THE EVOLUTION OF SELECTED ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN TURKISH EDUCATION THROUGH DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTAL PERIODS

BY

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Needless to say, none of the above individuals are responsible for the views expressed in this study.
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IN TURKISH EDUCATION THROUGH DIFFERENT
GOVERNMENTAL PERIODS

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Chairman: Arthur J. Lewis
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This study is an attempt to trace the evolution of selected issues and problems in Turkish education through different governmental periods during the growth of multi-party politics since 1945-1946. The educational system is viewed as the dependent variable and the problems concerning the relationship between education and politics are approached from the viewpoint that the political system influences the structure and functioning of the school system.

The determination of the issues and problems to be studied was made through interviewing a selected group of thirty individuals in Turkey. This group was composed of ten former ministers of education, ten academicians, and ten practitioners of education. Through the interview of this group, the three issues which this study focuses
on were selected as religious education at secondary school level, vocational and technical education at secondary school level, and teacher-training for secondary level schools.

Parts of the data were collected in Turkey from governmental agencies and departments, the ministry of national education, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, centers of the political parties, newspapers, and through personal correspondence and interviews. Other sources both in English and in Turkish were also used.

In this study, formulation of educational policy is seen as part of a political process, as are the demands made on the governing forces by the competing formal and informal groups for the revision of this policy. Societal changes affect education through the functioning of the political system. The nature of society served by an educational system, and the mode of the political organization of that society play an important role in the determination of the structure and functioning of education.

Since the establishment of the multi-party system in Turkey, the governments have been unable to adopt and implement certain educational policies which were needed for the expansion of a quality secondary school system.
Because the governments could not effectively control the flow of demands placed upon them, the determination of priorities in education and the allocation of resources to different fields have frequently assumed a political character.

A gap existed between the policies of the governments stated in their programs and the performance of the governments. This situation was essentially related to the gap that has existed between the policies of the parties in power and the demands of the parties' constituency. Also, too frequent changes in governments have resulted in the lack of a continuous planning and a responsible administration.

There is a need in Turkish education for employing systematic processes of educational planning to regulate the input of external sources, especially political institutions. Also, Turkish educators need to examine the control of education in the society and participate effectively in the political process to deal with the problems which characterize the relationship between education and politics.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Problem and Purpose

The central problem of this study is to trace the evolution of selected issues and problems in Turkish education through different governmental periods during the growth of the competitive party system in Turkey since 1945-1946. This evolutionary trace requires an investigation of the consequences of changes in the political system of education in Turkey. Thus, the educational system is viewed as the dependent variable and the problems concerning the relationship between education and politics are approached from the viewpoint that the political system influences the structure and functioning of education.

There are two main areas of concern in this investigation: (1) the nature and the degree of the influence of governmental changes in the evolution of selected issues and problems in Turkish education during the multi-party era in Turkey, and (2) the ways in which this influence has
manifested itself. In the chapters that follow, a framework for categorizing the myriad examples of the interaction between education and the system of political power and a descriptive analysis of the consequences of changes in the political system of Turkey on education are provided.

Political development as an integral part of modernization movement in Turkey has been considered a logical step in expanding and consolidating the reforms carried out in various sectors of the society. After the Ottoman monarchy was abolished in 1923 and the Republic of Turkey was substituted for it, the one-party non-competitive political system with a radical-modernist orientation toward change accomplished many reforms within legal, educational, and cultural institutions. These reforms were put into effect under the leadership of a few men who dominated Turkish politics; namely, politicians, bureaucrats, and military personnel who occupied a uniquely advantageous position for influencing the process of the change. Prior to 1950, a new political organization was, however, necessitated by the changes that occurred in the structure and the mentality of the society. In 1945-1946, the decision of the government to institute a multi-party system was put into effect. This transition soon gave a different character to the social
and occupational complexion of the political leadership. Also, it led to the emergence of a chain of reactions which, in a variety of ways, served to accelerate and change the direction of Turkey's transformation. Since this transition, it has been observed that there have been growing stresses on the political system which has not exhibited to date "the capacity necessary to cope with the various issues and demands placed upon it by the rest of society." ¹ Also, keen differences in principles and policies have existed among the political parties which, during the growth of multi-party politics, have functioned as intervening structures between the state and the society and competed for governmental power. ² A great number of changes and occasional autocratic-oligarchic tendencies in governments have resulted in the lack of continuous planning and stability in the various sectors of the society. Reactions against the incapable and, to a degree, anti-democratic


measures of some governments have been observable, which have even taken the form of military interventions of different nature on several occasions.\textsuperscript{3}

With the establishment of multi-party politics, all trends of opinion have enjoyed a much greater freedom of expression. In the main, however, three fundamental trends have characterized the major groups in competition for power, influence, and authority: the conservative-religious, the secularist-modernist, and the moderates. The constant struggle among these groups has greatly affected the evolution of various issues and problems facing the social, political and economic sectors of the society.

Regarding the problem of the present study, the centralized character of the educational system in Turkey (with a great interdependence between the state—political system—and the schooling process) must be emphasized. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the indications are

that many of the innovations and reforms in education have been instigated by the national government, or by groups which have used the power of the national government to implement their proposals. However, because of the high degree of governmental integration and centralization, the massive changes which Turkey has already experienced and those which are in process render all the more conspicuous the reciprocal relationships between education and politics in this country. As a result of problematic developments in the political scene, to what extent and in what nature the political system ought to interfere in education and how much autonomy ought to be granted to professionals in education raise difficult issues involving a subtle conflict of values. Without a clear understanding of the political conditions acting upon the structure and functioning of education in a politically unstable country, the extremely complicated and highly significant relationship between education and politics cannot be fully appreciated by those who are concerned with change and innovation in Turkish education. This is to suggest an investigation of the problems of education in the light of the problems of political development in the society.
The purpose of this study is to reveal through historical research methods the evolution of selected issues and problems in Turkish education through different governmental periods in Turkey. The study focuses on three significant issues in Turkish education and analyses the position of various governments with differing views, policies, programs, and decisions on these issues. This investigation also provides a basis for comparing the plans and ideals of political parties competing for power with the degree to which they have been as dynamic, resourceful, concerned, and committed to the improvement of the educational system in Turkey as the times permitted. At the same time, this study aims at producing the kind of material useful in sensitizing students of Turkish education, educators in Turkey, and those concerned with comparative education to the complexities of modern changes in the structure of power (political development) and the effects of these changes on the school system of Turkey in comparatively modern times.

Review of the Literature

This investigator has found that there exists no systematic study of the evolution of educational issues and problems through different governmental periods during the
multi-party period in Turkey. Therefore, the present study can be considered an initial exploratory research in an area which has never before been studied intensively.

Studies which concerned themselves with education and politics in Turkey investigated mainly the political consequences of the structure and functioning of the school system. In this regard, three basic areas of investigation can be identified: (1) the impact of the school system on the political culture of the nation, (2) the socio-economic position of the educated person in Turkish society, and (3) educational institutions as direct actors in politics. However, the primary purpose and the central problem of the present study consider the relationship between education and politics from a different perspective; namely, in general terms, political forces and conditions acting upon the system of education in Turkey. Nevertheless, the findings of some research studies have meaningful implications for the topic of this study. These will be considered below.

Decisions concerning the structure and functioning of an educational system are made through political choice. In this context, the character of the political system and of its elites in a society becomes a critical variable.
However, one must pay attention to the "obvious interaction between politics and other segments of the social order and . . . the particular configurations of forces as more or less rigid constraints upon the ability of any leader to adopt particular policies." The nature of the ruling group in Turkey, principally of deputies in the Grand National Assembly of 1920 to 1957, was analyzed by Frey. The extreme importance of government in Turkish society and the focal position of the Grand National Assembly in the governmental structure were emphasized in the study. Frey found that a consistently high level of formal education characterized the background of the deputies in the Assembly. He concluded that:

Of all the social background characteristics which we have examined . . . education distinguished most clearly and consistently between the designated leadership levels in the Assembly.

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6Ibid., p. 390.
In an examination of the educational level of the Turkish political leaders against the background of the educational level of the Turkish population at large, Kazamias wrote that:

the Turkish political elites are not only a very highly educated group, they are also recruited from a relatively small segment of the Turkish society. . . . The very fact that leaders are so highly educated, and the led are educated to a much lesser extent, if at all, creates a chasm bridged by very few lines of communication.7

The facts of the social and educational background of Turkish officials (civil servants) suggest a similar trend. Dodd,8 after studying the career patterns of selected groups of officials and their educational and social backgrounds, concluded that the senior and middle-grade Turkish officials have a high level of formal education and are represented by the professional and urban elements in the society. However, Dodd suggested that this situation may

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be no more than a temporary phenomenon related to the stage of educational development reached in Turkey.

The above studies indicate that, in Turkey, the amount or level of formal education has been a crucial prerequisite for the attainment of political leadership positions and employment in the civil service. Indirectly, one can also suggest that the differences between groups in educational opportunity and attainment have been reflected in the distribution of political power and employment in the civil service. This observation reveals the elitist character of education in Turkey, one result of which, as Öğuzkan stated, has been that "the intellectual group has had the upper hand in directing the affairs of the nation since the beginning of the Republic." Before the establishment of the multi-party system, this educated, or intellectual, elite dominated Turkish politics. During this period, as Chambers put it, "there existed a sort of closed corporation of professional public servants who, acting as politicians, passed laws which they and their

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colleagues administered as bureaucrats." However, since the transition was made from a one-party to a multi-party system in 1945-1946, changes have taken place in the social and occupational complexion of political leadership. The political elite has become more diversified and more representative of the existing socio-economic groups. As a result of this development, as Logoğlu concluded in his study:

The capacity of Turkish leaders to introduce orderly change from above was lost for the sake of and as a result of democracy.11

The same investigator viewed the multi-party competitive system of democracy as existing primarily in formal terms, as he stated:

Turkish democracy is largely the politics of incoherence rather than of transformation. In a society where everyone is an emanation of someone or something else, the critical individual capacity to cope with change and conflict is lacking. There are voters in Turkey but very few citizens.12


11Logoğlu, "İsmet İnönü and the Political...", p. 255.

12Ibid., p. 254.
One of the most important aspects of modernization in a developing country is political development. Onulduran, in his study, was concerned with Turkey as the country in which to observe this process. According to this investigator,

in Turkey there are now functionally specific institutions and political functions are performed by institutions or government agencies charged with them. . . . The civilian politicians are accepted by both the various political groups and the military as the legitimate power holders. . . . Turkish politics is definitely party politics. . . . The political participation of masses has increased tremendously since the beginning of the multi-party era. . . . Turkey possesses a complex bureaucratic organization, and as a rule, decisions by the power holders are executed . . . and as modernization takes the country more and more firmly in its grip, new groups, such as labor unions and pressure groups begin to emerge.13

Despite these signs of progress, however, there is still much to be desired in the political system of Turkey. For example, petty bickering among the politicians threatens civilian political rule and stability. The keen division between the political parties competing for power is dangerous in Turkey's progress toward development in

various sectors of the society. Sayari, in his study of party politics in Turkey, succinctly stated that:

The constant resort to demagogy on the part of some party elites or the inability of the legislature to deal effectively with the pressing socio-economic problems confronting Turkey continue to provide the opponents of competitive politics with much ammunition to criticize the existing system.\textsuperscript{14}

The efficiency of the bureaucracy also needs to be improved. Instances of corruption and favoritism do seem to occur in Turkey more frequently than in more developed nations.\textsuperscript{15} A gradual politicization on the part of bureaucrats have been observed since the beginning of the multiparty era. The political parties that have held governmental power have often attempted to secure politically expedient decisions from the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{16}

The effects on the education of such characteristics of the Turkish political system are numerous. Some research studies, though mostly in an indirect way, made reference to these effects. For example, in an investigation to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{14}Sayari, "Party Politics in Turkey. . . .\textsuperscript{15}" p. 317.  \\
\textsuperscript{15}Onulduran, Political Development and . . . ," p. 108.  \\
\end{flushleft}
analyze the role of education in Turkish economic and national development, Kaya \(^{17}\) considered the role of politicians in educational development. He concluded that the politicians' partisan approach to the educational system has led to inadequate curricula, faulty methods, and inappropriate educational policies, and is the basic reason for the slow economic, social, and political development in Turkish society. Akdemir \(^{18}\) analyzed the causes of failure at each of three levels of education in Turkey (elementary, junior high, and high school). In the conclusion, three factors were found to be problematic: (1) the centralized mechanism of the Ministry of National Education, (2) distribution of educational facilities, and (3) the supply of personnel in education. From this analysis, there emerged a view of the educational system as ineffective and inefficient. Akdemir's study indicated that the problems of education in Turkey are closely associated with the problems in governmental


administration. This view has also been supported by other investigators. For example, Akalin,\(^\text{19}\) who studied the teacher supply problem in Turkish secondary education, indicated an insufficient supply of secondary school teachers due to inadequate resource utilization. Doğan,\(^\text{20}\) in his study of the evaluation of the Turkish secondary school system, saw a necessity for (1) an administrative reform in the central and provincial organization of education, (2) the development of an objective policy in personnel assignments and transfers, (3) the development of the criteria to open new schools, and (4) the distribution of some responsibilities of the central organization to local authorities and individual schools.

The highly centralized character of the organization of the educational system in Turkey creates difficulties in dealing with the problems of education in this country. On the other hand, the dependency of the educational system on the political system is highly contributed to by the central character of the educational system itself. According to


the report of the Mediterranean Regional Project, the weaknesses of the central organization of education included the following: (1) delegation of authority is not clearly defined and authority is not commensurate with responsibility, (2) because of a high degree of centralization, routine work and the decision-making usually take a long time, (3) there are no provisions to employ "specialists" within the Ministry of Education, and (4) the indications are that the administrative system has simply developed by trial and error.²¹ Similarly, Bursalioğlu pointed out that:

(1) Structurally the Ministry is top-heavy and characterized by rigidity, duplication, and competition between various practically independent units.
(2) All authority is concentrated in the hands of the Minister and the undersecretaries who are appointed, not on the basis of professional or administrative experiences, but usually on political grounds.
(3) Decision-making and policy-implementation and termination are not rational procedures. (4) ... advisory bodies to the Ministry ... are weak and ineffective. ...

(5) The Ministry is characterized by inertia, a tendency to defend the status quo, and "various pathologies of authority, such as authority without competence, overemphasis, exaggerated aloofness, and insulation from criticism."22

These deficiencies in the administrative contexts of the Turkish educational system mean that it is almost impossible to innovate in any level of schooling. Thus, unless comprehensive and sustained efforts are undertaken by the highest levels in the Ministry, the national government, and in the legislature, many of the important issues and problems in Turkish education will largely remain unresolved.

Two conclusions which are relevant to the problem and the purpose of the present study seem to emerge from the above review of the literature: (1) the growth of the multi-party competitive politics in Turkey since 1945-1946 has been marked by a variety of shortcomings and problems which have profoundly affected the developments in various sectors of the Turkish society, and (2) problems of education can be associated with the problems in governmental administration and in the political development in Turkey.

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These two points suggest that there is a need for research which concentrates on the relationship between education and politics in Turkey, from the viewpoint of how the system of political power influences the form, process, and content of education. The present study addresses itself to this area of concern in its limited way by studying the evolution of selected issues and problems in Turkish education through different governmental periods since the beginning of the multi-party era in Turkey.

Overview of the Conceptual Considerations

In this study, politics is defined as the struggle among groups which takes the form of competition for formal roles and functions through which authoritative decisions in a society are made as well as competition for the allocative outputs themselves. Based on this definition, formulation of educational policy is seen as essentially part of a political process, as are the demands made on the governing forces by the competing formal and informal

23 Under this heading, a short summary of the conceptual considerations concerning the relationship between education and politics is presented. See Chap. II of this study for details.
groups for the revision of this policy. Education is a major function of the state and, thus, a part of state organization. It has both supportive and allocative functions. Therefore, it can be viewed as a miniature political system which shares the major characteristics with more obvious and familiar political systems. Education is affected by, and subject to, the changing conditions in the larger political system.

The significance of the relationship between a system of education and the political system increases with the degree of change a society and its governmental system are undergoing. Education is affected by societal changes through the decisions put forward by the governing forces. These decisions are shaped by the interaction between official power-holders and formal interest groups and associations. However, a governmental system, in itself, is also capable of producing enough demands related to the structure and functioning of education.

The nature of society served by an educational system, and the mode of the political organization of that society play an essential role in the determination of the form, process, and content of education. In a more specific sense, the status of education in a society is a direct
correlative of the degree of predominance of value-orientation, and the type of political system, found in that society.

One must, however, note that implementation of educational policy has political consequences of various kinds. Therefore, when the relationship between education and politics is analyzed, the question is whether the educational system or the political system is to be regarded as the independent variable. The present study views education as the dependent variable. This is necessitated by the nature of the problem and the purpose of the study.

Methods and Procedures

Selection of Issues and Problems

This investigator spent the time between March 17, 1976 and March 27, 1977 in Turkey to determine the issues and problems to be studied, and to have access to various

sources of data in Turkey. His work, during this period, was assisted by Dr. Ziya Bursalioğlu of the Faculty of Education at Ankara University and supervised by his Doctoral Committee.

The determination of the issues and problems to be studied was made through interviewing a selected group of thirty individuals in Turkey. These thirty individuals were determined through a series of background interviews with twelve individuals intimately acquainted with various aspects of Turkish educational, political, and administrative systems. These twelve interviewees were also asked for suggestions regarding the structure of the interview of the thirty individuals.

After concluding the background interviews with the above individuals, the next step involved structured interviews with thirty individuals. The composition of this group was as follows:

1. Ten politicians (former Ministers of Education),
2. Ten academicians whose concern had been in the fields of education, politics, or public administration in Turkey, and
3. Ten practitioners of education who had held high official positions in the Ministry of Education.
The determination of the individuals to be included in the above categories, except for the politicians, was a subjective judgement. The suggestions of the pre-interview group and Dr. Z. Bursalioğlu were used in making the selection. Although the selections were made as objectively as possible, it is recognized that another analyst might have added certain names and excluded some of those who were chosen. However, considering the methodological problems involved, this investigator is confident that the interview group is a fairly accurate representation of the above categories.

The above individuals were interviewed for the purpose of determining the issues and problems to be studied. The interviews were structured as follows:

1. Using the table illustrated below, the interviewee was asked to discard one of the four areas which, according to him, has had the least critical development regarding the impact of the political system and government changes during the multiparty period.

2. In the second step, the interviewee was asked to point out particularly in which level of schooling each of the three remaining areas has shown the most critical development.
Table 1. List of the Twelve Individuals in the Pre-Interview Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Selahattin Ertürk</td>
<td>Professor of Education, Head of the Department of Education at Hacettepe University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Fatma Varış</td>
<td>Professor of Education, Dean of the Faculty of Education at Ankara University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Kemal Özinoğlu</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Education at Middle East Technical University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hüsnü Arici</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Psychology at Hacettepe University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. İlhan Akhun</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Faculty of Education at Ankara University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Niyazi Karasan</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Faculty of Education at Ankara University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. İbrahim Başaran</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Faculty of Education at Ankara University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Haydar Taymaz</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Faculty of Education at Ankara University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Galip Karagözoğlu</td>
<td>Secretary to the Committee of Training of Scientists at Scientific and Technical Research Organization of Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nihat Bilgen</td>
<td>Member of the Committee on Education and Instruction of the Ministry of National Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orhan Dengiz</td>
<td>Former Minister of National Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Üstündag</td>
<td>Former Minister of National Education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. List of the Individuals in the Interview Group.

1. Practitioners:

Dr. İlhan Özdid, Head Undersecretary (1971-1972), and Undersecretary of Vocational and Technical Education (1973-1974).

Selçuk Kantarcioglu, General Director of Personnel Affairs (1973-1974), Legal Consultant of the Ministry of Education (1975), and, at the time of the interview, Representative Member of the Ministry of Education to the State Personnel Organization.

Dr. İbrahim Ethem Başaran, Assistant to the General Director of Elementary Education (1970-1974), and General Director of Adult Education (1975).


Celal Şentürk, General Director of Teacher Training (1974).

Dr. Haydar Taymaz, Assistant Director of Study and Planning of Vocational and Technical Education (1968-1971).

Nihat Bilgen, Member of the Committee on Education and Instruction at the time of the interview.

Dr. İlhan Sezgin, Member of the Committee on Education and Instruction at the time of the interview.

Dr. Sudi Bül'bül, Assistant to the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Education (1972-1975).

2. Academicians:

Professor Dr. Emel Doğramacı, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Hacettepe University.

Professor Dr. Şefik Uysal, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Ege University in İzmir.

Professor Dr. Hasan Ali Koçer, Chairman of the Department of Foundations of Education at the Faculty of Education at Ankara University, and Director of State Sports Academy in Ankara.

Professor Dr. Fuat Turgut, Department of Education at Hacettepe University.

Professor Dr. Hifzi Doğan, Faculty of Education at Ankara University.

Associate Professor Dr. Süleyman Özoğlu, Faculty of Education at Ankara University.

Associate Professor Dr. Cevat Alkan, Faculty of Education at Ankara University.

Dr. Galip Karagözoglu, Secretary to the Committee of Training of Scientists at Scientific and Technical Research Organization of Turkey.

Dr. Ahmet Akgün, Department of Education at Hacettepe University.

Dr. Mustafa Aydin, Department of Education at Hacettepe University.
Table 2 (Continued)

3. Politicians (Former Ministers of Education)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term of Service</th>
<th>Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İbrahim Öktem</td>
<td>6/12/63-12/2/63</td>
<td>İnönü-IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/25/63-2/13/65</td>
<td>İnönü-X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cihat Bilgehan</td>
<td>2/20/65-10/22/65</td>
<td>Ürgüplü</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orhan Dengiz</td>
<td>10/27/65-4/1/67</td>
<td>Demirel-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4/15/73-2/7/74</td>
<td>Talu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İlhami Ertem</td>
<td>4/1/67-10/22/69</td>
<td>Demirel-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orhan Oğuz</td>
<td>11/3/69-2/14/70</td>
<td>Demirel-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3/6/70-3/12/71</td>
<td>Demirel-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şinasi Orel</td>
<td>3/26/71-12/3/71</td>
<td>Erim-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İsmail Arar</td>
<td>12/11/71-5/22/72</td>
<td>Erim-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabahattin Özbek</td>
<td>5/22/72-4/10/73</td>
<td>Melen-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Üstün dağ</td>
<td>2/7/74-11/24/74</td>
<td>Ecevit-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara Reisoğlu</td>
<td>11/24/74-3/13/75</td>
<td>Irmak-I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. The interviewee was then asked to state a minimum of three reasons for each of his selections which appeared on the table.

4. In the final state of the interview, various governmental periods were discussed with the interviewee on the basis of the total nine reasons which he stated in the previous step.

The first two steps were intended to identify the three issues to be studied, and the third and fourth steps to obtain data on the selections of the interviewees.

The selections of the interview group appear on Table 4. This table clearly indicates that teacher education, vocational and technical education, and religious education were seen by the interview group as important issues to be considered at secondary education level in a study of the evolution of educational problems through different governmental periods since the establishment of the multi-party system in Turkey. Accordingly, the three issues to be studied were determined as appeared on Table 4; namely, teacher education for the secondary schools, religious education at secondary school level, and vocational and technical education at secondary school level. The specific problems concerning these issues are dealt with in the third, fourth and fifth chapters of this study.
Table 3. Interview Guide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elementary Level</th>
<th>Secondary Level</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and Techn-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>nical Educa-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>tion</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Selections of the Interview Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elementary Level</th>
<th>Secondary Level</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Education</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational and Technical Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Phases of the Study

This study of the evolution of selected issues and problems in Turkish education through different governmental periods consists of two main parts: the descriptive phase in which efforts are made to identify, describe, analyze, and classify the events and developments within the limitations of the area of the problem, and the interpretative phase in which consideration is given to possible implications of the study for the present and the future of the relationship of education and politics in Turkey. The conceptual considerations concerning this relationship are also dealt with.

Sources of Information

There were seven types of sources that provided the basic information for studying the evolution of selected issues and problems in Turkish education through different governmental periods. These were: governmental agencies and departments, the Ministry of National Education, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, centers of the political parties, newspapers, personal correspondence and interviews, and other sources of information. This investigator collected parts of the data from these sources during his stay in Turkey.
Nature of Data Collected

1. Governmental Agencies and Departments. Publications of various governmental agencies and departments such as the State Planning Organization and the State Institute of Statistics were used to obtain information.

2. The Ministry of National Education. Records and the publications of the Educational Councils, the Committee on Instruction and Education, the General Directorates of Teacher Education, Vocational and Technical Education, and Religious Education were extensively used.

3. The Turkish Grand National Assembly. Records of the parliamentary debates, the Official Gazette of the Assembly, and other related sources found in the collections of the Assembly were consulted.

4. Centers of the Political Parties (Justice Party, Republican People's Party, and National Salvation Party). The reports and debates of party congresses, programs of parties, the governmental programs were used to obtain information on parties.


Other newspapers and periodicals occasionally consulted are cited in the footnotes and in the bibliography of this study.
6. Personal Correspondence and Interviews. Personal correspondence and interviews with people familiar with the evolution of the selected issues in education through different governmental periods were used to obtain data.

7. Other sources included publications on educational and political developments in Turkey, both in English and in Turkish.

Treatment and Analysis of Data Collected

The descriptive parts of this study were based on the data collected from the sources mentioned above. These sources were evaluated by establishing their present reputations. Then, the evaluation of the information as information was undertaken. Here, attention was given to the internal consistency of the information. Finally, the external consistency of the information was estimated; that is, the extent to which it was consistent with other information about the same event. Through consulting a variety of sources, the investigator was able to resolve the differences among the sources and in only a few instances had to rely on a professional judgement to make the final evaluation. The translation of the Turkish materials, if
not otherwise specified in the footnotes, was made by the investigator. A free translation style was used in order to convey more accurately in English the thoughts and ideas expressed in Turkish.

Structure of the Study

The first chapter of this study concerns itself with the introduction of the study. The second chapter concentrates on the conceptual considerations involved in the relationship between educational and political systems. In the third, fourth, and fifth chapters, three educational issues are dealt with in terms of their evolution through different governmental periods since the establishment of multi-party politics in Turkey. In the final chapter, conclusions and recommendations are presented.
CHAPTER II

EDUCATION AND POLITICS--CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

Schools are major social institutions subject to all the foundations and forces of the society in which they function. These social and socio-related foundations and forces have such dimensions as historical, philosophical, psychological, governmental, economic, and political all impinging upon the structure and the functioning of a school system.¹

With a focus on the relationship between particular types of political systems and the structure and functioning of the school system, it is the intent in this conceptual framework to deal with the ways in which education is shaped by political foundations and forces which characterize the political system of a society. In this regard, the

uniformities which characterize the educational policies of
different kinds of states, and the degree to which systemic
changes in their systems of political power structure affect
educational policy will be described.

The Significance of the Relationship

"Politics" as it is used in this study is not intended
as a derogatory term, but should be considered a descriptive
one. As stated earlier, this term refers to struggle among
groups which takes the form of competition for formal roles
and functions through which authoritative decisions in a
society are made as well as competition for the allocative
outputs themselves. Politics applies to a process as well
as an organization. As a process, it is concerned with the
formulation of goals, decision-making on various levels,
and the way in which power is exercised and expressed. As
an organization, it is taken to mean the control and guidance
of the formal and informal political organization in a society,
provided by law or tradition, through the political process.

Considering the purpose of the discussion which will
be provided in this chapter, a more operational description
of the term politics is needed. Therefore, I will
specifically be concerned with (1) activities focused on the acquisition and use of power through control of institutions of government, (2) activities in which public issues are discussed and demands upon government expressed, and (3) actions of formal institutions of government, which make laws, interpret them, and attempt to carry them out through a bureaucracy. In this sense, politics involves the activities and relationships of individuals, groups, and organizations resulting in, or intended to result in, decisions by any governmental policy-making body.

Application of this view of politics to the educational scene suggests that politics manifests itself in the governance within the school system, in the process by which schools are controlled by and held responsible to public, and in the process of decision-making as it relates to other governments.²

Saylor and Alexander stated that:

Schools are political institutions, that is, they "relate to government or the conduct of government." All schools, whether public or nonpublic, are subject to political control and direction.³


The formulation of educational policy, being a function of government, is basically part of a political process, as are the demands made on government by forces within and outside of the governmental structure for the revision of policy. On the other hand, as a part of state organization, the educational system is one of the mechanisms in the society for the allocation of certain resources and values as well as a source of support for the system of political power. Therefore, the educational system can be viewed as a miniature political system which shares the major characteristics with more obvious and familiar political systems. This close relationship implies that education will tend to take on the purposes and characteristics of the particular form of political organization within which it functions. Thus, one observes that school is a major public institution—in a totalitarian state an institution which has clearly defined values, goals, and purposes; in a democratic society,

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4 This thesis is fully developed in Frederick M. Wirt and M. W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1972).

an institution for which values are less clearly defined, but are, nonetheless, closely related to the political environment. This is to say that the interplay between education and politics exists universally, although it tends to be obscured in societies which are well-educated and politically stable, especially if education is locally controlled and ostensibly non-partisan.\textsuperscript{6} Rowley, for example, observed that:

For some time in some western countries the structure of the legislature, the relationship between offices of the civil service, and the slow rate of change in laws—reflecting the stability of the society—made it possible (though erroneous) to conceive of politics, with its conflicts and interests, as separate from the institutions of administration, including those concerned with the administration of the national system of public education.\textsuperscript{7}

The obscurity of the relationship between education and politics in some societies, thus, appears to be due to the


characteristics of a stable political system, with strongly entrenched constitutions legitimizing the offices of governments. However, today, even in the most wealthy and developed societies, the period of stability is drawing to a close, and the problems in political systems and those concerning education produce more and more material for political conflict which makes the structure and functioning of education increasingly susceptible to political pressures. In a general sense, therefore, the question becomes almost imperative: Are there adequate compensations for the excesses and mistakes of state control and direction of schools, and the aberrations of public understanding of education? Certainly, education is particularly vulnerable to some characteristics of politics, especially mass politics. Since the responsibility rests on no one in particular, it is difficult to ensure a strong leadership to deal with substantial instabilities in public understanding of education and with the attempts of certain formal and informal groups to divert education from its real purpose.

In order for political interference in education not to be mischievous, it is particularly essential that educators must examine the control of education in the society and the effects of that control on the schools and teaching.
Accordingly, as Nunnery and Kimbrough emphasized, school officials must understand the complexities of politics, know the methods of gaining power within the existing political structure, and be able to convert this knowledge into successful action. "Schools cannot afford to be free of politics. Neither should they be limited by ineffective political activity."^8

The Question of Socio-Political Roles and Functions of Education

The relationship of education to the system of political power is varied, complex, and elusive. This relationship partly stems from the socio-political roles and functions performed by the educational system in the society. These roles and functions, by their nature, have the capacity of making the structure and functioning of education more open to political pressures in various forms from a multiplicity of sources. Is education more important as an instrument of the political system, as a major political entity, as a

source of particular social, economic, and political outcomes, or as an arena of competing social and political value systems? In general, educational systems of contemporary world societies perform all these roles simultaneously. However, conflicts emerging from such a multiplicity of roles and functions directly affect schools, often creating contests among educators, administrators, formal interest groups and associations, political parties, governmental departments, and national governments. This situation will be dealt with below.

Education as an Instrument of the Political System

Education can be viewed as an instrument of the political system in the sense that it is an instrument of power and a foundation for the authority of the state, and, to some extent, the instrument of national governments.

This role of education can be best observed in the progress of traditional societies toward modernization. The process of modernization can be looked upon from the viewpoint of, at least, two distinct, but interrelated, concepts: the behavior of people, including their general sets of values and daily living patterns, and the
institutions of society which are being modernized. Although the stimulus for modernization often comes from the people and although the institutions adapt themselves to new challenges, the existing stimulus-response relationship between these two entities is considerably more than, and not always, unidirectional. The high degree of complexity in the interaction between people and institutions can create situations in which changes in the behavioral patterns of people and institutional changes that take place may not always be complementary to one another.

The contradictions concerning the people-institutions dichotomy often create, on the part of individual people representing personal and social divisions of the society, such symptoms as ambivalence, frustrations, and emotional reactions to the distance between aspiration and reality. In the larger society, reaction and conflict caused by the disruption of traditional patterns can cause political instability, social tensions, psychological disorientations, and economic disequilibrium. Therefore, some attempt has

9 See Onulduran, Political Development and . . . , Chap. 1.

to be made to mobilize the efforts of people around the leadership of government—a process without which the developing nation cannot operate as a modern state. Cooperation among men through communication and concession of authority should ideally result in a highly organized citizenry, where formal and informal organizations will be formed—all involving interrelated efforts of great numbers of people in order to achieve rapid advances in the society. Frey commented that:

The high degree of organization in "advanced" states is necessarily produced by power, by consensus, or by some combination of the two. People act in concert either spontaneously because they possess similar attitudes or because they are acted upon by other people. . . . In general, certainly, schools are able to produce a considerable degree of consensus in a society and to facilitate that organization of masses of people in the society which is necessary to national economic and political power. 11

Thus, as it is observed in both democratic and authoritarian politics, schools will provide the state with a major training ground to mold the ideas, opinions, and behaviors

appropriate for novice citizens. Since the survival of a political system is partly determined by the level of support which it receives,¹² schools will be regarded by the governing forces as means to political ends. The ideal of education will, therefore, be greatly subordinated to the national interest as interpreted by the government of the day. Walsh, however, warned that:

Those in political control will tend to see in the educational system a most effective means for furthering the objectives they espouse. If these objectives are valid and realistic, education will, other things being equal, prosper and thrive. If the objectives are invalid, then, education will either be deliberately and drastically curtailed or it will become a tool for advancing causes and cults or for perpetuating the power structure.¹³

Although the role and functioning of education as an instrument of the system of political power is both desirable and necessary, the above statement suggests that there is nothing infallible about the control and direction of education by the governing forces. Officials that are elected and wield power do not assure that education, in their hands,


¹³Walsh, Education and Political Power, p. 1.
is safe and good. A school system with an insufficient amount of power to exercise over educational matters is subject to becoming vulnerable to the weaknesses of the political system in which it functions. It should be emphasized that, in general, education is an insecure organization, submissive toward its environment, including other social and political organizations. As Elboim-Dror stated:

If we were to construct a continuum of organizational power in environmental relations . . . ranging from the organization that dominates its environment to the one dominated by its environment, education would be near the powerless end. . . . Though other public service systems are also under the control of political institutions, education seems to feel the control more.14

In his study of politics of education, MacKinnon made a parallel observation. He stated:

Every phase of education is affected by politics and the virtues of government control are taken for granted in the school system to an extent impossible in any other activity in the state. . . . The state is so involved in every phase of education that education is a political activity, and its problems are, to a large extent, problems in governmental administration.15


This situation obviously stems from the enormous importance of education for the future of the society. However, it suggests that, when education reaches the point of being dominated by the system of political power, the quality of outcome in the educational system will largely be dependent on the quality of influence of the political system in education.

The growing national power in education is observed in both developed and developing countries. In developed countries, a growing and shifting population has created problems and educational demands which local communities have not been able to meet. Also, financial demands of an increasing school-age population have been severely felt in most localities. As a result, the states have increased their support as well as their influence in local school matters.\textsuperscript{16} In the case of developing countries, almost every national government and leader regard education as the basic component in nation-building and as the foundation for rapid economic development and social change.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore,


\textsuperscript{17} Szyliowicz, \textit{Education and Modernization}, p. 2.
education is viewed as an instrument of the system of political power to achieve results which are intended by that system, and, thus, as a central political activity. It is the responsibility of governments to set the objectives of educational plans and programs and carry them out through the bureaucracy—taking into account the national interest, and its own survival.  

The above discussion suggests that there is a point beyond which education may lose efficiency and freedom as it functions as an instrument of the political system. As Friedman emphasized, a state monopoly of education can gradually lead to conformity and waste.

Educational System as a Political Entity

An educational system is considered a political entity in the sense that (1) it is part of the apparatus of government and directly dependent upon the process of governing, and (2) it can be studied from the viewpoint of its being

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18Rowley, The Politics of Educational Planning...

a political actor and a prominent political issue. Frey stated, for example, that:

The school system in most countries is . . . a large scale organization, serving its own interests and vying with other organizations in the society for power and resources. Attempting to sway governmental policy, it affects even non-educational decisions of government . . . the component parts of the educational system become "interest groups," striving to affect policy without assuming formal power, such activities tend to alter the distribution of power in the society.20

Thus, the educational system as a political entity, as a whole and in its parts, can be a political force of some consequence. As far as its organization is concerned, no decision, for example, is made about education without the direct or indirect sanction of government, or a legal process which has been defined by some agent or agency of government. At the same time, by definition, decision-making in education is a political process. Thus, education is almost always a prominent political issue. Its structure and functioning attract the attention and activities of not only elements of governmental and educational systems but also various groups and organizations outside these systems, such as press, voluntary associations, political parties, and individuals.

In such a surrounding, it is only natural that the school system and its components responsibly participate in the political process as political actors or entities. However, the form and effectiveness of this participation vary from one political system to another. Such variations directly affect the structure and the functioning of education in different societies. For example, Iannaccone and Lutz observed in the United States that the educational system tends toward developing a closed system of social power and politics. This situation has directly resulted from the special political and governmental arrangements provided by the larger political system for the functioning of schools. These authors concluded from their analysis of the research that:

The politics of school districts, influenced by their special governmental arrangements and the emotional commitments of American society in the absence of the two-party system, have developed an unusual degree of autonomy. This has resulted in an amazing capacity among school districts for rejecting changes that would modify their usual processes and their internal status structure. The rejection of new inputs, people, ideas, activities, and technologies is hardly surprising when those who have the most to lose by this innovation constitute the internal power structure of the existing system. 21

In a similar vein, Selakovich, finding that the power and control aspects of education and other governmental functions are viewed differently, wrote:

The result has been a difference in the manner in which formal and informal power groups as well as individuals have related themselves to schools and to government. . . when schools are considered, a great deal of innovation in organization and administration has come from within the profession of education. 22

Concerning educational matters, such characteristics may be said to contribute to the effectiveness of the educational system as a political entity. In non-educational matters, the effectiveness should be somewhat minimal due to political and governmental arrangements surrounding education. These arrangements, according to Selakovich, partly explain the inability of the schoolmen to work effectively in the political process at large. 23 Rowley observed, on the other hand, that a relatively closed system of social power and politics in education in some developed countries has implications in terms that educators may be cushioned against the effects of inadequate

22 Selakovich, The Schools and American Society, p. 185.
23 Ibid., see Chapter 11.
resources within the walls of educational institutions without having to consider limitations involved in the competition for power, influence and authority in the larger political system. The desirability of such a situation is, of course, questionable, as Nunnery and Kimbrough stated:

Since the quality of education in the school system is related to the maturity of the larger political system served. . . . There do appear to be reasons for educators to exercise greater interest and participation in general civic affairs than traditional practice demanded. 25

In the case of most other societies, where education is centrally controlled and greatly dominated by the system of political power, educators as well as other elements in the educational systems play disproportionately important parts in politics. The shape and purposes of education in such countries are determined, in general, not only in the conflict which results in legislation, but also by the competition for power, influence and authority between the legislature and the bureaucracy; between the political parties;

24Rowley, Politics of Educational Planning..., p. 11.

within the dominant party, and within the bureaucracy which is very much the instrument of political as well as educational decisions.\textsuperscript{26} In such a political surrounding, educators as well as other elements in the school system must accept the political facts as the foundations and forces on which to build. The political environment of education is such that, in the process of a simultaneous struggle over the educational system and its performance, the component parts of the system seek greater opportunities to exercise power over resolving problems in education as well as other issues of political importance. For example, in general, teachers constitute one of the largest vocational blocs. They are politically significant not only because they are a political force as direct participants in politics, but also they are crucial communication links between the governing forces and the mass of the people. The activities of the students generally have a powerful impact on the actions of the government institutions. Certain educational institutions frequently attempt to further their academic

\textsuperscript{26}Rowley, \textit{Politics of Educational Planning}. \ldots, p. 14.
or non-academic interests by political action. All such activities affect the nature of the distribution of power in the society. Male observed in England, for example, that the growing power of the national governments in education has stimulated the growth of militancy among teachers and their organizations, as well as among citizens and many other groups who want to be included in the decision-making process. Many of the important decisions in education, therefore, are made by the national government in consultation with the powerful teachers' organizations, local governments, and citizen groups.  

