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Here we are again with a new issue of Vox Collegii. Since we last went to press, there has been quite a turnover in staff, and a number of Faculty Advisors have left us and been replaced. The winds of change have been felt at more senior levels too, with the appointment of our new Dean, Dr Daria Daniels Škodnik, who relieves Dr Richard Hooker; and the arrival of Dr Jeffrey A. Larsen, who replaces Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp, as Director of the Research Division. On Friday 18th October, the College hosted the 60th Edition of the Anciens’ Annual Conference and Seminar, a special occasion for the NDC’s Anciens, culminating in a celebratory concert performed by the Italian Army Band. Then, on 2nd December, in cooperation with the Italian Atlantic Committee, the College hosted the Rome Atlantic Forum, focused on cyber security and its implications for NATO.

Moving on to the magazine, our latest issue of Vox Collegii is marked by both innovation and continuity.

This time, the renewed tradition of the Call for

Articles marks a fresh departure in choice of subject matter – specifically, topics pertaining to energy and environmental security, which I am convinced are increasingly relevant. The article chosen for this issue deals with the very topical issue of shale gas, which is creating a certain amount of excitement among energy experts. This choice of subject provides a particularly timely follow-on from the “Frack to the Future” roundtable, organized in September by the NDC’s Middle East Faculty and Research Division.

The impulse to innovate continues with two brand-new initiatives. The first is an interview with H.E. Franco Frattini, Italy’s candidate for the position of NATO Secretary General. During our conversation we focused on prospects for closer cooperation between NATO and the EU, a subject on which Mr Frattini has been quite positive in the past. The possibility of his nomination as Secretary General now gives renewed topical interest to informed discussion of this sometimes controversial question.

The second initiative is a plan to work in close conjunction with Ms Mari Skåre, NATO’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security. Mrs Irene Fellin, who is Gender Advisor to the Special Representative, will contribute a section on Women, Peace and Security in this and the following two issues of Vox Collegii. The College’s active interest in this subject makes it a natural choice of topic for a dedicated section of the magazine, particularly following the recent appointment of Dr Daniels Škodnik as Dean. Finally, after 60 years, the College has its first woman in the command group – an event which our graphics team have celebrated with an innovative and distinctive choice of colour for the pages dedicated to Women, Peace and Security.

Finally, a word of thanks to everyone who follows us on our different media, such as Facebook and Twitter. Our every effort will go into keeping actively in touch with you all, as we have done so far, and we trust that you will continue to inspire us through your support and your comments.

Lieutenant Colonel
Alberto Alletto
Italian Army, Head Public Affairs Office
Since the last issue of Vox Collegii in July 2013, the College has certainly lived through an exciting and fulfilling few months.

A clear sign of the NDC’s ability to keep abreast of important changes worldwide, while at the same time maintaining its commitment to the founding goals of outreach, education, and research, is the fresh breeze of innovation which is blowing through the corridors of the College.

Most importantly, the new academic year has seen the nomination of the NDC’s first female Dean, Dr Daria Daniels Škodnik. We are extremely proud that the College has taken this important step, so relevant to the modern world: the spirit in which the NDC renews its commitment to its founding values is fully consistent with the NATO Women, Peace and Security initiative, and with the broader UNSCR 1325 framework. There could be no better expression of the College’s readiness to work efficiently in parallel with – and in support of – international organizations.

The relevance of the College’s work in preparing Course Members for positions of great responsibility was also marked by the 60th Anciens’ Annual Conference and Seminar, comprising a full and varied programme of events. As President of the Anciens’ Association, I was thrilled and proud to attend the Seminar, where Anciens were joined by the current Senior Course for an outstandingly rewarding discussion with the invited lecturers. The Anciens’ Association provides the best possible illustration of the vital link between past and present, offering a dynamic source of inspiration and ideas for the future.

As we move forward in this spirit of innovation, I also extend a warm welcome to the new Director of the Research Division, Dr Jeffrey Larsen. I am certain that he will contribute greatly to the Division, and thus to one of our College’s founding pillars.

The College continues to fulfil its outreach mission with vision and energy, through a dynamic programme of initiatives and events. To name just a few, the College recently received the visit of delegations from the Norwegian National Defence College and the Baltic Defence College, and hosted the 7th Annual Operations Research and Analysis Conference, organized by Allied Command Transformation and the Science and Technology Board. We also held our yearly Military Conference on Issues of Mutual Interest between NATO and the Russian Federation. Often referred to more simply as “Russian Week”, this is an essential instrument for closer cooperation with our Russian partners.

Education continues to be the cornerstone of the College’s activities: as Senior Course 123 draws to a successful conclusion, I am very pleased to say that this course was attended by a total of 79 Course Members from no fewer than 34 countries, representing NATO, the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Partners across the Globe. For the first time, the College welcomed participants from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and from Mongolia.

It has also been a busy time for the NDC Middle East Faculty, whose NATO Regional Cooperation Course recently reached its tenth edition (NRCC-10), contributing significantly to closer partnership and cooperation with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Most importantly, this edition of the NRCC was the first to include a brief visit to a MENA country: in late October, Course Members were made most welcome in Amman for a valuable day of briefings from the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I am sure that all our readers will enjoy not only the features about life at the College, but also the diversity of analyses and perspectives which this issue provides on a range of topics. The subjects dealt with are of great current relevance to NATO, its mission and its values.

Lieutenant General
Arne Bård Dalhaug
Royal Norwegian Army, NDC Commandant
A chat with Franco Frattini: NATO and EU multilateral cooperation

A recent meeting between Mr Franco Frattini and the NDC Commandant provided me with the opportunity to discuss with Mr Frattini the controversial issue of cooperation between NATO and the EU. Considering that this question (which is part of our Senior Course curriculum) is of great interest not only for the College but for the whole of NATO, I thought it would be appropriate to publish this interview here. Since Mr Frattini is Italy’s candidate for the position of NATO Secretary General, his vision might become extremely relevant in the near future.

I wish to thank Mr Frattini for his willingness to cooperate with “Vox Collegii”, and for sharing his ideas with us.

The Editor-in-chief

On 27th September 2013, in your blog entitled “Diario Italiano”, regarding NATO and EU multilateral co-operation, you mentioned: “The most important political goal, in the future of NATO and in times of economic crisis, is for NATO to better involve EU partners, by encouraging coordinated political choices (...)”. How do you see the setting up of political and decisional interaction between these two Organizations?

We need to promote the complementarity between NATO and the EU’s European Common Security and Defence Policy. NATO and the EU have 22 members in common. Complementarity between them is a must. Security and foreign policy are, for sure, fields where strong political leadership is needed, because of their direct impact on national sovereignty. Defending citizens and their security is, and should remain, a top priority for all democratic governments. That’s why neither NATO nor the EU can run the risk of underestimating the serious, multifaceted and asymmetric threats characterizing today’s fast-changing international security environment. Consequently, they should invest more – and better – in multilateral security cooperation. Additionally, at a time of financial constraints, NATO and the EU have to explain to public opinion that the money spent on preventing and addressing security challenges and threats is not wasted, but invested to protect the citizens.

I see, in particular, complementarity between specific efforts and initiatives: NATO’s Smart Defence, to better align the collective requirements and national priorities of member states; the Connected Forces Initiative, to ensure better interoperability; the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing”, rationalizing defence efforts while reducing costs; and the coordinating role taken on by the European Defence Agency, for the development of the EU’s defence capabilities, cooperation, acquisition and research. In promoting this complementarity we should avoid any duplication of efforts.

But this is not enough. Because of the international financial crisis we all face, defence budgets are being cut and will continue to be cut in all NATO countries. What is needed, therefore, is more transatlantic coordination. This requires better...
spending and the coordination of defence cuts, which our nations will be forced to make because of the financial crisis, within NATO and without undermining the prerogatives of sovereign states, rather than the horizontal cutting of national defence budgets. The European Allies should not be seen as the “soft power” appendix to a US “hard military” security provider. That’s why, on my blog, I wrote that the most important political goal, in the future of NATO and in times of economic crisis, is for the Alliance to better involve EU partners, by encouraging coordinated political choices on where we can cut (think about “static” defence spending, or not “interoperable” areas) and where, on the contrary, we need new investments (for example, in modern defence capabilities, such as cyber security, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, UAVs or special operations forces).

