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Soldiers from the states and the nation who were involved in the American Civil War are remembered in a ceremony at the National Infantry Museum in Georgia on Saturday, April 13, 2013. The ceremony honored the 150th anniversary of the start of the war, which began on April 12, 1861. (AP Photo/Rainier Ehrhardt)

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ABOUT THE COVERS
The front cover shows the Hong Kong garrison of the People's Liberation Army on parade (AP/Wide World Photo). The table of contents shows (left to right) Chinese military honor guard welcoming the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Ministry of Defense in Beijing (U.S. Air Force/D. Myles Cullen); SM-3 standard missile fired from USS Decatur to intercept a ballistic missile launched from Hawaii (U.S. Navy); and amphibious assault vehicle rolling ashore during training at the Pacific missile firing range (U.S. Navy/Prince A. Hughes III). The back cover shows (clockwise from top) a Special Operations Soldier being hoisted into HH-60G Pave Hawk during search and rescue exercise (99th Expeditionary Rescue Squadron/Kevin J. Grummwald); Soldiers unloading trucks from C-5 Galaxy aircraft (181st Fighter Wing/John S. Chapman); Marines of the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force decontaminating after participating in Exercise Ardent Sentry (U.S. Marine Corps/Leslie Palmer); and USCGC Mustang escorting the Navy's Military Sealift Command Henry J. Kaiser into the port of Seward, Alaska (U.S. Coast Guard).


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Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today.
Joint Force Quarterly bids fair winds and following seas to its publisher, General Peter Pace, whose integrity and devotion to academic freedom have made this journal more widely read and referentially cited than ever before. For those who have noted the absence of the traditional opening article, “From the Chairman,” know that it was General Pace himself who insisted that no ghost writers be enlisted to emphasize his presence as publisher. Instead, through this absence, he encouraged contributors to take issue with traditional ways of doing business and to offer critical analyses of strategy and policy. As a result, JFQ receives more unsolicited manuscripts and is larger in size than at any time in its 14-year history.

JFQ also wishes to acknowledge the generous support of the National Defense University Foundation, who made it possible to award the winning essay contest authors included in this issue for articles of exceptional quality. And, as noted elsewhere in this issue, 20 professors from the professional military educational institutions convened May 22–23, 2007, to judge JFQ articles from calendar year 2006, selecting the four most influential articles for awards totaling $4,500, again provided through the support of the Foundation.

The JFQ staff would like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focuses. The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for specific upcoming issues:

- **December 1, 2007** (Issue 49, 2nd quarter 2008): Focus on Air and Space Power
  - U.S. Special Operations Command

- **June 1, 2008** (Issue 51, 3rd quarter 2008): Weapons of Mass Destruction
  - National Security Council

- **March 1, 2008** (Issue 50, 3rd quarter 2008): Focus on Naval Power
  - U.S. Central Command

- **September 1, 2008** (Issue 52, 1st quarter 2009): Border Issues, Migration, Drug Interdiction
  - U.S. Transportation Command

JFQ readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the So what? question. That is, how does your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the reader’s professional understanding or performance? Speak to the implications from the operational to the strategic level of influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be interesting if presented with care!

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Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.)
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**CORRECTION**

In JFQ 46 (3rd Quarter 2007), the initialism C4 was incorrectly defined in Steven M. Anderson and Douglas A. Cunningham’s “Log-centric Airbase-opening Strategies in Korea.” In the article, C4 denotes the logistics section of the combined U.S.-Korea staff, not command, control, communications, and computers.
The recently revised Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02A, Joint Doctrine Development System, set forth new guidance to provide warfighters with effective and accurate doctrine through a more expeditious change process and more timely revisions. Five recently approved revisions include Joint Publication (JP) 3–03, Joint Interdiction, JP 3–05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, JP 3–15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare Operations, JP 3–35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and JP 3–60, Joint Targeting. From new doctrinal treatment of unmanned aircraft systems, special operations targeting and mission planning, improvised explosive device defeat, and “force visibility,” to the recent change to “deliberate” and “dynamic” categories of targeting, relevance and timeliness are the goals.

The latest version of JP 3–03 added a considerable amount of new material. The additions included discussion of interdiction in joint operations, U.S. Coast Guard and maritime interception operations, riverine operations, joint interdiction planning, operational area geometry and coordination, and coverage of the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan. It also introduced the terms strike coordination and reconnaissance, unmanned aircraft, and unmanned aircraft system to joint doctrine.

The revision of JP 3–05.1 subsumed the former JP 3–05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning. JP 3–05.2 is no longer part of the joint doctrine hierarchy. This publication reflected the change from special operations missions and collateral activities to "core tasks" and updated special operations joint doctrine. Furthermore, it clarified joint special operations task force command and control relationships and included more discussion on special operations forces and conventional forces integration.

JP 3–15 added numerous appendices pertaining to mobility and countermobility capabilities, mining capabilities and countermeasures (it removes the term countermining), and improvised explosive device defeat. It adds the terms explosive hazard, humanitarian mine action, and obstacle intelligence. This publication also modified definitions of the terms barrier, denial measure, mine, and obstacle.

JP 3–35 consolidated the former JP 4–01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, into its recent version. Deployment and redeployment operations introduced key entities in the synchronization and optimization of deployment and distribution operations—the U.S. Transportation Command deployment distribution operations center and combatant command joint deployment distribution operations center. Of note, it introduced deployment and redeployment operations in the conduct of homeland defense and civil defense.

JP 3–60 changed the major categories of targeting from planned and immediate to deliberate and dynamic. Subsequently, it posed the relationship that deliberate targeting manages planned targets, and dynamic targeting manages targets of opportunity. It also changed the names of Phase 1, 2, and 6 in the joint targeting cycle to end state and commander's objectives, target development and prioritization, and assessment, respectively.

The information above highlights only some of the key changes regarding these recent revisions. Revision continues in earnest. By December 2007, 65 percent of the joint publications will be less than 3 years old. Of note, during the May 2007 Joint Doctrine Planner’s Conference, the joint doctrine development community unanimously voted in favor of drafting two new joint doctrine publications: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism. Both are currently in production.

By C. V. Christianson

The joint force commander—and by extension, his logisticians—requires timely, accurate, and relevant information to make effective decisions. This requirement is especially critical in the joint logistics environment (JLE). The joint logistics community must continuously execute processes, effectively coordinate the allocation of limited resources, and clearly understand the supported joint commanders’ requirements across the broad range of military operations. To execute these functions effectively and efficiently, joint logisticians must have visibility.

This article serves as a reference point for discussion, a framework for concept development, and an integrating tool for the countless efforts across the Department of Defense (DOD) and industry to improve logistics visibility in the broadest and most holistic sense. Focusing specifically on the JLE, this article proposes a definition of visibility, highlights key issues and concepts for consideration, and offers ideas for future efforts based on an understanding of where we believe the most pressing requirements for visibility lie within the joint logistics environment. It is clear that complete system-wide access to all information is not attainable or even desirable. Given this fact, this article offers a framework that describes in broad terms the kind of visibility required by different elements within the JLE.

Current definitions of visibility focus almost entirely upon asset visibility. In order to provide effective logistics support across the operating environment, joint logisticians must “see” more than just assets. They must fully understand the requirements for logistics support (who needs what?), as well as the resources available (what do I have to work with?) arrayed to meet those requirements. Logisticians must also be able to monitor joint logistics performance within the JLE. Without this kind of knowledge, the logisticians cannot plan or execute effectively or efficiently.

Logistics visibility is best defined as access to logistics processes, resources, and requirements to provide the knowledge necessary to make effective decisions.

Processes are defined as a series of actions, functions, or changes that achieve an end or result. Multiple processes occur across and within the JLE, such as depot repair, patient movement, force deployment, and delivery of contingency contract support. Before we can effectively develop visibility applications, we must clearly understand the end-to-end processes that deliver an outcome for the joint force. Mapping these processes is critical to knowing where and when to place visibility “sensors” to give us the knowledge we need to enable the effective delivery of those joint outcomes.

Resources can be summarized using the term total assets, defined as the aggregate of units, personnel, equipment, materiel, and supplies brought together to generate and support joint capabilities and their supporting processes. We must be able to see Service component, multinational, and other logistics assets in a way that provides integrated resource visibility to the joint warfighter.

Requirements are defined as what the joint force needs to accomplish its mission. Requirements can originate from anywhere and can result in a tasking for anyone in the JLE. Requirements also change over time based on plans, current operations, and a changing environment.

Collectively, visibility of processes, resources, and requirements comprise the information that logisticians need to accomplish their mission; without each of these elements, they cannot apportion resources and prioritize effort. Logistics visibility provides the ability to plan, synchronize, and monitor operations and processes to optimize outcomes. The ultimate effect we are trying to achieve is sustained logistics readiness.

Some think that the objective for visibility should extend across the entire

Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, USA, is the Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff.
logistics domain and should include complete real-time access for everyone within the system. While it is true that every aspect of the enterprise must be visible to planners, operators, or managers at some level, it is also clear that not everyone needs to be able to see everything all the time. At some point, too much information may be a hindrance and can actually detract from effective decisionmaking. Consequently, there are several key questions that a high-level consideration of visibility should address: Who among the JLE needs visibility, and why do they need it? What do they need to see? And, finally, where do they need visibility? These questions have significant implications for systems design, operational planning and execution, and resource allocation.

Who Needs Visibility and Why? The answer to this question is fairly straightforward. Everyone within the JLE has a requirement for some type of visibility for a variety of reasons. However, the ultimate purpose of our effort to achieve better visibility resides at the tactical level, where operational requirements form the basis of all our efforts. Our customer is at the tactical level.

The joint force commander’s (JFC’s) ability to execute his directive authority for logistics is completely dependent upon visibility. Without visibility into the JLE processes, resources, and requirements, the JFC cannot effectively integrate Service component capabilities to achieve mission objectives.

The joint logistician is responsible for matching resources against anticipated requirements to provide supportability assessments to the JFC. The supportability assessment tells us if the JFC’s operational concept can be sustained. In addition, as operational requirements change, the joint logistician’s ability to reassign resources rapidly against requirements is directly tied to visibility and is therefore invaluable to the JFC.

Services are responsible for delivering ready forces and equipment to the JFC. At the strategic level, this mission demands different information and uses different processes than at the operational or tactical levels. For the Services to accomplish missions, they also need visibility of the JFC requirements to ensure delivery of the right forces and equipment for mission accomplishment. The Services also need visibility into the processes that support theater component efforts.

Planners and decisionmakers at the DOD staff level require visibility to provide responsive and relevant policy guidance and to ensure that DOD strategic resources are applied appropriately to meet all JFC requirements. Their goal is to ensure resources are utilized to achieve outcomes that are both effective and efficient.

Our interagency, multinational, and commercial mission partners require visibility of processes, requirements, and resources necessary to support their participation in our operations.

Ultimately, we need to develop or enhance systems, processes, and tools for improving visibility in a manner that supports each of these user requirements.

What Do We Need to See? The answer to this question depends on one’s position within JLE—what the end user wants to see is different from what the manufacturer, supplier, or distributor wants to see. Each player in the JLE tends to see his visibility requirement as the visibility requirement for everyone. Our challenge is to provide the right kind of visibility across a complex environment, to the right user, at the right time. Below are listed the key areas where we need specific types of visibility.

Process visibility provides process owners and decisionmakers the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of a particular process: “Are we delivering what’s expected?” The deployment/redeployment process, the force reception process at a major port, or the depot repair processes are all parts of a system of systems that rely upon visibility for its effectiveness. Joint logisticians and process owners require visibility to enable effective control and to allow the optimization of processes against a desired outcome.

Resources must be visible by item, person, or unit individually or in some form of aggregation. In some cases, visibility by a discrete individual identity such as a serial number, lot number, national stock number, social security number, or unit identification code is required. Some individuals or items are so uniquely important—strategically, operationally, and tactically—that, by their very nature, they require real-time, 100-percent visibility across the logistics enterprise. Examples might include fissionable material, human remains, or vaccines. In other cases, visibility of items, persons, or units in some form of aggregation is necessary to determine the status of a particular capability and its ability to achieve the JFC mission. Examples might include a specific
force module, a port opening capability, or a medical treatment capability.

Requirements must also be visible by item, person, or unit individually or in some form of aggregation. Ultimately, visibility of requirements is necessary to initiate supporting efforts across the JLE. In most cases, the JFC is responsible for defining those requirements. The Services, supporting combatant commands, and Defense agencies need visibility of those requirements to better support the joint force commander’s mission. DOD must have visibility over those requirements to ensure resources are used effectively and efficiently.

Where Is Visibility Needed? As noted previously, the answer to this question depends upon where one sits. End-users will want to know when they will receive their items and be less concerned about every step along the way. Broadly stated, visibility can be applied while elements are in-transit, in-storage, in-process, or in-use. These terms broadly describe visibility needs in terms of the item’s location in the JLE. But there are still other factors we must consider.

Although we have specified visibility in terms of who needs to see what and where he needs to see it, in practice there are no clear lines of delineation between different levels and activities with regard to visibility requirements. Moreover, visibility priorities and needs may change over time or across the phases of an operation. For example, planners might see joint force requirements as their most critical need, while during the sustainment phase of an operation, available resources might take precedence. During the initial phases of expeditionary operations, visibility of processes might be the greatest need to ensure that limited resources are optimized as planned. That said, each of the three elements of visibility—processes, resources, and requirements—is needed to make effective decisions.

Even though there may be near-unanimous agreement that the single greatest gap in the world of defense logistics is visibility, there are several barriers that inhibit efforts to enhance and share it. First, authoritative data are not always available to the joint logistician. The only thing worse than having no data is having two sets of data, and our inability to provide trustworthy data impedes quality decisionmaking. Second, it is unlikely that we will have unity of command over the entire spectrum of joint logistics. One of our major challenges, then, is to achieve unity of effort without unity of command. This is a particular issue as we share, process, and integrate information across different commands, agencies, systems, and processes to develop a common operating picture. Another major dilemma is how to ensure adequate security for sensitive information while simultaneously offering the maximum possible transparency and ease of access to all members of the community. Operational partners—both within DOD and without, including international friends and allies—need to have confidence that their information will be handled properly by our systems.

It is difficult, yet essential, to address the way ahead for senior logistics managers, planners, and system developers to enhance visibility for everyone within the JLE, allocate resources, and focus efforts to best achieve that effect. From our perspective, we see four areas for major improvements to visibility:

- **Map the processes.** Understand, define, and document the processes within the
JLE—leverage the work ongoing with the Joint Logistics Portfolio Management Test Case and U.S. Transportation Command (the distribution process owner). Use the base realignment and closure initiative to further our understanding of the defense supply chain and develop an integrated process as an outcome from that effort.

- **Identify existing visibility capabilities.** Continue to leverage efforts already under way within the distribution process owner and other activities. Document and integrate those existing or emerging efforts that best contribute to increased logistics visibility. We must align visibility capability requirements with our process mapping to eliminate redundancies and gaps.

- **Develop a JLE data architecture.** Under Defense Information Systems Agency lead, define the data framework, identify authoritative data sources, and influence and guide the joint logistics community’s network-centric data strategy efforts. Our goal is to develop a JLE Data Architecture Campaign Plan.

**Deliver a joint logistics application (Global Combat Support System–Joint).** This application should enable visibility for the joint logistician and facilitate visibility across the JLE. Ensure that Global Combat Support System–Joint provides an effective work environment to turn data into information and enhances the ability of the joint logistician to plan and execute joint logistics operations.

Visibility is not an end in and of itself but a means to make better decisions, gain efficiencies, and improve effectiveness across the JLE. It is also an objective that we will continually strive toward; as our environment continues to change, there will always be additional information requirements or demands for enhanced timeliness and accuracy. As logisticians, we continually strive to improve the quality of our decisions and optimize the logistics readiness of the joint force. Enhanced visibility will lead to increased logistics readiness and improved user confidence.

We are all partners in delivering visibility across the JLE, and we all have a critical role to play in helping to deliver sustained logistics readiness to the JFC. The logistics community and those who interact with us must work together to develop this capability to enhance support to the JFC and above all to the Servicemembers who depend on us. **JFQ**

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**NOTE**

1 *In-transit* refers to assets being shipped or moved from origin (such as commercial vendors, units, storage activities, or maintenance facilities) to a destination (such as units, storage activities, or maintenance facilities). *In-storage* refers to assets stored at unit, DOD or commercial sites, and disposal activities. *In-process* refers to assets acquired from sources of supply, but not yet shipped, or assets repaired at intermediate- and depot-level organic or commercial maintenance facilities. *In-use* refers to those items used for their intended purpose.
Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate

By JOHN S. PRAIRIE and FRANK X. REIDY

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, is the designated agency within U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to conduct joint special operations education. It is responsible for courses that cover necessary material that is either not provided elsewhere or not provided when required by the special operations forces (SOF) community. As of February 2007, JSOU began offering a Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate (JSOWC).

The JSOWC program is an intensive, SOF-focused educational curriculum that prepares special operations warriors and enablers for assignment to joint special operations duty positions. This program is designed to provide the individual with the principles of joint operations while focusing on the key concepts of joint special operations. Within this program, three specific courses will concentrate on formulating and integrating U.S. national strategy, resources, and planning at the strategic level; conducting joint special operations collaborative planning at the operational level; and providing a thorough understanding of the current irregular warfare environment.

Supporting the USSOCOM Capstone Concept for Special Operations, JSOWC is designed to meet joint special operations education requirements that have not been traditionally provided at Service schools, career advancement schools, or military occupational specialty training. The curriculum is subdivided into three distinct course modules:

- Module 1: Strategic Thinking for Special Operations Forces Planners Course
- Module 2: Irregular Warfare Course
- Module 3: Joint Special Operations Collaborative Planning Course

While the modules are mutually supporting, each is independent and may be taken in any sequence based on the individual’s availability. Completing all three modules qualifies the student for the certificate.

The courses in the certificate program build on the lessons learned from recent operations, emphasize operational art, and include rigorous academic materials. Module 1 will be offered October 15–26, 2007, and again April 7–18, 2008. This module will concentrate on national policy, strategy, and strategic-level planning. Module 2 will be offered January 7–18, 2008, and again June 9–20, 2008. This module will focus on terrorism, theory of insurgencies, counterinsurgency practices, and historical case studies. Module 3 will be offered October 29–November 9, 2007; March 10–21, 2008; and August 11–22, 2008. This module will feature planning and tools essential for joint SOF staff planning and will conclude with a comprehensive exercise.

The certificate is for SOF personnel at midcareer. It is designed for those personnel preparing for, en route to, or assigned to their first joint SOF headquarters at a theater special operations command, the USSOCOM Center for Special Operations, or joint force headquarters. The intended students are special operations senior noncommissioned officers (E–6 through E–9), warrant officers (W–1 through W–4), and commissioned officers (O–2 through O–4).

The idea for the certificate program has been 2 years in development. During fiscal year 2005, JSOU completed an educational requirements analysis. A key finding in that study noted that neither USSOCOM, nor Service, nor joint professional military education institutions are sufficiently preparing midlevel SOF leaders at the appropriate times in an individual’s career for the operational or strategic challenges of the war on terror. The JSOWC program is just the first initiative intended to elevate the JSOU curriculum and to make progress toward USSOCOM’s educational goals while remaining aligned with joint and component training institutions. Through this program, JSOU will deliver personnel who will be better positioned to contribute to the war on terror mission to the USSOCOM Center for Special Operations, theater special operations command staffs, and other joint force headquarters.

Seats are limited to 20 students per course, so register now via the JSOU Web site at <https://www.hurlburt.af.mil/jsou/>, and monitor the JSOU page for updates. Please direct questions to Lieutenant Colonel John Prairie at DSN 579–4328 or commercial 850–884–4328. JFQ
Letters to the Editor

To the Editor: As Chief of the Strategic Leadership Division and U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Proponent, I read with interest Colonel Timothy Shea’s highly critical article on the George C. Marshall Center (Issue 46, 3rd quarter 2007). I will leave it to the Marshall Center to answer the large part of Colonel Shea’s critique; however, I feel that it is necessary to respond to the small section of that article that specifically addressed FAO training at the Marshall Center.

Colonel Shea states that the Army FAO training program at the Marshall Center retains a “Cold War legacy approach” and is failing to progress to in-country training opportunities that already exist in Russia, Ukraine, and other locations. The article fails to identify our current focus on expanding training opportunities in-country and the fact that Army FAOs began conducting in-country training in Ukraine and Russia in August 2007, with more slated for 2008 and beyond.

Colonel Shea is correct to point out that in-country training programs offer new FAOs (with their families) complete language immersion and regional travel. The Army FAO Proponent Office, within the Army Directorate of Strategy, Plans and Policy, has defined core competency requirements that each FAO intern is expected to achieve in-country: regional experience and knowledge, U.S. policy goals and formulation, language, military-to-military experience, U.S. military involvement, and U.S. Embassy administration. Each in-country training site is evaluated by FAO regional managers, often former Defense Attachés or Office of Defense Cooperation Chiefs, to ensure it meets these core competencies. Each year the FAO Proponent Office holds regional conferences to evaluate and discuss current in-country training programs with the host Embassies, geographic combatant command, and others. The next Europe and Eurasian FAO regional conference is scheduled for late November 2007 in Moscow with the intent of highlighting the expanding Eurasian program.

While I concur with Colonel Shea’s primary point of expanding in-country training opportunities for Eurasian FAOs, I would like to comment on the current program at the Marshall Center. My office closely monitors and manages the Eurasian FAO Program at the Marshall Center. While based there, Eurasian FAOs spend the majority of their time on multiple 30- to 90-day in-country training assignments in Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Often these Eurasian FAOs conduct longer, vitally important in-country programs, such as training and then deploying with Georgian units to Iraq. The Marshall Center provides language training support and courses that help a FAO achieve core competency requirements.

Colonel Shea states that FAO skills atrophy at the Marshall Center, citing Defense Language Proficiency Test (DPLT) scores since 2002. However, our review shows that since 2002, 96 percent of all new FAOs trained at the Marshall Center either maintained or improved their DLPT scores.

In August 2007, one FAO arrived in Ukraine and one in Moscow for 12 month in-country training. In July 2008, the number will increase to two in Moscow. We are currently evaluating additional opportunities in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and other countries within the Eurasian FAO geographic region. Opening these sites is consistent with the Army’s constant review and adjustment of FAO training to meet a changing security environment. It is also just one part of training Army “Pentathletes” who are capable of handling multiple complex tasks across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Army FAOs play a critical and successful role in a wide variety of vital foreign policy and national security positions. The Army’s training and utilization of Foreign Area Officers is the example that other Services use to stand up their own programs. We believe that the in-country training program is an essential piece to ensure a FAO’s success in future operational assignments. The changing security environment requires constant evaluation and debate to adapt our training to meet new challenges. The Army FAO Proponent Office welcomes the debate and this opportunity to present an update and clarification of our program.

—COL Steven F. Beal, USA
Chief, Army FAO Proponent Office

To the Editor: Every organization stands to improve itself when subjected to objective internal and external reviews and critiques of its practices, policies, and operations. That said, untruths, false allegations, and misperceptions, in light of hard evidence to the contrary, only serve the interest of those who wish to advance a narrow personal agenda. This letter to the readers and editors of Joint Force Quarterly objects strongly to the inaccurate, incoherent, and inconsistent assertions in Colonel Timothy Shea’s article, “The George C. Marshall European Center: Proven Model or Irrelevant Prototype?” published in JFQ Issue 46, 3rd quarter 2007.

For the record, after having seen a draft of this article late last year, I personally invited Colonel Shea in December 2006 to visit the Marshall Center to see first-hand what we are doing, how our programs had evolved, and how we are in tune with German and American defense policymakers on priorities and direction. Colonel Shea declined this invitation.

Colonel Shea’s article was particularly disturbing in light of the damaging and inaccurate picture that it presents of the German-American partnership that underpins the Marshall Center. It is simply not true that “each time the United States presents its opinion on an issue, the alternate German point of view is presented to the audience.” Our video recordings of the hundreds of lectures delivered at the Marshall Center in recent years will prove to anyone who takes the time to review them that this statement is nonsense. The German-American partnership at the Marshall Center is based on the common values we share—it is not a high school debate between opposing sides. We do not seek a watered-down consensus, but encourage informed and in-depth examination of complex 21st-century security issues. The German government deserves appreciation for its generous and farsighted support of the Marshall Center, not the petty sniping in which Shea indulges. And while we are talking about the value of partners, we should not overlook the fact that the governments of Canada, Switzerland, Austria, France, and Croatia all choose to provide a fully qualified faculty member to the Marshall Center at their expense, enriching our curriculum and enhancing cultural awareness.

It is not my intent here to parse the many inaccurate and misleading statements found throughout the article; however, three glaring inaccuracies require a brief rebuttal.
First, I must challenge the undocumented and gratuitous comments about the quality of the military officers and government officials who participate in Marshall Center courses and programs. Since 2004 alone, 186 Marshall Center graduates from 30 nations have served or are currently serving in government positions at the levels of minister, deputy minister, ambassador, member of parliament, or chief of defense for their countries. Fifty-two of these graduates hold or previously held positions as ministers or deputy ministers, to include two prime ministers.

The Marshall Center’s ability to effect change through its alumni is not limited to those graduates now in top-level positions. In 2006, as an especially noteworthy example, several midlevel counterterrorism professionals from different African countries—graduates of the Marshall Center’s Program on Terrorism and Security Studies—used the personal relationships they had formed here to foil a planned terrorist attack on a major sports event in Egypt. The information-sharing that led to the arrest of the terrorists would never have happened without the network of trust and the intellectual interoperability created at the Marshall Center.

Secondly, the Shea article unfairly targets not only our German partners and the Marshall Center alumni but also the dedicated faculty and staff of the Marshall Center itself. The allegation that there is an “absence of politico-military expertise at the Center” is ludicrous. The Marshall Center faculty is made up of distinguished academic experts as well as experienced military officers with backgrounds in security issues including terrorism, defense reform, stability operations, homeland security, and conflict resolution. Check our Web site and you will easily see what I am talking about. Our professors range from a former commander of a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan to former Ambassadors and general officers to tenured professors from distinguished American universities.

Finally, I must take exception at Shea’s outrageous allegation that the “absence of priority countries such as Russia—which has not elected to participate seriously—reflects a disturbing trend in the suspect pool of graduates in recent years.” Candidates for Marshall Center programs are identified by U.S. and German embassies, working with host nation defense and foreign ministries in international capitals. Since Colonel Shea’s arrival in the Embassy in Moscow in the summer of 2005, the number of Russian nominations for Marshall Center programs has dropped by over 50 percent. Perhaps one should seek an explanation from a client country team other than the U.S. Embassy in Moscow as to this anomaly regarding Russian participation, since over the same period we have seen a rise in student numbers from many former Soviet republics—most notably Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia.

In the battle of ideas—which is the greatest challenge we face—our “weapons” are our values. How then can programs that are the cornerstone of the Marshall Center—programs that address democracy, rule of law, and respect for human dignity—be characterized as irrelevant? Objective observers do not come to that conclusion.

On a final note, Colonel Shea’s article distracts from the real challenge facing the Marshall Center and the four other Department of Defense (DOD) regional centers, and that is remaining focused on accelerating global change, combating the strong anti-American attitudes that have hurt our international standing, effectively offsetting ideological support for terrorism, and influencing national and regional perceptions of contemporary security issues. The five U.S. DOD regional centers are worth their weight in gold. We are not only building professional relationships among our friends and allies but also interacting with international partners who are actively seeking to understand, address, and solve the most complex defense and security issues that we collectively face as a community of nations. The regional centers are setting the conditions upon which we just might achieve peace, stability, security, and economic growth for generations to come.

