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Dear Reader,

Welcome once more to a new issue of Vox Collegii. Since we last went to press, the College has been to the fore in a number of exciting academic initiatives. Working in such an environment is a great source of motivation for your editorial team, always eager to share news and critical insights with you.

In May, I was privileged to attend the inaugural lecture of the Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassadors Course (GFOAC 2015-1). Professor Christopher Coker (GBR) gave an inspiring talk, entitled “Cultural Dialogue: the Western Encounter with the Rest”. What I see as the core issue of this topic is the question of whether meaningful cross-cultural debate is possible at all: NATO proves that it is not only possible, but enlightening and beneficial to all concerned.

A mainstay of the NATO Defense College’s activity is our firm commitment to ensuring that cross-cultural debate continues to flourish. Vox Collegii and our social accounts contribute greatly in this respect, affording a space where readers can share their suggestions and comments. Here at the NDC, we believe that constructive criticism provides an essential basis for the setting of new qualitative standards. The successful conclusion of the “Defeating Hybrid Threats” conference provides a clear measure of the College’s vital contribution to conceptual and practical knowledge of the most topical concerns, but this does not mean that we can rest on our laurels. I see it as a starting point for sustained discussion, helping achieve the necessary focus throughout the build-up to next year’s Warsaw Summit and hopefully providing a conceptual framework that will prove viable for many years to come. The need for communication is crucial in this respect, especially in response to the challenges we touch on in this edition of Vox Collegii: the geopolitics of emotion, as practised by Russia, and the Allies’ need to achieve an appropriate civil-military balance and further enhance cooperation.

Since last year, Russian aggression against Ukraine has involved deception, deployment of proxy soldiers, unmarked special forces, undercover transfers of equipment, intimidation and propaganda. Hybrid war as a phenomenon is nothing new, but we still need to improve our situational awareness – not only on the operational level, but (even more important, from an Alliance perspective) in terms of the broader picture. In this regard, the role of the NATO Defense College is to prepare minds to fully understand the world we live in. We need to make clear that war is no solution. It is a short cut for those who have invested above all in hard power. The flaw in such a vision is that it is illusory: far from accomplishing important goals more quickly, war merely brings violence and destruction or, at the very least, leads to the ostracism and isolation of the aggressor. Ensuring that this precept is clearly understood is an essential step towards safeguarding worldwide peace and security.

Lieutenant Colonel
Alberto Alletto
Italian Army, Head Public Affairs Office
Another year of innovative input and discussion on a broad range of topics has come to a successful conclusion. Over the last six months, the NATO Defense College (NDC) has striven to respond rapidly to the uncertain and dynamic nature of the international environment through a variety of academic activities and research.

It was an honour for me to open one of the most important events hosted by the NATO Defense College: the international conference entitled ‘NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats’.

The Conference, which was held on 29-30 April 2015, focused on “hybrid warfare” tactics, as used especially on NATO’s Eastern and Southern Flanks, and the strategies required to counter this threat.

The high numbers in attendance at this flagship event prove once again that the NDC is playing a fundamental role as NATO’s premier academic institution.

One of my future objectives will be to organize other equally relevant conferences at the College, which I consider to be ideally suited for discussions and exchanges of views on specialized, contemporary issues, such as those dealt with during the April conference.

In addition, over the last few months, I have focused my attention on the NDC Review, which raised two matters linked to the NDC’s prime function as the Alliance’s cornerstone for higher military education.

The first is related to the academic validation of the NDC’s Senior Course by each national institution, while the second involves ensuring recognition for the Senior Course as a distinct Master’s degree, with a number of necessary exams to be taken for certification purposes. I am deeply committed to bringing these challenges to fruition; they represent compelling innovations for our prestigious College and I have, consequently, requested the Dean to look at possible solutions in order to reach both targets.

Furthermore, I recently attended the Conference of Commandants (CoC), an annual meeting for the Chiefs of military educational institutions; this year the forum was held in the capital of one of our significant Partner countries, Austria, from 28 to 30 June, and I took this opportunity to share my ideas about the validation and recognition of the Senior Course. Considering that education is a crucial field which connects all higher defence establishments, I was able to listen to valuable and constructive opinions on this subject.

In conclusion, in line with the input received at the CoC, I shall be strongly supporting all the necessary efforts to add value to the NDC and guarantee its continuing success.

Major General
Janusz Bojarski
Polish Air Force, NDC Commandant
Security in the West has been severely jeopardized by Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the ongoing subversive activity in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s actions are the latest demonstration of an increasingly prevalent way of waging war in the Information Age. Provision of training, advice and assistance to local indigenous forces by an intervening nation has been traditionally viewed as a peripheral military undertaking, rather than a strategy of first choice to achieve military ends. Military institutions understandably view the purpose of armed forces as the conduct of wars, the application of force being the principal means of defeating an adversary. A shortcoming of this perspective is that training and consultancy come to be seen as intermittent, ancillary tasks which distract from the core proficiencies required to conduct combat operations. However, given the unconventional challenges facing the military in the twenty-first century, a strategy of supporting indigenous elements by training, advice and other forms of assistance (as opposed to committing large numbers of forces in a direct combat role) is in most cases the most viable way of using force for purposes of military coercion. In the strategy framework of ends, ways and means, enabling local forces is the ‘way’ of the foreseeable future.

1.1 Defining a strategy of ‘support and influence’

A strategy of ‘support and influence’ is one in which an intervening third party to a conflict assists indigenous military, paramilitary, police, or other forces with recruitment, organization, training, equipment and other forms of support. The indigenous force is leveraged as a proxy or surrogate, in order to prevail over another belligerent through the threat or use of force. This support and assistance can take the form of offensive or defence-related aid, by lethal and or non-lethal means, and can be provided in an overt, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine manner. Such a strategy could take the form of training and advising a host nation force faced with lawlessness, insurgency, or subversion; developing indigenous security forces in a stabilization role following regime change; or rendering assistance to an insurgent or resistance force seeking to overthrow a government or achieve related aims.

Essentially, the strategy focuses upon enabling the capability and capacity of other elements, and providing support ranging from strategic information and diplomatic efforts all the way to tactical-level assistance with such issues as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical support. The intervening party that assists indigenous forces can also provide advice and assistance in varying degrees through forward physical presence, and remotely through technological or third party conduits. Provision of advice and assistance allows the intervening party to shape the application of force by the indigenous element, and thus better assure the achievement of the desired ends.

In a ‘support and influence’ strategy, the central effort is focused on enabling an indigenous force. Other lines of operation, as well as other assets and enabling
capabilities, are employed as support elements. However, participation in direct combat operations by the ground forces of the intervening nation, beyond the presence of advisors accompanying local forces, is not part of such a strategy. Introduction of combat forces by an outside third party usurps the strategic initiative and responsibility of indigenous forces; this also undermines the advantages of local knowledge and of experience with the terrain, culture, languages, tribes and adversaries, which provide a setting for locally derived solutions.