There are areas of closer cooperation between NATO and the EU, but how do we guarantee dependable and automatic access to common capabilities?

A lot has been done already in this field – take, for example, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces. Moreover, NATO and the EU agreed on those military assets and capabilities that would be “separable but not separate” from NATO’s military structure and that could be put at the disposal of the EU, for EU-led operations. These were, to simplify, the Lord Robertson-Solana agreements between NATO and the EU. But we can do much more: improving the modalities whereby, once a national political decision is taken, each Ally effectively provides a predetermined capability after receiving notice that this is required – the so-called “assured access”. Of course, a political decision is required between the Allies, on what is made available and by whom. Even though this is not an easy issue, I think that NATO and the European Defence Agency should work together to this end, to ensure transparency, efficiency and optimization, and to avoid discouraging further investments on assets that are needed. At the same time, we must avoid discriminating between NATO-EU Allies and those Allies who are not members of the EU, as well as preventing any risk of decoupling in transatlantic security.

How do we cooperate better with private industry on matters of defence and security?

A first step is to improve our procurement systems, where, particularly among EU Allies, there are far more cases of fragmentation and duplication than collaborative programmes. We should consider pooling and sharing production, as well as procurement. The existing fragmentation duplicates production and leads to different standards of equipment, thus hindering the development of logistical support systems and weakening military interoperability. Europeans should, again to improve private-public cooperation, quickly implement an EU common market on defence, after the adoption of important EU directives and the strengthening of the EU Defence Agency, that go exactly in that direction.

We know that NATO and the EU have developed specific competences and different levels of know-how, in different areas. Where do you think learning spill-over could occur from NATO to the EU, and vice-versa?

The scourge of international terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, accompanied by the erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; conflict spill-over from failing and failed states; the protection of sea lanes of communication and energy supply routes; cyber security and environmental challenges – these are challenges that affect us all. Their global character is evident. But while we have made good progress in intensifying our efforts to fight international terrorism and to promote international cooperation on environmental issues, I believe that much more

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needs to be done and shared, as we look at 21st century security challenges and threats common to NATO and partner countries.

The increasing globalization of the oil market, for example, has accelerated the pace of exploration and production, thereby highlighting the need to secure the communication, transport and transit routes of crucial energy resources. This is of common interest to both energy producers and consumers.

Cyber security is another transnational – and increasingly global – new security challenge that requires more international cooperation. Since Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, NATO's website has regularly come under cyber attack and, from the major cyber attack in Estonia in 2007 to this year’s attacks against US financial institutions, cyber security has revealed the importance of securing the digital infrastructure that our economies and our military security depend on. From our cellular communications to hospitals, from schools to airports, from classified military and security infrastructures to the World Wide Web, security in cyberspace is crucial to our public safety and national security. There is, therefore, a growing need to prepare our societies for cyber emergencies, and for our States to develop strategies for successfully managing cyber crises. NATO and the EU need to further develop their know-how and the capabilities to defend themselves against sophisticated cyber threats and deal quickly with cyber emergencies.

In today's political and strategic international environment, the success of a policy aimed at preserving peace and preventing conflicts depends, even more than in the past, on effective preventive diplomacy and on the successful management of crises affecting our security. No country can address these new, more complex and global security challenges and threats on its own. Their successful management requires a multilateral and cooperative approach to security. Again, NATO and the EU, if they share know-how and work together, can obtain better results.

What role is there for NATO and the EU (perhaps together) in Afghanistan after December 2014?

By 2014 the transfer of full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security to the Afghan National Security Forces will have happened. NATO will, consequently, draw down its military forces in the country and will transform its mission into training, advising and equipping Afghan security forces, supporting them to prevent this country from, once again, becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

After 2014, there will also be a need to do more to enhance our partnerships, including the strategic partnership with the EU.

NATO should broaden the complementarity of efforts between the two organizations to all areas of mutual interest, with more focused and more regular political consultations. This requires developing a new mindset between the two institutions, to multiply regular political consultations at all levels, and organizing cooperative activities between NATO and the EU.

I am thinking of more frequent and regular meetings between the NATO Secretary General and the President of the EU Commission, with follow-up meetings of their staffs to explore areas of complementarity between NATO and the EU. It would also be very useful to increase the number of occasions on which the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative can brief the NAC or the PSC, during formal and informal ministerial level meetings. Cascading down, there should be regular working level meetings between the staffs of NATO and the EU, involving the different NATO Divisions and the EU General Directorates, including the regular organization of briefings of NATO’s International Staff and the External Action Service to NATO and EU bodies in all areas of mutual interest – for example, by looking at complementarity in assisting countries in transition in North Africa and in the Mediterranean region. Assistance in the field of capacity building will be crucial to project security and stability in the Mediterranean region. We could look at areas where the efforts of NATO and of the EU could be complementary, providing added value in such a way that they would be most effective in assisting countries undergoing transition – as is currently the case in Libya.

In addition, meetings could also be organized between the military bodies of both NATO and the EU, especially between the top level military bodies such as the NATO and the EU Military Committees, to be prepared by regular contacts between NATO’s and the EU’s military staffs.

These practical measures would help in identifying, in concrete terms, the areas of complementarity and cooperation between NATO and the EU in areas of mutual interest.

Finally, one crucial area for NATO after 2014 is the enhancement of the partnerships that our Alliance has successfully developed with countries in different regions of the world. The new NATO Strategic Concept, approved by NATO’s Heads of State and Government in Lisbon in 2010, identifies three core security tasks to maintain the security of our territory and populations: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security with a broad range of countries and organizations around the globe. Cooperative security, through the further deepening
and possibly broadening of these partnerships and institutions, is crucial to NATO's current and future ability to be an effective security provider. NATO's partnerships with countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue, in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, or with Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, show how, through political dialogue and practical cooperation, it is possible to build a new culture of cooperation in the security sphere. This engagement provides a better mutual understanding between NATO and a large number of countries of different cultures and it helps to prevent tensions and, therefore, to avoid conflicts. NATO's engagement with its partners also helps us build the political consensus and military interoperability required to manage complex crises successfully, when they occur. The political and military contribution of our partners to the successful management of the NATO-led operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya testifies to the effectiveness of NATO's engagement with its partners, and of its contribution to a more secure, stable and peaceful international environment.

Post-2014 NATO must, therefore, continue to build on these different networks of partnership, because the best way to address the new transnational security challenges and threats of today's fast-changing international environment is undoubtedly the cooperative approach to security developed by NATO, of which our partners are increasingly an integral part.

Finally, possible EU-NATO integration raises the problem of the resulting weakening of the transatlantic link, which continues to be so essential for NATO. Is this a prospect which can reasonably be accommodated?

During the last twenty years, NATO has undergone a major adaptation process to the new post-Cold War security realities, to continue providing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. In an uncertain and fast-changing security environment, NATO embodies the transatlantic link and remains the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security.

Since NATO's establishment, its member countries have built a transatlantic community of shared values and interests, based upon the strong belief that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension and that we need, therefore, to continue to enhance the political component of our Alliance, as provided for by article 2 of the Washington Treaty.

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This transatlantic Alliance is a unique source of political and military capabilities to successfully manage unpredictable crises and to build new partnerships through a new and cooperative approach to security, while continuing to provide for the security of its members.

Furthermore, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic continue to deepen transatlantic cooperation on a vast array of distinctly new and global challenges, from the international financial crisis to climate change and energy security.

So I can certainly confirm that, today, no NATO country and no EU country can shoulder the responsibility and burden for collective security alone. This is why NATO-EU cooperation will not weaken the transatlantic link but rather, it will strengthen it. What we need today is a new transatlantic bargain between Europe and the United States of America.

The new US national security strategy, outlined in January 2012 by President Obama, places special emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region – a region that is also of security interest for the other member countries of NATO. At the same time both Europe and the United States have an interest in stability and security in North Africa, because instability and insecurity could spread from there to the broader Middle East and directly affect the security of NATO and partner countries in the region.

We need, therefore, a new transatlantic bargain, one that would not only confirm the commitment of the United States to European security, under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but that would commit the US to supporting the European Allies, through NATO, in managing crises in North Africa under Article 4 – in return for a European commitment to support the United States in the management of crises in the broader Middle East, especially in the Gulf.