—John P. Rose, Ph.D.
Director, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

NATO Symposium

NATO: Meeting the Challenges of the New Security Environment?
February 20–21, 2008

For nearly six decades, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the central organizing point of transatlantic security. After the Cold War, questions were raised regarding the relevance, usefulness, and future viability of the Alliance. Through expansion and a series of transformations, NATO has evolved and perhaps even been strengthened. General Bantz Craddock, Commander, U.S. European Command, recently remarked, “NATO has transitioned from a defense alliance to a security-focused alliance.” This shift marks a lessening emphasis on national survival and the impetus for cooperation and action. Common security interests and assessments of threats will ultimately determine the Alliance’s ability to serve as the bulwark against the challenges of the future security environment. Rather than the very clear focus on defending against the Warsaw Pact, NATO’s current focus is on creating conditions that maintain the peace, foster regional security cooperation, and promote capacity-building efforts to strengthen the Alliance.

Topics will include:

- Alliance commitment in Afghanistan
- capacity-building and shared risk/commitments
- cooperation on missile defense
- member agreements on external issues, such as the crisis in Darfur
- NATO and European Union security policy/cooperation
- NATO’s continuing role in Balkan security and stability operations
- role and value of NATO involvement in the Black Sea region.

Information is available at www.ndu.edu/inss. Click on “Conferences.”
Executive Summary

In time another power will supersede America in technology, wealth and power. At the moment China is building a high-seas fleet that one day may challenge America’s ability to influence events in the Far East. The trick will be to manage competition, and bring China ever closer into our accepted system of international norms rather than indulging in counterproductive hostility. The Navy is an indispensable guarantor of peaceful, strategic order, and because it doesn’t require a physical presence ashore it can, in Theodore Roosevelt’s words, “speak softly” but still “carry a big stick.”

—H.D.S. Greenway

Our second Forum article is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Essay Competition finalist whose author laments U.S. strategic neglect of Africa. Colonel Philippe Rogers, USMC, argues, as did Colonel Gordon Magenheim, USAR, in the 2nd Quarter 2007 JFQ, that China's strategic behavior in Africa is tailored both to “increase its influence and limit [the influence] of the United States.” Pointing to the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States, Colonel Rogers asserts that the U.S. Government has no coherent overarching strategy for Africa. He further underlines the relative disadvantage of the United States in the competition for influence by arguing that China is willing and able to offer financial aid with no moral strings attached. This behavior undercuts international incentives to induce reform and gains China access to resources and influence. It also serves to perpetuate conditions that fuel the war on terror, with Sudan and Zimbabwe as prime examples. The author outlines a number of steps to counter Chinese influence in Africa and concludes with three key benefits of such a strategy.

The third Forum offering focuses on what many consider the most technologically demanding branch of any country’s armed forces, in this case, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF’s modernization campaign has been under way for 15 years, but it still has far to go before it can fight and win against a high-tech enemy. Dr. Phillip Saunders and Erik Quam attempt to predict the future force structure of the PLAAF by exploring various ways of thinking about its role within overall Chinese military modernization plans and the part that it will play in future People’s Liberation Army missions. They begin with a breakdown of the current PLAAF order of battle and how it is evolving to meet future requirements. They subsequently examine the potential influences and missions that the Party-state will weigh in the course of this iterative modernization effort. As in the air forces of all militarily significant countries, the future PLAAF will be smaller but more capable.

The fourth Forum entry comes from a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Dr. Evan Medeiros argues that China’s
activism is altering but not transforming the conduct of its international relations. Moreover, China’s claim that it is committed to a harmonious world is “insufficient to explain the multiplicity of Chinese diplomatic strategies, interests, and actions.” The author models China’s international behavior by describing five layers of interest and perceptions, which are informed by three strategic priorities and three historic lenses. He paints a picture of increased reliance on foreign sources of economic resources to fuel domestic growth and promote social stability for the ultimate purpose of ensuring oligarchic rule. He concludes with four implications for U.S. policymakers and the view that there is time and space to influence Chinese thinking.

Our fifth Forum entry is a review of the internal Chinese campaign against a predominantly Muslim separatist group in the northwestern Xinjiang (pronounced shin-jong) Uyghur Autonomous Region. Dr. Martin Wayne argues that the Party-state’s deep sensitivity to internal criticism of the “ideologically bankrupt and locally corrupt” government precipitated an initially harsh and counterproductive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. After a brutal military reaction, China embarked upon a comprehensive effort to address the threat with the efficiency that only a totalitarian state can impose: it directed change in local governance, education, and economic development while placing pressure on all extra-national means of support—both countries and organizations—with spies to monitor compliance. Internally, China is able to control information and exhort reporting against resistance activity with the full, albeit uninformed, backing of the growing Han Chinese population relocated to this region from points east. Although the Chinese effort is contextually very different from international counterinsurgency campaigns, Dr. Wayne suggests five lessons for crafting COIN policies.

The final installment in the Forum is a critique of the Pentagon’s annual report on the “probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts” of the People’s Liberation Army. Dennis Blasko is a former U.S. Army Attaché who served in Beijing. He dismisses mistrust of Chinese strategic intentions (referred to in the current report as a “lack of transparency in China’s military affairs”) as mirror-imaging about force protection. He explores 10 topics for a “more balanced and complete evaluation of Chinese military modernization” and minimizes the problem of China’s frequent public threats against an independent, free Taiwan.

Questioning conventional wisdom and the continued efficacy of traditional practice is healthy, as is debate over movements to change time-tested approaches to military art. Over the past 2 years, JFQ has actively solicited submissions from the field emphasizing both the successes and failures of joint forces engaged in the war on terror. The case study that has precipitated the most contributions to date is Operation Anaconda, the March 2002 effort to kill or capture Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan’s Shahi-Kot Valley. One excellent manuscript was coauthored by USAF colonels Robert Hyde and Mark Kelly. These authors used a counterfactual history approach to relate how the operation could have been successfully conducted with established joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. In the end, however, JFQ decided to present only two articles on this subject in our Features section for the exclusive purpose of fostering debate and improving the way U.S. forces do business jointly. The first of these is an academic analysis directed by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force and coauthored at Air University by Dr. Richard Andres and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Hukill, USAF (Ret.), and the second is based on the personal experience of Colonel Michael Isherwood, USAF (Ret.), who integrated air operations with ground maneuver in Afghanistan during 2005–2006. The battle of Shahi-Kot Valley evokes strong emotions among U.S. air and ground warfighters, but as Colonel Isherwood points out, “reopening this discussion can help us examine the progress made and opportunities ahead to improve air and ground integration.” These articles are presented in this spirit, and counterpoints from ground warfighters continue to be solicited.

At 164 pages, this issue presents more content than any previous JFQ, and we are grateful for the superb contributions received from national security professionals worldwide. Please consult page 2 for planned focus areas to be examined in the next four issues. This volume includes a fold-out poster inside the back cover to assist joint professional military education institutions in advertising the 2008 Secretary of Defense and CJCS Essay Competitions. The National Defense University Foundation has generously budgeted for next year’s cash awards in recognition of the value and influence of this kind of scholarship. Congratulations to the 2007 winners whose work appears in this issue. JFQ

—D.H. Gurney
China’s conceptions of international order are grounded in lessons drawn both from its history and, particularly today, from the ancient Warring States period in which proto-nations struggled for hegemony. At the end of this period, the Ch'in state gradually emerged victorious. Today, as China seeks to orient itself in the modern international world into which it was plunged by its tumultuous contact with European powers during the 19th century, it seems to have turned increasingly to its ancient past to teach itself lessons for the future—and perhaps most of all to the history of its Warring States period. This modern focus on the Warring States model is itself the result of the conceptual collision between Western ideas of pluralist international relations and a far more ancient tradition that has its roots in imperial history and the Confucian core of China’s classical canon.

The Chinese tradition has as its primary model for interstate relations a system in which legitimate, stable order is possible only when one power reigns supreme—by outright conquest of the Sinic geographic core and by at least tributary relationships with all other participants in the world system. Its central assumptions about the need for political unity, the natural order of all politics as hierarchy, and the fundamental illegitimacy of separate and coequal state sovereignties enjoy powerful roots in China’s intellectual tradition.

This worldview has influenced how China has lived out its relationships with others for centuries, in particular its painful encounters with the West. And it may be important in the future because China is still a relative newcomer to the system of Western-derived international law. Chinese history provides no precedent for the stable, long-term coexistence of coequal sovereigns, and its traditional ideals of moral governance and statecraft, at least, deny the possibility. Whether China has internalized the mores of international pluralism or will be tempted to return to its conceptual roots as its power grows is a question that may shape the geopolitics of the 21st century.

The Weight of History

China’s thousands of years of history have an extraordinary presence in traditional and contemporary Chinese life and thought. Perhaps “the most historically conscious nation on Earth,” the Chinese have long been

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“almost uniquely concerned with history, seeing in it not only the main source of knowledge regarding the functioning of human society . . . but viewing it also as providing a model for the present.” The principles embodied in the classics are seen as spelling out the causal sinews of the world as it exists at all times—making them fundamental reference points for decisionmaking. Even in the communist period, “scholars, bureaucrats, and ordinary people alike” tend “to draw examples from the Chinese past to illustrate points about the present.” This profound reverence for the past and focus on grounding the legitimacy of contemporary thought and action in congruence with alleged historical lessons has “inimically influenced China’s attitude toward military preparedness and intelligence over the centuries.” It has also powerfully conditioned China’s approach to basic issues of legitimacy and legality in the international system.

Among the most important conceptual reference points in the classicist tradition of understanding everything in terms of ancient precedents and analogies were the tumultuous events leading up to the first great unification of China by the Ch’in (Qin) dynasty in 221 BCE. This unification was preceded by a long period of conflict and disunity. The increasing decline of the feudal Chou kingdom led to the corresponding rise of de facto independent states. During the so-called Springs and Autumns period between 722 and 481 BCE, some trappings of Chou authority persisted, and politics was largely seen as consisting of a “struggle for dominance between the rulers of the separate states composing the Chou realm.” In this struggle for dominance, more than 100 states were annexed or simply extinguished.

This process of warfare and consolidation by rival warlords continued into the so-called Warring States period, which began in the mid-fourth century BCE. By this point, the galaxy of fragmented post-Chou feudal remnants had coalesced into a handful of survivor states, the Seven Great Martial States, “each contending for control of the realm, and fifteen weaker states for them to prey upon.” At stake were the grim alternatives of conquest or extinction, for “it was clear that all but one of them would be destroyed.”

The triumph of the state of Ch’in put an end to this warfare, and its ruler is remembered today as the First Emperor of China. His brutal totalitarian rule created a state far more centralized than any prior kingdom and yet stretching over much of what is China today. Ch’in’s notoriously tyrannical rule was short-lived, collapsing in 207 BCE. Its successor dynasty, the Han (202 BCE to 220 CE), however, is remembered as setting the mold for all subsequent Chinese history.

**Imperative of Unity**

The Han adapted the centralized structure of the authoritarian Ch’in state to a public ethic based on the teachings of the great sage K’ung-fu tzu (Kongzi) (551 to 479 BCE), who is better known in the West today by the Latinized version of his name, Confucius. This “Han synthesis” cemented this ethos of centralized Confucian governance in place as the Chinese governmental archetype for millennia to follow. The core patterns of Chinese imperial governance—the “fundamental forms of national culture, founded on a common script and literature, and endowed with the capacity to survive no matter what the future had in store of the Middle Kingdom”—were forged at this time.

A key element of the Chinese governmental ideal, however—one that Han governance took as its foundation—was already in place as the basic model of rule toward which every aspect of Chinese statecraft aspired, even (or perhaps especially) during periods when China had no single sovereign: the imperative of universal rule. The patterns of interstate relations established during the Warring States period revolved around aspirations to unity. The thinkers and statesmen of that chaotic time had “longed for a political unification,” and these impulses became a core part of the Chinese intellectual framework.

It is hard to overstate the impact of this monist ideal of statecraft. Over the ensuing generations, there were other periods in which China lacked a single ruler and rival regional warlords faced off in ways not unlike the protostate system of the pre-Ch’in era. However, such claimants never asserted their reciprocal legitimacy as formally coequal sovereigns. Rather, they claimed the natural right to rule over the whole of China. The key conceptual model for Chinese theories of political order, in other words, was that of brutal state competition for hegemony tending inevitably toward unification under a regime organized along the lines of the Han synthesis. Once this crucial pattern had been established, “the impulse to harmony and unity never waned” over the sweep of China’s extraordinarily long and rich history.

What is interesting to the historian of ideas is the degree to which this model of Sinic universalism enjoyed such powerful roots in currents of Chinese thought that long predated...
the Han synthesis. This is most obviously the case with Confucianism, which became, in effect, the secular religion of the empire for most of China's subsequent history.

Politics of Hierarchy

Confucianism is at its core an ethical teaching, stressing the importance of benevolence, "the characteristic element of humanity," and righteousness, "the accordance of actions with what is right." The Confucian gentleman should cultivate moral self-knowledge and virtue in the fulfillment of his responsibilities within a network beginning with the family and extending throughout society as a whole, accumulating moral conduct and continually resisting selfishness in the course of daily living. Fundamental to this conception is an idea of society in which actions can be harmonized smoothly with "what is right" precisely because what is right is clearly known—or would be if persons and situations were properly understood.

Confucianism thus regards the correct use of language and names as in part constitutive of correct action in society. If one's son is properly characterized as a "son," for instance, then from this designation will flow an entire spectrum of understood social roles, rituals, and responsibilities revolving around the nature of what it means to be a son that will define both his and others' proper relationships to him. When these roles and rituals are properly lived out, society will function as it should, from the level of the family up to the great affairs of state.

As Confucius declared, "If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success." Through the rectification of names, in other words, Confucianism aspires to "an ideal social order with 'everything in its place.'" This ethic would help give a special salience in subsequent Chinese history to issues of statecraft as well as everyday social behavior, and the key to successful governance is found in the same processes of cultivating right conduct. Government works precisely to the degree that the ruler cultivates his virtue and thereby transmutes his right conduct into a "moral potency." In effect, the virtuous prince "secretes" authority; social harmony spreads outward in concentric circles around him precisely because he is virtuous. Ultimately, this is simply another aspect of the rectification of names: harmonious order arises when each person understands and embodies the virtues and conduct appropriate to his role in the world. As Confucius put it, "there is proper government when the prince is a prince, and the minister is minister, when the father is father, and the son is son."

The virtue of the ruler thus creates good order in the state. No real compulsion need be involved, for if "the true king leads the way" by moral example, "the people consent and voluntarily follow." In effect, so powerful is the example of a true prince that right order spontaneously self-assembles around him: he who understands li and embodies its virtue "would find the government of a kingdom as easy as to look into his palm." According to Confucius, "If a truly royal ruler were to arise . . . virtue would prevail" within a generation. This ideal of rulership—in which political authority naturally coalesces around the virtuous ruler—embedded itself deeply in the Chinese consciousness.

Moreover, there was no frontier beyond which such virtuous order-creation would not reach. By exhibiting supreme virtue, men are "brought to resort to [the ruler] from all quarters," and by "kindly cherishing the princes of the States, the whole kingdom is brought to revere him." The extent to which virtue compels the extension of the ruler's authority is proportional to the extent of the virtue, and a prince of perfect virtue would inevitably find the entire world subjecting itself to him. The very presence of a true Sage-king in the world, therefore, is enough to precipitate another Golden Age because "forthwith, multitudes would resort to his dominions." Confucius likened this dynamic almost to an irresistible force of nature: "He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it."

The Confucian philosophy of governance and world order is thus radically monist. Idealizing the vassalage relationships of Chou-era feudalism into a general principle of political order, it assumes that a perfectly virtuous ruler would naturally come to hold sway over all of humankind. In one commentary on Confucius, for instance, it is recounted that the Master felt of the Sage-king that "his fame overshadows the Middle Kingdom, and extends to all barbarous tribes . . . [so that] all who have blood and breath unfeignedly honour and love him. Hence it is said, 'He is the equal of Heaven.'"

Such a system did not have "national" frontiers in the modern sense. When asked by scandalized pupils how he could have at one point considered going to live among the "rude" and barbarian "nine wild tribes of the east," the Master replied that "if a superior man dwelt among them, what rudeness would there be?"

These themes were echoed by Meng-tzu (Mencius) (371–289 BCE), who also made his way into the orthodox Confucian canon. According to the Book of Mencius, "The benevolent [ruler] has no enemy" anywhere, and if a prince were to establish a properly benevolent government all manner of merchants, travelers, visitors, and "all under heaven
who feel aggrieved by their rulers” will flock to his banner.” As with Confucius, virtuous rule was for Mencius the remedy for all the world’s ills—and ideal virtue would set off a sort of political chain reaction leading in the direction of universal dominion. The ruler who wishes to enlarge his territories, therefore, need only display the proper virtue, and soon he would not only rule the Middle States (all of China) but also “attract . . . the barbarian tribes that surround them.”

Confucianism, therefore, seems to take a clear position on whether a legitimate international order can rest upon the formal equality of coequal sovereigns: it denies this. Unless all leaders are imperfect in a precisely balanced way, with virtue distributed precisely evenly among international actors—a possibility that would seem to be inherent in the model but that does not appear actually to have been imagined and is surely highly unlikely, to say the least—Confucianism presumes that such a system will be unstable and tend, over time, toward consolidation under the most virtuous. Just as a family can have only one father, so can stable, long-term order in a Confucian system really exist only under a single ruler, a Sage-king whose virtue-derived authority unifies the Sinic geographic core and causes even remote “barbarian tribes” to turn in tribute toward the Son of Heaven as iron filings toward a magnet. In effect, Confucian ethics thus presumes that interstate relations, in the sense they are conceived in the modern West, cannot exist over the long term and must give way to universal order under the most virtuous ruler. As Mencius made clear, the key to political order in the world is a radical monism derived from the reification of Chou-era feudal vassalage and its hierarchical analogues in all Confucian social relationships: “When there is unity, there will be peace.” Any arrangement short of this ideal is necessarily provisional.

Even during periods in which China was not unified—such as during the Springs and Autumns and Warring States periods when politics within the Chinese system consisted of a form of interstate relations that exhibited a rich diversity of balance-of-power behavior and in which some norms of “international” conduct gained some purchase—the competing states’ concept of self seems to have been less that of emergent, separate nations than as contenders in a winner-take-all struggle for imperial supremacy over “All under Heaven” (Tien Hsia or tian xia). The underlying ethos of the Chinese states system pointed emphatically toward unification, and this precluded the development of an explicitly international conception of legitimate political order. Whereas post-Westphalian Europe, in effect, made a virtue out of a necessity by elevating “a fact of life—the existence of a number of states of substantially equal strength—into a guiding principle of world order,” China concluded that the problem of war could only be answered by Empire. This had dramatic consequences for Chinese understandings of world order because “empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system.” From the Warring States period onward, there appears to have been no point at which the various rulers of China did not regard it as axiomatic that unification was their ultimate goal. They merely disagreed over whose rule unification should occur under.

Relations with the Other

This ancient legacy of hierarchical assumptions about international order also shaped China’s relationship with non-Chinese peoples. In cultural terms, Confucian notions of virtue seemed to make it axiomatic that “each step away from the central [Chinese] states led only into less civilized, more unrighteous cultures.” China had been under varying degrees of “barbarian” threat from beyond its borders long before the Ch’in unification, and Chinese security policy was thus permeated by the challenges of what was called “containing the barbarians.”

Indeed, there was some tendency to deny barbarians the status of human beings at all. This was not simple racism, for it also had theoretical roots in Confucian thought. For Confucians, one acquired one’s humanity not simply by virtue of embeddedness in a political society per se, but according to the degree to which one partook of Chinese Confucian culture. A land whose inhabitants observed the ritualized li of Confucian propriety was civilized, and its people were fully human, but “one whose people did not follow li was not civilized, and its people were not fully human in the sense that they had no means of realizing their potential as human beings.”

A person was thus not regarded as an innately autonomous individual but was instead merely “born as ‘raw material’ who must be civilized by education and thus become a truly human man.” The central moral issue for Confucianism was thus not how to respect any sort of intrinsic humanity as such, but “the factual questions of whether a man is properly taught the Way and whether he has a desire to learn diligently.” Becoming a person was something to be achieved through personal cultivation and proper socialization, with the natural implication that it was not just political order that existed in concentric gradations around the virtuous ruler—the Son of Heaven—but humanness itself. The farther they were from the cultural center of the universe, the less human did humans become: “To conceive of humans apart from the civilizing practices of society is impossible—one would be not a person, but a beast.”

The social contextuality of Confucian humanity had implications for China’s relations with non-Chinese peoples. If one achieves humanity by participation in proper Confucian society, a barbarian people might acquire it by accepting incorporation into the greater cultural whole of the Chinese system, but non-Sinicized peoples would forever remain little more than brutes. It was thus a persistent conceit in Chinese history that “only the Chinese were fully human; all others, who had human form and substance but not human (Chinese) consciousness and cooperation, were barbarians.” This contrast goes back to Confucius himself, who noted that filial piety must incorporate proper ritualized reverence for one’s parents, and not simply material support for them: otherwise one would not differ from “dogs and horses.”

Not surprisingly, therefore, Imperial China maintained a basic contempt for foreign “barbarians” who did not observe Chinese cultural mores. Official pronouncements likened them to subhuman dogs and sheep, and dripped disdain for those whose “hearts and minds are different” and thus “in all respects have a different essence [from the Chinese].”

As with Confucius, for Mencius ideal virtue would set off a political chain reaction leading in the direction of universal dominion
They should be “rejected as animals” because there was “no difference between them and birds and beasts.” This Confucianized racism provided an additional set of reasons why relationships of formal equality with barbarian rulers were out of the question.

In keeping with this idea of civilizational gradients and the Confucian emphasis on the rectification of names, throughout China’s long history of struggling against incursions from neighboring peoples, a consistent theme of imperial diplomacy was the importance of maintaining formal symbolic inequality with its neighbors. It was key to the ancient Chinese conception of world order that China be recognized as the center of the civilized world. The Chinese Emperor was the Son of Heaven (Tien Ti), and his rightful realm was All Under Heaven.

Accordingly, it was a grave offense—and an implicit denial of the Emperor’s virtue and thus authority to rule even within China—for another ruler to claim formal equality with the Chinese emperor, and China punished such effrontery when it could. Imperial China certainly did not always enjoy military supremacy over the steppe peoples, and on occasion—most notably with the Mongol and Manchu conquests—victorious barbarians actually founded Chinese imperial dynasties. Nor were Chinese officials in weaker dynasties averse to paying substantial gifts to particularly powerful barbarian peoples to help keep them at bay. It was crucial, however, that even such extortions payments be accompanied by symbolic acts of deference and tribute by the barbarians to China, so the proper order of the world would still seem to be preserved. Maintaining a clear status-hierarchy between itself and barbarian peoples was a defining feature of the Middle Kingdom’s approach to the Other.

Ultimately, the tributary hierarchy under the Son of Heaven was viewed as a unitary global system of concentric circles that did not stop at Empire’s edge. Around the Son of Heaven were arranged “barbarians of varying degrees of uncouthness and hairiness,” but who “could yet be brought within the religious-cosmic circle of Chinese enlightenment if they would but ‘come to be transformed’ (lai hua) by the Virtue (te) of the universal monarch” by acknowledging themselves as tributaries. As John King Fairbank observed:

“The mystical influence of the all-wise example and virtue (te) of the Son of Heaven not only reached throughout China proper but continued outward beyond the borders of China to all mankind and gave them order and peace, albeit with gradually decreasing efficacy, as parts of a concentric hierarchy.”

Imperial China maintained a basic contempt for foreign “barbarians” who did not observe Chinese cultural mores

Whether “inside” or “outside” the Celestial Kingdom itself, therefore, all was an extension of Confucian ideals of family life and filial piety: “China was envisaged as the head of a family of nations, presiding with patriarchal wisdom over the junior members around her.” The Chinese concept of world order thus admitted no such thing as “international” relations, inasmuch as everyone, to a degree proportionate to their basic humanness, owed formal obeisance to the Celestial Emperor.

All of this suggests why Fairbank, for instance, has described “the chief problem of China’s foreign relations” as having been “how to square theory with fact, the ideological claim [to supremacy] with the actual practice”—which could vary considerably. The Sinocentric world order may have been “a myth backed up at different times by realities of varying degree, sometimes approaching nil,” but it was a myth that was critical to the legitimacy of the entire Imperial system and indeed the very foundations of Confucian society. It was a recurring challenge for the Imperial Court, over the centuries, to sustain the symbolic baggage of Chinese moral geography first in the face of “the geographic fact of nomadic Inner Asian fighting power,” and thereafter when confronted by European power projection.

The Shock of Plural Sovereignty

The Middle Kingdom’s engagement with the world of European-derived norms of international law can be said to have begun with the Emperor’s rejection of successive British diplomatic overtures in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. British traders had long been present at Canton, but beginning in 1793, British envoys were dispatched to open more formal relations with the Empire. These missions, under three English noblemen—the Earl of Macartney (1793), Lord William Amherst (1816), and Lord William Napier (1834)—were wholly unsuccessful, mired in diplomatic and protocol struggles with their Chinese hosts and confronted by the Imperial Court’s refusal to countenance the relationship of sovereign equality the Britons proposed.

It was a stalemate: the English were “resolved that nothing [they] might do should be interpreted to indicate vassalage or sub-ordination of England to China,” while the Chinese were equally determined to agree to nothing that would imply any derogation from the natural position of the Son of Heaven at the top of a global status-hierarchy of politico-moral virtue. Both Macartney and Amherst were conveyed through China on vehicles decked out with Chinese-language signs describing them as tribute-bearing envoys. Things became acute with Macartney when he resisted the traditional kowtow of subservience to the Emperor, but in any event the Emperor flatly refused to permit the establishment of a permanent British embassy in Peking; there was no place in the Chinese system for a foreign official claiming to represent a foreign sovereign in a relationship of formal equality with China. Amherst also refused to kowtow and became offended when Chinese officials tried to press him into what he considered an unseemly court visit. He declined the offer of an audience on those terms and was sent packing. The Emperor was quite displeased, declaring in a letter to the King of England that:

such gross discourtesy is utterly unprecedented. . . . Henceforward, pray do not dispatch missions all this distance; they are merely a waste of time and have their journey for nothing. If you loyalty accept our
sovereignty and show dutiful submission, there is really no need for these yearly appearances at our Court to prove that you are indeed our vassal. This was the position Lord Palmerston took when the Chinese, he complained, but “this instruction has been very imperfectly obeyed.” Palmerston even sent them a draft treaty that he hoped they would obtain after the close of hostilities, explicitly writing into it a requirement that the prescribed method of signature demonstrate “clearly the absolute equality of England and China, and of their reigns.” The resulting Treaty of Nanking (1842) reflected many of these British concerns, with terms carefully undermining the Celestial Empire’s claims to political preeminence in the world system.

With the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 after the second Sino-British war, the British obtained what Macartney had been refused: the right to appoint an ambassador directly to the Imperial Court and do so without having to “perform any ceremony derogatory to him as representing the Sovereign of an independent nation, on a footing of equality with that of China.” The provisions in the settlement pertaining to foreign diplomats’ rights of residence in Peking, however, were the hardest-fought part of the negotiations. After an additional round of fighting that saw the Chinese kill a group of European negotiators and a vengeful allied army under Lord Elgin burn the Emperor’s legendarily beautiful Summer Palace in 1860, Britain installed a permanent envoy in Peking, a step duly followed by the other powers.