1.2 An indirect approach against a backdrop of netwar

The words of military theorist Liddell Hart resonate ever more clearly in today’s international security environment, especially following a decade of troubled interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan: ‘... throughout the ages decisive results in war have only been reached when the approach has been indirect. In strategy the longest way round is apt to be the shortest way home.’ One could argue that a concerted effort to recruit, organize, train, equip, advise and assist Iraqi and Afghan security forces, as the central element of a strategy implemented from the outset and with a coherent long-term plan over the course of a decade, could have achieved the desired ends more effectively and efficiently.

The central premise to the indirect approach is to throw an adversary off balance. Hart described a direct approach, without the preparatory shaping of an indirect lead, as a blunt and raw approach that typically achieves an adverse outcome and results in exhaustion following the expenditure of a great deal of futile effort. A strategy of ‘support and influence’, utilizing training, advice and assistance, is the modern-day manifestation of the indirect approach, particularly against the backdrop of what was first described by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt as ‘netwar’ in a 1996 RAND monograph. Arquilla and Ronfeldt tellingly compared warfare in the Information Age to the Chinese board game ‘Go’, and war in the past to a traditional chessboard, providing a dramatic illustration of the differences between the two. The authors’ prediction of this paradigm shift

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1 Hart (1941), Strategy of the Indirect Approach, Faber and Faber Limited, p. 4.
2 Ibid., p. 5.
4 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996), The Advent of Netwar, RAND, pp. 5-16.
for war is particularly instructive in relation to today’s extremely complex security environment, in the light of recent events in Ukraine and the constantly tightening constraints on defence budgets.

Arquilla and Ronfeldt stated that war would be about distributing assets, not massing them, in pursuit of positional advantage. Networking of stationary nodes and assets was seen as more important than combined operations with specialized assets in defence of a hierarchical architecture. In other words, the goal is no longer to prevail through attrition of an adversary’s forces by removing pieces from the board. Most importantly, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that; ‘there is often a blurring of offense and defense – a single move may both attack and defend simultaneously’. This contrasts with chess, in which offensive and defensive actions are more apparent, and massed concentrations of assets are advantageous.

What this perspective underlines is positional defence of interests via networked relationships, as opposed to defence of physical territory. It is in this way that a ‘support and influence’ strategy can enable an indirect approach, i.e. upsetting an enemy’s balance by leveraging local forces rather than directly confronting him. The development of these local forces allows for their proactive insertion and presence in and around the interests of an adversary, at well-defined points of vulnerability. As stated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, ‘It is more about deciding where to stand than whether to advance or retreat.’ A strategy of ‘support and influence’ contributes incrementally to a decisive result. Larger local forces, empowered with indigenous knowledge and information, advice, assistance and communications systems, are capable of ‘swarming’ the enemy’s points of vulnerability. Most importantly, a ‘support and influence’ strategy does not necessarily require engagement and the use of force to achieve the desired effect; it could rely upon the potential use of force and on Sun Tzu’s ‘sheathed sword’ stratagem. Ultimately, this produces an effect or outcome that is grossly disproportionate to the means or resources invested in the strategy.

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6 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996), The Advent of Netwar, RAND, pp. 5-16.
7 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996), The Advent of Netwar, RAND, p. 57.
8 Tzu (6th Century BC), The Art of War, Delacorte Press, p. 16.
1.3 A comprehensive, integrated long-term ‘support and influence’ strategy

The interdependent nature of security challenges such as organized crime, narcotics, terrorism and insurgency inevitably lends itself to strategies that develop indigenous capabilities and capacities. As a result, the application of a successful ‘support and influence’ strategy must not be compartmentalized and restricted to specific ‘micro’ aspects of the overall effort. We know in principle, from successful counterinsurgencies, that a holistic, integrated approach is required between the civilian side and the military, i.e. a comprehensive and fully integrated approach. Here again, the Russian example is a case in point: conventional manoeuvring and exercises on multiple fronts were complemented by offensive information operations, enabling local forces in a well-orchestrated strategic approach.

Efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq give an idea of the possible outcome when these efforts are poorly integrated. Inevitably, the security situation on the ground drove military forces to focus on an attritional campaign against opposing forces that are visible and can therefore be targeted. In such a setting, the prerequisite for extricating international forces from both these conflicts rested principally with competent and capable indigenous security forces, bolstered by supporting institutions. The division of command and control structures between the US and the international coalition, as well as the initially ‘enemy-centric’ focus of the campaign, significantly retarded the development and implementation of a ‘support and influence’ strategy. In actual practice, a patchwork of episodic and disjointed efforts developed in the various fields concerned (military, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, command and control, logistics, communications, etc.). If the strategic objective does not include a long-term physical presence of the intervening force on the ground, this presupposes that some local entity must safeguard what has been achieved.
Unfortunately, though, provision of advice and assistance to make this possible is rarely employed as the strategy of choice from the outset.

The focus of advice and assistance must not be limited to military, paramilitary, or police forces. In all fields, the key is to ensure indigenous solutions enabled with outside assistance, rather than externally driven solutions to complex problems that in many cases are simply not fully comprehensible by outsiders. The positive impact of such an approach is complemented by significant safeguarding of lives, financial and political capital, and legitimacy.

1.4 Why a ‘support and influence’ strategy?

A first consideration is that, as already mentioned, traditional military tools can do very little to address twenty-first century threats and challenges. Outside intervention and direct participation as a belligerent in combat operations are clearly not suitable ways of countering asymmetric threats. Strategies of annihilation, exhaustion, attrition, survival, containment, isolation, decapitation and control cannot be successful when dealing with regular and irregular forces in failed states, insurgents, terrorists or non-state actors.13 Counterinsurgency and stability operations undertaken by the international community in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade are prime illustrations of this.

Some observers describe ‘support and influence’ as a means to accomplish more with less, or ‘a strategic model for […] new age austerity’.14 Certainly, one of the advantages of such a strategy is that it minimizes expenditure of resources. Ultimately, its value should not be as a fallback option. It must be applied from the outset, with the desired end-state in mind.

Because seeking to apply force via a surrogate or proxy is perceived in traditional military cultures as unorthodox, it is rarely viewed as a stand-alone solution to a problem requiring the application of force. However, close prior assessment would in most cases show a positive return on the investment made. When compared to direct intervention and the associated expenditure of national resources and capital in dealing with complex civil conflict, a strategy of ‘support and influence’ makes eminently good sense.

Such an approach is at times unattractive because it requires a patient, long-term strategic vision. Advice and assistance can rarely provide an immediate panacea. Consistent efforts will achieve long-term sustainable results over time, whereas efforts driven by short-term perspectives on a crisis will in most cases create temporary results.

1.5 Whither a strategy of ‘support and influence’?

A ‘support and influence’ strategy is applicable against state and non-state actors, conventional as well as illicit networked threats. It is an inherently adaptable strategy that adopts a long-term, patient, nuanced approach to challenges, rather than direct military intervention and the commitment of ground forces to combat operations.