It becomes clear that inasmuch as the elements in an educational system become political entities and actors, as well as objects of political conflict, the effectiveness of education in these roles and functions will largely be determined by the way the larger political system operates and by the special governmental and political arrangements in which the school system functions.

Education is assumed to have the potential for changing various aspects of a society. For example, underlying the huge investments being made in education is the belief that formal schooling is a major variable determining the rate and level of economic development. Education is also seen as an instrument of social change; the role of education in transforming people's beliefs, attitudes and values as well as altering social institutions to render them consonant with the needs of the society is often emphasized. The importance of education for nation-building and political development has been a concern for political scientists. Whether or not education can fulfill these and many other
possible expectations is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to point out that which intended outcomes in the society should be realized through the use of the school system and how these desired outcomes can be accomplished cause some degree of political conflict in educational policy- and decision-making.

Education also produces some results, on the other hand, which are not consciously intended or recognized. Among these are at least three functions that are worthy of discussion here from a political point of view. First, education serves to validate social status by affecting types and levels of employment. Second, education is one of the determinants of social mobility. And third, it affects ideas, attitudes, and values of the population. All such consequences of educational experience have an impact on the future formation of the power structure in the society. And control and direction of education by the system of political power play an important role in the determination of these consequences.

Many positions in modern societies are available only to people who have certain educational qualifications. Thus, it may safely be assumed that significant differences between population groups in educational opportunity and
attainment will often be reflected in the distribution of political and economic power and employment.\textsuperscript{31} As educational experience offers such future opportunities to some groups, the popular evaluation of access to the educational institutions becomes more crucial. Clearly, the power relationships among groups with varying educational opportunities will be affected in the long run. This situation is especially critical in those countries where the educational development has not yet reached the level which would offer fairly equal opportunities to various different groups in the society. Therefore, in the face of the scarcity of educational resources, the question of who will get what type of education becomes important. And changes and competition within the system of political power will directly affect this issue.

Education is also one of the main avenues of social mobility. As an important aspect of stratification, social mobility refers to movement from one class or rank to another, and is affected by such variables as income, occupation, power, and association. Educational experience

\textsuperscript{31}Abernathy and Coombe, "Education and Politics. . . ," p. 128.
directly contributes to all these variables. On the other hand, the amount and form of mobility are also related to the type of political system that exists in a society. One study found, for example, that stable democracies have high rates of upward and downward mobility, while authoritarian and politically unstable nations have less mobile populations. Leslie et al., pointing out that societies vary in the amount of status inconsistency—(discrepancies among the several dimensions of a person's class or rank)—which they foster, stated:

Those with more status inconsistency tend toward pluralist, rather than elitist, power structures. They are also likely to have more social mobility. Mobility rates derive more from structural properties of the system itself than from the qualities or efforts of the population.

Thus, one may assume that education's role as one of the determinants of social mobility is itself affected by the dynamics of other determinants. The school system operates in the context of other institutions and is constrained by


them. When the political institutions, and political system at large, are considered in this connection, one may argue that specific decisions concerning the structure and functioning of education will inevitably reflect the distribution of power in the society, the kinds of support that any particular regime possesses, its ideological orientation, and its level of political development. Thus, as one considers the links among education's role in affecting mobility, the patterns of mobility itself, political ideology, and elite or pluralist power distribution, one suggests that this may be a true causal relationship reflecting the fact that different political systems will respond in different ways in their educational systems to demands of certain groups for greater educational opportunities. To put it in an indirect way, as was concluded in a study of education in a diversified sample of ten states by Aran et al.:

Variations in the nature of the societal center in general will be systematically related to the variation in the pattern of educational demand, in the patterns of response to these demands and in the impact

\[34\] Szyliowicz, *Education and Modernization*, p. 12.
Education as an Arena of Competing Political and Social Value Systems

Based on the belief that schools influence attitudes, belief, values, and subsequent citizen behavior, various organizations and associations find themselves in a competition to affect curriculum, teachers, and students in order to have the school system promote their own views and ideals. Such competition can take place between the ministries and departments of government, and within the ministry or department responsible for education. Political parties, by their nature, try to use the elements of the system for their own purposes as far as possible. The political party in power inevitably tries to ensure that educational programs reflect the party's own ideology. The party also tries to ensure that the educational programs contribute to the realization of the party's own governmental program. On

the other hand, states which are completely committed to particular doctrines of history and social change use the school system to ensure complete acceptance of what they proclaim to be the basic truth. 36

When power changes occur (resulting from political elections, revolutions of various kinds, or depending on time factor), differing views and ideologies of new groups in power will inevitably be imposed on the school system to make necessary provisions in curricula, instructional matters, professional formation and performance of teachers, etc.

In democratic regimes, the operation of such groups is clearly valid, 37 but their uncontrolled or unregulated impact on the school system can be calamitous. Materials and units forced into the curricula, indoctrination of the teaching force and students, introducing new elements into the school system at the behest of pressure groups, political parties, or governments can, in fact, make education a highly

36Rowley, The Politics of Educational Planning. . . .

sensitive area as a source of various forms of social and political disorder. Such a danger especially exists when systemic processes of educational planning do not regularize the input of these external forces; that is, these forces should be regarded as resources for the process of planning rather than as parts of the planning groups.

**General Statement**

The foregoing discussion illustrates that one way of looking at the relationship between education and politics can be based on the inherent nature of the educational process itself. Namely, the school is a political institution in the sense that it allocates certain resources and values as well as being a support for the larger political system. Thus, the process of education carries such characteristics that the structure and functioning of education become matters of significant but differing preferences among the forces in the society. This situation obviously sets the scene for political conflict focused upon the educational system and its performance.

The relation of education to politics can also be studied on the basis of the patterns and nature of change in the system of political power and in the society, which will be dealt with below.
The specific processes of change in modern societies are directly related to the society's institutional structure and to the means by which its institutions handle the problems resulting from change. As Adams stated:

In the contemporary world change has increasingly been the result of conscious attempts to alter techniques, norms, and institutional products. That is, change is now more closely linked to rational intention through (1) introducing appropriate innovations at crucial points and (2) anticipating the consequences of these innovations.\textsuperscript{38}

This continuous process can be considered as functioning through three distinct, but interrelated, variables: society, government, and education. These three variables are closely interrelated and they exist in a state of mutual dependence. Governmental decisions have a powerful effect over the developments in the society. Societal changes are repeatedly reflected in governmental policy

and decisions. And education has various impacts on societal and governmental changes.

Iannaccone, concerned with the patterns of change in government and society as they are related to the governing of education, stated:

The governmental dimension is characterized by the alternation of (1) long periods of stability with (2) shorter periods of abrupt change. This is the case whether one thinks of the governmental dimension in terms of its customary structure of organizations and the alignment of these, its predominant lifestyle, or the characteristics of its governing elites. . . . The key to the governmental pattern lies in the artificial, consciously man-made arrangements for reflecting the society's needs, aspirations, and wishes.

The societal dimension, instead, is characterized by a relatively more constant rate of change. . . . It does not display the abrupt shifts and then stable periods seen in the governmental dimension. 39

One may argue that an abrupt shift in the governmental dimension will almost always result in a wide gap and convergence over time between the governmental and societal systems. On the other hand, although changes in societal dimension are characterized by a constant and a steady

pattern, these changes can create extremely complex problems for the governmental dimension to deal with. For a government must meet the demands of a changing environment if it is to survive. By failing to change rapidly enough, a governmental system invites in the society even more rapid changes that foreshadow its destruction.\textsuperscript{40}

Easton\textsuperscript{41} demonstrated that a political system persists when two conditions prevail: when its members are regularly able to allocate valued things, that is, make decisions; and when the system is able to get these allocations accepted as authoritative by most members most of the time. Under particular circumstances, changes and conditions in the society are transmitted to the political system in the form of demands and as potential sources of stress which generally stimulate the internal structure and processes within the system to regulate or cope with the stress produced by the demands. Therefore, it follows that

\textsuperscript{40}Leslie et al., \textit{Order and Change}, pp. 133-134.

a political system should be able to take purposive decisions in its natural and social environment to change the course of events. If necessary or desirable, these decisions may include modifications or fundamental transformations of the political system itself. The more unresponsive and rigid the political system is, the more it must rely on socialization and/or coercion to generate at least the minimal level of support necessary for its continued legitimation and, consequently, for its very existence.

Clearly, the environmental conditions shape the inputs of a political system in which these inputs are converted by the internal mechanism into outputs. Once the outputs have emerged from the system, they have a feedback effect on the general environment and potentially on the political system itself.

However, it is important to note that occurrences within the political system are also capable of producing sufficient stress to require a response in the form of outputs. Easton, suggesting the term "withinputs" for these internal stresses, maintained that these demands do not arise from the experiences of persons who have acted in roles outside the political sector of society. The
"within inputs" emerge directly out of political roles themselves; that is, from the system. 42

One undeniable fact emerges from the above analysis: that changes in a society and in its political system are highly correlated. For example, as demonstrated in a research by Olsen, the development of the political system must keep pace with popular participation which follows social mobilization of the population if a dynamic equilibrium or stability is to exist. 43 This correlation does not, however, give an indication of the direction of causation. It is rather obvious that social change breeds political change. But it would be reckless to neglect the possible flow of causation in the opposite direction. Depending on circumstances, either the political system or the societal dimension may be playing the dominant role in the process of change.

The implications of the relationship between these two mutually dependent and highly correlated dimensions on


education are numerous. Obviously, social changes and conditions through political decisions affect education, since educational policies are made by the central government and its selected officials. This also suggests that basic issues concerning education will usually be dealt with primarily on the basis of the understanding of, and priorities given to, these issues by the governing forces. Therefore, educational policies and decisions will reflect, and sometimes betray, the view of the society or political creed which the government has. However, as already described, the pattern of change in governmental dimension is characterized by longer periods of stability and shorter periods of abrupt change. Naturally, the effects on education of too frequent changes in government can range from a lack of a continuous and responsible administration to an unstable educational planning. Instability in educational administration and planning, in turn, has the capability of intensifying various forms of political disorder. Abernathy and Coombe observed in the developing countries which undergo massive social changes with unstable political systems that:

education contributes directly towards instability because it generates demands upon the political system which that system
is unable to meet. On the other hand, the adequate provision of education at all levels is a necessary condition of political stability: only with trained manpower can public demands be satisfied by the government and its bureaucracy, and only a public educated to its responsibility can participate with understanding in the task of nation-building.\textsuperscript{44}

This dual role of education in promoting both public order and unrest must be appreciated by those who participate in and advise governments on the making of educational policy and decisions, because the policy and decisions produced may have the potentially conflicting political consequences in the society. However, indications are that indignation over the confusion in the educational systems of most developing countries is frequently observed.\textsuperscript{45} Even in some developed countries, four years of stable government are insufficient for dealing with substantial problems of education. The sharp political antagonism observed in politically unstable countries does not permit hope for future educational stability.

\textsuperscript{44}Abernathy and Coombe, "Education and Politics...," p. 139.

In modern democracies, political parties, in this connection, usually play a key role. The decisions for an organizational change and for other basic school laws, which should be made by parliament, require agreement by the political parties. Such a consensus appears to be difficult but not impossible as far as there are no significant differences in principles among the political parties. However, if parties represent conflicting policies, their influence on education can prevent the nation from achieving the kind of educational system required for rapid development.46

On the other hand, in addition to leaders and parties exercising power in the political system, all the personnel are carriers of the political factor and should responsibly face the relations of politics to education. If the educator, for example, adheres to the ideals of education (such as the values of equal educational opportunity or the function of education in developing human potential and personality), he is in danger of becoming professionally ineffective.

46 Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz.
He has to realize the existence of power, and how it must be wielded.

**General Statement**

The foregoing discussion gives way to an important conclusion that the significance of the relationship between education and politics increases proportionately with the degree of change which a society and its governmental system are undergoing. The discussion has been based on the patterns of change in societal and governmental dimensions. However, it should be pointed out that changes in societal and governmental dimensions can be of several types, often appearing simultaneously. Some changes are structural, in that large units break into smaller ones or small ones come together to make larger ones. Another important type of change is ideological, in that it involves value systems. Therefore, it is important to analyze, viewing education as the dependent variable, the ways in which the structure and functioning of education are influenced in different types of political systems and by different value-orientations found in contemporary world societies. This topic will be dealt with below.
As discussed earlier, in order that noticeable cultural differences shall exist at all, there must be a significant degree of conformity to norm within each society. This suggests that the form and functioning of education is to be judged by how it relates to the social and cultural milieu in which the schools function. The analysis of this milieu requires a consideration of the nature of the society served by the schools and the values toward which the schools should aim. 47

Thus, with regard to any one society, one may expect to find that the form, process, and content of education will vary with the degree of predominance of its value-orientation. Wallace, 48 in this regard, suggested three distinct value-orientations which may differentiate various societies, and different time periods within a particular society. These


are: (1) the revolutionary, or utopian, orientation, (2) the conservative, or ideological, orientation, and (3) the reactionary orientation.

The revolutionary society is described as a society dominated by a revitalization movement which is a deliberate, organized, and conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture. A society which attempts to transform itself from a traditional to a modern one can be considered in the process of such a revitalization movement. Black\textsuperscript{49} described certain stages which a society must pass to achieve such transformation:

1. Challenge of modernity,
2. Consolidation of the modernizing leadership,
3. Economic and social transformation, and
4. The integration of the society.

The successful completion of the above stages results in the transformation in many respects of social life, which also produces a fundamental reorganization of the whole society. In a society which is in a process of revitalization movement, the primary concerns of the schools are, in

order of priority, the moral transformation of a population, the promotion of intellectualism, and the development of technical skills. Wallace explained the reason for this priority list as follows:

the moral rebirth of the population and the development of a cadre of morally reliable and intellectually resourceful individuals to take over executive positions throughout the society is the immediate necessary task. This is the capital investment, so to speak, from which interest in the form of technical skills will ultimately be generated.\(^5^0\)

The whole process of the revitalization movement in revolutionary societies, in fact, is "the transformation of both man and society, but most of all man's mind."\(^5^1\) Thus, the schools become the moral battleground for the rest of the society. In order to explicate and apply social and political theory to local situations, intellectual training and development of technical skills are then emphasized.

The conservative society, on the other hand, is the one in which a revitalization movement has established itself

\(^5^0\)Wallace, "Schools in Revolutionary and...", p. 23.

\(^5^1\)Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 3.
with a victory over reaction and has strengthened a successful new culture. The primary problem in this type of society is to keep the new system going as effectively as possible, with occasional improvements, and possibly with smoothly programmed shifts from one phase to another. The school in a conservative society will generally emphasize the development of technical skills as its primary mission; that is, training people for performing various jobs, for citizenship, for handling human relationships smoothly, and the like. The demands of morality come next, because morality is considered to be necessary to keep society from falling apart. Intellect is the least emphasized aspect of education, and it will not usually be supported by the state "for fear of developing something dangerous at the expense of undeniably useful technic and unquestionably desirable morality."52

The third type, the reactionary society, is a post-conservative society which, having been challenged by a revitalization movement, adjusts its posture to minimize the effectiveness of its competitor's propaganda and to mobilize counterattacks. According to Wallace, this type

52 Wallace, "Schools in Revolutionary and . . . ," p. 25.
of society, in the area of learning, has two essential concerns:

first, to combat the alien heresies by revealing the inadequacy of their values and the poverty of their practice; and second, to recapture the moral enthusiasm of its earlier, revitalization phase.\textsuperscript{53}

Thus, a reactionary society is very much concerned with morality. In the schools, moral education of the young must take precedence over all else. The development of technical skills will also be favored over intellect. The tasks which were regarded in the preceding conservative phase will be redefined to make them technical.\textsuperscript{54}

Looking at a particular society based on the above classification, it is suggested that the orientations will change in a definite order: a society which is now revolutionary will, if it changes, become conservative, next reactionary, and again most probably revolutionary. Thus, any one society is apt to follow a roughly cyclical path through revolution, conservatism, and reaction, over and over again.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{53} Loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 26.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., pp. 21-22.
Political regimes have also certain attitudes toward change. These attitudes affect the change in the value-orientation of a society. Apter\textsuperscript{56} suggested the existence of three types of regimes in this regard, which are: (1) modernizing autocracies in which innovation is introduced by traditional authorities or institutions, (2) mobilization systems in which the mobilization of people is attempted, usually by a single party, to deal with economic and cultural deficiencies and to achieve certain specific goals, and (3) reconciliation systems in which a variety of groups, institutions, and governmental bodies compete in the developmental process.

Apter's tripartite division does not take sufficient account of the wide political and social differences that exist especially among developing countries. Thus, the following three general orientations toward change regardless of the type (or character) of the political system seem to be useful for the purpose of the present discussion: (1) a total commitment by the regime to change as evidenced by

its willingness to restructure all aspects of the society, (2) the regime's willingness to allow changes in some areas of social order, only insofar as no threat is posed to fundamental societal goals and values, and (3) regimes in which the orientation seeks to minimize the amount of change in the society.\textsuperscript{57}

These three general orientations can also be combined with a classification of political systems; such as rule by the one, rule by the few, and rule by the many, each possessing one of the above orientations toward change. The categorization which would evolve out of such an effort can be useful in observing the educational change in conjunction with changes in the value-orientation of a society and its political system.

Various authors have dealt with the classification of political systems.\textsuperscript{58} However, there is no end to the classifications. Since every regime is at once unique and in flux, all classifications are at best partial and

\textsuperscript{57}Szyliowicz, *Education and Modernization*. . . , p. 17.

temporary. Nevertheless, classifications serve to illuminate the major political similarities and dissimilarities between regimes, and within the developmental stages of a particular regime.

Based on the number of political parties effectively operating in the state, the classification developed by Mehden is useful for our purposes:

1. Noncompetitive systems
   a. States that have no parties or in which parties do not play effective governmental roles
   b. One-party or multi-party-proletariat states
   c. One-party states

2. Semicompetitive systems
   a. One-party dominant systems

3. Competitive systems
   a. Two-party democratic system
   b. Multi-party states.59

Each of these systems, either noncompetitive, semicompetitive, or competitive, may have, depending on circumstances, either one of the three orientations toward change mentioned above. However, there are difficulties in studying each of these systems on the basis of each orientation.

59Mehden, Ibid., pp. 50-88.
First of all, important parameters are imposed by the configuration of any political system. Second, the implementation of a similar orientation toward change by two different political systems would most probably result in similar institutional and attitudinal pressures and requirements. Therefore, instead of studying each type of political system on the basis of each orientation toward change, I shall use four basic ideal types of political systems which are identified with a particular orientation toward change, in order to delineate the relationship between education and the system of political power in the process of change. These are:

1. The radical modernizing system,
2. The reform conservatist system,
3. The adaptive system, and
4. The balance competitive system.

60 Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization..., p. 18.

The **Radical Modernizing System** is revolutionary in the sense that it is characterized by a willingness to restructure every aspect of the society to achieve a desired transformation. As Szyliowicz viewed:

The entire society and culture is examined from a new perspective— that of modernization—and whatever changes are necessary to achieve that goal are inaugurated.\

The radical modernizing system is generally noncompetitive in the way in which political power is used in an authoritarian manner as an instrument to forge new relationships in the various realms of society. Coercion is a self-evident advantage since, at the point of transformation from one type of a society to another, key information is so obvious that action, not information, becomes the major problem. Therefore, the success of the regime is highly related to building a nucleus of modernizing men and institutions (especially the educational institutions that would continually produce such men). This suggests that educational institutions, in this type of regime, will be

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most heavily used as an instrument of power and as a foundation of the state. The aims of education, social, economic, and political, will be determined by the governing or revitalizing forces, based on the values of the new society to be created. As a political entity, the educational system will play an important role, because schools will be regarded appropriately as reflectors as well as agents of change. Very little, if any, pressure will be placed on the structure and functioning of the educational system by those who have faith in a different social and political understanding, because it will be difficult for them to get organized legitimately to exercise power in a radical system of power structure.

The Reform Conservative System is one in which change is promoted in only certain aspects of social order. Epstein viewed that a reform conservatist prefers gradual reform, if possible within the existing constitutional framework, to violent and rapid change; he prefers only what is necessary, instead of seeking to implement a theoretically conceived blueprint in toto, and he seeks above all to maximize continuity in institutions and ideas.64

In a reform conservatist system, power is usually vested in a ruling class or in a political elite representing conservative groups, but co-optation of new elements is tolerated. Thus, a reform conservatist government can be found in either non-competitive or competitive political systems. If, however, the regime has set out to modernize its political system to achieve a democratic competitive power structure, it will generally be an unstable political system because of existing traditional forces still in effect. The aim is to promote change without disrupting the traditional values, institutions, and relationships.

In reform conservatist systems, governments may be willing to establish a modern system of education. But mostly, the traditional system or institutions will be preserved for a period of time until they are smoothly integrated in the modern system of education. In general, the school system will be regarded by the governing forces very much as an instrument of power, since socialization, rather than coercion, will be looked upon as a source of support for the political system. However, education as a political entity and as a prominent political issue may become highly problematic because various groups, modernist and traditional, will try to affect governments to change or produce
policies in concert with their respective views. Thus, as an arena of competing political and social value systems, education can, to a degree, suffer from the characteristic political conditions of the reform conservatist regime. Governments may, at times, desire to take chances on unpopular measures which are designed to achieve long term goals. However, the character of the regime is also such that some immediate public demands may have to be satisfied in order to avoid the loss of crucial popular support, even if conceding such demands has the potential of producing political difficulties and problems in the long run.65 This suggests that conditions of the political system will be heavily reflected in the developments which take place in education.

The Adaptive System is characterized by an unwillingness to change. Szyliowicz viewed the adaptive system as the one in which:

The fundamental goal of the ruler . . . is to preserve the existing system, although he is usually willing to accept infrastructural improvements in such areas as technology and

65Abernathy and Coombe, "Education and Politics. . . .," loc. cit.
economic affairs. The society is characterized by a ruling class, and political roles are filled by the members of this class.66

The adaptive system can be noncompetitive or semi-competitive. Education contains many traditional elements. Little or no change can be expected in schools through the efforts of governments. Education's contribution to development or modernization is, therefore, minimal. The formal schooling is basically elitist in nature. In the long run, however, education can have a revitalizing effect on society's developments as schools reach more and more people. For example, looking at the graduates of the school systems of the societies which can be characterized by an adaptive polity, Abernathy and Coombe observed that:

A civil service composed largely of young nationalistic technicians may develop an extreme distaste for the older men who, though not specialists, hold important government posts. This sentiment will probably be reciprocated by the politicians, who view the new generation of technocrats as inexperienced and lacking real roots among people. . . . The danger in this situation is that the government will deteriorate as cooperation diminishes between the makers and the implementers of law.67

66Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization. . . , p. 19.

67Abernathy and Coombe, "Education and Politics. . . .", p. 133.
In such a case, it will be highly difficult to innovate in the educational system. On the other hand, a political regime with an adaptive attitude will view education as an instrument of the system of political power. As a political entity, the educational system is not effective. However, as an arena of competing social and political value systems, education's significance is increased by the nature of the political regime. Education's role and function as a source of particular social, economic, and political outcomes will not be truly appreciated by the power holders, since the regime seeks to minimize the change in the society.

The Balance Competitive System is one in which politics are structured along democratic lines. Also, a certain level of modernization is observable. A variety of groups, institutions, and governmental bodies are in competition in the developmental process. Therefore, the political power tends to be dispersed between specialized and functional elites. The interests of existing social and economic groups are effectively represented in the political system. Also, a considerable opposition is tolerated. The balance competitive system is found in multi-party and two-party democratic political regimes.
In a society with a balance competitive system, political power will enter into a close partnership and alliance with the educational effort. In a sense, this system depends on education, which is ideally considered the means by which people become qualified to govern themselves, and to share and participate in the decision-making process. The success of the regime is highly related to how accurately and intelligently the citizens can interpret the policies and programs which the government proposes to them. Thus, ideally, a good balance among the socio-political roles and functions of education will be achieved in a fully realized competitive democratic system.

However, there are at least two factors which may be a threat to the improvement of education in such a system. First, in the process of change, the government may become a group or entity somewhat apart from, and removed from, the people themselves. This situation is most likely to be found in the developing countries where the political education of the population has not yet reached the required stage for an effective constitutional democracy. Thus, although competitiveness in the political life of the nation may seem to have been realized formally, cooperation and communication among groups and between the society and
the government will be considerably limited. This situ­
tion may gradually lead to an increasingly entrenched and
defensive elite in power, and bureaucracy may become pre­
occupied with political intrigues within its own ranks.
When the political atmosphere reaches this point of weak­
ness, education will almost always be in a state of in­
stability, and its roles and functions will likely be
confused.

A second factor which may become a threat to the im­
provement of education in a competitive system is caused
by the character of political parties actively operating
in the state. Parties may represent differing views and
sometimes extremely conflicting principles concerning educa­
tion. The two-party system, for example, can only be success­
ful if the political culture is one in which both parties
are prepared to accept each other as alternative governments,
and if they are not committed to fixed ideological posi­
tions. The multi-party system, on the other hand, almost
by definition, leads to coalitions and possibly to govern­
mental instability. This means that, in a society where a
multi-party system exists, internal differences can be
sufficiently acute to prevent any single party from obtain­
ing an absolute majority, either in the country or in
parliament, and to ensure that a large number of parties exist and gain some representation in the legislature.\textsuperscript{68} Obviously, all governmental affairs will be affected by such dynamics. Coherent educational policy will become more difficult to obtain as each party stresses its own ideology and interest. And political responsibility will remain ambiguous. Each party will, if possible, use educational resources to increase its influence. In a sense, education will become a means to power. The only safeguard against disruption of educational policy in competitive systems is probably an acknowledged fairness and competence of the educators and educational planners. Where governments are so dependent on education for social change and economic advances, the educator, in his capacity as an expert, can influence political decisions.

\textbf{General Statement}

It should be noted that each of the above categories is an ideal type. Any attempt to classify or categorize political systems based on their types and their attitudes

\textsuperscript{68}Curtis, \textit{Comparative Government and Politics}, see pp. 159-165.
toward change necessarily prescinds from the individual conditions. This is primarily because political systems are not actually independent of historical conditions and they move constantly to adapt themselves to changing conditions, demands, and pressures. Nevertheless, the classification presented above has some important advantages in terms of clarifying the relationship between education and the system of political power. It can be useful, for example, in combining historical and comparative perspectives so that one can study educational developments in conjunction with political developments in a society over extensive periods of time. Problems of education can be considered within their political context and the relevant characteristics of the political system in terms of the ideal types presented above can be outlined.
CHAPTER III

ISSUE ONE: RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AT SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL

Introduction

The modernization movement, in which Turkey has been engaged for more than a century, has profoundly affected the place of religion in Turkish society. After the proclamation of the republic in 1923, the significance of religion as a unifying element in the society, and the influence of Islam over state affairs, declined drastically. This was mainly caused by the acceptance of secularism as one of the basic principles of the republic. However, after 1945-1946 when the transition was made from a one-party to a multi-party political system, a partial restoration of religion has taken place, essentially because, in a political atmosphere of freely expressed opinions, the principles and the implementation of secularism have been the constant issues of political importance.

The decline of religion in the early republican period and its subsequent reemergence after the establishment of
multi-party politics has increased the significance of education. From a political point of view, there has been a continuous struggle to re-evaluate the role and functioning of education in Turkey and to re-evaluate the meaning of secularism in relation to school practices. This chapter concerns itself with the evolution of religious education at the secondary school level in Turkey. This evolution will be viewed in the light of political developments which have taken place at the national level since the establishment of multi-party politics in Turkey. The purpose is to analyze the nature and the degree of influence of political changes on religious education at the secondary school level and to study the ways in which this influence has manifested itself. In order to facilitate the understanding of the period under study, background information concerning the Ottoman and the early Republican periods will also be dealt with briefly.

The Ottoman Period

Before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, religion was not only a social institution but also a form of government, a legal and social order, and the very basis upon which the educational system rested. The Ottoman state was a theocracy in which, as Mardin stated:
religion was the mediating link between local social forces and the political structure. . . . The institution of religion was one where popular structures were linked with the Ottoman ruling institution, and religion provided the cultural fund which shaped ideals of political legitimacy among individuals.¹

The Islamic ideology, endowing Turkish culture with the temporal and cultural outlook of that religion, also shaped the structure and functioning of education. The schools, which were financed partly by the government but mostly by the religious foundations, and controlled by the religious hierarchy provided instruction from primary to advanced levels.² Before the early part of the nineteenth century, three types of schools constituted the formal aspect of education: (1) the Palace School (Enderun Mektebi), (2) the religious schools (medreseler), and (3) the private children's primary schools (sibyan mektebleri).³ These predominantly religious schools had high standards and clearly defined functions, and fulfilled the purposes for which they


³On the structure and functioning of these schools, see Kazamias, Education and the Quest for. . . . Part One.
were established.\(^4\) Also, as a major determinant in the social and occupational placement of the individual, education was closely interrelated with the political structure.\(^5\) However, during this period, the state never accepted responsibility for the basic education of its citizens. In the absence of a public school system, most of the socializing aspects of education were, therefore, done by non-school agencies.

By the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state had gradually become incapable of adjusting itself to changing conditions and of meeting the challenge of the Western progress and innovation. As a result, a borrowing of techniques and institutions from Europe began (especially for consolidating the powers of the central government and generally for establishing a more efficient bureaucratic machinery). It was essentially the military and political necessities from which the need for change resulted.\(^6\)


\(^5\) Kazamias, ibid., Chap. I. Frey, "Turkey," p. 211.

In the general modernization movement during the Tanzimat (reorganization, reformation) period (1836-1876), certain institutional changes took place in an attempt to regenerate the government, the nation, and the empire. Reforming education was an integral part of this movement. For example, efforts were made by the reformers to bring education more under the authority and supervision of the state. In newly established schools, an essentially secular education in the Western pattern, especially French, was offered. The year 1869 was a turning point for educational developments.

In that year, the government promulgated a set of regulations to establish a government-controlled and secularly-oriented public system of education, which was to be independent of the traditional system run by the religious institution and Ulema (learned men, doctors of Islamic theology). Both the opening of new schools and the public education movement were, however, centered around the post-primary level, of which the results were (1) the opening of new careers and new avenues for social mobility, and (2) the loosening of the hold of religious orientation and the religious hierarchy.

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7On 1869 regulations, see Kazamias, Education and the Quest for..., pp. 63-64. And Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, p. 73.
on Turkish education. Thus the movement had important political consequences. The graduates of secular-oriented schools, exposed to Westernism, secularism, constitutionalism, and even Turkish nationalism, gradually formed an elite group that served in the lower and middle ranks of the military and bureaucracy. Naturally, the religious hierarchy (the product of the traditional medreses), vehemently opposed innovation and secularization in the schools. In a broader sense, the medrese-trained intellectual perceived the basic threat posed by the growing system of secular, modern education to their Islamic conception of a reformed empire, just as those in favor of Westernization-modernization conceived the idea that Islamic teaching was the major obstacle to progress and truth. ⁸

In the same vein, the educational bifurcation which was created as a result of the existence of a set of parallel educational institutions, one religious and the other secular, was both an effect and a cause of a split among elites. More specifically, the creation of the secular, Western-oriented school system of education revealed the profound intra-elite conflict between the military and bureaucratic contingent

⁸Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, p. 38.
and the religious hierarchy. The military and bureaucracy, and religious hierarchy, representing different orientations toward change, saw education as a powerful tool and made efforts through their own educational systems "to inculcate the distinctive, specific, and uniform outlooks among the students whom they recruited." As the graduates of the modern schools gradually increased, the contest between secularist-modernists and religious traditionalists became more apparent, reflecting itself in the struggle to control the future of the Ottoman state and society.

However, the entire secularization-modernization movement was far from affecting the masses. As Kazamias stated:

This overwhelming proportion of Ottoman Turks remained illiterate, mostly isolated in rural villages, pristine in modes of thinking and earning a living, politically non-participant, and religiously tied to superstition and a folk type of Islam.

In his widely quote statement, Ziya Gökalp described the differences among population groups as follows:

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10 Frey, loc. cit.

In this country there are three layers of people differing from each other in civilization and education: the common people, the men educated in medreses, the men educated in (modern) schools. The first still are not freed from the effects of Far Eastern civilization; the second are still living in Eastern civilization; it is only the third group which has had some benefit from Western civilization. That means that one portion of our nation is living in an ancient, another in a medieval, and third in a modern age. How can the life of a nation be normal with such a threefold life? How can we become a real nation without unifying this threefold education?  

Before the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, a radical break with traditional institutions, values, and beliefs was not seriously considered by the modernizers. However, Turkey then had a public school system (though severely limited) which contained the foundations of a system comparable to those of advanced nations. The system was both statist and elitist in character. This was 

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13"Variations mainly existed in ideology and in the perception of what shape a reformed empire should take." Kazamias, "Transfer and Modernity in...", loc. cit.
particularly because the entire movement in education was military and political. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the leaders of reform (secularist-modernists) saw that the capacity for modernization could be generated by a minority of Western-educated sympathizers and executives. The transformation of the society was to be achieved from the top down. Therefore, secondary and higher levels of the modern school system were essentially viewed as the training ground for the ruling class. However, the reform conservatist orientation of governments toward change and the reactionary attitudes of the powerful religious faction within the elite proved impossible for the creation of a unified modern system of education in the society.

The Republican Period Before the Establishment of the Multi-System

The proclamation of the Republic in Turkey in 1923 after a successful war of independence and an internal revolution permanently altered the power structure of Turkish

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society. This change represented a clear-cut triumph of secularist-modernists over the religious-traditionalists, and a triumph of a "secular state" over the idea of a "reformed Islamic state." In order to consolidate this initial victory, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the national leader of the Republic, and his cohorts, produced a series of secularizing and modernizing reforms within the legal, educational and cultural institutions. The Kemalist approach to the question of secularism differed, however, radically from the approaches of the previous reformers. The distinguishing point was the introduction of the principle of populism to replace the old notion of reforming the traditional basic institutions. Atatürk, in his declaration of the establishment of the Republican People's Party (RPP), explained that:

The aim is rather to mobilize the entire nation, called people, by including all classes and excluding none, in common and united action toward genuine prosperity.16

15 İsmet Giritli, Fifty Years of Turkish Political Development 1919-1969 (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınlarından No. 1454, 1969), p. 38.

16 Loc. cit.
The Kemalist secularism purposes, accordingly, were to encompass both the institutional and behavioral aspects of living. The aim was, as Karpat stated:

to help create a modern national state without the bias of religion; to liberate the society from the hold of Islam; and to bring about a new type of individual. It was a rationalistic, scientific-minded, anti-traditionalist, and anti-clericalist secularism.17

Thus, the struggle of Kemalist secularism was not only over separating the spiritual and temporal, but also, and essentially, over the difference between democracy and theocracy. It was not a policy of elimination of religion but a rejection of Islamic polity. The leaders of new Turkey saw that the national existence would not be dependent upon any polity based upon religion, and a secular regime should not view the citizen as a believer. Accordingly, the new regime (radical reformist in its attitude toward change) approached the religious issue from two different perspectives: (1) the religious enlightenment of the masses, and (2) the moral integration of the society.18

17Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 271.

18Giritli, Fifty Years of Turkish... , p. 40.
The secularizing reforms in education during the early republican period were basically a reflection of these two perspectives in schools. In 1924, the Law of Unification of Education\textsuperscript{19} was promulgated by the Grand National Assembly, which placed "all educational institutions" under the control and authority of the Ministry of National Education. Altogether 479 medreses with a total enrollment of approximately 18,000 students were closed.\textsuperscript{20} The teaching of religion, Arabic, and Persian was proscribed. A Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic script. The curriculum was reoriented and revamped in line with the principles of secularism and nationalism, and the Turkish cultural content in language, literature, and history was strengthened. Also significant in nature, the first constitution of the Republic made all types of schooling the concern of the central government.\textsuperscript{21}

The Republican government gave a new character to religious education in schools. The Law of Unification of

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu} (3 Mart 1924, No. 430).

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization in...}, pp. 201.

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Kazamias, Education and the Quest for...}, pp. 185-187. Kazamias, "Transfer and Modernity in...", \textit{loc. cit.}
Education made the Ministry of Education responsible for the opening of a Theological Faculty at İstanbul University and for the establishment of religious schools to train religious personnel. In 1924, the Medrese of Enlightenment (Medrese-tül-İrşat) in İstanbul and 28 provincial medreses which had five-year terms were converted into religious schools (imam-hatip okulları) and placed into the second cycle of the secondary school level of the modern system. The imam-hatip schools were to train religious leaders and preachers, and were to have a four-year term.