The crisis management operations of the future, while requiring the consensus of all 28 members, may imply a high degree of flexibility regarding the conduct of those operations, which could involve NATO member countries and partners alike. Such operations could also involve very diverse partners, as was the case in Libya and Afghanistan.

Finally, I would like to stress the importance of including, in this new security equation, the establishment of a free-trade transatlantic space between the United States and the European Union. This Free Trade Transatlantic Agreement will help us not only to boost jobs and growth on both sides of the Atlantic, but also to develop more wisely, within NATO, the defence capabilities needed by both Europe and the United States to deal with future crises. I would like to say that I cannot see a better partner for Europe than the United States or better partner for the United States than Europe. That is, indeed, the real core of our successful transatlantic community.
Going Smart: the Next Stage in the NATO-Georgia Partnership.
A View from Georgia

1. Introduction

Slow-paced though it may seem, the Smart Defence programme is progressing steadily towards implementation. So is the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). “Brainchildren” of the current NATO Secretary General, both stimulate higher levels of interoperability and project-based cooperation within the Alliance. They provide cost-efficient solutions, making up transatlantic military shortfalls in times of austerity.

These initiatives also favour the participation of non-NATO allies, consistent with the acknowledgment that: “Today, a non-article-5 NATO operation without partner participation is almost unthinkable”. Understandably, the main focus in this respect is on the “most able operational partners”. By contrast, countries with limited defence capabilities receive far less attention, though their contributions to the overall success of NATO-led operations are greatly valued.

Against this background, the present research paper argues that a more extensive role in Smart Defence projects or the CFI should be given to NATO operational partners offering limited capabilities but high commitment. Focusing on Georgia in particular, the article analyses potential practical options together with their likely effects on both sides. Similar considerations might, to differing degrees, hold true for other partners.

2. In search of a security “jacket” – a bumpy road to partnership

Speaking at a joint press conference in late 2011, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili half-humorously teased NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen:

“I was hoping you would bring me at least a jacket, [a] NATO jacket, so that I would not stay out … we would not stay out in the cold without [a] NATO jacket. We are still not asking for [a] NATO umbrella, though, but [a] jacket would do this time”.

Looking back, probably no other partner countries have sought NATO “article 5” collective protection with as much determination as Georgia has in recent years. This small nation, with a population of only 4.5 million, is also aware that “there is no such thing as a free lunch”: continuously ready to commit troops to NATO operations, Georgia makes in-kind “investments” in order to ensure future security guarantees.

NATO-Georgia relations officially began in 1992, when Tbilisi became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) – a predecessor of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In the following years, it joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). November 2002 was a historic moment: at the EAPC Summit in Prague, then President Shevardnadze officially stated Georgia’s intention of joining NATO. The Alliance granted Georgia an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO pledged to admit Georgia, though not committing itself to a date. At the moment, through the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) and the Annual National Programme (ANP), the Alliance provides Georgia with

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The opinions expressed in this article are his own and must not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
practical support and consultations “in support of [its] reform efforts and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations”.

On a practical level, Georgia has made great progress towards interoperability with NATO forces. This is clearly indicated by participation in numerous PfP training exercises in Georgia and elsewhere, supplemented by substantial contribution to NATO-led peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and other theatres. At present, with around 1,600 military personnel, Georgia is a leading non-NATO ISAF troop-contributor in Afghanistan’s most unstable region – Kabul and the Helmand Province. In per capita terms, the Georgian contribution surpasses that of all other nations on the ground. Nevertheless, standing on the threshold of membership does not necessarily mean that entry will be easy for Georgia. Several interrelated factors, listed below, illustrate the complexities of Georgia’s position and its membership aspirations.

2.1 Russia
Arguably, the Bucharest Summit decision impelled Russia to act harshly and break the NATO-Georgian “courtship” in August 2008. Three years later, then President Dmitry Medvedev conceded that Moscow’s military intervention in Georgia was intended to oppose NATO’s possible eastward expansion.

2.2 Occupied territories
Today, twenty percent of Georgia’s territory is occupied by external military forces. In the wake of the August 2008 war, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “State-to-state” agreements with them enabled Moscow to increase its military presence in the region and to control the Abkhazia-Georgia and South Ossetia-Georgia borders. Almost 300,000 internally displaced ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia are still being denied their legal right to return to their homes. Their unresolved fate exposes additional vulnerabilities in Georgia’s national security, with socio-economic instability and internal political grievances exacerbating tensions.

2.3 Regional Instability
Georgia’s neighbourhood is also highly insecure. Azerbaijan and Armenia are locked in a protracted conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and, despite the ceasefire agreement, there are still sporadic cross-border attacks. Increasing military expenditure in Azerbaijan and Armenia raises the immediate danger of a re-escalation of hostilities between them.

In the north, Georgia shares a border with Chechnya and other republics of the Russian Federation, where instability still persists and threatens to spill over into Georgia. The Russian-Georgian border is notoriously porous and allows North Caucasian Islamic rebels to seek sanctuary in both countries.

2.4 Georgia’s military imbalance vis-à-vis neighbouring countries
In terms of military capabilities, Georgia is the weakest country in the South Caucasus. Oil-rich Azerbaijan spends much of its growing affluence on militarization, apparently anxious to retrieve Nagorno-Karabakh by force if necessary. Armenia lags slightly behind Georgia on defence spending, but is a member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and hosts Russian military installations. Though both countries are in the PfP, neither seeks NATO membership. Of course, it goes without saying that Russian military superiority in the region remains largely unchallenged. Peace in the South Caucasus is fragile. Georgia, therefore, considers its unequivocal pro-Western orientation vitally important, inter alia as a means of compensating for the rising discrepancy in defence spending in the region.

Overall, while membership of the FYROM*, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro will complete the geographic encirclement of the Balkan Peninsula by NATO member states, Georgian membership will extend the Alliance’s external borders and related security challenges. In addition, full integration of new members into the

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5 According to the “The Military Balance 2013”, Azerbaijan has the highest proportional level of defence spending in the world (7 % of GDP, equivalent to 3.1 billion USD).
6 Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
transatlantic defence system imposes a considerable financial burden on the economically powerful Allies for decades. Experience has already shown that none of the previous candidate countries admitted, mostly after the end of the Cold War, have completely met NATO membership conditions.

In an age of austerity, enlargement is becoming an even less affordable prospect.

With this in mind, before analysing Georgia’s contribution to NATO multinational projects or the CFI, the real strength of its military capabilities must be assessed.

3. “Peaceful warriors”: the Georgian defence reforms

Georgia embarked on a path of fundamental defence reforms in 2002. After 9/11, the “Global War on Terror” announced by the Bush administration included military-to-military or financial aid to countries threatened by terrorist networks. At the request of the Georgian government, the US agreed to expand its military footprint in the South Caucasus, with a mission to train the local army. In parallel, the Pentagon continued to support Georgia financially through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, in order to sponsor the acquisition of military equipment and other services for Tbilisi.

Given the immediate security challenges described above, what the country really needed was an army with strong defensive capacities and the ability to fight local territorial conflicts. Instead, the political leadership in Tbilisi opted to concentrate efforts entirely on participation in peacekeeping missions abroad, from the Balkans to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Originally, the US support was to include training of the Georgian army so that it could act autonomously in handling domestic security challenges emanating from cross-border hideouts in Russia, where the Chechens and various al-Qaida-linked militants were able to find safe havens. Later, however, the scope of military exercises was extended to include preparation for out-of-area counterinsurgency operations. Against this background, the training led by the US Marines in Europe in 2002-2004 (Georgia Train and Equip Program, or


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GTEP) and in 2005-2007 (Stability Operations Program, or SSOP) honed Georgian skills in basic combat tactics. This training was followed by pre-deployment exercises, which “focused essentially on counter insurgency and stability operations at the tactical levels because of the missions Georgia agreed to undertake in support of the War on terror”.

The decision of the reform-minded Georgian government to make sizable deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan had its disadvantages. Regularly sending brigade-size units on peacekeeping missions jeopardized the country’s defensive capacities, as more than half Georgia’s best-trained infantry personnel were, at any given time, involved in pre-deployment training, missions abroad or post-deployment leave. In addition, the rotation period of almost a month needed by incoming units to take over on the ground overstretched Georgia’s military strength.