The question remains, however, as to whether military and defence establishments will begin to acknowledge ‘support and influence’ as a first-choice, bona fide military strategy requiring a comprehensive and integrated long-term campaign construct, or will continue to practice it on an ad hoc basis. ‘Support and influence’ has not yet achieved such recognition. Until it enters into the mainstream of military strategic thought, it will unfortunately not be offered to decision-makers in a coherent manner as a potential solution to the complex challenges and threats faced in this century.
Alarming for neighbours and domestic opposition: the new Russian military doctrine

by Heidi Reisinger

The new version of Russia’s military doctrine appeared quietly during the (Western) Christmas holidays on the website of the Kremlin, only in the original Russian version without translation, and with minimal media exposure. The expected rhetorical and media-driven show of force did not happen.

So much secrecy raises interest in this basically boring document. At first glance, it hardly differs from its predecessor from 2010: a kind of preamble with all sorts of platitudes and definitions, followed by a list of military dangers and threats, and chapters with possible policy- and technology-based answers.

Russian documents of this kind have always offered at best limited information to the outside observer, as the Russian president will not consult with the doctrine before he sends “little green men” or entire units into a neighbouring country. These documents are often totally overloaded, so that anything and everything can be read into them. Furthermore, they are not free from internal contradictions. But at least they serve as a basis for legitimacy, both outside and inside Russia, with a view to justifying military action.

This doctrine is quite restrained in tone (no open agitation against the West), but also makes very gloomy reading, as global threats have intensified and dangers lurk everywhere, including the militarization of space. However, among the many platitudes there is also substance. Ignoring the notion that, from the perspective of many states, Russia itself is again becoming a threat to European security, then at least three important trends can be distilled from the new military doctrine.

First, military hazards within Russia are given greater prominence than before. It’s not just about “Islamism” or “terrorism”, but unrest and internal disintegration instigated and orchestrated from abroad hence the talk of “influencing the (Russian) population, especially young people, to undermine the goal of the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions of the defence of the fatherland”. There are several references in this direction, which send an unmistakable signal to the Russian people. Public protest, as in 2011 and 2012 after the manipulated Duma elections and the Medvedev/Putin tandem exchange, let alone a Russian “Maidan”, will not be tolerated. Following this logic, similar scenarios in the states geographically closest to Russia are considered a significant threat. Such developments must be nipped in the bud by any conceivable means, even military.

The second important trend to be considered concerns Russia-NATO relations. Unlike previous versions of the military doctrine, there is no mention here of cooperation with the Alliance, only of a “dialogue on an equal footing”. NATO was previously seen (along with the United States) as a source of military danger. Now it is seen as the source. However, it is not given threat status, as expected by some observers; on the other hand, though, one threat identified in the document is...
the “demonstration of military force with military exercises in Russia’s neighbouring states and its allies”. This formulation is actually reminiscent of Russia’s own “snap exercises” at the Ukrainian border. Here, however, the tables are turned and the reference is clearly to multilateral exercises involving NATO members and partners in the Baltic States, Poland and Western Ukraine. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the largest land grab since the Second World War, it seems absurd to associate NATO’s perceived expansion with a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia. The main point that emerges here is Russia’s need for buffer states, effectively denying neighbouring states full sovereign power.

The third topic of interest is Russia’s choice of allies and partners. Given the clear curtailment of dialogue with NATO and the EU, the doctrine places emphasis on intensified cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the other four BRICS (Brazil, India, China, South Africa).

In terms of Russia’s allies, only Belarus and the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are directly mentioned. Of course, there is no mention of the fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have not been recognized by any of the aforementioned partners. With this doctrine, the Russian leadership has turned its back on cooperation with Western partners and is working on the creation of alternatives. It perpetuates the myth that Russia could compensate the ruined partnership with Europe and America with new partners in Asia. The document, therefore, advocates a “non-aligned security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region” and the protection of Russian interests in the Arctic.

Ukraine itself – let alone the war there – is not mentioned. However, the references to the threat of new, mixed methods of warfare and the importance of (dis)information campaigns provide an accurate reflection of Russia’s actions in Crimea and continued ...
Eastern Ukraine.

This Russian military doctrine sends a warning to potential critics inside Russia, and especially to its direct neighbours. For NATO and the West, Russia is no longer just a difficult partner, which is nevertheless interested in common security and stability, but seems to have become an increasingly isolated and unpredictable state, whose authoritarian regime is fighting for its own survival.
Civil-Military interaction - a bridge too far for NATO?

by Philippe von Burg

Do NATO soldiers engage properly with their non-military counterparts? Or is the Alliance too militarized to interact with civilians effectively?

With NATO’s growing geographic reach and full-spectrum capabilities, civil-military interaction (CMI) will be increasingly critical to its efficacy. To a large degree, its success depends on the role of civil organizations and partners. According to NATO doctrine, these include national civil administrations, host nation civil administrations, various political bodies, international organizations, governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, global economic bodies, and populations themselves.

NATO’s intent to not only develop new partnerships but also optimize their effect and quality is thus an important consideration. Civil-military policy is ambiguous, the structure ineffective, and operations lack political guidance. At a 2012 conference co-organized by ACT and SHAPE, experts agreed that NATO’s comprehensive approach needed a reset in order to improve the civilian-military interface, particularly at the political and strategic levels.

The Alliance subscribes to the "comprehensive approach to crisis management at the political and strategic, operational, and theatre/tactical levels". Related NATO guidance consists of the Strategic Concept 2010, Allied Joint Doctrine, Military Policy on CIMIC and CMI, as well as the CIMIC Doctrine. Whereas theatre/tactical CIMIC is well defined, the political-strategic CMI is incomplete and lacks focus.

Definition of terms

Comprehensive approach

The comprehensive approach is a civilian-led effort across the spectrum of conflict and disaster relief missions, embedded within a flexible institutional and organizational framework that better enables collaboration and thus sequences with a determined focus on the needs of the affected populations. It involves political, civilian and military instruments by international, regional and local actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities, in order to maximize coherence and effectiveness of the overall effort. As such, the comprehensive approach is the internal and external coordination of all available instruments and actors, their timely and appropriate

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3 Based on the literature and practitioner assessments. Not all sources are explicitly referenced.
4 Julian Lindley-French and William Hopkins, “Operationalising the comprehensive approach”.

continued ...
deployment in the various conflict phases, and the definition of common mission objectives.

**Civil-military interaction**

**CMI**

Permanent high-level relations between NATO and non-NATO political and civilian actors to foster cultural and institutional familiarity in order to achieve improved policy, strategic understanding and agreement on overall objectives, coordination, roles and the division of labor. CMI facilitates high-level joint analysis and identifies how to manage a particular crisis in the short, medium and longer term. As a result, CMI links NATO to all key stakeholders at the strategic level and enables or provides political guidance to operations.