The imam-hatip schools were abolished by the government in 1930 for "lack of students." Similarly, the Theological Faculty at İstanbul University was closed in 1930 when its student population dropped to only 20. In 1935, the government put forward another decision to discontinue

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Table 5. Imam-Hatip Schools During the Early Republican Period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The School Year</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923-1924</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1925</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1926</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1927</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-1928</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1929</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1930</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

religious instruction which was provided in the elementary schools. In all these moves, the primary excuse was the lack of students. However, one must consider the government's attitude to positively undermine the influence of traditional religion in the society and particularly in education. Thus, an almost purposeful lack of concern on the part of the government to improve and encourage the vocational training of religious personnel actually left the imam-hatip schools in neglect. The closing of these schools and the discontinuation of religious instruction in the elementary schools also meant that the Republican regime favored positivism and science in education. As Adivar commented, in the early part of the Republican period, Western positivism was emphasized in the schools as Islamic dogma had been emphasized in the past.26

It becomes clear that the developments in education in general and religious education in particular were intimately tied with the socio-political changes in Turkey in the early Republican period. It should be pointed out that the

political leadership during this period was in the nature of party dictatorship, and all the governments followed a radical reformist attitude toward change. In general, therefore, it was almost impossible to air any direct opposition to the secularizing and modernizing policies of the regime. For this reason, the religious issue stayed dormant at least until the struggle started for the establishment of a multi-party system. On the other hand, although secularism profoundly affected the institutional aspects of the society, a large proportion of the population that lived in villages and small towns continued to preserve and practice their basic Islamic customs and traditions. Therefore, the cultural goals of secularism were only partially realized, and "many of the religious reforms were observed through the force of law rather than out of conviction."27

The Struggle for Multi-Party Politics and Its Impact on Religious Education (1945-1950)

The transition from a one-party to a multi-party political system in Turkey was realized as a result of the

27 Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 271-272. The term "religious reforms" in Karpat's statement should be taken to mean secularizing reforms. A religious reform is generally understood as a change within the religion. Such a change was not the aim of the republican regime in Turkey.
permission of the government for a gradual liberalization of political institutions. This transition signalled the beginning of a new phase in Turkey's transformation as it gave release to pressures that had built up during the one-party authoritarian rule.²⁸

The establishment of the multi-party system, as Rustow pointed out, "was made in the absence of prior overt conflict between major social groups or their leading elites."²⁹ In other words, this transition was not accompanied or preceded by an observable manifestation of economic, religious, or territorial cleavages. However, in general terms, cultural and economic cleavages that had remained latent under the one-party radical reformist rule were rapidly politicized after 1945 as the political parties penetrated into periphery in search of mass support.³⁰

²⁸ The political and socio-economic context of Turkey's transition to competitive politics is analyzed in depth in ibid. For a journalistic account of the same period, see Metin Toker, Tek Partiden Çok Partiye (Istanbul, 1970).


In early 1946, the Democratic Party (DP) was formed by four dissenting deputies who split from the Republican People's Party (RPP). Although a number of other parties came into existence during this period, the DP, capitalizing on the record of grievances accumulated during the one-party period, succeeded in establishing a large provincial organizational network and suddenly began to expand mainly because people became convinced of the genuine character of its opposition to the RPP in power. In any case, the political atmosphere was such that public opinion seemed to be in sympathy with all efforts to criticize the RPP's government and its performance. Newspapers welcomed the ideas of opposition in their columns and published articles on the problems of the country.

The first elections with universal suffrage and competing parties were held in July 1946. During the election campaign, a rapid mobilization of the masses was observed. After the elections, the RPP was, however, able to maintain

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31 On these parties see, Tarik Z. Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler (İstanbul, 1952), pp. 693-744. And Karpat, Turkey's Politics, Chap. 15.

32 Giritli, Fifty Years of Turkish... , p. 67-68.
its status as the majority party in the parliament with the DP acting as the major opposition party.\textsuperscript{33}

In general, the 1946 elections began a trend in the political development of Turkey which has been characterized by the inclusion of new claimants into the political system. More specifically, with the transition to multi-party politics, the political elite became more diversified and more representative of the existing socio-economic groups. At the same time, the existence of opposition parties representing different segments of the society changed the composition of the elite itself from being a relatively radical national elite to a more conservative and local group of influentials that were oriented toward immediate and visible advantages. The indications were that the various political changes were in the direction of a greater dispersion of power.\textsuperscript{34} However, the political parties during the early part of the multi-party era were mainly

\textsuperscript{33}The 1946 elections returned 395 seats for the RPP, 64 for the DP, and 6 for the independents, with 85 per cent of the electorate participating. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{34}Frey, \textit{The Turkish Political Elite}, p. 196.
vehicles for the electoral campaign rather than instruments of change. In terms of their programmatic orientations they did not differ from one another significantly.35

The Issue of Religion and Secularism

As described earlier, secularizing and modernizing policies of the one-party period resulted in significant changes in the institutional aspects of the Turkish society. In terms of behavioral patterns of people, secularism, however, affected the educated group profoundly, while a large proportion of the population still regarded religion as a belief system that was of central importance in their daily living patterns. Thus, an important consequence of this situation was that the disruption of the traditional Islamic system exacerbated the intellectual-mass cleavage. This was particularly because the one-party regime failed to provide the necessary structures to perform the linkage functions among the elements of the political system which had been previously carried out by religion.36

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of political activities, resulting from the establishment of the multi-party politics, was, however, an important breakthrough for bridging the gap between the masses and the intellectuals. And the issue of religion played an important part in this breakthrough. For example, religion effectively served as one of the major components of the DP's mobilization strategy, which, in turn, caused the RPP to make concessions from its strict secularist stand.

The DP, in its programme, rejected the interpretation of secularism in terms of enmity toward religion and it recognized religious freedom as a sacred human right. However, the party leaders quickly discovered that over three-fourths of the potential voters that lived in villages and small towns felt highly sensitive toward the forcibly enforced secularization policies of the one-party period. Thus, the DP leaders readily politicized the issue of religion, while a demand for religious reform assumed greater significance in the DP's propaganda. The DP was not alone in this respect. A number of other parties

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37 Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, p. 602.

which espoused the religious cause in strong terms were also successful in contributing to the sensitivity of the religion as a political issue. The Nation Party (NP) which was formed in 1948 by a splinter group from the DP took, for example, an extreme position on the issue by criticizing the secularist reforms of the one-party rule and by demanding, in clearly stated terms, a religious reform which was in contradiction with the essentials of Kemalist secularism. In addition to party activities, the growing self-assertiveness of religious functionaries and the sudden increase in the number of religious newspapers and journals also gave added impetus to the demand for a religious reform.

All these developments made it clear that the RPP as the governmental party could no longer afford to ignore the pressure for a change in its strict policy of secularism. It was significant, therefore, that the party, at its 1947 convention, scheduled a full-dress debate on the issue. In

39 For a brief description of these parties, see Ibid., p. 93. And Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," Middle East Journal, VIII (1954), p. 271.

the convention, the strengthening of the religious establish-
ment was urged by many speakers. The government was to seek
a constructive solution to the problem which was being
effectively exploited by other parties for political purposes. 41
As a result, in the following two years before the 1950 elec-
tions, the government took various steps to permit a religious
relaxation throughout the country. However, as Rustow
stated:

the People's Party's sudden concern for
religious reform smacked too much of "me-too-
ism" to stave off the electoral debacle that
some of its leaders had foreseen.42

It was evident that there was in the country a great
deal of religious feeling that looked for more expression
than the government would allow. The developments in the
political scene had made it clear that those who gave way
to the establishment of multi-party politics had not expected
that the religion would shortly become an issue of high
political importance. However, Islam was already restored
to politics in an active way. It was seen as a provided of
a powerful basis for getting votes from the masses. The

41 See CHP Yedinci Kurultayı Tutanağı (Ankara, 1948).
42 Rustow, "Politics and Islam...", p. 95.
political system which had been dominated by a single party (RPP) for a long period of time could no longer tightly control and suppress the religious elements when in conflict with the reform measures of the Republic.

**Developments in Religious Education (1945-1950)**

The way in which the religious question became an important source of political discussion provided a pretext for polemics about the role of education in Turkish society and about the interpretation of secularism in relation to school system. In reality, religious education was the first publicly debated issue in the general framework of the discussion on secularism after the establishment of multi-party politics. Religion was seen as one of the best educational means of restoring the moral values of youth and society. Thus, the political parties were concerned with changes in school programs. The DP programme demanded, for example, the appointment of a committee of experts to study and report on the question of religious education in schools, and the reestablishment of a Theological Faculty in the University. The RPP, as the party holding governmental power, turned to educational institutions to show

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43 Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 418.
44 Loc. cit.
its willingness in a religious liberalization movement. It was apparent to the RPP leaders that the establishment of political parties necessitated a change of government policy on religious education, without affecting the essentials of secularism.

On the other hand, a certain public interest was already aroused by the debates which took place among parties’ leadership levels and by such demands which were placed on the government as the reintroduction of religious courses into school curriculum and the training of religious personnel. Also, moderately phrased articles, with a gradual increase in number, continued to appear in the press. As a result, as early as December 24, 1946, the Grand National Assembly felt the necessity to discuss the matter. In this session, two prominent members of the RPP, H. Suphi Tanrıöver and Baha Pars, spoke in favor of restoring religious courses in school programs. Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü, two of

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46 It was suggested by these speakers that reintroducing religious instruction in the schools would help to strengthen the moral resistance of the youth against communist propaganda. Ibid., pp. 428, 438ff.
the four founders of the DP, wholeheartedly supported such a restoration in their speeches. However, the Prime Minister Recep Peker insisted, reflecting his government's viewpoint, that such a move by the government would "open gates to religious propaganda."\(^{47}\)

This particular debate in the Parliament signalled a coming change of policy, as a long controversy followed in the press, in the Parliament, and elsewhere. The scope of this controversy, however, should be examined rather carefully. The demands which were being placed on the government were not just in the nature of a general desire that the government should restore religious instruction in the schools. The debates and discussions went far enough to concentrate on the nature and type of religious instruction that should be tolerated in the school programs. Among such details were (1) whether this instruction should be compulsory or optional, (2) whether it should be organized and controlled by the Ministry of Education or by the Presidency of Religious Affairs, and (3) in which grades it should be provided, etc.\(^{48}\)

\(^{47}\)Rustow, "Politics and Islam. . . .", p. 93.

\(^{48}\)See Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 418.
As the pressures on the RPP government built up to make a compromise to settle the controversy, the RPP council passed a resolution in early 1947 advising the government to permit the teaching of religion by private individuals outside the public schools and the opening of private schools for the training of religious personnel, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. In a speech in the Assembly, the Minister of Education R. Şemsettin Sirer explained the government's stand on religious education as follows:

The Turkish nation is a muslim nation and the Turkish state is a secular state. . . . Religion is a matter of conscience. It is between the individual and God. In a secular order, the state cannot tell its citizens to believe in, or to follow, this or that religious faith. Therefore, the state in its schools and in its educational programs cannot give place to religious instruction. But, outside the school, citizens, by their own judgements and initiations, can give religious education to their children under the supervision of the state. The state has only a duty of supervision and our government has determined and organized under which conditions this supervision would take place.


However, it was apparent that this understanding was not shared by some RPP members who wanted to see religious instruction as a regular part of the school curriculum. In the 1947 national convention of the party, for example, some prominent members demanded that certain steps be immediately taken by the government. One significant speech was given by H. Suphi Tanrıöver who was one of the first Ministers of Education after the secularization of the schools system in the early days of the Republic. He said:

Let us train at least one tenth the number of men that secular states (in Europe and America) are training to serve the Turkish nation in its religious institutions.51

Some other members pointed out that a strengthening of the religious establishment by way of accepting a more liberal stand on religious education was a necessity. According to these members, secularism had caused a certain level of regression in moral standards and views.52 There existed, however, in the party, a group that considered any concession to religion a regressive step and a compromise

51Rustow, "Politics and Islam. . . ," p. 94. Tanrıöver resigned from the party four weeks after the convention in protest to the opposition to religious education within the party. This move further dramatized the quest for a redefinition of secularism.

52Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 279-280.
of republican principles. Nevertheless, the 1947 convention clearly indicated a change in the interpretation of the RPP's programme and philosophy from "revolutionary" to "moderate." Accordingly, especially in order to secure popular support for the forthcoming elections, the party started a liberal policy in compliance with popular wishes. For example, it was no coincidence that the government was put under the premiership of Şemsettin Günültay who was known to be inclined to moderation and political and cultural liberalization, and had a sympathetic but balanced approach to religious matters. Tahsin Banguoğlu, the Minister of Education in Günültay's cabinet, in a similar manner, was in favor of a more liberal and flexible implementation of the secularist policies in the school system.

In 1948 and 1949, two laws concerning religious education were introduced to the National Assembly. One of these laws, proposed by some RPP members, concerned itself with the opening of schools for the training of religious leaders and preachers. The proposed law was justified by the reasoning that there were no religious officials to lead the Islamic rites in the villages and that without religious guidance people were increasingly tied to superstition and a folk type of Islam. In 1949, the legislation in respect
to religious liberalization was passed by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{53} The government under the premiership of G"{u}nal'tay took steps to implement the fourth article of the Unification of Education Law by authorizing the opening of a Faculty of Theology at Ankara University and by reintroducing religious courses in the primary grades. Also, fifteen professional courses for the training of religious clerics (imam-hatip kurslari) were opened to function under the authority and supervision of the Ministry of Education. In all these moves, the principle of secularism was paid the utmost attention: (1) courses in religion in primary grades were optional for those whose parents had requested the instruction, (2) the training of religious clerics was not made a part of the secular school system, but was to be handled in professional courses run by the Ministry of Education, and (3) the Theological Faculty at Ankara University had clearly defined functions which were not in contradiction with the principle of secularism.\textsuperscript{54} This

\textsuperscript{53}During the Assembly session in which this legislation was passed, the RPP deputy Behçe't Kemal Çağlar, a well-known national poet, resigned from the party and the parliament in protest against the compromise on the principle of secularism.

\textsuperscript{54}See Eren, Turkey, Today and Tomorrow, pp. 201-202. And Parmaksizoğlu, Türkiye'de Din Eğitim, p. 29.
faculty was to be an answer to the acute shortage of personnel to teach religion and to undertake the various functions in mosques.\(^{55}\)

**General Remarks**

The establishment of the multi-party system in Turkey changed the character of the elite from being a relatively radical national power group to a more conservative and diversified group of influentials. A more liberal interpretation of the principle of secularism during this period, allowed a wider scope of religious education and practices. However, the nature of the school system, being secular and modern, was not affected by the movement in terms of any degree of restoration of Islamic teaching. Although all the parties, including the RPP, sought votes by politicizing the religious issue, the government, in its efforts to liberalize religion, believed that modern schools and modern teaching could penetrate small towns and villages to establish a safe foothold on behalf of secularism. The implementation of religious education was successfully handled within this understanding. However, in the

\(^{55}\)Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 418-419.
larger political arena, the indications were that the political parties were promising additional religious freedom and that politicians who acquired positions through religious propaganda were ready to go to extremes to preserve these positions. The affects of such developments on education were to be felt after 1950 elections which brought the DP to power.

The Democratic Party in Power (1959-1960)

Elections were held on May 14, 1950. Close to 8.5 million people (88% of eligible voters) went to polls and elected an Assembly of 408 Democrats, 69 Republicans, 1 Nation Party, and 9 independents.\textsuperscript{56} After 27 years in power, the RPP peacefully handed over power to victors.

During the election campaign, the RPP had advocated an ideology which seemed to emphasize government control and regulation over economic and societal affairs, while

\textsuperscript{56} For a statistical analysis of the election, see 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üye Seçimleri Seçimleri Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1966). The striking proportion in the distribution of the seats among parties was due to the peculiarity of the then Turkish majority electoral system. Actually, the DP received 54, and the RPP 40, per cent of the total vote. See Sayari, "Party Politics in Turkey . . . ," pp. 48-51.
the DP had promised, in general, a greater liberalism in the society and minimum control over individual action. The specific issues on which these parties differed substantially were the scope of statism, the place of religion in Turkish society, and the saliency of the bureaucracy in policy-making.

As suggested by several analysts, one of the major factors which contributed to the DP's success in the elections was the open criticism, by the party leaders, of the enforced secularization by the RPP of 1920's and 1930's. Political and administrative reform and economic development also assumed great significance in the DP's propaganda.

Educational developments between 1950-1960 with the DP in power were heavily dominated by political factors. The governments in this period were highly responsive to rural opinion and were willing to sacrifice educational


59See Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1965), p. 133; Ahmet Yücekök, Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 84-87; Giritli, Fifty Years of Turkish. . . , pp. 81, 83.
objectives, if necessary, to maintain the crucial support of the peasantry. In general, a rapid expansion, the lack of a coherent policy, and the absence of any advance planning characterized educational policy. On the other hand, as the change of government in 1950 carried a clear implication that the DP in power was expected to be tolerant of reversions to the old religious way of life, religious education showed a critical development during the same period. It is important that an analysis be made in terms of political developments of the period to develop a better understanding of the changes in religious education.

As discussed earlier, the transition to competitive politics in 1945-1946 resulted in the inclusion of new claimants to power. The change in government in 1950 showed a clear-cut shift, especially in the membership in the grand National Assembly, in terms of the social background of the power elite. Compared to the leadership in the RPP, which had been derived from the military group which came to power with Ataturk revolution, plus a substantial number of urban intellectuals and bureaucrats, the DP leadership was a composition of the new middle class.

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60 Lewis, Turkey, p. 132.
created during the republican period and the traditional pre-republican social elite. As soon as the struggle among the political parties started, the distinct urban-rural bipolarity became quite apparent. Both the RPP and the DP quickly came to an understanding of the crucial importance of rural population in the political (especially electoral) process. In general, therefore, although religious and economic questions were extensively politicized, the major concern of the parties before and after 1950 elections appeared to be the rural development. The first four years of the DP administration, while providing a partial relaxation on religious restrictions, put a greater emphasis on the implementation of an ambitious program for economic development.\footnote{On Turkey's economic development under the DP, see Dwight J. Simpson, "Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey," \textit{Middle East Journal}, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 141-152; İlkay Sunar, \textit{State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development} (Ankara: A. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları No. 377, 1974); and Robinson, \textit{The First Turkish Republic}., pp. 147-161.}

The expansion and the scope of economic activities between 1950 and 1954 by the DP government: (1) made advances in rural and infrastructural developments, (2) led to the growing integration of the traditional rural population into the national economy, (3) increased the migration of
the villagers to the cities, and (4) developed ties between urban and rural areas. All such developments created a degree of transformation in rural life and led to the emergence of the peasantry as an important factor in Turkish politics.

The satisfaction of the rural strata by the economic policies of the DP government displayed itself in the result of the 1954 elections which revealed another victory for the DP. The RRP was only able to win 35 per cent of the vote and 31 Assembly seats out of a total of 541, while the DP collected 56.6 per cent of the vote and 503 seats. 62

Encouraged by this overwhelming victory, the DP tried to move too rapidly with the economic advances. Expectedly, however, the economic program of the government could not be completed due to the unplanned manner in which the government spending was carried out, adverse terms of trade, large defense expenditures, and a shortage of capital. The result was an inflationary situation which was seriously felt as early as mid-1950's. The urban elements, especially salaried personnel, were hardest hit by this economic crises, who began to criticize the policies of the government

more and more frequently. The reaction of the Prime
Minister Menderes and his government to the increasingly
vocal discontent by the opposition parties, a number of
influential newspapers, and the urban, educated groups
proved highly sensitive, as it took the form of augmenting
the level of coercion on the activities of opposition
parties, Assembly, press and universities. As a result of
such developments, the level of political tension was
very high prior to 1957 elections.

During the campaign for 1957 elections, the opposition
parties sought benefits by criticizing the economic policies
of the DP administration, the increased governmental
attempts to dominate the bureaucracy, and the government's
policy of secularism. The DP leaders, on the other hand,
decided to base their election strategy on criticisms
against the past and present policies of the RPP. The
elections indicated a decline in the percentage of the vote
for the DP, compared to previous two elections. The party
received 47 per cent of the vote and 424 assembly seats
out of a total of 610, while the RPP won 41 per cent and
178 seats.63

63 Ibid.
Since the election results gave a better position to the RPP to play a more effective role of the opposition in the Parliament, the bitterness between the DP as the governing party and the opposition grew severely. As a result of deteriorating economic conditions and the DP's sensitivity to criticisms, an increasing coercion by this party and its administration on the activities of the Parliament, political parties, press, bureaucracy, and universities created a great deal of tension in the country. Groups that had enjoyed a high social and political status before 1950, on the other hand, came to an understanding that their positions and functioning were seriously threatened by those who assumed leadership positions in the DP and mobilized the rural electorate. Such groups were composed of bureaucrats, intellectuals, and the military officers. And because the DP failed to permit the inclusion of these groups into the national policy and decision-making process, the agitation of these groups led directly to a revolution in 1960.

As previously mentioned, before and after 1950 elections, the political parties effectively politicized the cultural and economic cleavages which had remained dormant under the one-party radical reformist rule. The DP, for
example, as a part of its mobilization strategy, successfully exploited the existing cultural cleavages between the urban intelligentsia and the traditional rural peasantry by emphasizing the shortcomings of the secularist policies of the one-party rule.

The DP received the strongest support from the religious-conservatists who were wholeheartedly behind the DP governments to bring about the changes in the policies and the implementation of secularism. This group regarded religion, that is Islam, as an inherent need of the individual and as an educational institution. The radical religious-conservatists believed that the Atatürk revolution was an attempt to wean the Turkish people away from their religion. Therefore, they openly attacked secularism as having undermined the cultural ethical basis of the society.64 However, although the DP used various political tactics and made several decisions to please the religious conservatists, the stand of the party on the issue of secularism was

64 Rustow, "Politics and Islam. . . .," pp. 98, 102; Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 274. Also see Ali Fuat Bağgil, Din ve Laiklik (İstanbul, 1955).
heavily based on a moderate, legal, and historical approach. The party leaders saw no conflict between Islam and the ideals and principles of the revolution. The religious issue, during the entire period of the DP administration, was a question of day-to-day political compromise. Accordingly, the position of the party's leaders on secularism was that, in the past, secularist reforms may have been necessary measures to be taken; however, these reforms should be subject to some revision in the present. Also, the party regarded the conception of religion controlled and supervised by the state as violating the principle of secularism.

After the DP came to power in 1950, a number of steps (although some of them were perhaps symbolic) were taken by the government to minimize the state control and regulations on the religious life of Turkish Muslims. The very first legislation passed by the party in the parliament was the

65 The DP program declared explicitly that the party understood secularism to mean non-interference by the state in religion, and a complete absence of religious consideration in formulating and implementing the laws. The DP's governmental programs between 1950 and 1960 did not contain any anti-secularist and reactionary policy. See İsmail Arar, ed., Hükümet Programlari, 1920-1965 (Ankara, 1968), pp. 209-288.

renewed permission of the call to prayers to be recited in Arabic instead of Turkish. In July 1950, the government authorized the use of the state-regulated radio for Koran recitations and sermons which were also printed and widely distributed by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Such acts of the government were accompanied by the growing self-assertiveness of religious functionaries, an outbreak of fez wearing, an increase in mosque attendance, the publication of increasing number of Islamic tracts and books, and by the upsurge of various religious sects. The government also largely financed the repair of many mosques and the building of many new ones.

During the DP period, religion also maintained its status as one of the major bases of capturing votes from

67 The call to prayer was translated into Turkish and had to be recited instead of Arabic from 1933 to 1950. See Howard A. Reed, "Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims," in Islam and the West, Richard N. Frye, ed., p. 118.

68 Ibid.

69 Reliable figures are not available on the number of mosques built during the DP administration. One estimate by the officials in the Directorate of Religious Affairs was that 5,000 mosques were built between 1950 and 1960. This was approximately the same figure given for the construction of new schools in the same period. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961, p. 9. The Democrats had
the peasantry. There was a considerable exploitation of religious feelings of rural population by the DP leaders to maintain the popular support. However, it must be recognized that, especially during the period between 1950-1954, religion was of secondary importance to the government for, at least, two reasons. First, the DP government faced with problems of greater significance in foreign affairs, Turkey's growing role in the Western defense system, and economic development. Second, the partial religious liberalization which had been provided by the RPP shortly before the 1950 elections had left little to be done by the DP administration. Apart from these two reasons, the leaders of the DP also showed some degree of apprehensiveness about further religious reforms. However, after 1954 elections, when Turkey faced with serious economic and political problems which I have discussed earlier, the DP lost much of the support of secularist-modernists and, to a degree, the support of the


moderates. Therefore, to stave off the decline in the popular support for the government, the DP sought to satisfy the demands for greater religious freedom. Also, there was a noticeable relaxation of the official antipathy towards the more obscurantist manifestations of Islamic religious feelings. 71

In short, although religion was a highly significant campaign issue, which created a pro-religious atmosphere and a reassertion of traditional attitudes once repressed but never abandoned, the legislation and the governmental decisions resulted only in a partial restoration of Islam and affected only a small part of Ataturk's secularist reforms. However, in education, the developments showed some critical trends and some degree of deviation from the secular and modernist characteristics of the school system which had been goals since the establishment of the Republic.

In the fall of 1950, the Menderes government changed the character of religious education in the schools. During the last year and a half of the RPP administration, the teaching of religion in the schools was not a part of school curriculum and was provided only for those whose parents specifically requested their children's enrollment in religious classes. The DP government made the instruction of religion an integral part of school curriculum. The parents who did not want their children to take religious courses would have to inform the school administration. At the meeting of the Fifth National Educational Council in 1953, a decision was passed to make religious courses effective in grade-passing. In March, 1952, a further installment of the DP debt to Islam was paid when religious instruction

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72 This change was put into effect by a decision of the Council of Ministers (No. 3/12018, November 4, 1951).

73 On the composition and the functioning of the Educational Councils, see Kazamias, Education and the Quest for..., pp. 118-119; and Cumhuriyetin 50 Yilinda Milli Egitimimiz (İstanbul: MEB, 1973), pp. 93-94.

was added to the curriculum of the village institutes. 75

The DP government also viewed that the fifteen professional courses for religious clerics, which had been opened by the RPP government, were not satisfactory in terms of their programs and effectiveness. 76 The ministry of education,

75 This move by the government was particularly partisan. The village institutes (Köy enstitüleri) were established in 1940 to meet the village teacher shortage. Village youth were recruited by the institutes to train the future village primary teachers, technical leaders and advisors. The general purpose was to raise the level of village communities and to foster economic development in the country. However, the dynamic spirit of the village institutes was in contradiction with the religious, contemplative, and patriarchal mentality of traditional-conservatists who were in the process of re-establishing their domination by taking advantage of the democratic atmosphere created after the establishment of multi-party politics. These schools were put under attack on the grounds that they were conducive to undesirable ideologies such as socialism and communism and that their curricula and conditions were not adequate for training a good teacher. After several program revisions, the DP government, succumbing to intense conservative pressures, passed a law which merged the institutes into the regular teachers' schools. This decision of the government aroused widespread indignation among the intellectuals. On these institutes, see Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, pp. 287-301. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 337-380. Şevket Gedikoğlu, Köy Enstitüleri (Ankara, 1971). Alexandre Vexliard, and Kemal Aytaç, "The Village Institutes in Turkey," Comparative Education Review, VIII, No. 1 (June, 1964), pp. 41-47.

thus, appointed a commission to study the matter of converting these courses into schools as a part of the school system. This commission was made responsible for the preparation of courses of studies, and for advising the ministry on the structure and functioning of these schools. Consequently, on October 13, 1951, the Commission of Directorates of the Ministry of Education put forward a legal decision for the opening of schools for religious leaders and preachers (iman-hatip Okullari). On October 17, 1951, seven iman-hatip schools started teaching in different provincial cities. Until 1958, these schools were attached to the Directorate of Private Schools. Between 1958-1961, they were put under the responsibility of the General Directorate of Academic Secondary Education.

The iman-hatip schools, during the DP administration, provided a seven-year education which was based on the elementary level and consisted of two cycles—the first cycle had a four-year term and the second cycle, a three-year term. Both cycles were considered integral parts of the education provided in these schools.

77 BMMTD, IX-51-4 (February 25, 1951), speech given by the Minister of Education Tevfik İleri, p. 838.

78 No. 601, October 13, 1951.
Table 6. İmam-Hatip Schools, First and Second Cycle (1951-1960).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>876</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-1953</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2048</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1956</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>2181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1958</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1959</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1960</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2922</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  
After the 1954 elections, the DP and government leaders, facing difficult economic problems and an intensifying opposition from the minor parties, press, and intellectuals in general, showed greater efforts to exploit the religious feelings among the peasantry. The conservative members of the party demanded in their parliamentary speeches that there was a need for further religious freedom in the society and that the religious instruction was to be introduced to secondary schools and even to the universities. The DP government seemed to be in sympathy with these views.

On September, 1956, a course on Islam was introduced into the first two grades of the middle school. Again, the

79For example, in his speech in Adana, the Prime Minister Menderes recited prayers from Koran and promised that Istanbul would soon become "a second Mecca of the Muslim World." Cumhuriyet, November 22, 1957. In inter-party competition, the religious appeals of the DP went far enough to openly announce that the RPP was the Godless party, Menderes was God's chosen instrument for the Turk's salvation on earth, and he was indispensable, etc. See Robinson, The First Turkish Republic..., pp. 193-194. Rustow, "Politics and Development Policy," p. 25. Giritlioğlu, Türk Siyasi Tarihinde CHP nin Yeri, pp. 278-285. Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, pp. 305-307.

80See BMMTD, IX-51-1 (February 25, 1951); IX-49-1 (February 27, 1952); IX-53-2 (February 25, 1953); and IX-49-2 (February 24, 1954).
regulation was that students could opt out of the course if their parents requested their exemption.\textsuperscript{81} Also, the government allowed religious instruction in the normal schools for the purpose of preparing prospective primary school teachers to the teaching of religious courses in the primary school program.\textsuperscript{82}

Practically every primary and middle school student took the religious course.\textsuperscript{83}

From a legal point of view, the way in which religious instruction in primary and middle schools was handled during the DP administration was criticized on the following grounds:

1. The insertion of religious courses as regular subjects into the normal class schedule, and

2. The change in the regulation from an opt-in basis by parental request to an opt-out basis.

\textsuperscript{81}On January 8, 1956, the Prime Minister Menderes himself had promised the introduction of religious courses in the middle school programs in a speech in Konya. Cumhuriyet, January 9, 1956.

\textsuperscript{82}Kazamias, Education and the Quest for . . . , p. 190. Parmaksizoglu, Türkiye’de Din Eğitimi, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{83}Parmaksizoglu, loc. cit.; Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization . . . , p. 331; Reed, "Religious Life of . . . ," p. 122.
These two changes were seen particularly in conflict with the principles of secularism and secular education.  

From an educational point of view, the available information suggests a low quality of content and instructional methods and poorly trained teachers in the religious courses. The content of these courses was prepared by an appointed committee in the Ministry of Education. However, it contained elements which were in conflict with the positive subjects of the school program. Some elements in the content placed emphasis on the miraculous and imaginary aspects of Islamic religion. Also, in order to promote Islamic religious values among the youth who took these courses, Islam was frequently compared with other religions. On the other hand, mostly, individuals who had had no official training to do the job were employed as teachers of these courses. Therefore, as Reed observed, the official religious classes in the schools did not appear to seriously compete with the reactionary, obscurantist type of traditional Islamic religious

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85 Özek, Türkiye'de Gerici Akimlar ve ..., pp. 471-472.
instruction by unauthorized religious clerics outside the school system, which was then quite popular and widespread.\textsuperscript{86}

The imam-hatip schools, which trained religious leaders and preachers, also suffered greatly from lack of proper teachers, quality programs and textbooks, and building facilities. Severe charges concerning the imam-hatip schools and the teaching of religion in public schools were leveled by the opposition parties and the intellectuals to which the government, as in other areas, reacted with increasing sensitivity. Especially between 1955-1960, fewer data concerning education were made available by the government. However, transcripts of parliamentary debates and a report which was prepared by the National Commission on Education reveal the fact that imam-hatip schools, under the DP administration, were in no position to function in concert with the purposes for which they had been established and within the essentials of the secular educational system in which they had been placed.

In the parliamentary debates, not only the deputies from the opposition parties but also a good number of

\textsuperscript{86}Reed, "Religious Life of...", p. 123.
moderate members of governmental party often criticized various aspects of imam-hatip schools. There were two main areas of concern in these criticisms: (1) inadequacy of these schools as far as buildings, furniture, equipment, teacher and program qualities were concerned, and (2) the possible ill effects of these schools, in the long run, on the secular school system and in the society. The lack of concern on the part of the DP administration and governmental leaders to improve the quality of education in imam-hatip schools was quite observable. For example, in 1953, although eight new imam-hatip schools were opened, no additional teaching and administrative cadres were provided. This situation severely affected the functioning of all fifteen schools which then existed. Against the criticisms regarding teacher quality and shortage in these schools, the Minister of Education, in a speech in the Assembly, suggested that, since the graduates of the Faculty of Theology were to fill in teaching positions, teacher shortage and quality

87 See especially BMMTD, IX-48-3 (February 26, 1952); IX-49-2 (February 24, 1954); X-45-1 (February 26, 1956); and X-46-4 (February 25, 1957).

problems would be solved as the graduates of this faculty increased in their numbers in the years to come.89 This explanation was a clear indication that the government did not see any inconvenience in doubling the number of imam-hatip schools at the beginning of the 1953-1954 school year despite the fact that there were not enough qualified personnel to teach various subjects.

The report of the National Commission on Education,90 which was submitted to Menderes government in early 1959, also contained vigorous criticisms concerning religious education. From a legal point of view, the Commission did not see a conflict between the secularist principles of the Republic and the way in which religious instruction was organized and implemented in elementary and middle schools.91

89 Ibid., IX-49-3 (February 24, 1954), speech given by the Minister of Education R. Salim Burçak, p. 854.

90 The National Commission on Education was established in 1958 with the support of the Ford Foundation. A number of outstanding Turkish educators and intellectuals shared responsibilities in the preparation of the Commission’s report which was suppressed and classified as secret by the DP government. The report was made public after 1960 revolution.

In general, however, the report reflected two major hesitations of the Commission in terms of the structure and functioning of imam-hatip schools. These were: (1) whether the expansion of these schools would result in some degree of duality in the educational system, and (2) whether the type of education provided in these schools would have the capacity of producing negative influences on the process of modernization in Turkish society.

The major criticism of the Commission regarding the curriculum of imam-hatip schools concerned itself with the proportions of religious and nonreligious subjects. The Commission felt that there was a need for a study and a consequent revision of the curriculum to reduce the proportion of religious subjects in order to reinforce and strengthen the teaching of nonreligious ones.\(^{92}\) The report also recommended the opening of special classes to prepare some students for higher religious learning at the university

\(^{92}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 112-113.} \) The percentage distribution of subjects in imam-hatip school program was: 43.7 per cent religious and 56.0 per cent nonreligious. For a comparison of the percentages of nonreligious subjects in various types of schools at secondary level, see \text{Orta Öğretim Program- larinda Yönelmeler (1924-1970)}, pp. 65-73. When compared with the program of medreses of the prerepublican period, the imam-hatip schools was more religious-oriented. See Parmaksizoğlu, \text{Türkiye'de Din Eğitimi}, pp. 32-33.
level. These classes would follow programs in conformity with lycee curriculum. Concerning the quality of teaching and teachers, the Commission observed that the majority of the teachers who taught religious subjects had considerably less than adequate qualifications. They were mainly outmoded medrese graduates, products of the traditional religious schools of the Ottoman period. This group brought with them the medrese spirit and mentality into the imam-hatip schools. This situation was to be regarded as a serious threat to the future of the country. 93

In terms of the functional characteristics of imam-hatip schools, the Commission insisted that the vocational nature of these schools be preserved. The indications were that the majority of graduates were not working in jobs related to their vocation. The report stated: "If these (graduates) are accepted by universities without having to pass the general lycee exams," the result would be the creation of "two types of lycees in the country." 94

93 Milli Komisyon Raporu, p. 112.
94 Ibid., p. 113.
The report of the National Commission also emphasized that there was a great need for the preparation of the textbooks to be used in these schools.

Many practical recommendations emerged from the report. These can be summarized as follows: (1) in order to prevent the degeneration of these institutions, a committee of selected university professors and the authorities from the Ministry of Education should be set up to ameliorate various aspects of imam-hatip schools, (2) the functioning of the schools and their graduates should be closely controlled and supervised, (3) imam-hatip schools should be made vocational schools at the second cycle of secondary education level, giving education following general middle schools, (4) the teachers with medrese education background should be eliminated, and (5) courses in religion in the normal schools should be improved. 95

As mentioned earlier, the DP government suppressed the above report, classifying it as secret. Therefore, the report failed to serve its original purpose of activating the government leaders and officials to take steps for bettering the conditions in imam-hatip schools. The only

95 Ibid., pp. 112-113.
move by the government was the establishment of a new educational institution at higher education level, the Higher Islamic Institute, to train sufficient number of teachers for the rapidly growing imam-hatip schools. The Institute started teaching in 1959. However, the staff of the Institute was, again, deficient, as were the students who came totally unprepared for the curriculum which was designed to further the understanding of Islam in the light of contemporary science and social principles.

It becomes clear that the expansion in religious education during the period between 1950-1960 was marked by a variety of shortcomings and deficiencies which had the potential of producing conflicting educational and political consequences. The DP governments during this period were unresponsive to criticisms and were unwilling to produce the kind of decisions and actions which would prevent such consequences. This attitude of the DP governments can be explained on the basis of the following reasons:

96 See Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, pp. 314-315.
97 Eren, Turkey, Today and Tomorrow, pp. 202-203.
The exploitation of the existing social and economic cleavages in the society for political purposes by the DP resulted in an atmosphere in which the government policies were alienating the urban intelligentsia, while most of these policies were being produced as a response to rural opinion. As one author put it:

"Menderes' domestic policy was to maintain himself in power by giving the peasants what they wanted: loans for farm equipment, public works in country districts, and a relaxation of the official antipathy towards the more obscurantist manifestations of Islamic religious feelings."  

Another author saw the blend of the DP rule between 1950-1960 as majoritarianism, acquisitiveness, and semi-religious appeals. The DP largely distrusted the criticisms and the demands of the intellectual elite, as the party and government leaders failed to develop an instinctive disposition for pluralism. Every word or action of the opposition was castigated as unpatriotic, insincere or partisan. Especially in the late 1950's when the economic situation sharply deteriorated, the party and

98Lewis, Turkey, p. 134.


100Eren, Turkey, Today and Tomorrow, p. 24.
and the government, in order to maintain the support of the rural conservative strata, preferred not to com­promise with the intellectual elite on the basic issues including the religion which was still an effective tool in the mobilization strategy of the DP.

(2) Ideally, the introduction of religious courses into elementary and middle school programs and the opening of the schools for religious leaders and preachers were to serve two main purposes: one was to minimize the ill effects of the reactionary, obscurantist type of Islamic religious teaching done by individuals and agencies outside the school system; and the second was to train a new generation of intellectual, reformist, and enlightened religious leaders which, at the grass roots level, could be a significant force in Turkish development. The DP administration showed, however, little, if any, effort for the realization of these purposes. As discussed earlier, the party continuously sought to politicize and exploit the religious feelings among population groups in order to gain some favor with the electorate and perhaps to make the economic measures somewhat easier to take. Changes in religious education, in general, were regarded as a part of this strategy rather than as steps for the
realization of above purposes. This attitude of the DP administration was quite apparent in that schools for religious leaders and preachers were opened under premature conditions; an increasing number of students were admitted into these schools without taking into account the deficiencies in their programs, problems regarding the teacher quality and shortage, lacking building facilities, etc.; and courses on religion were introduced into elementary and middle school curriculum, but their efficiency was questionable. All such developments suggest that the administration under the DP leadership seemed to be more concerned with the visibility of the measures taken in religious education than securing the necessary conditions to improve the quality of that education. 101

1960 Revolution and the Period Between 1960-1965

On May 27, 1960, the DP administration came to an abrupt end. The National Unity Committee (NUC), composed

101 One investigator suggested that the medrese-nature of imam-hatip schools did not pose a major inconvenience to the leaders of the DP and the administration. The main reason was that a new generation of enlightened religious leaders would have been a threat to the success of the DP in exploiting the religion for political advantages. Özek, Türkiye'de Laiklik, p. 470.
of 38 military officers and headed by General Cemal Gürsel, took over the government by suddenly arresting all important political leaders and placing military commanders in charge of the areas in which they were sanctioned. Unlike most other revolutions, compromise and moderation prevailed after the military take-over. On May 28, the military leaders appointed a seventeen man cabinet of whom fifteen were civilian "technicians" who had not been identified with any political party. Also, it was clear that the military wanted to return power to an elected civilian parliament. As a part of this general pattern, party activity that had been suspended by the NUC was resumed in early 1961—the ban on political parties was lifted on January 31, 1961. Until the return of power to civilians was accomplished, Turkey was governed by the NUC with the cooperation of civilians between May 27, 1960 and October 25, 1961.