For China, the issue of ambassadorial representation was problematic because “diplomatic practice ran counter to the whole political and social system of Imperial China.” It was not only that European-style diplomacy was inconsistent with the Sinic view of world order but also that such diplomatic relations directly threatened the authority of the Emperor. Since true virtue in the Son of Heaven inevitably resulted in both China and the barbarian world spontaneously ordering themselves around him, the acceptance of barbarian nations as formal equals would necessarily imply the Emperor’s lack of virtue: “If the barbarians were no longer submissive, the dynasty had clearly forfeited the Mandate of Heaven and would soon come to an end under the stress of rebellion from within and invasion from without.” As Werner Levi observed, “The granting of equality to foreign diplomats at the court would overthrow the whole social order.”

missions under three English noblemen were confronted by the Imperial Court’s refusal to countenance the relationship of sovereign equality the Britons proposed.

Even after the traumas of 1858–1860, therefore, China maneuvered tenaciously to preserve what it could of its ancient symbolic supremacy. Forced to accept the residence of foreign envoys in Peking, the court sought at least to insulate the Son of Heaven himself from those indignities. Accordingly, the Europeans were told that the new Emperor, then merely a child, was too young to receive diplomatic visitors. For the duration of his status as a minor, therefore, China found a way to prevent the horror of barbarian representatives appearing before the Celestial Emperor without showing appropriate respect (for example, by performing the traditional prostrations of the kowtow). It was not until 1873 that China was finally prevailed upon to permit formal diplomatic audiences—though even then the Emperor carefully conducted them at the hall in the capital traditionally used for receptions with representatives from tributary states. It was not until around 1890 that a full set of agreed protocols were worked out to govern the foreign diplomatic corps’ interactions with the Emperor.

The late-19th century humiliations of a weak and corrupt Ch’ing dynasty at the hands of the West are well known, as are the increasingly unequal treaties and other arrangements that China was forced into. As acute as was the bitterness this engendered, however, China suffered far less than most other victims of European power during this period. Unlike most of the native rulers of, for instance, India, South-east Asia, the Middle East, or Sub-Saharan Africa—or indeed Latin America in an earlier century—the Imperial government was fortunate to have stayed in power and remained more than merely nominally independent of direct European rule. China suffered greatly, but the severity of its perceived wounds was a function of much of its prior self-esteem as of any disadvantage vis-à-vis other non-Europeans during this period. China’s adversaries succeeded in imposing a long succession of measures that seemed to strike at the heart of...
the ancient discourse of symbolic legitimacy that underlay Imperial rule.

Perhaps, therefore, the most interesting aspect of the Sino-European conflicts was the fact that they were not just about trade or conquest but that they also represented a profound clash of intellectual paradigms. This period has a special significance precisely because it was one of status conflict, a struggle that was clearly understood as such on both sides, as the opposing worldviews of Sinic universalism and international pluralism ran headlong into each other. Neither competing conceptual system had any space in it for the other’s views, for each denied the premises on which the other was founded. One might say that the world had become too small for both to coexist.

Models for the Future

A key question for observers pondering the future, then, is how the shock of plural sovereignty has affected China’s view of itself and its conception of world order. It had been taken as axiomatic for millennia that the key to peace and plenty in China was unity and that disunity produces only “civil war, insecurity, and disaster for elite and commoners alike.” Just as Confucian ethics “required cultural unity as an essential ground of a civilized political-social unity,” so the proper ordering of the peoples of the world required a political unity—or at least a recognized gradient of power and virtue that reaffirmed the centrality of the Middle Kingdom. Legitimacy and socio-moral superiority were indissolubly linked. As Chinese writings on geopolitical strategy echo even today, the “great mission under heaven was to turn chaos into unity,” and the “basic trend of Chinese history” was toward unification. And yet here came relationships and a series of classically hallowed approaches to coping with the problem of political diversity. Beginning in the 19th century, it came to be felt that the key to understanding China’s uncomfortable present and uncertain future lay in its ancient past before the Qin unification. The Warring States became the prism through which Chinese thinkers viewed the post-Westphalian world.

Modern Chinese thinking about international relations is thus wrapped tightly in the cloak of pre-Ch’in geopolitics. Chinese writings on statecraft, strategy, and international politics are rich with analogies to the pre-unification period, as Michael Pillsbury has noted, and China’s generals clearly find today’s “multipolar world” to be “amazingly similar to the Warring States era.” Even where it exists in a complex amalgam with Marxist dialectics, Warring States–era statecraft is central to China’s understanding of the future.

As recounted in the official journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), for instance, the 20th century was “a global ‘Warring States Period’” characterized by “clear boundaries between nations, between areas, and between cultures” that exist in competition. Chinese writers on international politics or military strategy commonly turn to “vivid stories . . . during the Spring and Autumn Period and the seven major powers during the period of the Warring States” to explain contemporary international dynamics. The quarterly journal of the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science and the China Military Science Association, for instance, has urged modern Chinese statesmen to follow lessons from the Warring States period in how to use skillful combinations of cooperation and conflict to win victories in the modern world. Similarly, the journal of the CCP’s Central Committee has urged modern leaders to continue to study strategic thinkers from the Springs and Autumns and Warring States periods in learning how to build up China’s strength in a world of competing states.

Such analogies are particularly useful to the Chinese leadership in that they explain both the basic pluralist nature of the modern international system and provide a theoretical explanation for (and justification for resisting) the alleged predatory onslaught of aspiring non-Chinese hegemons such as the former Soviet Union and, more recently, the United States. Thus, for example, regional adversaries such as India in the 1960s and Vietnam in the 1970s could be decried as would-be “regional hegemons” that needed to be “taught a lesson” in punitive Chinese expeditionary wars. The Soviets were long seen as global hegemonists who sought to surround and isolate China with client allies. And even Japan is sometimes described, with a longer historical perspective, as a would-be hegemon that would be delighted to replace U.S. influence in East Asia. Most of all, in recent years, Warring States analogies have been used in connection with exhortations to resist purported American hegemony.

Recourse to the Warring States period for lessons about modern international politics, especially when combined with continuing idealization of the Confucian unity of the Han dynasty—even as the government in Beijing turns increasingly to Confucian ideology to provide a post-Marxist theory to legitimate its rule—suggests important implications for Chinese views about the future course of international politics. Simply put, Chinese history provides no precedent for the stable, long-term coexistence of coequal sovereigns, and the country’s traditional ideals of moral governance and statecraft cannot comfortably admit such a possibility. The modern world may be understandable through the prism of the Warring States, but it is thus intelligible only as a waystation along the road to hierarchical order. The perceived lessons...
of thousands of years of Chinese statecraft, in other words, teach that multipolarity is both unstable and morally illegitimate in a system that includes Chinese civilization—the natural and inevitable state of which is to exist as the moral and political hub of the known world.

The implications of the conceptual framework that China brings to contemporary international relations are necessarily indeterminate, for history is not destiny, and the modern world presents Chinese leaders with unprecedented challenges and opportunities. But as the inheritors of a monist political ideology that conceives of international order in fundamentally hierarchical terms, idealizes interstate order as tending toward universal hegemony or actual empire, and lacks a meaningful concept of coequal, legitimate sovereignties pursuant to which states may coexist over the long term in nonhierarchical relationships, modern Chinese statesmen would seem to carry heavy cultural “baggage” indeed.

Thankfully, modern China appears to believe that principles of sovereign equality and international law are currently in its interest. Nevertheless, viewed through the prism of the Warring States period—the conceptual framework through which China itself seems to view today’s multisolvent world—such sentiment might simply be a tactical choice useful, for now, in helping fend off the depredations of strong, would-be (non-Chinese) hegemons. As China’s strength grows, however, the Middle Kingdom may well become more assertive in insisting on the sort of Sinocentric hierarchy that its history teaches it to expect and its traditional notions of power and legitimacy will encourage it to demand.

NOTES

5 Rodzinski, 61.
10 Ibid., 263–264.
15 Ames, 2.
17 Confucius, 256.
18 Fingarette, 62; see also Rodzinski, 33.
19 Confucius, 402–404.
20 Ibid., 267.
21 Ibid., 269.
22 Ibid., 409.
23 Ibid., 349 (emphasis deleted).
24 Ibid., 145.
25 Ibid., 429.
26 Ibid., 221.
27 Lin, 751.
29 Lin, 755.
30 Fung, 180.
32 Ibid.
33 Sawyer, The Tao of Spycraft, 62.
34 Ibid., 38.
36 Fingarette, 34–35.
38 Fung, 188.
39 Dorsey, 29.
40 Confucius, 148.
43 Rodzinski, 61.
46 The First Chinese Embassy to the West, xvi.
47 Fairbank, 2–3.
49 Fairbank, 3.
51 Quoted in Harley Farnsworth MacNair, China’s International Relations and Other Essays (Chicago: Commercial Press, 1926), 23–24.
52 Quoted in Morse, appendix B, 628.
53 Ibid., appendix G, 645.
54 Ibid., 300. The phrasing here is apparently Morse’s summary or paraphrase.
56 The First Chinese Embassy to the West, xxiv.
57 Ibid.
58 Werner Levi, Modern China’s Foreign Policy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), 13.
59 Swaine and Tellis, 45.
60 Fingarette, 64.
67 Zong Han, “Further Increasing China’s Comprehensive National Strength,” Beijing Qushi (June 1, 2002) (FBIS trans. CPP20020719000103).
68 Burles and Shulsky, 40.
While the United States has been preoccupied with global challenges to its security since 2001, China has used what it calls an independent foreign policy (a term Beijing uses to denote independence from American power) to achieve diplomatic, military, and economic influence in African nations in exchange for unconditional foreign aid, regardless of the benefiting country’s human rights record or political practices. This foreign policy undermines U.S. objectives intended to promote good governance, market reform, and regional security and stability, while concomitantly diminishing U.S. influence. China’s relationships with Angola, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, for instance, have enabled these countries to ignore international pressure and frustrated efforts to isolate, coerce, or reform them. Left unchecked, China’s growing influence will likely facilitate similar behavior from other African countries, stymieing U.S. efforts and leading to friction, if not outright conflict, between Beijing and Washington.

The United States, therefore, needs a coherent and overarching strategy that coordinates its diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of power to counter China’s growing influence in Africa.
China Rising

Current U.S. power and influence are historically unique in their all-encompassing, dominant nature; only hindsight will tell if various strategic gambles furthered this power and influence or precipitated their decline. In this vein, while American foreign policy remains predominantly focused on the war on terror, the United States must anticipate future security challenges from emerging threats and competitors.

China, no longer able “to hide its ambitions and disguise its claws,” has matched its meteoric growth with an expansive global policy that strongly resembles what John Mearsheimer calls “offensive realism.” As the term suggests, China’s yearning for power is manifest not only in its invigorated external focus and more aggressive international policies, but also in “its opportunistic creation of strategic counterbalances designed to increase its influence and limit that of the United States.” This increasing Chinese influence is nowhere more evident than in Africa.

The Importance of Africa

Africa’s emergence as a continent of strategic importance is not surprising considering its vast resources and potential. China’s national objectives (economic expansion, increased international prestige, a unified China and Taiwan, and domestic stability) directly or indirectly fuel its keen interest in Africa. The United States, on the other hand, has no coherent, overarching strategy for Africa, although the 2006 National Security Strategy does describe it as a continent of geostrategic importance and of high priority to the administration.

China’s explosive economic expansion is driving its “go global policy.” Its voracious appetite for resources forces it to look externally, driving it to lock up future energy sources for anticipated needs. Currently, 25 percent of its oil comes from Africa. China’s economic expansion also requires other natural resources, fueling a continuous search for new markets.

Diplomatically, China seeks international support and prestige by creating close ties with developing nations. Likewise, it uses its position as the sole “developing” United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent member to great advantage by championing smaller countries and their causes. China also goes to great lengths to build international diplomatic inertia to counter recognized statehood for Taiwan. With 54 countries, Africa represents a rich source of future international support for Chinese endeavors.

If successfully realized, the above objectives will support Chinese domestic stability and security (internal unrest historically being its greatest destabilizer) by reinforcing the legitimacy of Communist Party control.

Growing Influence

China’s growing influence in Africa is surprising in its intensity, pervasiveness, and commitment across the breadth of traditional instruments of power. While Washington is strategically focused elsewhere, Beijing deftly uses a combination of tools, enticements, and devices to achieve this influence. Not tethered by pressuring concerns that threaten its existence and blessed with an explosive economy, China leverages its instruments of power in the pursuit of overseas objectives.

The primary instrument in securing these objectives is China’s “independent foreign policy.” Succinctly, it offers financial aid with no political strings attached. To developing African nations, wary of former colonial masters and superpowers who offer stipulation-based aid, China’s willingness to assist without conditions is a welcome respite. Although recipients of this largesse understand that it undercuts international attempts to induce reform, the attraction of immediate, lucrative, and needed investment is too tempting to ignore. In return, China asks for preferential consideration for economic opportunities.

Equally enticing to African nations is China’s support from an international perspective. China recently became comfortable in its “liberal internationalist skin,” but it has since learned how to adroitly wield its weight. It leverages close ties cultivated with developing African nations, and its UNSC status is appealing to less fortunate countries who welcome the apparently equal partnership being offered.

China is also successful as a “full on supplier” of “package deals.” It not only seeks...
new markets and preferred trade, but offers a full range of aid to include military advisors and sales, infrastructure development, medical support and programs, debt relief, low or no interest loans, free trade agreements, education and technical assistance, industrial hardware and software, cultural exchanges, and preferred tourism. It offers these through a combination of private and public (state sponsored) ventures, with its state and provincial representatives armed to low bid contracts, even if at a loss.

Diplomatically, China has formal relations with 47 African countries. During the last 6 years, President Hu Jintao and other high level emissaries made repeated trips to Africa while over 40 African country delegations traveled to China. Beijing is also heavily engaged in African regional organizations, and its diplomatic delegations often outnumber combined European and American representatives. In 2006, China hosted an economic forum of 48 African ministerial delegations. It has also built and paid for African embassies in Beijing to ensure their countries’ representation.

Economically, China has trade relations with 49 African countries and bilateral trade agreements with the majority of them. The Chinese-African Economic Forum, created in 2000, is an economic windfall for China and its partners. Gross Africa-China trade totaled $10.6 billion in 2000, $40 billion in 2005, and is forecast to surpass $100 billion in 2010. China instituted 7 Trade and Investment Promotion Centers throughout Africa to serve as regional economic engagement focal points, and 700 Chinese companies operate in 49 African countries. Besides heavily investing in extractive industries, China is building infrastructure capacity throughout Africa to include dams, railways, port improvements, highways, stadiums, and pipelines. It has lucrative oil contracts with Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan, and there are Chinese trading and manufacturing enclaves throughout Africa specializing in textiles, fishing, and other commerce.

Militarily, China made significant arms sales to Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, and developed a burgeoning small arms manufacturing capability in Sudan. China is also a significant contributor to African UN peacekeeping missions, and as of May 2007, it had 1,315 military personnel deployed to 7 peacekeeping operations.

**Ramifications**

Chinese and American influence in Africa is not a zero-sum game in the near term; however, the long-term stakes are high with respect to strategic objectives. U.S. strategic aims in Africa are intended to promote good governance, market reform, and stability and security, which in turn help limit the spread of the war on terror and maintain U.S. access to the continent. China’s influence, gained through its independent foreign policy, ostensibly undermines U.S. attempts to effect positive change and achieve its strategic objectives in Africa. If that influence grows without a counterbalancing increase in U.S. influence, the United States risks losing strategic flexibility and freedom of action on the continent.

The conflicts in Sudan and Zimbabwe demonstrate China’s willingness to circumvent, if not completely ignore, international pressure and underscore the potential injuriousness of its actions and the ramifications to U.S. policy in Africa.

Sudan’s internal conflict has been roiling for decades. A seemingly intractable domestic conflict with age-old roots has become a full-scale genocide, and the international community, collectively sworn not to allow another Rwanda-type massacre, is...
Drilling platform for Chinese petroleum project in Sudan

Finding a solution to be elusive. Worsening the situation is China’s refusal to yield to international pressure and condemn Sudanese actions, citing Sudan’s right to govern its internal affairs irrespective of the ongoing genocide. The disturbing reality is that China is heavily invested in Sudan, whence 20 percent of its African oil comes, and its oil firms are deeply entrenched.\(^\text{26}\) Over 10,000 Chinese workers and 4,000 soldiers live in Sudan.\(^\text{21}\) Instead of using its considerable influence to call for a solution, China has cast a blind eye on Sudanese inaction and complicity, all but endorsing its actions. Chinese refusal to address the situation in Sudan more directly is a contributing reason for ineffective UN resolutions.

The injurious effects of China’s implicit support to Sudan are many, manifest not only in Khartoum’s ability to ignore the international outcry and its perceived imperviousness to sanction, but also in the resultant destabilizing effects the genocide is having on neighboring states. Both Chad and the Central African Republic, two fragile countries that can ill afford destructive influences, are being affected by Sudan’s internal unrest.\(^\text{22}\)

In the case of Zimbabwe, currently subject to U.S. and European Union sanctions, China openly backs President Robert Mugabe despite his human rights record, corrupt regime, and internal unrest, which are affecting regional stability. China sold Zimbabwe over $200 million in arms, signed lucrative contracts for resources, and provided it with much-needed financial and international support.\(^\text{23}\) As Mugabe exclaimed, “As long as China walks with Zimbabwe, it will never walk alone.”\(^\text{24}\)

There are many other examples of Chinese actions enabling African nations to flout international pressure, to include countries in which the United States has considerable interest, such as Angola and Kenya. These are not isolated instances for China, but instead demonstrate a determined pattern of enabling behavior through its foreign policy. As Beijing continues to expand operations in Africa, the likelihood of Chinese and American policies clashing will increase, possibly forcing underlying tensions into open conflict.

### Countering Chinese Influence

A strategy designed to counter Chinese influence in Africa will need to incorporate all U.S. instruments of power in order to overcome the allure of Chinese packaging and power appeal. This would include increasing diplomatic presence; accentuating and reinvigorating currently successful political, military, and economic incentive programs; and directly engaging China in Africa through cooperation, inclusiveness, and challenging it to abide by international norms of behavior.

Current U.S. engagement in Africa is a patchwork of generally successful but unsynchronized initiatives and policies that cross intragovernmental boundaries. Washington needs to consolidate these by appointing an “Africa czar” with the responsibility and authority to integrate and coordinate U.S. initiatives and policies. Coupled with the apparently imminent establishment of a U.S. Africa Command, the United States would be better positioned and organized to focus on the African continent and expand U.S. influence with a concomitant bounding of Chinese influence.

In addition to the Africa czar, the United States needs to increase its diplomatic profile in Africa. One of the most successful aspects of Chinese engagement has been the willingness of its leadership to travel extensively in Africa and to effusively host African leaders at home. Although President George W. Bush has traveled to Africa more than any U.S. leader in recent history, this high-level engagement should increase and become routine. The Africa czar and other U.S. Government leaders should accompany these high-level Presidential visits as well as conduct visits of their own. In conjunction with an increased leadership visitation program,

Economically, U.S. investment in Africa represents 1 percent of its total foreign trade, although this amount still outpaces Sino-African trade.\(^\text{26}\) But China’s proclivity to appear as a benign capitalist—freely investing yet with the knowledge it will operate at a net loss—is difficult for American investors to match. To maintain any long-term economic advantage, the United States needs to aggressively expand, improve, and incentivize existing initiatives to encourage economic and political reform. It also needs to focus on economic areas important to Africans that the Chinese are not developing: seek new and creative economic opportunities that outperform Chinese models; and counter China’s locking up of African resources by leveraging superior American extractive technology.

The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a rewarding initiative for those countries seeking U.S. market access. This program, and the breadth of countries eligible
for it, should expand. Those in compliance with the principles of AGOA should be highly rewarded and recognized, and countries compliant with good economic reform should be awarded favorable bilateral trade, free market agreements, and preferential access to U.S. State Partnership Programs.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and private involvement and investment in African agricultural endeavors must increase (USAID African agricultural projects have dropped by 90 percent since 1970). Agriculture represents 24 percent of Africa’s collective gross domestic product and 40 percent of its foreign exchange, while employing over 70 percent of its population. To date, China has not been demonstrably involved with African agriculture, primarily because it faces its own agricultural challenges. This is a key opportunity for the United States to influence an area that China is not currently capable of addressing, while engendering better practices, good will, and employment. Agricultural subsidies that inhibit African access to U.S. markets should be selectively dropped to entice specific nations and encourage further economic growth and reform.

The United States may counter Chinese state-sponsored economic packaging by using its own creative means. Combined U.S. efforts using the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, U.S. State Partnership Programs, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and USAID can compete with Chinese bids or seek opportunities in China-free markets, thereby opening the way for private American industry investment. These ventures could also be backed by U.S. Government tax incentives to emphasize their importance and encourage further investment opportunities.

An overarching energy security strategy for Africa, under the auspices of the Africa czar, would align energy policies. This would in turn lead to a coherent vision of how to counter Chinese efforts to secure African energy sources. For instance, a weak link in China’s energy industry is its lack of offshore extractive capabilities, a technology that it currently outsources. Although China is buying African future energy reserves and building pipelines and improving ports to export them, the United States is buying oil from most of the same countries, yet remains poised to maintain the offshore extractive edge. This is an important advantage over land-locked reserves, particularly when proven offshore oil reserves are larger (especially in West Africa) and do not as readily suffer from the illicit vagaries associated with onshore reserves.

With respect to security and military cooperation, U.S. efforts in Africa significantly overshadow those of the Chinese. Initiatives such as the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative, Gulf of Guinea Guard, and others are integral to regional stability and to the prosecution of the war on terror. Similar initiatives that emphasize U.S. military cooperation with African counterparts need to be expanded and made inclusive in order to maintain U.S. influence. International Military Education and Training (IMET) should be expanded or increased preferentially to those countries complying with AGOA and other reform initiatives, or simply as another enticement to counter expanding Chinese influence. The positive influence IMET engenders is incalculable. Premier U.S. peacekeeping initiatives that train Africans (such as the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program) are instrumental to African security and should expand to include more eligible nations. African nations compliant with governmental and economic reform should be high priorities for U.S. military aid, including Excess Defense Articles, military grants, and third country sales.

In international forums, the United States must encourage China to change
policies detrimental to international and U.S. reform efforts in Africa. Inviting China to observe or participate in Group of Eight, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, United Kingdom Commission for Africa, and other forums where Africa is concerned (perhaps including the Millennium Development Account) would encourage it to act as a responsible international stakeholder and avoid policies that inhibit

lash by Africans, already fomenting in certain areas due to “unfair” Chinese economic and hiring practices, the United States would be well postured to fill the void.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, should future Chinese-American relations be cooperative rather than competitive, both countries could use their significant influence to coordinate actions in Africa to achieve their strategic objectives while simultaneously improving the continent.

Although the focus of this article has been limited to countering Chinese influence in Africa based on one interpretation of China’s possible designs, there clearly are other imaginable alternatives. The 2006 National Security Strategy states that “the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with us to address common challenges and mutual interests.”11 The combined efforts of a strong U.S.-China cooperative relationship would be beneficial not only to both countries, but also to African states and the state of African affairs as well. 

Benefits of a U.S. Strategy

This strategy for countering Chinese influence in Africa will serve several purposes. First, a coherent strategy will increase U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic influence throughout Africa, allowing Washington to maintain political support, open access to markets and energy sources, and freedom of action in the war on terror. This increased influence will also facilitate a continued push for political and economic reform and regional security and stability across the breadth of Africa while maintaining the ability to pressure and isolate regimes with poor human rights records and political practices.

Second, should China experience an economic market correction that forces it to disengage from Africa, or an economic back-

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4 Todd G. Punnette, “The Inevitability of India” (Research paper, Naval War College, 2005), 5.


8 Estimates of the percentage of Chinese oil that comes from Africa range from 23 percent to 31 percent. The author has settled on 25 percent as a median estimate.


11 See <www.aneki.com/africa.html>. The author uses 54 countries as the base number for Africa since that is the number he most often came across in research; however, different sources cite different numbers of countries making up the African continent.


13 Ibid.

14 Brookes and Ji, 10.


18 See Brookes and Ji, 5; and Pan, 5.


21 Lake and Whitman, 43; Zweig and Bi, 32.


24 Ibid.


26 Brookes and Ji, 9.

27 Ibid.

28 Lake and Whitman, 51.

29 Ibid.


31 Bush, 46.
China's Air Force

By Phillip C. Saunders and Erik R. Quam

The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is in the midst of a modernization campaign aimed at retiring and replacing obsolete aircraft designed in the 1950s and 1960s. While modernization has been under way in earnest for the past 15 years, China's air force is still in a transition phase, caught in the middle ground between the type of force that the PLAAF fielded over its first 50 years and the development of a new air force with modern equipment, doctrine, and capabilities.

The thousands of J–6 fighters that once made up the fighter fleet have been retired: about 1,000 older J–7 and J–8 fighters remain in service, including 32 Russian-built Su-27UBK multirole fighters and 116 Chinese-assembled Su–27 variants; 73 Russian Su–33MKK fighters; and 62 of the new, indigenously produced J–10 multirole fighters. China is also developing and purchasing force multipliers, including advanced transport aircraft, tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft.

The Chinese vision is of a highly trained modern air force equipped with high-tech aircraft, advanced precision-guided munitions, support aircraft that serve as force multipliers, and networked command and control and intelligence capabilities that allow the PLAAF to fight and win a high-tech war under "informationalized" conditions. This force not only would be more capable of carrying out missions such as air defense and support for ground forces against a modern adversary but also could undertake offensive strikes against ground and naval targets farther from China's borders.

The new PLAAF will integrate support systems such as airborne early warning aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and intelligence collection and jamming aircraft to increase the effectiveness of combat aircraft and enhance warfighting capability.

Modernization will also include larger numbers of more capable air transports, which will enhance the effectiveness of PLAAF airborne forces for internal and external missions.

The Chinese air force of the future will consist of fewer but more capable aircraft and support systems. Yet the total size and precise mix of foreign and domestic aircraft remain open questions. This article seeks to illuminate the future force structure of the PLAAF by exploring the different ways of thinking about the role of the air force within overall PLA modernization plans, as well as the potential roles it will play in future PLA missions. It begins with a concise breakdown of the PLAAF as it stands now and is shaping for the future. It then shifts to the potential influences and missions that Beijing will weigh in making determinations for modernization. These influences are already affecting PLAAF transformation.

An Evolving Force

The PLAAF is now in transition between the limited force consisting mainly of obsolete capabilities that it fielded in the 1980s, and the more advanced force that it intends to field in the coming decades. The new PLAAF will be a smaller force, composed primarily of third- and fourth-generation multirole fighters and fighter-bombers. It is uncertain whether China will decide to build or acquire new bombers, but the deployment of advanced cruise missiles should allow existing bombers to contribute more effectively to a variety of missions, including antiship and ground attack taskings. The new air force will also fully integrate support systems.
systems such as airborne early warning (AEW)/airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), aerial refueling tankers, intelligence collection, and signal jamming aircraft to increase the effectiveness of combat aircraft and enhance warfighting capability. Modernization will also include larger numbers of more advanced air transports, which will enhance the effectiveness of PLAAF airborne forces for both internal security and external missions. The air force will continue to modernize its ground-based air defenses and will likely seek to develop more effective defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles.

