Vox Collegii
The voice of the College

Mali: What Implications for NATO?

NATO’s Cyber: Past, Present and Future

Smart Defense: A Business Perspective & Keeping NATO Relevant
Contents:

The Editorial ................................................................. 2
The Commandant’s Corner ............................................ 3
A deep insight:
“Smart Defence: A Business Perspective” .......................... 4
by Ms Stanislava Judinyová
“Smart Defence: Keeping NATO Relevant” ......................... 13
by Bastian Matteo Scianma
“NATO’s Cyber Past, Present and Future” .......................... 18
by Christine Hegenbar
“What Implications for NATO in the Sahel?” ........................ 23
by Dr Guillaume Lasconjarias

Life at the College:
SERC 2 – NATO and Partners Address Strategic Change .... 26
by Colonel Daniel Gillespie

Our Courses ...................................................................... 28
Our Guests ...................................................................... 32
Our Publications .............................................................. 34
In the last edition of Vox Collegii, an invitation was extended to readers outside the College to become active contributors by sending in personal analysis of specific topics. Our Call for Articles met with a very enthusiastic response.

In this issue, readers will once more find articles and short research papers by outside contributors, as well as by eminent researchers from the NATO Defense College (NDC). In my opinion, this is an interesting opportunity to share and exchange opinions on a range of vital topics, regarding not only the Alliance but the entire international scene. Using external contributors who are not affiliated to the NDC or to NATO is a fundamental way of ensuring our academic freedom and willingness to balance different views, some of which may be less palatable to NATO “die-hards.” It is important, however, that we guarantee an objective and impartial discussion of any given topic. Diversity, differing points of view, shared values, constructive criticism and consensus building are all of these are catalysts for life-long education, and this is what we strive for at the College.

Specifically, topics in this issue of Vox Collegii include Smart Defence, cyber security and the implications of the war in Mali.

Finally, the situation in Mali is one of the main subjects currently under discussion, begging the question of what role – if any – NATO will play, and what are the likely implications.

A word, in closing, about our constant efforts to ensure state-of-the-art communication. The NDC recently opened a Twitter account: together with Facebook and YouTube, this is a fundamental step forward in our ongoing dialogue with our followers. All three of these media have been very useful for highlighting and sharing the main events the NDC has participated in, or which it has promoted. Take, for example, the live tweet arranged during the recent “Roundtable Meeting on Brazil and the Euro-Atlantic Area,” enabling closer interaction between the NDC, other NATO entities and our followers. The next step is to consolidate the links between the NDC’s social accounts and Vox Collegii, giving readers the opportunity to share their suggestions, comments and criticisms.

I trust that our readers will appreciate these new features, including the magazine’s new cover, as well as the topics we propose in this issue, and I thank all of you for your continuing support.

Please keep following us on Facebook and Twitter, and post your comments or contributions.

LtCol Alberto Alletto
Chief Public Affairs

This year the NATO Defense College (NDC) has already participated in a number of major international events, underlining the importance of outreach activities dedicated not only to NATO members but also to Partner countries.

First, the NDC was one of the promoters of a two-day conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in early May, on Brazil-NATO and Brazil-European Union relations and perceptions. The conference was an opportunity to inform Brazilians of the role that NATO and the EU play in their region, specifically on security matters. It was an important example of how valuable the College’s dynamism and expertise can prove on the international scene.

Shortly afterwards, the NDC and the Norwegian Defence University College jointly hosted the 42nd Conference of Commandants of Alliance Defence Colleges in Oslo. This conference offered significant new perspectives on the main topic under discussion: “The Role of Education in the Post-Afghanistan Era.”

The third major event was the 13th Kyiv International Week, at the Ukrainian National Defence University. This conference focused on current and topical questions for NATO, and for the Partners with which it enjoys close cooperation.

All three conferences were excellent illustrations of the NDC’s impressive outreach efforts, important vehicles not only for exchanging knowledge and experiences but also for even closer interaction with valued and respected partners around the world.

Senior Course 122 has come to a successful conclusion, with Course Members deriving enormous benefit from cutting-edge input on a broad range of topics, as well as from their own purposeful approach to the challenging tasks they were faced with. Firm emphasis was placed upon consensus-based decision-making and the immense importance of interpersonal interactions.

The focus of the College’s educational activities is not confined to the Euro-Atlantic space. With more and more Course Members from Partner nations, a great deal of attention is now given to other regions of major relevance, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

From the perspective of partnership and cooperation, having Course Members from many different parts of the world such as the MENA region is a great asset for at least two important reasons: as a valuable source of alternative viewpoints to ensure a broad and balanced perspective, and also as a model for far-sighted cooperation in educational and research activities.

Earlier in the year we were pleased to host the Ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC IX), and it was with great pride that we ran the second edition of the Senior Executive Regional Conference (SERC II) in June. The SERC, with a specific focus on the Mediterranean and Gulf regions, is addressed to high-profile decision-makers, leaders and influential thinkers. It is a forum for dialogue and pluralism, the aim being to promote greater mutual understanding on vital strategic matters.

The future of the NDC will continue to be busy. We are already planning activities for the next semester, starting from late August – Analyzing schedules for lecturers and other visitors to the NDC, as well as fine-tuning the curricula for upcoming courses.

Vox Collegii offers a timely and relevant complement to College life, as a high-level academic tool. The magazine not only gives valuable and cogent expression to the identity and values that NATO upholds, but also offers our readers a privileged insight into the NDC’s mission and activities.

Lieutenant General Arne Bård Dalhaug
Royal Norwegian Army, NDC Commandant
Introduction

The current economic and financial crisis has exacerbated what Richard Rosecrance famously referred to as the ‘butter versus guns’ dilemma⁵ in the Euro-Atlantic area. In other words, countries which use their defence budget as a ‘jenny bank’ in an effort to ‘spare’ other areas of expenditure like social policies are particularly hard-hit. Defence cuts obviously entail the risk of substantial reductions in the defence capabilities of NATO countries, hardly consistent with the Alliance’s need to ensure that they do not slip below pre-crisis levels.

‘Smart Defence’ is a term which was coined by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen during the Munich Security Conference in February 2011 and came to prominence during NATO’s May 2012 Chicago Summit. Such an approach offers a potential response to the impact of the crisis on national defence spending within NATO. The concept is based on three main ‘pillars’: prioritization, enhanced international cooperation and specialization. It is complemented by what is known as the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), based on expanded education and training, increased exercises and better use of technology. The CFI was introduced by the NATO Secretary General in February 2012.

Based as it is on greater cooperation between NATO Allies in terms of capability development, acquisition, use and maintenance, Smart Defence is actually not as new a concept as it might seem. Various multinational projects in areas such as airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and strategic airlift capability were already under way before Mr Rasmussen’s Munich speech. What is different about ‘Smart Defence’ is that it is seen as a sort of ‘new mindset’ which NATO member states should adopt in relation to how they manage their defence capabilities.

Against this background, those involved are not only member states’ defence ministries and armed forces. Smart Defence is also about the ‘business of business’, and this should not be overlooked in the ongoing debate on the subject.