The Russian-Georgian five-day war, besides revealing the fragility of the security architecture in the eastern vicinity of the Transatlantic Alliance, also provided a testing ground for the newly transformed Georgian defence system. Despite the excellent training received and the huge capital invested, Georgian troops were unprepared for defensive operations; they “failed to justify the pre-war expectations of many experts and crumbled before the Russian onslaught”.

To make up for this major loss, the Georgian government has recently overhauled the national defence concept and set out another round of reforms. For the first time, this places “the focus of the armed forces on territorial defense”.

4. Georgia’s prospects of developing a competitive advantage

Limited military and industrial capabilities mean that Georgia cannot be included among the “heavy lifters”. In this respect, its place as a prospective NATO member would be among the “Tier III” countries, whose combined contribution to the overall military strength of the Alliance is no more than 10 percent. Allies in this category are, as a rule, unable to contribute to flagship projects such as ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling or precision-guided munitions.

Nevertheless, limited ability to develop full-spectrum military capabilities is not necessarily a disadvantage. Indeed, low-capability countries are usually more open-minded towards specialization – a key component (and the biggest challenge) of Smart Defence.

Against this background, what options are available for Georgia to develop a specialized niche role, gain a competitive advantage and bring benefits to itself as well as to NATO?”

4.1 NATO Response Force (NRF)
The trademark ability of the Georgian army to conduct peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations offers an opportunity to build on this specialization and enhance competitiveness.

The Georgian 1st, 2nd and 3rd infantry brigades – operating at platoon, company, battalion or brigade level, and under American, French, German or Turkish command – have carried out a broad spectrum of counterinsurgency operations (patrolling, guarding bases and checkpoints, demining), while also training soldiers of the Afghan National Army to operate Soviet 82/120 mm mortars and 122 mm howitzer D-30 in Kandahar Province.

Needless to say, the “strategic” decision of the Georgian government to contribute large numbers of troops to these activities left “neither budgetary nor mental space for much else”; it is taken for granted that the know-how acquired on missions can be successfully exploited by the Alliance within the framework of the NATO Response Force (NRF).

In post-ISAF military planning, the NRF will play an important role by enabling Allied forces to “shift… emphasis from operational engagement to operational preparedness”. As Jamie Shea argues: “After 2014 there is a risk that this battle-hardened experience, including interoperability and common procedures, could be lost as nations take their forces home.”
On careful consideration, Georgia could play a part in this work and perhaps contribute Special Forces components to the Immediate Response Force element of the NRF – initially with a company-level unit. In addition, committing limited numbers of support elements such as medics, engineers or artillery units and assigning at least one high-ranking staff officer to the NATO command structure would be a good preparation for greater involvement in the CFJ.

Currently, NATO faces acute problems in force generation for the NRF, which seriously weakens its operational readiness. Most noticeably, the infantry suffers in this respect – for example, “when the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) went on standby for NRF 13, the land component stood at only 27% of target capacity”. Against this backdrop, Georgia’s contribution will help to fill manning shortages and, if the certification process is successful, a company-level rotational unit can be formed.

4.2 Joint educational centre
The pooling of training facilities and infrastructure is the easiest and most promising area for multinational cooperation among the Allies: apart from the planned cost savings, it should also afford improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale and connectivity between national forces. The Sachkhere Mountain Training School, recognized as a PfP training and education centre since 2010, is another asset which Georgia could use to develop a niche capability. It is one of 12 such institutions in NATO partner countries, and the only one specialized in mountain operations among the 23 PfP-status institutions. The school was developed under the sponsorship of the French Ministry of Defence; since 2006, it has regularly hosted personnel from NATO and partner countries for basic and intermediate courses in all-year-round mountain operations. In addition, under the guidance of French instructors, the Georgian rotational peacekeeping company has regularly completed pre-deployment exercises before joining the French contingent at the Camp Warehouse base in Kabul. More recently, the Georgian Ministry of Defence offered to train Afghan forces at Sachkhere, as a contribution to post-ISAF missions. Operating in the largely mountainous terrain of their country, Afghan soldiers will be able to make excellent use of skills acquired at Sachkhere.

The competitive advantage of the Georgian centre lies in its cost-effectiveness. It could become a multi-nationally funded, joint education centre for the East European and South-East European NATO members, as well as partner countries.

4.3 Regional maritime security
In NATO-Georgia relations, the regional dimension started to play an increasingly important role after 2004, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the Alliance. Since then, the Black Sea has frequently been referred to as a “NATO lake”: three out of its six coastal states are members of the Alliance, while the other three – Georgia, Ukraine and Russia – enjoy privileged bilateral status. This offers an opportunity to develop strong regional cooperation, which could have a more prominent role in a broader transatlantic security context.

Given the divergent security preferences of the Black Sea coastal states, it might seem imprudent to argue that multilateral cooperation between them is a success. However, a number of common security concerns make cooperation indispensable – above all, the use of the Black Sea as a transit route for the drug traffic from Asia to Europe, or for illegal migration and proliferation of nuclear materials by organized criminal groups. In addition, the role of the Black Sea as a hub for Caspian crude oil shipments and other cargos makes it particularly vulnerable to terrorist activities.

Fortunately, various initiatives have already set the scene for joint military projects. The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and “Black Sea Harmony” – both Turkish-led – have involved all the main regional actors. In the former, the ships of six countries take part in joint exercises twice a year: “the tasks performed during these exercises have varied...
over the years, but usually include some combination of search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, mine counter-measures, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (CBRN) and peace support operations" 12. The second operation, Black Sea Harmony, was launched in 2004. It is very similar to its Mediterranean counterpart, Operation Active Endeavour (though BSH is not a NATO initiative) 13.

More importantly, although the Russian-Georgian war inflicted a heavy blow on any prospects of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area, BLACKSEAFOR is still a unique platform for interaction between the Russian and Georgian militaries. After a brief withdrawal in 2008, the Georgian patrol boat resumed participation in the drill three years later.

Turkish and Russian reluctance to accommodate an increasing role of NATO in coastal waters suggests that cooperation will be most effective if the joint maritime project continues to develop under Turkish auspices, albeit to NATO standards and with the Alliance’s firm political backing and support. Establishment of a permanent operational HQ and a training centre for participating personnel, with expenses to be shared by all littoral states including Georgia, would make it possible to create a multinational standing fleet as a means of ensuring maritime security in the Black Sea.

5. Conclusion: Implications for the Future

The catalogue of practical options for engagement in multinational projects could be enlarged further. For Georgia, however, financial constraints and existing facilities mean that the key areas of possible pooling and sharing with NATO Allies are logistics and education.

A possible future scenario is briefly set out below.

5.1 For NATO:
- Support will involve changes in the current partnership agenda and help tailor it to each individual partner’s ambitions and commitments. With greater military integration and inclusion in NATO multinational projects or forces, operationally committed partner countries will be able to take on a more visible role in decision-shaping and decision-making processes.
- In bilateral relations, the Alliance will show that the promise made at the Bucharest Summit is not a dead letter and take practical steps towards meeting Georgia’s expectations, thus effectively maintaining the validity of the “open door policy” until consensus regarding Georgia’s formal membership is finally achieved.
- NATO will mitigate the risks of admitting another potential “free-rider” by allowing Georgia to shoulder a bigger burden of its collective defence, where appropriate.
- Participation of Georgia and other partner countries in small-scale projects will allow “heavy-lifter” NATO Allies to

13 Turkey firmly upholds the conventional principles agreed in Montreux in 1936, establishing certain restrictions on movements of non-Black Sea state vessels in the Black Sea basin.
free up additional resources and shift them to more strategic – and costlier – projects, adapting to a rapidly changing security environment in times of increasing budgetary austerity.