The J–6 fighters that once made up most of the fighter fleet have all been retired. The PLAAF’s future aircraft are beginning to enter the force, although the total number and precise mix of foreign and domestic aircraft remain unknown. The PLAAF now has 15 years of experience with the Su-27 fighter as well as with Su-30s and J–10s and modern surface-to-air missiles. The Su-27s and Su-30s are being complemented with the J–11, the Chinese-assembled version of the Su-27. Initial “coproduction” involved Chinese assembly of aircraft kits provided by the Russians, but the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation plans to increase the proportion of domestically produced components for the J–11 gradually. Throughout the 1990s, there were concerns in Beijing that the Russians were not giving China the most advanced version of the Su-27 but were offering more advanced versions of the aircraft to India. The Su-27SM system exhibited at the Zhuhai Air Show was reported to have upgrades aimed at addressing China’s concerns, including multifunction liquid crystal displays and a precision navigation system incorporating laser gyroscopes and a Global Navigation Satellite System/NAVSTAR receiver. China has continued to purchase Russian-built Su-30s and to assemble J–11/Su-27 aircraft.

The J–10 is China’s first domestically produced fourth-generation aircraft and will likely make up a large portion of the future force. The J–10 is a highly capable, multirole fighter strongly influenced by the Israeli Lavi, which was influenced by the F–16. The J–10 is equipped with aerial refueling capabilities that significantly improve its range and flexibility. The J–10 has entered into serial production, and some 60 aircraft (enough to equip about three Chinese aircraft regiments) are reportedly deployed.

The PLAAF may also field the Xiaolong/FC–1, an indigenously developed fighter that is the product of a Chinese-Pakistani joint venture. Originally known as the Super-7, the project goal was to upgrade the J–7 into a more capable fighter with an advanced engine and upgraded Western avionics to provide an effective but less expensive fighter. The PLAAF is reportedly not enthusiastic about acquiring the Xiaolong, but the producer, the Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Group, is pushing for PLAAF purchases in order to validate the aircraft for foreign customers. The Xiaolong/FC–1 would provide a less expensive alternative to the fourth-generation aircraft the PLAAF is currently acquiring.

Along with fighters, the PLAAF will continue to modernize its ground-attack and bomber forces. China’s efforts to improve its ground-attack capabilities include development of the JH–7/FB–7 Flying Leopard. Although the JH–7 is a multirole aircraft, its limited capabilities against modern fighters suggest that it will be used mainly for ground attack and antiship missions. The JH–7 is capable of carrying C–801/802 antiship missiles and was initially deployed with the PLA Navy (PLAN). About 20 JH–7s are currently deployed with the PLAAF 28th Air Division in Hangzhou. The air force ground-attack aircraft. Production of the H–6/Badger bomber has resumed, with an emphasis on a new variant capable of carrying antiship and land-attack cruise missiles. Chinese military Web sites show pictures of the H–6 and the modified H–6D with cruise missiles on them as well as pictures of the H–6 firing cruise missiles from the air. The H–6’s vulnerability to modern air defenses suggests that it will likely be employed as a standoff platform to deliver cruise missiles outside the range of enemy air defenses. It is still unclear if the Chinese intend to upgrade the bomber fleet with the Russian Tu-22 and Tu-95 bombers.

The Chinese press has openly discussed the pros and cons of those aircraft, but thus far there has been no decision to purchase either one. Chinese sources have indicated that the only reason the PLAAF would want to acquire new strategic bombers would be to prevent the United States from entering any Taiwan scenario. Some Chinese analysts believe the purchase of these aircraft would mark a significant shift in the balance of power in Asia.

The PLAAF will also develop and deploy force multipliers that will enhance the capabilities of its combat aircraft. These systems will include tankers, AEW aircraft, electronic warfare and intelligence collection aircraft, and transports that will support a rapid-response capability for internal and external contingencies. The S–30 can be refueled by the Il-76/Midas tankers, with four already ordered from Russia although not yet delivered because of a production problem. The J–8s and J–10s can be refueled by HY–6 tankers, a modified H–6 platform. Expansion of the tanker force and delivery of the Il-78 will extend the range and endurance of the PLAAF refuelable combat aircraft.

China has made several efforts to acquire or develop AEW and AWACS capabilities, but current information suggests that only limited progress has been made. Some Chinese sources take the position that AEW would be more beneficial to the PLAAF than AWACS since it would require fewer changes in current operational practices. China reportedly signed a deal in 1996 to acquire the A–501 Phalcon AWACS from Israel, but the purchase was canceled in July 2000 after the Israeli government came under pressure from the Clinton administration. China’s initial effort to develop a domestic AEW

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The People’s Liberation Army Air Force will be a smaller force, composed primarily of third- and fourth-generation multirole fighters and fighter-bombers.
capability used the Il-76 as a platform for the KJ-2000, equipped with indigenously designed phased-array radar. Research and development on this system has reportedly made significant progress, but the program was set back by the crash of a prototype in June 2006 that killed some 40 technicians. A second domestic AEW program, the KJ-2, is being developed based on the Chinese Y-8X transport aircraft. Both the KJ-2 and the KJ-2000 are to be equipped with data links compatible with the J-7, J-8, J-10, JH-7, and H-6. Both of the domestic AEWs carry phased-array radar. The PLAAF is also making efforts to modernize its transport fleet, focusing primarily on the Il-76/Candid, the Chinese Y-8 and Y-9, and the Soviet Antonov An-12. Along with these dedicated transports, Chinese airlines fly large numbers of commercial aircraft that could be pressed into service in a crisis.

Future Size
The preceding section has examined the modernization programs under way and the aircraft and systems that will constitute the future PLAAF. However, the ultimate size of the future force is unclear, with questions remaining about what quantity and mix of aircraft China will eventually deploy. A number of influences and perspectives will shape what the air force looks like. Leaders will have to balance modernization goals between somewhat competing sets of factors. This section describes five perspectives that may influence the future size and composition of the PLAAF.

The first perspective focuses on China’s external security environment, the military missions derived from potential threats, and the air force capabilities and force structure necessary to carry out these missions. The 1991 Gulf War highlighted to the Chinese how advanced U.S. military capabilities and operational concepts could make a country vulnerable, prompting intensified efforts to build a more advanced and capable PLA. Beginning in 1993, Beijing’s sense that momentum toward Taiwan independence was growing further accelerated PLA modernization. The issue of Taiwan threatened to bring China and the PLAAF into direct confrontation with the United States, a possibility made clear with the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers to the vicinity of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Most of the aircraft acquisitions and development programs shaping today’s PLAAF were initiated prior to the leadership’s intensified concern about Taiwan independence, including the acquisition of Russian Su-27/Flanker fighters, the J-10 fighter development program, and initial efforts to build tankers and AEWs.

The threat of Taiwan independence led the PLAAF to build near-term combat capabilities through purchase and coproduction of Russian multirole fighters, such as the Su-30, while decreasing the emphasis on strategic air force assets such as tankers and strategic bombers. The general assessment of the international security environment will continue to influence overall Chinese defense budgets and the resources available for army building, but specific contingencies might shape air force modernization more directly. Some of these scenarios include a relatively benign security environment in which the air force concentrates on its air defense mission. This would imply greater emphasis on air bases and air defense assets along China’s land and maritime borders and a relative neglect of long-range strike capabilities. This scenario would see decreased emphasis on long-range bombers and aerial refueling capabilities, including tanker acquisition. Another scenario would have the air force focusing on power projection into the East China and South China Seas to ensure a PLAAF capability to protect vital Chinese sea lines of communication. This would imply greater emphasis on aerial refueling capabilities, overwater flight training, long-duration maritime patrol and intelligence collection, and perhaps strategic bombing capabilities. This scenario might bring the PLAAF into conflict with the PLAN naval aviation over responsibilities for these missions.

A third scenario would involve greater attention to potential threats from Japan and India. This scenario might also include preparation for dangers stemming from the U.S. Air Force beyond Taiwan, which would be the most demanding scenario for the PLAAF. This would require a greater emphasis on training operations in preparation for well-equipped air forces. Geographically, the PLAAF might redeploy its assets in order to increase its capabilities to strike India and, to a lesser extent, Japan. The lack of overseas bases constrains the contributions that tactical aviation assets (such as multirole fighters) can make to scenarios that require long-range operations. Air refueling can help extend the operational range of tactical aircraft but is an imperfect substitute for overseas bases. Without overseas bases, the PLAAF might be at a disadvantage relative to the navy and the Second Artillery in fighting for budget resources in some scenarios.

A second means of assessing the future size for the PLAAF and Beijing’s modernization choices is to look at the potential military requirements associated with China’s growing international interests. Continued economic growth and global integration have increased dependence on foreign sources of energy (especially oil and gas) as well as access to international markets to maintain that economic growth. This is stimulating a more activist foreign policy that may eventually require new military missions. The extent to which expanding international interests translate into new military requirements for the PLAAF will depend on how Chinese leaders decide to pursue their interests and the relative value of military instruments (especially airpower). To date, the leaders have stressed Beijing’s peaceful development and downplayed the potential for using force to pursue national interests. If this approach continues, the most likely new missions for the PLAAF would be strategic airlift to support Chinese contributions to international peacekeeping, disaster relief, and evacuation of Chinese nationals from conflict zones. A
The overall balance between offensive and defensive capabilities, emphasis placed on air force missions and campaigns, and relative contributions the PLAAF can make to joint campaigns will all influence the size of the air force compared to other services. The 2004 Defense White Paper called for “giving priority to the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force,” implying the need for greater investment in air capabilities. However, ground force officers remain dominant within the PLA, so parochial service considerations are likely to continue to influence resource allocation.

A fifth approach would emphasize building the PLAAF into a modern air force capable of engaging and defeating other air forces. Here the most ambitious benchmark would be the ability to engage and defeat the U.S. Air Force. A less ambitious goal would be to tackle modern Asian air forces such as those of India and Japan. This approach implies the development of advanced fighters and force multipliers such as tankers and AWACS aircraft. In terms of force structure, such an approach would emphasize additional procurement of Russian aircraft, efforts to acquire advanced Western technology for Chinese platforms, and a reluctance to procure less capable indigenous systems.

These five perspectives outline different ways of thinking about the future size of the PLAAF. Each suggests a different view about the role the air force might play in national security and what force structure would be appropriate. However, none provides a straightforward prediction as to what the future force will look like. In reality, the PLAAF force structure will be the product of a political process that incorporates some aspects of each of these perspectives.

How top civilian leaders assess the overall international security environment and the resources they are willing to devote to military modernization will shape the overall budget and policy environment in which air force modernization takes place. A leadership reassessment of China’s security environment might change the relative priority and resources devoted to modernization.
For example, the need to prepare for a conflict over Taiwan independence has been a key justification for increased military spending in recent years. If the Taiwan situation appears more stable and the international environment is relatively benign, the need for increased military spending may be less persuasive to civilian leaders focused on domestic priorities, such as promoting development and reducing inequality between urban and rural parts of China. There are some indications that PLA strategists are beginning to look beyond the Taiwan issue and articulate the rationale for building a military capable of global operations in defense of China’s sea lines of communication and expanding global interests. It is unclear how persuasive this rationale will be to national leaders. Conversely, a downturn in Sino-U.S. relations could reinforce concerns about potential threats posed by the United States and cause an increased emphasis on military modernization.

Modernization Paths

Modernization is to maintain present efforts and relative emphasis on support aircraft. The most likely path for PLAAF force structure will be shaped by narrower decisions about the division of labor on air defense and conventional strike missions, proper tradeoffs between foreign and domestic production, high-tech versus lower-cost systems, and relative emphasis on support aircraft. The most likely path for PLAAF modernization is to maintain present efforts to build the air force using a variety of means, including ongoing procurement of advanced aircraft from Russia, continued domestic efforts to design and produce advanced aircraft, and incorporation of imported engines, avionics, and munitions into Chinese aircraft designs. The preference is to gradually shift away from foreign procurement and use of foreign components as the domestic aviation industry’s capabilities to produce advanced aircraft and components improve.

Three variations on this force modernization path illustrate alternative possibilities.

Efforts to Maximize Capability Quickly. This path would likely flow from a leadership assessment that China’s security environment was deteriorating and that more resources needed to be devoted to accelerate military modernization. The likely consequences would be increased procurement of foreign aircraft, redoubled efforts to acquire foreign AEW/ACWACS, tanker, and transport aircraft, and accelerated production of both high- and medium-quality indigenous aircraft. Efforts to replace imported components with Chinese-produced equivalents would be deemphasized in favor of buying increased stocks of critical foreign components. Given procurement and production lead times, this scenario would require at least 2 to 3 years to produce substantial gains in capability. The PLAAF’s ability to absorb and employ additional aircraft would be constrained by its capacity to train pilots and maintenance personnel and the time needed to upgrade units to operate more advanced aircraft.

A High-Tech Air Force. This path would emphasize advanced aircraft, support systems, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities to integrate aircraft into informationized operations. The PLAAF would focus procurement on Russian fighters and possibly the J–10 fighter while procuring few if any FC–1 or JH–7 aircraft. China might also explore “co-development” of new advanced aircraft with Russian partners as a means of upgrading its aircraft inventory and improving the research and development capability of its defense industry. The PLAAF would retire older aircraft as more capable replacements entered the force in order to focus its resources on advanced aircraft. Investment in support aircraft such as AEW/ACWACS and tankers would be a priority, with renewed efforts to procure foreign platforms and technology combined with intensified indigenous development. The PLAAF would resist efforts to replace foreign engines and avionics with Chinese-produced equivalents that did not deliver the same performance or reliability.

A Domestically Produced Air Force. This path would emphasize indigenous efforts to produce advanced weapons and seek to avoid reliance on foreign suppliers. It implies less emphasis on procurement of Russian aircraft, increased purchases of J–10 fighters (and possibly FC–1 and JH–7 aircraft), and enhanced efforts to replace foreign engines and avionics with indigenous equivalents. Development of force multipliers such as AEW/ACWACS, tankers, and transports would depend on how quickly the defense industry’s research and development efforts progressed. A spiral development model where initial capabilities were deployed and then improved over time would be a possibility. This approach implies a more relaxed pace of modernization but would lay a firmer foundation for future Chinese efforts to develop advanced aircraft. This path would likely result from leadership confidence that the security environment was improving and that a military conflict was unlikely in the midterm.

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force hopes to build a force consisting primarily of advanced aircraft integrated with effective support systems, with the capability of conducting offensive strike missions against ground and naval targets and effective air defense against advanced militaries. This air force would be capable of conducting and supporting joint operations and would rely heavily on networking and informationization to employ airpower effectively. These aspirations will likely be constrained by the current technological limitations of the Chinese aviation industry and by the resources made available to support defense modernization. One of the biggest uncertainties is whether the air force will choose (or be forced) to procure large quantities of less capable aircraft to support the Chinese aircraft industry or to support the leadership’s goal of indigenous innovation and self-reliance. Decisions about
how many J–10, FC–1, and JH–7 fighters to procure will be a key indicator. In theory, the defense reorganization of 1998 that established the General Armaments Department should give air force requirements greater weight in procurement decisions, but this may not be true in practice.

Chinese leadership perceptions of the international threat environment (to include assessments of the likelihood of a crisis over Taiwan or a conflict with the United States) and budget allocations will have a significant influence on the overall size of the future People’s Liberation Army and the speed with which modernization takes place. Nevertheless, it is already clear that the future People’s Liberation Army Air Force will be a significantly smaller but more capable air force. 

NOTES


4 “Wen Wei Po Quotes ‘Authoritative’ Sources on Decommissioning of Jiaan–6 Fighters,” Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), February 8, 2007, available at Open Source Center; “WWP: Chinese Air Force to Acquire Several Hundred ‘Xiaolong Fighters’” (FBIS CPP20070208710004).


14 The authors thank Richard Fisher, Jr., for providing a copy of this article.


18 Kahn; Colton.


21 Kenneth Allen, Glen Krumel, and Jonathan Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 114.


23 Ibid.

24 For a useful discussion, see Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005).
China has arrived as a truly global actor. Its economic and political interests now span the globe, having gradually moved beyond the Asia-Pacific in the last decade. Beijing is active on issues and in regions previously peripheral to its diplomatic calculations. Its foreign policy decisions are influencing global perceptions, institutions, relationships, and processes. China’s global activism is altering—but not transforming—the conduct of international relations at virtually all levels of the system. Within Asia, China has become a preeminent power, engaged in multiple dimensions of regional economic and security affairs. Indeed, it has become a fulcrum of change in the regional order, ensuring that its pivotal role will deepen in the coming years. Moreover, it is no longer appropriate to talk of drawing China into the existing international community of accepted norms, rules, and institutions. On balance, it is already there.

These trends beg questions: What is China up to in international affairs, and why? What are its aims as a regional power and as an emerging global actor? How is it pursuing them? Are its approaches consistent with America’s current economic and security interests? What types of diplomatic challenges does China present to U.S. diplomatic and security interests?

To some extent, China’s leaders have articulated answers to these questions. Its policymakers claim that they seek “to foster a stable and peaceful international environment that is conducive to building a well-off society in an all around way.” They assert that the themes of “peace, development and cooperation” now define Chinese foreign policy in pursuit of building a “harmonious world” in international affairs. It is not that these claims are patently untrue or a clever strategic prevarication. Rather, they are simply insufficient to explain the multiplicity of diplomatic strategies, interests, and actions. In other words, there is more to China’s foreign policy. This article aims to fill these gaps.

To this end, this article examines China’s current international behavior, which is a collective term encompassing both foreign relations (bilateral and multilateral) and the foreign policies used to pursue them. It argues that China’s international behavior is best understood as being comprised of multiple layers, each adding to our understanding of the strategies, drivers, and tools informing China’s diplomacy. The layers are the historically determined lenses through which Chinese policymakers view the world and think about Beijing’s role in it: perceptions of the current international security environment; five core diplomatic objectives in regional and global affairs; specific
foreign policy actions in pursuit of national objectives; and the multiple challenges facing China in achieving these objectives.

Each section of this article addresses one of these layers. The conclusion addresses the implications of China’s international behavior for U.S. security interests, with a focus on the degree of convergence and divergence in U.S. and Chinese global interests in the coming two decades.

**Foreign Policy Outlook**

China’s international behavior is influenced by at least three historically determined lenses that color the manner in which its policymakers and analysts look at the world and think about China’s evolving role in international affairs.

First and foremost, there is a strong and pervasive belief within China that the nation is in the process of reclaiming its lost status as not only a major regional power but also, eventually, a global one. Policymakers, analysts, and media write about the rise as a “re-ivalization” (fixing) or “rejuvenation” (zhengxiao) of China’s rightful place in the world as a great power. In Chinese eyes, their country is undergoing its fourth rise in the international system over the last 5,000 years.

A second and related view among strategists is the notion that China is a victim of “100 years of shame and humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers who sought to split and Westernize it. Beginning with the Opium War in the 1840s and not ending until Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China felt subjugated and violated by interventions from external powers, especially Japan. This victimization narrative has created an acute sensitivity to potential infringements on national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Third, China possesses a “defensive security outlook” in which its strategists are preoccupied with external threats and constraints on its actions. This mindset manifests itself in policies focused on maximizing security around China’s periphery and maintaining its autonomy in international affairs. Fearful of the use of threats or actual use of military force to coerce Beijing into taking unwanted actions, Chinese leaders seek to secure their freedom from external restrictions on the protection of their vital security and economic interests. There is little talk about territorial aggrandizement or the need for external adventurism to facilitate national rejuvenation, which is an important manifestation of this defensive security outlook.

China’s international behavior is also informed by the three enduring diplomatic priorities of ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic development, and international respect and status. These have been collectively driving foreign and security policy since the founding of the PRC. Yet the policy manifestations of these three strategic priorities and the leadership’s relative emphasis on them have varied in the last 25 years and will continue to do so. Most notably, the emphasis on development as a foreign policy priority has gained prominence since the initiation of reform and openness policies in the late 1970s.

**International Security Environment**

Assessments of the current international security environment are the building blocks of Chinese foreign policy. These perceptions are the basis on which leaders determine foreign policy interests and policy objectives. A defining element of current perceptions is the pervasive uncertainty about the range and severity of threats to national interests. For some, China has never been as secure in the last 200 years as now, when its global power and influence are rising. For others, the security threats facing the nation are acute and growing, and this situation is exacerbated by internal challenges that divert attention from the former. There are six major perceptions that inform foreign and security policies.

**No Major Power War.** A consistent feature of Chinese assessments of the current global security environment is the low probability of war among major powers. This judgment is key because it reinforces the political rationale for pursuit of a foreign policy that continues integration with the international community. As a reflection of this, Jiang Zemin declared in 2002 that the next 20 years was a period of “strategic opportunity” (zhanlue jiyuqi) to reach a new level of national development.

**Globalization.** Chinese policymakers regularly highlight that globalization has redefined interstate economic and political interactions since the Cold War, resulting in both opportunities and constraints. China believes that it has benefited from globalization on balance. Globalization has enhanced interdependence among states and increased the relevance of economic power, positive-sum interactions, and soft power in international affairs, all of which Beijing seeks to leverage in its diplomacy.

**The Global Power Balance.** Following the Cold War, most Chinese analysts predicted a swift evolution from the bipolar international system to one initially dominated by U.S. power and, eventually, to a multipolar system. Such a multipolar configuration has evolved far more slowly than most Chinese expected. Policymakers have been surprised by the U.S. ability to maintain its position of unipolar dominance. In particular, they are concerned with the perceived U.S. willingness to circumvent international organizations and use military force to resolve diplomatic problems. Among Chinese policymakers, the U.S. unipolar position in international affairs
Energy Insecurity. Beijing’s concerns about energy security have emerged as a new and influential factor affecting how it views its international security environment. For China, energy security is defined in terms of two issues, price volatility and security of delivery, and it sees itself as vulnerable on both fronts. These concerns increasingly influence its pursuit of new sources of energy in the Middle East and Africa.

China’s Rise. Chinese statements and analyses regularly tout the “rise of China” as an influential factor in global economic and security affairs. These claims underscore China’s nascent confidence in its growing influence in bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly within Asia. In this context, Chinese analysts and policymakers highlight Beijing’s desire to use its status and influence to shape the rules and norms of multilateral organizations in ways consistent with national interests.

Foreign Policy Objectives

The lenses through which China looks at the world, its long-term diplomatic priorities, and its perceptions of its external security environment are collectively reflected in five specific foreign policy objectives. Some are government articulated priorities, while others are analytical extrapolations from Chinese analyses and government actions.

The first foreign policy objective is maintaining a favorable and stable international environment in order to facilitate continued economic reform, development, and modernization within the country. China seeks to minimize security threats on its periphery that would divert resources from domestic priorities. This guiding principle has been the core foreign policy objective during the reform era beginning in the late 1970s. Yet in recent years, Chinese leaders have become acutely aware of the growing linkages between domestic affairs and international behavior. As its 2006 Defense White Paper stated, “Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today.” A related dimension of the domestic-external linkage is that China needs to expand access to trade, investment, and technology to keep its economy growing; therefore, it must build and maintain bilateral relationships that will ensure continued access to these critical inputs to national development.

A second foreign policy objective is reassurance. Policymakers are aware of the concerns among China’s neighbors that its consistent economic growth and military modernization may threaten their economic and security interests. In response, Beijing has adopted a regional strategy that seeks to reassure Asian states that it would not undermine their economic and security interests and would even seek to bolster them. Beijing is pursuing this strategy by spreading the benefits of economic growth and negotiating resolutions to longstanding regional disputes. This strategy is encapsulated, in part, in a diplomatic policy of “peaceful rise/development.”

A third objective can be called countercontainment. It encompasses policies that seek to reduce the ability or willingness of other nations to contain, constrain, or otherwise hinder China’s rise. Concerns about U.S. policy toward China and Asia motivate this objective. Beijing’s diplomacy in Central, East, and Southeast Asia seeks to forge relationships and create a political environment in which the United States can never work in concert with other Asian states to balance or contain Chinese power. Specifically, Beijing’s foreign policy seeks to build bilateral relationships in Asia in which regional policymakers are sensitive to China’s perspective on the Taiwan question and are unwilling to assist the United States in a cross-strait military conflict. To be sure, this objective is not necessarily the driving force in Chinese regional policy or global diplomacy. A core dimension of the countercontainment strategy is that Beijing seeks to take such steps in a manner that avoids confrontation with Washington.

A fourth and relatively new objective for China’s foreign policy is diversifying its access to energy and other natural resources. China is now the world’s second largest consumer of oil and third largest oil importer. Resource access has assumed a greater priority in recent years and increasingly influences China’s diplomacy in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Energy security encompasses diversifying both suppliers and supply routes.2

A final objective is reducing Taiwan’s international space. China seeks to limit the ability of other nations to confer status on Taiwan. This objective is long-standing and is part and parcel of an incessant effort to prevent Taiwan’s independence and, ultimately, to foster reunification. China’s desire to eliminate Taiwan’s international space is evident in both its multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, and that has been the case for decades. This objective is most relevant to Chinese action in Latin America, Africa, and the South Pacific.
Foreign Policy Actions

China has adopted numerous specific policy actions in pursuit of its five objectives. Many of these have registered substantial success. Beijing has sought to expand the quality and quantity of its bilateral relationships in regions far from Asia. This has been accomplished by establishing “strategic partnerships” with developed and developing countries as well as with entire regions, such as Africa (see table 1). China has also initiated senior-level “strategic dialogues” with many of these nations to further deepen political relationships in order to generate influence and leverage. For China, these partnerships are not quasimilitary alliances that involve extensive security cooperation, as implied by the term strategic. Rather, in the Chinese lexicon, a partnership is strategic by dint of two dimensions: it is comprehensive, including all aspects of bilateral relations (for example, economic, cultural, political, security); and both countries agree to make a long-term commitment to bilateral relations, in which problems and tensions are evaluated in that context.

Beijing has embraced multilateral organizations in numerous regions and on several functional issues. In the last decade, its diplomacy has shifted 180 degrees, from reviling multilateral organizations to embracing them, especially in Asia. China now uses these forums to reassess regional nations about its intentions and to grow its access and influence. In Africa and the Middle East, membership in regional organizations has become a staple of outreach to regions that were traditionally peripheral to Chinese interests. Beijing has even created a few multilateral arrangements of its own, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (see tables 2 and 3).

One of the most striking features of China’s international behavior in the past decade has been the growing number of diplomatic tools that it has operationalized in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. At least three new (or newly enhanced) categories of such tools can be identified: economic, military, and leadership. Beijing’s economic diplomacy is robust and multifaceted, including not only trade but also outward direct investment, foreign assistance (development and humanitarian), and free-trade agreements. Chinese leaders are seeking to share the largesse of their growing economy as a means of generating political influence. Their military diplomacy is far more robust and systematic than in past years; it now includes participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping activities and international exchanges including joint military exercises and various types of intelligence exchanges. China’s top leaders now travel abroad far more frequently and in strategic pursuit of their country’s proliferating global interests. In sum, Chinese foreign policy in the last 5 to 10 years has developed and deployed an abundance of new and effective means to shape its external environment in pursuit of its five core foreign policy objectives.