1. Let’s do business smartly

In their article on Smart Defence, published in Defense News just after the Chicago Summit, Henrik Breitenbach and Bastian Glegeicher state that: “Smart Defence is not just about addressing the tight fiscal climate, it is about using these conditions to change the way we do business”. They see Smart Defence as a source of brand-new opportunities for the defence industry, creating a “market that will only exist because of Smart Defence” and making it possible “to sell products that would not otherwise be sold” – i.e., products needed for costly, large-scale projects such as missile defence which can be implemented only if several (if not all) Allies are involved.

Smart Defence thus opens up an array of new business opportunities. At the same time, these very opportunities entail a number of hidden but nonetheless ‘tricky’ issues.

1.1 Buying together = Buying cheaper?

The first question is: are the Allies able to prepare a sufficient number of viable multinational projects in the domain of defence procurement? One of the arguments for common acquisition of defence capabilities by a group of nations is that such an approach allows economies of scale. The logic for this is simple: if nations buy something together, they will be able to negotiate better terms than for smaller orders from individual nations – a considerable advantage in times of austerity. However, the business logic of the suppliers (whether in periods of crisis or of prosperity) is focused on a very different objective: profit maximization. This will also imply hard bargaining, with no guarantee that the final price will actually be lower than in deals concluded by individual nations.

Another issue with common procurement is the challenge for nations to agree exactly what they wish to acquire together. At a political level, there should be no problem in representatives of different national defence departments agreeing on joint procurement of, for example, armoured vehicles or aircraft. At expert level, however, things can become more complicated because precise technical specifications are needed. The NH-90 helicopter is a case in point in this respect. Initially, the idea was to create a single helicopter platform and thus achieve economies of scale for the nations involved. However, individual countries’ demands for modifications and special features delayed the project’s development and the NH-90 is now produced in more than 20 different versions⁴.

The question thus remains as to whether the Alliance already has a sufficiently developed culture of interoperability to members to reach agreement within a reasonably short time, with regard not only to joint acquisition of certain defence capabilities but also to the necessary technical specifications. If so, this is certainly good news for the defence industry; if not, a scenario of protracted ‘horse-trading’ among buyers unable to agree on technical requirements could leave the industry with the impression that it is better off

---


⁶ Ibidem.

---

continued ...
A Deep Insight

Vox Collegii

Volume VII

A Deep Insight

dealing with clients outside the Alliance who do not need to comply with Smart Defence principles.

The solution in this case could be a harmonization of national defence planning. If defence capabilities should be developed in a multinational framework, nations have to generate an effective mechanism for consultations on the identification and definition of the capabilities they intend to acquire (as well as of the capabilities they wish to reduce or eliminate, so as to rationalize any ‘specialization by default’ as a result of massive cuts). This would help identify suitable capabilities to include in multinational procurement procedures, initially involving member states with clear affinities in terms of strategic culture and interests. The effective and efficient NATO Defence Planning Process could play a significant role in this respect.

1.2 ‘Small ones’ versus ‘big ones’

There is another stumbling block that could possibly hinder the success of Smart Defence from the corporate point of view: the ‘painful’ question of business competition.

As ‘Smart’ projects will involve several nations, they will tend to be more complex and possibly more ambitious than projects undertaken by individual states. This means that they will be better suited to large bidders that are able to cope with the project in its entirety. How will this affect small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which currently operate on the defence market, especially in smaller Allied countries? Are there any mechanisms to ensure that even smaller defence industry actors will benefit from Smart Defence, or are SMEs set to lose the market share they have held until now?

Smart Defence would probably aggravate competition were the defence procurement market to maintain the somewhat ‘special’ status it has enjoyed in most of the countries concerned. However, new procedures for the award of certain tenders by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security were introduced by European Union (EU) Directive 2009/81/EC (the ‘Defence Procurement Directive’), or ‘DPD’. Amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, this brings defence and security contracts in line with the rules of public procurement, the aim being to gradually establish a European defence equipment market.

The deadline for transposition of the DPD into the national legislations of EU member states was 20th August 2011, the result being the opening of national defence markets to bidders from other EU states on an equal footing with domestic defence actors. This rule can be waived only in specific cases where the essential security interests of member states come into play. However, the text of the DPD specifies in this regard that: “the non-application of this Directive must be proportionate to the aims pursued and cause as little disturbance as possible to the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services.”

NATO members within the EU are thus already in a situation that allows for increased competition. It should also not be forgotten that the DPD recommends supporting the involvement of SMEs in order to develop the “diversity of the European defence-related supplier base”. By the same token, it states that a member state should be given the option to “allow or to require its contracting authorities/entities [to ask that] at least a certain share of the value of the contract” be subcontracted.

Provision is also made for member states...
to designate central purchasing bodies within the EU (including institutions like the European Defence Agency, which are not normally subject to the provisions of the DPD). Taken together, these measures offer EU SMEs a reasonable guarantee that they can continue to compete on defence markets.

The DPD admittedly does not apply to cooperative defence procurement procedures involving more than one member state, as might be the case in Smart Defence acquisition projects. However, it is in the interest of states with many SMEs supplying the defence sector to ensure that these EU rules on subcontracting will be at least partially incorporated into Memorandums of Understanding and other founding documents of NATO Smart Defence projects.

A completely different line on defence procurement is taken in a paper by a group of experts from the Visegrád countries (V4), entitled "Towards a smarter V4: How to improve defence collaboration among the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia." This document proposes that the NATO Summit Declaration on Capabilities is clear in this respect: "Maintaining a strong defence industry in Europe and making the fullest possible use of the potential of defence industrial cooperation across the Alliance remain an essential condition for delivering the capabilities needed for 2020 and beyond."

Provided that Smart Defence is perceived as a factor contributing to the achievement of both government and business interests, it has a good chance of success.

Conclusion

The defence industry has to become an integral part of our thinking about Smart Defence. Governments and industries alike face the negative consequences of the economic crisis. Smart Defence can be consistent with the interests of both: security interests in the case of governments, business interests in the case of industry.

The NATO Summit Declaration on Capabilities is clear in this respect: "Maintaining a strong defence industry in Europe and making the fullest possible use of the potential of defence industrial cooperation across the Alliance remain an essential condition for delivering the capabilities needed for 2020 and beyond." Provided that Smart Defence is perceived as a factor contributing to the achievement of both government and business interests, it has a good chance of success.

Smart Defence: Keeping NATO Relevant

Mr Bastian Matteo Scianna

1. Quo vadis NATO?

The history of NATO is a success story. After the implosion of the Soviet Union, the Alliance’s very raison d’être appeared to have gone; but even this did not mean the end of NATO, let alone the “end of history.” New multifaceted threats in the international security environment led to new challenges and uncertainties. The out-of-area missions in the 1990s were followed by debates over a global NATO: the ongoing Article 5 mission in the Hindu Kush began more than a decade ago. However, as famously highlighted by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in his 2011 Brussels speech, the end of the Cold War ushered in a period of steady decline in Europe’s defence budgets. Secretary Gates was correct in pinpointing the European capability gaps during the campaign in Libya, and warned of a demilitarization of Europe and unequal burden-sharing.

The Libya campaign did indeed highlight the basic deficiencies in the European NATO states’ military capabilities and their apparent unwillingness to increase defence spending in an “age of austerity.” It also showed that NATO, far from going “out of business”, is actually “too busy to fail.” The demand for Europeans to take the lead while Washington “led from behind” did not result in the Alliance splitting, or a European Sonderweg without US involvement; rather, it showed how indispensable US power is in supporting European-led military operations. It thus underlined the need for continued interoperability of the Alliance’s armed forces and shared strategic goals, at a time when the US is pivoting towards Asia.

