on active duty intelligence with assignments ranging from Battalion S2 to U.S. SPACECOM J2.
Introduction

In May 2011, President Obama visited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to speak to the intelligence community about the successful raid on Usama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan earlier that month. The President called the raid, “...one of the greatest intelligence successes in American history” and praised the intelligence community, civilian and military alike, for “...using every capability–human, technical–collecting, analyzing, sharing, integrating intelligence and then acting on it.” The President then spoke directly to his “absolute confidence in the skill of our military personnel,” and his reliance on CIA’s intelligence, which he said comes across his desk every day.1

The Abbottabad raid provides an exceptional contemporary illustration of the CIA and the military working together. Moreover, after 10 years of war, the professional and personal bonds that have formed between the CIA and the military have resulted in the two organizations working well together across the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. That spirit of cooperation has touched on, and likely will continue to touch on, many important areas of mutual interest including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, counter proliferation, counterinsurgency as well as multiple conventional threats.

And, while the CIA and the military have worked well together with many successes since 9/11, there continues to be a certain mystique associated with the CIA. This article is intended to remove some of the air of secrecy. It is intended for all military professionals, and especially for those military intelligence (MI) professionals who have not yet dealt with the CIA, or who have had limited dealings with “the Agency.” That said, the CIA is an intelligence organization and, therefore, secrecy is essential. This is particularly true when it comes to the issues of sources of intelligence and methods of collection. However, there remain many basic, unclassified aspects of the CIA that military personnel should be familiar with as intelligence professionals.

What Does the CIA Do?

The CIA is an independent agency responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers.2 The National Security Act of 1947 established the authority for the agency to carry out three principal activities: collect foreign intelligence, analyze intelligence, and conduct covert action.3 The following excerpts from the National Security Act establish these authorities.4

- Agency operators “collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means.” This is also referred to as foreign intelligence collection.
- Agency analysts “correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence.” This is also referred to as all-source analysis.
- And the Agency performs other functions and duties as the President may direct, which could include activities to influence conditions abroad, “where it is intended that the role of the U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publically.” In other words, covert action.5

How is the CIA organized?

To accomplish these missions, the CIA is organized into four basic components: the National Clandestine Service (NCS), the Directorate of
Intelligence (DI), the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) and the Directorate of Support (DS). There is also a Director's staff, which includes offices such as the Office of General Counsel (OGC), the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the Office of the Associate Director for Military Affairs (ADMA) to name just a few.

The mission of the NCS is to strengthen national security and foreign policy objectives through the clandestine collection of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and covert action. The NCS consists mainly of operations officers whose job it is to collect foreign intelligence information often by recruiting individuals, or assets, with access to desired intelligence information. NCS officers are probably the type of person that many people think of when they think about the CIA–a James Bond type character.

The DI consists of officers who analyze intelligence from multiple sources such as NCS-generated HUMINT reporting (referred to as TDs, which is short for Telegraphic Disseminations), Signals Intelligence, MI reporting and open source information among countless other sources. The result of this collection and analysis is the production of all-source or finished intelligence for the President, Cabinet, and senior national security decision makers. The premier intelligence product in the intelligence community is the Presidential Daily Brief, or PDB, and the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence is a major contributor to the PDB. Much of the DI's finished intelligence is also posted to the CIA's classified web site called the Worldwide Intelligence Review (WIRe), which is available to the military. Other noteworthy CIA products that military professionals should be aware of are The World Fact Book, the CIA's regularly published online directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, and unclassified extracts from CIA's professional journal called Studies in Intelligence.

If an NCS officer is our James Bond type, then the DS&T includes our “Q” department. The DS&T consists of officers who create, adapt, develop and operate the technical collection systems and apply enabling technologies to the collection, analysis, and processing of information. They develop the tools and technology needed to both collect foreign intelligence and to support CIA activities in the field. As a classic example, think of the tie clip that is also a miniaturized camera.

Finally, DS officers provide everything the CIA needs to accomplish its mission. DS officers are often the first CIA officers into difficult operational areas and are responsible for establishing key support functions such as communications, supply chains, facilities, financial, and medical services.

How are the CIA and MI different?

A principal difference between the CIA and MI is the customer. While the CIA’s customers are the President, cabinet-level officials, and the National Security Staff, MI is focused on the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. The commander is the principal customer, whether it is at the battalion, brigade, division, corps or other echelon of command.

Another important distinction, related to the first, is the level at which each organization focuses its intelligence collection, reporting, analysis, and production. The CIA is focused at the strategic or national level, while the military is, for the most part, focused on intelligence at the tactical and operational levels.

Still, there are times when the lines cross. While military commanders are most interested in intelligence specific to their area of operations (AO) and level of command, many military commanders are also consumers of the CIA’s products in order to fill intelligence gaps at the strategic level (i.e., what is going on around them, outside of their AO and in neighboring countries). In the same vein, the military, at times, collects intelligence of strategic value, which is then used by the CIA to analyze.

And, while there are many other differences between the CIA and the military such as rank, uniform, jargon, acronyms, and above all the size of each organization’s budget and the number of personnel, the two organizations are drawn to work together with one overarching purpose—the national security of the U.S.

How do the CIA and the Military Work Together?

The CIA and the military have worked together to protect and defend the U.S. since the CIA was established in 1947. This complex relationship has evolved during that time in response to world
events. One way the CIA and the military work together is through intelligence sharing. CIA analysts use MI reporting in their finished products. The military, in turn, uses CIA intelligence to round out its strategic picture of the operational environment.

Operationally, the CIA and the military have worked together for many years but especially since 9/11 in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. As a result, many institutional and individual connections have been established or strengthened, so much so that the relationship between the CIA and the military arguably has never been better. The Abbottabad raid is probably the best recent example of CIA and Department of Defense (DoD) operational cooperation.

The military also works with the CIA through the CIA’s array of stations and bases overseas. The Chief of Station, is a senior NCS officer at each station, and could be viewed as the CIA’s “commander” in military parlance.

Finally, the CIA’s Office of the Associate Director for Military Affairs (ADMA) coordinates worldwide activities that support CIA and DoD interaction. As an example, ADMA manages CIA representatives at military headquarters, particularly the Combatant Commands, as well as Faculty Representatives at selected DoD schools such as the National and Service War Colleges. The representatives’ offices are intended to enhance cooperation and understanding between the CIA and the military regarding each other’s missions, capabilities and limitations.