**Civil-military cooperation**

**CIMIC**

CIMIC is a joint function at operational and tactical levels, comprising capabilities integral to facilitating civil-military cooperation within national and international contexts in order to support the achievement of mission objectives by enabling NATO commands to participate appropriately and effectively in comprehensive missions with diverse non-military actors.

In contrast to CIMIC’s tactical origins in the 1990s, CMI

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emerged later and became policy with the Strategic Concept 2010. CMI aims at “improving the coherent application” of NATO instruments, “improving … practical cooperation at all levels with partners”, and enhancing NATO’s ability to support stabilization and reconstruction “in all phases of conflict and in concert with other actors”. As the “success of a comprehensive approach is dependent on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding and collaboration …”, perceptions of civilian partners are essential to NATO assessments and institutional evolution.

This paper aims to produce a realistic external view of NATO’s CMI efforts. This research will be based on interviews with civilian practitioners outside the Alliance. Selection was determined by recent roles and affiliations, and willingness to provide opinions. The list of interviewees can be found in the appendix. To ensure authenticity, on occasion anonymity was requested. This approach permitted the collection of personal assessments free of institutional agendas and processing. A few interviewees are explicitly acknowledged in this text, subject to their willingness to be named.

In order to ensure the civilian point of view, choosing the interview topics was left to the interviewees. The inquiry thus examined three general questions: (1) What is the understanding of NATO’s CMI? (2) What are the key gaps and challenges? (3) How should NATO move forward with CMI?

The political-strategic dimension

Perceptions from the outside: good intentions – strategic confusion

The general state of NATO civil-military affairs is described as “strategic confusion”. It is equally unclear to what extent NATO embraces and practices the comprehensive approach. What types of civilian actors does NATO really interact with, and how? As is often the case, the scope of civilian actors is outlined in theory but fails to gain traction in practice.

Additionally, questions exist at times as to the NATO office with which a given interaction takes place when it does. An example of insufficient outreach comes via the EU. Some CSDP staff cannot easily identify NATO’s approach, despite a formal EU-NATO partnership. The impression is that the more the civilian actors reach out to NATO, the better the inter-institutional understanding generally becomes. In contrast, the impact of NATO outreach is perceived to be limited.

Militarization of tasks and sporadic outreach create distance

The perceived militarization of civilian responsibilities causes alarm, especially in light of the “too often low performance where attempted”. Examples are humanitarian and reconstruction assignments, for which the military is “neither equipped nor trained” and hence has little chance of success. Nor is militarization per se in the interest of NATO, as is clearly recognized. The political motivation to use military assets for tasks better addressed by non-military instruments, while often irrational, nevertheless seemingly offers an easy way to display activity. It also illustrates, though, how well intentioned policies can be damaging.

A further aspect noted was that NATO practises civil-military activities in waves, depending on operational needs instead of strategic purpose. One reason suggested is a possible lack of seriousness. Is NATO using the comprehensive approach as a “catch phrase” to have “everyone jump on the band wagon” for trendy issues? Also, some inquired whether NATO civil-military engagement is truly comprehensive, or perhaps limited to humanitarian-military coordination. Indeed, NATO civil-military efforts appear to correlate with short-term operational needs.

Political ambition vs. strategic reality

This is especially true when one considers that the “previous level of ambition was already too big for it (NATO)”. The main reason for this sentiment is that it “actually takes an appropriate political commitment by member states to resource” these ambitions, so as to provide requisite structures and capabilities. CMI is described as “missing the boat at all levels”, because of the absence of “effective interaction with real output from start to finish”. Interviewees across the spectrum identified a gap between ambition and reality. Whereas NATO policy is intended to work comprehensively, in practice this goal is remote. The level of ambition overshoots political commitments and policy. NATO and partners are actively meeting and talking, yet the intellectual and practical step forward is not yet made.

One obstacle in this respect is the perceived low quality of decision-making, due to poor “political and strategic understanding by senior levels and their command groups”, combined with “insufficient analysis of local contexts”. Yet, NATO forces are deployed mostly into security-challenged and conflict-affected environments, where the “root causes are

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8 The ICRC representative was the exception, conveying the commonly known position in line with ICRC policy.

8 As confirmed by a former ISAF commander and a former ISAF chief of staff, NATO Defense College, Rome, 2014.

continued ...
typically of a political nature and can only be solved politically. A partial explanation provided was the overt focus on CIMIC at the tactical and operational levels. Although civil-military interaction takes place, it seems to produce little political-strategic output. Or, as Hryckow puts it, “de-confliction does not produce strategic guidance.”

“National and regional political understanding is a prerequisite to avoid problems with military action,” as the World Bank advisor reminds us. Unfortunately, NATO provides insufficient political support to strategic joint operations, or to regional and theatre commands. Afghanistan, where the NCR attempts to cover such aspects, is the exception.

CIMIC on steroids - lack of comprehension, wrong capabilities

With respect to CMI, lack of comprehension and capability gaps appear to diminish effectiveness and output, both of which are seen as having been inadequate for some time. NATO’s CMI concept as such might be ill defined. Hryckow calls it “CIMIC on steroids pushed to strategic levels”, without having accomplished the “necessary intellectual work”. “Solving technical needs is easy, whereas doing so with the underlying key aspects is hard work.” It is “the way of interaction with local politics and dynamics that is exponentially more important in achieving impact” and NATO “lacks understanding the politics of how foreign processes work”. NATO appears inadequately prepared for today’s crisis environments where causes and resolutions are more intricate.

One reason could be the inherent focus on tactical and operational aspects in current civil-military policy, which lacks a high-level view across all sectors. For example, military policy for host nation support is limited to logistics only. NATO policy describes CMI as “a group of activities” and CIMIC as “a function comprising a set of capabilities”. Unfortunately, such assumptions appear to add to the identified guidance gaps and poor political-strategic output to date. Hopefully, current CCOE efforts on defining the CMI dimension will be able to

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16 NATO Civilian Representative.

work toward more comprehensive guidance.

Another cause for the outlined shortcomings seems to be a lack of individual CMI capability. “Not having the right people in the appropriate places is a problem for NATO.” NATO’s defence-focused membership is seen as a “possible reason for the lack of experience working across other government functions and with broken institutions”. Without the right people in the right places, NATO is limited in its comprehension of environments and is therefore limited in effect. With such ongoing deficiencies of individual capability, the achievability of NATO’s political ambitions is in doubt.

Institutional culture and barriers

The nature and level of interaction between NATO and others also depends on each organization’s adaptability to changing environments. According to Merkelbach, “militaries tend to be less dogmatic and more flexible and adaptable than civilian organizations.” Others observe that, over time, there is also a “civilian-side learning curve as to WHEN and HOW to best interact with militaries”. In this regard, “ongoing interaction helps,” which comes from pro-active engagement rather than formal agreements. For example, the NATO-EU partnership appears to require a dose or two of proactivity. In this relatively small field of work, “personalities and relationships count to make institutions work.”

Hence cooperation between NATO and civil organizations is formed by variables beyond the control of any single actor among those involved, but can be influenced by each in partnership. Taking into account the organizational characteristics of NATO and its “partners” could yield opportunities and improve decision-making.