Thus the background against which Secretary General Rasmussen outlined the idea of Smart Defence: doing more with less, through cooperation, prioritization and specialization.

This article will first outline the status quo and conflicting viewpoints on Smart Defence. The concept’s pragmatic feasibility will then be argued, with some examples.
the latter part of the 20th century, seem international economic crisis1. Hardly any of the countries concerned spent the required 2% of GDP agreed by NATO members as the minimum defence expenditure requirement an exception being the notoriously high-spending Greeks, whose defence budget accounts for 4% of GDP and makes them second only to the US in percentage terms. Countries hit particularly hard by the crisis have made dramatic cuts: by comparison with 2008, Latvia has halved its spending and other countries too have made considerable reductions (Greece 26%, Spain 18%, Italy 16%, Belgium 12% decline, Ireland 11%). Even the three biggest defence spenders in real terms – the United Kingdom, France and Germany – had to make at least modest cuts (below 5%). The only countries to increase defence expenditure were Poland, whose economy has done extremely well during the crisis, and resource-rich Norway. There is thus a general trend showing an alarmingly low level of European capabilities and the continuation of splintered acquisition processes, in a world where security threats are becoming increasingly complex and the benign hegemon is seen to be turning its back on the “Old Continent”.

3.2 Criticisms

Smart Defence is seen by some as merely a new bumper-sticker to describe a preoccupation with fruitless attempts at better coordination. Such criticism is often linked to the idea that reluctance to waive even a limited part of national sovereignty makes Smart Defence a hopeless task. Co-operation, prioritization and specialization involve areas of budget autonomy and industrial capacity that a state has to be willing to relinquish in exchange for greater long-term benefits. However, political short-sightedness may hamper the vision needed to focus on such benefits. Some analysts indicate the need for the Alliance to set out incentives and present a clear, detailed rationale for governments and industry to act together2.

Another critical point arises in relation to the likelihood of large member states maintaining a full range of military capabilities. This means that other members could sell defence cuts as Smart Defence initiatives, without contributing to the Alliance’s overall capabilities or taking up their share of the overall burden – a tendency which could be accentuated by a focus on flagship projects with vast costs, where smaller member states would be unlikely to become involved at all. However, the biggest problem of a “niche approach” is the perceived uncertainty as to whether a shared capability would be available for use in the event of a conflict. “Picking” could thus create new capability gaps, as shown by the problems with German AWACS crews during the Libyan campaign. The danger of organizing the Alliance on an “à la carte” basis is that its capabilities could be severely hampered as a result.

3.3 Potential

Advocates of Smart Defence argue that the only way of addressing the numerous challenges outlined above in order to achieve a stable, reliable basis for collective defence and international crisis resolution is through combined effort and fair burden-sharing across the Atlantic.

---

Joint Strike Fighter and, before that, the Eurofighter. There are still difficulties to be addressed, but such projects reflect a move in the right direction.

4. Conclusion

In Smart Defence, NATO has found an appropriate answer to defence budget cuts, multifaceted security challenges and the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region. Specialization remains the most difficult area, where pragmatism, project-focused cooperation of “the willing” and prioritization should be fostered. Short-term financial benefits should not be the sole aim: the focus must be on the changing international security environment, and the indispensable role NATO continues to play in such a scenario. The approach of political and industrial decision-makers must thus be based on “hard nosed pragmatism”. Not all projects need to involve a majority of member states, but opportunities should be seized to invest together where little money is available and where there is a will to cooperate judiciously.

The Europeans’ experience of supranational decision-making processes as a way of preserving national sovereignty may be a great asset in this respect, as can the process of “learning under fire” in Afghanistan: in this scenario the Alliance proved flexible and adaptable, albeit in a “super tanker” style12. The experience and difficulties of more than a decade of coalition warfare should not be underestimated. A new generation of officers and civilians alike embodies the will for pragmatic cooperation under the most severe circumstances, in an integrated Comprehensive Approach.

However, the Libya operation marked the surfacing of a deeper, still ongoing debate about the likelihood and future role of a “global NATO”. A range of positions have been expressed in this respect, variously focusing on fulfillment of Article 5 obligations, limited scope for out-of-area missions, and Anglo-American demands for a global engagement of NATO. This diversity of views threatens to undermine the cohesion of an “increasingly polycentric Alliance”13.

Such is the context in which the discussion of Smart Defence needs to be placed, and in which it must not be seen as a means to define strategic ends but as part of an integrated process. Important questions that still need to be clearly discussed are for what ends Smart Defence is needed, and by what kind of NATO.

---

9 Not all projects need to involve a majority of member states, but opportunities should be seized to invest together where little money is available and where there is a will to cooperate judiciously.
11 A Deep Insight
12 The Europeans’ experience of supranational decision-making processes as a way of preserving national sovereignty may be a great asset in this respect, as can the process of “learning under fire” in Afghanistan: in this scenario the Alliance proved flexible and adaptable, albeit in a “super tanker” style. The experience and difficulties of more than a decade of coalition warfare should not be underestimated. A new generation of officers and civilians alike embodies the will for pragmatic cooperation under the most severe circumstances, in an integrated Comprehensive Approach.
13 The Europeans’ experience of supranational decision-making processes as a way of preserving national sovereignty may be a great asset in this respect, as can the process of “learning under fire” in Afghanistan: in this scenario the Alliance proved flexible and adaptable, albeit in a “super tanker” style. The experience and difficulties of more than a decade of coalition warfare should not be underestimated. A new generation of officers and civilians alike embodies the will for pragmatic cooperation under the most severe circumstances, in an integrated Comprehensive Approach.
For more than a decade, cyber defence has been on NATO’s agenda. The Alliance is strongly connected to the digital domain: NATO has 30 significant communication networks and over 100,000 personal computers. Furthermore, the communication and information infrastructure is crucial to the societies of its member states. Against this background, one of the growing challenges for NATO in the coming decades is that its central mission of collective defence and cooperative security necessarily includes cyberspace.

This article covers three aspects of the question. First, which cyber incidents were – and still are – putting the topic on the agenda? Second, how did the Alliance react to the cyber threat in its official summit declarations and strategies? Finally, we will focus on future prospects of cyber defence within NATO.

Past (I) - Kosovo 1999: Targeting the military

The first widely reported cyber actions against NATO took place in 1999, during Operation Allied Force. In March 1999, NATO started the first major bombing campaign to force Serbian military units out of Kosovo and save the threatened Albanian civilian population. Numerous pro-Serbian hacker groups protested against these measures by attacking NATO’s internet infrastructure. These incidents included the defacement of the webpage for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. For several days the NATO public affairs website reporting on the war in Kosovo was unavailable. Simultaneously, a flood of emails blocked NATO’s email servers. Both affected the performance and capability of the organization to communicate. The hackers achieved a public relations and propaganda victory.