Challenges Facing Diplomacy

Beijing confronts several challenges to its pursuit of effective diplomacy. Some stem from domestic circumstances that impact its foreign policy, and others from regional reactions to its growing power:

- Leaders will likely confront the problem of rising expectations. As Beijing positions itself as central to Asian economic and security affairs, it is not clear that China has the intention or capacity to consistently meet external expectations of its self-proclaimed status as “a responsible major power”—or that its expectations of its role will match those of its neighbors.
- An occasionally coercive approach toward other states about their Taiwan policy reveals the limits of Beijing’s effort to appear as a moderate, benign, and unique rising power. Its actions on Taiwan occasionally remind Asian states of the uglier side of Chinese diplomacy.
- Numerous governance challenges directly and indirectly affect external perceptions of China and of Beijing’s ability to carry out effective diplomacy. These challenges frustrate the government’s ability to manage internal problems (such as environmental pollution) that often spill over to neighbors and also hinder the government’s ability to comply fully with its bilateral and multilateral trade and security commitments. This fosters external perceptions of an unreliable partner and a source of regional instability. Poor management of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak in 2003 offers a prominent example of this challenge.
- As China “goes global” with outward investment and acquisition of foreign natural resources, Beijing runs the risk of being seen as an extractive economy that takes much from developing nations but contributes little to their economic development. Thus, it may face a limited backlash in the coming years about its foreign investment practices. Recent anti-China riots at a copper mine in Zambia could be a harbinger of a broader trend.

Understanding the Totality

Given these multiple layers to China’s international behavior, what does all of this mean for our understanding of Beijing’s current and future role in global politics?

From the vantage point of 2007, China is not ideologically driven in a manner that motivates a revolutionary foreign policy that seeks to acquire territory, forge anti-U.S. balancing coalitions, or otherwise dismantle the core elements of the current international system. While China is dissatisfied with certain attributes of the status quo (for example, the standing of Taiwan and perceived American unilateralism), it is benefiting from and leveraging numerous dimensions of the current system to pursue its core goal of national revitalization through the accumulation of “comprehensive national power.”

Diversification is one concept that nicely encompasses multiple implications of China’s current international behavior. This is a strategy partly by design and partly by default:

- China is diversifying the sources of economic inputs, including access to foreign markets, investment, technology, and strategic resources. For example, economic interactions with the European Union and Africa have consistently and substantially grown in the last decade. The result is reduced reliance on one or a small number of economies, while at the same time there is a growing overall reliance on external sources of economic goods.
- Sources of security are being diversified by developing or improving relations with a variety of power centers and international institutions. This approach creates multiple types of leverage for China and minimizes its reliance on stable and positive relations with a single major power for its security, namely the United States.
- Sources of international status and legitimacy are being diversified. For decades
### Table 1. China’s Strategic Partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formulation</th>
<th>Date/Venue</th>
<th>Joint Military Exercises</th>
<th>Recognize China as a “Market Economy”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Joint maritime search and rescue exercise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2004; Wen Jiabao visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2004; Wen Jiabao visit</td>
<td>Joint maritime search and rescue exercise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2005; Hu Jintao visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>All Around Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2005; Hu Jintao visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>November 2005; Hu Jintao visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>Long-term and Stable Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>1996; Jiang Zemin visit</td>
<td></td>
<td>November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXICO</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2005; Hu Jintao visit</td>
<td></td>
<td>November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2005; Wen Jiabao visit</td>
<td></td>
<td>December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIAN</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2005; Wen Jiabao visit</td>
<td>Joint maritime search and rescue exercise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAZAKHSTAN</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2005; Hu Jintao visit</td>
<td>Joint counterterrorism exercise with Shanghai Cooperation Organization states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2005; Hu Jintao visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2004; Zeng Qinghong visit; expanded June 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes (date unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2005 Nigerian President Obasanjo’s visit to China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2004; Hu Jintao visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION</td>
<td>Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>2003 during Sixth EU summit</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity</td>
<td>2003 during Ninth ASEAN+1 meeting in Bali, Indonesia</td>
<td>All ASEAN countries have recognized such status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Multiple English news reports based on searches in Lexis-Nexis news database and Chinese media sources. The Chinese search terms were “zhuanzuo” (strategic), “huoban” (partner), and “guanxi” (relations).
### Table 2. China’s Membership in Regional Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Organization</th>
<th>Level of Participation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Other Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS + 1</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>ASEAN + China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS + 3</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>ASEAN + China, Japan, South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS REGIONAL FORUM</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>10 ASEAN members, 11 &quot;Dialogue Partners&quot; (Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, United States), Papua New Guinea, Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>November 1991</td>
<td>Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, United States, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST ASIA COMMUNITY</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>10 ASEAN members, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN COOPERATION DIALOGUE</td>
<td>Founding Member</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH ASIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHANGHAI COOPERATION ASSOCIATION</td>
<td>Founding Member</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATIN AMERICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35 independent nations of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>35 independent nations of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45 African countries attended the first forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION FORUM</td>
<td>Founding Member</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE EAST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22 countries of the Arab League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL</td>
<td>Cooperative partner, FTA agreement under negotiation</td>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA-ARAB COOPERATION FORUM</td>
<td>Founding Member</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>China and 22 countries of the Arab League</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Multiple English news reports based on searches in Lexis-Nexis news database and Chinese media sources. The Chinese search terms were “zhanlue” (strategic), “huoban” (partner), and “guanxi” (relations).

### Table 3. Regional Organizations Established by China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Ministerial/Summit Meetings</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHANGHAI COOPERATION ASSOCIATION</td>
<td>April 1996 (Shanghai 5), June 2001 (SCO)</td>
<td>Six summit meetings as of June 2006, and many other ministerial meetings</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION FORUM</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>Two minister-level conferences held October 2000 and December 2003; first summit-level meeting November 2006</td>
<td>45 African countries attended the first Ministerial Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA-ARAB COOPERATION FORUM</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>Two ministerial conferences held September 2004, May 2006</td>
<td>22 countries of the Arab League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOAO FORUM FOR ASIA</td>
<td>February 2001</td>
<td>Five annual conferences held</td>
<td>25 countries in Asia, and Australia attended inaugural conference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Multiple English news reports based on searches in Lexis-Nexis news database and Chinese media sources. The Chinese search terms were “zhanlue” (strategic), “huoban” (partner), and “guanxi” (relations).
China grounded its status as a major power on a narrow set of national attributes that included UN Security Council membership, possession of nuclear weapons, large size and population, and historical legacy as a great Asian power. It has begun to broaden the base of its global status by highlighting its developmental successes over the last 25 years and its willingness to share these with other states. In addition, Beijing is redefining its international profile away from viewing global affairs as a “struggle” in which it must oppose “hegemony and power politics.” It is now promoting more positive concepts such as “development,” “cooperation,” and fostering a “harmonious world” as the basis of its foreign policy.

Overall, China’s twin goals of maintaining economic growth and domestic stability (and thus the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party) remain the prevailing drivers of its external behavior. Its foreign policy seeks primarily to reduce vulnerabilities to various external threats while maximizing its influence, leverage, and freedom of action in order to acquire the inputs for continued economic growth and, ultimately, to secure its reemergence as a great power. Chinese international behavior over the last two and a half decades has also demonstrated a willingness (at times a reluctant and coerced variety) to abide by the major attributes of the prevailing international norms, rules, and institutions in pursuit of these two core goals.

To be sure, China increasingly wants a seat at the table to play a greater role in modifying and shaping global rules and institutions. This is already evident in its multilateral diplomacy, which involves creating multilateral organizations as well as expanding its participation in existing ones. China’s role as an agenda- and rule-setter will become a more prominent feature of its diplomacy in the coming years.

Moreover, China’s international behavior is a deeply transitional phenomenon. It is neither fixed nor certain. Beijing’s interests, goals, and self-image as a global actor are continually evolving. While policymakers clearly have strategic objectives in mind, they are feeling their way forward with a foreign policy that is increasingly affected by domestic imperatives (which both shape and are shaped by China’s international behavior) and a highly dynamic international security environment. Chinese foreign policy reflects a continual balancing of competing internal and external demands, which are growing in number and variety.

Implications for the United States

These trends raise several issues for U.S. policymakers and analysts. First, Chinese diplomacy is not focused on directly competing with or challenging the current U.S. position of predominance in global affairs. To be sure, Beijing is trying to reduce the U.S. ability to constrain Chinese choices, especially in Asia where its interests are greatest. It is normal and expected for competition to be a dimension of U.S.-China relations—or U.S. relations with other major powers. The issue is the nature and scope of that competition. To date, the evidence suggests that adversarial security competition is limited, and Beijing wants to keep it that way for at least the next two decades. Taiwan, however, is the obvious exception.

Second, as China’s global interests grow, U.S. and Chinese interests and practices will inevitably bump up against one another, regardless of whether it is Beijing’s intention to confront Washington. This is beginning to occur in Africa and within UN deliberations. In such instances, the conceptual and policy differences on foreign policy between the United States and China, such as over Chinese views on human rights and local governance practices, will come into starker relief. Yet as China’s global interests expand and its identity as an international actor evolves, the possibilities for greater U.S.-China cooperation on common security challenges may grow as well. Climate change and energy security are two prominent examples of cooperation with strategic implications.
Third, as China diversifies along the three vectors noted above, its foreign policy will likely become decreasingly dependent on amicable relations with the United States. Beijing may feel less need to accommodate U.S. concerns and better able to resist American pressure as it pursues its global interests. This will complicate Washington’s ability to shape Chinese policy preferences and could add to the competitive aspects of bilateral relations.

Lastly, the highly transitional nature of Beijing’s international behavior still provides the United States with additional opportunities to jumpstart debates within China about how it defines its global interests and its rights and responsibilities as a global actor. China is debating what it means to be a great power in the 21st century at the very time the international community wants to know how China will use its growing power and status. Thus, there is time and space for the United States and the international community to influence Chinese answers to these critical questions.

These considerations raise additional issues about the future direction of Chinese foreign policy and the future of U.S.-China security relations:

- Can China really avoid the mistakes of other rising powers and short-circuit the emergence of an intense security competition with the United States? Is it inevitable that Washington and Beijing become rivals?
- What steps can China take to reassure U.S. policymakers that it does not seek to push the United States out of Asia or undermine American influence in other parts of the world?
- If China has adopted a national strategy of “peaceful development/rise,” why did it conduct an antisatellite missile test in early 2007, and why is it accelerating its military modernization? Also, how much influence does the People’s Liberation Army have in foreign policy?
- Why is China so willing to provide aid and investment to governments that are highly undemocratic, corrupt, and exploitative of their people? Why does it appear to be the defender of countries that have poor relations with the United States, such as Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, and Zimbabwe?

- How does the foreign policy decision-making process affect China’s actual international behavior?
- What actions can the United States take to accommodate some Chinese interests—while not appeasing China? Can Beijing and Washington reach some modus operandi in which China can expand its rights and responsibilities in international affairs without disadvantaging U.S. economic and security interests?

The answers to these and other questions will go far in determining the position of China in the emerging world security environment and its standing vis-à-vis the United States and the global community at large. JFQ

NOTES

1. Chinese leaders and government officials now use the term peaceful development. The government rejected peaceful rise as an official term because it was deemed inaccurate and potentially provocative. However, both terms have the same conceptual content. See Bonnie Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Ecology of Foreign Policy Decision-making in China: The Ascension and Demise of Peaceful Rise,” The China Quarterly 190 (June 2007).

2. There is a great deal of overstatement in the international media about China’s energy needs. While China’s domestic demand for oil is clearly growing, the Chinese economy is not highly dependent on it. China is about 90 percent energy independent given its coal-based economy and large coal reserves. China depends on imported oil to meet about 12 percent of its total national energy needs. By contrast, U.S. dependence on imported oil is over 50 percent. In 2006, China’s top oil suppliers were (in order): Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, and Russia. About 45 percent of China’s oil imports come from the Persian Gulf, the region of greatest Chinese oil dependence.

3. China’s numerous governance challenges include bureaucratic fragmentation, corruption, social instability, poor internal transparency, weak environmental controls, a decaying health care system, and growing nationalism. See C. Fred Bergsten et al., China: The Balance Sheet: What the World Needs to Know Now about the Emerging Superpower (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2006).
Since the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, China has been fighting an increasingly sophisticated campaign against violent extremists in its northwestern Xinjiang region. China’s “war on terror” has focused on preempting a nascent insurgency before it could militarily challenge the state. While China has kept its counterinsurgency actions in Xinjiang secret for fear of “internationalizing” the conflict, Chinese leaders are now seeking to gain international acceptance for their counterinsurgency campaign as part of the larger war on terror.

Critics accuse Beijing of needlessly and brutally repressing a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority group—the Uyghurs—and cynically casting the campaign after 9/11 as part of the war on terror to gain political cover. China’s actions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are poorly explained by officials, likely because the effectiveness of the campaign and its components is poorly understood by the leaders themselves. The actions in Xinjiang are governed by the party-state’s worst fears of social unrest removing the final critical pillar upholding the regime: the Chinese people’s belief that the party-state, however ideologically bankrupt and locally corrupt, is still holding the country together.

In countering Xinjiang’s insurgency, China acted early, forcefully, and comprehensively and prevented a nascent insurgency from maturing. Chechnya and Kosovo are worst-case scenarios often invoked by Chinese sources, yet Afghanistan and Iraq have now taken over as the unstated but ever-present comparison when assessing the threat of insurgency. With borders on both Pakistan and Indian Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and several Central Asian republics, China would have reason enough to worry about cross-border problems, yet it claims that it too has suffered from the indigenous phenomenon of what it terms “religious extremism, separatism, and terrorism.” Chinese sources claim that over 160 people have been killed and 440 injured in more than 200 attacks by forces seeking to split the Alaska-sized Xinjiang region from Chinese control.

Xinjiang, literally “new frontier,” is technically an autonomous region for the Uyghurs, a primarily Turkic Muslim ethnic group that comprised nearly the entire regional population when Mao and the Communists took over China in 1949. Today the Uyghurs are officially a minority in their own autonomous region due to decades of Communist-led population movement of Chinese from the east. Xinjiang’s violence peaked in the late 1990s, with steady small-scale attacks against officials accused of caprice and corruption at a level similar to the Basque experience. China’s changing use of force in Xinjiang traced through major incidents of unrest is presented in Figure 1.
in figure 1. Today, because China not only employed a mix of security forces but also engaged in broad political action, society in Xinjiang increasingly if begrudgingly is turning away from insurgency as the path forward.

From studying the campaign in Xinjiang, including strategy, tactics, and tools, U.S. military decisionmakers can learn five lessons about the nature of China today and about crafting more effective counterinsurgency policies.

- The response targeted indigenous support for a nascent insurgency with links to the global jihad. While leaders worked to diminish external support for the insurgency, they recognized that a counterinsurgency must primarily be locally focused to be effective.
- The government acted early, forcefully, and comprehensively, employing a new mix of security forces and political tools.
- China crafted a security meaningful to society. Security forces progressively grew more effective against the insurgency as they reduced brutality.
- The government countered the insurgency from the bottom up, using deep knowledge of local society. Employing society-centric warfare turned the groupings in society against the insurgents and the idea of insurgency itself.
- China’s priority on stability engendered an effective counterinsurgency in Xinjiang. Leadership took the threat seriously. Of necessity, the response to instability had to be not only quick but also complete.

Some of these lessons might be uncomfortable for decisionmakers because they often contradict previous views. Nevertheless, this article reflects the perspective of people across China today—especially those in Xinjiang. Simply put, the country is changing due to internal policies aimed at creating a modern and powerful state. It is also changing internally because it is following the example set by the United States and Europe, however slowly and incompletely. While China’s political evolution appears glacial to outside observers, a key reason Xinjiang’s insurgency has been greatly reduced in scope and scale is the government’s early, forceful, and comprehensive response to instability.

While leaders worked to diminish external support for the insurgency, they recognized that a counterinsurgency must primarily be locally focused.

### Targeting Indigenous Support

While leaders recognized the international dimensions of Xinjiang’s insurgency, their response focused primarily on the insurgency’s internal components. Since the Soviet-Afghan war began in 1979, China has been effectively confronting an indigenous insurgency with links to the global jihad in its far northwestern Xinjiang region. The government has used political and military tactics, which together turned society against the idea of violence influencing politics. While political violence, including revolts, rebellions, and jihads, has rocked Xinjiang throughout history, the latest unrest flowed directly from the lessons of the Soviet–Afghan war, which included the idea that men with the help of Allah and armed with AK–47s could defeat a superpower. If the Soviet occupiers were expelled from Afghanistan, the struggle elsewhere must also be possible. State power no longer seemed so great, and communism had proven itself bankrupt at governing across China.

In eastern cities, dissent flowed out from the universities or up from families, neighborhoods, villages, and workforces swindled by corrupt and capricious local officials. In Xinjiang, dissent gained additional traction through the mosques and religious social groups.

Causes espoused in Xinjiang are many: the search for autonomy promised but never truly delivered; simple ethnic nationalism, whereby the Han should leave Xinjiang to its “rightful Uyghur owners”; freedom for religious practice beyond that sanctioned by the state as not politically threatening; the hope of self-determination and perhaps even democracy; the goal of Central Asia’s “color” revolutions of the mid 2000s and a hope harbored in Xinjiang throughout the previous decade; the search for human rights denied by a repressive and brutal regime; and, in some cases, the desire to use religious identity as a direct challenge to state power. With so many grievances espoused, searching for one all-encompassing explanation may be fruitless. As counterinsurgency scholar David Kilcullen argues, contemporary insurgencies are “complex conflict ecosystems” in which multiple actors, groups, and ideologies independently pursue their own agendas without necessarily having a formal or unified organizational structure, or indeed any substantive operational coordination.

Insurgency in Xinjiang has been no different from insurgency elsewhere in some respects. While there were many purported reasons for resistance, perhaps the most important driver of the conflict was state weakness. The threat for China came as its state institutions were found incapable of responding adequately. Because the security forces were the only institutions capable of moving effectively within society, brutality was perceived to be the only option. Brutality is a recipe for alienating and inflaming society, resulting in strategic failure. Xinjiang’s governance, social, educational, and religious institutions similarly were deemed to be infiltrated with separatists. These key institutions were purged and filled with loyal cadres, an increasing number of which were and are Uyghurs.

Xinjiang’s insurgency is not isolated from developments beyond its borders; indeed, while the activities there are carried out by local actors based on local societal and political circumstances, the region fits into the contemporary global jihad that has evolved at least since the Soviet–Afghan war. Explicitly, concerning Xinjiang’s place in the global jihad, the threat today is diminished because of an increasingly effective counterinsurgency campaign.

Al Qaeda was once a group of individuals joined by common beliefs and motivated to violently press their political views and multiply their power through instilling fear and awe. Today it is the vanguard organization of like-minded groups and individuals internationally. Moreover, it has become an inspirational base upon which a global jihad can rise. This social...
movement is likely to shape life for the worse globally for at least a generation and probably more. Training in Afghanistan and Pakistan, at first against the Soviets and later in camps at home and abroad, has provided tactical knowledge on weapons, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and small group skills.

Two types of training occurred in Afghanistan’s camps, terrorist and insurgent. This tactical distinction divides the minority of fighters, who honed the skills to blend into societies either in their home country or abroad and prepare methodically for spectacular attacks, from the vast majority, who trained to fight as warriors in irregular battles against security forces.

While formal connections to established terrorist organizations (al Qaeda foremost among them) were important to the first generations of extremists, a rising generation shows less need for such formality. Today, terrorists are increasingly able to wrap themselves and their local fights in al Qaeda’s banner without formal institutional links. After successful attacks, al Qaeda’s leadership can then take credit—even postmortem. While we struggle for the appropriate vocabulary to categorize our current threat, al Qaeda has placed itself at the forefront of a global social movement building on many local insurgencies as well as sympathetic individuals and societies abroad. Insurgencies are primarily indigenous affairs, and the contemporary global jihad is no exception. Whatever the cause, security forces and political leaders often assert external support for their local problems. External connections are present in nearly every insurgency, but these fights will have no traction or significance without the support of the local population, solicited through approbation or fear.

In Xinjiang, insurgency and counter-insurgency simultaneously evolved; as the insurgency changed character, the counter-insurgency adapted. However, the Xinjiang counterinsurgency differs from others in that it evolved along its own trajectory, separated from the influences of the insurgency’s tactical ebb and flow.

The official statistics for casualties in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2001 have not been amended since 2001. While there are slight fluctuations in particular numbers when recited by different officials, this variation is more easily explained by “misstatement” than by deliberate recalibration. To date, Western scholars have been unable to account for the majority of these figures using open-source reporting or fieldwork. The White Paper intended to explain China’s terrorism problems and the government’s response did little to reduce the arena’s obscurity for the rest of the world.

Beyond attack statistics, the potential for insurgency can be discerned through at least two other measures: the number of fighters receiving training, and the support in society for insurgency as a viable path forward (or the only path, chosen by approbation, fear, or both). China asserts that over 1,000 Chinese Uyghurs were trained in Afghanistan’s camps in the 1990s. Additionally, East Turkestan Islamic Movement leader Hasan Mahsum was reportedly killed in a firefight in northwest Pakistan in December of 2003 along with other al Qaeda and militant suspects. According to press reports, China continues to press Pakistan to eliminate or repatriate Uyghur militants taking refuge across its southern border.6

While the reliability of this information is difficult to assess from open sources, 22 Chinese Uyghurs were imprisoned at Guantanamo, according to the Congressional Research Service.6 Of these, five were reportedly determined to be there by mistake. After lengthy international diplomacy and Chinese condemnation, they were released not to China but to a United Nations refugee camp in Albania. The fear, and not an unreasonable one, was that China would likely torture and then execute them if they were repatriated, even though reportedly they were abducted by bounty hunters and sold to American forces as “terrorists” for the equivalent of $5,000. After long denying any training in Afghanistan, the Albanian five now say they went to a Uyghur camp outside of Tora Bora because the food was free. They learned to fire an old assault weapon and did not ask questions.7 Ten of the Chinese Uyghurs at Guantamano were deemed to be receiving military training in order to return to China and put their new paramilitary insurgent skills to use. The remaining seven were deemed to be hardcore al Qaeda operatives, willing to fight wherever the next jihad might take them.

Acting Early, Forcefully, and Comprehensive

Raw brutality alone is not what has prevented the insurgency from embroiling and dissolving China’s control of Xinjiang. Even the most brutal force can achieve ephemeral tactical victories, yet strategic effectiveness is ultimately achieved through political measures that deeply reshape society. Scholars looking back through history’s long list of failed counter-insurgencies highlight the need for dealing with insurgencies before they take hold and before society perceives that the forces of order might lose.8 China’s early efforts against the nascent insurgency in Xinjiang were military affairs because no other forces existed which were seen as capable of responding to the threat.

As the insurgency progressed, China quickly built up forces capable of moving down the spectrum of violence—away from military actions in favor of paramilitary and then police forces more capable of moving in society. The government acted forcefully and found more appropriate and effective levels of force to interact with society. Political tools were implemented that fundamentally altered the social environment. Consequently, society in Xinjiang today is far less receptive to insurgency. In short, China drove change in society through a bottom-up approach.

At first China responded brutally, using military force directly against society, suppressing riots and protests with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As the campaign progressed through the 1990s, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), the Public Security Bureau (PSB), and local police were stood up and became able to assert their presence not only throughout the region’s cities but also in towns and villages. These organizations increasingly recruited Uyghur cadres, though Uyghurs assert that trust, responsibility, and promotion to higher ranks have been slowed if not outright prevented because of racist fears and Chinese worries about training future insurgents (as in Chechnya and numerous other insurgencies where resistance leaders were once members of the security forces).

Chinese sources speak of a “four-in-one defense” of Xinjiang: the PLA, PAP, XPCC, and the Chinese people (see figure 2).9 Here the term Chinese people refers primarily to Xinjiang’s growing Han population that moved in from the eastern provinces. When the Communists took control of China circa 1949,
Crafting Meaningful Security

Security is more than military force alone. For a campaign to be more than momentarily tactically effective, the counterinsurgency must both use the least force possible to dominate the battlespace and engage and reshape society into an environment inhospitable to the insurgency. Beyond building more capable forces, China initiated a comprehensive campaign to transform society using governance, educational, religious, and economic tools.

As the insurgency escalated and reached its high-water mark in the late 1990s, China found its grip on Xinjiang increasingly threatened, not from raw violence but from the perceived infiltration of local institutions by separatists and their ideology. While bombings can powerfully motivate society against a state through fear or approbation, the campaign in Xinjiang was perceived as heavily weighted in favor of political-ideological penetration of society and grass-roots institutions. If successful, this would effectively have severed the state from local society. Feeling itself in a precarious situation, China's military presence in Xinjiang purged its institutions not only of those suspected of separatism but also of ideas considered separatist. Thus, the soft policies in Xinjiang ranged from coercion through cooptation to genuine incorporation, a project still in process.

Governance in Xinjiang is achieved at each level with paired government and party officials where, locally explain, the official with overriding weight to make policy will be Han Chinese and the lesser official will be an ethnic minority, primarily Uyghur. For example, at a university, the president might be a Han and the party secretary a Uyghur; a prefecture would have a Uyghur governor and a Han party secretary. The key to knowing who holds the power at each level, locals in and out of leadership say, is looking at which post is controlled by the Han. Though Xinjiang is a deeply and fundamentally racially divided society with self-perceived discrimination ever-present, the party-state has been making a concerted effort to incorporate “loyal” Uyghurs increasingly into the governance structure since the purges of the 1990s. These cadres are largely university educated within the region and secularly minded.

Today, Uyghur officials hold power greater and more genuine than at any time since the founding of the People’s Republic. Nevertheless, minority officials fear that if they use this power they might overstep and suffer severe consequences. The actions of minority cadres in government and in the party will determine the strategic longevity of China’s hold on Xinjiang; the greater the power devolved to capable local minority cadres, the more effective the effort will become. In the wake of the Tiananmen era, loyalty to the party-state was relatively easy to assess: in many cases the individuals later judged to be loyal had remained noticeably silent when protests rocked Xinjiang’s universities and government centers.

Education is a primary concern for counterinsurgents, for a society’s view of its history and its future is at stake. In Xinjiang, local schools were opened offering education in either Uyghur or Han (Mandarin) languages, where educated Uyghurs could find prestigious work.

Unmentioned in China’s Accounting of Xinjiang

Uyghurs in Xinjiang—8,000,000 to 9,000,000. While the last census was in 2000, the demographic shift in Xinjiang has been pronounced. The year 2005 may be the first time that Hans outnumbered Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Public Security Bureau (PSB)—Strength in Xinjiang unknown. The vanguard policing and domestic intelligence organization, the PSB in Xinjiang is reputed to resort to violence against suspects first, then, later, ask questions. In 2005, China announced the creation of 36 antiterrorism groups in key cities, likely within the PSB. Other prominent PSB missions include counternarcotics, countersubversion (political and religious), including countering nonviolent challenges to state power), and acting as antiterror shock troops. The PSB is perceived to have penetrated all of Xinjiang’s above-ground social institutions with spies and informers.

scholars looking back through history’s failed counterinsurgencies highlight the need for dealing with insurgencies before they take hold
teaching Beijing’s lessons in their local languages. In China’s perspective, this campaign was perceived to be so successful at incorporating Uyghurs into the system that in 2004 the use of their language in higher education was curtailed in favor of the next step: education primarily in Hanyu (the Chinese name for Mandarin, literally the language of the Han). The content of education is similarly controlled by the party-state, and spies and informants are believed to police classroom compliance.