Conclusion

The CIA and the military have very different missions, but both are vital to protecting and defending the U.S. Since 9/11, world events have drawn the two organizations closer together and a spirit of cooperation has emerged. Going forward, the CIA and DoD will need to maintain that same level of interagency cooperation and also seek ways to further improve interoperability in order to face our adversaries of tomorrow.

Endnotes

4. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amended the National Security Act to provide for a DNI who would assume some roles formerly fulfilled by the Director of Central Intelligence, with a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
6. NCS was previously called the Directorate of Operations.
12. The CIA museum offers tours to select military groups and houses an impressive display of DS&T’s past creations and innovations.
14. DoD personnel and budget numbers are significantly larger than the CIA.

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson, an MI officer, is a 1992 graduate of Texas Christian University. He has served overseas in Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea and Germany in addition to multiple assignments in the U.S. He is currently assigned to the CIA’s Office of the Associate Director for Military Affairs. This article has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information. That review neither constitutes CIA authentication of information nor implies CIA endorsement of the author’s views.
Intelligence Development in the Romanian–American Battle Group during the four year partnership.

One of the key functions of the U.S. Army is our mission to partner with foreign forces and provide training, effects, and capabilities those forces might not otherwise have. This function ranges from training newly-developed indigenous forces to defend themselves, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, to partnering with modern militaries to share lessons learned from conflicts and peace-keeping operations. Since 2006, U.S. Army Europe has provided support to the Romanian Army through combined deployments in Zabul Province, Afghanistan to complement and enhance the warfighting capabilities of this valuable allied nation. Of all the enablers provided, U.S. Intelligence personnel are perhaps among the most valuable, allowing the partnered forces access to the broad menu of assets that the U.S. military has, and enabling their forces to conduct operations effectively to defeat the shared enemy of international terrorism.

Mission Background

In the summer of 2006, U.S. European Command agreed to support the Romanian Land Forces deployment of a battalion task force (TF) by providing a U.S. Infantry company, Naval Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTACs), a mortar platoon, and Operations and Intelligence personnel. This company team was attached to the Romanian Battalion, and has remained so through 2010, providing operational and logistical augmentation, training and support. Over the years, the responsibilities of the TF have ranged.
from the entire Zabul Province to more focused missions including security of Afghan Highway 1 and securing and building capability in the Afghan Security Forces and key population centers within the province. Similarly, the scope of duties for the attached intelligence personnel have gone from leading the Battalion Intelligence section through operational planning and analysis processes to supporting the Romanian S2 staff from the “right seat” and augmenting them with assets to which they would not normally have access.

Training

Perhaps one of the most valuable events of the mission for the Intelligence section, was the training events at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany and Cincu, Romania. It was here, when the Intelligence personnel could attend, that the processes needed during the deployment were established and the personal bonds between Romanian and U.S. personnel could be grown. It also allowed U.S. Intelligence personnel to assess their counterparts and ensure that the individual training, which followed the Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs), developed the skills needed to truly complement the Romanians’ skill sets.

Due to varying timelines for deployment between the Romanians, the U.S. company, and the attachments to the company, not everyone participated in the MREs. From the intelligence perspective, not attending the training event was a significant detractor to the partnership. Aside from the sharpening of skills and the individual training received on certain systems, this removed the ability to develop good working relationships between the U.S. and Romanian personnel; a loss that may have led to some of the issues experienced during deployment which will be discussed later.

For the MREs in which the U.S. intelligence personnel did attend, each side developed an understanding of the other’s capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses, which lead to a division of labor and internal cross-training of skill sets. For example, where the Americans provided digital systems and technical capabilities, the Romanians might have previous area experience and effective analog systems (which would prove useful during power and network outages). From direct observation and review of previous teams’ after action reviews, it would appear that those rotations where the U.S. and Romanian Intelligence personnel both attended showed the greatest cooperation during combat operations.

The second portion of the pre-deployment training plan was individual training, including instruction on systems such as the Distributed Common Ground System–Army and the Tactical Ground Reporting Network as well as processes such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) employment and Collection Management and Analysis in support of tactical units. While this training was useful in reinforcing the skills of the American personnel, it would have been immeasurably valuable for the Romanian Intelligence personnel who do not receive such training given the lack of specialization in the Romanian Army. Particularly for the given mission, and the multi-national capabilities of European training centers, incorporating individual training would not only increase the internal capabilities of our allies and ensure interoperability with U.S. forces, but in light of this particular mission, further enable the U.S. and Romanian personnel to work together and provide the increased capability through use of the entire combined section rather than unequal reliance on the U.S. element.

Combat Operations

The integration of the American and Romanian elements through the course of the numerous rotations ranged from complete and inter-dependent operations to independent and fragmented duties within the section. In the best cases, the close relationships in the section came from conscious decisions to support each other while those sections that appeared fragmented were less cooperative due to a lack of understanding in each others’ capabilities, in both the Intelligence section and among the rest of the combined staff. Towards the end of the partnership, when the integration appeared to be at its closest, certain duties still almost by default, fell to either the Americans or the Romanians. ISR, for example, was almost a solely American duty, mainly due to the greater understanding that the U.S. forces had of the assets and capabilities. Some might say that a specialization of duties within the section is a positive attribute, and it can be, but that does not absolve the need for a certain depth of knowledge among the rest of the crew.
Until late 2009, the U.S. forces of the Romanian American Battle Group controlled the bases north of Highway 1 in Deh Chopan, Mizan, and Arghandab while the Romanian Army provided security along the highway in Qalat, Tarnak wa Jaldak, and Shajoy Districts. Though the mission of the U.S. attachments to the Romanians was to support them with certain enablers, this was not a direct contact relationship below the Battalion headquarters simply due to geography. This, in conjunction with the inability to train together in the Intelligence section, compounded some of the problems experienced between the Romanian and American personnel. As other forces arrived in the Province starting in 2009, the U.S. units were allowed to support the highway mission and that led the priorities of both nations to a common goal. This common interest, securing the highway and its environs, allowed the U.S. and Romanian companies to not only operate together, but enabled cooperation among the staff so that the elements became mutually supporting and thus received the mutual support of U.S. and Romanian staff sections.