5.2 For Georgia:
• Over-commitment to peacekeeping missions, which took its toll on Georgia’s weak defensive capacity, can be leveraged in pursuance of integration with NATO. In practical terms, instead of focusing on its weaknesses, Georgia may wish to concentrate on niche capacity development by creating a deployable unit ready to share the operational burden with Allied forces in out-of-area missions.
• From a military point of view, there will be a premium on higher interoperability with Allied forces and Georgia will be able to make contributions “with as few caveats as possible”. It should be expected that Georgia will continue its past level of commitment to future NATO operations.
• Pooling and sharing military assets and capabilities with NATO Allies will underpin Georgia’s ability to transform its defence structures and policy in tandem with NATO transformation and keep pace with the change of mindset required by Smart Defence. This will lighten the future burden-sharing obligations, which formal membership of the Alliance will entail.
• There will be greater regional cooperation with neighbours, with the advantage that this will reduce Georgia’s immediate national security concerns. Military-to-military relations will help rebuild confidence among the various actors and provide a basis for effective political communication.
As a final remark, it is also appropriate to consider how a possible cooling of NATO-Georgia relations might affect the Alliance: if Georgia were one day to abandon its membership aspirations and withdraw from all joint projects, this would surely not create a disastrous capability gap for the Alliance.
A new game called fracking: ‘shale’ we play?

1. Introduction

Every time I hear the mention of shale gas – in the news, during conferences or in everyday conversation – it is always referred to as a ‘revolution’. So what’s so special about it?

From an energy supply point of view, the ‘shale breakthrough’ has postponed the global threat from oil and gas reserves running dry, by two or three decades. In practical terms, this means that, in 2040, there will still be a virtually unchanged pattern of consumption in the world’s use of oil and gas – two of the three principal sources of energy (together accounting for 53.6% of supply in 2010, and an estimated 51.4% in 2040). The planet will enter a ‘gas era’, with inherent advantages for the reduction in atmospheric pollution – but major concerns too, related to the depletion of water reserves and the earthquakes that fracking can generate.

Geopolitically speaking, two decades can mark a change of epoch: shale gas is set to twist the tectonic plates of global power and totally change the way investors look at markets. As in any revolution, some will come out with empty pockets, while others will make a fortune.

But before unveiling the specifics of the revolution and discovering how, quite soon, the world will start reversing forward, we should first take a look at what shale gas actually is and how it is extracted.

Natural gas is found trapped within shale formations. It is extracted through a process known as hydraulic “fracking”, whereby large quantities of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into faults, to fracture underground shale rock layers and release previously inaccessible gas and petroleum.

The concept of fracking was already on the horizon when the Parkers Plus company took the final steps in developing a commercially viable technique, and started drilling horizontal wells in Texas.

On 19th September 2013, the NATO Defense College organized a seminar on the ‘Geopolitical Implications of the Shale Gas Revolution for NATO and its Partners’, bringing together international experts from the military, diplomatic and civilian arenas.

Bruce Bullock, Director of the Maguire Energy Institute - US, provided some initial context: “Hydraulic fracturing is a transformative technology that is causing a wave of creative destruction with significant global economic impacts.”

Since the end of the Second World War, the traditional natural gas market has been structured around exporting, producer regions – the former USSR and the Middle East – and major consumers in the US, Europe and China. This configuration, characterized by complex networks of gas pipelines and intricate diplomatic and financial agreements, required huge, long-term investments and planning, giving rise to a certain element of predictability. The construction and securing of global supply routes produced relations of mutual dependency, agreements and alliances between nations.

Today’s energy supplies are being radically rerouted in previously unforeseen ways.

As Joe Saba, Director of the Middle East Branch at the World Bank, explains, “this is the dawn of a third hydrocarbon era” that strengthens the United States, reduces...
China's dependence on foreign energy imports and makes investments in the developed world a far better proposition than banking on emerging markets, while potentially destabilizing both Russia and Saudi Arabia.

We entered the new millennium with US imports largely shaping the international gas market. A decade or so later, the US is about to become the world's largest supplier of oil and gas, with Europe potentially becoming its prime customer. As a consequence, Russia and the Middle East, in finding their positions weakened, will set reasonable (lower) prices for the gas they export to European countries.

In actual fact, the advent of shale gas is going to change the winners and the losers on the global chessboard, as noted by Cecile Maisonneuve, Director of the Energy Programme at IFRI in France. And as that happens, investors will need to rearrange their portfolios accordingly.

As in any other revolution involving resources, this new scenario has the potential to confer massive wealth to some countries – and take it away from others. So how will that play out in the short term?

2. America

The US is the obvious winner, thanks to breakthrough technology for fracking and reduced operating costs. The rapid commercialization of large-scale shale gas production is fostering self-sufficiency in the US, resulting in reduced strategic interest in the Middle East and other energy-rich parts of the world, and diminished vulnerability to developments beyond its borders.

A surplus in US energy resources has led to lower gas prices and a switch from coal to gas for electricity generation. In addition, this has triggered a global price drop for coal. Cheap gas has encouraged US multinational companies to re-establish and re-invest at home. Yet, for the moment, there is uncertainty as to whether the US will strive to become a major overseas gas exporter, mainly because the conversion process of gas

continued ...
to its liquefied form (LNG), for ease of transport, is very costly. The US may also prefer to stick to low energy prices to retain its competitive advantage and encourage home-based ‘reindustrialisation’.

In the medium term, the difference will be felt in the number of jobs that are created. One of the fundamentals of macroeconomics is that higher employment levels generate increases in domestic wealth, leading in turn to a rise in consumption rates, which is the main determinant of a country’s GDP. Boosting the country’s GDP entails an improvement in the average standard of living, in the quality of education and in the health of the population.

But all that glitters is not gold, and shale gas exploitation in the US remains controversial. “Critique centers on the flaws in regulation and the danger brought on by the speed of exploitation,” emphasizes Teresa Sabonis-Helf, Professor at the National War College of the United States, who goes on to say that: “Slowing the speed of fracking development, or getting the federal government more involved in regulation, are the two main lines of national NGO activity.”

Currently, the US and Canada are practically the only countries exploiting their unconventional gas resources – mainly shale gas, though North America is by no means alone in possessing this resource.

3. Europe

Europe, too, has its own significant shale gas deposits (approximately 10% of the total amount discovered so far), with the largest reserves to be found in Poland, France and Norway. Across the EU, government attitudes vary, and public opinion is similarly divided and often hostile, reflecting concerns about shale gas production and its impact on the environment. France and Bulgaria, in particular, have banned fracking, whereas most countries are adopting a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. In contrast, Poland and the United Kingdom are supporting its development.

Developing shale gas extraction in the EU could, in fact, reduce the EU’s overall energy dependency by diversifying energy sources, but two main factors make it unlikely that shale gas will ‘revolutionize’ energy markets across Europe. First, a range of regulatory barriers, as well as rising public concern about the negative impact of the new industry on the environment and on climate, make any development unlikely until such time as the resource becomes both economically viable and environmentally acceptable. So far, there are considerable risks: water contamination, water table depletion, the triggering of earthquakes, the destruction of biodiversity, land use and methane emissions. “Water and traffic are the main source of concern,” according to Marco Arcelli, Managing Director of Enel Trade - Italy.

However that may be, initial scepticism surrounding the future of a non-conventional energy source might be considered as ‘part of the game’. In spite of that, a second factor would, in any case, leave the EU trailing behind: were the EU to start exploiting its reserves, it would still largely be dependent on external gas suppliers.

And yet, the EU stands on the winners’ side. This is because the US, thanks to its shale gas reserves, will not be competing with the EU for LNG supplies from other parts of the world. The resulting surplus – originally bound for the US – is going to be increasingly dumped onto European markets: by 2020, shale gas in the form of LNG will arrive in significant quantities in Europe, and some domestic shale gas might additionally become available. Europe will thus benefit from this second stage in the shale revolution, which will push oil prices down.

To cut a long story short, prices will drop and imports of LNG will increase, thereby further weakening the Russian grip on European gas markets.

The UK will be a major beneficiary. It has a lot of shale gas, and the government is determined to start getting it out of the ground to revitalize growth. The difficulty is that the country is very densely populated, with gas reserves situated under some of the wealthiest areas. There have already been protests in Balcombe, in West Sussex, over exploration plans, but the project is set to go ahead.

Poland also has potentially huge reserves; the country is already doing well, and “shale gas will help consolidate its role and that of Eastern European countries within the NATO framework,” says Fabio Indeo, Researcher and Lecturer in Geopolitics, Geostategy and Geoeconomics. Initial enthusiasm, however, has rapidly been overtaken by reservations, following in-depth probing which has revealed that the costs would outweigh the benefits.

The wild card is France. It has the largest reserves in Europe, but President Hollande has banned any development.