Past (II) - Estonia 2007: Targeting a nation

In 2007, intensive cyber operations against Estonia clearly underlined the political motivations and the scale of technical know-how involved in cyber attacks against the Alliance. Estonia is widely known to be one of the most wired and technologically advanced countries in the world. The decision to relocate a Soviet-era World War II monument triggered a series of persistent Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that flooded networks and websites, making them inaccessible. The attacks targeted not only servers responsible for the Estonian internet infrastructure, but also government websites and those of politicians. The website of the Estonian President came under attack, as well as private sector service providers used by organizations such as banks and media corporations. The attacks lasted more than three weeks.

This politically motivated cyber operation proved damaging to the political, constitutional, economic and social structure of the state.

In response to events in Estonia, NATO decided to further strengthen its cyber security. The first official NATO Cyber Defence Policy, adopted in January 2008, is divided into three key elements: subsidiarity, non-duplication and security. The priorities were underscored in the Bucharest Summit Declaration, in April 2008. “Our Policy on Cyber Defence emphasizes the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack.” The urgent need for an updated cyber strategy once again became apparent in July and August 2008, when Georgia faced cyber attacks in the context of a broader armed conflict with Russia.

At the beginning of 2010, NATO reported that the number of cyber attacks against its networks had increased significantly over the past 12 months. These developments were addressed in the recommendations of the group of experts working on the new Strategic Concept for NATO in

Present (I) - Libya 2011: Largely without cyber incidents

Operation Unified Protector – enforc- ing United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 – lasted seven months and included operations at sea and in the air. They aimed at establishing an arms embargo and a no-fly zone, as well as protecting civilians. Very few cy- ber incidents were observed. The “hack- tivist” group Anonymous claimed to have hacked a NATO server and extracted a large amount of data. Other hackers, pos- sibly from Lužec, who also claimed to be against NATO action in Libya, broke into a NATO-affiliated bookstore and posted the names, usernames and passwords of the 12,000 registered users. Neither these, nor any other minor incidents had any significant impact on the military op- eration or were picked up by the media. Presumably, there were three reasons for this: first, NATO worked in close consulta- tion with Libya’s neighbours and gained their support; second, the international community of “hactivists” was distract- ed by the general unfolding of events in the Arab Spring, and third, NATO has bet- ter cyber defence than it did in 199914.

NATO has constantly added to ad- dress the cyber threat. Following the Lisbon Summit, in June 2011 NATO De- fence Ministers approved a revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence. However, it provided clear guidelines for NATO member states and an agreed list of priorities on cyber defence. In October 2011, ministers also agreed on an Action Plan. The focus was put on preventing cyber attacks and building resilience across the Alliance’s networks. Assistance to others in cyber defence efforts was also offered15.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the importance of implementing the cyber- defence commitments made at the Lis- bon Summit was emphasized in the sum- mit declaration: “We have committed to provide the resources and complete the necessary reforms to bring all NATO bod- ies under centralised cyber protection, to ensure that enhanced cyber defence capabilities protect our collective invest- ment in NATO”16.

Future (II) - Core tasks and major chal- lenges

Unclassified information about NATO’s future cyber policy is rare. Furthermore, there are now only a few militarily rele- vant examples of cyber conflicts. For this reason, the question as to how NATO should prepare to face further future challenges in cyberspace has not yet been answered in detail. What is certain is that the Cyber Defence Policy and Ac- tion Plan, adopted in June 2011, paved the way for NATO’s short-term cyber strategy. The following core tasks should continue to be addressed:

(1) NATO has to secure its operational and administrative network systems. “Best defence practice” should be developed to guard against attack and provide early detection through surveillance. As it is not possible to keep adversaries from penetrating the networks, NATO should also develop and implement standards in consequence management capabilities. In the face of an attack, crucial systems should be as resilient as possible, so as to restore, adapt and re-enable as soon as possible.

(2) NATO has to protect its confidential information. As classified reports and other sensitive information are crucial for NATO’s military operations, the military communication system and computers with sensitive data have to be very well protected. In order to prevent information leaks, e.g. through personal computers and storage media like USB flash drives, security measures should also include staff training within NATO.

(3) NATO should help to strengthen the cyber defence capabilities of its member states as NATO’s systems are necessar- ily interconnected, weakness in any of them results in weakness for all the oth- ers. Proper cyber defence of national networks critical to NATO’s core tasks is absolutely essential. In addition, it is also important for NATO to support the over- all defence capabilities of its Allies – espe- cially critical national infrastructure. One step in this direction is the 2012 National Cyber Security Framework Manual, issued by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCE) in 201317.

8 Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010.

A Deep Insight
Vox Collegii
Volume VII
NATO has to address is how cyber de-

One of the most important questions
NATO has to address is how cyber de-

As it is often practically impossible to
identify the sources of attacks, the focus
here is understandably on defence. But
NATO will have to remain agile in order
to respond to the fast changing threats of
cyberspace. This might include intensifying
the cyber domain and tries to assess how
existing international legal frameworks in
Warfare examines the inadequacy of the
International Law Applicable to Cyber

As it is often practically impossible to
defend cyber actions included under Ar-
ticle IV, which states that “the parties will
consult together whenever, in the opin-
ion of any of them, the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any
of the Parties is threatened” Under what
circumstances are they covered by Ar-
ticle V, which states that “an armed attack
against one shall be considered an attack
against them all”? The Alliance need not
define the specific red line, but the pivotal
question of what distinguishes an every-
day attack from a military attack has to be
discussed. This evaluation will surely be
made by political decision-makers, and
not by military or technical experts. The
Tallinn Manual serves as a guide. It de-
defines a militarily relevant cyber attack
as “a cyber operation, whether offensive
or defensive, that is reasonably expected
to cause injury or death to persons or
damage or destruction to objects.” The
definition is dependent on the result: if
a cyber operation is followed by signifi-
cant destructive consequences, it is to be
defined as a cyber attack and also as a
use of force. If the cyber operation merely
leads to inconvenience or irritation, it is
neither a cyber attack nor a use of force.
Only significant armed attacks should be
embraced by NATO’s Article V.

Mentioned in every NATO summit since
2002, cyber threats are central to NATO’s
agenda and will continue to be so in fu-
ture summits and strategies. There will
surely be an updated cyber defence
strategy in view of future changes in the
technology and conditions. It is likely that
future major cyber incidents and the fu-
ture of technological developments will
shape these assessments. In the coming
years, NATO will probably have to move
beyond the basis of collective cyber de-

If one ignores cyber espionage and a few
other exceptions, cyberspace is still not
used for military activity. To what extent
cyberspace will become a battlefield for
war in the future, only time will tell.

One of the most important questions
NATO has to address is how cyber de-

TRUE 52

FALSE 6

NATO should have both
defensive and offensive CYBER capabilities.


Mali: one of the poorest countries in the
world, where the current political, hu-
manitarian and security crisis not only
endangers an already weak state but also
threatens to involve the entire region.
Even if NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen stated earlier this year
that he did not see a rile there for the Alli-
ance, he acknowledged that “a number of
individual NATO allies are assisting France
in Mali”. Moreover, there are at least three
reasons why NATO cannot neglect this re-
region. First, as Secretary General Rasmus-

The opinions reflected in this
article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions
of the NATO Defense College, or the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Dr Guillaume Lasconjarias is a
Research Adviser at the NATO
Defense College.