As U.S. and Romanian units began to share battle space, missions, and facilities to a greater degree, the Intelligence personnel also coalesced into more of a single unit. The 2008 and 2009 MREs between the U.S. Company Teams (A Co/D Co, 1-4IN) and the Romanian Battalions (280th/33rd) were two of the few training exercises where the attached Intelligence personnel attended. Here, many skills between the two sides were developed which led to immediate increased capabilities for the Romanians once deployed and the quick integration of the U.S. Intel attachments into their headquarters as they arrived shortly after. While some things had changed between training and deployment, which is to be expected, the company teams and Intelligence attachments arrived knowing their colleagues on a social and professional level.

As previously stated, some divisions of labor continued even with the combined mission, but they did so based on each individual’s strengths rather than nationality and in a manner which fostered interoperation. Tasks that had once been solely “American duties” or “Romanian duties” were now shared and cooperative efforts. Tasks from major operational planning to routine briefings became combined endeavors with both American and Romanian personnel adding information and then presenting it as well. In fact, during the parliamentary elections of 2010, for the first time in 4 years the Romanians led the planning and coordination of the ISR supporting the main effort in Zabul Province. None of this could be conducted in a vacuum and though each person in the combined section had “his task,” it was not without the cooperation of many other personnel that they could accomplish these tasks. The positive result to this was a noticeable increase in the quality of the section’s products and increase in capabilities overall. Duplicate efforts ceased, and the section was able to move from basic support, discussing what had happened in the past to actually getting to the point where intelligence drove operations; the end state to which all tactical intelligence sections should strive.

**Conclusion**

While many of the enablers provided by the Americans to the overall Romanian American Battle Group were indispensable, it may have been the intelligence section that allowed the Battle Group to move from maintaining a presence to expanding its influence. The cooperation between the American and Romanian personnel left a mark on both as each side learned new techniques and processes and developed a greater understanding of the coalition environment and the various capabilities brought by allied nations. The U.S. technical capabilities, combined with the tactical knowledge and experience of the Romanians ensured that over the four-year relationship of the Romanian American Battle Group, success was achieved.

CPT Krisjand Rothweiler is currently serving as the U.S. Intelligence OIC for the combined 812 Romanian Battalion and D/1-4 IN Task Force in Zabul, Afghanistan and will be redeploying to his assigned position as the Deputy Chief for Intelligence and Security at the Joint Multinational Simulations Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany this fall. Prior to this, he served as the MiTT Intel Trainer for the 2/2/4 Bn of the Iraqi Army, Battalion S2 for 3-7 Field Artillery and AS2 for 1-27 Infantry of the 25th Infantry Division. He holds an MS in Information Assurance from Norwich University and a BA in Political Science from the University of Maine.
USAICoE and the Army Learning Model for 2015: LIO Delivers Digital Training for the Future

by Regina S. Albrecht

Introduction

For the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, a substantial investment in the U.S. Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015 is paying off. USAICoE is building a hefty portfolio of newly redesigned instructional products that are facilitating lifelong learning for the 21st century Soldier. Predicting a tectonic shift to a learner-centric environment, USAICoE committed to digital training 10 years prior to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) introduction of ALM 2015.

A significant part of USAICoE’s investment has been dedicated to expanding its number of digital classrooms from 21 in 2002 to 270 in 2012. “We are using technology where it fits to enhance educational experiences, not chasing the latest and greatest technology,” stated Major General Gregg Potter, Commanding General of USAICoE and Fort Huachuca. “Integrating technology into our instruction is in line with changing the way we educate our Soldiers using the Army Learning Model.”

A key component in the school’s transformation to a new learning model is the Learning Innovation Office (LIO), USAICoE’s in-house developer of interactive multimedia instructional (IMI) products. Recognizing the value of LIO’s work, Potter visited the organization in December 2011 to receive updates on USAICoE’s latest IMI products. He later announced plans to conduct quarterly site visits to the organization. LIO Director Leanne Rutherford stated that the Commander’s interest in the organization is encouraging. “The quarterly briefing will offer the Learning Innovation Office an opportunity to keep MG Potter well informed on projects in the analysis, design, development, implementation and evaluation (ADDIE) phases,” Rutherford said.

LIO Project Manager Michelle Austin stated that in the past few months, six projects have either transitioned into the testing phase of development or the implementation phase of the ADDIE process. LIO projects in the final phases of completion include the:

✦ Information Collection Guide.
✦ Afghanistan Cultural Awareness Guide.
✦ MI History Course Virtual Tour.
✦ Fusion Analyst.
✦ Collection Asset Management Simulator (CAMS).
✦ CI Special Agent Course (CISAC) Distance Learning (dL) and Surveillance Detection Route (SDR) IMI.

Information Collection Guide

Captain Lauren Hertling, Commander, B Company, 304th MI Battalion, recently worked with LIO on behalf of the Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JICTC) to create an Information Collection Guide. “The intent of the guide is to offer the MI Captains’ Career Course (MICCC), MI Basic Officer Leader Course, MOS 35F Intelligence Analyst, and the Noncommissioned Officers’ Academy’s (NCOA) students a greater understanding of what information collection platforms’ capabilities and limitations look like and the type of products they can provide,” she explained.
Beverly Manigault, Deputy Director of JICTC, provided additional details on how the product will support training at the schoolhouse. “The Information Collection Guide will benefit joint information collection planning and synchronization for USAICoE, Army Reserve, and National Guard training,” she said.

Satisfied with the new product, Hertling stated that she believes the guide will accomplish JICTC’s objectives, which include meeting requirements of ALM 2015. “Using technology as an enabler, JICTC is transitioning to a learner-centric training program.” Hertling stated that the Information Collection Guide is among the organization’s initial attempts at implementing ALM 2015. “It’s the first interactive product of its kind for JICTC.”

Describing it as a collective information source, Hertling stated that the guide eliminates the need to view numerous slide shows and access websites. “It’s a great learning tool–truly a one-stop shop for assets, capabilities, as well as the products that the assets can provide,” she said. Recalling her first time to view the product, Hertling stated that she was impressed with the depth of information and simultaneous comparison of assets. As a former collection manager, Hertling was able to offer valuable input into the development of the guide. “I provided various products for LIO to use alongside the assets as well as the asset capabilities,” she said.