Overall, the shale gas revolution could prove to be a real opportunity for the EU to overcome its financial difficulties and consequently regain stability, should it decide to play its cards wisely.

4. Asia

China, too, has enormous reserves (almost 50% more than the US) and is counting on them to sustain its economic boom. It is not yet a shale gas producer, though it is trying to meet the growing energy demand by developing new sources of energy so as to diversify and secure supply.

Shale gas will lend a second crutch to China’s industrial revolution, because lower oil prices will make China’s exports of manufactured goods even more competitive.
China’s reaction to the US energy transition is one of perplexity mixed with trepidation. Many believe that future energy self-sufficiency in the US will dampen its interest in the Persian Gulf, leading to a military withdrawal from the region, which could, in turn, compromise China's energy security. Despite that, Asian countries are likely to remain largely dependent on energy imports from the Middle East and Africa.

Concerns about a US withdrawal from the Gulf are, however, totally unfounded. Despite US independence from Gulf oil, it will remain dependent on the region for price stability. Oil is a global commodity with a world price tag, so instability in the region and any consequent increase in price would inevitably affect US – and world – markets.

This is why the US will not withdraw from the Persian Gulf, even if its imports from the region should plummet. This means that China will actually benefit from the US’ willingness to play the role of global policeman.

As more and more of the Gulf’s energy output flows towards Asia, the US commitment as the underwriter of security in the region allows China to avoid taking on political and security responsibilities in the Middle East for the protection of its own energy security. Nevertheless, “the development of an LNG market in China is transforming relations between China and the Gulf countries,” says Nicolas Mazzuchi, Director of Polemos Consulting and Researcher at IRIS in France, and the new realities of the oil market and geopolitics might soon force its hand.

The potential is there and there are no regulatory obstacles, though China’s geology – which differs considerably from that of the United States – may make extraction more difficult and less profitable.

The winners are thus clear enough, but who are the losers?

5. Russia and the Gulf States

All major oil and energy exporters will suffer. The US has already overtaken Russia as the world’s biggest gas producer. Experts predict that within two to three years, the US will also have overtaken Saudi Arabia in oil production.

If these predictions are confirmed, there will be a knock-on effect. Europe’s relations with Russia are one example. Until recently, the Russian giant Gazprom supplied 40% of Europe’s imported natural gas (representing more than 60% of the company’s revenue). Russia, like the Middle East, has no major unconventional gas reserves, and has shown no interest in the issue, owing, in part, to its huge deposits of conventional gas.

continued ...
So the first big loser is Russia. Gazprom can wave goodbye to lucrative, long-term contracts and will have to peg its rates to market prices.

As a consequence, Russia has lately been eyeing up the Asian market: China, South Korea and Japan (which, since the March 2011 tsunami and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, has been seeking non-nuclear sources of energy). However, given the new competition from Central Asian countries and Australia in the supply of gas to China, Russia is unlikely to exert energy supremacy over China, as it did over Europe in the last decade. This shift is encouraging Russia to move from a pipeline-based policy and long-term dependency to a more flexible approach based on LNG.

The situation is different in the Gulf States.

The Middle East will be hit very hard, admits Jamal Abdullah, Researcher at Al-Jazeera in France. “Countries such as Saudi Arabia can try to diversify into new industries but, come to think of it, if it were that easy, they would probably already have done it.”

Iran will have a hard time as well, and so will Libya and other Gulf states, such as Qatar. Qatar is the world’s number one exporter of LNG (which is shipped rather than piped, and converted back to gas at its final destination). Many of these countries have regimes that will collapse if their economy runs into serious trouble. Any prediction regarding their future in the fast-changing world energy scenario must be, to say the least, tentative.

6. NATO’s Position

NATO’s role in such a revolution is to ensure the security of its Member States.

What NATO can do to prevent this revolution from affecting defence budgets and the balance of power, states Julius Grubliauskas, the NATO Energy Security Advisor from Lithuania, is to “maintain strategic awareness and consultation among Allies and Partners, share intelligence to better adapt to the new energy environment, strengthen counter-piracy and counter-terrorism systems, and include energy security elements in NATO training and education.”

That said, shale gas should not be considered as a threat, but as an opportunity for strategic and technological development. Fortified by rising shale gas production, the US is in a position to ease NATO nations’ dependency on Russian and Iranian supplies, and to encourage natural gas diversification for NATO Allies.

7. Conclusion

The game is still in its early stages, and even short-term forecasts will inevitably prove controversial. The shale gas revolution has already started and all major players on the world energy market are getting ready to face the challenge.

It is a controversial process: on the one hand, it reduces American and European dependence on the Middle East and Russia and creates new job opportunities; on the other hand, it raises strong environmental concerns and destabilizes the geopolitical balance.

In conclusion, natural gas is replacing dirty, old coal plants and dangerous and expensive nuclear plants. It will fuel cars, aircraft, ships, and engines of all kinds. It costs far less.

The worldwide availability of immense quantities of cheap gas will prove a great boon to humanity: natural gas is the principal (almost 80%) component of artificial fertilizer, and its low price will reduce the prospect of famine and lack of food worldwide.

A new revolution is in the making. As stated at the beginning, shale gas will shift the tectonic plates of global power, enhancing the influence of some states and undermining that of others, providing the means to feed humanity and, perhaps for the first time, ensuring that all of humanity has access to heat and light.

Nevertheless, we must take care not to drop our guard. Shale gas is a very important step forward, yet it has some drawbacks. The rush for a cheap, clean and reliable source of energy has just begun.
NATO firmly believes in the pivotal role that women can play during all phases of a conflict. From conflict prevention to conflict management, the inclusion of women in peace resolutions is one of the key factors for achieving sustainable peace and security in a democratic country. Allied and Partner countries are therefore strongly committed to making this principle an integral part of NATO’s everyday business, from both a political and a military point of view. Civilians and militaries have been working side by side for better implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the achievement of concrete and sustainable results.

In the road map that will redefine the position taken by the Alliance in the global security scenario beyond 2014, the Women, Peace and Security agenda will certainly play a major role.

The year 2000 was not only the beginning of the Millennium, but it also opened a new chapter in the field of security issues. With the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in October 2000, the role of women and their responsibilities officially became part of the international security agenda. This landmark resolution not only represented an historic moment in the recognition of the role that women play during a conflict and its aftermath, but it also changed the global concept of security. Through the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the Security Council acknowledged the changing nature of contemporary conflicts that increasingly affect civilians more than soldiers.

The different roles played by men and women within every society are defined by the society itself. Gender roles determined by legislation and social norms define what women can or cannot do. The discrimination that women still face in many contemporary societies is the main cause for the disproportionate impact that wars and conflicts have on them. Women are among the most affected by violence during periods of conflict, and therefore their experience, their perspectives and capabilities are needed to generate peaceful consensus within their communities.

Recognizing the disproportionate impact that war and conflicts have on women and children, Resolution 1325 calls for more protection, especially from any form of sexual and gender-based violence used as a tactic of war against women and girls (but also against men and boys). At the same time, it highlights the fact that women have, historically, been left out of the peace process, underlining the crucial and necessary role that they can play during reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Engaging women in security and peacekeeping is critical to advancing global stability and a safer world. We will soon celebrate the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325; progress has been made, but we are still far from reaching its objectives of protection and inclusion.