Mali: one of the poorest countries in the
world, where the current political, hu-
manitarian and security crisis not only
endangers an already weak state but also
threatens to involve the entire region.
Even if NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen stated earlier this year
that he did not see a rile there for the Alli-
ance, he acknowledged that “a number of
individual NATO allies are assisting France
in Mali”. Moreover, there are at least three
reasons why NATO cannot neglect this re-
region. First, as Secretary General Rasmus-

The opinions reflected in this
article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions
of the NATO Defense College, or the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Dr Guillaume Lasconjarias is a
Research Adviser at the NATO
Defense College.

The opinions reflected in this
article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions
of the NATO Defense College, or the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Mali: one of the poorest countries in the
world, where the current political, hu-
manitarian and security crisis not only
endangers an already weak state but also
threatens to involve the entire region.
Even if NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen stated earlier this year
that he did not see a rile there for the Alli-
ance, he acknowledged that “a number of
individual NATO allies are assisting France
in Mali”. Moreover, there are at least three
reasons why NATO cannot neglect this re-
region. First, as Secretary General Rasmus-

The opinions reflected in this
article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions
of the NATO Defense College, or the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

As it is often practically impossible to
defend cyber actions included under Ar-
ticle IV, which states that “the parties will
consult together whenever, in the opin-
ion of any of them, the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any
of the Parties is threatened” Under what
circumstances are they covered by Ar-
ticle V, which states that “an armed attack
against one shall be considered an attack
against them all”? The Alliance need not
define the specific red line, but the pivotal
question of what distinguishes an every-
day attack from a military attack has to be
discussed. This evaluation will surely be
made by political decision-makers, and
not by military or technical experts. The
Tallinn Manual serves as a guide. It de-
defines a militarily relevant cyber attack
as “a cyber operation, whether offensive
or defensive, that is reasonably expected
to cause injury or death to persons or
damage or destruction to objects.” The
definition is dependent on the result: if
a cyber operation is followed by signifi-
cant destructive consequences, it is to be
defined as a cyber attack and also as a
use of force. If the cyber operation merely
leads to inconvenience or irritation, it is
neither a cyber attack nor a use of force.
Only significant armed attacks should be
embraced by NATO’s Article V.

Mentioned in every NATO summit since
2002, cyber threats are central to NATO’s
agenda and will continue to be so in fu-
ture summits and strategies. There will
surely be an updated cyber defence
strategy in view of future changes in the
technology and conditions. It is likely that
future major cyber incidents and the fu-
ture of technological developments will
shape these assessments. In the coming
years, NATO will probably have to move
beyond the basis of collective cyber de-

Dr Guillaume Lasconjarias is a
Research Adviser at the NATO
Defense College.

The opinions reflected in this
article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions
of the NATO Defense College, or the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Mali: one of the poorest countries in the
world, where the current political, hu-
manitarian and security crisis not only
endangers an already weak state but also
threatens to involve the entire region.
Even if NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen stated earlier this year
that he did not see a rile there for the Alli-
ance, he acknowledged that “a number of
individual NATO allies are assisting France
in Mali”. Moreover, there are at least three
reasons why NATO cannot neglect this re-
region. First, as Secretary General Rasmus-

The opinions reflected in this
article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions
of the NATO Defense College, or the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Mali: one of the poorest countries in the
world, where the current political, hu-
manitarian and security crisis not only
endangers an already weak state but also
threatens to involve the entire region.
Even if NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen stated earlier this year
that he did not see a rile there for the Alli-
ance, he acknowledged that “a number of
individual NATO allies are assisting France
in Mali”. Moreover, there are at least three
reasons why NATO cannot neglect this re-
region. First, as Secretary General Rasmus-

The opinions reflected in this
article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions
of the NATO Defense College, or the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Mali: one of the poorest countries in the
world, where the current political, hu-
manitarian and security crisis not only
endangers an already weak state but also
threatens to involve the entire region.
Even if NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen stated earlier this year
that he did not see a rile there for the Alli-
ance, he acknowledged that “a number of
individual NATO allies are assisting France
in Mali”. Moreover, there are at least three
reasons why NATO cannot neglect this re-
region. First, as Secretary General Rasmus-

The opinions reflected in this
article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions
of the NATO Defense College, or the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
1) The roots of the problem

In the past year Mali has experienced a double crisis, leading to the collapse of state structures: rebellion in the north, and a military coup. However, this is only the latest phase in a long pattern of conflict which can be explained by four key factors: territorial claims, new religious influences, economic interests and the structural weakness of the state.

- Territorial claims: The root of the problem is to be found in the movement to assert the identity and territorial rights of the nomadic groups collectively referred to as the Tuareg people. Spread over six countries (Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and, to a more limited extent, Tunisia), the Tuareg reject the modern borders established during the colonial period. Throughout the post-colonial period, they have been excluded from the states in which they live and have striven to assert their rights, if necessary by force. One of the main rights asserted by the Tuareg is the recognition of an independent state of Azawad, spanning three regions of northern Mali (Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao).

- New religious influences: The penetration of a new form of Islam into the region raises a number of issues. Traditionally, there is a clear distinction between the tolerant form of Islam practised by the Tuareg, and the intolerance of the increasingly jihadi movements on strict application of Sharia law. Over the last two years or so, radical Islam has increasingly penetrated the region and different jihadi groups have been set up, the best known being Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

- Economic interests: The Sahel is traditionally a north-south and east-west transit region. The old trade routes of the salt caravans are today important for cigarettes, petrol and arms, but also for drugs. The Sahel is thus a major crossroads, both for international criminal organizations and for local Makass, with everyone enjoying a slice of the pie: not only the local politicians and the military, who are paid to turn a blind eye, but also Islamic armed groups who take their cut and protect the traffickers for a fee. In 2012, the cocaine trade alone generated profits of 500 million euros in West Africa. Around 380 million were laundered and spent within the region.

- Structural weaknesses of the state: The Tuareg rebellions led to attempts to renew the commitment to coordinate the efforts of the two armies does not automatically imply an end to the jihadist presence. Some of the rebels who have fled the battlefield and disappeared have returned to their villages or crossed neighbouring borders in search of refugee camps. While it hardly seems likely that the northern regions will again become a haven for jihadists in the immediate future, the terrorist threat still remains a reality in a region where the porousity of borders makes it difficult for countries to prevent the crisis spreading. Areas of potential crisis in the region have to be closely monitored, especially when it comes to NATO’s MD partners Algeria and Mauritania. Both countries eventually launched their offensive in early January 2013.

II) Current challenges

After the coup d’état and the launch of the jihadist offensive, the French forces were called to the rescue. So far, the intervention has been successful and efficient. However, the mission is not over and a long-term effort will probably be needed to rebuild security forces while trying to avoid a spill-over effect.

- Security reconstruction: The EUTM, which started in mid-February 2013, has the important mission of training the Malian army. Before even thinking about the future of the Malian armed forces, the objective is to avert any further disintegration and restore the troops’ confidence. Ongoing issues include: mismatched and obsolete equipment stockpiles, and a general shortage of ammunition and weaponry. Additionally, training these battalions will be all the more difficult since they are still in the field and waiting to be relieved by units from other African states. Of course, this security challenge cannot be properly addressed without political reconstruction. It is not just about reconquering lost ground, but also about ensuring that long-term political solutions are successfully implemented. In theory at least, a political process is under way: legislative and presidential elections are planned this summer, but are they likely to prove effective?