Hertling stated that she was pleased with LIO and JICTC’s effective work relationship. “We appointed one of our information collection subject matter experts (SMEs) to work on the project.” He worked hand-in-hand with LIO’s instructional designers and developers to ensure that it met the training requirements and student needs.”

As the lead developer for the guide, LIO Programmer Jose Martinez stated that he is pleased with the project and what it represents. “The Information Collection Guide is a great example of two organizations working together to create an innovative product that takes advantage of available technology.”

Manigault stated that plans are underway for the organization’s next information collection project. “The next version will be upgraded to impact real world operations beyond TRADOC.”

LIO completed the Information Collection Guide in August 2011. It is currently awaiting a certificate of networthiness (CoN). JICTC expects to add the product to its curriculum by the 3rd quarter 2012. Upon approval, the product will be hosted on the internal JICTC website.

The Human Intelligence Training-Joint Center of Excellence, Weapons Intelligence Course, and NCOA have requested customized versions of the Information Collection Guide.

**Afghanistan Cultural Awareness Guide**

In addition to the Information Collection Guide, JICTC also solicited LIO’s assistance to develop an Afghanistan Cultural Awareness Guide to fill other training gaps. "Internal scenario evaluations and student after action review comments indicated the need for a more efficient way of translating the unique and complex socio-economic system that exists in Afghanistan," stated Staff Sergeant Jeffrey Mitchell, JICTC Exercise Director, B Company, 304th MI Battalion.

Representing JICTC, Mitchell collaborated with LIO to develop the Cultural Awareness Guide, which is in accordance with ALM 2015. “The guide will enhance students’ ability to conduct background intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) information,” he said. IPB is the Army’s longstanding methodology for incorporating and analyzing relevant information for all types of operations.

Mitchell stated that the guide is multifunctional. “While the Cultural Awareness Guide will primarily be used by students attending the JICTC exercise, observer-trainers will also rely on it to convey factors not covered in other briefs.” According to Mitchell, the product’s most unique function is the editing feature. “The guide will give observer-trainers assigned to specific geographic areas the capability to modify and exemplify particular facts and factors based on their area of responsibility. This will, in turn, provide each student with specific information that can also be updated and modified as the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan changes.”

LIO Generalist Chris Gonzales served as the lead developer for the Cultural Awareness Guide project. He discussed LIO’s goals with this project. “We wanted to provide JICTC with a product that satisfied its need, yet be sustainable in the future,” Gonzales said. “With this in mind, we developed a fully tailorable guide that will allow the organization to add custom information at its will, making the product completely adaptable to changing times.”
Mitchell stated that LIO worked tirelessly to develop and perfect the product to JICTC’s high standards and specifications. Impressed with their expertise, he stated that the instructional designers and developers assigned to the project were both well versed and imaginative. “This in itself assisted greatly in LIO developing a highly intuitive and comprehensive product that will positively affect JICTC’s future training capabilities.” Mitchell explained. Presently awaiting a CoN, JICTC plans to incorporate the guide into its curriculum in early 2012.

The Information Collection Guide and Cultural Awareness Guide aren’t LIO’s and JICTC’s first collaborative projects. LIO previously worked with the organization to develop open-source intelligence videos, which involved writing and producing a series of news reports to promote situational awareness.

**MI History Course Virtual Tour**

While LIO was collaborating with JICTC to meet its training needs, the organization was simultaneously teaming up with USAICoE’s Command History Office to develop a virtual tour for the MI History Course. Encompassing the MI Museum and Army Intelligence Aviation Memorial Park as well as buildings around Fort Huachuca that are named for MI professionals, the virtual tour is helping USAICoE meet its training requirements.

Ruth Quinn, Staff Historian, stated that TRADOC requires that Advanced Individual Training students complete a 2 hour block of instruction in MI history. Previously this requirement was met by physically transporting students to the museum. “Since the onset of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it became a logistical nightmare for Soldiers to acquire this training,” she said. “As a result, we identified the need for a product that would allow us to present the training in a virtual format.”

Fostering a student-centric environment, the virtual tour is helping the organization comply with ALM 2015 requirements. The virtual tour also benefits USAICoE students stationed at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, and Pensacola, Florida, allowing them to remotely complete the required MI History training.

LIO’s Principal Multimedia Specialist Thomas Gray and Visual Information Specialist Scott Haury developed the product’s interactive components. Gray and Haury describe the virtual tour as very informational and user friendly. “When students enter the virtual tour of the museum, they can view different areas and select specific exhibits,” Gray said. “Within the exhibits, they can click on specific areas (e.g., an artifact) and the text associated with the artifact appears.”

Haury stated that the virtual tour of the memorial airpark is similar to the museum tour. “When choosing specific areas of the memorial airpark, interpretative panels appear,” he said. “Selecting a section of the panel opens up an enlarged picture and the text associated with it comes into view.”

According to Haury, the virtual tour of the buildings is biographical in nature. “Clicking on the ‘USAICoE Memorials’ area of Fort Huachuca displays a menu of the various buildings by name,” he said. “When selecting a particular building, the individual that it’s named for appears as well as a picture of the plaque that’s on the building and the text on the plaque.”

He added that the individual’s most interesting contributions are also included in the information. “It was our intent that the people taking the virtual tour would not see anything less than those doing it physically,” Quinn said. “However, because it is virtual, we were able to include additional information and make it more interesting.”

As part of the project, LIO also worked with the Command History Office to develop a student exam. “When sending students into a museum, they may sort of browse around and not receive any quantifiable training, but the exam ensures that this doesn’t happen,” Quinn said. “The exam is basically our way of verifying whether or not students received the MI History training.”

Doug Whitney, Computer Engineer for LIO, developed the program that administers the exam. “The Command History Office compiled a total of 165 questions,” Whitney said. “From these questions, the program randomly draws a test of 25 questions for each student.” He stated that of the 25 questions, 15 are dedicated to material learned in the museum, five encompass the memorial airpark and another five cover the buildings. “Students must pass the exam with an 80 percent. If they don’t pass, they must download a different set of questions and retake the exam.”
Whitney said that once students pass, they are directed to print their certificate of completion, which is linked to a follow-up survey. “The survey is an excellent opportunity for us to obtain feedback from the students,” Quinn said. “It helps us to identify problems so we can fix them.”