While a combination of various factors contributed to the civilian rule breakdown, the virulent intra-elite

102 On the alternative courses of action which can be taken by the leaders of military interventions, see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968).
conflicts and intra-party cleavage between 1950 and 1960 can be said to be the underlying cause of the revolution. One of the reasons given by the military for its intervention was that the partisan activities of the political parties had destroyed the social fabric and unity of the Turkish nation. More specifically, however, the 1960 revolution was presented as a revolt against the oppressive regime of the DP and its crimes against the constitution. The basic issues which led to the military take-over can be analyzed under three categories: 103 (1) the role of religion in Turkish society, (2) the maintenance of political freedom, and (3) economic policy. The DP’s lack of enthusiasm for the spirit of Kemalist reforms, especially in the area of secularism, was shown as one of the reasons for the military intervention. 104


Also, a marked sensitivity of the DP to criticisms and opposition had resulted in a whole series of curbs on political, academic, and journalistic freedom which was passed by an increasingly DP-dominated Assembly. The regime's oppressiveness had alienated the intellectuals, students, journalists, and a sizeable portion of bureaucrats and the officer corps. As a result, in order to put democracy back on the right track, the armed forces, "the cutting edge of the intelligentsia," undertook the coup.\textsuperscript{105} In the case of economic policy, the DP administration seriously extended the economic activities in relation to available resources. The result was a seriously felt inflation which was another main cause of the take-over.

The military leaders of the revolution, namely, the members of the NUC, recognized the great importance of the above issues and the need for social, economic, and political reforms.\textsuperscript{106} However, fundamental changes in various sectors of the society could hardly have been accomplished in the short period of time during which the NUC was in power. Several factors should be taken into account in examining

\begin{itemize}
  \item Interviews in \textit{Cumhuriyet}.
\end{itemize}
the successes and failures of the NUC. First of all, as in the case of almost all military revolutions, the NUC members had no overall reform program in mind upon accession to power. Once in power, on the other hand, they found it necessary to deal with more practical problems such as the trial of the individuals connected with the ousted regime, the writing of a new constitution and an electoral law, dealing with the opposition to the coup of the DP sympathizers and religious leaders, and trying to prepare necessary conditions to return power to civilians. Nevertheless, some achievements of the NUC can be noted.107 These were contributed by two important factors: (1) because of the deeply rooted belief in authority in Turkish political culture, the NUC faced practically no difficulty in implementing its measures, and (2) it enjoyed, in general, the broad support of intellectuals, the university students, civil servants, and the supporters and members of the RPP.108


Thus, as Ülman and Tachau viewed:

The coup of May 27, 1960 should be regarded as an integral part of the developing struggle between the traditional masses of villagers and small townsmen on the one hand and the more modernized urban elite on the other.\(^{109}\)

When one considers the reflection of this struggle on the formation and activities of parties, however, one sees a distinct difference in the trends of developments before and after 1960. Namely, the inter-party competition between 1946-1960 was marked by a trend toward a two-party system which proved to be a major obstacle to the growth of new parties. However, after 1960, a new trend was observed in the nature of the party system which was characterized by an increased fragmentation and ideological polarization. The Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP) were founded in 1961 with the hope of replacing the dissolved DP in the party system. The following year, a splinter group from the Republican Peasants Nation Party (RPNP) formed the Nation Party (NP) which stressed the value of

private enterprise and placed much emphasis on religion and morality. Formed in 1961 as a Marxist-oriented party, the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) espoused "socialism" as the key to rapid socio-economic development. The formation of the Unity Party (UP) in 1966, which aimed at representing a certain communal interest, and the Reliance Party (RP) in 1967 by a dissenting group of RPP deputies added to the number of political parties competing for power, influence and authority. 110

Basically, as a result of this increased fragmentation and ideological polarization in the party system, 1961 elections gave none of the parties a majority in the Assembly. 111 Until the 1965 elections, therefore, Turkey was governed, for the first time in its history, by coalitions. The RPP and the JP participated in the first coalition which

110 After 1960, many other parties were also formed, but they did not actively participate in the partisan struggle leading to the general election. Nye, "The Military in Turkish Politics, 1960-1973," p. 107.

111 The proportional representation system which was used in the election was another reason which precluded the obtainment of a clear-cut majority in the Assembly by a single party. See Sayari, "Party Politics in Turkey. . . .," pp. 51-55. The 1961 election returned 173 seats for the RPP, 158 for the JP, 65 for the NTP, and 54 for the RPNP. The RPP received 36.7 per cent of the vote, the JP 34.8, the RPNP 14.0 and the NTP 13.7. Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1971 (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, publication No. 670, 1973), p. 143.
survived for only eight months. The second coalition stayed in power for nearly eighteen months and included the RPP, NTP, and the RPNP. The third coalition was formed on December, 1963 with the participation of the RPP and a large number of independents, which lasted until February, 1965. All these three coalitions were led by İsmet İnönü as the Prime Minister. The fourth coalition, formed under the Premiershiop of S. Hayri Ürgüplü who had no party affiliation, governed the country until after the general election on October 15, 1965. The JP, NTP, RPNP and NP participated in this coalition.

The lack of cohesion and leadership characterized the political scene between 1960 and 1965. Thus, weak coalitions, which tended to be inactive on the major problems confronting the country, were unable to control a variety of pressures which were contributed to greatly by the increased fragmentation and ideological polarization. In a sense, the restoration of multi-party politics after the revolution led to incoherence for the same reasons that the establishment of multi-party politics did in the 1950's. The election in 1961 demonstrated, for example, that the country remained split along essentially the same lines as in the late 1950's. The continuity of voting alignments
was evident in the election results that the JP and the NTP received almost an equal percentage of votes that the DP had received in 1957 elections. The RPP's share of the votes was also close in percentage to its share in the 1957 elections. At the same time, party leaders, even those who shared responsibilities in coalition governments, were unable to develop enduring relationships. As Logoglu stated:

Each party leader related to his followers in the polarity of emanation and saw other party leaders as a direct threat to his own power. The result was incoherence. 112

In a general sense, the developments between 1960 and 1965 sharpened the power instincts of all members and would-be members of the political elite. As a greater variety of political ideologies found representatives in the political arena, there developed little agreement among the groups and individuals on the alternative courses of action in dealing with various problems. Therefore, this five-year period did not resolve any major social or economic problem. The major achievements of the NUC rule and the coalition governments were the restoration of

112 Logoglu, "İsmet İnönü and the Political...," p. 248.
civilian rule and the maintenance of multi-party polities on a modified basis (e.g., a new constitution, new modern basic democratic institutions, etc.).

Religious Education Between 1960-1965

As the political upheaval of 1960-1961 began an accelerated social change in Turkey, the interaction between education and politics has started to take place in a re-doubled intensity. However, the political scene was not conducive to the emergence of the kind of strong, positive leadership and governments that were vitally needed to balance a variety of conflicting pressures and demands concerning the educational system. It can be said that the old struggle between conservatives and reformists revived after the 1960 revolution in a more complex manner.

The NUC period was characterized by the combination of drastic method and uncertain purpose. Interviews with the NUC members by the newspaper Cumhuriyet indicated that education was recognized by the military leaders as the single most important problem confronting the country. However, different officers focused on different aspects of education. The program of the NUC government also viewed education as one of the urgent national problems; however,
no specific problem of education was emphasized. The program simply indicated that certain steps were going to be taken for an education reform, which would provide the basis for the efforts of the future governments.\textsuperscript{113} The government soon took the following measures: (1) establishment of a Reserve Officers Teaching Program to deal with the severe shortage of teachers in rural areas, (2) establishment of a planning board within the Ministry of Education, and (3) publication of the report of the National Commission on Education which was suppressed by the DP government.

In addition, the NUC convened an Education Commission of its own for the preparation of a National Education Plan. This Commission, in its report to the government, made many recommendations for reform at all levels of schooling in Turkey.\textsuperscript{114} On the religious courses which were being taught in the last two years of elementary school and in the first two years of middle school, the Commission recommended that these courses be provided only in the last year


\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Milli Eğitim Planinin Hazırlığı ile Görevli Komisyonun Raporu} (Ankara: MEB, 1960). This report was published on November 11, 1960.
of these schools. On imam-hatip schools, the Commission supported the recommendation of the National Commission on Education that these schools should follow the middle school education in the system. The report stressed the need for a curriculum revision and improvement and suggested that courses on occupational subjects be added in order to make the graduates productive citizens. All teachers should be appointed from among the selected university graduates. Finally, the Advanced Islamic Institute, which was established by the DP government to train teachers for imam-hatip schools, was seen by the Commission, structurally and functionally, in contradiction with the Law of Unification of Education.

Within the short period of NUC rule, however, no major operation was directed to religious education in schools. In fact, neither religion nor religious education gained any significance from a political point of view. It should be pointed out, however, that NUC government placed emphasis on religion and religious education within a legal framework. The government wanted to include in the Constitution measures strictly prohibiting the exploitation of religion.¹¹⁵ This

prohibition was specified in the Article 19 of the 1961 Constitution. More significantly, the same Article made reference to religious education by stating that "Religious education is subject to the individual's own will and volition, and in the case of minors to that of their legally appointed guardians."

After the 1961 elections, with the return of the civilian rule, religious education gradually regained its importance as an issue of political significance. Political parties became increasingly concerned with the developments in religious schools and religious instruction in public schools. Various associations, newspapers, and other publications pointed out the shortcomings of religious education in the school system. Most notably, between 1960 and 1965, there was a considerable number of commissions and committees which were set up by the government and the Ministry of Education to report and make recommendations on this issue. The past, present, and the future of religious education in Turkey were, thus, extensively dealt with.

The Committee on Religious Education and Instruction, which was set up in 1960 and presented its report to the government in 1961, considered the religious instruction in
secondary schools on the basis of the principles and regulations which had been put forward by the Cabinet of Ministers on August 13, 1956. The report pointed out that the textbooks for both the teachers and the students had not yet been prepared by the Ministry of Education and that no measure had been undertaken by the government for the training of teachers. Therefore, there were differences among individual schools in the way in which this instruction was implemented. The Committee made recommendations in four areas: (1) the training of teachers, (2) developing appropriate teaching methods and procedures for these courses, (3) revising the curriculum objectives and content, and (4) preparation of textbooks. 116

On imam-hatip schools, the Committee made severe criticisms. According to the report, the program of imam-hatip schools had neglected some of the important religious vocational areas by focusing only on the training of religious leaders and preachers. This situation created a disequilibrium among the ranks of the religious personnel in Turkey. The imam-hatip graduates had to work under the

supervision and control of muftis (senior Muslim priests) whose educational backgrounds were, in general, obscure.\textsuperscript{117}

The second criticism of the Committee concerned itself with the employment opportunities of imam-hatip graduates. The limited number of existing cadres for religious personnel had been, and were being, filled haphazardly. By passing a simple competency test, even those without an elementary school diploma were able to be employed as religious leaders and preachers. This situation should pose serious questions in terms of the future of rapidly increasing imam-hatip graduates. Third, the Commission maintained that it was impossible to keep the existing nineteen imam-hatip schools at a level for the realization of the purposes for which they had been established. Because of the serious problems originating from the lack of teachers, textbooks, teaching and building facilities, and regulations, each imam-hatip school differed from others in terms of the type of education it offered to its students. In some schools, the

\textsuperscript{117}In 1962, for the first time, the number and the educational backgrounds of religious functionaries were officially disclosed. There were more than 60,000 of whom 370 had higher education, 417 lycee, 1298 middle school, 3106 elementary education. It was estimated that 55,000 had no formal educational background. \textit{Cumhuyiyet} and \textit{Milliyet}, Aug. 19, 1962.
education was even behind the qualities of medrese education and was implemented with at least two hundred years old methods and techniques. These deficiencies gave the impression to some traditional, religious circuits that Islamic teaching was being revived at the secondary school level. Thus, many parents sent their children to imam-hatip schools to educate them in a religious way. As a result, the majority of imam-hatip schools were losing their vocational school character, and they were becoming institutions which gave free religious instruction to some students. Finally, the report of the Committee on Religious Education and Instruction called attention to the tendencies of accepting the graduates of imam-hatip schools to the universities. Many of the graduates were trying to find a way to continue with their education at the university level. This was particularly caused by the disappointment of the graduates in their inadequate professional preparation and in their employment difficulties. This situation should also be considered as an indication that imam-hatip schools were not functionally effective as vocational educational institutions. 118

Concerning the above matters, the Committee made several recommendations which were, in general, similar to those that had been made by the previous reports. Additionally, however, it suggested (1) inclusion of other religious vocational areas into the imam-hatip school curriculum, (2) turning the existing nineteen schools into four fundamental ones which would be named "institutes, or Lycees of Islamic Theology," (3) the establishment of a General Directorate of Religious Education within the Ministry of Education, and (4) the acceptance of imam-hatip school graduates into the Faculty of Theology and other relevant departments of the university.  

The above report, as the other two reports previously discussed, concentrated on the problems of religious instruction and religious schools in terms of the degree of realization of the purposes and functions. The value of these reports lies in their pointing out the problematic aspects of religious education in Turkey and in their practical recommendations related to the improvement and development of this field. They were also effective in making the issue of religious education a matter of a growing public and governmental concern. Being

\[119\text{Ibid., p. 16.}\]
impressionistic in nature, these reports did not, however, examine the issue in a broader context by also considering the structure and functioning of secondary education in the Turkish educational system. In this respect, the Seventh National Educational Council, which met in February 1962 and discussed the educational functions and structural characteristics of various schools at the secondary level in relation to one another, was significant. One of the reform proposals which was submitted to the Council concerned itself with middle-level schools. These secondary level, first cycle educational institutions included the middle school which offered general or classical education, the middle-level of vocational and technical schools and teacher-training institutions, and other special or professional schools. It was suggested that these schools, differentiated by curricula, were accepting elementary school graduates without considering their aptitudes and abilities. Once students entered any one of these schools, they had no choice but to follow the prescribed course, which prevented subsequent transfers. This also meant that students had to follow an almost predetermined path so far as their future education was concerned (i.e., middle school led to lycee, a vocational middle-level
school led to the second cycle of the same school, etc.). Thus, in order to break the monolithic middle school-lycee sequence and to bridge the vocational-academic dichotomy, it was felt that the various kinds of middle-level schools should be replaced by "comprehensive, or multipurpose, middle schools" with a curriculum which should include both compulsory and elective subjects. This new type of middle school would be the continuation of elementary school and the basis of academic and vocational and technical schools of the second cycle of secondary level.\footnote{Yedinci Milli Eğitim Şurası Komite Raporları, I., (Ankara: MEB, 1962), p. 7.} This proposal was accepted by the Seventh National Educational Council.\footnote{Yedinci Milli Eğitim Şurası, 5-15 Şubat 1962: Çalışma Esasları Konular ve Kararlar (Ankara: MEB, 1962), pp. 123, 179.} The Ministry of Education also accepted it in principle.

In accordance with this recommended change in the structure and functioning of secondary education, the first cycle of imam-hatip schools was to follow the middle school program furnishing its graduates with a middle school diploma. Therefore, the imam-hatip schools were to be
placed in the second cycle of secondary level as vocational institutions following the middle school education.\(^{122}\)

This decision of the Council was approved by the Ministry of Education.\(^{123}\)

The above developments which took place in a short period of time soon activated the political scene in such a way that pressures were placed upon the Ministry of Education to reconsider various aspects of religious education at the secondary level. As a result, in 1963, the Minister Ş. Ratip Hatıpoğlu called out a special commission to study and report on the issue. This commission was composed of the representatives of the Ministry of Education, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Faculty of Theology, and the Higher Islamic Institute. Some members of the Senate and the Grand National Assembly were also invited as guests to participate in the activities of the commission. In its report, the commission dealt with only those problems concerning vocational religious education. As was expected, however, its recommendations seemed to refute the decisions

\(^{122}\)Ibid., p. 209.

\(^{123}\)MEB Tebliğler Dergisi, No. 1212 (16 Temmuz 1962), p. 149.
and the suggested policies of the Seventh National Educational Council. Namely, the commission recommended that the vocational religious character of the first cycle of the imam-hatip school curriculum be preserved, and that the imam-hatip schools be viewed as providing a complete seven-year education which should not be divided by a diploma. 124

It is quite clear that, although there were differences in their recommendations, the Seventh National Educational Council and the reports of the commissions and committees did not significantly differ from one another in terms of defining the problems of religious education. Before examining the stands of coalition governments of the period between 1961 and 1965 on this issue, it is useful to briefly point out the problem areas to which these recommendations were directed. On the religious courses offered in middle-level schools, criticisms and recommendations were concerned with (1) the quality of religious courses in terms of their objectives and content, and the teaching methods used, (2) the lack of teaching materials, i.e., textbooks, (3) the lack of trained and qualified teachers, and (4) the grade

124Parmaksizoğlu, Türkiye'de Din Egitimi, pp. 41-42. Dinçer, İmam-Hatip Okulları, pp. 76-77.
levels in which this instruction was provided. Concerning imam-hatip schools, emphasis was put on (1) the degree of realization of the vocational functions of these educational institutions, (2) problems related to the curricular and instructional deficiencies, (3) teacher quality and training, (4) physical facilities in the schools, and (5) administration and supervision of the schools.

Concerning the above matters, the measures taken by the coalition governments were rather limited. This situation can be explained on the basis of two factors. First, as described earlier, the political situation was highly problematic after the 1960 revolution. The governments which were formed between 1961 and 1965 devoted most of their energy to the maintenance of civilian rule and multi-party politics. With respect to social and economic problems, no major issue was resolved mainly because the parliament and the governments found it necessary to deal with more practical and urgent demands and problems that were generated by the revolution that had recently taken place. Therefore,

125 It should be noted that, during this period, religious instruction in schools was no longer seriously argued from the standpoint of the secular nature of the school system in Turkey.
even though education was recognized as one of the most important problems confronting the country, none of the four coalition governments were able to seriously produce a major change in specific aspects of this problem. The second reason is closely related to the first. In a political environment which was characterized by an increased ideological polarization and fragmentation, the coalition governments refrained from squarely confronting issues that were politically sensitive though whose solutions were urgent and essential. Because various parties participated in the governments, coherent policy was difficult to obtain as each party stressed its own interest. Thus, political responsibility remained somewhat ambiguous, since strong and responsible governments were unobtainable. Naturally, the parties and the governments avoided sensitive issues by by-passing them rather than pressing for action, which is one way to explain the formation of a good number of commissions and committees to study and report on the issue of religious education. This attitude was particularly evident in the RPP around which the first three coalitions were organized. Being aware of the distinct differences among the parties in terms of principles and policies, the RPP, by refraining from facing the politically sensitive issues,
sought to achieve consensus and cooperation for the main-
tenance of the coalition governments. 126

At this point, a look will be taken at the stand of the Ministry of Education with regard to the various reports on the issue of religious education. In general, the Ministry recognized the importance of the problematic aspects of religious education, which were posed by the reports. However, the Ministry, confronted by a variety of different recommendations, took a position which was essentially similar to the 1963 commission's. As an answer to "the intentions of some groups to exploit the issue of religious education," the Ministry made its position public in early 1964. 127 In the document, no reference was made to religious instruction in elementary and middle-level schools, which indicated that the religious instruction in schools was not a matter of a high political significance at that time. On imam-hatip schools, the Ministry emphasized that the essential function of these schools was to train

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126 On the attitudes of the government leaders towards various issues of this period, see Loğoğlu, "İsmet İnönü and the Political. . . ," pp. 230-242.

127 MEB Tebligler Dergisi, No. 1296, 23 Mart 1964.
middle-level, enlightened religious personnel. Thus, their graduates had to function in accordance with the professional preparation which they received in these vocational schools. For the graduates of imam-hatip schools who would want to continue with their education at higher levels, the same opportunities existed as for the graduates of other vocational schools. Therefore, the Ministry thought that increasing the number of these schools beyond the needs and employment possibilities, and turning them into the kind of institutions which would train both religious leaders and other kinds of professionals or prepare students for higher education would not be scientifically possible. At the same time, the existence of such institutions would be in contradiction with the constitution and the Law of Unification of Education.

In concert with the recommendations of the 1963 Commission on religious education, the Ministry saw its responsibility as making sure that the imam-hatip schools functioned as institutions of vocational education. To achieve this and a better training of the students, these schools were to be made boarding schools in proper buildings and under appropriate conditions.
Table 7. İmam-Hatip Schools, First and Second Cycle (1960-1965).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen on the above table, the quantitative aspects of imam-hatip schools showed a steady development during the period between 1960 and 1961. After the opening of seven new schools in 1962-1963, the government decided to freeze the number of existing imam-hatip schools. This decision was made for essentially two reasons. First, as the Minister of Education İbrahim Öktem himself explained in the Parliament, only one-third of approximately 2,150 imam-hatip school graduates were working in positions which were, one way or another, related to their vocational preparation. On the other hand, the Presidency of Religious Affairs had only 1,000 available salaried cadres to employ religious leaders and preachers. The majority of the graduates were unable to find suitable jobs and, thus, they were vocationally unfunctional. It was, therefore, necessary to limit the capacity of imam-hatip schools according to available employment possibilities. Second, the conditions in the existing schools, as had been pointed out in various

reports, needed urgent attention and improvement. Thus, the Ministry viewed that, before the problems of existing schools would be entirely solved, the opening of new ones would be meaningless and against the national interest.

Several objective and sincere steps were taken by the Ministry, especially during the second and third coalition government periods in order to better the physical conditions and the quality of education in imam-hatip schools. The Ministry, for example, cooperated with the Faculty of Theology, the Higher Islamic Institute, and the Presidency of Religious Affairs in an effort to revise and improve the curriculum of imam-hatip schools. In accordance with this effort, the preparation of textbooks was seriously undertaken. The schools were furnished with necessary instructional materials and equipment.

The state-subsidized boarding capacity of these schools was increased from 1,000 to 2,000. Some local associations were given financial aid to construct dormitories and better school buildings. An investment program for the improvement of the existing schools was prepared and written into the First Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967), which proposed a 15 million TL spending in 1965 and 1966.
The teachers and administrators, who lacked adequate vocational and pedagogical training, were eliminated. All teaching positions for vocational religious subjects were filled with the graduates of the Faculty of Theology and the Higher Islamic Institute. The Ministry also showed a special interest to appoint experienced, secular and modern-minded teachers to the positions for teaching of general subjects.129

Within the central organization of the Ministry, a General Directorate of Religious Education was established in 1964. With this move, the administration and supervision of religious schools and religious instruction was made the responsibility of an independent unit in the Ministry.

The role of the various reports and the personal commitment of some Ministers of Education to the issue were primarily responsible in the realization of the above measures which greatly stabilized the development of religious education during that period. However, the efforts of the government and the Ministry were viewed suspiciously by some

129In an interview on Nov. 8, 1976 with Mr. İbrahim Öktem, the Minister of Education of the second and third coalition governments, this investigator was informed that during this period, also some specially selected administrators and teachers had been appointed to the imam-hatip schools to keep the retrogressive tendencies under control.
religious groups. The Ministry especially was attacked in an effort to create an atmosphere to influence the public opinion as if the real intention of the government were to prepare conditions under which the religious schools would be closed down on a legitimate basis. Also, the criteria used by the Ministry in the appointment of teachers and administrators were criticized as being detrimental to the functioning of the schools. Some felt that the reports of various committees and commissions on religious education did not reflect the truth and that their members had not been chosen objectively. Some extreme religious sects viewed the developments as a schism. The conservative groups, in general, were not satisfied with the level of development in religious education reached. Some of these views were also expressed by the members of conservative parties in the Assembly.\footnote{See Parmaksizoğlu, Türkiye'de Din Eğitimi, pp. 42-44. Milli Eğitim Bakani Dr. İbrahim, pp. 12-13. BMMTD, I-53-2 (February 12, 1963); I-60-3 (February 23, 1964); and I-112-2 (May 22, 1965).}

In order to minimize the effectiveness of the above criticisms, and, at the same time, to create and maintain a
consensus among the parties, both in and out of government, in terms of the actions to be taken in religious education, the Minister İbrahim Öktem conferred with the leaders of the political parties in an effort to get their support. This move was accepted with respect and sympathy. On the other hand, in the face of a felt military "supervision" over political life during this period, even the conservative parties carefully refrained from catering to the interests of religious reactionaries and from criticizing the government's stand on religion and religious education.

The Justice Party in Power
(1965-1971)

The second election under the second republic was held on October 15, 1965, after which the Justice Party (JP) came to power by winning 52.9 per cent of the popular vote and 240 deputies out of a total 450 in the National Assembly. The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, suffered its worst defeat since the beginning of the multi-party era. It received 28.7 per cent of the vote compared to 36.7 per cent in 1961 elections, and it gained 134 seats in the Assembly. Of the several other parties which also

131 Interview with İbrahim Öktem.
competed in the 1965 elections, the Nation Party (NP) won 31, the New Turkey Party (NTP) 19, the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) 14, and the National Action Party (NAP) 11 seats.  

In the next election which was held on October 12, 1969, the JP was again successful. It won 46.5 per cent of the vote and 256 seats in the National Assembly. The RPP received 27.4 per cent of the vote and 143 Assembly seats. The distribution of the remaining seats among the other parties was as follows: the Reliance Party (RP), a splinter from the RPP, 15, the Unity Party (UP) 8, the NP 6, the NTP 6, the TLP 2, and the NAP 1.  

Both the 1965 and 1969 elections produced the expected results. The success of the JP was mainly contributed by two factors: the basic continuity of voter alignments, and the effective strategies pursued by the leaders of the party to present the JP to the electorate as the continuation of the outlawed DP. Indeed, the JP has been a close successor of the DP. For example, both parties, in terms of


their organizational performance, have been characterized by an adaptive and anti-elitist approach. They both have had a reform-conservatist orientation toward change. They have been primarily responsive to local demands, and also they have opposed imposed change and innovation from above. As Sayari commented, when one considers the long standing elite-mass cleavage in Turkey, it becomes understandable that the explicit anti-elitist political styles of both DP and JP and their populistic appeals have greatly contributed to their successive electoral victories.¹³⁴

In terms of its programmatic orientation, the JP has clearly demonstrated its willingness to preserve traditional norms and refrain from undertaking radical measures in dealing with the socio-economic problems. This marked reform-conservatist orientation of the party toward change has been evident in its approach to social, economic, and political issues. The programmatic themes of the JP included commitment to democracy, respect for the expression of the "national will," primacy of free enterprise in economic life, rural development, and a decentralized administrative system.¹³⁵

In terms of its strategies for political succession and vote maximization, the JP has made use of several sensitive issues even though some of these strategies have been detrimental to political stability. In the early 1960's, the party leaders speculated on the legitimacy of the 1960 revolution. After succeeding to establish a large provincial organizational network in a short period of time, the party became especially vocal in defending the DP administration's performance between 1950 and 1960. It also devoted much effort for granting amnesty to the imprisoned DP deputies. The leaders of the party have continuously made bitter attacks on the political standing of other parties, especially the RPP, in order to undermine their electoral strength. Also, since its establishment in 1961, the defense of religious freedom by the JP has been one of the most important factors in its general appeal to the masses.\(^{136}\) The JP leaders, in order to promote the

conservative image of the party, have made frequent references to God and religion. 137

The JP has consisted of a heterogeneous coalition of several elements and has periodically suffered from the lack of party cohesion. Conservative and liberal elements with conflicting goals and aspirations for control of the party have frequently caused intra-party conflicts. Coherent policy on some critical issues was, therefore, difficult to reach. However, the existence of different elements within the party has been another factor which helped the party to appeal to different strata in the society. In fact, the JP has not been selective in terms of the social groups for representation. In the words of its leader, Süleyman Demirel, the JP "is not a class but a mass party" 138 seeking to represent the interests of all segments of the society 139—although by definition these interests are in conflict.

137 Onulduran, Political Development and. . . , p. 71.
139 Ibid., p. 34.
In general, the JP showed considerable tolerance to the expression of all sorts of opinion within the limitations of the constitution. The JP administration, committed itself to rapid economic development in a democratic framework, made progress in expanding and diversifying the economy. In a planned developmental effort, there was a fairly rapid economic growth. For the most part, however, the lower income groups did not benefit from these advances as much as the rich land owners, well-to-do capitalists, and bourgeoisie did.

In the late 1960's, various problems arose. The country began to suffer from both the nature of the JP rule and the position of different groups in the polity. As one author viewed:

the acquisition and retention of political power became dominant, often at the expense of the requirements of modernization. Seeking to maintain and strengthen its position the government neglected various important problem areas that represented constraints upon development because of the political costs involved in challenging existing patterns and entrenched interests.\(^{140}\)

Also, the JP's policy of economic growth with reliance on the private sector proved to be unworkable. The

administration was not willing to provide some modifications resulting in the state's playing a greater initial role in areas which required substantial capital outlay and slow profit returns.  

Unable to deal effectively with the steadily growing inflation and other economic problems, the government came under an intensifying opposition which became more and more radical. Especially in the years following 1968, the university students with the support of intellectuals emerged as a major political force demanding reforms in various areas. The political activities of the students gradually took various forms of violence and created a tense political atmosphere in the country.  

Formal interest groups such as professional associations and labor unions also became highly politicized and polarized. At the national level, the political parties symbolized both the fragmentation and the extremes of political opinion.

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The political consequences of these developments were an increasing polarization in Turkish society and rapidly deteriorating social, economic, and political conditions, which created a potential for military intervention. On March 12, 1971, the armed forces issued a memorandum which called for the resignation of the JP government. In the opinion of the military commanders, a new civilian leadership was needed to achieve stability and the much needed social and economic reforms. The memorandum led, within few hours, to the resignation of the government.

The Issue of Secularism During the JP Rule

The JP, since its establishment in 1961, has rejected a rigid interpretation of secularism. The party programme stated that, "A secular state does not require that citizens should cut their ties with religion. Every citizen is free to worship according to the requirements of his religion and sect." Demirel emphasized, for example, that religion should be looked upon as an important social

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143 Adalet Partisi, Adalet Partisi Program ve Tüzük, Article 10, p. 6.
force which gives direction to individual morals and helps a person to acquire a philosophy about life and a view of the world. \textsuperscript{144} Demirel stated that:

Our people do not complain about the principle of secularism of the state. But they complain about the way of implementation of this principle which restricts the freedom of conscience and religion. \textsuperscript{145}

Demirel explained the government's role and responsibility in this connection as follows:

Since the religious organization is part of the state bureaucracy, they \textit{the people} naturally demand from the government the type of aid which would facilitate the practice of Islam. \ldots We believe that religious freedom should be encouraged within the constitutional limits. It is especially important that we pay more attention to the establishment of institutions for the training of religious personnel. \textsuperscript{146}

The issue of secularism has been one of the major themes of the JP's election campaigns and thus, an important factor in the party's appeal to the masses. At least until the founding of the National Order Party in 1970, the JP championed the cause of Islam. There existed within the

\textsuperscript{145}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{146}\textit{Adalet Partisi, AP Genel Başkanı ve...}, p. 51.
party a group of Islamic nationalists which occupied im-
portant positions in the leadership ranks. This influential
group effectively functioned to further the cause of
orthodox Islam and religious conservatism. In general,
however, the JP has demonstrated less willingness than the
DP to use religion for political purposes. Demirel and other
JP spokesmen, for example, often prompted strong reactions
to the accusations of such parties as the RPP and the TLP
to portray the JP government as an ardent supporter of
certain groups of religious reactionaries. On the other
hand, however, the JP carefully refrained from taking a
position against the efforts of some minor political parties
such as the NP and RPNP to politicize the religion. It was
apparent to the leaders of the JP that such efforts of
these minor parties did not pose any significant threat to
the electoral strength of the JP.

The RPP's approach to the issue of religion as the
major opposition party during this period should also be
given consideration. This party, especially in the late
1960's, deliberately sought to depoliticize the issue by,
at least, refraining from criticizing the government's
policies on religion and secularism. The party secretary
Bülent Ecevit openly objected, for example, to the RPP's
overemphasized concern for secularism as being detrimental to the establishment of close ties between the party and the electorate. He said in the Nineteenth General Congress of the RPP that:

The Turkish nation has, by and large, always refrained from siding with the religious reactionaries. ... We should not be critical of an individual's religiosity, rather we should be critical of those who exploit religion to preserve their economic interests. We have staunchly defended secularism in the past. But what have we gained? If we can explain to the masses our policies without hurting their religious feelings, even those whom we consider as reactionaries will be willing to support us.

Clearly, as compared with the period of the DP rule between 1950 and 1960, the significance of the issue of secularism and religion somewhat declined during the JP period. Despite the existence of an influential group of religious conservatives within the governmental party, the political groups which espoused the religious cause in stronger terms were organized around the minor parties which did not have access to governmental power. It should,


however, be pointed out again that this period witnessed a continual politization of the issue in inter-party conflicts and competition.

Religious Education During the JP Administration (1965-1971)

Because the JP in power ideally sought to represent the interests of all segments of the society, its policies had a wide range of flexibility in response to many shifting circumstances. This character of the party inevitably gave the primacy to political over developmental requirements in governmental affairs. Trying to keep the middle-of-the road and refusing to take a firm stand and mark its place in a continuum from right to left, the JP was far from being an instrument of change. In order to maintain the crucial support of various groups with varying expectations and interests, the government took measures with little regard for the consequences, which, in turn, weakened the legitimacy of the JP in power itself. This situation was particularly observable in educational developments. While being directly affected by political factors, education played a major role in the downfall of the JP government. In general, the government was reluctant to responsibly face
the many aspects of its policy in the important educational areas where the fundamental changes were urgently needed. The expectations and goals of the planners were largely disregarded. As had been during the DP rule, the quality in education was sacrificed for quantity. And as a result, many dysfunctional aspects of the educational system were further entrenched and additional strains were placed upon all three levels of schooling.\textsuperscript{149}

Developments in religious education between 1965 and 1971 were directly dominated by political factors. This field was given a special importance and a high priority by the JP administration. However, the approach of the government to religious education significantly differed in certain areas from the approaches of the governments of the period between 1960 and 1965. The policies, plans, programs, and the measures of the previous governments were, therefore, largely disregarded. As a result, the pace and direction of developments in religious education were deeply affected.

The stand and measures of the JP government on various problematic aspects of religious education which had been

\textsuperscript{149}Szyliowicz, \textit{Education and Modernization} . . . , pp. 353-360.
raised in the previous governmental periods will be dealt with below.

In relation to the nature and the extent of religious education which should be provided in the secular system of Turkish education, the JP government's attitude was clear. The party and the government leaders constantly emphasized that religion had long been neglected in Turkey due to the misinterpretation of the principle of secularism. Therefore, a climate of freedom of conscience and religion should be urgently created. Accordingly, the JP's 1965 governmental program emphasized that it was not possible to view the principle of secularism as a restriction on religious education. The program maintained that the government would take necessary measures to expand religious education in an effort to satisfy the moral and religious needs of the population. Thus, the training of religious personnel would be given a high priority. Clearly, the JP government approached the question of secularism and education from a

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different perspective. What was not meant by a secular system of education, rather than what was meant by it, was argued by the party and government leaders. Simply, the principle of secularism did not mean a limitation on religious education and it was the responsibility of the government to provide services to facilitate the religious life of the population.

In terms of the structure and functioning of religious education, the JP government's stand also differed from the stands of the previous governments. As discussed earlier, before 1965 an understanding had developed that a meaningful vocational training could not be provided at the first cycle of secondary level schools. The Seventh National Educational Council and various reports had proposed the transformation of this cycle, including the middle-level imam-hatip schools, into general middle schools. And the Ministry of Education had accepted this recommendation in principle. The JP administration clearly showed, however, its intention to preserve the vocational religious character of both the first and second cycles of these schools. This policy reflected itself in the planning. The Second Five Year Development Plan (1968-1972) excluded middle level
imam-hatip schools as it proposed that the first cycle of all vocational schools be transformed into general middle schools. 152

However, an interesting development took place in 1970 when the Eighth National Educational Council met and addressed itself to the same question. The Council discussed the structure of secondary school system in Turkey and the reorganization of the transition from secondary to higher education. The proposal which was presented to the members of the Council called attention to the unplanned and irrational development rates in the secondary level schools, which largely resulted from the character of the structure and functioning of that level itself. For example, two of the important educational institutions at the first cycle of secondary level were normal schools and imam-hatip schools. Between 1955 and 1968, the student population of first cycle imam-hatip schools had increased from 2,181 to 33,400; from 1.3 to 4.6 per cent of the total number of

of students in this cycle. Meanwhile, during the same period, the number of students enrolled in the first cycle of normal schools had increased from 6,301 to 13,626, which meant a decrease in the percentage from 3.7 to 1.9 of the students of these schools in the first cycle. A consideration of the development rates of these two types of schools raised questions which should lead one to serious conclusions. The secondary school system needed a new structure if it was to contribute to social and economic development. The problems of vocational and technical education also needed urgent attention. A structural and functional change at the secondary level was, therefore, a necessity.

Based on the above considerations, the proposal which was presented to the Council suggested that there be only one type of school (the middle school) at the first cycle of the secondary level. The program of this school would be the common body of all second cycle programs such as academic or vocational and technical, and the continuation of the compulsory elementary education.

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154 Ibid., p. 12.

155 Ibid., p. 19.
This proposed change in the structure and functioning of the first cycle was accepted by the Eighth Council and approved by the Ministry of Education on November 5, 1970. As a result, the decision for change which had also been recommended by the Seventh Council in 1962 was officially put into effect by the Ministry.