Improve military deployments with better-informed political decision-makers

Political statements can create “political dynamics that develop quickly and, once established, are difficult to change.” Wrong “perceptions trigger deployments of inappropriate assets”, such as strategic airlift capacity. Generally, the willingness of NATO and national governments to deploy military assets for disaster response and in humanitarian crisis is appreciated. However, the “utility of military means is often misunderstood and deployments misguided.” Improved strategic understanding would also “help overcome institutional distance and reduce political pressure,” a particularly misleading element. Informing political levels about practices of prevention, intervention and development is a unanimous demand. Misinformed politicians and inaccurately perceived situations by military leaders can result in counterproductive momentum and ill-suited assets being imposed on a crisis response. A consultative approach with civilian responders has proven to be helpful in this regard.

Reform and potential contributions to international efforts

In the international framework, existing opportunities for cooperation are highlighted. According to Dwan, the UN-NATO partnership holds the potential to become more effective in future crises by cooperating more in developing regions. Although the UN might have been over-enthusiastic about potential NATO SSR contributions to UN efforts in the short term, it remains an attractive opportunity for collaboration. Another area of cooperation could be a response to asymmetric environments, in which NATO and its members have expertise. Also, a coordinator or clearing-house role for security contributions to the comprehensive approach can potentially be a highly relevant partnership area.

Also recommended is a more “purposeful and regular interaction” to build “familiarity and confidence” between people and institutions.

Required: linking expertise and partner capacities

In light of NATO’s ambitions and the evolution of global intervention practice, there is a growing demand for “linkage of expertise and efforts”. Effective “CMI could help alleviate some of the existing politics and sensitivities around NATO engaging in particular regions,” which would help UN offices to partner more effectively in areas of NATO expertise. Reservations by UN member states on NATO involvement could be overcome by a more pragmatic discussion and activation of concrete programs. With more substantive interaction prior to a crisis, NATO and civilian partners may significantly improve the quality and effect of interaction.

Further potential value is identified in increasing the “use of

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14 NATO CIMIC Center of Excellence
15 For example, whereas the 2005 air bridge to Pakistan, planned in close coordination with civilian organizations, was successful, the 2010 repeat failed. The latter was decided by NATO without consultation of civilians, which would have made the difference, as the operating environment had significantly changed since 2005. Still, it caused apprehensions up to the NATO Secretary General. Interviewees from humanitarian organizations pointed to the initially planned military assets for the Ebola response in a similar light.
16 Some nations at times hesitate or object to NATO presence and participation.
17 For example, NATO could reach out to partners in regions of strategic interest. It could also support capacity building in Africa, such as in the greater Sahel region coast-to-coast.

continued ...
civilian networks and capabilities to improve understanding, political advice and strategic guidance" to the NCS. Linking up with partners more effectively could make their capacities available to NATO, such as EU "in-area political capabilities and strategic on-land effect". However, first the question of "expectations from partners" would have to be answered within NATO. For example, does NATO require "regional political advice" or "particular civilian skills"? Some, in fact, recommend that NATO limit its activities to primarily military tasks. As a possible approach to define expectations, Siedschlag\(^\text{18}\) argued that with practice comes experience and pointed out the need for a "culture of cooperation … rather than too much emphasis on detailed structures or procedures", getting stuck at conceptual levels. Several interviewees echoed this. Hence, opportunities exist to operationalize the comprehensive approach and increase the presence and acceptance of NATO in critical areas. A more proactive engagement with partners could lead the way, provided that the necessary culture and will are instituted.

**Improve CMI capabilities and streamline the structure**

The ambiguity of civil-military policy is readily seen, and some of the consequences have been shown in this study. For one, incomplete guidance on CMI/CIMIC causes gaps in comprehension, alignment and action. These gaps indicate an inherent lack of understanding of the issue within NATO, rather than a lack of will per se. As a result, the need for "individual capability to think and act strategically across the civil-military spectrum" emerges clearly. "Bringing such linkages to life" is essential, as "security measures will impact other areas too". Rather than aiming at full-spectrum civil expertise, NATO can hire from a small pool of individuals with broad backgrounds to understand a wide range of civilian and military issues. These individuals could be "trained to a degree where they possess..."
sufficient literacy in areas of the comprehensive approach to effectively link with civilian organizations.

Valuable outputs of recent efforts

As an overall positive effect, “NATO’s adoption of the comprehensive approach led many Western actors to follow suit or build their own whole-of-government concept.” The NATO decision “encouraged examination of linkages between political security and development work.” As a result, many NATO members and partners are increasingly experienced in CMI and could lend critical capacity to the Alliance. However, leadership within NATO itself would be necessary to take advantage of this capacity.

The Alliance also appears generally to work well on Alliance issues. NATO HQ is seen to provide excellent “big picture political work that is prudent and appropriate, including good framework papers and academic policy,” as well as good advisory capability “when focused on alliance issues”. CIMIC practice is also mentioned positively, particularly workshops and sharing of best practices. Moreover, some NATO commands have a decent grasp of the CMI-CIMIC space and practise civil-military outreach of their own accord. Some of the formalized interactions appear to work well, though. For example, the NATO-ICRC MOU\(^{19}\) has created clarity and structure for “excellent interaction at all levels”. Also, NATO-UN relations have developed well since 2009 as a result of “frequent and confidence-building staff talks, primarily due to

\(^{14}\) For example: Allied Joint Force Command Naples and the 1st Rapid Deployable German-Netherlands Corps.

\(^{19}\) Memorandum of Understanding.

continued ...
their open and pragmatic nature”. Such institutional relations have improved due to the personnel involved. These are the exceptions in attitude or outreach resources.

**The operational and tactical dimensions**

**Interference of history**

Historical aspects can pose challenges, particularly in operational and tactical environments. “NATO’s failure to perform adequately in Afghanistan” is identified as a major handicap. It “creates problems for the civilian side in working with NATO elsewhere.” As a result, civilians opt to “work instead with NATO members or partner nations directly”. However, others suggest the “civilian side needs to move on from the negative experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan” and to improve future effectiveness. Or, as Dwan says: “focus on what works.”

**Organizational characteristics influence agility**

When interacting with civilian organizations, institutional time frames are a defining element to consider. In contrast to relatively agile UN emergency services or private contractors hired as readily available providers, NATO as a whole works comparatively slowly. At times events tend to speed up NATO processes, although decision-making does not always achieve the desired accuracy, effect production, or cost effectiveness, as in the case of strategic military airlifts versus more cost-effective and non-militarized commercial options.

As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this paper, many civilian actors struggle to adapt and engage with speed and impact as part of coordinated efforts. The reasons are many and the subject of increased analysis. One particularly relevant aspect coming out of this research is the fact that many civilian actors are permanently engaged in various theatres, while NATO is not. Consequently, such differences need to be taken into consideration in NATO planning and outreach. For example, much of the civilian focus is geared towards ongoing efforts. Nevertheless, major civilian organizations would welcome ongoing interaction with NATO, which could in turn use the exchanges to stay current.