Command Historian Lori Tagg provided oversight on the project. “We have a product that does exactly what we need it to do–teach our Soldiers about the history of the MI Branch, whether they are in Afghanistan, Fort Huachuca, Goodfellow AFB or Pensacola,” Tagg said. “Ultimately, it is better than what we originally envisioned.”

Quinn elaborated that the organization originally envisioned a very boring static tour. “I’m very pleased with how LIO was able to not only make the tour visually appealing, but also interesting by increasing the text size, enlarging pictures and rearranging items,” she said. Tagg and Quinn agreed that establishing open lines of communication was key in the project’s success. “Working with LIO has been an enjoyable and productive experience,” Tagg said. “They ensured that all of our questions were answered and concerns were addressed.”

The MI History virtual tour is being hosted on the University of Military Intelligence. AIT students and civilians on Fort Huachuca can access the tour at https://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.army.mil/Campus/General%20Courses/Introductory%20MI%20History%20Course/includes/Virtual%20Tour/index.html.

**Fusion Analyst**

JICTC and the Command History Office are among several organizations, including the 305th MI Battalion’s MOS 35F Committee, using LIO’s services to meet ALM 2015 requirements. “Most people focus on the cognitive aspect of learning, but part of ALM 2015 is incorporating the affective, emotional aspects into scenarios in order to create engaging learning experiences,” stated Nelson Mitchell, Training Developer for MOS 35F. “We are accomplishing this with Fusion Analyst.”

Mitchell acted as a liaison between the committee and LIO on this project. “Fusion Analyst is a web-based intelligence analyst simulator game based on JavaScript,” he said. “Analogous to a reinforcement tool, Fusion Analyst preps students for the S2 Game, previously developed by LIO.” He stated that the game can also be played anytime to reinforce IPB steps.

According to Mitchell, Fusion Analyst has a much wider target audience than the committee initially anticipated. “When the committee first started the project with LIO, we were thinking mostly of the 17 to 37 year-olds who are on FaceBook playing web-based games,” he said. “Now, we are considering the use of mobile devices to reach a much larger garrison or even deployment-based audience.”

Among Fusion Analyst’s features is the scenario editor, which Mitchell says will be invaluable to the committee in its efforts to maintain a relevant, current product. “With the scenario editor, we are able to link our scenarios directly to our courseware, and if there’s a change in courseware, we can fix the scenario to match it, which facilitates rapid scenario development.” The committee also considers the product’s grid overlaying aspects an advantageous feature for students wanting to practice their military map reading skills.

Additionally, Fusion Analyst includes a link diagram. Mitchell stated that this functionality enables students to practice connecting relationships between people, organizations, and events. “It’s a bonus that USAICoE’s architecture completely supports the product,” he said. “We can run Fusion Analyst on Thin Clients in the classrooms with no logistical issues.”

Once a CoN and code review for Fusion Analyst are acquired, the product will be available on the Intelligence Knowledge Network-Secret portal. Mitchell hopes to add the product to the committee’s curriculum during this quarter.

**Collection Asset Management Simulator (CAMS)**

For LIO, sometimes one product spurs the development of another. After viewing the 35F S2 Game, a trainer and his counterparts with the 304th MI Battalion’s MICCC recognized the need for similar products within their curriculum. MICCC Training Specialist Jamie Tate stated that the former MICCC Chief and former B Block both agreed if the S2 Game could be modified to be more robust for captains, it would be a great addition to the course. “I thought that we might tailor the product to function
as a reinforcing tool for our captains or as an initial viewing of products with a practical exercise preceding or following it,” he said.

Tate is coordinating with LIO to create MICCC’s new product, CAMS. CAMS consists of two IMI products, Operation Kanjhar Strike and Operation Kanjhar Storm. Operation Kanjhar Strike is a 2-dimensional (2D) game that will be employed in MICCC’s B Block of instruction. He stated that the 2D game will allow the organization to obtain individual grades for its students. “This game will give each student the opportunity to demonstrate their particular competencies, it may even prompt them to think differently than the collective group.”

Impressed with Operation Kanjhar Strike’s interactive capabilities, Tate commented that among the game’s top features will be its capacity to reward players with short video clips when activities are performed correctly. A 3-dimensional (3D) game, Operation Kanjhar Storm is under development for MICCC’s D Block. “Operation Kanjhar Storm is being designed as a continuation game with the same characters and some of the same message traffic as Operation Kanjhar Strike,” he said.

To play the 3D game, he said it will not be necessary for students to recall specific events from the 2D game. “The 3D game is intended to focus on the counterinsurgency operations side of the house,” he said.

Captain Luke Gosnell, LIO Executive Officer, discussed how CAMS is helping the MICCC further develop a blended learning environment for USAICoE. “With the 2D and 3D games, the MICCC is using technology as an enabler to improve the course,” Gosnell said. “By cultivating a blend of physical and virtual collaborative environments, MICCC and LIO are creating products that are realistic and in line with ALM 2015. When these captains leave Fort Huachuca, they should have a better feel for what to expect out in the field,” Gosnell added.

MICCC Chief Major Paul Gittins, Captain Timothy Cullers and Captain Michael Hall are serving as SMEs for the CAMS project. Once the products are completed, they will be housed on MICCC’s internal server. Tate expects Operation Kanjhar Strike to go online during this quarter, with beta testing of Operation Kanjhar Storm to follow thereafter.

CISAC

Another project presently in development at LIO is a dL program and IMI for CISAC. According to LIO Education Technology Specialist Ryan Owens, the dL program uses multiple software applications within an Adobe Captivate player and features a score and feedback mechanism.

“The IMI that we’re building will support CISAC’s SDR block of instruction,” Austin said. “It will allow students to practice and receive feedback from instructors prior to a live exercise.” She anticipates that LIO will complete the IMI project and dL program during the 3rd quarter 2012.