It should be noted that, by not making an exception for any type of school, both the Eighth Council and the Ministry disregarded the Second Five Year Plan which excluded the first cycle imam-hatip schools in its requirement to transform all first cycle schools into general middle schools. This situation naturally created some confusion that faced the Ministry with reactions by the religious-conservative groups. The feeling of these groups was that the real intention of the Eighth Council and those authorities in the Ministry who approved the decision of the Council was to abolish the first cycle of imam-hatip schools by introducing the above change. The pressures of these groups soon led the Ministry to a reconsideration of the status and the program

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157 See Dincer, Imam-Hatip Okullari..., pp. 79, 81.
of imam-hatip schools on the basis of the decisions of the Eighth Council. On December 14-15, 1970, a little more than a month after the meeting of the Council, a meeting was held in the Ministry in the form of a "religious education council" in secrecy. No official information was made public in terms of the nature and agenda of the meeting. According to some newspapers and a preliminary report on religious education written during the preparation of the Third Five Year Plan, the participants to the meeting were the principals of all imam-hatip schools, one representative teacher from each imam-hatip school, representatives from the Ministry of Education, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Higher Islamic Institutes, the Faculty of Theology, the State Planning Organization, and the religious professional associations and organizations, a total of 150 individuals. The decisions that were made during this meeting suggested that imam-hatip schools should be considered as a special case in an attempt to reorganize the structure and functioning of secondary education. Within this framework, the following points were agreed upon and proposed: (1) the vocational character of

158Leaks from the meeting appeared as news articles in some religious-conservative newspapers and magazines. See, for example, Diyanet Dergisi, 15 Aralık 1970; Bugün, 17 Aralık 1970; and Yeni Asya, 21 Aralık 1970.
the first cycle of imam-hatip schools should not be changed, (2) the program of the first cycle should consist of the middle school program and required courses on Arabic, the Koran, and religion, (3) the graduates of the first cycle should be given a diploma equivalent to middle school diploma, and (4) the second cycle imam-hatip schools which would prepare the students for both the higher education programs and religious professions.¹⁵⁹

During the preparation of the Third Five Year Plan, another proposal was made that, instead of preserving the vocational character of the first cycle, a one-year additional program with a vocational orientation would be offered to those graduates of the first cycle who would want to continue with their education in the second cycle imam-hatip schools. In this case, the first cycle would follow the general middle school program.¹⁶⁰

A consideration of the JP's government program, the Second Five Year Plan, the Eighth Educational Council, and the developments after the meeting of the Eighth Council


¹⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 24-25.
suggests the existence of a strong pressure to protect the original form and functioning of these schools against any reform attempt. The nature of the direction was also such that religious schools at the secondary level were to have the status of the general middle schools and lycees. The government, on the other hand, was in sympathy with these views which would necessarily result in the emergence of a separate school system at the secondary level. In fact, the JP government clearly contributed to this end. For example, the government paid little attention to the vocational nature of religious schools and their function to train a required number of religious leaders and preachers as projected by the plans. The JP in power clearly sought political gains by encouraging the development of these schools as a second source to prepare students for higher education. The 1965 government program stated that higher education would be open to the graduates of the imam-hatip schools.\textsuperscript{161} Also, the draft of the Second Five Year Plan which was prepared under the JP administration suggested the acceptance of these graduates into all colleges of higher education as an educational measure. Moreover, a

bill was prepared to employ imam-hatip school graduates as village elementary school teachers. At the same time, the government disregarded the decision of the previous governments to freeze the number of imam-hatip schools in order to improve the conditions of the existing ones. Thus, between 1965 and 1971, the number of religious schools greatly increased and the projected enrollment targets were also greatly surpassed. In fact, both the first and the second cycle of imam-hatip schools showed a high development rate--actually, the highest among all other vocational and technical schools at the same level. Between the school years of 1963-1964 and 1970-1971, the first cycle of imam-hatip schools showed a 234.6 per cent development rate in the first enrollments, 396.7 per cent in the total number of students enrolled, and 633.8 per cent in the number of graduates. In the second cycle, the development rate in total enrollments was 611.5 per cent, in first enrollments 766.1 per cent, and in the number of graduates 334.9 per cent. When these development rates are compared with


163 Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, see Table 41, p. 203.

164 Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Planı. . . , pp. 749, 755.

### Table 8. İmam-Hatip Schools, First and Second Cycle (1965-1971).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 9. Development Rates in Religious Schools (Second Cycle) and in All Vocational and Technical Education (Second Cycle) Between 1963-64 and 1971-72.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Religious Schools (%)</th>
<th>All Vocational and Technical Education (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Enrollments</td>
<td>611.5</td>
<td>127.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Enrollments</td>
<td>766.1</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the total development rates in all vocational and technical schools at the same level, the importance and the magnitude of the expansion in religious schools during the JP administration can be understood.

In the 1970-1971 school year, the student population of all imam-hatip schools constituted 20.8 per cent of the total number of students enrolled in all vocational and technical schools at the secondary school level. This also meant that, after the general middle schools and lycees, imam-hatip schools enrolled the highest number of students in secondary education. 165

This sudden and irrational development in the rates in religious schools also support the view that religious education emerged as a separate school system at secondary school level during the JP administration. This situation was particularly condemned by many intellectuals and "widely regarded as a betrayal of the principle of secularism and served to sharpen cleavages in the society." 166 However,

165 Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, pp. 202, 208.

the JP government was concerned more with the visible advantages of quantitative developments in these schools than the consequences of these developments on the structure and functioning of the school system as a whole. Clearly, political factors dominated the scene.

Before 1965, efforts had been made to reorient and improve the curriculum and the quality of teaching in imam-hatip schools. Soon after the JP came to power, the government, as a response to pressures of some religious associations,\textsuperscript{167} made a serious compromise by deciding to disregard the curriculum which had been prepared for the imam-hatip schools by a group of experts, even though this curriculum had already been approved by the Committee on Instruction and Education of the Ministry.\textsuperscript{168} However, in an effort to prevent the criticisms of intellectuals and certain political parties concerning the deficiencies in

\textsuperscript{167}On the nature of demands and interest of these associations, see Din Dersleri Meselesi, Türkiye Din Görevlileri Yardımlaşma Dernekleri Federasyonu Raporu (Ankara, 1967); Yavuz, Din Eğitimi ve Toplumumuz; and Parmaksızoglu, Türkiye'de Din Eğitimi, pp. 42-44.

\textsuperscript{168}BMMTD, II-50-3 (February 2, 1966), p. 610.
the imam-hatip school curriculum, the government appeared on the surface to be interested in revising this curriculum. Nevertheless, none of the aspects of the original curriculum was changed during the period of JP administration.

The problem of teacher shortage and quality had also been a concern of the governments between 1960 and 1965. As discussed earlier, significant steps had been taken by the coalition governments to improve the quality of teaching staff in imam-hatip schools by way of replacing the teachers with inadequate professional training with the graduates of the Faculty of Theology and the Higher Islamic Institutes.

169 The JP government program and the statements of the JP leaders suggest that the need for a revision of imam-hatip school curriculum was recognized by the government. See, Arar, ed., Hükümet Programlari 1920-1965, p. 437; Demirel, Büyük Türkiye, pp. 127-128, 130; and BMMTD, II-50-4 (February 19, 1966), pp. 637-638.

170 It was reported in 1968, for example, that the continuing studies of the Ministry of Education on the improvement of the programs and regulations of these schools reached the final stage. CSTD, Vol. 45/2 (1968), p. 475. In 1970, another report stated that the Ministry of Education was still continuing with its studies on the programs of imam-hatip schools. CSTD, Vol. 56 (1970), p. 547.
After 1965, the JP government, as a response to the pressures of local religious associations, removed many of the teachers and administrators from these schools that had been appointed by the previous governments. The rapid development rates (despite the lack of sufficient number of qualified teachers) aggravated the problems that characterized the education provided in these schools. This situation also created questions in terms of the Ministry's ability to control and supervise various aspects of religious schools.

The basic reasons for the rapid development rate in imam-hatip schools as suggested by the government leaders between 1965 and 1971 were (1) the demands of the public for religious-oriented education, and (2) the severe shortage of religious personnel with formal training to undertake various functions in mosques. Religious schools, during the

171 Interviews with the Ministers of Education of the JP government between 1965 and 1971 (Cihat Bilgehan, November 18, 1976; Orhan Dengiz, June 15, 1976 and November 16, 1976; İbrahim Ertem, November 22, 1976; and Orhan Oğuz, December 1, 1976) indicated a mutual understanding among these individuals on the characteristics of the teachers to be employed in religious schools; namely, the teacher should be religious, conservative, and have a firm belief in Islam.

172 BMMTD, III-55-1 (February 21, 1971), p. 64.
JP administration, did develop to satisfy the demands for religious-oriented education. However, their function to train religious personnel largely remained unrealized. This situation, as will be analyzed below, further convinced the intellectuals and secular-oriented parties that religious schools, in fact, emerged as a second school system at the secondary level during this period.

As mentioned earlier, the religious schools reached the level of enrolling the third largest student population at the secondary school level. And because the original curriculum was still in effect with a 43.7 per cent emphasis on religious subjects, the students which enrolled in these schools were actually receiving a religious-oriented education. However, since the purpose of that type of education in the system was essentially to train the religious leaders and preachers, the question becomes imperative: to what extent did the expansion of imam-hatip schools during the JP administration serve this purpose? In 1964, when there were about 3,000 graduates from these schools, only one-third of them were working in jobs related to their vocation.\(^{173}\) However, although the exact figures are not

\(^{173}\)BMMTD, II-55-2 (February 18, 1969), speech by the former Minister of Education İbrahim Öktem, p. 558.
readily available, various sources agree that the rapid expansion of imam-hatip schools between 1965 and 1971 considerably decreased this ratio. Approximately 10 percent of the graduates were able to find employment related to their vocation. Because of the inadequacies in their vocational preparation, many of the graduates still refrained from taking a professional assignment as they lacked the confidence to do the job. As a result, a continually growing number of the graduates became interested in getting accepted to the various colleges of the universities. And since the government was in favor of opening the doors of the universities to them, the imam-hatip schools with a religious-oriented curriculum rapidly came to play the functions of the general lycees to prepare students for higher education.

It should also be pointed out that a great majority of the students that enrolled in these schools came from low-income traditional village and small town families.

174See Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirmemiz Düzenimiz, p. 313; Ömer Okutan, Din Eğitimi Okulları Planlaması ile İlgili Rapor (Ankara: MEB, Planlama, Araştırma ve Koordinasyon Dairesi, 1971).
With free boarding facilities and the contributions of local religious associations, the imam-hatip schools were the only educational institutions in which many students could continue with their education after the elementary level. 175

The JP government was also in favor of expanding the religious instruction at secondary level schools. In addition to middle-level schools and normal schools, religious courses were introduced to lycees and lycee-equivalent in the 1967-1968 school year on an opt-out basis. 176 These courses lacked, again, adequate textbooks and competent teachers. 177

The foregoing discussion illustrates that the developments in religious education were often political and not based on objective criteria. The consequences of these developments on the educational system as a whole and in

175 See Kaya, ibid., pp. 311, 313; Okutan, ibid., pp. 8-9; DPT, Eğitim, Eğitim Planlaması Çalışma Grubu, I (Ankara: Mart 1976), mimeograph, p. 16; Koç, Emperyalizm ve Eğitimde..., p. 191; Bahadinli, Türkiye'de Eğitim Sorunu..., pp. 69, 134; and Namik Behramoğlu, Sinif Açısından Türk Gençliği (İstanbul, 1968), pp. 21-24.


177 Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, p. 313.
the society were paid little, if any, serious consideration by the government. It was, for example, clear that religious schools greatly failed in training the religious leaders and preachers that were needed. This failure was caused mainly by two factors: (1) the continuity of the inadequacies and the problems which characterized education in religious schools, and (2) the reluctance of the government to responsibly confront several important issues concerning the religious education. This should not mean, however, that the government did not conceive of the developments in religious education as problematic. 178 Political conditions of the period and the character of the JP as the governmental party, in many ways, restrained the government leaders from taking a reformist approach on the

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178 In terms of the interaction between politics and education, religious education was seen as the most problematic area by all the Ministers of Education of the JP government between 1965 and 1971. The interviews with these individuals showed that even the specific problems concerning the developments in religious education were fully recognized. Interviews with Cihat Bilgehan; Orhan Dengiz, November 16, 1976; İbrahim Ertem; and Orhan Oğuz.
Thus, they were either unresponsive or defensive to the realistic criticisms of opposition parties and secular-oriented associations concerning the ill aspects of developments in religious education. A Minister of Education of the period said in a speech in the Senate, for example, that:

Some of these criticisms are ideological and intentional, some from political circles that want to weaken the government, some as emotional release of discontented individuals, some from those with a desire for fame and recognition, and some from those who have good intentions but can't help making generalizations out of single negative incidents under the influence of the present political atmosphere. . . . We are amazed by this incomprehensible irresponsibility and intolerance.

The domination of the developments in religious education by political factors during the JP administration can also be related to the kind of leadership performed by the ministers of education of this period. Indications are

179 For example, according to one of the ministers of education of this period, there were many individuals in the JP who thought of the developments in religious education as irrational and detrimental to the principle of secularism. However, these individuals would not voice their discontent with these developments "in order to protect their political future." Interview with İbrahim Ertem.

clear that all of the four ministers tended to react to whatever pressures were placed upon them. They were unable to provide dynamic, farsighted, and democratic leadership and they were more often the instrument of political rather than educational decisions.\textsuperscript{181} "The vagueness of the educational policies of the JP at that time" generally resulted in the arbitrary and personal decisions by the ministers\textsuperscript{182} whose competency could also be argued.

As described earlier, educational factors played an important role in the downfall of the JP government. In the eyes of intellectuals, the legitimacy of the government was seriously weakened by the type of decisions and measures taken in the various areas of education. Developments in religious education were widely regarded as betraying the principle of secularism, as the expansion of religious schools in the nature of the emergence of a

\textsuperscript{181}A factor analysis study indicated, for example, that the objectivity of the ministers of educators was affected by such factors as the personality of the minister, political atmosphere, the attitude of the prime minister, the immediate counselor, and professional formation and experience. Ziya Bursalioğlu, Okul İdaresinde Yapı ve Davranış Yenilikleri (Ankara: A. Ü. Eğitim Fakültesi Yayınları, No. 9, 1969), pp. 45-50.

\textsuperscript{182}Interview with Orhan Oğuz.
separate school system was severely criticized. Many intellectuals were convinced that these schools were disseminating values and orientations that were dysfunctional for modernization.

The March 12 Memorandum

On March 12, 1971, the armed forces made it clear in a memorandum that they did not have confidence in the JP government. The memorandum accused the parliament and the government of driving the "country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest" by their policies and measures, and demanded that a "strong and credible government within democratic rules" and capable of producing much needed social and economic reforms be established. Since the JP government soon resigned and an "above parties" government was formed, a "coup by communique" had been effected.183

The new government was put under the premiership of Dr. Nihat Erim, a professor of international law and a member of the RPP. Erim's "brain trust" cabinet, primarily composed of reform-minded "technocrats," vowed speedy action on social and economic reforms and on the elimination of social unrest and disorder. However, due to the conservative nature of the parliamentary majority, neither the Erim government nor the following two caretaker governments under Ferit Melen and Naim Talu was able to produce the kinds of progressive reforms originally intended. As Nye emphasized, "the reforms that were passed were primarily restrictive of liberties rather than expansive and status quo-oriented rather than progressive." Thus, in a general sense, as had been the case after 1960 revolution, the imposition of reforms from above was attempted and failed. In fact, the reform-minded intellectuals that were placed in power after the March 12 memorandum were gradually phased out in the top government positions. Also, left-wing intellectuals were intimidated and suppressed.

184 Nye, ibid., pp. 162-163.

185 Ibid., pp. 168, 170.
Education was one of the many social and economic sectors where various reforms were attempted. The government's approach to the issues and problems of the educational system was such that educational reform was viewed as having a comprehensive coverage, embracing all levels and parts of the school system both in terms of quality and quantity. Accordingly, a complete integration of the educational reform with the measures taken in the other social and economic areas was attempted. Efforts were made to translate and break down the plans into detailed programmes and individual projects which were designed to meet the purpose of the educational reform as a whole. However, except in the area of religious education, these programs and projects could not be put into implementation. The conservative parliamentary majority either refused or prevented the implementation of the plans "imposed" by the above-party technocratic cabinets.


187Personal correspondance with Şinasi Orel, May 20, 1977; and Interview with İsmail Arar, June 19, 1976.
Indignation over the developments in religious education during the JP period was clearly expressed in the reform efforts of the above-party governments after 1971. The program of the first Erim government aimed at the elimination of the educational dualism at the secondary level by promising that imam-hatip schools would be reformed in terms of readjusting them to the secondary school system. The program also suggested that studies in secondary education which began in the Seventh and the Eighth Educational Councils would be completed within a short time, evaluated and put into implementation.\textsuperscript{188}

The first cycle of imam-hatip schools was, in fact, transformed into the general middle schools on August 4, 1971.\textsuperscript{189} In addition, a new set of regulations concerning the vocational religious education at the second cycle of secondary level was prepared and put into implementation on May 22, 1971.\textsuperscript{190} The curriculum of the second cycle imam-hatip schools was reoriented and revamped in line with the

\textsuperscript{188}Egitim Reformu... , p. 8.

\textsuperscript{189}Based on the decision No. 225 of the Committee on Instruction and Education on Aug. 4, 1971 and the approval of the Minister of Education on the same date.

\textsuperscript{190}Resmi Gazete, No. 14193 (22 Mayis 1971).
principle of secularism and the principles of modern education. This curriculum was put into effect on July 31, 1972. As a result of these developments, twenty years after their establishment, the seven-year (3+4) imam-hatip schools were transformed into the four-year secondary level second cycle vocational imam-hatip schools with a revised program. The Ministry of Education undertook studies to prepare employment-need projections of religious personnel, which were to provide the basis of the future developments in vocational religious education.

With the realization of the above changes, the imam-hatip schools were given the status of other vocational schools at the secondary level. In terms of their functions, they were seen as primarily having a vocational character and purpose. Their students could transfer to any other type of school at the second cycle after passing examinations in the required courses of the curriculum of that school. Continuation to higher education for the graduates of imam-hatip schools required passing exams in certain

191 MEB Tebliğler Dergisi, No. 1708 (31 Temmuz 1972).
192 See Eğitim Reformu, pp. 21-23.
courses of lycees which were designed to prepare students for higher learning.\textsuperscript{193}

The reformation of imam-hatip schools in terms of adjusting them to the structure and functioning of secondary education had been first suggested in the report of the National Commission on Education, which was published after the 1960 revolution. However, due to the nature of political developments, governments of the period between 1960 and 1971 showed an unwillingness to change the various aspects of imam-hatip schools. The effectiveness of the existing conservative-religious forces within the Ministry, the government, parliament and in the society greatly prevented the realization of these changes. These forces, again, viewed suspiciously the measures of the governments in religious education between 1971 and 1973. Articles appeared in the conservative newspapers which referred to these measures as a step taken toward abolishing religious schools in the Turkish educational system.\textsuperscript{194} In the parliament, a general discussion concerning the imam-hatip

\textsuperscript{193}See footnote 189.

\textsuperscript{194}See, for example, Tercüman, August 7, 1971; Nihat Dinçer, "İmam-Hatip Okulları Kapatılıyor mu?," Tercüman, August 18-19, 1971.
schools was requested by a Democratic Party (DkP) deputy. Within the Ministry, there existed a group of upper-middle and high level bureaucrats who were not desirous to produce any type of change in religious education. Nevertheless, it was clear that the military leaders gave high priority to reforms in various fields of education and one of the first specific educational reforms which was announced by the Erim government concerned itself with religious schools. The program of the government specified the kind of change by stating that "the system based on separate religious education will be terminated and it will be integrated into the secular educational system." This determination led to the realization of change despite the discontent of the conservative-religious circles.

**Developments in Religious Education**

**After the 1973 Elections**

The results of 1973 elections gave none of the political parties a majority of the seats in the National

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196 Interviews with İsmail Arar; Veysi Muharremoğlu, November 5, 1976; and İlhan Özdil, November 17, 1976.

197 Eğitim Reformu...., p. 8.
Assembly. Eight parties competed in the election. The RPP, emerging as the strongest party, collected 33.2 percent of the vote and gained 185 out of the 450 seats. The JP, which had won a majority of the Parliamentary seats in the previous two elections, gained 149 seats with 29.4 percent of the votes. Of the two newest parties, the NSP gained the third highest percentage of votes (11.9) and seats in the Assembly (48), and the DkP 11.7 percent of the votes and 45 seats. The other parties won only small percentages of the votes. The RP gained 13, the NAP 3, the UP 1, and the independents 6 seats.\textsuperscript{198}

Due to the differences and the distribution of the Assembly seats among the parties, a stalemate ensued—the longest parliamentary deadlock in Turkey—which lasted until a coalition government was formed by the National Salvation Party (NSP) and the RPP in January 1974. The NSP was originally founded as the National Order Party in January 1970 which was banned in May 1971 by the Constitutional Court for being anti-secularist and promoting a

\textsuperscript{198}For a systematic analysis of the 1973 election results, see Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a 'Critical Realignment?','" International Journal of Middle East Studies, 6 (1975), pp. 460-480.
theocratic state. The NSP combines a concern for social and economic justice with an emphasis on traditional Islamic values and morality as the foundation stone of life. The party appealed to Islamic socialists, graduates of religious schools and the Koran courses, the lower middle class small businessmen, and various minor illegal Islamic sects. The electoral success of the NSP in the 1973 elections was a clear indication of the continuing powerful attraction of the Islamic cause in Turkish politics. As Nye stated:

> Atatürk's forced westernization and revolution from above cannot be said to have penetrated all the villages of eastern Anatolia. Great masses of villagers retain the Islamic value system and willingly give their votes to whichever party appears to be better able to assure them greater respect for religion and morality.¹⁹⁹

The RPP, on the other hand, has become a party, under the new and vigorous leadership of Bülent Ecevit, that is committed to a moderate leftist stand. The programmatic orientation of the party has been consistently based on the six principles of Kemalism: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, etatism (statism), and revolutionism (reformism). The RPP emphasizes a reformist social justice

and a democratic, socially conscious political system, and is heavily concerned with the strategies for rapid economic growth and industrialization. The party manifesto depicts the socio-economic conditions in Turkey as the manifestation of an "unjust system" and promises various reform within several sectors of the society. It pledges itself, for example, to secure equal educational opportunities for all Turkish citizens as a means to level the income differences between social classes. Since the 1960 revolution, the RPP has broadened its basis of support to include progressive intellectuals, unionized workers, small businessmen in cooperatives, and some radicals, all attracted to the social democratic image of the party.200

The RPP-NSP coalition was, therefore, in many ways, an unnatural union of two parties with different and conflicting orientations toward change. The political philosophy of the NSP which is inimical to rapid modernization and the reformist orientation of the RPP toward a rapid socio-economic development in a balance competitive system reflected themselves in the governmental program and the

200 Ibid., pp. 266-267. Also see Sayari, "Party Politics in Turkey. . . .," Chap. V.
performance of the coalition. The internal differences in principles brought the government down within eight months by the RPP itself.

Serious and important issues and problems concerning the educational system in Turkey were realistically defined and emphasized in the program of the RPP-NSP coalition. However, in two areas, the program indicated a return to the past trends. It stated that education in all vocational and technical branches would be based on elementary education and courses in morals would be introduced into secondary education curricula. These views were accepted in the Ninth National Educational Council and approved for implementation by the ministry of education. Specifically, the Ninth Council proposed the implementation of the same middle school program in all middle-level schools. However, the vocational and technical subjects would be introduced to the programs of those middle-level schools which had

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202 The inclusion of these statements into the coalition program was demanded by the NSP. Interview with Mustafa Üstünçag.
originally functioned as the first cycle of vocational and technical schools.\textsuperscript{203}

In religious education, the implementation of the above decisions resulted in the reopening of first cycle of imam-hatip schools which had been transformed into the general middle schools in 1971. Also, as a result of the pressures of the NSP wing in the government, 29 new imam-hatip schools were opened during the eight months of the RPP-NSP coalition in office.

Courses on morals were also introduced to the programs of all secondary schools. These courses were to be taught by teachers assigned by the principals of individual schools.\textsuperscript{204}

The minister of education of this period, Mustafa Üstündag of the RPP, explained in a parliamentary speech that the government was sincere in its intention to reopen the first cycle imam-hatip schools because, due to the closing of these schools in 1971, there was a decrease in the number of students enrolled in the second cycle.\textsuperscript{205} However,


\textsuperscript{204}Ibid., pp. 314-315. The decision of the Committee on Instruction and Education, No. 395, August 26, 1974.

\textsuperscript{205}BMMTD, IV-86-1 (May 26, 1974), p. 204.

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both the reopening of the first cycle of imam-hatip schools and the introduction of courses on morals were not in concert with the educational policies of the RPP in general; they were put into effect primarily for the sake of securing the continuity of the coalition.\textsuperscript{206}

The resignation of the RPP-NSP coalition resulted in another government crisis in Turkey, which was eventually resolved by the formation of a coalition government by the conservative parties; namely, the JP, the NSP, the NAP, and the RP.\textsuperscript{207} The program of this government which secured

\textsuperscript{206} Interview with Mustafa Üstündag.

\textsuperscript{207} The relevant characteristics of the JP and the NSP have been described earlier. The NAP is the new name given to the RPNP after former Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş became its chairman. The NAP is strongly nationalist, anti-communist, and Pan-Turkish. The leadership in the party is in the nature of a quasi-dictatorship. The NAP has a well-disciplined para-military youth organization called the commandos that has engaged in violent activities against leftist movements among students and workers. Educational and cultural matters constitute a considerable space in the program of the NAP. Educational institutions are seen as having the function of strengthening of national unity and consciousness to achieve a national reorganization. The party also appeals to religious orthodoxy in an effort to undermine the strength of other conservative parties.

The RP, on the other hand, was formed by a splinter group from the RPP in 1967. It is a centerist, Atatürkist, nationalist, secularist, and anti-communist party. Its orientation toward change is a reform-conservative one, very similar to the JP's. The RP, also, has extensively sought to politicize
the vote of confidence of the Assembly on April 12, 1975 put emphasis on both the moral and material development in Turkey. The program promised that the religious and moral courses in schools would be strengthened in terms of their programs and teacher quality; the training of religious personnel would be given a high priority and consideration, and this personnel would be profited from in the social and economic development of Turkey.\(^{208}\)

During this coalition period, as Table 10 clearly illustrates, the developments in religious vocational schools showed their highest rates since the first establishment of these schools in 1951. The government, in addition to the changes in the structure, also favored some functional changes in these secondary level institutions. For example, since 1972, the program of general lycees with the addition of vocational religious subjects had been implemented. In 1975, this curriculum was differentiated in some religious schools to include language and literature, economics and

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social studies oriented programs which were designed to prepare students for higher education. With these changes in the curriculum, the only major difference between the religious schools and general lycees has been that the religious schools teach subjects in religion so that the graduates may have the option of going into the university or working in jobs related to their vocational preparation.

The sudden and highly rapid rate of developments in religious schools during the JP-NSP-RP-NAP coalition period can be effectively explained on the basis of the nature of policy and decision-making by the government concerning education. Although the parties which participated in this coalition were all right-wing conservative parties, they represented differing and mostly conflicting educational policies as far as their respective programmatic orientations

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209 DPT, Orta Düzeýde Meslek... pp. 25-26.

210 The leaders of conservative parties have long supported the view that religious schools should train students for both the vocation and the university, a view that has been rejected by secularist-modernists to protect the secular nature of the educational system. See Abdi İpekçi, Liderler Diyor ki (Istanbul, 1969); KOÇ, Empyralism ve Eğitimde... p. 90. Also interviews with Cihat Bilgehan and Orhan Dengiz.
were concerned. Thus, both the protocol and the program of the coalition dealt with the question of education in highly vague terms. 211 Each party, during the service, on the other hand, sought to further its own interest without taking into consideration the terms of the coalition. This was particularly done by placing political pressures on the civil bureaucracy in the nature of "a fierce fight" in order to break the "negative politics" of the bureaucrats to undermine the policies of the government. Each party in the coalition was concerned with reshuffling the higher as well as the lower level civil servants in order to secure politically expedient decisions and to increase the political patronage on the bureaucracy. 212 These efforts by the parties successfully served these purposes, as many governmental agencies and organizations became the instruments of partisan and political decisions. Some departments

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212 Metin Heper, "The Recalcitrance of the Turkish Public Bureaucracy to 'Bourgeois Politics': A Multi-Factor Political Stratification Analysis," Middle East Journal, pp. 489-490.
of the ministry of education were heavily affected, as they had no choice but to implement the policies imposed on them by the governing parties in the coalition. 213

In the field of religious education, the developments were largely intended to serve political, rather than educational purposes. For example, the NSP, which held the balance of power during this period and advocated a curious mixture of strict Islamic faith and rapid industrialization, extensively sought political gains by presenting these developments to the people as the achievements of the party itself toward "re-forming the great Turkey." Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the NSP, stated in a message to the nation during a religious holiday that:

We are determined that we will use the sublime principles of our religion, which are a strong and inexhaustible source, in the moral and material development of our nation and in securing our national unity and integrity. 214

According to Erbakan, "religious" education, more specifically Islamic teaching, was an essential condition of


development in Turkey. He emphasized, with some degree of exaggeration in figures, that the opening of 270 imam-hatip schools; reaching a student population of 150 thousand in these schools; basing the religious secondary education on the elementary level; making all the faculties of universities accessible to the graduates of imam-hatip schools; opening and creating various jobs for these graduates, and increasing the number of Koran courses were all important steps taken towards the moral development in Turkey, which was "the only road to being able to be strong and happy, and to reaching prosperity and salvation."  

Other parties in the coalition also sought political gains in the developments in religious education as a part of their general strategy to use religion for political expediency.  

A report by a sub-commission in the State Planning Organization concerning the training of middle level vocational personnel makes it clear that educational

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215 Ibid. For a criticism of these views, see Oktay Akbal, "Yeniden" Neyi Kuracaklar? Cumhuriyet, September 21, 1977.

216 The President Fahri Korutürk expressed his discontent with this strategy being used by some parties. See Cumhuriyet, October 30, 1977.
requirements were paid little, if any, attention by the government in the opening of new religious schools. The report stated, for example, that a total of 149 imam-hatip lycees that were opened during the 1975-1976 and 1976-1977 school years "urgently" needed instructional materials and equipment; the pre-service training of imam-hatip school teachers had inadequacies; the relations between the Ministry of Education and the Presidency of Religious Affairs should be made productive to bring solutions to the employment problems of imam-hatip school graduates, on which studies were "desperately needed"; and the school buildings were inadequate in terms of their capacities and standards.\textsuperscript{217} Considering the high rates of development in religious schools after 1974, the same report indicated that employment would become a highly serious problem for the graduates, since no working relationship between religious education and the employment possibilities had yet been established in terms of quality and quantity.\textsuperscript{218} The acceptance of the graduates into universities was not a solution to this problem but a delaying factor.\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{217}DPT, \textit{Orta Düzyeye Meslek...}, pp. 26-27, 36.

\textsuperscript{218}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{219}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 38.
The primacy of political over educational and manpower requirements which characterized the attitude of the government in its approach to religious education was also manifested in the way in which the planning was carried out. The Third Five Year Plan, which covered the period between 1973 and 1977, had proposed that religious schools (second cycle) continue functioning in their present form with specified number of first enrollments and without increasing the number of schools that existed at the beginning of the planned period. The plan targets in terms of first enrollments, total students, and graduates in imam-hatip schools were greatly exceeded. In 1976-1977, 25,800 students were enrolled in the second cycle instead of the anticipated 14,500. In the same school year, 5,508 students graduated from the same cycle instead of 2,850 as projected by the plan.

In the larger scene, the government proved unable to deal with the enormous economic, political and social troubles which were allowed to drift while the parties in

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220 Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Planı, pp. 759, 763.

221 Ibid., see Table 595 on p. 762.
the coalition themselves maneuvered for self-advantage. Before the 1977 elections, it became clear that the indecisive coalitions which had governed Turkey in the recent past could not plan for the future and only worsened the situation. Therefore, it was hoped that the election would produce a clear-cut winner for a stable and responsible government to be formed. However, with eight parties competing for power, the results of the election showed the continued confusion of the electorate about its self-image.

The RPP won 213 Assembly seats out of a total 450, thus falling 13 short of an absolute majority. The JP, on the other hand, won 189 seats, which, in combination with the NSP's 24 and the NAP's 16, still gave the conservatives a majority. The RPP, following the elections, formed a minority government which failed to win a vote of confidence in early July 1977. President Korutürk then called on the JP leader, Demirel, to try to re-form his conservative coalition. Demirel succeeded and he again took office as the prime minister, with the NSP and the NAP participating in the government. Nevertheless, as had been the case with the previous conservative coalition government, impotence and uncertainty followed, which eventually resulted in the resignation of 13 discontented JP deputies from the party.
Hence Demirel was forced to resign losing the majority in the parliament. Consequently, Ecevit's RPP with the support of some independents, most of whom were those who had resigned from the JP, formed a new government in January 1978. The major problems facing this present day government include the inflation that had reached 35 per cent, unemployment which is the 20 per cent of the labor force, political terrorism, and Turkey's dispute with Greece over Cyprus.\textsuperscript{222} Thus far, the government has not directed any type of major operation toward the problems which characterize religious education at the secondary school level in the Turkish educational system. However, in view of the existing political uncertainties (the government has only a two-vote majority in Parliament--a margin which seems to offer little stability), no major attempt to reorganize the form and functioning of religious education should be expected in the near future. Nevertheless, the concern with reform in various aspects of education evidenced by the RPP which has emerged as the strongest party in the recent elections augurs well for the future.

\textsuperscript{222}\textit{Time}, Vol. 111, No. 3 (January 16, 1978).
CHAPTER IV

ISSUE TWO: VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION
AT SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL

Introduction

Development represents the achievement of both economic and social goals, and the types of education designed to contribute to the achievement of development are to be closely related to these goals. In general terms, the social demands for education are derived from a society's culture in its broadest sense, while the economic demands aim at producing skilled manpower. It is recognized, however, that the types of education cannot be easily distinguished in terms of the nature of their contributions to social and economic ends. Nevertheless, the indications are that the educational requirements of developing countries are essentially determined by the national commitment to rapid economic development.

1 See OECD, MRP, Chaps. II and III.


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It has been argued that a major barrier to economic development is the lack of trained manpower resulting from ill-equipped educational programs and insufficient or mismanaged investment in the training of necessary manpower. This view, which gives a secondary importance to the availability of natural resources and capital in economic development, can be related to a statement made in a recent report:

Education systems have been irrelevant to the needs of developing countries during the last two decades because education policies were often keeping company with overall development strategies which were themselves irrelevant to the societies and conditions of developing countries.

It must, therefore, be recognized that the interaction between the policies of economic development and educational institutions is highly complex and intertwined with social and political effects. The capacity of the political system and the ability of political decision makers to cope with the demands placed upon them by the rest of the society and by the requirements of development should be taken into account as important factors which condition the development

3 Harbison and Myers, Education, Manpower and Economic Growth.

of the educational system. This consideration characterizes the nature of the present chapter which concerns itself with the evolution of the vocational and technical education at the secondary school level in Turkey and focuses on the issues and problems which have characterized this field through different governmental periods.

Developments in Vocational and Technical Education Before the Establishment of Multi-Party Political System

In retrospect, the educational objectives of the republican period in Turkey were the derivatives of socio-political ones until at least 1932. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as the new regime attempted to transform the society from a traditional to a modern one in a radical-reformist manner, the educational system was essentially viewed as a vehicle to achieve the "moral" transformation of the populace. The educational institutions were mainly used "to ensure political socialization in developing Kemalist political culture congruent with and supportive of the imported Western institutions."\(^5\) In a more specific

sense, the governments of this early period attempted through educational institutions to raise a cadre of re­liable and resourceful individuals who would undertake executive positions throughout the country. Since the socio­political transformation in the newly established republic was the immediate necessary task, the economic objectives of formal education (the teaching of vocational and tech­nical skills needed for economic development) were not seriously emphasized. It was probably viewed that interest in the form of technical skills would ultimately be generated during the process of transforming the society's socio-political structure and mentality. This should not mean that the educational system during this period was totally unresponsive to the requirements of economic development; it means that this aspect of education con­cerned the governments less than the socio-political aspect did.

Crystalization of economic objectives of development in Turkey gradually took place following the 1929 World Depression which had its effects on the economic life of Turkish society. In the early 1930's, it became clear to the revolutionary leaders of the republic that the efforts to Westernize the society with emphasis on socio-political
objectives had caused a considerable slowness in the forma-
tion of physical and human capital in the country. As a
result, in 1933, the first Turkish five-year-plan was pre-
pared for the expansion of economy based on the republican
principle of etatism (statism) which simply means that the
state, along with and in support of private individuals,
would engage in economic activity. This interest in economic
development directed the attention of leaders to the func-
tioning of the educational system to solve the problem of
acute shortage of skilled technical and vocational labor.
Thus, the policies of economic growth came to play an
important role in the determination of educational objec-
tives, and vocational and technical secondary schools
characterized this period. However, the success was limited.
The prestige and attractiveness of vocational and tech-
nical schools remained low, and the government failed to

6 Ibid., p. 85.

7 As in the case of most developing countries, voca-
tional and technical education has been in conflict with
the traditional values of the society in Turkey. The
larger part of the Turkish population has not possessed,
"to a significant degree, the attitudes and motivations
which prescribe a 'spirit of enterprise.'" OECD, MRP,
p. 28. See also Hifzi Doğan, Ülkemizde Endüstrileşme ve
Teknik Eğitim (Ankara: A. Ü. Eğitim Fakültesi Yayınlarinden
No. 64, 1977), Chap. 2.
take steps to encourage students to select these schools instead of academic lycees.\(^8\)

In the evolution of vocational and technical education in Turkey, the most significant period was between 1940 and 1950, during which education in general enjoyed the support of the state and a strong and valuable leadership of individuals who served as ministers of education. A major plan which was designed specially for the development of the field and backed with specially produced laws was successfully implemented. As a result, a rapid increase in the number of vocational and technical schools and students was achieved.\(^9\) There were 59 schools in this field with 9,101 students in 1930-1931, 103 with 20,264 students in 1940-1941, and 326 with 53,289 students in 1950-1951.\(^10\) While enrollments in these schools continued to rise sharply,

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the efforts of the governments in the 1940's to create a more functional school system successfully resulted in a decrease in academic enrollments at the secondary level. The intention was to foster and engineer economic development through the school system whose objectives were modified to fulfill the semi-skilled and skilled manpower shortages resulted from the investments of public enterprises.

Szyliowicz, considering the nature of educational developments in general before the multi-party period, stated:

A modern educational system had indeed been established. . . . Turkey now possessed the kind of educational establishment that could serve as the basis for continued rapid development. Whether it would do so would depend upon the decisions that would be made within a political system which had been profoundly affected by the expansion of educational opportunities and the many changes that had occurred.\(^\text{11}\)

In fact, changes in the educational system and the expansion of educational opportunities (1) directly contributed to "the emergence of new elites and resulting strains within the pattern of social-core-group and elite configurations within the society,"\(^\text{12}\) and (2) resulted in changes in

\(^{11}\)Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization, p. 229.

\(^{12}\)Loc. cit.
the nature of demands made by the society on the educational and political systems. This meant, in the first place, that the existing political balance needed modifications in order to facilitate the effective representation of new groups in the political process. And secondly, decisions concerning educational developments must reflect a balance between the requirements of development in general, and the demands of different population groups.

Following the Second World War, the need for a political, social and economic change became evident. And this change took place in the nature of a gradual liberalization of the political and economic institutions. The effects of this change on the evolution of vocational and technical education will be dealt with below.