Religious practice in Xinjiang is far less constrained than is popularly reported by Western media accounts. Mosques abound and attendance is reportedly unhampered for normal people. Constraints are placed on individuals in positions of authority because, China argues, nonreligious cadres can represent everyone while those who openly espouse particular religions will represent only that religion. The content of religion is similarly curtailed: while spirituality may be expressed, when the content of religion is perceived as political, the offending leader or group is pressured or removed—at times through heavy-handed measures. Locals assert that mosques and other religious settings, like educational ones, are infiltrated and monitored for political dissent by security forces.

Economic development is, President Hu Jintao asserts, “the key to solving all of China’s problems.” Nevertheless, while Xinjiang radiates visible material development from city centers outwards, locals perceive that they are receiving none of the benefits and are largely shut out of the economy due to pervasive ethnic discrimination. Even though economic development is a statistical reality in Xinjiang, its effects on society’s support for insurgency are inflammatory: Uyghurs perceive this development as an increasingly visible sign of Han invading from outside the region to take local natural resources and jobs. Spot surveys made while traveling through Xinjiang confirm this perception. For instance, road construction crews in several locations were almost entirely composed of Han workers, banks were staffed nearly completely by Han, and the most materially developed towns have the largest percentages of Han.

Countering Insurgency Bottom-up

“Responsibility begins at home” might be China’s counterterrorism motto if its system allowed critical investigation and analyses of the campaign and its effectiveness. While the most recent U.S. counterinsurgency manuals, military and civilian alike, rightly highlight the non-military aspects of counterinsurgency, China implemented what is here termed society-centric warfare. Beyond the population-centric approach advocated in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, China’s approach assigned responsibility for working against the insurgency to all of the groupings in society. Internationally and internally, China holds groups accountable for the actions of its members. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as bilateral relationships, Beijing pressures Central Asian countries to control their Uyghur populations and prevent them from working against its interests. China reportedly has intelligence operatives working within these countries, yet primary responsibility rests with the governing authorities to police their own domain.

In Xinjiang, using this strategy of society-centric warfare, every grouping of society is held accountable for its rank and file. Pervasive surveillance has an exponential effect on society beyond the simple collection of information: reporting to authorities is additionally driven by individuals afraid of being accused of participating or supporting illicit activities because they failed to report. Furthermore, China’s security forces held social groups responsible for the actions of their members. Not only were these negative tools implemented, but also the positive policy tools of governance, education, economic development, and religion described above drew society’s support away from the insurgency and opened a path, however slow and bitter, toward a better future incorporated into a new, evolving China.

Engendering Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgency in Xinjiang was enabled by seemingly infinite political will: the Chinese people demand internal stability and give the regime freedom of action to remove threats from the periphery. The Communist Party, concerned primarily with self-preservation of its position atop the one-party-state, drives and assists state responses...
to instability on the periphery. The state, directed by the party, must produce the perception of stability that the people demand. Internal stability is primary among China’s strategic interests because it enables all other goals, including prospects for economic development. The priority on stability facilitated an effective counterinsurgency in two ways. Firstly, the regional leadership quickly understood that they had to quiet the unrest quickly and completely, and that they had the full support of national leaders along with the core population silently backing official actions—whatever they might be. Secondly, like peoples elsewhere in China, the population of Xinjiang increasingly if grudgingly bought into the idea that stability across China leads to a better future. Acceptance of this vision of Xinjiang benefiting from increasing incorporation into China undercut passive support for insurgency and drew Uyghurs and Uyghur society into active stabilizing roles in governance, business, religion, and education.

The prospect of unrest in Xinjiang shook the regime’s veneer of stability and catalyzed government action with the full if uninformed backing of the Chinese people. Simply put, the Chinese people demand stability because they survived the bad days of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. For the core, these self-inflicted wounds of the past buy today’s regime time as it attempts to build a new economic and political order across the country. China’s reform strategy is east, then west; economics, then politics.

While the Communist Party’s concern is for self-preservation atop the state, the state must produce the perception, and perhaps the reality, of internal stability. The party-state is operating on time purchased by the negative push of previous sociopolitical tumults and the positive pull of the gradual but significant changes perceived by society. Paradoxically, while society craves stability and credits the current national leadership for positive works, the local application of power is often unchecked, capricious, corrupt, and caustic. Riots, often violent and large, arise across China as local officials clumsily and heavily assert themselves, in many instances needlessly escalating property disputes and family-planning practices into social unrest. Across China, political protests increased dramatically during the 1990s and this trend more than continued, spiking at 74,000 “mass incidents” in 2004 and 87,000 “social order” crimes in 2005. Officials’ statements and Chinese media reports assert that the statistics may have dropped nearly 20 percent in 2006, yet this numerical change is likely produced by altered methodology for counting and reporting by officials and the media, and not from social changes created by deliberate policy. Furthermore, open source data on incidents of unrest correlate closely with the spectrum of press access across China and may thus reflect access rather than facts on the ground.

Fundamentally, Chinese leaders must enable and produce substantive changes in society before the spell wears off—before the older generations’ fears of unrest fade and new generations rise to maturity, fearless. Threats from the periphery (for example, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan) are subsiding as dissent and unrest are beginning to shake the core in myriad localities. In Xinjiang, China has purchased time with a firm hand accompanied by the promise of a great and prosperous future; the next national challenge is to reform local governance before corrupt and capricious officials discredit and undercut the entire Chinese project.

NOTES


4 For example, see Daily Times (Pakistan), “China Demands 20 Insurgents Hiding in Pakistan,” March 17, 2007.


Congress requires that the Pentagon annually address the “probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and . . . the military organizations and operational concepts” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This broad guidance gives the Secretary of Defense latitude to discuss the entire scope of Chinese military modernization and suggests that Congress intended that such a comprehensive analysis be produced.

However, even after providing Congress with reports varying in format and content since 1997 (except for 2001, when no report was submitted), the authors of the current report seem uncertain how to provide a thorough analysis of PLA modernization. Should each report be an all-inclusive stand-alone document, or should reports build on information provided in previous years, thus assuming a degree of prior knowledge on the part of the reader? Since most readers do not compare one year’s text to previous editions, it would seem logical that each report address all elements of the tasking. Yet many components of Chinese military strategy and organization were not discussed in this year’s report, even when significant new or relevant information was available. At the same time, though not required by Congress, the authors of the report have taken it on themselves to address U.S. defense policy and, in particular, U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

Thankfully, the 2007 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China is considerably less politically charged than its immediate predecessor. With the change of leadership at the Pentagon, it was no longer necessary to mimic former Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s rhetorical questions from Singapore in June 2005: “Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases? Why these continuing robust deployments?” Likewise, the six references in 2006 to China’s “military expansion,” which had been used inexact and interchangeably with the term military modernization, were dropped completely. Curiously, the report did not repeat the statement from the National Security Strategy that the United States “seeks
to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.” Instead, the current report retains only the general statement that the “lack of transparency in China’s military affairs will naturally and understandably prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown [emphasis added].” This formulation suggests that the authors were trying to downplay an official U.S. hedging policy toward China.

This year’s report, while an improvement over the 2006 effort, focuses primarily on elements of PLA modernization that Washington believes potentially threaten the United States itself, American forces in the region, or Taiwan. This is not a new phenomenon, and such a myopic focus supports the conclusion in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review: “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.” To be sure, these developments are essential factors in American security planning, but such an exercise in mirror-imaging about force projection, missiles, advanced aircraft, aircraft carriers, and so forth reflects only a fraction of what is actually happening in the Chinese armed forces.

The Pentagon might have addressed some of the following 10 topics for a more balanced and complete evaluation of Chinese military modernization.

Force Structure

This year’s report did not describe the structure of the Chinese armed forces, though previous reports have attempted to. Because the U.S. and Chinese militaries are so differently structured, it is important to define accurately the composition of the Chinese armed forces. According to the 1997 National Defense Law, the Chinese armed forces have three components: the active and reserve units of the PLA; the People’s Armed Police (PAP) force; and the people’s militia.¹

The PLA is organized into ground forces (the army), the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, and Second Artillery (strategic missile forces). The army makes up roughly two-thirds of the PLA’s 2.3 million active duty end-strength, with about 11 percent in the navy, 17 percent in the air force, and 4 percent in the Second Artillery.² By the definition above, neither the PAP nor the militia is part of the PLA. Both meet the definition of paramilitary organizations.³

The PAP is tasked primarily with internal security functions and has a dual chain of command that extends to the Central Military Commission as well as to the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security. The 2006 Chinese White Paper contained new information about PAP manpower strength, stating that it “has a total force of 660,000.”⁴ This number is much lower than most foreign estimates (including previous Pentagon reports), which counted up to 1.5 million personnel. The White Paper figure, however, may not have included another 230,000 PAP personnel who are considered “police officers in military service.” These personnel are found in border security, firefighting, and personal security guard units and come under daily command of the Ministry of Public Security.⁵ They would bring the PAP total up to about 890,000—still far smaller than previous estimates. The size, training, and equipment of the PAP are particularly relevant to the government’s ability to maintain domestic stability as the number of protests and demonstrations increases.

PLA reserve unit personnel strength is estimated to be another 800,000.⁶ Reserve units have an assigned cadre of active duty personnel but are manned mainly by civilians (some of whom, but not all, have previously served on active duty). Militia units are also composed of civilians and organized by local governments or in commercial enterprises. Reserve units fall under the command of provincial military district headquarters; militia units are commanded by grassroots People’s Armed Forces Departments.⁷

As it did last year, this year’s report states that approximately 400,000 ground force personnel are “deployed to the three military regions opposite Taiwan” and provides a count of group armies, infantry, armor, artillery, and marine units in the Taiwan Strait area (but gives no unit strength figures).⁸ That number is probably considerably short of all army personnel in those three military regions. In addition to personnel in the units identified above, army personnel account for most of the manpower in:

- headquarters and communications units for military regions, military districts, military subdistricts, and county-level People’s Armed Forces Departments
- logistics subdepartments, including hospitals and supply/repair depots
- coastal and border defense units
- garrison units not included in the categories above
- a variety of army schools with thousands of staff, faculty, and students.

While many of these personnel would provide direct support to PLA operations, such as command and control, rear area security, and logistics assistance, most would not be part of China’s expeditionary force, and a sizeable number are noncombat personnel.

PLA coastal and border defense units likely amount to 200,000 or more total personnel, all of whom are deployed in early warning and defensive positions along China’s periphery and would not add to the PLA’s offensive punch. Approximately another 100,000 PAP troops are assigned land and sea frontier defense missions throughout China, including duties similar to the U.S. Coast Guard.¹¹

People’s War

In a report specifically tasked to discuss China’s military strategy, this year’s omission of any examination of People’s War is striking. Although the report discussed some elements of People’s War, it did not integrate the separate factors into a discussion about this cornerstone of Chinese military thought.

A decade ago, some analysts, including myself, thought People’s War would (or should) soon be discarded into the dustbin of history. However, since 1999, with the dissemination of updated doctrine for the PLA, People’s War has been described consistently as a “strategic concept” or “a fundamental strategy . . . still a way to win modern war.”¹² Such references are found in authoritative works such as The Science of Campaigns and The Science of Military Strategy, as well as in all the Chinese White Papers on national defense. Granted, People’s War has been modified greatly from its original form as practiced by the Red Army, but an understanding of its continuing relevance to Chinese military
thinking is essential to a true analysis of PLA military strategy. As a basis for China’s declared military strategy, People’s War is defensive but acknowledges the decisive nature of the offense. Chinese doctrine allows for preemptive action at the tactical and operational levels: “If any country or organization violates the other country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to ‘fire the first shot’ on the plane of tactics.”

People’s War is not a mystery, and many of its principles are not unique to China. The Science of Military Strategy describes 10 strategic principles for People’s War that illustrate its traditions and commonalities with other countries’ military thinking:

- knowing ourselves and the enemy
- preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy
- striving for the initiative and avoiding the passive
- employing military forces and tactics flexibly
- closely combining the three battle forms of mobile war, positional war, and guerrilla war
- concentrating superior forces and destroying the enemy one by one
- fighting no battle unprepared, fighting no battle you are not sure of winning
- being prudent in fighting the initial battle
- unifying command

- closely coordinating military and non-military struggles.

Clearly, People’s War is not just guerrilla war. Though the PLA generally perceives itself as the weaker force against most opponents,

People’s War is a form of organization of war, and its role has nothing to do with the level of military technology. The concept of People’s War is not confined to the war of low technology only. . . . The great power of the People’s War is released through comprehensive national power, the combination of peace time and war time, the combination of the military and the civilian, and the combination of war actions and non-war actions.

Chinese military planners seek to incorporate traditional People’s War concepts of speed, mobility, deception, and use of camouflage and stratagem into their battle plans.

Today, People’s War principles are seen in the many elements of mobilization practiced by the Chinese armed forces and civilian populace, including political, economic, science and technology, and personnel mobilization. People’s War also reveals itself in the extensive practice of “socialization” of many logistics functions to the civilian sector (also known as “outsourcing”). The roles and missions of the Chinese reserve force are central to People’s War. Since 1998, PLA reserve units and the militia have been reorganized and modernized in parallel with the PLA. Much of their work focuses on providing rear area security, especially air defense, for PLA active duty units as well as the civilian population, logistics support, and repair of infrastructure damaged from long-range strikes on China. The reserve force also has a role in information war. This mostly civilian support will enable the PLA to fight its battles with less attention to its rear area.

As People’s War continues to evolve, the Pentagon report would be an appropriate venue to explore its contemporary meaning. For example, what did the 2006 Chinese White Paper mean by: “The Navy is enhancing research into the theory of naval operations and exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime People’s War under modern conditions”? But People’s War is not the only strategic concept overlooked in this year’s report.

**Calculus of Deterrence**

The Pentagon report addresses how China itself is deterred from taking military action against Taiwan. In fact, readers might be surprised by the number of times official Chinese military writings begin their discussion of PLA missions and strategy with references to preventing war or deterring certain events from occurring. The Pentagon report does mention nuclear deterrence and, as will be described later, actually describes China’s deterrence posture toward Taiwan (without using the word itself). However, it does not include a comprehensive discussion of the role of deterrence in China’s military strategy.

The Science of Military Strategy devotes an entire chapter to the subject, which provides insights into many actions the PLA has taken in recent years:

Strategic deterrence is a major means for attaining the objective of military strategy, and its risks and costs are less than strategic operations. . . . Warfighting is generally used only
when deterrence fails and there is no alternative. . . . Strategic deterrence is also a means for attaining the political objective. 17

Since “strategic deterrence is based on warfighting . . . the more powerful the warfighting capability, the more effective the deterrence.” The first “basic condition” for strategic deterrence is a capable force. Next, a country must show determination to use that force and ensure that the parties to be deterred understand those capabilities and determination. 18 Specifically, large-scale military parades, joint military exercises, and military visits are methods to demonstrate strength and will. The January 2007 antisatellite test and increased military training can thus be interpreted as part of China’s deterrence posture.

In 2001, The Science of Military Strategy defined Beijing’s deterrence capabilities:

China currently has a limited but effective nuclear deterrence and a relatively powerful capability of conventional deterrence and a massive capacity of deterrence of People’s War. By combining these means of deterrence, an integrated strategic deterrence is formed, with comprehensive national power as the basis, conventional force as the mainstay, nuclear force as the backup power and reserve force as the support. 19

In summary, the PLA’s own vision of deterrence is much more extensive than that described by the Pentagon report.

Carriers and Gators

Two weeks before this year’s report was released, the new commander of U.S Pacific forces visited China and specifically discussed the “will and resolve” that an operational aircraft carrier demonstrates. He concluded, “I do not have any better idea as to China’s intentions to develop, or not, a carrier program, but we had a very pleasant and candid exchange about the larger issues attendant to a carrier program.” 20

The bulk of the report’s discussion about PLA aircraft carrier developments repeated last year’s discussion about the ex-Varyag from Russia. While the report noted that the ship was only “70 percent complete,” it nonetheless postulated three options for its eventual use: an operational aircraft carrier, a training or transitional platform, or a floating theme park. Like last year, however, the report did not mention that the Varyag has no engines—a minor detail that, until rectified, would preclude options 1 and 2.

Last year, the report noted some 50 medium and heavy amphibious ships in the PLA Navy, “an increase of over 14 percent from last year,” suggesting a concerted effort to increase amphibious lift capacity. This year, the number of these ships did not change (was the 14 percent increase an anomaly?), but strangely, the report did not mention the launch of a landing platform dock class ship last December, an event well documented on the Internet. This type of oversight was not unique to the discussion of the PLA Navy.

The January 2007 antisatellite test and increased military training can be interpreted as part of China’s deterrence posture.

PLA Citizens

In addition to civilians in reserve units and the militia, at least four other categories of civilian personnel support the PLA. First, an unknown number of uniformed civilian cadre are included on PLA active duty rolls. These personnel have distinct insignia on their PLA uniforms and perform a variety of specialist and technical functions, particularly in the medical and educational fields. Their analogue in the U.S. military is the workforce of approximately 700,000 Department of Defense civilians who are not considered as active duty and do not wear uniforms.

Another unknown number of civilian workers and staff perform administrative and custodial duties at PLA facilities. They are paid out of the defense budget but are not considered on active rolls and do not wear uniforms. In the past, when the PLA managed a network of factories, presumably workers at those factories were included in this category.

In 2006, a new category of civilians who work for the PLA on contract was created. According to the 2006 White Paper, some “20,000 posts formerly taken by [noncommissioned officers] are now filled with contract civilians.” 21 These contract workers are not counted as active duty but do wear PLA uniforms, apparently without insignia. Though some of them may go to the field, they mostly hold administrative jobs, including medical and maintenance work.

The 2006 White Paper also revealed for the first time another category of civilians who support the PLA: “The grass-roots People’s Armed Forces Departments established by the state at the level of township (town) or sub-district are non-active-duty organizations. They are manned by full-time staff that are under the dual leadership of the local Party committees and governments at the same level and military organs at higher levels [emphasis added].” 22 Among their many responsibilities are conscription work, national defense education, and direct command of militia units. Local governments pay the salaries for these grassroots personnel, who are not part of the active duty PLA but do wear PLA-like uniforms with distinctive insignia (different from the uniformed civilian cadre described above).

Training Emphasis

The Pentagon report provides glimpses into PLA training that support Washington’s focus on force projection and preemption. Indeed, many aspects of more realistic training, along with increased operations tempo, add to the PLAs potential to perform these missions. But the report does not provide a complete examination of training for all the missions the PLA is preparing to undertake.

Missing is discussion about the extensive efforts directed at basic tasks, such as new equipment, logistics, and staff training, that all PLA units must undertake before they advance to more complex training evolutions. While advanced air defense systems are discussed, the number of less sophisticated air defense exercises that take place throughout the country might surprise some readers. Likewise, antiterrorism and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense training is much more widespread than suggested by the report. No mention is made about reserve and militia training or integration of civilian support, including joint civil-military command arrangements, that are fundamental to PLA doctrine.

Self-assessments

Without a doubt, PLA capabilities have increased significantly over the past decade. The Chinese media contain many examples of force improvements and illustrations of new capabilities; nonetheless, Chinese military literature also has many reports and editorials that identify shortfalls and actions taken to overcome them.
This year's report makes multiple references to the possibility that Beijing might make miscalculations that could lead to crisis or war. The propensity for national-level misjudgment is not unique to China, however. In fact, *The Science of Military Strategy* is quite specific about using prudence in the decision to go to war:

*The essence of strategic judgment is to reveal from the numerous and complicated phenomena the essentials and internal relations of the war so as to achieve a correct understanding of the overall war situation... Avoid substituting ‘preconception’... so as not to base the strategic judgment on one’s own wishful thinking.*

Moreover, “imprudent decision to use force is never permitted. Being prudent towards war is not being afraid of war, but ‘before launching a war making sure to win’ as Sun Zi said.”

The Pentagon did not mention any of dozens of self-assessments the PLA has made about its own situation in its internal media. For example, in summer 2006, the official army newspaper carried a series of special commentator articles on the state of military, political, logistics, and armaments development. Each one not only praised progress, but also identified shortfalls in personnel, training, equipment, and funding. For example, “there is a gap between the current level of modernization in our military and the requirement that must be met in order to win regional informatized wars” and “money is needed in many aspects... the contradiction between the needs of military modernization construction and the short supply of funds will exist for the long run.” Regional and service military newspapers highlight and expand on these same themes. Without evaluating these writings, other countries could also misjudge PLA capabilities.

### Extra-budgetary Funding

Since 2002, the Pentagon has attempted to apply a multiplication factor to the announced Chinese defense budget to approximate actual defense spending. While foreign observers agree that the announced budget does not include all funds available to the armed forces, the amount of information the Pentagon provides to justify its multiplication factor varies from year to year. In 2002, the factor was “some four times larger.” In 2004, without explanation, the factor was reduced to two to three times the announced number, where it has continued to hover. This year the report acknowledged great variation in the range of estimates made by various institutions for defense spending but provided no details as to how it concluded that the $45 billion announced figure for 2007 “could be as much as $85 billion to $125 billion.”

After reading all the Pentagon reports, a number of extra-budgetary factors can be discerned, yet actual monetary sums are provided occasionally only for a few factors (mostly foreign weapons purchases). The significant problems of exchange rate conversion or estimating purchasing power parity are never discussed in detail. Many factors that the Pentagon has identified over the years, plus several new elements, are included in a recent analysis by the United States–China Policy Foundation, which summarized the three major sources of extra-budgetary funding as:

#### Central government
- foreign equipment purchases
- some military research and development from the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense or Ministry of Science and Technology
- some demobilization expenses from the Ministry of Civil Affairs
- some retirement expenses for soldiers from the Ministry of Civil Affairs
- some advanced education expenses for officers from the Ministry of Education
- some military-related infrastructure construction
- some reimbursement for disaster relief efforts
- People’s Armed Police expenses

#### Local governments (provinces, cities, counties)
- operational/training funding for PLA reserve units and militia (some support also comes from enterprises in which militia units are organized)
- some demobilization expenses
- some military-related infrastructure construction

Complicating the issue further is that the amounts for each element above would vary from year to year. Additionally, as the official budget has increased, some elements that previously were off-budget probably have now been brought into the official budget. This study concludes that not enough information is available to quantify each factor, nor is a reliable methodology agreed on to account for exchange rate differences “to make a reasonable estimate of the total amount of ‘defense-related spending.’” Thus, a simple multiplication factor applied annually to China’s announced military budget does not appear to be a trustworthy method to estimate total defense spending.

While the Pentagon reasonably calls for greater transparency on budget issues, the Chinese themselves do not admit to any significant sources of extra-budgetary funding. Moreover, because of the many potential sources of funding, the central government would likely have difficulty quantifying each of the elements listed above.

### Transparency

As in previous years, “lack of transparency” was a major theme in this year’s report. Unfortunately, the report addressed only in the shallowest way the actual contact between PLA and foreign forces. In a major policy change from previous decades, the PLA has made significant efforts to open itself to outsiders:

*Since 2002, China has held 16 joint military exercises with 11 countries. In August 2005, China and Russia conducted the “Peace Mission–2005” joint military exercise... In November and December 2005, the PLA Navy held joint maritime search and rescue exercises...*
with its Pakistani, Indian and Thai counterparts, respectively. In September 2006, China and Tajikistan conducted the “Cooperation–2006” joint counter-terrorism military exercise. In September and November 2006, the Chinese Navy and the U.S. Navy conducted joint maritime search and rescue exercises in the offshore waters of San Diego and in the South China Sea. In December 2006, China and Pakistan held the “Friendship–2006” joint counter-terrorism military exercise. . . . In September 2005, the PLA invited 41 military observers and military attachés from 24 countries to attend the “North Sword–2005” maneuvers organized by the Beijing Military [Region].

Though the Pentagon report mentions the joint naval search and rescue training, it did not provide any insights into lessons learned about the PLA from this exercise—just as no previous report has provided any information derived from observation or participation in exercises or other forms of official military-to-military contact. In particular, the Defense Department has made no comment about what its observers saw at North Sword 2005, which included participation of elements of two armored divisions supported by airborne troops, nor has it provided information about the first North Sword exercise in 2003 that U.S. observers also attended. These exercises were described extensively in the Chinese media and appeared to be much more realistic than the demonstrations U.S. military personnel often see on routine visits. In May 2006, the commander of U.S forces in the Pacific visited a PLA Air Force base and sat in the cockpit of one of China’s newest indigenously manufactured aircraft, the JH–7 Flying Leopard. In March 2007, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was given access to Su–27 aircraft and Type 99 tanks at “advanced” units of the PLA.

The report identifies many areas about which the United States has questions—budget issues, force structure, and intentions—but the constant repetition of the “lack of transparency” theme causes one to ask: what exactly has been discussed during the senior-level dialogue over the past years? While many important issues remain unresolved and the PLA’s window is certainly not fully open to foreign observers, this year’s report did not address most Chinese efforts at transparency or any insights gained from military-to-military contact.

America as Threat

The governments of neither the United States nor China officially call the other an enemy, though both acknowledge the potential for military conflict. Military headquarters in both countries undoubtedly plan and prepare for a variety of such contingencies; this is prudent military planning. But military contingency plans do not necessarily reflect national strategic intentions.

Professional military students and planners in the PLA carefully study U.S. military capabilities, doctrine, and experience. For them, preparing tactically and operationally to confront the capabilities of the most advanced and combat-experienced military in the world is rational and to be expected. It represents preparing for the worst-case scenario and is evident in a large percentage of reports about PLA training. But like military contingency
plans, these preparations do not necessarily reflect national strategic intentions.

Former Secretary Rumsfeld’s disingenuous assertion that “no nation threatens China” is inconsistent with the reality of American global military capabilities. Chinese civilian and military leaders have long understood that U.S. military deployments and capabilities have the potential to threaten their country. This point was made specifically by Colonel Larry Wortzel, USA (Ret.), in a recent monograph published by the U.S. Army War College: “China’s leaders and military thinkers see the United States as a major potential threat to the PLA and China’s interests primarily because of American military capabilities, but also because of U.S. security relationships in Asia.”

Wortzel bases his conclusion on information that was available long before Rumsfeld’s speech in 2005. The U.S. Government would categorize America’s potential to use military force as part of its overall deterrence posture. This year’s report illustrated the continuing relevance of U.S. deterrence in a textbox entitled “Factors of Deterrence,” which begins: “China is deterred on multiple levels from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention [emphasis added].” At the same time, the Pentagon report actually describes a parallel approach by China toward Taiwan, but without using the word deterrence:

Beijing appears prepared to defer unification as long as it believes trends are advancing toward that goal and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. In the near term, Beijing’s focus is likely one of preventing Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence while continuing to hold out terms for peaceful resolution under a “one country, two systems” framework that would provide Taiwan a degree of autonomy in exchange for its unification with the mainland [emphasis added].

Instead, the report categorizes the PLA’s “sustained military threat to Taiwan” as part of an “overall campaign of persuasion and coercion.” By China’s own definition, deterrence includes the threat of force through demonstration of actual military capabilities, which is exactly what has been observed over the past decade—and U.S. deterrence theory would not disagree. From Beijing’s perspective, however, this threat does not contradict its official preference for peaceful reunification.

Military professionals can operate in an environment of deterrence and potential threats, seeking to lower the possibility for conflict while preparing for the worst. The Pentagon report does not characterize the United States as a potential threat to China, but there is no doubt the potential is well understood in Beijing.

The modernization of the Chinese armed forces is a topic of utmost importance to the United States, its allies, and Asia. The U.S. Congress and public deserve a reliable, comprehensive evaluation that can be used as the basis for informed discussion about a subject that will be critical to the course of history in Asia for the 21st century. While this year’s report was an improvement over previous efforts, the Pentagon can do much better.