- The risk of a spill-over: The clearing of former jihadist safe havens by the French forces does not automatically imply an end to the jihadist presence. Some of the rebels who have fled the battlefield and

rebel groups exerted from Mali have moved to the political and institutional paralysis of the country and paved the way for the rebels’ offensive.

In sum, the deep-rooted causes are diverse but all have far-reaching effects in a number of areas: environment, development, security and governance. Taking control of the principal northern Mali and threatening the whole country, mixed groups (regional extremists, drug traffickers and Tuareg separatists) finally launched their offensive in early January 2013.

III) What role can NATO play?

The Malian crisis cannot be addressed as a purely national one. It is a regional crisis with international ramifications and a comprehensive answer is therefore required. The Alliance cannot ignore this region, if only for the sake of its relations with Algeria and Mauritania. Furthermore, the Alliance has, since the 2010 Strategic Concept, underlined the importance of strong partnerships and of making a greater contribution to crisis management. There are at least two possible ways in which NATO’s expertise could be usefully applied.

Help train security forces – not just Malian, but also regional forces

In operational terms, conditions today seem right for rebuilding the Malian army: the EUTM is encouraging, but perhaps it is not enough. What is missing is, above all, to train at the executive level – a key point if one wants to achieve real progress. One model to follow could be that of the NATO Training Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within NATO, keeping up the skills and capacities involved would afford a real opportunity to offer partners or Allies the tools needed to reorganize/ restructure their forces.

Ensure better regional military cooperation

NATO can be an effective framework when it comes to providing a clearing house capability between regional actors, in terms of exercises, training, exchanges of intelligence and efficient use of information. It can also help regional leaders become better acquainted and integrate use of the model in the setting of regionally oriented courses and seminars at the NATO Defense College in Rome.

To conclude, the Malian issue illustrates what the potential risks are of terrorist groups oscillating between extremist demands and criminal interests, once they have gained a strong foothold in which access is difficult and where national sovereignty is not applied. The French intervention put a stop to a threat which had already been recognized as dangerous one, but which the international community had not addressed appropriately. The situation undermines the need for redenomination of the threat – not only national, but also European and Allied strategies and interests in the region. Existing partnerships have to be strengthened, for example in the setting of regionally oriented courses and seminars at the NATO Defense College in Rome.
SERC 2 – NATO and Partners Address Strategic Change

Colonel Daniel Gillespie

In late September 2012, the NATO Defense College broke new ground when 25 ambassadors, generals, and other high-ranking military officers and senior officials from 17 different nations met for the inaugural Senior Executive Regional Conference or “SERC”. At the SERC, these selected decision-makers, influential thinkers, and leaders, representing nations within NATO and the greater Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region, discussed the most important security issues facing the region and the Alliance. The Conference was so successful that less than a year later, from 23-28 June 2013, another extremely valuable experience was repeated.

The opinions reflected in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the USA Armed Forces, the NATO Defense College, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The idea for the SERC evolved from the success of the NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC), a 10-week course which aims to promote mutual understanding between NATO and MENA officers and civil officials about common security concerns. The premise is that nations in both NATO and the MENA region have shared security concerns which, if solved, would benefit both groups of nations and make them more secure. To date, 220 Course Members from 30 nations have attended the NRCC in its short five-year history. Given the usefulness of bringing these people together in the NRCC, the idea arose of having a similar gathering for leaders and decision-makers at the level of ambassadors, senior flag officers and civilians of similar stature.

The second iteration of the SERC, or SERC 2, was themed “Partnerships in Times of Strategic Change”. Specifically, it was structured around presentations and discussions on the major geopolitical changes affecting both NATO and its partners: the impact of the protracted Syrian crisis on the region, the security challenges as a result of instability in the Sahel region, international cooperation in counterterrorism and the counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the beginning of NATO’s drawdown from Afghanistan.

The Conference opened with a warm welcome address by LtGen Arne Bård Dalhaug, who challenged the delegates to engage each other in a frank and open manner. He then turned the floor over to Gen Knud Bartels, Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, who gave a comprehensive overview of NATO’s current operations in light of the strategic changes in the MENA region. Gen Bartels then joined in the resulting discussion, which foreshadowed many of the later lectures, as delegates were eager to offer their views, and hear those of the Chairman, on numerous important topics.

The delegates engaged in a lively discussion about the crisis in Syria and its impact on the region, prompted by lectures by MajGen (ret.) Amos Gilad, Director of Policy and Political Military Affairs, Israeli Ministry of Defence, and H.E. Safak Göktaş, General Director of the Policy Planning Department, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both distinguished diplomats provided unique insights into the ongoing crisis. Their perspectives, from countries bordering with Syria, as well as those of the attendees, were most enlightening.

The intractable problems of the Sahel region were presented by General Eric Bonnemaison, Deputy Director for Strategic Affairs, French Ministry of Defence; and by Captain Mohamed Cheikhna Ould Talebmoustaph, Deputy Chief of Defence of Mauritania. France’s recent intervention in Mali, and the ongoing efforts of Mauritania to address the issues in their region provided timely and relevant data and information. The ensuing dialogue resulted in a useful understanding of the many facets of the security situation in the Sahel, as well as some options to begin addressing some of the issues. It was agreed that the Sahel is a useful case study for addressing the deteriorating security environment in many parts of the world.

LtGen Simon Vincent Mayall, Defence Senior Advisor for the Middle East, British Ministry of Defence spoke to the Conference about the challenges of arresting the proliferation of WMD through a combination of efforts, such as export controls and limiting the transfer of key technologies, as well as other more practical means. He concluded that it would require a long-term approach based on very high-level engagement. H.E. Dr Sameh Aboul Enein, Deputy Assistant to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, advocated an approach based on the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones in the region. While there are challenges to the implementation of such an idea, the very notion, in a comprehensive approach context, would have tangible pay-offs.

The impending change in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, from the focus on counterinsurgency to a training and advisory role, requiring the removal of NATO’s combat forces, is one of the biggest, ongoing strategic changes NATO is facing. US Marine Corps Gen (ret.) John Allen, who recently returned from a 19-month tour in Afghanistan as Commander, SACEUR, talked candidly about the successes and challenges NATO faces in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. He is optimistic about Afghanistan’s chances for success in the future. Crucial to that success will be the ability to deal with a three-pronged threat: the nexus between extremist-inspired terrorism and insurgency, organized crime which is allowed to flourish, and drugs which finance the violence and the crime.

NATO’s strategy for dealing with the issues discussed in this Conference requires the forging of partnerships with the region. The current framework for those partnerships is based on the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, both of which were initiated years ago under very different circumstances.

The closing address was an illuminating review of the Italian Defence Posture in future strategic scenarios, which provided an overview of many of the issues discussed at the Conference from the point of view of Italy, an important member of NATO which is connected to the region by the Mediterranean Sea. This presentation was presented by the Chief of the Italian Defence General Staff, Admiral Luigi Di Nelli Mantelli, who is eminently qualified to speak on the subject.