To request LIO’s products and services, contact Ms. Austin at (520) 533-7140 or michelle.l.austin20.ctr@mail.mil. LIO’s request for service form is located at https://iknsp.army.mil/CMDGROUP/Ltd/SitePages/Home.aspx.

Ms. Albrecht is the Senior Technical Editor/Writer for the Learning Innovation Office.
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, will soon have the capability to provide all of its students a 21st century educational experience—a blended approach to learning, using the recently acquired learning management system (LMS).

Responding to the All Army Activities (ALARACT) 231-2010, USAICoE has selected Moodle™ as its new LMS. ALARACT 231-2010 requires the migration of all existing courseware to one of the approved LMSs within the Army Learning and Content Management Capability (ALCMC).

Crawford Scott is the Information Technology Architect for USAICoE’s Learning Innovation Office (LIO), the organization tasked with providing a learning management solution for the MI community. “To comply with the ALARACT, LIO migrated courseware housed on the University of Military Intelligence’s (UMI) TotalLMS to the U.S. Army Learning Management System (Saba) and Blackboard,” he said. “USAICoE will use Moodle to complement and not replace ALCMC.”

“Moodle (or Modular Object-oriented Dynamic Learning Environment) will ultimately increase our capabilities and it will serve as a nice complement to the other LMSs out there. It will allow us to reach students who only have Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) access.” Scott elaborated that Moodle provides USAICoE with a customizable, cost effective LMS solution on SIPRNET as well as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).

“I’m encouraged with Moodle because it has a user-friendly interface and will allow the organization to build out any additional functionality needed by the schoolhouse in the future.” He stated that Moodle not only provides a SIPRNET solution, but also offers Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) benefits. “On the NIPR side, we can use Moodle for USAICoE specific courseware and in-house production of MI-specific courseware in a blended and dL configuration.”

In addition to Moodle, LIO also analyzed the cost, usability, stability, scalability and customization, as well as the support and resources of TotalLMS and OLAT. “TotalLMS, our existing LMS used on NIPR for UMI, is overly complicated. It’s basically too much LMS for what we need—it does too many things that we don’t need and not enough of the things that we do.” It also lacks a reporting capability needed to capture metrics on student usage, success, and progress.

Scott stated that while OLAT is a fine LMS, it’s only been deployed in smaller organizations and it’s not as refined as Moodle. “The available resources for OLAT support, configuration, and enhancement are not as extensive as Moodle. Conversely, Moodle boasts an entire group of worldwide partners working together to enhance and deploy it.”

Moodle has been deployed in smaller environments and larger institutions as well. An added benefit is Moodle’s paid for and free services, which will allow LIO to configure, extend, and support it. “Ultimately, of the three solutions under consideration, Moodle provides USAICoE with the best overall solution, given the constraints we had to work within,” Scott concluded.

LIO Director Leanne Rutherford agreed that Moodle is the right solution for USAICoE. She said that the task of identifying a suitable LMS solution was a major undertaking for the organization. “Trying to manage the ALARACT while satisfying the school’s requirement for three domains (NIPR, SIPR, and JWICS) and transitioning material from UMI, wasn’t an easy feat,” Rutherford said.

Scott added that deploying the new LMS presented its own challenges due to the need for a certificate of networthiness (CoN). Last year, LIO requested a CoN for Moodle from the U.S. Army Network Enterprise...
Technology Command. The organization received the CoN in March. “The configuration of the environments was also a bit of a challenge at first,” he said.

Despite the obstacles that had to be overcome, Rutherford expressed her satisfaction with the outcome of the LMS project. “I’m excited because our biggest problem has been facilitated learning in the classroom and Moodle will now act as an enabler,” she added. Although Rutherford is excited about the use of Moodle, she cautions that it is not the end all, be all. “Moodle has a very particular purpose–its purpose is to be used in the classroom as a blended approach to learning,” she said.

According to Rutherford, USACoE’s use of Moodle also has the potential to have a large impact on the entire Army.

LIO will implement Moodle alongside TotalLMS to allow currently enrolled students the opportunity to complete their work and transition to the new LMS. The NIPR instance of Moodle is projected to become operational during the 4th quarter 2012, and the SIPR version is expected to be deployed shortly thereafter. Unlike the NIPR version, SIPR and JWICS will require new production environments.

Once in place, students will create new accounts on the SIPR UMI website. Access to the SIPR UMI will be made available through the Intelligence Knowledge Network-Secret (IKN) (S) web portal.

All current courses on the NIPR instance of UMI will be offered on the SIPR and JWICS versions. Technical concerns will be dealt with by the LIO LMS Team. For more information on Moodle, contact Scott at (520) 538-7360 or crawford.g.scott.ctr@mail.mil.

Ms. Albrecht is the Senior Technical Editor/Writer for the Learning Innovation Office, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
This short but valuable book is about the U.S. Congress' monitoring of our intelligence agencies. One of its main themes is that Congress has not done a very good job in this regard. A number of reasons are cited to explain this situation such as rules and procedures that hinder legislative expertise in intelligence as well as Congress’ budgetary power over executive branch intelligence agencies. (10-11) The author also notes that: “Congress has always overseen other policy areas more rigorously than intelligence for one fundamental reason, that is where the political rewards for legislators are greater and the costs less. Intelligence is in many respects the worst of all oversight worlds: .... Intelligence oversight may be a vital national security issue, but it is a political loser.” (115-116)

However, it is obvious to anyone who has studied intelligence activity that other reasons could explain the poor performance of this particular type of oversight. For example, what Congress might under cover if it exercised a more thorough oversight function could result in embarrassment for the U.S. In addition, the lack of oversight might be due to a feeling that if it were to be done, our intelligence communities could be hampered in performing activities that are safeguarding the security of our country.