NOTES

4 Percentages are based on estimates found in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006 (London: Routledge, 2006), 264. The PLA does not control the Chinese civilian defense industrial complex, which is overseen by the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense.
5 The PAP and militia have no direct equivalents in the U.S. Armed Forces. The PAP is similar to the Italian Carabinieri.
9 PLA reserve units and militia are known collectively as China’s “reserve force.” PLA reserve units most closely resemble state-based U.S. National Guard units and, to a lesser extent, U.S. Reserve units, though U.S. Reserve forces are much more interchangeable with Active duty units than are their PLA counterparts.
10 The PLA marine force is part of the navy and consists of two brigades. Technically, these marine forces are not part of the ground force. The army, on the other hand, has two amphibious mechanized infantry divisions, which add up to at least twice the size of the marine force.
14 Ibid., 230–231.
15 Ibid., 454–455.
18 Ibid., 213–215, 228.
19 Ibid., 222. The book’s use of the term limited nuclear deterrence would probably be more accurately described as “a credible nuclear deterrent force” as stated in the 2006 White Paper.
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 468.
An Interview with
Timothy J. Keating

JFQ: You’ve had an interesting journey from flag lieutenant at USPACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] to commander. We would like to hear about your goals while in office and your mandate coming from Northern Command.

Admiral Keating: You’re right, I was in Hawaii in the mid 1980s serving as the commander’s flag lieutenant, and I would walk through the front office. In the vestibule, there were all the former commanders in chief of Pacific Command, and I’d pass Admiral [William] Crowe’s picture every day. There has been so much that has changed in the 20-something years, and we have been through the Pacific much of those intervening 22 years now. We’ve been in Japan for 2-plus years with the Kitty Hawk battlegroup—the Independence and Kitty Hawk from 1998 to 2000—so it’s not like we were there in 1985 and then were off in a closet somewhere. But now that we can course around in this capacity, the relationships that we enjoy with countries, the security in the region, the economic growth, the vitality, the partners and allies that we enjoy—all of these are different, stronger, and better. And it is a result of hard, hard work. All of our departments—State, Commerce, Energy, Defense, et cetera—have been working the Pacific assiduously. There have been hot spots in other parts of the world, of course, and the Pacific has had its spikes, but generally speaking, it has been a peaceful region. But that doesn’t mean it’s all sweetness, harmony, and light; there are areas that we watch carefully. But from 1985 to 2007, there has been much improvement—a huge increase in the economic engines that are turning, more folks “breathing free air” than in the mid-1980s, and it is a generally more positive, secure, tranquil area by almost any standard.

JFQ: What are the biggest challenges and opportunities you are presented with in the current strategic environment?

Admiral Keating: Maybe it’s just because I’m older, but I don’t think of things today in a straight “Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, civilian” perspective—a military perspective. There is much to recommend a pol-mil [political-military] or even an econ-pol-mil [economic-political-military] prism rather than just air wings and amphibious groups, whatever.

Take energy, for example. China, Japan, Korea—they import much more than they produce in terms of resources for energy. In China alone, their energy consumption is increasing; their environmental issues are not insignificant attendant to energy consumption. Australia now enjoys a huge commercial market with the People’s Republic of China that hardly existed, I’d say, 10 years ago, 20 years ago for sure. And so the movement of commerce of various kinds through the waters and the airspace of the Pacific is a considerable factor in our day-to-day concern.

Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of Joint Force Quarterly interviewed Admiral Keating at his Pentagon liaison office.

The growth of the militaries in the region is very interesting. It isn’t just China. Australia, India, Indonesia/Malaysia, the Philippines to a lesser extent, Japan, South Korea—and North Korea. Are the North Koreans really going to “denuclearize the peninsula”? Clearly, the challenges that we have in the AOR [area of responsibility] are not insignificant. Again, a long, measured, steady hand on the rudder, with all agencies of the government and frequent, candid collaboration with our allies and partners, recommends to me the same picture ahead of us that we’ve enjoyed behind us, if not better.

JFQ: The focus of our Forum is China. Chinese authorities are reportedly ready to establish a telephone link to enable senior-level conversations in the event of a defense crisis. Is there a need for a military-to-military link at a level below the political?

Admiral Keating: I don’t know that I would say that there’s a need. I would say that this hotline—everybody thinks of the Moscow hotline—is not just for military applications. The ability to communicate quickly and accurately, but in a secure fashion, with the Chinese would be an advantage for us to be sure. There are other ways of doing it besides some big, super-sophisticated, spooky, only-5-people-in-the-world-can-use-it type of landline or satellite or whatever. This is one of the points we make with our Chinese counterparts: not much good happens when countries try to withhold or conceal or subvert information capabilities and technologies. Now, we all have our programs that we don’t so much want folks to know about, but the way we tried to describe it when we were in China last time was if we can reduce potential for misunderstanding, whether meeting face-to-face, exercising at lower levels, exchanging noncommissioned officers—if we can reduce the gaps where either misunderstanding exists today or could develop, that would go a long way toward further reducing, if not eliminating, the chances for a significant misunderstanding.

So, a long answer to a short question. Is a hotline a good idea? Yes. Is it the only way? Absolutely not. Are there current efforts under
way that are bearing fruit? Yes. Do we want to put a hotline in? I think we're close to getting the T's crossed and the I's dotted, and we may see it within, I'll say, 6 months.

JFQ: The former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asia, Richard Lawless, recently noted that China's shrouded annual defense spending is " emblematic of our fundamental concerns over a lack of transparency in China's military and security affairs." China claims to be spending about $45 billion a year on defense, while U.S. estimates put the figure as high as $125 billion. Does PACOM have the resources at its disposal to adequately deal with the emergence of such a large military in its AOR?

Admiral Keating: Yes, we do. The background, the texture, the hue is that we have PACOM forces who are out of our theater; they are in Iraq and Afghanistan, principally. That causes us, appropriately, to reassess the risk in our AOR constantly; we're doing it every day, and we have revised slightly our risk assessment, and we have reported that to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman and to Congress. But in the end, the answer to the question of whether you can execute your mission is yes. Many people only point to China and the Korean Peninsula as examples of military growth in recent years. The reality is that any number of militaries in the region have more capability and capacity today than they did 20 or 30 years ago. It hasn't changed our perspective or position as the preeminent military power in the Pacific because at the end of the day, our job remains to protect our homeland and beat our adversaries, and we are capable of doing both readily today.

JFQ: The Okinawa-based Marine Expeditionary Force is scheduled to relocate to Guam by 2014. What are the strategic implications of this move for your AOR?

Admiral Keating: If you look at a map, you see that Guam is at the strategic crossroads of the Pacific. We will improve our ability to respond in an agile, flexible, powerful manner by moving some forces out of Okinawa and down to Guam. It will improve our strategic, operational, and tactical reach. There is, of course, the notion that Okinawans will get some of their land back. That's beneficial to the people of Japan, and it will allow us to increase our presence in important areas of the Pacific that are a little more difficult to reach today than they will be when we have more forces at Guam.

JFQ: Under current procurement and decommissioning plans, the U.S. Navy's attack submarine fleet will shrink to fewer than 30 boats by the late 2020s. China has added more than 30 advanced submarines to its fleet over the past decade and has 6 new submarine programs under way. What is driving China's military buildup, and what should PACOM do in response?

Admiral Keating: When we were in China in May, Chinese military officials said, "We have no offensive intentions. Our military is designed exclusively for defensive purposes. We want to protect our borders, we want to protect our coastlines, and we want to protect our assets and resources." That said, their weapons system development is somewhat curious if one does accept the fact that it is just for defensive purposes. So we can quibble about whether a submarine is a defensive or an offensive weapon. Are antiship cruise missiles offensive or defensive weapons? Shelve that for just a second. China's military is growing: They are operating in areas of the Pacific where they had not operated before, and they are developing systems and platforms that are, while not at the same level of capability as ours, not insignificant in their capability and capacity and volume. So we're watching very carefully the Chinese military's tactics, techniques, and procedures, and we're attempting to work more closely with them in fundamental search and rescue missions and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in a kind of building-block approach to make sure we are apprised of their capabilities. I go back to reducing the potential for misunderstanding, and we make sure they are absolutely clear on our capabilities. That's part of the strategy, an important piece of the strategy for Pacific Command: we're going to let them know how good we are. We're not going to disguise anything. We have a significant technological and capabilities advantage, and we're not going to forfeit that.

JFQ: What are the key enablers for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region?

Admiral Keating: Dialogue. We move around a lot in the AOR. It's big, and you don't go anywhere in less than 8 hours. But we're getting out there and sitting down with folks and talking to them and making sure their intentions are clear. We're making sure our goals are clear, too. We're working as hard as we can to understand their intentions, their strategy—"they," by the way, is all of them, both partners and allies. There are folks out there who would rather not be seen as terribly close to the United States. That's understandable; we don't quarrel with them. But we want to reassure them of our understanding and of our support when requested. We're not going to show up unless we're needed. And when we are requested, we're going to get there with the full kit bag of capabilities, and then we'll leave when we're done. That happens principally with disaster relief—the tsunami is perhaps the foremost example. So there are other countries, the Philippines, for example, where our special operations forces are providing very important and effective training to the Filipinos. We're not doing the actual antiterrorist work; we're teaching them how, we're showing them how, and then we will watch from a distance as they execute the tactics, techniques, and procedures that we have taught them. When we help them, we are essentially helping them learn. So we are looking to be a subtle but unmistakable presence throughout the theater, we're looking to provide a clear message of support, and we want to do this through dialogue, through presence, through the theater security cooperation plan. And we want it to be a mutual, candid exchange, not a one-way dialogue.

JFQ: Thank you, sir.
I have been privileged to serve in the Pacific before. But now, from my vantage point as commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), I have gained a fuller appreciation for the vibrancy, diversity, and complexity of the Asia-Pacific. You can sense the optimism among the region’s 43 nations. I also see a region with security challenges, where the U.S. military continues to play an indispensable role in preserving stability. But in the main, I judge the future as one in which opportunity outweighs risk. In this article, I convey my sense of the area of responsibility—both the challenges and opportunities. I am proud to lead the men and women of USPACOM as we work—along with the interagency and allies and partners—to help shape a bright future for the nations and people of the Asia-Pacific.

U.S. Pacific Command capabilities have facilitated the region’s recovery from multiple crises—from major wars to natural disasters—by establishing conditions of security and stability. Security and stability have been at the foundation of the economic boom in the Pacific, particularly over the last three decades. Since World War II, Japan, South Korea, India, and now China have joined the United States at the top of the list of the world’s largest economies.

Among the leaders of the Pacific, there is unquestionably a sense of enormous potential for continued economic growth. At the same time, more and more regional countries see the value of fostering mutual security through cooperative approaches between nations and their militaries. USPACOM welcomes this shared sense of responsibility for meeting mutual security goals. As such, the command is actively pursuing military-to-military activities within existing bilateral frameworks, while encouraging more multilateral venues and supporting the development of new strategic partnerships. These efforts are vital to our security, compatible with our national interests, and beneficial to the entire Asia-Pacific region.

U.S. Pacific Command envisions a future of peace and prosperity among all members of the Asia-Pacific community. To be successful in this regard, USPACOM must leverage the great advantages of the region—diversity, economic strength, healthy alliances, strong partners—while overcoming the challenges of vast distances and weak governmental institutions in some nations. We operate within a geopolitical environment characterized by:

- 43 diverse, independent nations, with over 100 languages and 1,000 dialects
- varied government systems, including democracies, constitutional monarchies, communist states, and military regimes

By TIMOTHY J. KEATING and TERRANCE J. McCAFFREY III

Moving the Throttle Forward in the Pacific

The opportunities are immense, they’re profound, and we’re going to capitalize on them. . . . That is what we will be about in the Pacific Command—service. Service to our friends, to our allies, to all departments, and we will be working hard with our commercial partners to ensure a better quality of life, to ensure free lines of communication, to ensure the development of free and democratic societies throughout our area of responsibility.

—Admiral Timothy J. Keating

Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN, is Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. Lieutenant Colonel Terrance J. McCaffrey III, USAF, is Deputy Director of the Commander’s Action Group, Headquarters U.S. Pacific Command.
many of the world’s major religions, including Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, and Taoism

- nearly 60 percent of the world’s population, including the 4 most populous nations (China, India, Indonesia, and the United States)
- 5 of the top 10 economic powers (the United States, Japan, China, Canada, and India)
- mutual defense treaties with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand (five of the seven U.S. mutual defense treaties)
- vast distances, spanning 51 percent of the Earth’s surface and covering 16 time zones
- extensive littoral areas and sea approaches.

Roles

U.S. Pacific Command plays an important role in realizing the future. We plan to build that future on three foundations:

- support of U.S. national interests as established in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy
- force capability and readiness for all levels of activity, from humanitarian relief to winning wars
- cooperation with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, as well as our allies and partners, to create the conditions for regional security and prosperity.

As an engaged member of the community, we have laid a healthy foundation for our future efforts. We see opportunity in abundance. We also know that the USPACOM force posture and operational methods must adapt if we are to make common progress with our allies and partners. Significant conventional and longstanding regional flashpoints are well known, but we must address broader, nontraditional threats as well. We must also fully leverage growing U.S. and allied military capabilities, particularly the agile and responsive nature of our forces. Collaborative work with allies to improve our military alliances indicates the command’s intention to contribute to a more peaceful, prosperous Asia-Pacific. We will seek to harness the leadership, partnership, and support of the Pacific nations as we move forward to achieve mutual security goals.

Leading the way toward creating this opportunity and enhancing regional stability is our Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program. The goal is to work with the interagency community, allies, and partners to strengthen relationships, build capacity, and set the conditions for regional security and prosperity. For those nations in the area of responsibility with which we do not historically have close relationships, we will encourage healthy engagement. Recent applications of this approach include the deployment in 2006 of the USNS Mercy and USPACOM support during the 2004 tsunami that devastated coastlines across the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and portions of India). U.S. leadership and demonstrated compassion for the victims helped foster better relations, especially with Indonesia. Although our approach is not limited to humanitarian assistance or disaster relief missions, this experience will continue to be a model as USPACOM develops region-wide multinational operational ties. We will continue to expand our engagement in areas such as the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Program, exercises, and other educational venues.

Moving forward to confront challenges posed by terrorists and nonstate actors who are intent on threatening security in the Asia-Pacific region will remain at the top of our priorities. We place a premium on working by, with, and through our allies and partners to strengthen their capacity to create secure and stable environments. USPACOM employs both near- and long-term approaches to prevent terrorist exploitation of at-risk environments. In the near term, our objective is to stop the violence. In the long term, we seek to reinforce the region’s democratic, economic,
social, and security institutions through the indirect approach. Using these principles, USPACOM has trained and assisted the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their successful efforts to counter terrorist activity and improve conditions in the Southern Philippines. We will build on this positive outcome and expand the use of these winning concepts elsewhere in the area of responsibility.\(^1\)

China’s rise will be important to USPACOM. While we must maintain our military capabilities to preserve regional security, interaction with China must also focus on what we can do to influence China’s development as a responsible global stakeholder. Through continued dialogue and military-to-military initiatives, such as mid-level officer exchanges, we improve understanding and reduce the potential for miscalculation during contingencies or emergencies. Our future efforts will emphasize opportunities for cooperation with China rather than areas of competition.

The security conditions on the Korean Peninsula represent another area where USPACOM must keep its focus. North Korea remains an enigma with unknown intentions, particularly with its nuclear and missile programs. The Six-Party Talks have been helpful in getting the issues on the table and providing a venue for discussions with the regional stakeholders. Whether the talks will result in the permanent shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and eventual denuclearization of the peninsula, however, is far from clear. Should success occur, the talks may form a foundation for future dialogue discussing reunification—an outcome that may be in our interest if carried out constructively. Independent of diplomatic results, however, the growing capability of Republic of Korea ground forces allows us to continue to transfer the lead for South Korean defense to our allies. The United States will continue to reduce its military footprint on the peninsula, freeing up forces for availability elsewhere.

Our relationship and alliances with both Australia and Japan will remain cornerstones of stability and security. As regional events shape the changing world, it is likely that our mutual arrangements will continue to mature as well. Australia will surely maintain its leading role in Oceania while Japan will expand its defense capabilities and build closer ties with the United States—its only military partner. Both have been stalwart participants in the war on terror around the globe; their partnerships will remain vital to our mutual efforts.

Our partners Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been helpful by improving maritime security in the critical Strait of Malacca. We will continue to encourage such combined approaches and regional multinational programs.

Relationships with both India and Indonesia have expanded over the last several years and have potential to grow even stronger. This is significant. India is the world’s largest democracy, and Indonesia is a thriving democracy with the world’s largest Muslim population. We have made great strides toward positive military-to-military relations with these nations.

Challenges such as natural and manmade disasters will occur around the region and may require U.S. military support. These inevitabilities, along with the potential for military confrontation, will require USPACOM to remain ready, forward, and vigilant into the future.

**The Way Ahead**

The rise of China has been of keen interest to the world. For USPACOM, our outlook must be broad if we are to help the Asia-Pacific—fully 43 countries—achieve their potential.

Our healthy alliances, positive economic trends, and potential for regional cooperation make it clear that opportunity is abundant in the Pacific. We are confident that, working together, we can achieve peace, stability, and prosperity. We will continue the long legacy of fostering lasting friendships and strive to build and strengthen new partnerships as well. We will pursue robust and frequent engagements throughout the region. Our aim is to create the conditions for security and prosperity across the entire region, leading to peace and political liberalization. This requires forward-based U.S. forces that will prevail in any conflict as well as operate and cooperate with regional allies, partners, and friends. Thucydides said, “The bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding go out to meet it.”

The future, though unsure, is nonetheless optimistic, and the men and women of U.S. Pacific Command will go out to meet it.
An Interview with
Ambassador Ravic Huso

JFQ: Tell us about your position as the foreign policy advisor [FPA] to the U.S. Pacific commander, and how you interact with the commander, his staff, and Washington policy circles.

Ambassador Huso: The foreign policy advisor is by no means a new construct. There is a long tradition of pairing military commanders with diplomatic advisors. Within U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM], Department of State career diplomats have advised the commander for the past 50 years. During that period, the position has become well established and, by most accounts, is a successful model for similar positions elsewhere. I would offer a few observations from the past 3 years on why the relationship seems to work well at PACOM.

First, the FPA works directly for the commander. While it would seem obvious, it is an important distinction. As staffs get larger and actions get more complex, the FPA has to stay above the fray in order to advise the commander on the most critical decisions affecting foreign policy in the region. Certainly, close coordination with the rest of the leadership and staff directors, particularly the J5, is absolutely essential. But the FPA answers directly to the commander—it can work no other way. I feel privileged to have worked with three superb commanders: Admirals [Thomas] Fargo, [William] Fallon, and now [Timothy] Keating. All three appreciated the perspective that a career diplomat could bring to their deliberations on policy issues and were more than willing to include me in all of their senior meetings within PACOM and during their regional travels. It has certainly kept me busy for 3 years, but it is the only way for the FPA to be an effective asset for the commander.

Second, the FPA has to stay plugged in very closely with the regional bureaus at State. Technically, the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs “owns” the FPA positions at the geographical combatant commands, under the POLAD [political advisor] program. However, as FPA, the policy issues I have dealt with have usually been more closely aligned with the regional bureaus’ interests, particularly the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. These two bureaus recognize the value of having one of their own as a close advisor to the PACOM commander and have been extremely supportive in terms of keeping me involved in key policy developments. Maintaining those links is key to the FPA’s utility to the commander.

Third, the command’s relationship with the Ambassadors in the region is critically important, and the FPA plays an important role in cultivating and managing that relationship. The commander and Ambassadors must have a common understanding of the security challenges, and potential policy solutions, in a given country. Certainly, there are other voices in Washington that have a great deal of influence over policy matters, but having the PACOM commander and Ambassador on the same sheet of music goes a long way toward policy coordination and implementation. Ambassadors make a point of stopping at PACOM as part of their orientation and periodically during their tours. And when the PACOM commander travels to a given country, his first stop is almost always with the Ambassador and key Embassy staff.

In all of this, it is important to note that the FPA link is not, and never should be, a shortcut for the established process of interagency policy coordination that occurs back in Washington. PACOM’s voice in the interagency process runs through the Joint Staff and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]. The FPA has to respect that process.

JFQ: How does the foreign policy advisor interact with the Joint Interagency Coordination Group [JIACG]?

Ambassador Huso: This has been a work in progress, as the JIACGs have evolved from their original focus on counterterrorism to more broadly cover interagency coordination. But we have a good model in operation here at PACOM. In very general terms, the FPA is focused on strategic policy coordination and implementation, while the JIACG is more focused on the operational and tactical coordination and execution of specific programs and policies. I know that is a broad characterization, and in practice, there is quite
often overlap. But good coordination has thus far helped avoid conflicts and redundancies. The JIACG here is part of the J5 and has a midgrade Department of State officer on staff. Daily discussions with him, the JIACG director, and the J5 are key to making this work. Of note, PACOM also has a Department of State public diplomacy advisor on staff in order to inform PACOM officers of notable public diplomacy issues for the Embassies in the region, support foreign public outreach efforts, and coordinate with PACOM officers on their strategic communications planning.

**JFQ:** What would you highlight as some of the major successes in the region that you have observed in the past year, from the standpoint of interagency cooperation?

**Ambassador Huso:** The biggest success, in my view, was the coordinated interagency response to the tsunami that affected Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka in late December of 2004. Much has been written on the tsunami from the standpoint of building goodwill with the Indonesian people and government, but it really was a significant event in terms of interagency cooperation, too. Most of that was in the coordination and execution of the provision of aid—and took place on the ground in the affected areas—with the local U.S. commanders working in concert with the Ambassadors and their staffs and coordinating with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and our partners from other nations.

Another important example of interagency success has been occurring in the Philippines, as the U.S. military and civilian aid agencies have partnered with the Philippines government to execute a coordinated strategy to eliminate terrorist safe havens in the south. From the U.S. standpoint, coordination of military and civilian assistance programs has been a key to our ability to help the Philippines government provide needed services and promote economic development in the south. This would not have been possible without the efforts of Ambassador [Kristie] Kenney and her staff, working closely with the commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines, to make this happen.

Perhaps a lesser known example of interagency success has been the development and execution of security assistance programs under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act. This was an authorization established in FY2006 [fiscal year 2006] for the Department of Defense to use up to $200 million of its funds in grant assistance to build capacity relevant for counterterrorism and stability operations in partner nations. To develop the specific proposals, Pacific Command partnered with Embassies, in coordination with relevant offices in OSD Policy, Joint Staff J5, and Department of State, to develop a single, combined Department of Defense–Department of State proposal for projects in the region. The combined proposals arrived in Washington with the joint endorsement of the PACOM commander and the respective Ambassadors. As a consequence, $58 million in proposals from the Pacific Command area of responsibility were granted in FY2006, focusing on building maritime security capacity in South and Southeast Asia. The collaborative planning process developed in this theater was held up as a model of interagency cooperation.

Lastly, my office has continually pushed to get more Department of State involvement in PACOM exercises, planning conferences, and events—not just from Embassies, but from the regional and functional bureaus at the Department of State. Typically, the Department of State has not had a training culture, but more senior leaders, particularly in the East Asian and Pacific Bureau, are recognizing the value in sending key officers out with the military to participate in major training events. I think this has contributed greatly to the excellent relationship this command has enjoyed with State.

**JFQ:** Thank you.
Today’s security environment demands immense versatility and flexibility from our military. The Armed Forces must be able to meet the needs of the President and Secretary of Defense to respond across the full spectrum of operations—from major combat operations, to disaster relief, to humanitarian assistance. Additionally, our forces must be capable of operating in the joint and combined environments across the full spectrum of operations. The imperative to “train the way we operate” is as clear today as ever.

In the war on terror, which is characterized by the enemy’s use of asymmetric tactics, it is paramount to have credible forces capable of fighting jointly and multinationally to deter aggression, respond to crises, and, above all, win. The U.S. military must continue to develop, mature, and integrate training that enables prompt and effective response to any and all contingencies that may confront the Nation. It is essential to train to new missions and technologies, train with new partners such as India and Indonesia, and provide world-class training venues and facilities. In order to keep pace with our enemies’ rapidly evolving tactics, we are obliged to ensure that all training maximizes return on investment, especially in terms of time and money.

Asia-Pacific Challenges

The individual Services are responsible for training their respective forces, while sustaining a capacity to operate jointly falls upon the geographic combatant commander. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is thus responsible for ensuring that the Nation’s military forces in the Asia-Pacific region remain a trained and ready agent for stability.

The Pacific theater offers many unique challenges to USPACOM forces. Unlike Europe, with its modern, high-tech armed forces linked by the world’s largest alliance structure, the Asia-Pacific is characterized by developing nations, an extensive maritime environment, and a tradition of nonalignment. Stability is threatened by geopolitical and socioeconomic realities, as well as unresolved territorial claims, historic animosities, and lingering mistrust between countries. Many nations lack the capabilities to address their security challenges effectively.

Vast distances and high operational tempo also present challenges to military forces in the region. Although USPACOM has more troops assigned than any other
most of USPACOM’s forward-deployed forces are stationed in areas with relatively little room for exercising

training activities by emphasizing environmental stewardship as a key component of our training approach. Though not led by J7, strategic communication has an important role in protecting the training opportunities and venues for our forces.

The thrust of the infrastructure line of operation is resolution of issues relating to facilities, logistics, transportation, and munitions storage that hamper joint training by seeking joint solutions to traditionally Title 10 issues. The infrastructure line is exemplified best on the island of Guam, where building and range plans are in the making to support thousands of Marines who will relocate from Okinawa by 2014. The data to support this massive design process come from a joint master training requirements document, developed after several months of collaboration among USPACOM Service components. This collaboration was a great example of how the combatant commander can facilitate the direction of joint training within his area of responsibility.

Both strategic communication and infrastructure support the third line of operation: training. At USPACOM, the training line is captured in the joint training plan (JTP). Designed to facilitate the development and maintenance of credible U.S. military forces, the JTP incorporates a requirements-based joint and multinational training program focused on the joint mission essential task list. To improve Service and multinational interoperability, we use the JTP to make training opportunities visible and available to all the components, even if the planned exercise is single-Service oriented. We have found numerous examples where the Services can augment each other’s exercises or training events with little additional cost, thereby maximizing the opportunity for, and effectiveness of, joint training.

Key annexes to the JTP include information on the joint training requirements group, Pacific Warfighting Center, and Joint Task Force (JTF) Certification Program. The joint training requirements group is a body of flag officers representing all Service components and dedicated to enhancing the Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) training environment to provide joint context to training. Providing this LVC training conduit will be the charter

Joint Training Strategy

To ensure that U.S. forces remain pre-eminent and that the many challenges in the Asia-Pacific do not strain the ability of our military to train, USPACOM has refocused on improving joint and combined training. Underpinning this effort is the recent development of the Pacific Joint Training Strategy (PJTS). The PJTS vision is “a joint and combined training and exercise program that enhances, demonstrates, and certifies the readiness of USPACOM forces in challenging events combining live, virtual, and constructive environments.”