SERC 2 attendees also had the opportunity to visit the Italian Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (Centre for Advanced Defence Studies) and to attend a Roundtable hosted by the Ambassador of The Netherlands to Italy. The topic was “The Nature of Future Conflict” and the discussion went very well with the theme of SERC 2. Admiral (ret.) Giampaolo di Paola, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and Italian Minister of Defence, and Gen Allen were among the speakers.

By almost any measure SERC 2 was resoundingly successful. The NATO Defense College provided its traditional welcoming and professional atmosphere. The opportunity to discuss difficult issues openly and freely, in an environment of academic freedom based on the Chatham House Rule, makes the College the perfect “neutral ground” for talks on such an ambitious agenda. The exceptional experience and favorable results of SERC 2 will doubtless secure a spot on the calendar for SERC 3.
### Senior Course 122

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>First Coun.</td>
<td>K. MuradyAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Col W. LUTKENBÉGÉN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Col T. DUPONT</td>
<td>Col J. PEETERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>LtCol M. SADKOVIĆ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Cmdre L. BISSON</td>
<td>Capt. R. CASPICK, Mrs D. LEMIEUX Col S. TURBIDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>LtCol I. STŘECHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>LtCol F. BARTNÆSSEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Col P. CAVALIER</td>
<td>Capt. D. DE SANT—JAEN, LtCol G. DELAUNAY, Capt. B. DIAMOND, LtCol F. GAUTHIER, Capt. F. PRIDER, LtCol F. PRINZON DU SEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>LtCol F. BOCKHOLT</td>
<td>LtCol G. KRAMBRELL, LtCol A. MILLER, Capt. B. PRÖLL, LtCol G. SCHULLES, Col R. SCHLARB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>LtCol C. BOULIG</td>
<td>First Couns. C. KARAGIORGI, Col P. ALTOBANIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>LtCol G. GARES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Maj. A. MERTIZZO</td>
<td>Col P. DI PALMA, LtCol G. ESPERATO, LtCol S. AIELLO, LtCol L. PRIGAZZI, Maj. M. PANTUCIO, LtCol M. SCOLAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>LtCol M. TAMAMOTO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>LtCol A. QAISNEH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Col S. EL BOU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Cdr A. MOKRNIAD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>LtCol F. VAN VEENENDAAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>LtCol F. BREDAL</td>
<td>Cdr G. G. BRÅSSDAL, LtCol F. A. JACOBSEN, Mr. K. MÖN-oper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>LtCol G. MAJZER</td>
<td>Col R. MOROSCHL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. A. AL KOWARI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>LtCol C. CHUH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>LtCol V. PROKOPENKO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Cdr P. PAULER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>LtCol A. FERNANDEZ TAVARO</td>
<td>LtCol M. GUIL GARCÍA, LtCol L. F. GARCÍA, MAJARINO, ESPINO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Dr M. MANTOVANI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [*]</td>
<td>Maj. M. MOHARRÉMI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>LtCol Ü. BAYHAN</td>
<td>Cdr S. COMBES, LtCol R. A. EKÉMA, LtCol A. HATTP, Maj. A. KULC, LtCol F. KOCOGLU, Mr. F. SEVINC, Mr. F. ŞIRACI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

### Our Courses

#### NATO Regional Cooperation Course 9

- LtCol A. BOUAKKAZ
- Col M.A. BOUSSEAO
- Col A. KYEULA
- Col A. LANCEA

#### Our Courses

- Maj. M. MUHAREMI
- Col A. BOUAKKAZ
- Col M.A. BOUSSEAO
- Col A. KYEULA
- Col A. LANCEA

#### Our Courses

- LtCol M.P. ZENKER
- LtCol M. M. BOUBACAR BOUSSALEF
- LtCol B. BOLCHEF
- LtCol M. MOHAMED VALL

#### Our Courses

- Mrs O.A.A. ABDULAMEER
- Col M. M. BOUBACAR BOUSSALEF
- LtCol B. BOLCHEF
- LtCol M. MOHAMED VALL
Thanks to the modularized structure of the Senior Course (SC), some of its Study Periods are available to military officers and civilian officials who may not be able to attend the entire six-month programme. In this way, the NDC offers five different 5-day Modular Short Courses (MSCs) during every SC.

Run in conjunction with the SC, each MSC is designed to inform and to stimulate. It gives participants the opportunity to improve their knowledge and develop their understanding of major political, economic, socio-cultural, defence- and security-related issues with implications for the Alliance’s security and that of the entire international community.

The Generals, Flag Officers & Ambassadors' Course (GFAC 2013-1) was held at the NATO Defense College from 6 to 10 May 2013. It was attended by 49 ambassadors, generals, admirals, civilians and diplomats. Participants included representatives from NATO, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as Global Partners and the People’s Republic of China.

The aim of the Course is to enhance understanding of current political-military issues within the Alliance, and also to familiarize participants with current and prospective issues facing NATO.

On 28 June 2013, the NATO Defense College (NDC) hosted the closing ceremony of the second Senior Executive Regional Conference (SERC 2). The Conference was attended by a high-profile group of diplomats, senior officials, policy planners and researchers, from NATO member states and from the Alliance’s partner countries in the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf region.

Participants successfully engaged in an intensive week of study and lectures on strategic issues of great contemporary relevance to the security of the countries represented. This ambitious programme offered a forum of outstanding quality for open discussion, focusing on both the regional and the global level.

The Integrated Partner Orientation Course (IPOC 2013/1) on "NATO present and future" was held at the College from 15 to 19 April 2013, in conjunction with Senior Course 122. The aim of the Course is to analyze the role and character of NATO, including its organization, policies and activities; to consider the Alliance’s contribution to security; and to assess the transformation required by the changing security environment and the demands of current operations.
On 5 and 6 February 2013, the NATO Defense College hosted the 58th Conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA). On the agenda were security questions relevant to NATO and to the international security community at large. The inaugural address was given by Lt Gen Arne Bård Dalhaug, NDC Commandant, who was proud to welcome: H.E. Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs; H.E. Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Italian Minister of Defence; H.E. Arben Imami, Minister of Defence of Albania; the Honourable Franco Frattini, President of the Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI); the Honourable Karl A. Lamers, President of the ATA; and the Honourable Prof Enrico La Loggia, President of the Italian Atlantic Committee.

Visit of H.E. Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Italian Minister of Defence, to the NATO Defense College

For the 58th Conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association, which opened on 5 February 2013, H.E. Giampaolo Di Paola (ITA) visited the NATO Defense College. It was not the first time that the then Minister of Defence Di Paola had honoured us with his presence: during his mandate as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (2008-2011), he presided over many ceremonies at the College.

Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper, the United Kingdom’s Military Representative to NATO and the EU, visited the NATO Defense College on 15 March 2013. The Air Marshal was warmly welcomed by NDC Commandant Lt Gen Arne Bård Dalhaug (NOR A) and spent time with the Dean, Dr Richard Hooker (USA C), who provided a detailed briefing on the NDC’s mission and activities. Air Marshal Harper then attended lectures by guest speakers Prof Abass and Dr Tellis, on “Regional Organizations and their Impact on Global Security”. This was a joint session involving Senior Course 122 (SC 122), the ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC 9) and Modular Short Course 2013-2.