Developments in Vocational and Technical Education Between 1946-1960

After the legalization of opposition politics in 1945-1946, "the new middle-class and the traditional, pre-republican social elite" emerged as important elements in Turkish politics. The newly established Democratic Party

13Robinson, The First Turkish Republic., p. 143.
(DP) which represented this group came to power in 1950. With the establishment of multi-party politics, the political elite became more diversified and more representative of the existing socio-economic groups. Also, the change in the government resulted in modifications in the policies of Turkey's development.

In the field of economy, as the new president promised in his first speech in the Assembly, the DP government would make "maximum effort to facilitate the flow of capital--both state and private--into productive enterprises, with particular emphasis on agriculture."\(^{14}\) The etatist policies of development through public enterprises which had been followed by previous governments would be restricted by the DP to those economic activities which could not be undertaken by the private sector. More specifically, state interference would be reduced to a minimum, and the state sector in the field of economy would be restricted as much as possible. Efforts would be made toward the achievement of industrialization, but more attention would be paid to the potentialities of agriculture and to the economic problems of rural areas. Another target was to balance the growth and

\(^{14}\text{Ibid.}, p. 145.\)
expansion of various sectors of economy.\textsuperscript{15}

The actual performance of the DP in government between 1950 and 1960 did not conform to the party's official policies of economic development. The dichotomy between the program and the performance existed mainly due to the lack of planning. In this period, as Özelli put it, "economic planning had been altogether abandoned."\textsuperscript{16} This situation gradually gave way to a crises characterized by a high rate of inflation and a scarcity of consumer items. In general terms, the DP administration failed to shift the basis of the Turkish economy from agriculture to a more diversified structure; it made limited advances in modernizing the agricultural sector on which the country's economy depended; it did not develop a policy or program to deal with rapid urbanization which added to social and economic problems; it was unable to establish an effective balance between public and private enterprises; and the economic targets of the government were, to a large degree, unrealistic in terms of the investment capacity of Turkey.\textsuperscript{17} In addition to


\textsuperscript{16}Özelli, "The Evolution of Formal. . . .", p. 89.

\textsuperscript{17}See Robinson, The First Turkish Republic. . . . , pp. 206ff. See also footnote 61 in Chap. III.
planlessness which contributed to these failures, the priorities of the government were not based on developmental requirements but rather on their popular appeal. For example, it was clear to the leaders of the government and the party that increased expenditures in agricultural, infrastructural and rural development projects by the state positively affected the popular support of the DP. Thus, the developmental policies of the government increasingly assumed a political character.

Economic objectives for educational systems in developing countries are derived from the policies of economic development. The above explanations illustrate that the negative developments in the economy of Turkey between 1950 and 1960 and the economic policies of the DP government which were irrelevant to Turkey's conditions did not provide a good basis for developing sound economic objectives for the educational system. In fact, as will be discussed below, the importance of human capital in economic development was neglected by the DP government. As a result, vocational and technical education did not grow to lusty

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18 Sayari, "Party Politics in Turkey. . . .," p. 110; and Logoglu, "İsmet İnönü and the Political. . . .," p. 183.
proportions expected and did not grow relative to other
types of education. Also, the developments in this field
were accompanied with a variety of qualitative and quanti-
tative failures.

As described earlier, the establishment of multi-party
politics in Turkey provided new channels whereby the views
and demands of rural population could be translated into
actual policy measures. As the power made a transition in
1950 from the hands of a relatively radical national elite
to a group of conservative middle-class elements, the demands
of local groups and influentials, working in a number of
ways, affected the formation of policies at the national
level and had important effects on the educational frame-
work. This situation directly contributed to economic and
social change which came increasingly to characterize rural
areas, which, in turn, led to an awareness of the importance
of education by the rural population and to increased demands
for educational expansion. The DP government, aware of
the importance of the rural population in the electoral
process, vigorously responded to these demands. As a result,
this period witnessed significant increases in student
enrollments. Several weaknesses, however, came to characterize the educational system. First, despite the impressive increases in student enrollments, the rate of school expansion declined in view of the rapidly growing school age population. Second, the rise in student enrollments was not related to manpower requirements. Third, because inadequate fiscal resources were allocated to education, serious qualitative and quantitative problems marked the educational developments. And finally, politically motivated moves dominated these developments, which prevented the adoption and implementation of a systemic education policy. The government merely reacted to popular pressures without giving any serious consideration to the possible consequences of such unplanned and irrational developments in education on the future of the educational system itself and the society.

19 See Kazamias, Education and the Quest for..., p. 271.

20 For a reflection of these views in all three levels of schooling in general, see Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization..., pp. 329ff; Robinson, The First Turkish Republic..., pp. 195-200; and Kazamias, ibid., pp. 160ff.
Regarding the evolution of vocational and technical education, the output of the educational institutions in this field was essentially geared to supply the needs of the state and its enterprises. The government did not seem to feel the necessity of producing policies and decisions to increase the flexibility of the structure and functioning of the secondary school system to meet the changing demands of the skilled-labor market, although such a flexibility was originally intended in accordance with the expansion of economy. As a result, the increases in the number of schools and student enrollments took place in an unbalanced way. Especially during the first five years of the DP administration, enrollment rates in vocational and technical schools dropped considerably. This situation was, in part, contributed to by the DP government's undermining the efforts of the previous governments to develop this field.\footnote{In their parliamentary speeches, the members of the DP and the ministers of education of the period criticized the policies of the previous governments on the grounds that (1) the development of the field were not relevant to the needs of the country, (2) the graduates were unable to find employment suitable to their educational background, and (3) the schools trained more people than needed. See BMMTD IX-51-1 (February 25, 1951), p. 756; IX-51-4 (February 25, 1951), p. 837; IX-48-3 (February 26, 1952), p. 941.}
renewed interest in this type of education after 1955, although resulted in increases in the number of schools and student enrollments, did not make an encouraging difference as the authorities had hoped. The growth of general secondary schools still remained greater. The percentage of students in general middle schools increased from 67 in 1949-1950 to 84 in 1959-1960. Similarly, enrollments in lycees rose from 51.5 to 55.4 per cent.\textsuperscript{22} The percentage of students enrolled in vocational and technical schools dropped correspondingly. For example, taking the period from 1953-1954 to 1959-1960, the percentage of elementary school graduates who entered general middle schools rose from 25.5 to 39.1, while those who entered vocational and technical schools dropped from 10.6 to 7.2.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite the drop in the rate of development of vocational and technical schools at the secondary level, the number of schools in this field increased from 326 in 1950-1951 to 530 in 1960-1961, and students from 53,289 to 108,221.\textsuperscript{24} The opening of new schools and the changes in

\textsuperscript{22}Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization. . . . , p. 334.
\textsuperscript{23}Milli Eğitim Hareketleri, 1942-1972, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{24}Milli Eğitimde 50 Yılı, 1923-1973, p. 71.
the types of programs were, however, not based on any systematic policy that considered manpower projections nor manpower forecasts.\textsuperscript{25} Simply, the government opened schools, enrolled students in them, and introduced various vocational and technical branches to the programs. This approach clearly deteriorated the functioning of the schools in the field. The report of the National Commission on Education stated for example that:

> Our commission, in its studies of the vocational and technical schools in the various parts of the country, observed that the buildings, workshops, laboratories, and even more so the teachers and teaching aids of some schools were not satisfactory. The existing administrative staff and teachers--despite the good intentions and exceptions--were not of the desired number and quality. In addition, it was seen that the schools were grossly overcrowded; because of lack of space in the workshops the students were unable to gain the required degree of technical proficiency; the relationship between general and technical subjects in the programs was not maintained; the study courses were inadequate, and there

\textsuperscript{25}In the speeches of the ministers of education of this period, there is no indication of an established policy of vocational and technical education. The statements mainly focused upon the number of schools to be opened and the type of vocational and technical branches to be introduced into the programs. It can also be said that the ministers of this period had little interest in this type of education. See BMMTD, IX-48-3 (February 26, 1952), p. 941; IX-53-2 (February 25, 1953), p. 988; IX-49-2 (February 24, 1954), p. 853; and IX-47-2 (February 23, 1955), pp. 610-612.
were no textbooks and lesson books suitable to the programs. No guidance and vocational orientation services had been set up in the schools, and there was no cooperation with the local industry.26

The report of the Mediterranean Regional Project, similarly, pointed out important problems which characterized the vocational and technical education in Turkey in early 1960's: (1) the aims of boy's trade schools were not clearly defined, "Whom do they really train--technicians or skilled workers?," (2) some of the graduates preferred to work in white-collar occupations which paid more and enjoyed higher prestige, (3) the higher levels of administration in the central ministry lacked a well-established philosophy of vocational education, (4) the methods used in the schools were quite out of date, and the shops were crowded, and (5) because of too early specialization in the secondary level, education was not functional. It was virtually impossible for the students to transfer from one channel to another. Thus, a large number of "able" students could never reach the university level.27

26 Milli Komisyon Raporu, pp. 53-54.

27 OECD, MRP, pp. 98-99.
Many of the above and other problems were also pointed out in the parliament by the members of the opposition parties. However, the attitude of the government remained the same as more schools were opened and new branches were added to the programs based on arbitrary and politically motivated decisions. This situation has already been analyzed above on the basis of the inadequacies in the economic policies of the DP government. Another factor which can explain the attitude of the government toward the vocational and technical education is the significance that was attached to this field by the leaders of the DP and the government. The analysis of this factor suggests a consideration of the nature of the demand for education and the way in which the government responded to popular pressures of different population groups.28 The M.R.P. report stated that:

society . . . makes a number of . . . demands on its educational system which do not—at least directly—increase the supply of skilled manpower or yield a product quantifiable in terms of its contribution to economic expansion.29

28The discussion which will be presented in this section is partly based on the analysis in *ibid.*, Chap. III.

29*ibid.*, p. 58.
Based on the above statement, it can be suggested that, in order for the economic development to take place, the political system must be able to create a climate of opinion or influence over the behavior of members of society and to produce the background necessary for the realization of the objectives of development. The purpose is simply to mobilize the efforts of people around the leadership of government, so that the society as a whole would accept and act upon the developmental effort.

The indications suggest that the performance of the DP in power between 1950 and 1960 did not create such an atmosphere of behavioral orientation complementary to the achievement of development. For example, in a society where vocational and technical education continued "to be regarded as second best and to attract the less competent (intellectually), less affluent type of individual," the significance attached to this field by the DP and its government was low. The primary factor which contributed to this attitude was that the educational policies of the government were largely based on political considerations. In fact, many moves in education were made for reasons of

30 Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for...*, p. 152.
political expediency rather than their educational soundness. For example, because of their overwhelming majority, the rural people were an important element in any consideration of education. This, however, does not mean that rural population had clear demands for education. On the contrary, the demands of the rural strata were "shapeless" and filled "whatever channels are provided to give the peasant's children a free education."\(^{31}\) This suggests that basic decisions and policies concerning educational services for rural areas and rural people had to be made by the government whose attitude toward change would necessarily have to determine the nature of these decisions and policies. Unfortunately, however, due to the DP's lack of sensitivity toward the requirements of a planned development, the policies and decisions concerning education were often adopted on the basis of their popular appeal. The vagueness of the demands of and the resentment felt against the imposed policies and measures of the previous governments by the rural population were effectively exploited by the leaders of the DP and the government for political gains. As a result, this period witnessed the implementation of

\(^{31}\)OECD, MRP, p. 65.
several reactionary policies, such as the closing of village institutes, "liberalizing" restrictions on religious education, and the relaxation of attempts to enforce compulsory attendance.

Obviously, no strong demand for vocational and technical education was placed on the government by the rural population which still shared the characteristics of a traditional society. The government, thus, did not feel a need to develop an attitude complementary to the development of this field. Especially for rural areas, such an attitude would have required specially produced measures to influence the behavior of people in order to create an interest in this type of education.

Another major population group which should be considered within the framework of the present discussion is identified as transitionals. In general, in terms of their attitude toward education, the transitionals (characterized by a relatively high opinion level and a willingness to break away from traditional ways) lacked the material means to receive education in schools with high prestige, and they lacked the motivation to overcome material limitations. This group essentially preferred—or were able to afford—the type of education in which the "gestation"
period would be short. It was this preference of transitionals which can explain a relatively well-formed and clear pressure which was placed on the government for the expansion of vocational and technical education at the secondary level. The nature of this pressure should, however, be made clear. As the M.R.P. report stated:

The demand for this type of education... would seem to be related to a limitation of opportunity with regard to the transitionals who would like to--but for complex reasons cannot--attend a lycee and thus turn to the Boy's Institute [Technical schools] as a second best.\textsuperscript{32}

Therefore, although the transitionals constituted the most important group in terms of generating pressures for the expansion of vocational and technical schools, there existed in their behavioral orientation a certain degree of a lack of enthusiasm for blue-collar jobs. Still, however, the growing number of transitionals highly increased the demand for this type of education that "The number of would be entrants into this category of schools has outstripped the number of places provided by them."\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 71.

\textsuperscript{33}Loc. cit.
It can be suggested that the DP government failed to see the advantage of the existing demand for this type of education, which could have been effectively profited from in an effort to develop a network of a vocational and technical education system.

The third and final population group which should be considered in terms of the educational demand and the associated behavior patterns is moderns, which had comparatively high educational standards, and were exposed to new social, economic and political outlooks. The significance of this group in formulating economic objectives for the school system was related more to higher education than the secondary school level. As described earlier, attempts were made in the 1950's to liberalize the Turkish economy, to build the infrastructure of that economy, and to form the association of private enterprise with state capital. With these new developments, bureaucratic, professional, and urban elements in general began to attach considerable importance to the education of their children in the

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34 The distinction between "traditionals," "transitionals," and "moderns" was made use of in a comparative study of the process of modernization by Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society.
technical and professional fields at higher education level. Naturally, general education at the secondary level was seen as the most desirable by this group, since only this type of education gave the graduate a chance to go into a variety of different colleges in higher education. In terms of the character of vocational and technical education, this attitude of moderns was understandable since, as stated in the M.R.P. report,

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\ldots \text{by itself, it does not provide, at the lycee level, the advantages that obtain at the level at which access to a profession is the terminal goal.}^{35}
\]

Thus, as far as the existing opportunities at the secondary school level were concerned, the attitude of moderns was based on an awareness of the functional characteristics of the school system, namely, "the facility with which the individual pupil is able to move up from one level to the next, and \ldots the range of economic and social choices open to him on graduation or school-leaving."\(^{36}\)

The vocational and technical education at the secondary school level during the DP administration should be considered in this context. The limitations in terms of student

\(^{35}\text{EC}D, \text{ MRP}, \text{ p. } 68.\)

\(^{36}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. } 88.\)
mobility and the lack of terminal choices which characterized this field can be shown as the primary reason to explain the secondary importance attached to this type of education by urban elements.

The above analysis suggests that, during the period between 1950 and 1960, there were discernable changes in the demand for education and the associated behavior patterns of population groups. The demand for vocational and technical schools was primarily a demand of transitionals, which, however, was a result of a limitation of opportunity which characterized this population group. Vocational and technical education still continued to be regarded as second best by all population groups analyzed above. In terms of the government's attitude, the absence of a strong demand in the society directly affected the development of the field. For the DP government whose policies reflected political rather than developmental considerations, the demands were not in the nature of an activating factor to increase the supply of skilled manpower through the school system. In addition, the DP, in expanding the secondary school system, lacked sensitivity toward such important issues as balancing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of expansion, establishing a sound relationship between
expansion and reform, and maintaining the balance between political considerations in educational policy and economic factors. Naturally, the standard of vocational and technical education in relation to the need for this type of education remained critically low. As Özelli pointed out,

The Turks lacked an agency, even in an embryonic form, to study the relationship between supply of and demand for educational institutions and supply of and demand for various occupations in the economy.\(^{37}\)

This situation increased the susceptibility of the educational system to the weaknesses of the political system. In general, changes in the structure and functioning of the school system were in the nature of ad hoc "solutions" (as perceived by the political and governmental leaders) to immediate political and economic problems.\(^{38}\)

In short, the evolution of vocational and technical education during the DP administration took place in the absence of a well-established policy, without the guidance of institutions, and without a consideration by the government of the short and long term manpower needs of the country. The result was, as Özelli concluded,


\(^{38}\)Ibid., p. 91.
The Turkish education and labor markets . . . evolved into a structure combining the worst aspects of both the market and the planned systems. ³⁹

Developments in Vocational and Technical Education Between 1960 and 1965

The military coup which ousted the DP from power on May 27, 1960 marked a turning point in the educational developments in Turkey. ⁴⁰ Education was recognized by the new leaders as one of the major problems confronting the country.

One of the most significant policy decisions of the government which was formed after the revolution was to systematize planning. Within the Ministry of Education, a planning board was established. Also, an agreement was made with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to establish an educational planning group as part of the Mediterranean Regional Project. This group functioned within the newly established State Planning Organization. The M.R.P. was essentially a practical attempt to relate educational planning to economic growth

³⁹Ibid., p. 92.

⁴⁰The causes and the consequences of the 1960 revolution in relation to the purposes of this study have been analyzed in Chap. III.
and social advancement, which prepared for the government an assessment of the long term educational needs of Turkey, and arrived at plans and financial estimates for meeting these needs. Also during this period, the First Five Year Development Plan, covering the period between 1963 and 1967, was put into implementation. Both the M.R.P. and the educational section of the First Five Year Plan approached the problem of education by first estimating the future requirements for skilled personnel in various fields (in private and public sectors), and then, examining the output of the educational system to determine the extent to which the manpower requirements would be met by the existing institutional arrangements. These efforts clearly revealed a number of weaknesses, limitations, and imbalances in terms of the functioning and the structure of the educational system. These problems were also reflected in various reports presented to the government. 41

The First Five Year Plan regarded education as the major tool in meeting the manpower demand arising from

41See Milli Eğitim Planinin Hazırlığı ile Görevli Komisyonun Raporu; Milli Komisyon Raporu. See also VII Milli Eğitim Şurası Komite Raporları I; Erkek Teknik Öğretim Komitesi Raporu (MEB, Ankara, 1961); and Kız Teknik Öğretim Komitesi Raporu (MEB, Ankara, 1961).
economic growth and social developments. In general, the plan was designed to correct such weaknesses of the educational system as the lack of mobility between the various branches, the lack of terminal choice inherent in the system, the rigidity between general and vocational-technical education at the secondary level, and imbalanced development rates among the different fields of education.

The improvement of vocational and technical education at secondary and higher levels was one of the two priorities established by the plan (the other was the universalization of elementary education by 1972). Accordingly, in terms of basic principles, consideration was given to a proper systemizing of vocational and technical training for girls and boys in accordance with the needs and possibilities of the advancing economy, to the equalization of the educational and training level of schools in various regions of the country, and to increasing productivity in schools.

From a qualitative viewpoint, the plan gave priority to a reduction in student-teacher ratios and to upgrading the quality of teaching and educational facilities in schools. In terms of quantitative developments, the plan scheduled a dramatic rise in the percentage of students in secondary level vocational and technical schools. The
number of students in these schools would increase from 38 per cent of the total in 1962 to 54 per cent in 1967 and 61 per cent in 1972, while the percentage of students in general education would drop correspondingly.\(^{42}\)

The expectations and goals of the planners could not be met, however, in view of the difficulties stemming from social and cultural factors downgrading vocational and technical education, and the problems which characterized the political scene. After the 1960 revolution, an increased fragmentation and an ideological polarization characterized Turkish politics. The short-lived, weak coalition governments which lacked cohesion and strong leadership generally refrained from taking effective measures in dealing with major issues. The concern of the governments was more with the practical and urgent problems. Developments in various sectors were affected accordingly. For example, in education, the efforts which were directed to the achievement of the objectives of the plan did not result in any

considerable progress, "except in the preparation of investment programmes to meet manpower demands." \(^{43}\)

Taking the period from 1960-1961 to 1964-1965, the percentage of elementary school graduates who entered the first cycle vocational and technical schools rose from 7.6 to 8.8, while the percentage of those who entered general middle schools dropped from 42.2 to 36.5. \(^{44}\) In the second cycle of the secondary level, the percentage of the school age population (16 to 18 years of age) that enrolled in lycees rose from 5.3 in 1960-1961 to 6.4 in 1965-1966, while the percentage of those who enrolled in vocational schools increased from 2.6 to 3.8, and in technical schools from 1.1 to 1.4. When we take into account that, during the same period, the percentage of age population which enrolled in this cycle increased from 9.0 to 11.6, \(^{45}\) the above figures clearly indicate that general education at the secondary level continued to attract more students than the vocational and technical schools, and that no significant


\(^{44}\) Milli Eğitim Hareketleri, 1942-1972, p. 23.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., pp. 28-40; and Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Plani. . . , p. 87.
change in channeling students into vocational and technical schools was accomplished.

It can, however, be said that this period witnessed a clear recognition of the importance of human capital in economic and social development by the political parties which participated in the coalition governments. In the parliamentary speeches of the members of the major parties, various problematic aspects of the vocational and technical education were realistically pointed out. The criticisms and suggestions of these speakers were concerned with financial, structural, and functional issues, teacher shortage, problems concerning physical facilities, channeling students into vocational and technical schools, etc. Also, there seemed to develop a common understanding among the political parties that meaningful and effective vocational and technical training could not be provided at early stages of schooling, i.e., at the middle school level.\textsuperscript{46} One other significant character of the period was that the approaches of the governments and the political parties reflected the primacy of developmental

\textsuperscript{46}See BMNTD, I-5-1 (February 24, 1961), pp. 233-234; I-52-1 (February 17, 1963), pp. 107-127.
requirements over political considerations. Therefore, it can be suggested that instability in the political system and the primacy given to the practical and urgent problems can explain the slow rate of developments in the field of education and the limited progress which was made in the achievement of the objectives of the First Plan until 1965.

In view of the existing qualitative problems, the governments of this period essentially preferred to spend the financial resources allocated to this field to improve the conditions of the vocational and technical schools. Sincere and realistic attempts were made to stabilize and balance the rate of developments in the various fields of education. In planning for the expansion of educational system, policies and priorities in terms of reforming the educational institutions were developed. In the attempts for meeting the long term educational needs of Turkey, both the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of expansion were considered and translated into plans and programs.

47Interview with İbrahim Oktem, BMMTD, I-52-2 (February 17, 1963), speech given by the Minister of Education Şevket Ratip Hatipoğlu, pp. 162-163.
Investment programs were prepared to meet the long and short term manpower demand through the school system. The emphasis was upon rationalization and planning. Thus, although the actual progress in the achievement of objectives for the period until 1965 was low and limited, this period can be said to have set the stage in terms of principles and policies for the future governments to build upon.

**Developments in Vocational and Technical Education During the Justice Party Administration (1965-1971)**

The 1965 elections brought the JP into power. However, for the reasons discussed in Chapter III of this study, the success of the JP in winning a majority in the Assembly and in forming a majority government did not result in the emergence of a strong and positive leadership that would produce the kind of policies and decisions for balancing political considerations in educational policy and economic factors.

In terms of its general appeal, the programmatic orientation of the JP has closely approximated reform-conservatism with adaptive tendencies. In this sense, the JP government tended to derive its policies and decisions from a consideration of what was necessary when it became
necessary. Thus, radical reformist solutions to socio-economic problems were generally avoided.

With respect to economic policy-making, the JP believes in economic growth with reliance on the private sector; however, it rejects "an orthodox interpretation of liberalism which rules out governmental intervention in the economy." In other words, the party emphasizes its commitment to a free enterprise system, and accepts governmental regulations within the realm of a mixed economy. The growth of a viable industrial sector has been given priority in the policies of the JP government, for which attempts were made to transfer excess manpower in the agricultural sector into the industry, to provide incentives to entrepreneurs for investments, and to expand the capital market.

From the start of its coming to power in 1965, the JP clearly opposed state planning of the command type, and has advocated central planning to pursue "a rational developmental policy." The party leaders have often argued that

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50 Ibid., p. 13.
the expectations and goals of the plans should be indicative rather than compulsory.

In terms of the relation of education to economic development, the 1965 governmental program of the JP conceived of education as one of the most powerful tools to be profited from in meeting the needs of the country's development. The program emphasized that vocational and technical education would be given a high priority; a cooperation would be established between industry, working life, and vocational and technical education; efforts would be directed towards training students in areas where manpower would be most needed; and higher educational opportunities would be provided for the graduates of vocational and technical schools to upgrade their skills.\(^{51}\)

In practice, the reform-conservatist character of the JP with adaptive tendencies, and the intention of this party to represent the interests of all segments of the society, caused this party's governmental policies and decisions to have flexibility in response to many changing circumstances. This situation was closely related to the JP government's effort to maintain and strengthen its position in view of existing patterns and entrenched interests in the power

structure. On the other hand, the intra-party conflicts has frequently suffered the JP from a lack of cohesion, which made it difficult the obtainment of coherent policy on important socio-economic issues. As a result, the JP government tended to neglect many of the important problem areas which represented constraints upon the process of development.

As will be discussed below, the above characteristics of the JP and its government deeply affected the speed and the direction of change in education in a number of ways. In general terms, expert opinion and the goals and expectations of the planners were not paid proper attention; the concern of the government with quantitative developments gave way to serious qualitative problems in schools; problems arose as the JP government was reluctant to confront the many aspects of its own policy in education. Because several needed changes in the structure and functioning of the school system were ignored for political reasons, the problems which had long characterized the system were further entrenched.52

52 For a reflection of these views in all three vowels of schooling, see Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization _____, pp. 353ff.
A consideration will be given at this point to the approach of the JP government to the planning, as a distinction will be made between the JP period and the previous governmental periods. During the DP administration, an elected party elite had controlled the decision and policy-making process mainly as a result of an insufficient political institutionalization. After 1960, a relative decline was observed in the importance of the parliament as an essential organ of policy-making. This situation was particularly contributed to by such factors as the establishment of the State Planning Organization, the involvement of the military in politics as a "concealed partner" alongside of the elected party elites, the rising number of interest groups and voluntary associations, and the normalization of the relations between the bureaucracy and political parties. All these factors led to an awareness on the part of the governments and political parties of the importance of the planned change and development for which policies and decisions would be produced through the cooperative efforts of the various elements in the political system. This attitude was particularly evident in the way in which the

governments increasingly sought for the contribution of technical expertise in policy-making and paid attention to the policies and measures set by the developmental plan.

After the JP came to power in 1965, a tendency existed in the government to carry out planning in a more flexible way. The result of this tendency was a considerable decline in the role and functioning of planning in governmental affairs. One study pointed out, for example, that:

The State Planning Organization is not deeply enough involved in the political and policy structure . . . to give effect to the many changes suggested to increase efficiency and improve resource allocation.54

In education, the government's reluctance to relate its policy and decisions to the goals and calculations of the plans clearly reflected itself in the reaching of targets. Both the First and Second Five Year Plan targets regarding the developments in the various fields of education were either greatly exceeded or could not be met. While, for example, the enrollment targets for vocational and technical schools could not be reached, the targets for academic secondary schools were vastly exceeded. Also, fluctuations characterized the rates of yearly increases of total

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enrollments, first enrollments, and the number of graduates in different fields.

The First Plan had proposed that the number of students in general middle schools rise steadily, reaching 480,000 in 1967 and 593,000 in 1972; however, by 1968, total enrollments in these schools already reached 639,841. Thus, all projections had to be revised in the Second Plan sharply upward. In general lycees, the number of students reached 152,000 in 1967 instead of 107,000 as projected by the First Plan. Again, in the Second Plan, projections had to be increased to 360,000 in 1972, compared to the previously planned figure of 168,000. Such developments in secondary level academic institutions indicate that, although a special emphasis was placed on the development of vocational and technical education in the planned period, the educational system remained basically centered around general education. The JP government acceded to popular pressures with little regard for the consequences of these developments on the

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55First Five Year Development Plan, Table 359, p. 404; Second Five Year Development Plan, Table 86, p. 183 and Table 88, p. 184; Milli Eğitim Hareketleri, 1942-1972, p. 25; Milli Eğitimde 50 Yıl, 1923-1973, p. 55.
school system and in terms of the contribution of education to development.

Vocational and technical education also showed irregularities in terms of both quantitative and qualitative developments. The First Plan had proposed that the number of students studying vocational and technical subjects rise from 38 per cent in 1963 to 54 in 1967 and 61 in 1972. 56 In view of political, social, and cultural factors which continued to downgrade this type of education, these targets could not be met. Therefore, the Second Plan revised the targets drastically downward, proposing that students in vocational and technical education at secondary level constitute 40.8 per cent of the total in 1972. 57 Although fluctuations were seen in the yearly development rates, the degree of realization of this target reached 39.9 per cent. 58 This achievement was, however, undermined by several factors. For example, the number of students in lycee level technical schools had reached 39,000 in 1967-1968 school year, getting close to the plan target of 42,000.

56 First Five Year Development Plan, Table 360, p. 405.
57 Second Five Year Development Plan, Table 98, p. 194.
58 Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Planı..., Table 588, p. 758.
In the 1971-1972 school year, the total enrollment in these schools reached 59,900, grossly exceeding the Second Plan target of 47,550. The targets for these schools had been determined in the Second Plan on the basis of the assumption that the existing technical schools at lycee level would be raised to the level of four-year technical schools beginning in the 1968-1969 school year. This change was proposed in the plan to ameliorate the deficiencies in the functioning and the structure of technical institutes whose programs were unable to create and establish the difference between the qualified worker and the middle level technician. The Ministry failed to achieve this transformation successfully, which negatively affected the significance of the increase in student enrollments. In the 1971-1972 school year, there were 136 technical institutes with 55,500 students, and only 36 four-year technical schools with 4,400 students. Thus, both the functioning and the structure of technical education at this level suffered from inadequacies. Other factors which undermined the

59 Second Five Year Development Plan, Table 92, p. 189; Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Planı, p. 745; and Education in the Third Five Year, p. 31.
enrollment increases were the resulting insufficiencies in terms of buildings, workshops, and laboratories, the deterioration of teacher-student ratio, and problems related to programs of studies. Pointing to a lack of a production oriented training in these schools, the Third Five Year Plan emphasized, for example, that the programs did not follow the developments in the industry and the graduates were inadequately prepared in meeting the requirements of the working life. This situation naturally resulted in a lack of confidence of employers in the capability of graduates and the uncertainty about wages and the extent of authority and responsibility of these graduates.60

Similarly, the plan targets for different types of schools in secondary vocational education were either surpassed or could not be met. In addition, certain politically motivated measures taken by the government deeply affected the developments in this field, with the resulting problems in the functioning of secondary school system in general. While, for example, religious schools

60See Education in the Third Five Year... , pp. 30-31, 34; DPT, Orta Düzye=de Meslek... , pp. 16ff.
showed the highest development rates among all the other vocational and technical schools, the quantitative developments remained highly limited (and generally below the plan targets) in health colleges, teacher training schools, girls institutes, and commercial lycees. Also, yearly growth of enrollments, first registrations, and the number of graduates showed an unstable development in various vocational schools.\textsuperscript{61}

During the JP period, the teacher-student ratio in all vocational and technical schools severely deteriorated due to irrational quantitative developments in schools and the lack of concern by the government in training the necessary number of quality teachers. For example, although the plans accepted one teacher for every fifteen students as the standard, the number of students per teacher for vocational and technical subjects in technical schools in 1968-1969 was 17.4; whereas in 1969-1970 this number reached 18.4, in 1970-1971 19.3, and 21.8 in 1971-1972.\textsuperscript{62}

Another problem was the drop-out rate in the schools in view of efficiency. For example, in technical institutes

\textsuperscript{61}See \textit{Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Plani.} ..., pp. 747-757.

\textsuperscript{62}DPT, \textit{Orta Düzeyde Meslek.} ..., p. 17.
the drop-out rate in the second plan period reached 32.4, the percentage of those who could graduate from these schools in three years was 55.4, and those who could graduate in longer than three years 12.1. The same rates for girls institutes were 13.0, 85.1 and 1.9; and for commercial lycees, 34.0, 48.4 and 17.6. While this situation greatly affected the productivity rate in the schools, both the resources were largely wasted and the efforts to fill qualified manpower gaps failed. Moreover, no system was established to see if the graduates of vocational and technical schools were being employed in positions related to their vocation. For example, only 34.3 per cent of technical institute graduates and 18.4 per cent of technical school graduates of the 1970-1971 school year were working in jobs related to their vocation. Those who continued their education in higher levels constituted 9 per cent of the graduates. These figures suggest that for more than half of the graduates, efforts and resources were wasted in terms of development.

63 Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Plani... Table 587, p. 757.

It becomes clear that during the JP administration, the calculations and expectations of the planners often remained on paper. The problematic aspects of the developments in the political scene directly contributed to this situation. However, some other factors should also be taken into account. Erturk,65 for example, speculated on the following points: (1) some statements in the plan have not been stated in operational terms, and thus have the potential of giving way to inconsistent interpretations, (2) the educational system itself poses difficulties in terms of the achievement of some plan targets, (3) the plan is concerned more with the number of manpower needed than with the qualifications of that manpower. Therefore, it cannot be said that a relationship has been established between the plan targets and the development of appropriate curricula, (4) even if such a relationship were established, another factor which would prevent the achievement of plan targets would be the inadequate approaches being used in curriculum planning in Turkey, and (5) other factors which affect the achievement

level of the plan targets would be the problem of teacher shortage and quality, insufficiencies in the utilization of technical expertise in educational decision-making, administrative problems, the inadequacies in the relation of education to other elements in the society, etc.

The functioning and the sensitivity of the governmental system is directly related to the amelioration of the above factors and problems. During the JP period between 1965 and 1971, many of the important problem areas that represented constraints upon development were not realistically approached and dealt with. As a result, the dysfunctional aspects of the educational system and those other factors which potentially prevented the achievement of the planned targets were further entrenched. It is, however, interesting to see that, in their parliamentary speeches, a high level of understanding among the JP members of the issues and problems of vocational and technical education existed. 66 On the other hand, the individuals that served as ministers of education during this period recognized even the most

specific issues and problems concerning this field.\textsuperscript{67} However, many efforts to deal with these issues and problems did not result in any major progress. For example, based on the Second Plan, in order to attract more students to vocational and technical schools, graduates of these schools were encouraged to continue in their specialty to upgrade their skills to the higher education level.\textsuperscript{68} Student increases remained only as a quantitative success, however, that further qualitative difficulties characterized the field in the face of the inadequacies in human and physical resources that were made available to the development of vocational and technical education. This situation can be related to the priorities given to different fields in education in the government's policy. Such priorities were often based on political considerations which also reflected themselves in the planning and implementation of various changes suggested to improve secondary education.\textsuperscript{69} In 1970,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Interviews with Cihat Bilgehan, Orhan Dengiz, İbrahim Ertem, and Orhan Oğuz. Also see \textit{BMMTD}, III-88-1 (May 25, 1970), speech given by the Minister of Education Orhan Oğuz, p. 531.
\item \textsuperscript{68} \textit{Second Five Year Development Plan}, p. 191.
\item \textsuperscript{69} According to Özdil, the development of vocational and technical education were negatively influenced by political developments because "the government tended to
the minister of education made it clear that secondary education would be restructured to train students in a variety of skills in order to (1) meet the demand for middle-level manpower, (2) reduce the pressures for admission to general education at secondary level and to university, and (3) train students to become productive citizens if they would not continue their education after graduation.70 Such a major change of an innovative nature could not be undertaken effectively in view of various difficulties facing the JP government in early 1970's. In fact, the political scene was such that the decisions made in the Eighth Educational Council and approved by the

establish priorities among educational fields, which largely degenerated the integrity of the educational system as a whole. Based on political preferences, this or that field of education showed high rates of development (i.e., religious education) at the expense of others." Interview with İlhan Ozdil. Although the ministers of education of the period all emphasized during the interviews with this investigator that political factors did not dominate the developments in the field, it was clear that none of them followed during their service a well-established policy of vocational and technical education. Orhan Oğuz stated for example that "the ministers and administrators were put in difficult positions and were confused because of the vagueness of the educational policies of the JP. . . ." Interview with Orhan Oğuz. This situation clearly increased the susceptibility of the educational system to political pressures and considerations.

70Cumhuriyet, July 11, 1970.
ministry were not fully supported by some groups and individuals who were able to affect administrators and politicians to produce decisions in different directions.

It should be pointed out that education, during the JP administration, represented only one of the many social and economic sectors where necessary fundamental changes could not be planned and implemented for far too long. This situation seriously weakened the legitimacy of the government that in the minds of some military officers and a large part of intellectuals a new strong and credible government was needed to produce much needed social and economic reforms. The result was a memorandum produced by the military forces, asking for the resignation of the JP government.

The March 12 Memorandum and Its Impact on the Developments in Vocational and Technical Education

As the JP government resigned, a series of short-lived above-party, caretaker, and coalition governments were

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71 See pp. 166-168, 194-196 of this study. In terms of the structure and functioning of secondary education both Seventh and Eighth Council's decisions were similar in many ways. In terms of the second cycle of secondary education, the Eighth Council saw the functions as to prepare students for (1) higher education, (2) both higher education and vocation, and (3) vocation or life. Sekizinci Milli Eğitim Şurası, ..., pp. 20-21.

72 Interviews with Fuat Turgut, June 28, 1976 and Sudi Bülbül.
formed. The first of these was put under the premiership of Nihat Erim whose cabinet was mainly composed of reform-minded "technocrats."

The military leaders had made it clear that the civilian leadership was expected to produce major changes in many of the economic and social sectors. However, to secure agreement on specific reform proposals by the Erim government proved highly difficult in the parliament in which the majority of the seats were held by the conservative parties. A continuous political maneuvering and the breakup of several coalitions characterized the scene which prevented the implementation of many of the reform projects.

As stated in Chapter III of this study, educational reform was accorded a high priority by the governments of this period and viewed as having a comprehensive coverage, embracing all levels and parts of the school system both in terms of quality and quantity. A complete integration of the educational reform with the reforms in other social and economic sectors was intended, and several detailed programs and projects were designed to meet the terms of that reform as a whole.

Except in the field of religious education to which a specific reference had been made in the first Erim government's
program, the proposed changes could not be put into effect in view of existing difficulties in the political scene. Thus, in practice, no significant change in the secondary level took place. It is important, however, to give consideration to the nature of the approaches of the governments of this period to the issues and problems of vocational and technical education as outlined in the governmental programs and reform projects.

The program of the first Erim government described the existing educational system as an important factor in Turkey's underdevelopment. A comprehensive effort was needed to reform all aspects of the educational system from the viewpoint of developmental process. The program stated that the studies which began in the Seventh and Eighth Educational Councils would be completed in a very short time, evaluated, and put into implementation in an effort to bring changes in the structure and the functioning of secondary education. Many of the decisions made in these councils had been either ignored or refuted during the previous governmental periods. As a result, the dysfunctional aspects of the secondary level produced such problems (which had the potential of

73Eğitim Reformu..., p. 8.
preventing the realization of plan targets) as enormous pressures for admission to general lycees and university, difficulties in the training of quality and desired number of manpower, problems related to providing equal educational opportunities, and low productivity rates among schools. The new system proposed by the Eighth Council seemed to offer ways to deal with these problems and facilitate the realization of targets. 74

For the preparation of an educational reform bill, the government set up a National Education Reform Strategy and Coordination Commission which presented its report in June 1971. In parallel with the governmental program, this commission approached the problems of education in terms of the manpower requirements of development, and focused on these problems from three different perspectives: individual, societal, and the training of manpower needed for development. 75 The formulation of these three aspects in the report presented to policy-makers a broader view of education which was different from the traditional views unrelated to the requirements of development.