**Training and personal interaction strengthen relations and build capabilities**

Opportunities for workshops, training and presentations are seen as a “practical tool to hold understanding”, at least at a minimal level. These help to “keep lines of communications open”. Interestingly, Geneva-based interviewees regard the CCOMC as a good start for organizations with a Brussels presence and with an active HQ-to-field structure, but consider that it does not meet its potential. It is worth mentioning that operational downtime could be the perfect moment to increase NATO outreach in order to learn and mutually evolve in “safe environments”, far from a particular operation with its contextual barriers. However, not much is made of this, and what is done focuses primarily on the humanitarian sector.

Fostering familiarity can also help overcome the challenge of information exchange. A promising approach would be to practise such exchange in already mentioned safe environments like training sessions and exercises. Such activities build “confidence and transparency” ahead of a crisis situation. Svoboda highlights that “exercises allow for greater interaction and proximity than is possible in politically tainted or crisis environments on the ground where the distance might have to be greater.” The return on investment from exercises can be increased further by allowing “civil-side input at the beginning of exercise planning”. Moreover, as Merkelbach suggests, NATO can support outcomes from such interaction more comprehensively by encouraging and enabling “flexible and transparent plug-ins for information exchange”. Additionally, it can “help civilian organizations identify necessary or advantageous links between themselves and NATO”.

Finally, relationships between people are the most effective plug-ins. Even when enabled by institutional concepts, relations happen (and must happen) between people because “they make the difference in practice.” Merkelbach asks: “Who are you going to call in a crisis?” Moreover, as interviewees from humanitarian organizations added, because “institutional relationships can be dangerous” in regard to potential future repercussions and action, relations should function specifically at a personal level. The virtue of early interactions enables institutions to react appropriately to each crisis, without the distorting lens of previous crises.

**Conclusions**

Today CMI is a bridge too far for NATO. Whether due to poorly informed political decisions, insufficient strategic guidance to operations, or misguided deployments of military assets to emergency relief efforts, the inadequacies of current CMI are costly. The inability to effectively engage civilian actors impacts
NATO's performance negatively. NATO has failed to establish CMI, the political-strategic tool and key enabler to bring the comprehensive approach to life.

It appears that a lack of CMI comprehension by both military and civilians within NATO and its partners provides insufficient pressure for overall civil-military guidance, capabilities and structure. Despite limited efforts and related analysis, NATO has been incapable of adopting lessons and recommendations. No single office or command appears responsible for operationalizing the comprehensive approach by leading overall civil-military efforts. Today, NATO is unable to provide the appropriate political and strategic guidance to such operations and cannot interact with all civil sectors strategically.

NATO now intends to engage in an ever-broader operational spectrum, further increasing the range of civil actors with whom it will potentially engage. These civilians have little confidence that NATO will fulfill its ambitions, due to an exhibited lack of political commitment. At the same time, some civil actors look to NATO to potentially help build capacity in regions like the Sahel in Africa, which could certainly be in NATO's strategic interest. In such cases, internal barriers and external needs will tend to create further pressure. NATO will have to address these strategically, at the same time as ongoing operational challenges, by actively engaging not only its membership but also the civilian sectors which are key to its future effectiveness.

Hence, NATO has two choices: retain current CMI levels but reduce operational ambitions, or keep the current level of ambition but improve CMI. If the latter option is pursued, then the following recommendations apply:

- **Institutional leadership needed.** An office at NATO HQ is needed, to lead the comprehensive approach at the policy level, operationalized by CMI and CIMIC.

- **Guidance and capability are needed.** The Alliance must move beyond the humanitarian sector and engage the full range of civilian actors at realistic levels. Critical individual capabilities and organizational structure must be improved, in order to think and act strategically.

- **Temporary vs. permanent deployments.** NATO's on-and-off operational deployments differentiate it from many of the permanently engaged civilian organizations, actors and stakeholders. The resulting organizational cultures, rhythms and capacities should inform the interaction aims and practices of NATO.

- **A focus is needed on military missions,** refraining from civilian tasks that are best left to non-military actors.

- **Increased roles and responsibilities are needed,** such as SSR/DSR, capacity building, or as a clearing-house to maintain operational capabilities and civil-military “muscle memory.”

- **Levels of ambition must be kept realistic** in NATO policy, because overgrown civilian partner expectations will cause problems later. As NATO aims to engage in a broader crisis spectrum, partners need to be able to make realistic assessments on potential engagements and capabilities.

Finally, interacting with civil organizations productively is an enabling factor for NATO projection and performance. Yet, years of operational deployments and lessons learned still leave the Alliance incapable of empowering its ambitions with effective CMI. As long as this persists, NATO remains off target in pursuing its goals and misses the chance to become a more effective and respected actor, especially in its envisioned far-away areas of operation. NATO will keep thinking and acting with tunnel vision, unable to connect with civilians strategically and hence falling short of linking its short-term operational efforts to sustainable long-term effect. Following through on the above recommendations will strengthen NATO’s effectiveness and relevance in international crisis management, enabling it to use resources with a sharper focus and a comprehensive vision.

A Spanish project in Afghanistan designed to improve water supplies shows the way by involving aid agencies, the Spanish military, the Afghan military and local workers. Source: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/03/ART7/EN/index.htm
International Kyiv Week 2015

From 20 to 24 April, 2015, the NATO Defense College (NDC), in association with the NATO School Oberammergau (NSO) jointly ran the 15th edition of the “International Kyiv Week”, entitled “NATO following the Wales Summit”, in support of the Ukrainian National University (UNDU). This annual initiative aims to familiarize UNDU officers with NATO’s current and future roles and priorities, to improve their knowledge of NATO’s organization and working methods, as well as to identify some key security challenges for the Alliance. This year, the initiative took place under the auspices of the Lithuanian embassy in Kyiv. International Kyiv Week demonstrates the importance of a strong partnership between Ukraine and NATO, which in view of current events bears special significance.

The team leading the event included the Commandant of the NDC, MajGen Janusz Bojarski (POL A), the Commandant of NSO, Captain W. Scott Butler (USA N), the Dean of the NDC, Dr Daria Daniels Skodnik (SVN C), the Director of the Academic Planning & Policy Division, BrigGen Heinz-Josef Feldmann (DEU A) and the Head of the NDC Research Division, Dr Jeffrey Larsen (USA C).

The uniqueness of the event lies in the fact that this is the only occasion when the NDC exports its educational resources and methods to another location. The concept is to apply the same methods as those applied in the Rome and Oberammergau curricula, with a series of lectures organized in coordination with the Commandant of the UNDU, LtGen Vasyl Maksymovych Telelym, and his team of experts.

The conference opened with a press conference, followed by a lecture on the “Future of NATO” by Dr J. Larsen. In the afternoon, Ms H. Reisinger (DEU C) gave a briefing on “NATO’s Partnership Policy”.