The author is a realist in her views of congressional oversight as may be ascertained from the following quotes:

“Perfect oversight is not achievable, but better oversight is. No big new ideas or even new laws are necessary. Instead, Congress should start by implementing three old ideas to change its internal operations:

- Abolish terms limits in the House Intelligence Committee.
- Consolidate budgetary power in the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.
- Strengthen congressional intelligence staff capabilities.” (120-121)

Additional suggestions regarding congressional monitoring of intelligence agencies included in this work are ensuring the intelligence community gets needed resources, making sure these resources have the maximum effect, and requiring accountability and the generation of public trust from the intelligence community. (6)

These suggestions might not be the only valuable ones that should be made but they are worthwhile for advocacy. The book also notes some of examples of poor congressional monitoring such as engaging in micromanagement when it would be better for an agency to be left to focus on the more important aspects of its responsibility. Another example cited in the book of poor congressional activity in the area of intelligence activities is blaming agencies rather than trying to work more constructively with them. (6-7)

Yet, the importance of intelligence to a country is emphasized throughout this work. For example, the author notes that: “In the twenty-first century threat environment, intelligence has eclipsed military firepower as the nation’s most important line
of defense. “(6) This succinct statement should alert us to the reality of the need for more resources being devoted by our government to intelligence agencies and their activities.

The author has been described as one of the top ten most influential experts in intelligence reform and has written two other works about the subject of intelligence activity. She is also involved in other professional activities which relate to the subject of intelligence. Hence, her background adequately allows her to comment on improving a vital aspect of our nation’s security.

Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
by Mark M. Lowenthal
CQ Press, (5th Edition), 2012, 417 pages

The infamous attack on the U.S. on 9/11 has resulted in numerous commentaries in one form or another on the matter of intelligence activity as carried out by governments. Certainly one of the best is the new edition of Mark Lowenthal’s Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. It is a book that is different from other works on the topic in a number of ways. First, it is current with a publication date of 2012 which gives it the advantage of providing information about recent international events relating to intelligence. Second, whereas many recent books just focus on one country or one major event, the coverage of this book is broad and relates to a wide variety of aspects that pertain to intelligence activity as carried out by the U.S. government. This includes how intelligence is received, analyzed, and formulated. In addition, there is a fine chapter at the end of the book which compares the intelligence activities of China, Russia, Israel, France, Britain, and other countries. Interestingly, the author notes that comparing intelligence services with one another is an inexact and pointless error, noting that each intelligence service is or should be structured to address the unique requirements of its national policy makers.

The fact that this is the fifth edition of the work attests to its value over a long time. The author’s professional background of over thirty years as an intelligence official and his ability to gather the valuable sources used in writing this book contribute to making it one that should be read by professionals who have a sincere interest in intelligence activity, not only of the U.S. but other countries whose intelligence activities impact on our country. This work has additional value in relating to us what happened in the past, what is occurring today, and what might take place in the future regarding intelligence activity as it pertains to the U.S. and to other countries. It informs us of intelligence successes and failures. It also calls our attention to intelligence problems such as a lack of cooperation between government agencies like the FBI and CIA and the effect such problems could have on the success of intelligence capabilities.

The style of writing is one that makes it interesting to read about the topic. Several examples of intelligence activities are presented in a manner that makes one want to continue reading this book and hope that the author will continue writing on the subject in the future as national and international issues change. After reading this book one will not only have a better understanding of what intelligence activities can do for a government, but probably become an advocate for the need for intelligence services. The author has an interesting and valuable conclusion noting that: “The key issue in assessing any intelligence service is: . . . Does it provide timely, useful intelligence to the policy process?” (374) Perhaps this is the way we should evaluate any intelligence service friend or foe.

Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University
Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach
by Robert M. Clark

The author begins this work by commenting on two intelligence failures—the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in March of 2003. Each event understandably led to more inquiries into the American intelligence community in terms of how to do a better job.

This book is not for the average person interested in intelligence activity but more for the professional intelligence analyst. Although there is much factual data in the work, it is more concerned with advocating a particular approach (target-centric) to be used by those involved in the intelligence process, which differs from other intelligence gathering approaches. For example, many intelligence communities are organized hierarchically and often use a few select methods to obtain information. The author suggests employing a wider variety of sources and analyses to obtain the correct intelligence. He believes that this approach will provide a better intelligence product.

Interestingly, the author notes that intelligence failures have three common themes: failure to share information, failure to analyze information, and failure to act upon it, and suggests that these failures can be reduced by adopting the target-centric approach to gathering information. This suggestion seems to have merit considering that so many methods and sources are needed to obtain optimum results. What may also be learned from this book is that intelligence decision makers should make every effort to expand their variety of methods for gathering intelligence. Admittedly, there are some situations where only one method can be used to obtain intelligence, but the author considers the wider question of generally how can one best do the job of an intelligence analyst. So what does this mean for the intelligence community? A basic implication is that a wider variety of sources of information should be used in developing an intelligence conclusion. It also implies that individuals having different talents and abilities should be recruited by intelligence agencies so that different perspectives will be available in making a final intelligence recommendation.

The book has three main parts: Introduction to Target-Centric Analysis, Synthesis to Creating the Model, and Predictive Analysis. Each of these parts has a number of chapters in it relating to the main part. Hence, the reader will be exposed to a variety of facets relating to each of the main parts. The scope of the book is large enough to cover the main topic of a target-centric approach, but small enough to focus on the major objectives of such an approach. There is also a helpful succinct summary at the end of each chapter which brings together the main points made in the chapter.

If one were looking for a source to justify the use of different approaches to be used in intelligence gathering, this book would do just fine. The numerous different examples cited in the work also tend to increase its interest and value for the reader. It is an excellent work that should be read and thought about by individuals involved in professional intelligence activities such as military leaders as intelligence customers.

Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University
CONTACT AND ARTICLE
Submission Information

This is your magazine. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence and Intelligence Communities.

Articles about current operations and exercises; TTPs; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Propose changes, describe a new theory, or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the following into consideration:

✦ Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
✦ Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
✦ We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take up to a year to publish some articles.
✦ Although MIPB targets themes, you do not need to “write” to a theme.
✦ Please note that submissions become property of MIPB and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

What we need from you:

✦ A release signed by your unit or organization’s information and operations security officer/SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain OR that the article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified/FOUO (IAW AR 380-5 DA Information Security Program). A sample security release format can be accessed at our website at https://ikn.army.mil.
✦ A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.
✦ Your article in Word. Do not use special document templates.
✦ A Public Affairs or any other release your installation or unit/agency may require. Please include that release(s) with your submission.
✦ Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How), photographer credits, and the author’s name on photos. Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif or .jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.
✦ The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address, and phone numbers with the biography.