After the adoption of UNSCR 1325, six other resolutions have followed and, together, they constitute the basis of the work on the Women, Peace and Security agenda\(^1\). While the main responsibility for the implementation of UNSCR 1325

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\(^1\) Since 2000, six additional UNSC Resolutions have been adopted: UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888, UNSCR 1889, UNSCR 1960, UNSCR 2106 and UNSCR 2122. UNSCR 1820, adopted in June 2008, complements UNSCR 1325 by focusing on the prevention and response to sexual violence in situations of armed and post conflict. UNSCR 1888, adopted in 2009, reinforces UNSCR 1820, notably through the appointment of a UN Special Representative to advocate the ending of sexual violence in armed conflict. UNSCR 1889, also adopted in 2009, builds upon UNSCR 1325 by improving the monitoring and reporting component and highlighting the importance of resource allocation. UNSCR 1960, adopted in 2010, calls for parties to armed conflict to make specific time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence. In June 2013, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2106 on preventing sexual violence in conflict. UNSC Resolution 2122, aiming to strengthen women’s role in all stages of conflict prevention, was adopted on 18 October 2013.
and related resolutions remains with national Governments, international and regional organizations also have an important role to play, as does NATO. In 2007, the Alliance responded to UNSCR 1325 by adopting a policy, developed with its Partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)2. Since then, the policy has been revised twice, in 2009 and 2011, and it will now be reviewed again in the run-up to the next NATO Summit. In addition, UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions are implemented in NATO-led operations and missions, in accordance with the Action Plan that was endorsed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. Experience in the field has shown how important it is to integrate a gender dimension while executing an operation. This is why, starting from 2009, the Alliance has deployed Gender Advisers in Afghanistan, Kosovo and at Strategic Commands as well. These Gender Advisers are key in helping commanders at all levels to take the gender perspective into account when formulating their operational strategies. Experience shows that the increased presence of women deployed in operations, the inclusion of gender-focused competences in training programmes, and the deployment of Gender Advisers help enhance our operational effectiveness and improve the way we work. In particular, having gender expertise, as well as having more female soldiers, improves our ability to conduct operations more effectively. In Afghanistan, for example, female soldiers are able to better connect with members of the population otherwise closed off from their male colleagues, and thereby help foster dialogue and understanding between NATO forces and the local community. The first Gender Adviser with the rank of a one-star General, Gordana Garašić, is currently starting her mission within ISAF. This high-level appointment shows the increased commitment and recognition for this role.

In May 2012, at the Chicago Summit, the 28 Heads of State and Government reaffirmed once more their commitment and aim to mainstream women, peace and security issues into NATO’s everyday business. At that event, they tasked the Council to continue implementing the Policy and the Action Plan and to assess the progress made through a review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO-led operations and missions. That review, which was independently undertaken by the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) in Sweden3, emphasized that, since the adoption of its Policy in 2007, NATO has made significant progress in integrating a gender perspective in NATO-led operations and missions4. The objective of the Review was to refine future policies, action plans, and military guidelines in NATO-led operations and missions5. The future efforts of the Alliance in this area will focus on four priority areas: the further development of gender training capacity and programmes, notably in the context of pre-deployment to operations, and the further development of a gender adviser capacity within NATO military structures; additionally, they will continue working on the integration of a gender perspective into NATO’s existing operational planning and assessment tools, and further improve the reporting mechanisms on gender-related

2 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_76395.htm?selectedLocale=en
On 22 February 2013, the Swedish Armed Forces signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Transformation (Hq SACT), and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), formalizing the role of Sweden’s Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) as the lead actor for gender education and training by designating it as the Department Head (DH) for all NATO-led curricula concerning gender. The cooperation established by this MoU will allow open participation from NATO, NATO nations, Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, non-NATO/ non-PfP nations and International Organizations / non-Governmental Organizations (IDNs/NGOs), in accordance with NATO policy for NATO accredited courses.
issues. NATO Military Authorities have developed a robust implementation plan, identifying specific ways in which the military intends to take forward the Review’s recommendations, which was endorsed by Defence Ministers on 23 October 2013.

In addition, the Chicago Summit marked another historical moment for NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions. Following an offer made by the Kingdom of Norway, the Alliance welcomed the nomination of a Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security issues. Ms Mari Skåre was appointed by the Secretary General as his first-ever Special Representative at the end of August 2012. Through this appointment, the Alliance took an important step forward in the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the results are already tangible 16 months after the beginning of her mandate. The primary role of the Special Representative is to coordinate and raise awareness of NATO’s policies and activities in these areas, within the Alliance, with external partners and with other stakeholders. It is also to provide support and guidance to the Alliance when it comes to the integration of a gender perspective into everyday activities. The overall approach has been developed in the context of the Alliance’s wider policy objectives of building and maintaining sustainable peace and security within the framework of the Strategic Concept adopted in 2010, and in NATO’s core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. For each of these areas the gender perspective represents a relevant component.

As a political and military security organization defined by the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, NATO recognizes the important role women play in enhancing security and in preventing and ending conflicts. We need to continue to educate and raise awareness on how conflicts affect women and men in different ways. Women continue to be vulnerable in conflict and we are still witnessing sexual violence being used as a tactic in war. During the last few years, sexual and gender-based violence in conflict has received increased attention from the international community, as proved by the endorsement of the Declaration of Commitment to end Sexual Violence in Conflict, made in New York in September 2013 by a total of 137 Countries, including all Allies. The Alliance itself will do its part in order to make this priority an integral part of its policies and to transform it into real action during present and future operations and missions. NATO is looking at the future and at its role beyond 2014. The Alliance will move from an operational posture to one which brings to the fore such features as training, education and assistance to Partners, to build and sustain their national security forces. NATO has a unique and well experimented set of skills and capabilities that can be used to support these activities, in order – at the same time – to reinforce post-conflict stabilization and help prevent new crises. At the last Ministerial Meeting on 3-4 December 2013, Foreign Ministers started a discussion on how to streamline the policy framework for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions within NATO, and a road map on the work that will be taken forward in the coming year was approved. The preparation for the next Summit will pave the way for new political discussions and a revised Overarching Policy will be presented at the next NATO Summit, when a progress report about Women, Peace and Security issues will also be submitted to Heads of State and Government.

The different nature of the challenges of the 21st century might change the character of our operations, but not their enduring purpose – to safeguard freedom and security. Including a gender perspective will enable us to do our work better: a reinforced commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda will strengthen Allied and Partner countries’ determination to face security challenges in order to maintain a democratic peace.

Ms Mari Skåre holds a Master’s degree in law from the University of Oslo. She has extensive experience from the Norwegian Foreign Service. Prior to her nomination as Special Representative, she served as Minister Counsellor and Deputy Permanent Representative at the Norwegian Delegation to NATO. She also served as Minister Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission at the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, and previously as Counsellor and Legal Adviser at the Norwegian Mission to the UN. Ms Skåre joined the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991. Her first assignment was as Legal Adviser in the Secretariat of the Minister of International Development. Since then she has held a number of positions and has extensive knowledge of the UN and NATO. Throughout her career she has worked with issues relating to women and security, particular through her positions as Minister Counsellor at the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul and the Norwegian Delegation to NATO. In these positions, she has been instrumental in formulating Norwegian policies and promoting this agenda internationally.

Ms Mari Skåre was appointed the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security on 27 August 2012. As of December 2013, 137 countries, over two thirds of all the members of the United Nations had endorsed the Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict. With this commitment, these countries have promised not to enter into or support peace agreements that give amnesty for rape. Suspects can be arrested in any of these countries, all of which have now recognized rape and serious sexual violence as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, so that the principle of universal jurisdiction applies. They will support global efforts to give aid and justice to survivors.

For the first time, every UN peacekeeping mission will now automatically include the protection of civilians against sexual violence in conflict. All 137 countries have also agreed to support the development of the new International Protocol on the Investigation and Documentation of Sexual Violence in Conflict, proposed by the UK.

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For the first time, every UN peacekeeping mission will now automatically include the protection of civilians against sexual violence in conflict. All 137 countries have also agreed to support the development of the new International Protocol on the Investigation and Documentation of Sexual Violence in Conflict, proposed by the UK.
From Thursday 17th to Saturday 19th October 2013, the NATO Defense College had the great pleasure of hosting the 60th edition of the Anciens’ Annual Conference and Seminar.

The NDC Anciens’ Association has a membership of more than 6,800 Anciens from all over the world, who have attended the Senior Course over the years. Their lasting ties with the College, and the professional network that they provide to current Course Members, add great value to the educational experience offered by the NDC, helping to build firm friendships.

Many Anciens hold positions of great responsibility in the civil services of their respective nations or in the Alliance – a fitting reflection of the rigorous educational standards set by the College, and of their importance for participating nations. In this overall setting, the Anciens’ Seminar provides an excellent forum for former NDC Course Members not only to discuss their insights into NATO-related matters, but also to share memories of the instructive and stimulating time they spent at the College.

The atmosphere of this year’s event gave fitting expression to the Anciens’ motto, “Witnesses of history, protagonists of the future”. To mark the special significance of this year’s gathering, the occasion was made even more memorable by the presence of H.E. Admiral (ret.) Giampaolo Di Paola (ITA N), former Minister of Defence of Italy, and by H.E. Mr Roman Jakič (SVN C), Minister of Defence of Slovenia, accompanied by the Ambassador of Slovenia to Italy, H.E. Iztok Mirosic.