On day two, Maj Mehmet Turk (TUR A) presented some
thought-provoking insights in his address entitled “NATO Crisis Management & Cooperation with the EU”. At the same time, the NDC Dean Dr Daria Daniels Skodnik gave a speech at the Ukrainian Diplomatic University. The address was followed by a Question & Answer session of which the audience took full advantage to engage with the speaker.

The next day, participants attended a morning presentation on the “Legal Aspects of NATO Operations”, delivered by LtCol Brian Bengs (USA F). In the afternoon, the crucial issue of “NATO – UKR Relations” was raised by Prof G. Perepelytsia (UKR), who provided an insightful address followed by a Q&A session.

On Thursday, 23 April, the focus shifted to the “Proliferation of WMD & Ballistic Missile Defence (NDC/NSO)”, in a lecture delivered jointly by Capt A. Madeira (PRT N) and Maj Trevor Newsham (USA F). In the concluding lecture, LtCol Brian Bengs reflected upon the long-term consequences of the 2014 Wales Summit in his address “NATO following the Wales Summit?”.

Closing remarks were made by the two Commandants, MGen Bojarski and LtGen Telelym; both highlighted the need for a collective and comprehensive strategy in the increasingly challenging and interdependent security environment.
NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats

Dr Jeffrey Larsen and Lorenzo Bettelli

The conference entitled “NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats” represented a fundamental milestone for the NATO Defense College and the Alliance. This event, held in Rome on April 29-30, 2015, was the largest academic conference ever hosted at the NATO Defense College.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the Eastern border of Ukraine has had a direct impact on the countries concerned, as well as on the entire international community. NATO has taken a central role in trying to identify concrete solutions to restore peace between the two countries. The conflict has been further complicated by the use of ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics (the mix of military and non-military, conventional and irregular components, including cyber and information operations), characterizing one of the most complex issues the international community has had to deal with. Thus, finding the way to address hybrid warfare can ultimately mean finding the route to a permanent ceasefire.

The NDC, as the prime educational institution of the Alliance, organized the two-day conference to bring about a better understanding of this crucial subject. The conference explored four main themes: NATO’s changing strategic environment; the scope and nature of hybrid threats; NATO’s politico-military responses to hybrid warfare; and NATO’s military response to hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare was defined as the denial of, and defection from, standard norms and principles of international relations in pursuit of narrow interests. As the final report of the conference stated, contemporary hybrid warfare is strategic in its ambition and employs a mix of disinformation, destabilizing gambits, and intimidation to force an adversary to comply with those interests. The essential purpose of hybrid warfare is to keep an adversary politically, militarily and societally off balance.

The conference attracted 200 external participants from the most senior ranks of NATO. In addition, the NDC’s Senior Course and NATO Regional Cooperation Course attended portions of the event. Administrative, logistical, security, and protocol requirements meant that large numbers of NDC staff were involved in helping to manage the conference. This included several social events for visiting participants and their spouses.

On 28 April the conference began with an icebreaker reception, hosted by the Polish Embassy in Rome. H.E. Tomasz ORŁOWSKI (POL), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Italy and the Republic of San Marino, gave the opening remarks, underlining the importance of the conference for a more detailed understanding of the hybrid warfare scenario.

The next day, NDC Commandant Major General Janusz BOJARSKI (POL), together with the Conference Chair Dr Jeffrey LARSEN (USA), NDC Director of Research, opened proceedings. The keynote address was given by General Knud BARTELS (DNK), Chairman, NATO Military Committee. The first session, dedicated to “The Eastern Flank – Russia and Hybrid Warfare, was introduced by Mr Nik GOWING (GBR), International Broadcaster, London, as panel moderator. The panellists were Brigadier Heinz KRIEB (AUT), Director CON-CAP; Mr Heinrich BRAUSS (DEU), Assistant Secretary General for Policy and Planning, NATO HQ; and Brigadier General Nico TAK (NLD), Director, NATO Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre.

In the second session, moderated by Dr Jamie SHEA (GBR), Deputy Assistant Secretary...
General, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO HQ, Professor Fawaz Gerges (GBR) of the London School of Economics explored “The Southern Flank – MENA, ISIL and New Threats.” The third and final session of the day, on “NATO’s Response to New Threats,” was moderated by Professor Dr Julian Lindley-French (GBR), President, Europa Analytica, the panellists being General Frank Gorenc (USA), Commander, NATO Air Command; Lieutenant General John Nicholson (USA), Commander, NATO Land Forces Command; and Vice Admiral Peter Hudson (GBR), Commander, NATO Maritime Command.

A formal conference banquet was hosted by the NDC Commandant that evening at Palazzo Taverna in the city centre. H.E. Thomas Greminger (CHE), Ambassador and Former Chairman, Permanent Council of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, delivered the keynote address, after brief remarks by the Chief of the Czech General Staff General Petr Pavel, who has been named as the next Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee.

The second day of the conference opened with presentations on “The Alliance and Managing the Hybrid Challenge,” moderated by Dr Larsen. The speakers were Major General Gordon Davis (USA), Deputy Chief of Staff Operations and Intelligence, SHAPE; and Dr Mel McNulty, Head of Politics, UK Joint Delegation to NATO.

Three sessions were held on the second day: “Deterrence and Reassurance,” “The Russia Challenge,” and “The Middle East Challenge.” These were moderated respectively by Mr Michael Rühle (DEU), Head Energy Security Section, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO HQ; Ms Radoslava Stefanova (ITA/BUL), Head Russia and Ukraine Relations, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO HQ; and Dr Richard Hooker (USA), Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington and former NDC Dean. The speakers for the deterrence session were Lieutenant General Michael Day (CAN), Deputy Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples; Mr Nicolas Roche (FRA), Director for Strategy and Policy, Military Applications Division, French Atomic Energy Commission; and Mr Elbridge Colby (USA), Center for a New American Security; Washington. The “Russia Challenge” panel included Brigadier General Vladimir Chchibaiia (GEO), First Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Staff of Georgian Armed Forces; Mr Matthew Rojansky (USA), Director, Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, Washington; and Mr Oleksiy Melnyk (UKR), Co-Director, Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes, Razumkov Centre, Kiev. The Middle East panel speakers were Lieutenant General (ret.) Dan Halutz (ISR), Former Chief of Staff Israeli Defence Forces, Tel Aviv; Major General (ret.) Mohammed Farghal (JOR), Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, Jordanian Armed Forces; and Dr Can Kasağolu (TUR), Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, Istanbul.

Concluding remarks were offered by Professor Lindley-French, conference rapporteur, and Major General BojarSKI. The rapporteur stated that: “NATO’s ultima ratio mission is a military mission and the influence and effect which will be vital if hybrid threats are to be deterred, contained, blunted and defeated demand credible Alliance military force. However, NATO’s purpose for existing is ultimately political, and for the Alliance to succeed a credible military Alliance cannot exist without a credible political Alliance. NATO’s bottom line is this: the world today is no safer than it was in the twentieth century. War is possible. Indeed, big war is possible. We in NATO form part of a community that can and must prevent that from happening.”