We will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for MIPB. From time to time, we will contact you during the editing process to help us ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Submit articles, graphics, or questions to the Editor at sterilla.smith@us.army.mil. Our fax number is 520.538.1005. Submit articles by mail on disk to:

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Contact phone numbers: Commercial 520.538.0956
DSN 879.0956.
Cross-cultural competency (3C) is a critical combat multiplier for commanders at all levels that enables successful mission accomplishment. Possessing cultural understanding is one of the critical components for Soldiers who interface with the local population. At a minimum, soldiers must possess cultural awareness. Leaders must demonstrate cultural understanding and be proficient in applying cultural knowledge effectively to achieve mission objectives. The TCC can help Soldiers gain this mission essential proficiency. Lessons learned from 10 years of operational deployments clearly indicate that 3C is a huge and indispensable combat multiplier.

The TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) is your culture center and the Army’s One-Stop-Shop for all things culture related. Service Members are the customer, and the TCC tailors products and training to meet the needs of the customer.

Why is Culture Important?

Cross-cultural competency (3C) is a critical combat multiplier for commanders at all levels that enables successful mission accomplishment. Possessing cultural understanding is one of the critical components for Soldiers who interface with the local population. At a minimum, soldiers must possess cultural awareness. Leaders must demonstrate cultural understanding and be proficient in applying cultural knowledge effectively to achieve mission objectives. The TCC can help Soldiers gain this mission essential proficiency. Lessons learned from 10 years of operational deployments clearly indicate that 3C is a huge and indispensable combat multiplier.

The TCC has developed several distance learning products available for facilitated instruction or individual student use. As an example, two seasons of “Army 360” that the TCC produced contain 19 episodes of missions run in six countries. “Army 360” is an interactive media instruction (IMI) training product which meets the Army Learning Concept 2015 learner-centric requirements. The TCC is in the process of turning the “Army 360” IMI into digital apps which will be easily accessible for all Soldiers. The TCC produced an Initial Military Trainee (IMT) training product for the initial entry level Soldier called “IMT-BCT What is Culture?” We are also producing a BOLC IMI product. Both products are or will be available via the TCC website. The TCC is expanding other products into the apps arena as well as developing additional distance learning products to provide new 3C training and sustainment.

The TCC supports Soldiers and leaders throughout the Army and other services in numerous ways. It conducts ARFORGEN/predeployment training for any contingency; trains culture trainers; and produces professional military education (over 160,000 military personnel trained since 2004). The TCC will create or tailor any products deploying units require.

The TCC produces cargo pocket-sized training products to include smart books and smart cards, as well as digital downloads for smart devices. Areas covered include Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, and more. Let us know what we can produce for you. For a complete list of materials, see: https://ikn.army.mil/apps/tccv2/.

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https://ikn.army.mil/apps/tccv2/
What is the UMI? Where is it? How do I use it?

The University of Military Intelligence (UMI) is a training portal of MI courses maintained by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona for use by authorized military (Active, Reserve, National Guard) and non-military (e.g., DOD civilian, Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. Government agencies) personnel. UMI provides many self-paced training courses, MOS training, and career development courses. In addition, the UMI contains a Virtual Campus that is available to users with an abundance of Army-wide resources and links related to MI: language training, cultural awareness, resident courses, MI Library, functional training, publications, and more.

UMI is undergoing improvement and expansion to become available for any approved MI courses (from any U.S. Army MI source) that are designed to be offered as Distributed Learning (dL) via the UMI technologically advanced online delivery platform(s).

UMI online registration is easy and approval of use normally takes only a day or two after a user request is submitted. Go to http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.army.mil, read and accept the standard U.S. Government Authorized Use/Security statement, and then follow the instructions to register or sign in. The UMI Web pages also provide feedback and question forms that can be submitted to obtain more information.

Use of the UMI requires:
- User registration (it’s free!).
- An active government email address (such as .mil or .gov).
- A sponsor (if user has no .mil or .gov email address) who can approve user’s access to training material.
- Verification by UMI of user’s government email address.
- Internet access. UMI courses require Internet Explorer 7 or previous browser and Adobe Reader, Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Shockwave Player, Windows Media Player, and/or a recent version of MS Office.
The Intelligence Experimentation and Analysis Element (Intel EAE) supports the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) by designing and executing experiments that model, test, and evaluate future Army concepts and force designs.

The Intel EAE has executed two major experiments this year supporting the MI redesign and Army of 2020 development efforts and will execute a third before the end of fiscal year (FY) 12.

**Intelligence Senior Leader Seminar (ISLS)**

The ISLS drew on the training and experience of senior MI officers, NCOs, and warrant officers to examine the skills, training, knowledge, organizations, architectures, systems, and capabilities that would be required in the MI Corps of 2020 to support the Army in the future operational environment.

**Intelligence Support to GAMOA**

Intel EAE supported the Army Experimentation-wide Gain and Maintain Operational Access Simulated Experiment (GAMOA SIMEX) throughout FY12. This experiment tested the Army of 2020 design concept using a TRADOC-approved scenario.

The 3rd Infantry Division provided soldiers to contribute to a better Army-wide understanding of the role of MI in forced entry and follow-on combat operations. They provided a realistic and experienced MI perspective to the experiment.

**Intelligence Support to the Squad Limited Objective Experiment**

In August of 2012, the Intel EAE will execute an ARCIC-funded experiment in conjunction with the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) to assess the intelligence requirements of tactical units in the field.

This experiment will employ squad leaders from the MCoE to determine what information and intelligence is required by dismounted infantry squads to perform their critical tasks and missions and whether or not Army MI can provide relevant, actionable intelligence to them based on anticipated analytical and network capabilities in 2020.

**Future Events**

Intel EAE experiments give soldiers the ability to contribute to future MI force design, and requirements and capability development as well as providing great opportunities for training. Participation in Intel EAE experiments gives units the chance to cement working relationships and receive training on future Army systems by role playing as a unit in experiments in a variety of operational scenarios and environments.

To participate in future Intel EAE experiments, please contact Mr. Rod Ritter, Chief, Intel EAE, (520) 538-0129, Rodney.l.ritter2.civ@mail.mil or Mr. Scott Stansberry, Deputy Chief, Intel EAE, (520) 533-4602, scott.e.stansberry.civ@mail.mil.