Admiral Di Paola gave a topical and enlightening presentation, entitled “NATO’s Evolution - The Way Ahead”, which set the scene for a productive discussion.

This year’s anniversary included a celebratory concert, offered to the NDC and Anciens by Italy as Host Nation. This event, on Friday evening, was organized under the auspices of the Italian Defence General Staff. Among the distinguished international audience attending the concert were military and political dignitaries, who were joined for this memorable occasion by the whole of the NDC Staff.

The concert was an unforgettable performance by the Italian Army Band, under the dynamic leadership of Maestro Antonella Bona. Listening to a varied selection of classical and popular melodies, the audience had a unique opportunity to relive the atmosphere of the various periods in the College’s history – from the early years in Paris right through to the present day.

The anniversary celebrations concluded on Saturday morning with a visit to Ostia Antica, organized in coordination with the College Art & History Programme.
Our Courses

Senior Course 123

(*) Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Our Courses

NATO Regional Cooperation Course 10

ALGERIA
Col M.E. BEKHOUCHE
LtCol L. BELATTAF
Col N. BOURAS
Col M. CHERIBET DROUICHE
LtCol A. LOUAFI

IRAQ
Mr J.H.N. AL-SHUWAILI
Mr A.A. KZAR

MOLDOVA REPUBLIC
Mr V. STATE

ITALY
Col L. LEVANTE

BAHRAIN
LtCol A. AL DOSARI

EGYPT
Col O. HAMZAWY
First Secr. T. KOTB
Col Y. MAHGOUB

JORDAN
Col H. AL MANASIR
Col M. ALZAGHAL
LtCol M. AL-ZU‘BI
Brig.Gen. J. MAFAR

MAURITANIA
LtCol B. AHMED MELOUJD
Maj. M.A. MOHAMED ABDALLAH
LtCol A. MOHAMED VALL
Col M. OULD MOHAMEDOU

GERMANY
LtCol W. ASMUS

TUNISIA
Col S. BERGHAOUI
Cdr T. SOUISSI

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Col W.K. AL NAQBI
Thanks to the modularized structure of the Senior Course (SC), some of its Study Periods are available to military officers and civilian officials who may not be able to attend the entire six-month programme. In this way, the NDC offers five different 5-day Modular Short Courses (MSCs) during every SC.

Run in conjunction with the SC, each MSC is designed both to inform and to stimulate. It gives participants the opportunity to improve their knowledge and develop their understanding of major political, economic, socio-cultural, defence and security-related issues with implications for the Alliance’s security and that of the entire international community.
The Generals, Flag Officers & Ambassadors’ Course (GFOAC 2013/2) was held at the NATO Defense College from 11 to 20 November 2013. It was attended by 35 ambassadors, generals, admirals, civilians and diplomats. Participants included representatives from NATO, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), as well as Global Partners. Furthermore, for the first time the course received two participants from Nigeria.

The aim of the Course is to enhance understanding of current politico-military issues within the Alliance, and also to familiarize participants with current and prospective issues facing NATO.

The Integrated Partner Orientation Course (IPOC 2013/2) on “NATO present and future” was held at the College from 21 to 25 October 2013, in conjunction with Senior Course 123. The aim of the Course is to analyse the role and character of NATO, including its organization, policies and activities; to consider the Alliance’s contribution to security; and to assess the transformation required by the changing security environment and demands of current operations.

12 September 2013
The Acting Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Italy, H.E. Han Qi, visits the NDC.

H.E. Han Qi signs the NDC guest book.
1 October 2013
The Commander of the NATO Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), Major General Pavel MACKO, visits the NATO Defense College.

2–4 October 2013
The NATO Defense College hosts the 2013 Operation Research and Analysis Conference, organized by Allied Command Transformation in collaboration with the Science and Technology Board.

7 October 2013
The NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, Ms Mari Skåre (NOR), visits the NATO Defense College.

10 October 2013
The Deputy Commander of the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy, Major General Sir George Norton KCVO CBE (GBR A) visits the NATO Defense College and delivers a lecture on collective operations in Afghanistan.

11 October 2013
A delegation from the Norwegian National Defence College (NONDC) visits the NATO Defense College.
The NATO Defense College hosts the 60th Edition of the Anciens’ Annual Conference and Seminar

29 October 2013
The next Commandant of the NATO Defense College, MajGen Janusz Bojarski - currently Military Representative of Poland to NATO and the European Union, visits the NDC.

31 October 2013
Eisenhower lecture by the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), General Patrick de Rousiers (FRA F)

General de Rousiers delivers the Eisenhower Lecture to Senior Course 123.

The Commandant and Dean with (from l. to r.) the Ambassador and Minister of Defence of Slovenia

The Commandant and Dean with (from l. to r.) the Ambassador and Minister of Defence of Slovenia

NDC Commandant LtGen Dalhaug (left) warmly welcomes future Commandant MajGen Bojarski.

Our Guests
Our Guests

22 November 2013
The NATO Defense College hosts the fifth meeting of the Middle East Faculty Academic Advisory Board.

20 November 2013
The Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, MajGen Vitalijus Vaikšnoras, visits the NDC.

11-20 November 2013
Generals, Flag Officers & Ambassadors’ Course 2013-2 on “NATO: Repositioning for the Future?”

27 November 2013
Journalists from NATO Partner Countries visit the NDC.

Journalists from NATO Partner Countries visiting the NDC: (Left to right) Mr Imran Chudhry, Ms Giulia A. Bruni Roccia (NDC Public Affairs), Mr Nagayo Taniguchi, Ms Simone de Manso (NATO HQ Press Officers), Mr Nawab Khan, Mr Mansoor Alam, LtCol Alberto Alletto (NDC Chief Public Affairs) and Mr Farhan Bokhari.
26-28 November 2013
2013 Military Conference on Issues of Mutual Interest.
Under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the 2013 Military Conference on Issues of Mutual Interest is held at the NDC.

2 December 2013
The NATO Defense College hosts the Rome Atlantic Forum on “NATO and the Future of Cyber Security”, jointly organized by the Italian Atlantic Committee (IAC) and the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA).

Welcome remarks by the Secretary General of the Italian Atlantic Committee Mr Fabrizio W. Luciolli (centre), the Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty Association Amb. Lazar Eleonovski (left) and the Political Adviser of the First Secretary - United States of America Embassy in Rome, Ms Kelly Hapka.

6 December 2013
Tenth NATO Regional Cooperation Course Graduation Ceremony. Graduation address by H.E. Alessandro Minuto Rizzo.

4 December 2013
The State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, H.E. Alex PETRIASHVILI, visits the NATO Defense College.

Senior NRCC-10 Course Member BrigGen Matar (JOR) receives his graduation diploma from Ambassador Minuto Rizzo and LtGen Dalhaug.
Our Publications

(available at www.ndc.nato.int)

Research Paper Series

July 2013

RP 94: Putting the 'N' back into NATO: A High North policy framework for the Atlantic Alliance?
Brooke SMITH-WINDSOR

September 2013

RP 95: Safe Seas at What Price? The Costs, Benefits and Future of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield
James Marcus BRIDGER

RP 96: Germany Is More Than Europe Can Handle: Or, Why NATO Remains a Pacifier
Sten RYNNING

October 2013

RP 97: NATO’s 2014 Summit Agenda
Karl-Heinz KAMP

November 2013

RP 98: Not only "Containerspotting" - NATO’s Redeployment from Landlocked Afghanistan
Heidi REISINGER

January 2014

RP 99: Send the Reserve! New Ways to Support NATO through Reserve Forces
Guillaume LASCONJARIAS

January 2014

RP 100: From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea: A New Maritime Mission for NATO?
Brooke A. SMITH-WINDSOR and José Francisco PAVIA

Report Series

July 2013

The Curious Case of the Egyptian Armed Forces: What was at stake when the Egyptian Military intervened against President Morsi?
Mona EL-KOUEDI

October 2013

The Strategic Dimensions of the Shale Gas Revolution: Shared Views from NATO and Gulf Countries
Jean-Loup SAMAAN
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