74 See Ertürk, "İnsangücü ve Eğitimle İlgili Plan. . . ."

As far as the problems of vocational and technical education were concerned, the governmental program stated that "Especially the development of technical education will be given importance." The government would specifically aim at establishing ties between the industry and education, increasing the productivity rates among the various branches of vocational and technical schools, revising the programs to increase the ability of the graduates to adapt themselves to working life and to facilitate their employment, and dealing with the existing qualitative and quantitative problems in the schools to meet the demand for manpower in an effective way. To realize these objectives and "to give a new direction to vocational and technical schools," a study group was formed in the ministry of education. This group was responsible for making specific recommendations regarding regulations and legislation needed for increasing the importance of the vocational and technical schools, for finding ways to satisfy the needs of a

76 Egitim Reformu., loc. cit.

77 BMMTD, III-45-2 (February 21, 1972), speech given by the minister of education Ismail Arar, pp. 575-584.

78 See Egitim Reformu., pp. 40-41.
developing economy and technology, for increasing the demand for this type of education, and insuring the proper employment of the graduates.

The above explanations are important in terms of understanding the types of issues and problems of vocational and technical education which the government found necessary to deal with. However, as stated earlier, the reform efforts of the government did not result in a significant change in the structure and functioning of this field. The following two governments under Ferit Melen and Naim Talu did not particularly concern themselves with the issue of educational reform. The programs of these governments simply stated that efforts would be made to improve the vocational and technical education, without describing any specific issue or problem, or the ways to deal with them.

It was, however, a result of the efforts of these governments, which were brought to power after the March 12 Memorandum to realize certain reforms, that a new law concerning the many aspects of the educational system was promulgated by the National Assembly in 1973. The law

was in the nature of a reform measure which realistically approached the problem of education in Turkey, but, at the same time, contained many idealistic statements. Therefore, as an analysis by Kaya indicated, the possibility of its full implementation does not appear to be in the near future. The law, which can be shown as the major achievement of reform governments of the period, will have to remain on paper until many other related problems can be resolved. For example, the following statement was made by one of the ministers of education of the period:

Does the central and provincial organization of the ministry have the structure and capability to carry out educational services and reforms? The answer to this question is unfortunately negative. In the organization of the ministry, the distribution of duties, authority, and responsibility is vague. Among the independent units, there are duplications and conflicts in terms of responsibilities. Decision-making is such a slow process that unnecessary formalities and routine works have become the real objectives of the central organization. Personnel appointments and transfers have been made not on the basis of objective criteria but arbitrarily. And inconsistencies are seen among the laws which were produced separately in different periods.

See Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, pp. 346-347.

BMMTD, III-45-2 (February 21, 1972), speech given by the minister of education İsmail Arar, p. 580. Orhan Öğuz, the minister of education before March 12, 1971, expressed his frustrations in an interview in terms of reform in education by saying, "In my opinion, the whole system should be demolished and a new one should be established." Interview with Orhan Öğuz.
Clearly, the problems which characterized the National Education system in Turkey required more drastic and immediate workable measures than the ones produced during this period. It should, however, be pointed out that the period is significant in that the idea of "the need for an educational reform in terms of Turkey's development" has been made an important concern of the political and the educational system. This need was emphasized in the governmental programs. It was understood that the existing educational system could not effectively contribute to social, economic, and cultural development, and that any educational policy must reflect the planning strategies which would deal with both the issue of the training of necessary manpower and the issue of proper utilization of the trained manpower. 82

Developments in Vocational and Technical Education
After the 1973 Elections

The 1973 elections did not give way to the emergence of a strong and responsible government. Due to the distribution of the seats in the Assembly and the differences in views and principles among the eight political parties,

82 See Eğitim Reformunda Strateji ve Yöntem, p. 21.
a parliamentary deadlock was observed until the RPP and the NSP were able to come together and form a coalition government in January 1974. This coalition lasted less than eight months and its resignation resulted in another government crisis. Finally, the conservative majority of the parliament formed a coalition under the premiership of Süleyman Demirel with the participation of the JP, the NSP, the NAP, and the RP. This coalition governed Turkey from April 1975 to the 1977 elections. After these elections, with the participation of the JP, the NSP, and the NAP, Demirel's conservative coalition was re-formed, which could, however, stay in power only until January 1978. Consequently, the RPP with the support of some independents was able to come to power under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit.

It is clear that instability has characterized the political scene in Turkey after the 1973 elections. Indecisiveness, uncertainty, lack of strong and dynamic leadership, and confusion over planning for the future can be said to have been the major features of the governments formed during this period. In many ways, the coalitions were the unnatural unions of the participating parties which represented different and mostly conflicting orientations
toward change. Once again, the primacy of political over developmental requirements in state affairs has been seriously felt, as each party maneuvered for self-advantage. The pace, direction, and content of change in many sectors including education have been deeply affected.

Compared to the previous governmental programs, the RPP-NSP program dealt with the issue of education in a greater detail. It stated the following regarding the nature of secondary education:

Measures will be implemented especially to speed up the orientation toward technical subjects in secondary education with the intention to achieve the trained manpower targets of the development plan. . . . Education in all vocational and trade branches will be based on elementary education, and the middle schools will have various branches and programs which provide vocational and trade education. 83

Thus, the government recognized that the secondary education would be approached in terms of the training of manpower required by the development plan. However, the program reversed a trend in the nature of the secondary education for which a continuing struggle had taken place since the late 1950's. Namely, an understanding had developed that a meaningful vocational and technical education

83 Kaya, İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz, pp. 362-363.
could not be provided at the middle school level, and thus, this education should follow the general middle school education in the secondary level. For example, one of the problems of the secondary school system was stated in the M.R.P. in the early 1960's as follows: "Pupils in the professional and vocational schools start to specialize too early, to the detriment of their general education." Because of this early specialization, transferring from one channel to another had become virtually impossible.84 Thus, various reports, the Seventh and the Eighth Educational Councils, and the Second Five Year Development Plan had proposed the transformation of middle-level vocational and technical schools into general middle schools which would be followed by vocational, technical, and academic lycees in the second cycle of secondary level. With the transformation of religious middle-level schools into general middle schools during the period of Erim government, this move had been completed. The National Education Law which was promulgated in 1973 had also placed all vocational, technical, and academic programs at the lycee level of secondary education followed by eight-year basic education.85 Thus the statement

84 OECD, MRP, p. 99.
85 Milli Eğitim Temel Kanunu, Articles 26, 29.
in the RPP-NSP government program meant essentially a return to the past structure and functioning of the secondary school system. It should be pointed out that the statement was included in the program mainly as a result of the demand of the NSP wing of the coalition for the purpose of realizing the reopening of the first cycle religious schools.

However, when the Ninth Educational Council in 1974 addressed itself to the question of basing vocational and technical branches on elementary education, a decision was produced requiring the preservation of the general character of the middle school program, that all middle schools would offer an identical general education program supported with elective subjects. In those middle schools which previously functioned as the first cycle of vocational and technical schools, relevant vocational and technical subjects would be made an integral part of the program, and instruction in these subjects and in related application and laboratory studies would be determined according to the objectives and characteristics of the second cycle school. \(^{86}\)

In terms of the decisions made on the governmental level, the next coalition period with the JP, the NSP, the

\(^{86}\) Dokuzuncu Milli Eğitim Şurası. . . , pp. 280-286.
NAP, and the RP in power did not produce any significant change in the structure and functioning of secondary education in general. The program of this government emphasized that the acceptance of second cycle vocational and technical school graduates into university and higher schools would be secured in order to ensure the equality of opportunity in higher education, to prevent excess enrollments in general lycees, and to increase the demand for vocational and technical schools. Also, the government would make efforts to increase the number of vocational and technical schools. 87

Since the 1977 elections, no major attempt has been made by the governments (the JP-NSP-NAP coalition and the RPP government) to deal with the issues and problems that characterize the secondary level vocational and technical education.

At this point, developments in certain aspects of this field will be considered through different governmental periods since 1973 on the basis of the policies and programs of the governments which have been described above.

In terms of the distribution of students at secondary level, the developments which took place during the Third Plan period were still in favor of general education. The governments could not make progress in the direction of channeling more students into vocational and technical fields. For example, in 1965-1966, the middle school graduates who entered general lycees constituted 45.5 per cent, which reached 62.7 per cent in 1970-1971. Although a decrease in this percentage was observed in recent years (50.4 in 1973-1974, 51.3 in 1974-1975, and 49.5 in 1975-1976) the situation is not satisfactory in terms of the plan targets. Irregular percentages characterized the percentages of the middle school graduates who entered vocational and technical schools. The increase for commercial lycees was from 9.7 per cent in 1972-1973 to 13.7 in 1975-1976; for industrial vocational lycees from 12.7 to 19.4; and in religious lycees from 7.0 to 7.8. However, while no increase in the percentage of the students who entered girls' vocational lycees took place, the percentages gradually decreased for primary-school teacher training schools and health and agricultural vocational lycees. 88

88DPT, Orta Düzyeyde Meslek.. Table 4, p. 6; and Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Planı.. Table 572, p. 743.
These developments indicate irregular first enrollment patterns in the field.

In terms of total enrollments, the plan targets were grossly exceeded in secondary level technical education. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the demand for these schools. For example, out of 69,795 middle school graduates who applied for admission to industrial vocational lycees in 1973-1974, only 26,933 could be accepted. In 1975-1976, the number of applicants reached 91,435. However, only approximately 50,000 could be enrolled.\textsuperscript{89}

The exceeding of the plan targets of total enrollments in the technical field naturally created a negative effect on the development of quality. For example, the teacher-student ratio increased from 23.5 in 1972-1973 to 31.9 in 1975-1976.\textsuperscript{90} In the vocational field, the total enrollment targets have also been greatly surpassed in commercial lycees, religious vocational lycees, and girls' vocational

\textsuperscript{89}Figures given by the undersecretary of vocational and technical education in Endüstriyel Mesleki ve Teknik Öğretim ile Sanayi İlişkileri Sempozyumu (Ankara: MEB, 1976), p. 25.

\textsuperscript{90}DPT, Orta Düzeyde Meslek..., Table 6, p. 8.
lycees. Only in health vocational lycees were the development rates parallel with the plan targets.91

Thus, although the governments in their programs and policies maintained that developments in secondary education would favor vocational and technical education in accord with the plan targets, they failed to achieve these objectives. The secondary school system still remained centered around general education. During the Third Plan period, the general and vocational-technical distinction at secondary level was reported to be essentially the same as in 1963.92 The Third Plan has established, on the other hand, that 65 per cent of the students in secondary education would be studying vocational and technical subjects in 1995-1996.93 However, as also expressed by the undersecretary of vocational and technical education in 1975, it would be unrealistic to expect to reach this

91Ibid., pp. 11-12.


target and to train manpower in required number and quality with the existing programs and facilities available. In fact, many of the qualitative problems which have long characterized the field continued to exist. In addition to the deteriorating teacher-student ratio, the physical capacity in the schools, equipment, workshop and laboratory facilities remained insufficient. The status and employment issues of the graduates were not resolved. Measures taken to provide a functional vocational and technical education were limited in establishing a working relationship between education, environment and the industry. The problems of demand and supply interactions in the educational system and in the skilled-labor markets could not be dealt with effectively. Even the qualitative developments took place in such a way that the quality of education in vocational and technical schools only worsened. During the period between 1965 and 1975, for example, the number of students in technical schools for boys in the second cycle increased from 25,000 to 77,000, while the number of schools

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94 See in general DPT, Orta Düzeyde Meslek...; DPT, Eğitim: Endüstriyel Meslek ve Teknik...; and Dogan, Ülkemizde Endüstrileşme ve Teknik Eğitim.
rose from 114 to 188 and the number of teachers from 2,600 to 3,000. These figures clearly suggest that the schools had to operate increasingly above their capacities being detrimental to the education of students in a field which requires learning by doing. This problem can also be related to the way in which resources have been used. As a result of the priority given to the development of vocational and technical education since the beginning of the First Plan period, resources have been generously allocated to this field, which reached 38 per cent of the total educational investments during the Third Five Year Plan period. However, necessary measures have not been taken for an effective realization of the investments. Many of the projects could not be completed within the limitations of the planned period and finance.

It becomes clear that the vocational and technical education system in Turkey in its present structure and functioning is not in a position to perform a production oriented training to meet the requirements of the economy and industry. Although intended by all governments, the

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95 DPT, Eğitim, p. 18.
96 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
restructuring of education to favor vocational and technical education at the expense of general training could not be achieved. Because the facilities and programs have not been improved to meet the standards, the present institutions in the field still mainly continue either as a springboard to higher education or other possibilities for further training and employment. 97

Thus, although manpower is understood to be the most important element in development, 98 and although the first goal of education is seen as training the manpower necessary for economic progress, 99 the nature of developments in the educational system has not been in the direction of fulfilling the expectancies. In addition to the inadequacies and insufficiencies within the system, employment problems

97 Interviews with Emel Doğramaci, December 24, 1976; İlhan Özdiil; Sudi Bülbül; and Cevat Alkan. According to Alkan, 85 per cent of the students in vocational and technical schools would wish to go into higher education.

Among the graduates in 1974-1975, those who were working in jobs related to their vocation were 38.6 per cent from industrial vocational lycées, 32.7 from technical lycées, and 15.6 for girls' vocational lycées. DPT, Orta Düzeyde Meslek., p. 59.

98 Second Five Year Development Plan, p. 162.

continued to exist. Many of the problems and necessities which have been mentioned for years in the plans, reports, governmental programs and policy statements, and in the statements of politicians and government officials still remain valid; namely, channeling more students into vocational and technical schools, taking measures to reduce the demand for university and higher education, providing a production oriented training especially in technical fields, solving the teacher problem, dealing with the inadequacies in the programs and with the problems concerning the prolificacy in the schools, and utilizing the trained manpower in such a way to satisfy the needs of the economy and industry, etc. Although these issues and problems have been well recognized by policy and decision makers, the governments failed to produce any considerable progress in the realization of an effective vocational and technical education system. Efforts were mainly directed to the increasing of the number of students and schools in the field, which, by itself, has not been sufficient in meeting the requirements. On the other hand, the indications are that such quantitative developments were essentially made in the form of a response by the governments to social and political pressures in the absence of a commitment to the
realization of a well-established policy. Quantitative developments of this nature have naturally contributed to the entrenchment of the above mentioned issues and problems.

Issues and problems which concern certain aspects and elements of a school system have to be dealt with by carefully taking into account the nature and the characteristics of the total system. This is to suggest, especially for centralized educational systems such as Turkey's, that system-wide procedures should be worked out to organize the efforts and programs of the involved parties to contribute to total planned change within the system and the individual aspects and elements of that system. Thus, the responsibility of assuring systematic examination of various areas in the system and of taking the initiative for innovations essentially and strategically belongs to the governments and the central ministry of education. In the case of Turkey, in terms of the development of vocational and technical

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100 Interviews with the former practitioners in the ministry of education indicated in general that some schools could not be opened in the planned locations and time due to the personal intervention of some politicians and in- fluentials.

101 See Lewis and Miel, *Supervision for Improved Instruction*, p. 185.
education and in dealing with the problems of secondary school system in general, there is much to be desired in the degree of concern with, responsiveness, and commitment to the improvement of education by the governments and the central ministry of education. However, the promising factor for the future is that sufficient progress has been made in defining and analyzing the issues and problems, in the determination of objectives to be achieved, and in searching for ways to deal with these issues and problems.
CHAPTER V

ISSUE THREE: TEACHER-TRAINING FOR SECONDARY-LEVEL SCHOOLS

Introduction

The development of effective educational systems is regarded by the governments of developing countries as a foundation for rapid economic development and socio-political change. The effectiveness of any educational system is dependent upon the quality of teaching and the availability of competent teachers. In other words, if competent teachers can be obtained, the likelihood of attaining desirable educational outcomes is substantial. Kazamias stated that:

The organized content of instruction, the principles upon which it is based, and the objectives it seeks to accomplish do not, in and of themselves, sufficiently define the nature of education or of curriculum. The efficiency of an education system depends in no small part on the quality of instruction, which is itself influenced by the "technology" of education and the calibre of the teaching staff.¹

¹Kazamias, Education and the Quest for. . . , p. 154.
Turkey shares with other nations the need for effective teachers. Since the establishment of the secular, modern educational system in the 1920's, efforts have been made by the governments to train sufficient number of qualified teachers to increase the effectiveness of education. However, Turkey still faces enormous problems in its educational system in this respect.

This chapter is an analysis of the issues and problems of teacher-training for secondary-level schools in the Turkish educational system in the light of political developments. The analysis will focus on the period of multi-party politics which started in 1945-1946. The nature and the degree of influences of governmental changes during this period on the evolution of teacher-training will be described.

**Developments in Teacher-Training for Secondary-Level Schools Before the Establishment of Multi-Party Politics**

Education was an important component of the program of the radical modernizing regime established after the proclamation of the republic in 1923 in Turkey. The leaders believed that the consolidation of the new state
necessitated a modern, secular national system of schools. Thus, successful attempts were made to modernize the structure and functioning of the educational system. Also, the regime adopted as its policy the expansion of educational opportunities.² Due to the environmental constraints, scarcity of financial resources, and traditionalism which characterized society, the educational expansion was rather limited during the first decade of the republic. However, significant increases in the number of students in all three levels of schooling were realized in the 1930's and 1940's. In the secondary level, the number of students enrolled in general middle schools increased from almost 6,000 in 1923 to 19,858 in 1928-1929, and to 92,308 in 1939-1940. In the second cycle, the increase in student numbers was the sharpest, which rose from 1,241 in 1923-1924 to about 5,700 in 1930-1931, and to 24,862 in 1940-1941.³

Both the changes in school programs which were realized in the early years of the republic and the increases in

²Ibid., pp. 115ff.

student enrollments faced the regime with a difficult task of obtaining teachers in needed number and quality. The majority of teachers available were unable to perform in the new school system as they lacked the background necessary to implement the revised and reformed programs. Special programs were designed and publications were made available to these teachers in order to raise their performance level. Success in these efforts was highly limited. 4

The governments of this period also made efforts to restructure the teacher-training schools and to establish new ones. Again, the progress was not so significant in producing a sufficient number of teachers. For the training of middle school teachers, a teacher-training institute was opened in 1926 with a two-year term. Until 1928, the institute had only Turkish and pedagogy branches. In that year, three year programs were set up in the separate branches of Turkish, history-geography, physical and natural sciences, mathematics, and pedagogy. In 1932-1933, art and physical education branches were added to the existing five, and the term of instruction was increased to four years. In

4Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization... pp. 207-208.
order to train teachers for each subject instructed in middle schools, a three-year music branch was added in 1937-1938 and a branch of foreign languages in 1941-1942. In 1944-1945, the physical and natural sciences branch was divided into physics, chemistry, and biology. As a result, the teacher-training institute taught in eleven branches.

Besides the training of middle school teachers as its primary function, the institute also offered in-service courses to teachers, and some of its graduates were appointed to vocational and technical schools, village institutes, and as elementary supervisors. The programs offered in the institutes lacked many qualities. Also, in terms of the number of graduates, the institute did not make any considerable contributions to the improvement of teacher condition in middle schools. While 73 students graduated in 1935, this number reached only 94 in 1940, and 200 in 1945.

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6OECD, MRP, Appendix A, Table 73, p. 164.
The majority of the teachers in middle schools, thus, had to be obtained from various different sources.\textsuperscript{7}

The only school that existed to train lycee-level teachers during the pre-multi-party period was the higher teacher-training school. Students in this school specialized in their subject area in the various faculties of the university. Courses on teaching were provided separately by a staff from the teacher-training institutes. The output of this school again fell far short of demand. The school graduated 27 students in 1935, 10 in 1940, and 27 in 1945.\textsuperscript{8}

In the training of teachers for vocational and technical schools, attempts were not successful. After 1927, students were sent to foreign countries by the government to receive education and, on their return, to be employed as teachers in vocational and technical schools. In view of the growth in the number of vocational and technical

\textsuperscript{7}The number of teachers in middle schools was 2,354 in 1935, 3,744 in 1940, and 3,862 in 1945. 	extit{Milli Eğitimde 50 Yıllı, 1923-1973}, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{8}See Küçükahmet, Öğretmen Yetiştiren Kurum..., pp. 15-16; MEB, 	extit{Cumhuriyetin 50 Yılındı,}, p. 149; and OECD, MRP, Appendix A, Table 70, p. 162.
schools and student enrollments, a girls' technical teacher-training school was opened in 1934-1935 and a boys' technical teacher-training school opened in 1937-1938. The number of graduates from these schools were far too limited to meet the demand. Thus, vocational and technical schools also had to employ teachers from different backgrounds.²

As the above explanation of the developments clearly indicate, the efforts to establish an effective network of teacher-training system for secondary level schools in the early republican period largely failed to produce a desired result. This situation can be explained on the basis of the nature of the educational expansion, the polity, and the educational transformation that took place. After the establishment of the republic, the main goal of the radical reformist regime was to create the structures of a modern state in Turkey. In education, the efforts resulted, despite many weaknesses, in the establishment of a modern school system which was unified, secular, and closely related to the socio-political objectives of that regime. In terms of change and innovation, it was, however, the secondary level of education which profited least from the

²See Doğan, Ülkemizde Endüstrileşme ve Teknik Eğitim, pp. 89-94.
efforts of the governments. The areas which were given primary importance were the reformation of the university level, mass education of the people, and the expansion of education in rural areas. It was believed that rapid modernization and the consolidation of the new state required the formation of an intellectual elite group, the bridging of the elite-mass gap, and the transformation of the traditional nature of the mass of the populace. These socio-political objectives of the period essentially determined the nature of educational policy.

In the area of teacher education, problems of rural areas were given the utmost importance. It was known to the leaders that the reforms did not sufficiently penetrate the great masses of the villagers, and a large gap existed between the small group of modernizing forces which held the power and the rural peasants and cultivators that retained traditional ways of living. The governments recognized that a new type of school teacher for rural areas was needed to transmit the ideas of nationalism and revolution and to transmit the less articulated needs of the rural people to the leadership. This concern resulted in the successful implementation of the eğitmen (trainers)
program in which young army veterans were given a one-year training in practical and academic subjects and, upon graduation, employed as trainers in one room village schools with a maximum of three grades.\footnote{10} This program led to the emergence of village institutes which offered a five-year program to village-origin primary school graduates to train them as prospective teachers, technical leaders, and advisors to the villages. Both the egitmen program and the village institutes made considerable contribution to the achievement of the goals for which they had been established.\footnote{11}

In the case of secondary-level schools, the question of how to increase the output of graduate teachers without a significant deterioration in the student-teacher ratios remained as the basic concern. Meanwhile, because teacher-training institutions were unable to produce enough graduates, many students continued to be trained along traditional lines.\footnote{12}


\footnote{11}See footnote No. 75 in Chap. III.

\footnote{12}Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization..., pp. 207-208.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the early republican period to teacher education was the promulgation in 1924 of Law No. 439, which classified teaching among the general services of the state as a profession to undertake the duties of instruction and education. Following the passage of this law, governments responsibly attempted to develop measures to deal with the teacher problem. The leaders made efforts to promote the professional status and dignity of teachers and teaching. It was made clear that teachers were indispensable to the nation's future. Their primary function was to instruct the young, but they were also a vital link between the rulers and the ruled. They were expected, as change agents, to advance the growth of national consciousness and development in their environment. Also, governments took steps to realize an adequate financial recognition of the profession. Measures were taken to provide teachers with the opportunities to improve themselves professionally.

15 See ibid., pp. 47-54.
Prior to the establishment of the multi-party political system, the following points summarize the characteristics of teacher-training for the secondary-level schools. Since the growth of the middle and lycee level schools displayed steady increases despite the failure in producing sufficient number of teachers, the administration was faced with the serious question of teacher shortage. This question could not be dealt with effectively given the nature and the capacity of the existing secondary teacher-training institutions. Therefore, a restructuring of these institutions was necessary to make them more functional and to prepare them for a healthy expansion of the school system in the years to come. Thus, teacher-training in general came to be one of the most important issues of education that concerned the administration. The issue could essentially be divided into two parts: the problem of teacher shortage and the procedures and the types of structural arrangements that were needed to train quality teachers.
Developments in Teacher-Training for Secondary-Level Schools Between 1945-1950

The establishment of multi-party politics and the appearance of opposition in Turkey after 1945 had no immediate effect in sensitizing political circles on the issue of teacher-training for secondary-level schools. However, governments of this period showed concern and interest in this field.

The Third National Educational Council met in December 1946 to discuss and advise on several matters of educational policy. The problem of providing teachers for secondary schools and the structure and functioning of teacher-training institutions for this level was one of the areas in which the council made studies and recommendations. In view of the principle (adopted by the RPP in power) that a middle school be established in every sub-province, the council strongly recommended that new sources of teachers 16

16During this period, political changes had, however, immediate consequences for village institutes, which were combined with the regular normal schools following a highly emotional and violent debate in the political arena.
be created. It was estimated that 1,000 teachers were needed each year to be able to open 50 to 60 schools a year and to fill the vacant positions in the existing ones. Another recommendation was restructuring and increasing the number of teacher-training institutes. These institutes would offer a two-year professional formation program to graduates of general lycees and normal schools. With their programs revised and improved, the technical teacher-training schools were recommended to have a four-year term. The opening of a second higher teacher-training school to train lycees teachers was also recommended.

In terms of administration, planning, and the implementation of a relevant policy, all teacher-training institutions were to be placed under the authority and responsibility of an independent unit in the ministry. The council proposed that the government take measures to increase the prestige of the teaching profession. In terms of the functioning of teacher-training institutes which trained middle school teachers, the council recommended that graduates of middle school teacher-training institutes be prepared to teach more than one subject. This recommendation was made on the ground that middle school offered
general training instead of training in specialized areas. 17

The Fourth National Educational Council in 1949 also considered the reorganization of teacher-training institutes and higher teacher-training schools. This Council recommended that: programs of the teacher-training institutes should be made parallel to the middle school programs; institutes should have three major branches as science, social studies, and foreign languages; students should choose as a minor branch from among art, music, physical education, or housekeeping; and art and physical education should be organized as separate branches. All these recommendations were accepted by the ministry and put into effect. In terms of the higher teacher-training schools, the council recommended the opening of a new school in Ankara. Since the lycee-level teachers came from various different sources, the council strongly advised that measures be taken to establish a uniformity in the implementation of lycee-level programs. 18


Indications are that the decisions made in both the Third and the Fourth Councils were not based on a careful analysis of the issue of teacher-training for secondary level schools. Even though the recommendations had practical values, a brief consideration of some of the aspects of the issue, which will be provided below, reveals that rather radical measures were needed.

As a result of the emphasis upon vocational and technical education, academic enrollments at the secondary level sharply decreased by 1950. In middle schools, the total enrollments dropped from 49,735 in 1945-1946 to 47,489 in 1949-1950. In lycees, the decrease was from 25,515 to 21,440. During the same period, the number of middle schools increased from 247 to 381, and the number of lycees from 83 to 88. In secondary-level vocational and technical schools, the total enrollments reached 55,522 and the number of schools 317. However, for both the first and second cycle secondary level schools, the increase in the number of teachers was not significant. In middle schools, this number rose from 3,862 to 4,364, in lycees from 1,817 to 1,831, and in vocational and technical schools from
Although the student-teacher ratios almost remained stationary, the increase in the number of teachers was not greatly contributed to by the teacher-training institutes, higher teacher-training school and higher technical teacher-training schools. Almost no progress in terms of total enrollments and the number of graduates was made in these institutions during this period. Although two additional teacher-training institutes were opened, the total enrollments in these institutes were only 636 in 1945 and 622 in 1950. The number of graduates increased, however, from 200 to 393. In the higher teacher-training school, the total enrollments dropped drastically from 185 in 1945 to 40 in 1950. This school graduated only 27 students in 1945 and 24 in 1950. In the higher technical teacher-training schools, while the total enrollments doubled in this period from 438 to 874, only 111 students graduated in 1945 and 142 students in 1950.

The fact that the institutions for training secondary level teachers could not produce sufficient number of

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20 OECD, MRP, Appendix A, Table 70, p. 162; Table 71, p. 173; and Table 73, p. 164.
graduates forced the ministry to employ individuals from different backgrounds as teachers. In general, as was going to be the case in the following governmental periods, elementary teachers were allowed to teach in middle schools, and even in lycees, although by law teachers for secondary cycle schools should have university or higher education. Middle school teachers taught in lycees. And even individuals with no professional preparation background in teaching were licensed to teach. 21

The above characteristics of the period in terms of teacher-training for secondary schools suggest that the Third and Fourth Councils failed to make in-depth studies of the situation and to recommend radical solutions to the problem.

The position of the governments and the ministry of education on the issue should be considered. Among the three governments that were formed from 1946 to 1950, only the program of the Recep Peker government made reference to the issue of teacher education. This government promised that the organization and the programs of the teacher-training institutions would be modified, and that careful

21Kazamias, Education and the Quest for... , p. 155.
attention would be paid to the training of the teachers in sufficient number and quality for all levels. The general character of this statement in the program and the absence of any statement concerning teacher education in the following two governmental programs indicate a lack of an established policy on the part of the governments of the period between 1945-1950, which also characterized the position of the ministry. When faced with criticisms in parliament, the ministers of education of this period failed to produce satisfactory answers. One minister emphasized that the problem of teacher-shortage would be solved by improving the teacher-training institutes, since the same type of institutions produced successful results in other countries. Another minister, admitting the existence of a severe teacher problem in the schools, advocated the decisions of the educational councils without providing any further insight to the problem.


23 BMMTD, VIII-26-1 (December 29, 1947), speech given by the ministry of education Reşat Ş. Sirer, pp. 459-468, 622.

24 Ibid., VIII-51-1 (February 20, 1950), speech given by the ministry of education Tahsin Banguoğlu, pp. 850-854.
The politically sensitive educational issues of this period were the reintroduction of religious courses into school curriculum, the functioning of village institutes, and the strengthening of moral and nationalistic elements in the school programs. The reorganization of the secondary education to expand vocational and technical training at the expense of general education was also a concern to the governments. However, problems of teacher training, although requiring urgent attention and drastic measures, did not become a highly important issue to be dealt with at the parliamentary, governmental, and ministerial levels. The changes and the progress made in this field were, therefore, too limited and mainly irrelevant to make a difference.

A structural change was realized in the programs of the teacher-training institutes on the basis of the decisions and recommendations of the educational councils. According to this change, single branches were organized around two major groupings as science and social studies. Foreign languages, art, music, and physical education were made individual branches. Students were required to be trained in a minor subject-matter area. With this change in the program of the teacher-training institutes, it was intended that the graduates would be able to teach more than one
subject in middle schools (e.g., a science branch student would be trained to teach such subjects as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology, and if needed, in his minor field). No major attempt was made, on the other hand, to improve the structure and functioning of other teacher-training institutions for secondary-level schools.

Developments in Teacher-Training for Secondary-Level Schools During the DP Administration (1950-1960)

The coming of the DP into power in 1950 resulted in significant consequences for Turkish society in general and the educational system.

Political factors clearly dominated educational developments that took place during this period. The governments, instead of attempting to develop a coherent or pragmatic policy of education, reacted to popular pressures in several important matters involving all three levels of the school system. There was a marked absence of any advance planning, and decisions were often political and not based on objective criteria.

The major characteristics of the DP period in terms of educational developments were (1) a spectacular increase in the number of students enrolled in all schools, (2) the
comeback of academic secondary education, (3) the reintro-
duction of religious training in the schools, (4) the
closing of village institutes, and (5) the relaxation of
attempts in enforcing the compulsory school law. Many
areas, including teacher-training, most in need of atten-
tion and speedy reform were practically ignored by the
governments of this period.

Educational expansion at the secondary level occurred
during the DP administration at a faster rate than at the
primary and higher levels. The number of middle schools
increased from 381 in 1949-1950 to 715 in 1959-1960, while
the students enrolled in these schools rose from 65,168
to 254,966, and the number of teachers from 4,364 to 10,977.
In lycees, the increase in the number of schools was from
88 to 190; the total enrollments from 21,440 to 62,368;
and the number of teachers from 1,931 to 3,860. The in-
creases in the vocational and technical schools were from
317 to 503 in the number of schools; from 55,522 to 98,010
in the total enrollments; and from 4,584 to 7,382 in the
number of teachers.25

In the middle schools, a fourfold increase in the number of students accompanied a significant deterioration in the student-teacher ratio from 15 to 23. Similarly, almost a fourfold increase in the enrollments in the general lycees took place, while the student-teacher ratio changed from 11 to 16. In vocational and technical schools, the student-teacher ratio remained steady at 12, 13. However, when the different types of schools in this field are considered, it is seen that, while the ratio deteriorated in some schools it improved in others. For example, in middle level health schools, the student-teacher ratio remarkably improved from 47 to 12. In industrial schools in the second cycle, a deterioration was observed, however, from 5 to 10. In the secondary level vocational schools, the teacher shortage was less acute.26

Thus, as will be described below, the failure of the teacher training institutions to provide an adequate number of teachers for secondary level schools became by the end of the DP period a major constraint on the development of the secondary school system in both qualitative and quantitative terms.

26 OECD, MRP, pp. 93-95.
In the teacher-training institutes which were the major sources for training middle school teachers, the growth in the number of students was not appreciable until 1959. The institutes graduated 265 students in 1955, 434 in 1957, and 652 in 1959. Although student-teacher ratios deteriorated slightly, the opening of the fourth institute in 1959 led to a considerable growth in the number of students and to an improvement in the student-teacher ratio. In 1959, 1,778 students enrolled in the institutes compared to 771 in 1955.27

In the higher teacher-training schools, on the other hand, there was a considerable decrease in the number of students and graduates. Although an additional school was opened in 1959, the total enrollments in that year were only 91. Between 1955 and 1960, the total number of graduates was only 59.28

The number of technical higher teacher-training schools reached 3 during the DP period. However, the improvement in the total enrollments and in the number of

27Ibid., Appendix A, Table 73, p. 164.
28Ibid., Appendix A, Table 72, p. 163.
graduates was not significant. In 1959, a total of 917 students enrolled in these schools, and the number of graduates in the same year was 205.\textsuperscript{29}

As a result of the limited developments in the teacher-training institutions, the teacher shortage problem grew worse while the government increased the student enrollments in secondary education without taking necessary measures to maintain, if not to improve, the quality of teaching in schools. According to the reports presented to the National Assembly, the vacant teaching positions in middle schools and lycees were, for example, 1573 in 1955, 3114 in 1958, and 4385 in 1960.\textsuperscript{30}

The major causes that contributed to the teacher shortage problem and to the inability of the teacher-training institutions to provide sufficient number of secondary level teachers during the DP administration can be analyzed on social, economic, and political bases.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., Appendix A, Table 71, p. 163.

\textsuperscript{30}Figures were obtained on a comparative basis from the reports of the budget commission on education and from the speeches of the ministers of education in BMMTD between 1955 and 1960.
Abernethy and Coombe observed in developing countries that:

With the introduction of mass education, the teacher's status tends to suffer a relative decline. Moreover a rapid increase in school capacity requires a rapid increase in teaching personnel, and as minimum standards of entry are lowered to bring in many new teachers, the prestige of all teachers is apt to fall, not least in their own eyes.\(^{31}\)

In Turkey, teaching suffered from a low prestige rating in part for the same reasons. As a result, Szyliowicz stated:

Teacher morale dropped precipitously and the entire climate within the schools changed markedly. The government's educational decisions led to a growth in feelings of cynicism and self-aggrandizement with adverse consequences for quality of education.\(^{32}\)

This situation was especially evident in rural areas.\(^{33}\)

Although the teachers in urban areas could enjoy relatively broad social and cultural advantages, "the very unattractive salary structure in teaching profession," became

\(^{31}\)Abernethy and Coombe, "Education and Politics in Development Countries," p. 135.

\(^{32}\)Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization. , p. 333.

\(^{33}\)See Robinson, The First Turkish Republic. , pp. 196-197.
"crucial to the recruitment of teachers." The question of salary or other material inducements became so crucial for the teachers in some parts of the system that many graduates of the teacher-training institutions did not accept employment from the ministry of education. For example, out of 205 graduates from the technical higher teacher-training schools in 1958-1959, only 19 accepted teaching positions. Similarly, because of better employment opportunities outside the school system, a total of 1,298 teachers resigned from the service in vocational and technical schools between 1953 and 1959. In 1959, 20 out of 48 teachers who completed their military service did not return to teaching in the same field. In that year, 2,200 teaching positions were reported to be vacant.

Another factor which affected the teachers' prestige was that, in view of the urgency of the problem of teacher shortage, many teaching positions continued to be filled

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34 OECD, MRP, pp. 95-96.

with persons with less than adequate qualifications. A study by Cemal Mihçioglu revealed, for example, that in some provinces

retired artillery majors taught physics, officers in the gendarmerie taught literature, chemists in sugar factoris taught chemistry, and in one lise . . . at least nine elementary school teachers taught sections.36

According to Kazamias, the quality of teaching suffered also from "certain rules and regulations governing recruitment, appointments, promotions, tenure, salaries, and transfer of teachers," which all rendered "the problem of recruiting competent teachers more difficult."37

The DP governments attitude toward teachers and teacher-education was perhaps the major element which contributed to the above negative developments. The opening of new schools and the increase in student enrollments were realized in the absence of any advance planning, which directly increased the shortage of teachers and resulted in double-shift operations in many schools, overcrowded classrooms, and the heavy demands made upon the performance of available teachers. Since the professional status of

36Kazamias, loc. cit.

37Ibid., pp. 156-157.
teachers is regulated by the central ministry, the partisan considerations within the government gave way to arbitrary transfers and appointments of teachers, whose morale dropped correspondingly. The intrusion of political considerations into educational affairs also affected the decisions of the individuals who would consider entering teaching profession.  

In the parliamentary debates, the opposition responsibly and realistically criticized the government's attitude toward the issue and pointed out many of the important problems facing the school system. Concerning the problem of teacher-training for secondary-level schools, the following points were heavily emphasized: (1) the existing teacher-training institutions were in no position to provide sufficient number of quality teachers for secondary-level schools, (2) changes in the programs of these institutions were haphazard rather than products of an established governmental policy, (3) because individuals with various backgrounds were employed as teachers, there were serious differences in the way in which school programs were implemented, and (4) the opening of new schools became

38Ibid., pp. 157-158.
a political investment of the governmental party. It was also pointed out that the teachers were under the political pressures and the partisan demands of the DP in power.

Records of the parliamentary debates indicate government leaders were unable to provide satisfactory answers to the above criticisms, as they failed to state any established policy of educational expansion or teacher-training. However, promises continued to be made, which were themselves highly optimistic in the face of realities. The report of the National Commission on Education, which was suppressed and classified as secret by the DP government, stated the situation in secondary education, for example, in the following way:


40 Ibid., XI-47-4 (February 26, 1958), p. 721. This session witnessed a highly heated debate on the problem of the opening of new schools without considering the teacher factor. The session had to be adjourned because of a violent argument that took place among some members of the assembly.