Visit of the Honourable Franco Frattini to the NDC

On 8 April 2013 the NATO Defense College was honoured to welcome a distinguished representative of Italy, the Honourable Franco Frattini, widely respected in international diplomacy for the educational standards he upholds so effectively as President of the Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI). After receiving a warm welcome from Lt Gen Arne Bård Dalhaug (NOR A), our distinguished guest took part in a round table discussion with senior NDC representatives and was then accompanied on a tour of the premises.

On 12 and 13 March 2013 the NATO Defense College hosted the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PPC) of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, in a meeting entitled “Emergency Security Challenges Working Group” (ESWG). The newly established ESWG planned the two-day event with a view to ascertaining specific methodologies and tools for analysis, providing expert in critical fields as well as identifying and analysing the impact of new security challenges.

On 15 April 2013, the NDC welcomed the visit of H.E. Angel Cholakov, Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria to Italy. Lt Gen Arne Bård Dalhaug (NOR A), NDC Commandant, cordially welcomed Ambassador Cholakov and provided detailed information on the College during a brief office call followed by a top table lunch.

12 April 2013: Conference and Workshop on “The Future of Airborne Forces in NATO”, at the NATO Defense College

The Conference and Workshop, which were being held for the first time, were an opportunity for in-depth discussion and analysis of prospects for NATO’s airborne forces in the short to mid-term, focusing on ways to enhance interoperability and share best practices, in the light of NATO’s “Smart Defence” and “Connected Forces” initiatives. This event was organized following a request by MajGen J. W. Nicholson (USA A), 82nd Airborne Division, who was the designated speaker for the meeting.

Ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course: an Intercultural Perspective on Religion

The ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC 9) included a topic of vital importance for intercultural dialogue: the study of the world’s three major monotheistic religions, with lectures complemented by visits to the Vatican (including attendance at a Papal Audience), the Great Synagogue of Rome and the Mosque of Rome. The programme began on 8 April 2013, with presentations by three authoritative and widely respected figures: the Reverend Father Owen Keenan, of the Papal Household; Rabbi Umberto Piperno, from the Beth Shalom Synagogue in Rome; and Imam Dr Al Muhrag, from Riyadh.
On 18 and 19 April 2013 the NATO Defense College was honoured to host a two-day visit from Lt Gen Jürgen Bornemann, Director General of the International Military Staff (IMS). LtGen Arne Bård Dalhaug (NOR A), NDC Commandant, warmly welcomed LtGen Bornemann to the College. A round table discussion was then held, with the participation of Dr Richard D. Hooker (USA C), NDC Dean, Commodore Harald Hakonsem (NOR N), Director of Management, BrigGen G. Bischof (DEU F), Director of Academic Planning & Policy, Col G. Murabito (ITA A), Director of the NDC Middle East Faculty, and Col K. Marselis (NLD F), Military Assistant to the Commandant.

On 17 April 2013 the NATO Defense College was honoured to host Lt Gen Frederick B. Hodges (USA A), Commander Land Command Headquarters Izmir, who addressed the ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC 9), Senior Course 122 (SC 122) and NDC Staff in a Lecture of Opportunity entitled "NATO Transformation". The lecture, which offered a thorough and up-to-date analysis of how NATO is responding to current challenges, was followed by a stimulating Question and Answer period.

On 3 May 2013 the NATO Defense College (NDC) was honoured to receive the visit of Gen Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, along with his Political Advisor Ambassador Tatiana Gfoeller and Lt Gen Jim Huggins. The aim of the visit was for Gen Odierno and his staff to have an overview of the mission and related activities of the NDC, and more specifically to engage with the ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC 9). On this occasion, Gen Odierno gave an extremely interesting lecture on "The importance of regional and multinational approaches to addressing strategic uncertainty".

On 26 April 2013, the NATO Defense College (NDC) was honoured to welcome Gen Sir Rupert Smith KCB DSO OBE QGM (GBR), who delivered the prestigious Eisenhower Lecture. There was an attentive and large audience for the occasion: Senior Course 122 (SC 122) and the ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC 9), Faculty and Staff.

The NATO Defense College hosted the NDC Academic Advisory Board (AAB), on 24 and 25 June 2013. Organized in conjunction with the second Senior Executive Regional Course (SERC 2), the meeting was attended by General Knud Bartels (DNK, Chairman of the Military Committee), Lt General Arne Bård Dalhaug (NOR A, NDC Commandant), Ambassador Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic (NATO/HRV), H.E. Dr Fred Tanner (CHE), Ambassador Robert E. Hunter (USA), Prof Julian Lindley-French (GBR), Vice Admiral C. A. Johnstone-Burt, CB OBE MA (ACT Chief of Staff, GBR), Dr Theresa Sabonis-Helf (USA), Mr Sinan Uğen (Carnegie Europe, TUR) and Brig General Gerd Bischof (NDC, AAB Executive Secretary, DEU F). The AAB is a crucial forum for discussion of present and future NDC programmes, ensuring timely reviews and updates of content to reflect constantly evolving international priorities.

On 10 May 2013 the NATO Defense College proudly hosted the Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Italian Republic, H.E. Vaqif Sadiqov. The aim of the visit was to provide the Ambassador with a general overview of the mission, role and educational activities of the NDC.

Mr Staffan de Mistura (ITA/SWE) visited the NATO Defense College on 10 May and addressed the ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC 9) on the topic “Opportunity from Crisis”. This was the final lecture of the course, prior to the graduation ceremony.

On 20 May 2013 the NATO Defense College proudly hosted the Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Italian Republic, H.E. Vaqif Sadiqov. The aim of the visit was to provide the Ambassador with a general overview of the mission, role and educational activities of the NDC.

Mr Staffan de Mistura (ITA/SWE) visited the NATO Defense College on 10 May and addressed the ninth NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC 9) on the topic “Opportunity from Crisis”. This was the final lecture of the course, prior to the graduation ceremony.

On 28 June 2013: Visit of Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli, Chief of the Italian Defence General Staff, to the NATO Defense College

On the occasion of the closing ceremony for the Senior Executive Regional Conference 2, Admiral Binelli Mantelli delivered a keynote speech entitled "Italian Defence Posture in Future Strategic Scenarios".
January-July 2013 Research Division Publications
(available at www.ndc.nato.int)

Research Paper Series

January
RP 88: The NRF: from a Key Driver of Transformation to a Laboratory of the Connected Forces Initiative
by Guillaume LASCONJARIAS

RP 89: The Broader Context of NATO's Nuclear Policy and Posture
by Michael RÜHLE

March
RP 90: NATO's Maritime Strategy and the Libya Crisis as Seen from the Sea
by Brooke SMITH-WINDSOR

April
RP 91: NATO and Japan as Multifaceted Partners
by Michito TSURUOKA

May
RP 92: NATO's Partnerships After 2014: Go West!
by Karl-Heinz KAMP and Heidi REISINGER

June
RP 93: NATO and the Arab League: The Importance of Being Earnest
by Mona EL-KOUEDI

Forum Paper Series

February
FP 22: AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects
edited by Brooke SMITH-WINDSOR

Report Series

January
Understanding the Malian Crisis from a Euro-Atlantic Perspective
by Guillaume LASCONJARIAS

June
"Political and Military Cooperation or NATO-Russian Roulette": Proactive Management of a Difficult Relationship
by Karl-Heinz KAMP and Heidi REISINGER

July
Conference Report: "The Future of Airborne Forces in NATO"
by Guillaume LASCONJARIAS