A detailed conference report by Professor Lindley-French was published by the NDC Research Division. It is available at: http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=4.
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Senior Course 126

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ARMENIA
LtCol. S. DARBIYAN

AZERBAIJAN
LtCol. M. ZEYNALOV

BELGIUM
LtCol. E. NORGÀ

CANADA
LtCol. D. HARRIS
Col. M. MINOR

CZECH REPUBLIC
Col. R. HONZÁK

DENMARK
LtCol. T. F. PEDERSEN

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Col. G. SAMARAS
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Cdr. M. CARRINO
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LtCol. F. MEROLA
Cdr. M. SINA
Cdr. G. TONGIORGI
Maj. L. VALENTINI

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NATO Regional Cooperation Course 13

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LtCol. J.J. JAIME PENUELA

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Highlights
Thanks to the modularized structure of the Senior Course (SC), some of its Study Periods are available to military officers and civilian officials who may not be able to attend the entire six-month programme. In this way, the NDC offers five different 5-day Modular Short Courses (MSCs) during every SC. Run in conjunction with the SC, each MSC is designed both to inform and to stimulate. It gives participants the opportunity to improve their understanding of major political, economic, socio-cultural, defence- and security-related issues, with implications for the Alliance’s security and that of the entire international community.
The Integrated Partner Orientation Course (IPOC 2015/1) on “NATO present and future” was held at the College from 20 to 24 April 2015, in conjunction with Senior Course 126. The aim of the Course is to analyse the role and character of NATO, including its organization, policies and activities; to consider the Alliance’s contribution to security; and to assess the transformation required by the changing security environment and the demands of current operations.

From 11 to 15 May 2015, the NDC in Rome hosted the first Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassador’s Course of 2015 (GFOAC 2015-1): a top-level course which raises and reinforces mutual understanding of security concerns, political-military issues and NATO’s interests and capabilities. On this occasion, 44 distinguished participants, from 29 different countries, had the chance to discuss some of the dominant issues confronting the Alliance with reference to this year’s theme: “NATO in a World of Mayhem”. The aim of the Course is to enhance understanding of current politico-military issues within the Alliance, and also to familiarize participants with current and prospective issues facing NATO.

The Fourth Senior Executive Regional Course (SERC 4) was held at the NDC from 8-12 June 2015.

The course, addressed to NATO member states as well as Partner countries in the Mediterranean and Gulf regions, once again brought together a distinguished group of participants: ambassadors, senior military officers, diplomats, decision-makers and influential thinkers.

The aim of this high profile course is to promote mutual understanding on issues related to the Mediterranean and the Gulf, to enhance knowledge of current security challenges for the Alliance and its partners, and to examine current and prospective issues facing NATO.
6 February
Admiral (ret.) Giampaolo Di Paola, former Italian Minister of Defence and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, delivered the graduation address to Senior Course 125, composed of 68 high-ranking participants from 27 different countries.

24 February
H.E. Ambassador Douglas Lute, US Permanent Representative to NATO, as guest speaker, and the Italian Permanent Representative to NATO, H.E. Ambassador Mariangela Zappia, attended the Inauguration Ceremony for Senior Course 126.

27 February
The NATO Defense College had the great honour of hosting NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who addressed NDC Faculty and Staff together with SC 126 and distinguished guests from 27 different countries.

04 March
The Commander of the Army Inspectorate of Infrastructure, LtGen Giorgio Battisti (ITA A), delivered the inauguration lecture to the thirteenth NATO Regional Cooperation Course.
12 March
Visit and Lecture by General John R. ALLEN (US MC), former ISAF Commander and currently Special US Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

13 March
Lecture of Opportunity by the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to Italy, H.E. Zia NEZAM.

15 April
The Ambassador of Egypt in Rome H.E. Amr Helmy, visited the NATO Defense College.

29-30 April
The conference entitled “NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats”, a fundamental milestone for the NATO Defense College and the Alliance, was attended by more than two hundred high-level participants from NATO and partner nations.

08 May
NATO Regional Cooperation Course 13 graduation ceremony with guest speaker Ambassador Gunter Mulack (DEU), Executive Director of the German Oriental Institute.
Our Guests

20 May
The NATO Defense College welcomed the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Finnish Defence Command, Lieutenant General Sakari Honkamaa, who was accompanied by the Chief of Current Ops, Brigadier General Markku Myllykangas (NDC Ancien from SC 120), and by LtCol Jukka Jokinen.

9 June
Keynote speech by the Minister of National Defence of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania H.E. Diallo Mamadou Bathia, to the fourth Senior Executive Regional Course

11-12 June
45th meeting of the NDC Academic Advisory Board.

The Board is currently made up of: LtGen Mark O. Schissler (USA F), Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and Chairman of the Board; VADM Ignacio Horcada Rubio (ESP A), Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Representative in Europe; MGon Gordon B. DAVIS, Jr. (USA A), Assistant Chief of Staff-Operations, SHAPE; MGon Vitalijus Vaikšnoras (LTU A), Commandant of the Baltic Defence College; Dr Rama MANI (FRA/IND C), Senior Research Associate at the Centre for International Studies (University of Oxford) and Councillor of the World Future Council; Professor Theresa SABONIS-HELF (USA C); and Mr Sinan Ülgen (TUR C).

13 July
The Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Italy, H.E. Tomasz Orlowski, visited the NATO Defense College.

The Ambassador was accompanied by a delegation composed of Col Andrzej Sarna, Military Attaché, and Ms Agata Blaszczyk, Counsellor. The delegation was welcomed by the NDC Commandant Major General Janusz Bojarski and Dean Dr Daria Daniels Skodnik. They were then briefed on the fundamentals of the NDC’s mission and the main features of College courses.

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RP 108: Nuclear Arms Control: Implications from the Crisis in Ukraine
Dániel BARTHA and Anna PÉCZELI

RP 109: NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force - Can the VJTF give new élan to the NATO Response Force?
Jan ABTS

March 2015
RP 110: NATO and the Security Challenges of the Sahel - Sahara Region within the new Geopolitical Order
Rabah AYNAOU

April 2015
RP 111: Russia’s Approach to Conflict – Implications for NATO’s Deterrence and Defence
Dave JOHNSON

RP 112: NATO’s Hybrid Flanks - Handling Unconventional Warfare in the South and the East
Andreas JACOBS and Guillaume LASCONJARIAS

RP 113: Energy as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare
Michael RÜHLE and Julijus GRUBLIAUSKAS

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RP 114: Africa: a Region for Enhanced NATO-EU Coopera-
tion
Allen PEPPER

June 2015
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Stephen J MARANIAN

RP 116: NATO-Mongolia relations: limited in scope, but with room to grow
Robert HELBIG

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Polina SINOVETS and Bettina RENZ

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Andreas JACOBS and Jean-Loup SAMAAN

February 2015
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