41 See, for example, ibid., IX-48-3 (February 26, 1952), p. 961; and X-46-4 (February 25, 1957), p. 877.
Secondary educational institutions are most in need of attention and speedy reform. Most of these schools are inadequate as far as buildings, furniture, equipment and all kinds of teaching aids are concerned. Above all, teachers and administrative staff of these institutions are generally inadequate in quality and in numbers... it is also a fact that children finishing school under these conditions are well below the desired standard.42

Prior to 1960, the government reacted to such severe charges and criticisms with increasing sensitivity. As this sensitivity extended to other social and economic areas as well, the political atmosphere grew steadily worse, which resulted in the alienation of the intellectuals and educators in general. The 1960 revolution which ousted the DP from power followed.

**Developments in Teacher-Training for Secondary Level Schools Between 1960-1965**

After the 1960 revolution, educational reform was given a high priority by the military and civilian leaders. No major change in the structure and functioning of the educational system was, however, accomplished. The political scene between 1960 and 1965 was characterized by a lack of

42Quoted in Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization, p. 337.
cohesion and strong leadership. Increased fragmentation and ideological polarization in the party system contributed to this situation. As the 1961 elections gave none of the parties a majority in the Assembly, several coalition governments were formed until the 1965 elections. These coalitions refrained from being active on major problems because there was little agreement among the parties on the alternative courses of action in dealing with the issues.

During this five-year period, seven persons served as minister of education, some of them less than three months and none of them long enough to have a strong positive effect on the developments of the various aspects of the educational system. In general, however, problems of education were dealt with on the basis of developmental requirements rather than political considerations. Efforts were made to stabilize the expansion of education in a planned manner. Several studies and reports were published which revealed the major weaknesses and limitations of the school system. Policies and priorities for reforming the educational institutions were developed with an emphasis on rationalization and planning.

During this period the necessity of a considerable expansion in the teacher-training institutions to meet the
secondary school teacher shortage and to bring supply into balance with needs was recognized. The publication of several reports and studies contributed to this understanding. The report of the Mediterranean Regional Project stated, for example, that:

The greatest single obstacle to the expansion of education is the limited supply of secondary teachers. . . . At its present capacity, the educational system can produce a net increase of 34,100 teachers by 1977 for a total of 49,000 required by the end of the period. At this rate, the difference between supply and requirements will be slightly more than 20,000 in 1977. 43

In the report of the Education Commission in 1960, which was convened by the National Unity Committee (NUC) for the preparation of a national education plan, recommendations were made to the government to increase the attractiveness of the teaching profession. According to this report, (1) measures should be taken to provide teachers with a satisfactory standard of living by legislating that teacher salaries be on a parity with salaries of other civil servants, (2) a law should be passed to morally and materially compensate teachers who were working in deprived areas,

43OECD, MRP, p. 113.
(3) evaluation of professional performance of teachers by the ministry should be made objectively, and (4) rules and regulations concerning promotions, transfers, and disciplinary measures should be reviewed and revised. The report also recommended that teachers have the right to form unions and federations.\textsuperscript{44} Concerning teacher-training institutions, the commission's recommendations were mainly related to the expansion of these institutions.\textsuperscript{45}

In the report of the Committee on Teacher-Education, which also prepared a ten-year plan, various issues and problems concerning teacher-training were dealt with. According to this committee, the teacher-training institutes were urgently in need of reform. In the short period of training in these institutes, the students could not be provided with adequate professional preparation to be able to teach more than one subject in middle-level schools. Thus, converting the institutes into education academies was suggested by the committee in order to train middle-level teachers, teachers for normal schools, elementary supervisors, and other education personnel.

\textsuperscript{44}Milli Eğitim Planının Hazırlığı ile... , pp. 41-42.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., pp. 31-32.
The committee found that the existing institutions could not possibly deal with existing problems in training teachers for lycee-level schools. Therefore, these institutions were to be reorganized into faculties of education in universities. It was projected in the report that 33,000 middle school and 5,970 lycee teachers were needed between 1961 and 1970. Drastic measures were to be taken to meet this demand. Thus, in addition to expanding the teacher-training institutions, the committee recommended that university graduates be attracted to teaching profession to serve after a period of on-the-job training.46

Several decisions in relation to the above recommendations were made by the Seventh National Educational Council in 1962. According to these decisions, (1) the term of training in all branches of the teacher-training institutes would be three years, (2) the branches in the institutes would be reorganized as Turkish, history-geography-civics, mathematics-physics, chemistry-biology, and the other original branches, and (3) revisions and improvements should be made in the structure and functioning of the general and technical higher teacher-training schools.47

46*O*ğretmen Yetiştirme Komitesi.* , pp. 54-57, 70-84.
The First Five Year Development Plan which covered the period between 1963 and 1967 made, on the other hand, projections for a fifteen-year period, determined developments to be made and policies to be implemented. Qualitatively, the plan was concerned essentially with a reduction in the high student-teacher ratio at all levels. The plan included measures to deal with problems of teacher-training and teacher shortage. 48

At this point, quantitative developments in the secondary level schools will be considered. Between 1959-1960 and 1964-1965, the number of students in the general middle schools increased from 254,966 to 354,257, and the number of teachers from 10,977 to 14,340; in general lycées, the number of students from 62,368 to 97,935, the number of teachers from 3,860 to 5,259; and in secondary-level vocational and technical schools, the number of students from 98,010 to 162,592, the number of teachers from 7,382 to 10,464. 49 These increases meant a deterioration in the student-teacher ratio from 23 to 24.7 in general middle

48 First Five Year Development Plan, pp. 41ff. See also Gedikoğlu, Kemalist Eğitim İlkeleri, , p. 154.

49 Milli Eğitimde 50 Yıl, 1923-1973, op. cit.
schools, from 16 to 18.6 in general lycees, and from 13 to 15 in vocational and technical schools. This situation was caused by the highly limited expansion of teacher-training institutions during the DP administration. These institutions remained limited in their capacity to graduate students in the early 1960's, because the enrollment capacity of the institutions had not reached the desired level before 1960.

Based on the recommendations of the studies and reports and directions and policies which were provided by the Seventh Educational Council and the First Five Year Plan, the governments of the period between 1960 and 1965 made efforts to improve teacher-training institutions and to deal with the teacher shortage problem. These efforts did not, however, produce any result in the nature of a reform or innovation. Nevertheless, impressive increases in the number of teacher-training institutions and in the number of students enrolled in them were realized. The number of the teacher-training institutes reached ten with an increase in enrollments from 1,267 in 1959-1960 to 3,092 in 1964-1965. In 1964-1965, a total of 1,755 students graduated from the institutes. With the opening of a new one, the three higher teacher-training schools
increased their enrollments during the same period from 153 to 1,216. These schools graduated 144 students in 1964-1965. The enrollments increased in the existing four higher technical teacher-training schools from 917 in 1959-1960 to 1,735 in 1964-1965. The number of graduates from these schools was 276 in 1964-1965.50

The above quantitative developments in the teacher-training institutions could not meet the demand for secondary-level teachers. However, the administration, in its approach to the expansion of teacher-training institutions, recognized that the supply of teachers had to be increased for a healthy expansion at the secondary-level to take place. Unlike previous governmental periods, the availability of quality teachers became an important factor to be considered in opening new schools at this level.

Some other aspects of the issue of teacher-training for secondary-level schools were also paid attention by the governments of this period. In order to raise the educational level in teacher-training, the governments adopted as a policy the opening of faculties of education to train lycee-level teachers and education specialists.  

50 Milli Eğitim Hareketleri, 1942-1972, pp. 60, 63, 72.
Preliminary studies between the ministry of education and the universities were concluded during this period for the opening of three faculties of education in three different universities. The first of these was planned to be opened in Ankara University in 1965.\textsuperscript{51} Regarding raising the income level of teachers, the government worked for the passage of a law\textsuperscript{52} in the Assembly that increased payments to teachers for the extra hours they taught. Also, during this period, teachers were given the right to form professional associations and federations. The governments paid attention to the unjust distribution of teachers in the different regions of the country. Thus, efforts were made to appoint teachers especially to the less-developed eastern provinces.\textsuperscript{53} In transferring the teachers, the ministry made progress in developing objective criteria.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51}Armağan (Ankara: A. Ü. Egitim Fakültesi 10. Yil Yayınları No: 2, 1975), p. VIII; Milli Egitim Bakani Dr. İbrahim... , pp. 19-20

\textsuperscript{52}Law No. 439 (March 12, 1964). For the text of the law, see Sürbahan, ed., Milli Eğitim Mevzuati... , pp. 128-132.

\textsuperscript{53}Milli Eğitim Bakani Dr. İbrahim... , pp. 28, 34. CSTD, Vol. 24/1 (1965), pp. 368-369.

\textsuperscript{54}Interview with İbrahim Öktem.
Several aspects of the government's policy on teachers and teacher-training came under the attack of opposition parties. Members of the conservative parties severely criticized the government and the ministry of education on the following grounds: (1) the student-teacher ratio continued to deteriorate in secondary-level schools, (2) the ministers of education tried to politicize the programs of teacher-training institutions, (3) certain teachers' associations were discriminated against and put under pressure by the ministry for political purposes, (4) subjective criteria were used by the ministry in teacher appointments and transfers, and (5) the ministry tolerated and protected those teachers who represented "extreme" ideologies such as socialism and communism. Even a general discussion was put into effect and held in the Assembly to question the activities and attitude of a minister of education concerning certain educational matters including teachers and teacher-training. This discussion resulted, however, in favor of the minister and the government.55

Despite the existence of opposition and criticisms by the conservative parties, the indications are that the governments of this period based their policies, decisions, and measures on the terms and directions which were provided in the development plan, plans and programs designed for dealing with teacher-training, and the reports and studies presented to the governments.\textsuperscript{56} However, although increases in the number of teacher-training institutions and in the number of students in these institutions were realized, teacher shortage continued to be one of the severe problems of the secondary-level schools. For example, 7,072 teaching positions were reported to be vacant in 1962. In 1963, the needed number of teachers in addition to the available ones was 5,067, and in 1964, 4,448 in the general middle schools. In general lycees, 981 additional teachers were reported to be needed in 1963 and 855 in 1964.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{56}CSTD, Vol. 24/1 (1965), pp. 360-370.

\textsuperscript{57}Figures were obtained on a comparative basis from the reports of the budget commission on education and from the speeches of the ministers of education in BMMTD between 1962 and 1965.
A major contribution of the governments of this period was the creation of an understanding of the importance of teacher factors in educational expansion. With the contribution of several reports, studies, plans and programs, principles and policies were developed and efforts were made to set the initial stage for the coming governments. Whether these principles and policies could be effectively used and improved and progress would be made in teacher problem and in teacher-training would depend on the type of decisions that would be made by the power-holders following the 1965 elections.

The increased fragmentation and ideological polarization in the party system of Turkey after the 1960 revolution had important implications for the educational system. Mainly as a result of this situation, for example, the coalition governments were unable to control a variety of pressures, and thus tended to be reluctant in producing major reforms in the various sectors including education. Therefore, the 1965 elections had to produce strong and positive leadership for the realization of these much needed reforms. The indications, however, were not promising. The elections in 1961 had clearly demonstrated a continuity in voting alignments. The parties (the JP
and the NTP) that were the successors of the old DP both in terms of their personnel and programs had received almost an equal percentage of votes that the DP had received in the 1957 elections. Between 1961 and 1965, the JP made gains by promoting the cause and performance of the DP. In terms of its strategies for political succession and vote maximization, the JP made it clear that it would be highly sensitive to popular pressures once in power. The question remained, however, whether the JP, once in power, would be able to balance political considerations in its policy and developmental requirements.

Developments in Teacher-Training for Secondary-Level Schools During the JP Administration (1965-1971)

Both the 1965 and 1969 elections gave the JP a majority in the Assembly and brought this party into power. The educational section of the governmental program of the JP recognized the problems of teachers and teacher-training. The 1965 program stated that:

Living conditions and material and moral needs of teachers will be paid close attention. . . . In order to meet the teacher need of secondary education, we will take all sorts of measures
to keep the trained personnel in the profession and we will increase the number of schools for the training of teachers.\textsuperscript{58}


The above statistics show that during the JP administration almost no expansion in teacher-training institutions was realized. This had a highly negative effect on secondary schools. In order to have a better understanding of this effect, the expansion of secondary-level schools during this period should be considered. These developments were not related to policies and directions which were determined by the development plans. For example, the First Plan target of 593,000 total enrollments in middle schools for 1972 had to be revised upward in the Second Plan, because the total enrollments in these schools already reached 639,841 in 1968. The same situation characterized the developments in general lycees. The total number of students in these schools reached 152,000 in 1967 instead of 107,000 as projected by the First Plan. Again, projections for

\textsuperscript{59}Milli Eğitim Hareketleri, 1942-1972, loc. cit.
these schools had to be revised sharply upward in the Second Plan. In the case of vocational and technical schools, despite the emphasis on the development of the field at the expense of general training, the targets could not be met because the government failed to realize a balance development rate among the different types of secondary schools. Thus, the projections in the Second Plan were revised drastically downward.\textsuperscript{60}

Thus, limited developments in the teacher-training institutions and irrational developments in secondary schools together resulted in a deterioration of the quality of teaching at this level. The teacher shortage became a severe problem. In the development of the teacher training institutions, the JP government practically disregarded the recommendations and calculations of the planners. The Second Plan had proposed that 4,600 students be admitted to the teacher-training institutes in 1968-1969--only 2,600 were admitted. In 1970-1971, 2,800 students were admitted to the institutes in the same manner, instead of 8,800 as projected by the plan.\textsuperscript{61}

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\textsuperscript{60} See Chap. IV, pp. 207-208.

\textsuperscript{61} Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma... Table 548/b, pp. 712-713.
The available statistics, some of which will be cited below, clearly indicate ways in which quality in secondary education declined as a result of the above mentioned developments. The student-teacher ratio in general middle schools dropped to 27 in 1965-1966, to 30 in 1968-1969, and to 36 in 1970-1971. In general lycees, in the same years, the ratios were 18.5, 23, and 25; and in vocational and technical schools, 16, 15.3, and 16. The deterioration in student-teacher ratios directly effected the percentage of students passing each class in the schools, which was 49 in the middle schools, 55 in general lycees, and 66 in vocational and technical schools by 1971.62 On the other hand, regional differences existed in the distribution of teachers. In middle schools and general lycees, the number of teachers per thousand students in 1970-1971 was 18.1 in the eastern Turkey and 24.8 in the Aegean and southwest regions.63 Also, differences


63 Doğan, Türk Ortaöğretim Sisteminin..., p. 65. On the distribution of teachers in different schools and according to different regions, see Öğretmen Dağılımı (İstanbul: MEB, 1973).
in the number of available teachers in different fields became acute. In 1970-1971, there were 29.7 teachers per thousand students in middle schools and general lycees to teach Turkish, history, geography, and civics; 29.3 to teach mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology; 17.2 to teach foreign languages; 11.1 to teach music, and 15.2 to teach physical education. 64

The above negative developments can be directly related to the JP government's attitude toward educational matters. First, the government did not pay sufficient attention to the policies, recommendations, and calculations of the planners. Second, as had been the case during the DP administration, the JP government conceded to popular pressures without taking into account the requirements of a balanced and healthy development in the school system. Quantitative developments were realized at the expense of quality of education as the government practically attempted to provide schooling to anyone. Third, the JP did not confront the many aspects of its educational policy stated in the governmental programs; thus, a gap existed between the program and performance.

64 Doğan, ibid., Table 3.7, p. 68.
Fourth, political considerations dominated the scene as the government sought to maintain and strengthen its position in power. The needed reforms and changes in various sectors including education could not be undertaken because the party essentially avoided the possible political costs of such reforms and changes. As a result, the pace and direction of the country's development was seriously affected, and the legitimacy of the government came to a point of being questioned.

In addition to the precipitous decline in quality of education, one of the most important consequences of the JP's educational policy was alienation of the teachers. This period witnessed a continuous struggle of a political nature between the government and the large teacher groups represented in professional associations. In general, teachers emerged during the JP administration as a major political force as they sought greater opportunities to exercise power over resolving issues and problems in education as well as in other areas of their concern. The government proved highly insensitive to such activities and tried to undermine the efforts of the teachers by using generally unjustifiable methods. In 1969, the frustration and the alienation of teachers resulted in a four-day
strike sponsored by the two major unions. The 50,000 teachers participating issued a manifesto demanding the following:

(1) education should be freed from foreign influence and reorganized to serve the people; (2) teachers should cease being punished for advocating change; (3) teachers who have lost their positions because of unfair decisions should be reinstated; (4) partisan considerations should cease to influence educational policy; (5) unions should be consulted when educational plans and programs are drawn up; (6) teachers' person and property should be safeguarded; and (7) teachers should be provided with an income adequate to let them lead a civilized life.65

Several thousands of teachers were suspended by the ministry of education which claimed that the activity was illegal. Shortly thereafter, most were reinstated, and the remainder returned to their positions with court orders. During the strike, the minister of education himself threatened the participating teachers through news media, and as one author claimed, the radio (run by the government) was stopped from providing balanced news concerning the event.66

65Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization. . . . , p. 365.

66Gedikoğlu, Kemalist Eğitim İlkeleri. . . . , p. 189.
Actually, it was soon after the JP came to power in 1965 that militant tendencies were observed among the teachers. Also, there existed a considerable tension with and within the ministry of education and the government. The leaders of the government and especially those individuals who served as ministers of education proved highly insensitive to the problems of education in general, and the problems of teachers in particular. One minister said in the Assembly, for example, that:

The teaching profession will be made attractive. How? It will be seen when the results are completely reached. . . . My mind does not comprehend why a teacher should talk about land reform, petroleum law, constitution, social justice, etc.; it is not applicable to a child's level of understanding. I can not tolerate this.67

The same minister said on a different occasion:

The teacher in his relations with the environment cannot make efforts to impose, by siding with a certain political understanding, the daily political issues that are the subject of debate. I want quality, "real" teacher. Those who fall out of this, I have to transfer them, I have to suspend

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67BMMD, II-50-3 (February 19, 1966), speech given by the minister of education Orhan Dengiz, p. 643.
them, and, if the fault is big, I have to expel them. 68

Indeed, the transferring, suspending, and expelling of teachers by the central authority did occur extensively. However, there was little indication of any objective criteria in these actions of the ministry. 69 The minister was describing the situation in secondary education in 1970 as follows:

Secondary education is really in need of reform... In order to reach the targets in the development plans, there is a necessity of bringing certain essential measures. In addition, the orientation toward vocational and technical schools is low. 70

When asked about the JP government's policy of opening schools, the same minister said the following in an interview:

68 Ibid., II-58-2 (February 19, 1967), speech given by the minister of education Orhan Dengiz, p. 510. The two other ministers of education of the period wholeheartedly supported the view expressed in the above statement by Dengiz in the interviews with this investigator. Interviews with İbrahim Ertem and Orhan Oğuz.


70 Ibid., III-88-1 (May 25, 1970), speech given by the minister of education Orhan Dengiz, p. 531.
When I was the minister, citizens came in groups to ask me for the authorization of the opening of schools in their towns. We opened schools. And then, they came back to ask for teachers. We realized that we did not have enough teachers to appoint, and that there had to be something to be done about this problem.\textsuperscript{71}

The above statements clearly indicate that the ability of the ministers of the period and the attitude of the government was not facilitative in terms of resolving the issues and problems of education. In fact, as a result of this inability and the attitude, many of the dysfunctional aspects of the educational system were greatly entrenched. The teaching profession suffered from limited prestige, low income, low morale, and poor and mostly partisan personnel procedures. People without formal preparation for teaching were used.\textsuperscript{72} For example, in middle schools and general lycees in 1970-1971, there was one teacher with the required level of formal training background per 52 students. This ratio was 44 in 1964-1965.\textsuperscript{73} On the other hand, as a result of the problems

\textsuperscript{71}Interview with Orhan Dengiz.

\textsuperscript{72}On the distribution of teachers according to the institutions in which they were trained, see Doğan, \textit{Türk Ortaöğretim Sisteminin...}, pp. 74-81.

\textsuperscript{73}Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma..., p. 697. Kaya, \textit{İnsan Yetiştirme Düzenimiz}, p. 220.
facing the teaching profession, many teachers resigned from the service for better opportunities outside the educational system. According to official sources, about ten thousand teachers from various levels migrated to European countries as workers. 74

It can be concluded that, during the JP administration, the problem of teacher-training for secondary schools, the problems of teachers, and the problems concerning the qualitative aspects of secondary education increased greatly. This situation was directly related to the inability of the government to deal with these problems. Decisions concerning education were made on the basis of political considerations with little regard for consequences or the calculations of the planners.

The March 12 Memorandum and Developments in Teacher-Training for Secondary-Level Schools Between 1971 and 1973

The ouster of the JP from office in March 1971 represented an important new development in Turkish politics. Nihat Erim was appointed as the new prime minister. His

74 Cumhuriyet, October 20, 1971.
cabinet included mainly "technocrats" outside of parliament. The main goal of the Erim government was understood as the implementation of the long-awaited socio-economic reforms and dealing with the activities of the extremist groups.

The program of the Erim government indicated the kinds of educational reforms that were envisaged. The program emphasized that (1) enough quality teachers would be trained to allow for student increases in schools, (2) issues and problems would be dealt with to make teaching profession more attractive, and (3) measures would be taken to insure that teachers would perform their profession in peace and confidence. 75

Study groups were established within the ministry of education with the participation of experts outside the ministry to work out the programs and plans for the realization of changes. These groups were made responsible to (1) determine the existing situation and evaluate the past studies, (2) determine the major issues, and (4) determine the levels and procedures in which the proposed changes would be implemented. 76

75 Egitim Reformu. ... , p. 9.
76 Ibid., p. 11.
Problems concerning teachers and teacher-education were dealt with in most of the study groups. In the studies for the reorganization of secondary education system, changes in the regulations in the pre-service and in-service training of teachers and in teaching responsibilities were proposed. In the specific studies for the realization of the related parts of the government's program stated above, the following areas were focused upon: (1) adjustments in the salaries and promotional ranks of the teachers, (2) payments to teachers for teaching overtime, (3) raising the starting step of teachers in the salary scale, (4) increasing the number of cadres for teaching positions to facilitate the appointment of new teachers, (5) the preparation of national education personnel mutual health and social assistance fund bill, (6) the preparation of a proposed regulation for the governing of recruitment, appointments, and exchange of places among the educational and instructional personnel, and (7) measures to be taken to train teachers in sufficient number and quality.

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77 Ibid., p. 37.
78 Ibid., pp. 49ff.
During the period of Erim government, satisfactory progress was made in areas concerning the problems of teachers. On the training of teachers the ministry set up two commissions to study long and short term needs. The outcome of the studies of these commissions and the efforts of the ministry did not, however, result in any significant change in teacher-training. Problems that characterized the teacher-training institutions and teacher situation in secondary schools continued to exist. No progress was made in terms of expanding these institutions, and of decreasing student-teacher ratios in secondary schools.

Under the political circumstances of the period, none of the major reform proposals of the government had the potential of being realized. As a result of the frustrations of the cabinet members resulting from the blocking of the activities of the government by the conservative parliamentary majority, eleven ministers resigned and brought the government down in December 1971. A second Erim government was formed with more representatives from the parliament. However, parliamentary support was still not sufficient for passage of reform bills.
In April 1972, Erim submitted his resignation. Consequently, two caretaker governments were formed under the premierships of F. Melen and N. Talu. These governments too promised the enactment of various major reforms in the various fields including education. Although the programs of Melen and Talu governments both suggested a program of limited reform (considering the conservative nature of parliamentary majority), they were unable to produce any significant reform originally intended. In short, after the March 12, 1971 memorandum, the imposition of reforms from above was attempted and failed.79

In terms of the topic of this chapter, the situation continued to deteriorate, as it had during the previous governmental periods. However, efforts were made to stabilize the developments in the secondary school system on the basis of the directions provided in the development plan. In middle schools in 1970-1971, the total number of students was 810,983, and the number of teachers, 22,301 with a student-teacher ratio of 36. In 1972-1973, the number of students reached 930,337, and the number of teachers,

teachers 25,572. In that year, the student ratio remained at 36. During the same period, the total number of general lyceee students increased from 253,742 to 293,278, and teachers from 10,136 to 12,364. The change in student-teacher ratio was from 25 to 23.7. In vocational and technical education, the number of students increased from 244,144 to 266,144, the number of teachers, from 15,039 to 15,814. The student-teacher ratio changed from 16 to 16.8. 80

During the period between 1971-1973, the opening of an additional teacher-training institution for lycee-level schools brought the total to six. Also, six new teacher-training institutes were opened. The teacher-training institutions for lycee-level schools enrolled a total of 3,337 students in 1972-1973. The teacher-training institutes in the same year had a total of 8,674 students. 81 The increase in the total number of students in these schools was not significant.

81Küçükahmet, Öğretmen Yetiştiren Kurum... , pp. 15, 17, 44, 47.
Following the 1973 elections, the political scene in Turkey did not permit the emergence of a strong and responsible government. During the RPP-NSP coalition which lasted less than eight months, no major operation was directed toward the teacher shortage problem and toward the issues concerning the structure and functioning of teacher-training institutions for secondary-level schools. However, this coalition demonstrated in its program a good understanding of these issues and problems. Following the resignation of this coalition, the conservative parties (the JP, the NSP, the NAP, and the RP) formed a coalition which lasted until the 1977 elections. The program of this coalition promised that teaching profession would be given importance, and efforts would be made to solve the problems of teachers and to provide opportunities for teachers' professional development.\textsuperscript{82}

During the JP-NSP-NAP-RP coalition, the whole organization of the ministry of education came under political

\textsuperscript{82} Hükümet Programı - 1975, p. 10.
pressures and partisan considerations. Each party in the government actively sought to further its own interest by trying to secure politically expedient decisions from the bureaucracy. As in the case of other ministries, many departments in the ministry of education became the instruments of political decisions.\textsuperscript{83} The result was that once again the primacy of political over developmental requirements characterized governmental affairs. This period witnessed practically no reform concerning teachers and teacher training. The number of teacher-training institutions was increased. However, political parties actively sought to infiltrate their respective ideologies especially among the students of the teacher training institutes. The NAP was most successful in attracting large numbers of students to the party's strongly nationalist, anti-communist, and Pan-Turkish ideals. The sympathizers of this party have engaged in violent activities in and outside of the institutes, which affected the functioning of the institutes greatly. The parties in the coalition placed political pressures on the teachers. In speeches

\textsuperscript{83}See Chap. III, pp. 228-229.
of many governmental leaders and officials, teachers were classified as either nationalists or "non-nationalists." Following the elections in 1977, the conservative coalition was re-formed but this time with the participation of the JP, the NSP, and the NAP. The attitude and approach of the government toward teachers and teacher-training remained the same during the very short time of its service. In December 1977, the government fell and the RPP with the support of the independents came to power in January 1978.

It is clear that the negative developments in the political scene in recent years did not permit the governments and the ministry of education to spend effort in resolving the issues and problems which have long characterized the structure and the functioning of the school system. Although an understanding developed regarding the necessity of finding ways to deal with the acute shortage of teachers and with the problems of teacher-training institutions, almost no progress has been made to realize the changes and reforms that were

84 Interviews with Mustafa Üstünąag, Selçuk Kantarcioğlu, İlhan Özdit, Veysi Muharremoğlu, Sudi Bülbü, Mustafa Aydön, and Ahmet Akgün. Almost everyday, newspapers published news concerning the above matters.
needed and proposed. In recent years, however, there have been impressive increases in the number of teacher training institutions and in the number of students enrolled in them. Recently, it was reported that the number of teacher-training institutes reached 67 and the number of students 111,854. In 1977-1978, 42,745 students were admitted to the institutes. 85

It is also clear that, comprehensive and sustained efforts have to be made by the ministry, national government, and the legislature, if a functional teacher-training system is to be established to meet the demands of secondary level schools. Such a responsibility has not been performed by many governments that stayed in power long enough. The efforts of some governments, on the other hand, could not produce any major achievement due to the political difficulties these governments faced.

Based on the above considerations, it may safely be concluded that the issue of teacher-training for secondary-level schools will remain unresolved until Turkey has a

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85Cumhuriyet, April 17, 1978.
strong and responsible government responsive to the problems of education in this country. Of course, such problems as the availability of resources, capacity of higher education, etc., must also be considered. However, the achievement of a quality educational system depends largely on the quality of the responses that governments will make to urgent educational needs. Therefore, both the long term objectives and the immediate demands have to be studied carefully before decisions are made and implemented.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This chapter is both descriptive and interpretative in that it deals with the implications of the evolution of the selected issues and problems in Turkish education through different governmental periods. The analysis presented in the preceding chapters suggests a number of trends concerning the relationship between education and politics in Turkey from the viewpoint of how the system of political power influences the structure and functioning of the school system. It also indicates that there are highly important areas in that relationship that directly concern those who are responsible and in positions to introduce orderly and planned change into the educational system of Turkey. In order to shed light on these trends and areas, the conceptual scheme which was elaborated in Chapter II will be applied systematically by bringing together the various findings which emerge from this study.
One aspect of the relationship between education and politics in Turkey is that the kinds of educational policies and decisions that are implemented are instigated by the government, or by groups that use the power of the government. The process of aggregating different views concerning education also takes place at the national level of politics. However, the adoption of certain policies and the aggregation of different views become difficult and complicated as a result of the weaknesses and dysfunctionalities which characterize the political system. After 1950, Turkey has not enjoyed the strong and cohesive leadership which has been needed to control the flow of demands from socially and politically mobilized groups. Dynamic tendencies in the socio-economic life have opened a gap between governmental capabilities and loads. Governments, unable to deal effectively with the growing stresses placed upon them, have become responsive to the demands of politically important groups without considering the possible negative consequences of their actions. Such responsiveness has been contributed to by the character of the political parties that have held governmental power. None of the major parties have been ideological or nationwide class parties. Thus, they have
tended to represent the interests of widely overlapping social spectra. This character has resulted in a high degree of flexibility in the parties' policies and decisions, which, in turn, has affected the development of various sectors.

The above factors concerning the governments and the political parties have clearly reflected themselves in the handling of educational problems. The determination of priorities in education and allocation of available resources to different fields of the school system have frequently assumed a political character so that many decisions concerning education have been made on the basis of their political expediency, rather than their educational soundness. For instance, through all the governmental periods, religious education has been consistently an educational issue of high political importance. The spectacular rate of developments in this field has exceeded the development rates in vocational and technical education and in teacher-training for secondary level schools. The rapid expansion of religious education was, however, in no small part a result of the general strategy of the political parties in power to maintain the popular support from the traditional segment of
the population. In a similar manner, the growth of academic secondary institutions has been greater than the growth of vocational and technical schools.

After the establishment of the multi-party system education has been vulnerable to the characteristics of politics, particularly mass politics. It has been difficult to ensure a strong and cohesive leadership that could deal with the substantial instabilities in and aberration of public understanding of education. This situation is analyzed later in this chapter.

Let us now turn to the various dimensions of the conceptual analysis presented in Chapter II of this study. In terms of the socio-political roles and functions of education, certain conclusions emerge. Education is an instrument of the political system in Turkey in the sense that governments regard education as a means to social, economic, and political ends that they espouse. Ideally, national interest in education is interpreted and converted into actual policy decisions by governments. For the political parties, education is an effective tool for furthering their objectives. The nature of developments in education is, thus, dependent in part on the types of goals designed by power holders. In Turkey, the party
and government programs provide general guidelines from which specific policy commitments could be obtained. However, since the establishment of the multi-party system, a dichotomy between the policies and the performances of the governments has been frequently observed. This situation could be related to certain constraints on the functioning of the governments and political parties. Especially to maintain the cohesion of the government and the party, or parties, in power, the leaders have carefully refrained from implementing those policies designed to achieve long term goals. A gap has existed between the policies of the party and the demands of the party's constituency. In setting the objectives of educational plans and programs, a government must take into account the national interest and its own survival. In Turkey, the question of survival has generally dominated the national interest in education during the multi-party period.

As a political entity, the Turkish educational system, as a whole and in its parts, has displayed certain weaknesses and shortcomings. It should be expected that an educational system and its components would responsibly participate in the political process concerning both educational and non-educational matters. Until 1960,
the effectiveness of the educational system as a political entity was at a minimum due to the domination of educational developments by the political system. Since 1960, as a result of planning and rationalization in education, the formation of teachers' unions, etc., a decline followed in the power of political institutions over educational matters. However, the period after 1960 has still witnessed several attempts by the governments to undermine the role of education as a political entity.

When Turkish education is considered as a source of particular social and political outcomes, this study suggests that conflicts have existed among the elements of the political system on the question of which intended outcomes should be realized through the use of the school system. On the various aspects of the three issues studied in the preceding chapters, there has been a continuous struggle among the political parties, between the government and opposition parties, between the legislature and bureaucracy, within the bureaucracy and individual parties. Such a struggle should be considered a healthy sign in Turkish politics for future developments in education. However, this struggle has been characterized since the beginning of multi-party politics by shortcomings in terms of producing significant results.
Another question has to do with the potential of education in producing both intended and not-consciously-intended results which have an impact on the future formation of the power structure. Although confronted with various problems, the governments have made great efforts to expand educational services to all segments of the population. As a result, students in the school system have become increasingly representative of the existing socio-economic classes. However, problems existed in terms of the types of educational opportunities made available to certain population groups. For example, religious schools have mainly enrolled the children of low-income traditional village and small town families. Vocational and technical schools have provided education for those who, generally, could not afford further education. The limitations on student mobility and lack of terminal choices which have essentially characterized these schools are factors impeding the progress of students through the system.

Turkish education can also be analyzed as an arena of competing political and social value systems. After the establishment of the multi-party system, various political elements have tried to have the school system promote
their own views and ideals. This situation was especially evident after the 1960 revolution that gave way to an ideological polarization and increased fragmentation in party politics. The programs and policies of the parties on education have differed from one another in discernible ways. Such differences have even made the formation of governments difficult. For example, when the RPP-NSP coalition was formed in 1974, the RPP had to satisfy the demands of the NSP for a faster expansion in religious education, the reopening of middle-level religious schools, and the introduction of courses on morals into school programs. Also, during the period of the JP-NSP-NAP-RP and the JP-NSP-NAP coalition governments, the participating parties represented different and mostly conflicting educational policies. Each of these parties sought to further its own interest in the school system by trying to put pressures on the civil bureaucracy to secure politically expedient decisions.

The operation of political institutions to affect the school system has been uncontrolled and unregulated. Since the school system could not regulate the input of these external sources by employing systematic processes of educational planning, it has displayed various forms of disorder.
Another dimension of the conceptual scheme presented in Chapter II concerned itself with education and patterns of change in society and government. One aspect of this dimension is that social changes and conditions affect the structure and functioning of education through policy decisions made by the governmental system. However, a government is not expected to rely solely on the demands generated by social changes and conditions, since, in general, public understanding of education is characterized by instabilities and aberrations. A responsible government has a duty of educating the public on appropriate courses of action, instead of merely reacting to pressures. The governments in Turkey have been unable to fulfill this type of a responsibility. Their responsiveness to popular pressures has gone so far in many occasions that the requirements of rapid socio-economic development have not been paid sufficient attention. As a result, while governments have maintained the support of some groups they have lost the confidence of others. The result was the weakening of their legitimacy. Reactions toward governments which have even taken the form of military interventions can be related to this fact. Indeed, both the 1960 and 1973 interventions were in no small part related to negative developments in the school system.
Another aspect of the dimension of education and change patterns in society and government concerns itself with the question of stability in the political system. In Turkey, the entire multi-party period has been characterized by highly frequent changes in government. Including the present-day government, 29 different governments have been formed since 1945. Such a frequency of change in government has directly contributed to the lack of a continuous and responsible administration and to unstable educational planning. This confusion in the educational system has often aroused widespread indignation among the intellectuals.

The last dimension of the conceptual analysis presented in Chapter II dealt with education in different types of political systems and societies. Although Turkey has been engaged in the process of modernization throughout the republican period, the society as a whole has never been reactionary or revolutionary. Reactionary and revolutionary elements have, of course, existed to a certain degree. In the main, however, change and innovation have been introduced by the power elite to the masses. The modern, secular system of education was realized, for example, by a handful of modernizing elites of the early
republican period. During the multi-party period, many changes and innovations have been the product of the governing forces. It should be pointed out, however, that the multi-party system contributed to the effective functioning of modernist, reactionary, and revolutionary elements in the political process. The constant struggle among these elements has greatly affected the direction and pace of educational developments.

In terms of the attitudes of the governments toward change, reform-conservatism has been the characteristic of most governments. Only after the 1960 and 1973 military interventions did radical reformist tendencies characterize the governments formed. The short period after the 1960 revolution observed, for example, drastic methods and uncertain purposes, which did not resolve any major socio-economic problem. After the 1971 intervention, governments were formed to realize reforms in various fields including education. Only a change in the structure and functioning of religious education could be realized. These governments failed in their attempts in other areas of education, because they had to function within the limitations of the political arrangements which had existed before the intervention.
Although reform-conservatism characterized the attitudes of most governments, certain adaptive tendencies have also been observable especially between 1950-1960, 1965-1971, and during the periods of the conservative coalitions formed after the 1973 and 1977 elections. These tendencies reflected themselves especially in the evolution of religious education.

The above considerations clearly suggest that the future course of educational developments in Turkey is largely dependent upon the kinds of responses that the political system will make to educational needs and requirements. The achievement of a stable educational growth and development will enhance the legitimacy of the governments. Governments have to realize that some unpopular measures have to be taken in order to achieve long term goals in education. Also, some immediate public demands may have to be satisfied to avoid the loss of crucial popular support. However, the governments should carefully study all aspects of such demands which may have the potential of producing educational and political difficulties in the long run. In Turkey, the governments and leaders during the multi-party period have generally lacked an understanding of the above considerations. Undoubtedly, educators have also lacked
an understanding of the crucial relationship between education and politics. A great deal of change and innovation in the structure and functioning of the educational system has come from outside the profession of education.

Thus, educators must constantly examine the control of education in the society and the affects of that control on the structure and functioning of the school system. They must also understand that ineffective political activity on their part will contribute to the continuity of problems which have characterized the relationship between education and politics since the establishment of the multi-party system.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Mr. Metin Alkan was born on May 27, 1949 in Kuşadası, Turkey. He attended Eğirdir and Senirkent elementary schools, Senirkent middle school, and Bolvadin high school. Upon his graduation from high school, Mr. Alkan enrolled in the Faculty of Education at Ankara University. He graduated from the educational administration, planning, and economics branch of this faculty in 1970. In 1970-1971, he worked as the head of the study and planning group in the Training Center of PTT (Poste, Telephone, and Telegram) organization in Turkey.

In 1971, Mr. Alkan passed a statewide competitive exam and was awarded a state scholarship to do doctoral study abroad. He came to the United States in 1972, and attended the English Language Institute of the University of Florida and the American Language Program of Columbia University. He was admitted to the graduate school of the University of Florida in 1973.

During his doctoral studies, Mr. Alkan majored in the field of curriculum and instruction.
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Education.

Arthur J. Lewis, Chairman
Professor of Education

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Education.

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