Over the last several months, the Training and Exercises Directorate (J7) has codified the numerous processes that integrate and synchronize all joint training capabilities available to USPACOM forces. The result is a strategy that guides the command’s training and readiness through a window of opportunity—which is narrowing, owing to factors such as declining training budgets, the need for environmental impact statements, and a host of other requirements that support upcoming joint and combined operational force milestones. Thus, getting it right now is of the utmost importance.
of the future Pacific Warfighting Center, which is a training and operations facility under construction on Ford Island. It will house and maintain a state-of-the-art capability that synchronizes and leverages planning, collaboration, technology, and knowledge management to enhance exercises, training, crisis support, and security cooperation throughout the Pacific theater. Lastly, the JTF Certification Program provides a holistic approach to reducing both the time it takes to stand up JTFs in the USPACOM area of responsibility and the challenges associated with JTF operations.

**Leading the Way**

Finding ways for our Service components to improve the quality and efficiency of joint training is a USPACOM priority. An example is found in the Joint Training and Experimentation Network (JTEN). With JTEN connectivity, live (tactical) force feeds can be exported to operational-level training audiences engaged in joint exercises. These feeds can also act as virtual feeds to “adjacent” forces training at physically disparate locales throughout the world. Conversely, LVC feeds can be imported to training areas within the USPACOM area of responsibility, such as the Pacific Alaska Range Complex, to benefit units training on tactical tasks. Exemplified during Talisman Saber-07, forward air controllers in Australia were able to receive crucial training in support of targeting for an A–10, flown via simulation from Eglin Air Force Base. In this scenario, the only thing missing was the visual image of actual bombs on target. The tyranny of distance is not insurmountable.

Another great example of recent USPACOM efforts to ensure joint training is the Army is including other Service training requirements in the development of the joint master training plan for the Pohakuloa Training Area. A–10, flown via simulation from Eglin Air Force Base. In this scenario, the only thing missing was the visual image of actual bombs on target. The tyranny of distance is not insurmountable.

As an example of the joint training at PTA, in March 2007, Army field artillery units conducted close air support operations with Air National Guard F–16 fighters. During the operations, Air Force joint terminal attack controllers provided terminal guidance for inert bomb drops, while Army field artillery units fired suppression of enemy air defenses with the M–777 lightweight howitzer. The Army is also working closely with the Navy and Air Force to expand restricted PTA airspace to provide better training in support of the Air Force’s continuous bomber presence. Last but not least, the Services are collaborating to redesign Bradshaw Army Airfield at PTA to support a wider range of C–17 training. Expanding C–17 operations at Bradshaw would benefit training opportunities not only for the Air Force but also for the other Services. For example, expanded operations would increase throughput of Stryker brigade combat teams between Oahu and PTA and permit increased usage by the Navy’s carrier-based aircraft at an outlying field.

U.S. Pacific Command is leading the way in facilitating joint training for all assigned forces within its area of responsibility. By methodically integrating and synchronizing the three lines of operation (strategic communication, infrastructure, and training), the command has been able to codify its joint training program through its newly developed Pacific Joint Training Strategy. Component commands have embraced the training strategy as a method of maximizing training opportunities and advancing capabilities to fight, when needed, as an effective joint and combined team. The success of the training strategy framework in U.S. Pacific Command makes the model potentially valuable to other Government agencies and nations. JFQ
The Enduring Value of Military-to-Military Cooperation in Southeast Asia

It is difficult to imagine a region blessed with more diversity and promise than Southeast Asia. Eleven nations with an aggregate population in excess of 550 million straddle the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. These nations possess an incredibly rich array of cultural traditions and an expansive religious heritage. Moreover, the market dynamics of the 21st century are empowering vibrant economies. Centuries-old sultanates work hand-in-hand with young secular governments to flourish in a globally connected world. Democracies continue to modernize and prosper, casting aside their colonial legacies and politically tumultuous histories.

Diversity and positive economic trends are reasons for optimism, but Southeast Asia’s geography and economic potential carry numerous intrinsic challenges as well. The sheer distance between several of the nations’ capitals and their most distant islands has historically made it difficult to extend government presence to every quarter. Long associated with piracy and other criminal enterprises, these remote locations still invite terrorists and their support networks to exploit them as safe havens. Another driver of conflict is the growing competition for scarce resources and products, in particular oil and steel, both necessary to fuel the region’s continued economic expansion. Estimates vary, but most agree that emerging Asia will one day rival or surpass the developed West’s appetite for the building blocks of modern industry. If effective mechanisms to manage this demand are not established and entrenched, the competition for resources may transition from a purely economic matter into the world’s diplomatic and military arenas.

Undoubtedly, the world economy depends on maritime security in Southeast Asia. The area’s geography channels commercial traffic into a few narrow lanes. Over 80 percent of the world’s

cargo is moved by sea, including much of its oil supply. In Southeast Asia, almost all commerce is compressed to flow into the Strait of Malacca, Lombok Strait, or Sunda Strait. Over 25 percent of the world's cargo and 50 percent of its oil pass through the Strait of Malacca alone, including 80 percent of Northeast Asia's oil. Any restriction of that commerce, whether due to a maritime attack or other means, would gravely affect the global economy.

In Southeast Asia, America's aim is to preserve security and facilitate an environment that fosters the development of stable, prosperous nations that are positive actors in the international community. The United States hopes to cultivate an ever-widening partnership of culturally diverse but like-minded nations—nations that value security, stability, good governance, accountability, and respect for the rule of law.

Activities

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) role in achieving the overarching objectives of the Nation can be captured broadly by three fundamental tasks: providing security to the region, enhancing the capacity of the region’s nations to provide their own security, and improving bilateral and multilateral cooperation and coordination. While this article focuses on the latter two tasks, USPACOM, as the unified command for the Pacific area of responsibility, never loses sight of its primary responsibility of maintaining regional security through ready and capable military forces. The command is prepared to defeat all traditional threats. It is also postured to work with its regional partners to counter myriad nontraditional threats, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other transnational dangers.

Building Security Capacity

Nontraditional threats thrive in at-risk environments. Where such environments exist in Southeast Asia, USPACOM attempts to augment the regional nations’ organic capacity to address threats directly and to reduce and eliminate the conditions that allow them to take root. USPACOM and the Department of Defense play a supporting role in this goal, except in the case of failed states. The agency primarily responsible for aiding the overall development of other nations is the Department of State, with the main role played by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The financial and human resources brought to bear by these organizations assist nations broadly, building agricultural and industrial capacity, supporting health and educational initiatives, and providing advice in a variety of governmental policies. This assistance strengthens governmental institutions and spurs economic development. Providing economic opportunity and hope for a better future is an important factor in defeating the underlying causes of terrorism. While the combat arms of the U.S. Services train partner militaries to pursue terrorists and attack their networks, the Department of State and other supporting agencies lead the main effort in the overall battle against terrorism.

USPACOM’s role in building capacity is primarily accomplished through a military-to-military engagement framework. Guided by U.S. national policy, the National Military Strategy, and Security Cooperation Guidance, the Southeast Asia Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program relies on a three-vector approach, working to improve equipment, training activities, and resources. Equipment assistance is intended to address physical capacity shortfalls and gaps—items such as radios, boats, radar towers, and other hardware requirements. American Embassy staffs and Country Teams draft proposals describing the desired capabilities and equipment sets that they believe best fill those requirements. When approved, the proposals can be funded through a variety of programs including foreign military financing and foreign military sales. More recently, initiatives such as the National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1206, “train and equip” authority have allowed the fast-tracking of needed hardware and systems to provide interoperable military-to-military capabilities that address specific regional capacity gaps. The improved capabilities offered by the new equipment allow these sovereign nations to enforce their laws and provide security, which in turn contributes to overall regional security and stability.
As an example, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have partnered in recent years in the Malacca Strait Patrols Initiative, involving air and maritime patrols to reduce the threat of piracy and contributing greatly to the reduced rate of violent incidents in that vital commercial conduit. USPACOM has coordinated with those nations to build maritime domain awareness, through the acquisition of coastal surveillance radars and communications equipment and their interdiction ability. Ensuring that these nations have the equipment necessary to execute operations addresses international problems such as piracy, terrorism, and economic vulnerability of shipping while avoiding infringements on sovereignty.

The second vector of USPACOM’s TSC program—training activities—focuses on sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures with Southeast Asian militaries and improving their interoperability. Military-to-military activity levels have been steadily rising over the last few years between the United States and most Southeast Asian nations. Bilateral engagements have resulted in increasingly strong military relationships between many of the region’s nations—as well as improved capability. For example, TSC programs have helped the Armed Forces of the Philippines to increase their ability to sustain long-duration patrols, conduct effective combined arms doctrine, and operate at night. These capabilities, combined with dramatically improved combat lifesaving and medical evacuation skills, have contributed to a string of combat successes in the Sulu Peninsula, with a corresponding uptick in troop discipline and morale.

USPACOM engagement strategies include Service-to-Service activities, joint and combined multilateral exercises, subject matter expert exchanges, and other training venues. Bilateral exercises are historically among the most successful exchange opportunities. Among the many that USPACOM is involved in are Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines, Pacific Fleet’s Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, Marine Force Pacific’s Incremental Training Exercises, and U.S. Army Pacific’s Garuda Shield with Indonesia and Keris Strike with Malaysia. USPACOM is increasingly encouraging multilateral ventures by inviting partner nations to participate in traditionally U.S.-only exercises. Cope Tiger, Red Flag, and Cobra Gold are among the most visible military-to-military exercises, but they represent only a fraction of the actual participation of Southeast Asian nations’ militaries in U.S. or regional exercises.

The final vector of USPACOM’s TSC program focuses on using nonmaterial resources to facilitate partner nation military development. One instance is the use of Title 10 funds to enable military personnel from resource-strapped countries to attend conferences or participate in exercises. Carefully applied, a relatively small level of funding can bring a far broader level of participation to events. Participants take home knowledge, procedures, and ideas, imparting them in turn to their own militaries and internally driving development and improvement.

**Toward More Cooperation**

TSC is the cornerstone of facilitating increased cooperation and coordination among nations. USPACOM represents the Department of Defense at numerous international organization events. In concert with the Department of State, USPACOM hopes to encourage increased multilateral engagements through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and similar groups. In 2006, the forum held its first-ever exercise addressing maritime security in Singapore and plans to hold capacity-building exercises for disaster relief in 2008 and 2009, the former cosponsored by Indonesia and Australia and the latter by the United States and the Philippines. Although not as mature an alliance as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or European Union, the region’s increasingly active cooperation can only lead to stronger ties and a more robust ability to work together to resolve common issues.

Some of the most influential military-to-military activities, particularly in regard to fostering cooperation, involve USPACOM interaction and training with regional partners in peacekeeping operations. The Global Peace Operations Initiative, a U.S.-funded program, has trained and equipped 75,000 peacekeepers globally, with 15,000 of them from Southeast Asia. Trained to United Nations (UN) standards through a series of workshops, modules, and exercises, these peacekeepers represent far more to their parent nations than an elite military force; they return home understanding international norms and standard procedures and provide global recognition and influence. Whether trained by the Global Peace Operations Initiative or not, many Southeast Asian nations contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. For instance, Indonesia and Malaysia sent forces to Lebanon, Liberia, and Sudan as a part of UN contingents; Philippine troops have deployed to East Timor, Sudan, Haiti, and Liberia; and troops from Singapore have served in East Timor and Nepal.

Peacekeeping’s international nature allows these relationships to achieve synergies that...
The Changing Character of War and Conflict:
Implications for U.S. Military Forces

November 13–14, 2007

The strategic guidance offered by the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy of the United States is founded on assumptions regarding the global security environment, nature of conflict, and resources available. The conflict in Iraq and war in Afghanistan continue to occupy the attention and greatest level of American military efforts several years after the outbreak of hostilities. As we approach the 5-year mark in Iraq and 6-year mark in Afghanistan, it is fitting to examine and assess some of the foundations of U.S. military strategy.

Topics will include:

- counterinsurgency and capacity-building
- effects-based approaches to operations
- impact of long-term combat on forces
- network-centric operations in environments dominated by clans and sects
- precision-guided munitions/precision strike
- role of democratic allies and partners in conflict and combat.

extend beyond peacekeeping as such. Participating nations are often amenable to military-to-military activities related to defense reform and professional development, including non-commissioned officer development programs and international military education and training. Many Southeast Asian nations have also become further involved in multilateral forums, including the Multinational Planning and Augmentation Team, a deployable, standardized, multilateral group that refines standard operating procedures, attends staff and command post exercises, and serves as a military force for coalition and combined operations.

USPACOM’s military-to-military engagement with Southeast Asia is a significant enabler, providing the region with capacity, training, resources, and a framework from which local and regional security and stability can grow. Military-to-military activities and capacity-building are not sufficient to address all of the region’s challenges in and of themselves. The military must embrace a supporting role in cases where the Department of State or other agencies have resources and programs better designed to solve regional issues. Common challenges often benefit from a collective approach, and only when we harness the capabilities of all U.S. Government agencies do we have the tools necessary to attempt the task at hand.

In the future, U.S. Pacific Command will continue to build on successful military-to-military relationships and to broaden interagency cooperation within Southeast Asia. Whether by providing security assistance to partner nations, exercising with other militaries bilaterally or multilaterally, or helping in relief and development efforts, the command will work with partner nations to build a stronger, more secure, and stable foundation for the region’s continued growth and prosperity.

NOTES


7. When Lloyds of London listed the Strait of Malacca as an area at risk of "war, strike, terrorism and related perils" in June of 2005 due to escalating piracy and sea robbery incidents, the resulting insurance premium hikes imposed on carriers raised oil prices around the world. A reduction of piracy incidents has since allowed the "war risk" rating to be rescinded, but the episode serves as a clear demonstration of the interlinked nature of the global economy and the need for effective maritime security in the region. See Zurich Financial Services, "Taking cover—and joint action," available at <www.zurich.com/main/productsandoperations/industryinsight/2006/march2006/industryinsight20060301_003.htm>; and Nazery Khalid, "Revocation of the Straits of Malacca as a War Risk Zone Long Overdue," Maritime Institute of Malaysia, accessed at <www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/nazery/nazery%20-%20W%20revocation.pdf>.


10. Access to a comprehensive picture of military activities in the Southeast Asia region is available at <https://www1.apan-info.net/>. The Asia-Pacific Area Network is an online portal offering information resources and a collaborative planning environment as a means to greater defense interaction, confidence-building, and enhanced security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. USPACOM established and maintains an unclassified Web-based information-sharing and collaboration network as a means of enhancing interoperability and multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.


The Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) achieved initial operational capability in January 2006. After 18 months, it is already setting a new standard for joint intelligence operations in the Pacific. Aggressive collaboration and integration with operators, planners, and the broader Intelligence Community have enhanced capability, improved predictive analysis, and, most importantly, provided operators with the intelligence support they need.

Today, we continue to press for further gains in the effective execution of theater intelligence operations. Our main efforts follow two primary lines of operation. First, we focus on processes. We must continue to drive intelligence out of “intel-only” quarters and into venues that operators and foreign partners can use. Integrating all available intelligence into theater operations is our goal. Second, we must continue to develop a culture that empowers our talented workforce and enables us to master the intelligence environment. Effective intelligence operations depend on more than sophisticated sensor technologies. Delivering the full potential of intelligence assets requires bold analysis, innovation, and vigorous collaboration.

Rethinking Intelligence

The JIOC concept was created by an initiative to improve intelligence support to military operations. The initiative, “Remodeling Defense Intelligence,” was issued in 2003 by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. It examined intelligence performance during major operations, including Iraqi Freedom. The study also examined the strategy, operations, and manpower requirements needed to master intelligence for tomorrow’s fight. In particular, the study found defense intelligence—though quite capable of locating conventional military forces—lacking in its ability to determine objectives, methods, and operations of nontraditional threat groups such as al Qaeda. It challenged defense intelligence to break down bureaucratic and technological barriers to intelligence integration among Department of Defense agencies and specifically encouraged the elimination of obstacles between the Intelligence Community and operational end-users.

Moreover, the initiative directed the establishment of JIOCs, which were charged with responsibility to synchronize capabilities of the Services, components, and agencies; streamline processes; and improve intelligence tradecraft by increasing the analytic depth of our workforce. By exercising these responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific, we are enabling more
agile intelligence operations and providing the sound intelligence that underpins effective theater military plans and operations—across the full spectrum of operations, from planning for pandemics, to monitoring proliferation of fissile material, to providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The Concept

One question that inevitably arises during JIOC command briefings is how the USPACOM JIOC is different from its predecessor, the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific. While the transition has transformed organizational processes, the highest impact change has been the shift in mindset at JIOC, which welcomes cross-agency collaboration and demands routine operations and intelligence interface, creating the energy and momentum that allow our new processes to succeed.

U.S. Pacific Command has a long history of aggressive intelligence and operations collaboration that was forged in World War II and is illustrative of the modern JIOC concept. At Midway, for instance, intelligence operations played a pivotal role in the outcome of the epic naval battle. In the spring of 1942, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was badly outmatched by the Japanese navy. Eighteen ships had been sunk or damaged during the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the aircraft carrier USS Lexington had been lost during the Battle of Coral Sea.

The JIOC portion of the Midway story begins on Station Hypo at Pearl Harbor, where U.S. Sailors were attempting to break the Japanese naval code in collaboration with fellow code-breakers in Australia and Washington, DC. By early May, naval intelligence was confident that the Japanese navy was planning a major operation at an objective known as “AF.” Midway was suspected, but the precarious position of the U.S. Pacific Fleet demanded a higher degree of confidence in the intelligence assessment. In collaboration with operators and planners, the intelligence team formulated a plan that directed U.S. forces on Midway to send out an uncoded message stating that the water distillation plant there had broken down. Within 48 hours of sending the false report from Midway, a Japanese naval message was decrypted that indicated AF was short of water. Further coordination among cryptanalysts and all-source intelligence teams allowed them to predict when and where the Japanese strike force would appear. This, in turn, enabled Admiral Chester Nimitz to marshal U.S. forces at the right time and place to engage and defeat the Japanese.

At Midway, collaboration among theater, national, and allied intelligence professionals, across all intelligence disciplines and absent information barriers, was essential in anticipating the Japanese threat and providing warning of the impending attack. Close integration among operators, planners, and intelligence analysts allowed the United States to improve the confidence of intelligence estimates and generate actionable products that led to victory at Midway and turned the tide of the war in the Pacific.

“Remodeling Defense Intelligence” found defense intelligence lacking in its ability to determine objectives, methods, and operations of nontraditional threat groups.

To create the JIOC, we concentrated on aligning our operations with theater priorities, implementing processes designed to improve theater intelligence, and building a culture committed to aggressive collaboration. Most significantly, we grouped major analytic efforts into four divisions aligned along theater priorities: China, counterterrorism, North Korea, and the Pan-Pacific. To break down internal barriers, we embedded within each division not only all-source intelligence analysts but also planners; collections, targeting, and foreign disclosure experts; and graphics and collaboration experts. Recognizing that 21st-century intelligence challenges require a more agile and mature workforce, we also raised grade and experience levels for all key positions.

Enablers

There are three critical enablers for JIOC operations: Intelligence Campaign Planning (ICP), Red Teaming, and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) use.

ICP—the intelligence version of Adaptive Planning—allows the JIOC to improve support to theater military planning. Adaptive Planning is a joint process under development that is designed to make the planning process more seamless and to produce high-standard plans faster. It is also designed to help generate plans that mitigate risk by offering options for changing conditions. At USPACOM, we used ICP to review the intelligence portions of all major theater operational plans. Doing so requires significant collaboration among national and theater intelligence organizations and has proven to be an excellent way to validate the effectiveness of this planning tool.

Another key enabler is Red Teaming, which provides an alternative (non-U.S.) perspective and allows hedging against conventional analysis, which is often constrained by what we know or think we know. Red Teaming taps the expertise of critical and creative thinkers and is designed to encourage consideration of overlooked possibilities, challenge assumptions, and present issues in a cultural context or from a different perspective. The success of our first application of Red Teaming during last year’s Exercise Terminal Fury was quickly followed by production of our Red Team’s assessment on North Korea: “What if Kim Jong-Il Were Willing to Give Up His Nuclear Weapons?”

Our third critical JIOC enabler, OSINT, is integral to comprehensive intelligence analysis. Open source intelligence considers the enormous amount of publicly available information and is critical to monitoring indications and providing analysis, assessments, and threat warnings across a huge and well-connected geographic area.

Our OSINT effort has been quite successful thanks to a joint approach that leverages the unique capabilities and strengths of the component commands. We credit much of our initial success to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). As the USPACOM executive agent for OSINT, USARPAC consolidated existing and emerging OSINT capabilities and is now developing procedures for managing OSINT requirements.
Cornerstones of Culture

The cornerstones of a successful JIOC culture are innovation, collaboration, and “staying low.” We are bringing forth smaller, more frequent experimentation and assessment to test JIOC ability to adapt and to see what we can do to meet emerging opportunities and challenges more rapidly. One such recent effort employed Intellipedia, a sort of classified Wikipedia. We experimented with Intellipedia during a December 2006 exercise and quickly improved the speed of intelligence collaboration and delivery. This innovative effort improved the effectiveness and capacity of our people by enhancing their ability to share, work together, and create knowledge that end-users need.

Our focus on aggressive collaboration as part of our culture extends far beyond Intellipedia. It permeates all that we do. An example is our morning intelligence brief, attended by J3 and J5 and their staffs, component intelligence representatives, national agency partners, and JIOC reserve centers. The brief is collaborative and, more importantly, allows time for immediate feedback among intelligence personnel, operators, and planners. Collaboration is further augmented with a monthly Analyst and J5 Desk Officer Forum that ensures exchange of planning and insights. Additionally, analytic divisions, through regular video teleconferences with major theater joint task forces and components, share as much as possible about theater operations and plans. Finally, we employ a Combined Joint Collection Management Board that includes Australia and works to ensure that our collection priorities and outcomes are as efficient and effective as possible.

To facilitate emergence from the legacy, intelligence-only mindset, the JIOC has adopted a stay-low policy to improve the dissemination of intelligence and information to theater and partner nation forces. The two major components of this policy are “Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) first” and “write for release.” SIPRNET first means that we make every effort to post our products on SIPRNET rather than on the more-restrictive Joint World-wide Intelligence Communication System. Write for release means that we strive to write intelligence products in such a way as to allow release to foreign partners by our foreign disclosure officers.

This stay-low policy is enforced from the top. Use of material not releasable to foreign nationals requires approval from the division chief, and analysts are charged with obtaining releasable products to ensure that our assessments reach the largest audience possible.

Today, in the interest of common security concerns, we focus on what we can share rather than on what we cannot. The need-to-know mindset has evolved into a responsibility-to-share mindset.

The Way Ahead

The next steps in the development of the USPACOM JIOC are to assess existing initiatives, adopt successful ones, and discard the others. Our leadership and execution teams are developing and carrying out several initiatives to improve JIOC capabilities. Over the next year, JIOC will focus on creating new capability in five thrust areas:

- deepening and broadening integration of intelligence, plans, and operations
- strengthening integration of national, interagency, component, and foreign partners
- investing in our people to thrive in a complex environment
- institutionalizing practices and standards that deliver ready knowledge online
- pursuing and incorporating best practices and instilling a “learning organization” mindset.

An ambitious new document from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, “JIOC After Next,” provides a draft outline of the vision for JIOCs from 2010 to 2015. An overriding premise of this vision is that networks are more effective than hierarchies in the intelligence business. We see this network-of-networks vision as a long-term opportunity to enhance JIOC effectiveness.

Although implementing lasting change is difficult, our people have made significant progress. Process and culture changes at the JIOC have greatly enhanced security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. Many challenges and opportunities remain, however, and continued success lies in our ability to think and act anew. It is imperative that we do so.
In 2006, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command, Vice Admiral David Nichols, USN, traveled to Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, for meetings with the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence. Whatever apprehension he may have had regarding his ability to tackle critical issues vanished when he discovered that his Pakistani counterpart, Major General Muhammad Mustafa Khan, the Director General for Analysis and Foreign Relations, was a friend and fellow alumnus of a course on Transnational Security Cooperation held at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in 2001. The meeting turned into not only a reunion, but also an occasion to advance a mutually beneficial agenda. The enabler was a relaxed relationship of mutual trust and a transparent framework for collaborative dialogue developed in 1 week at APCSS. In this case and countless others, a shared learning experience played a key role in contributing to a special relationship, a common knowledge starting point, easily accessible teaming skills, and an expanded network of key security practitioners capable of working together to prevent or mitigate crises in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Through its broad suite of innovative executive education, outreach, and research, the center—one of five Department of Defense (DOD) Regional Centers for Security Studies—has earned a reputation for facilitating broad-based multilateral security collaboration and executing DOD and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) strategic policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. The APCSS operating philosophy is based on a rigorous process involving constant assessment, feedback, and consultation with regional leaders, both U.S. and foreign, which is the driving force behind the evolution of APCSS programs. This assessment-driven approach is helping forge an ever-expanding multilateral community of interagency, military, academic, and nongovernmental security influencers, all interactively connected by a network of networks, collaborating at all levels to solve the region’s toughest security challenges.

Moreover, with an annual operating budget roughly equal to the cost of a single Apache helicopter or F–16 fighter, APCSS is helping to increase a uniquely important security capacity—that of leaders. Operating in direct support of the USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan, the APCSS enables relationships with and among traditional allies and potential regional security partners who give DOD, as well as inter-agency constituents, unique returns on dollars invested. In the Asia-Pacific region, where relationships are foundational to all progress, those forged at APCSS are cost-effective, high-payoff enablers. As an investment for the long term, they work and they stick.

**Short History, Big Impact**

Contributing to the formation of APCSS was Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye’s realization in the early 1990s that a DOD institution based in Hawaii, directly supporting U.S. Pacific Command, could play a significant role in educating security practitioners in the Asia-Pacific region. Senator Inouye introduced legislation to establish the center in 1994. Occupying temporary space at Camp Smith and the Waikiki Trade Center from 1995 to 2000, the center graduated its first executive course, which consisted of 23 fellows from 12 countries, in September 1996. Following a comprehensive facility refurbishment, APCSS moved to its permanent home at Fort DeRussy in June 2000. In its 12-year history, APCSS has graduated nearly 3,000 fellows from more than 50 countries; participated in 115 security-related conferences attended by roughly 7,000 security professionals from 70 countries; and partnered with academic institutions in 35 countries for conferences and research. In terms of sheer reach and ability to...
promote common security frameworks and stimulate regional collaboration, APCSS is playing a critical role in the broader effort to support the strategic security objectives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and USPACOM in the Asia-Pacific region.

**Strategic Imperatives**

The comprehensive security environment of the Asia-Pacific region could not be more complex. It is characterized by traditional national sovereignty issues; longstanding territorial disputes; rogue states; the threat of pandemic outbreak; increasing competition for energy resources; and humanitarian crises resulting from terrorism, ethnic conflict, poor governance, widening socioeconomic gaps, and natural disasters. These regional challenges give APCSS some strategic imperatives to focus its mission of educating and developing leaders to advance strategic communications and security cooperation. As a DOD institution, APCSS is uniquely postured to support long-term and emergent policy objectives identified by OSD and USPACOM by expanding the analysis of the security dimensions addressed and leveraging innovative, nontraditional approaches. The key is the focus on Asia-Pacific 21st-century leader development.

APCSS continually strives to tailor courses and regional outreach events in direct support of emergent security policy priorities. To support the war on terror, APCSS developed its Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism course to foster a broader understanding of terrorism, from roots to means and effects, and to share perspectives on best approaches and related collaborative requirements, for dealing with terrorism. Since April 2004, 7 iterations of the course have built relationships among 336 fellows from 51 countries, the vast majority of whom are counterrorism practitioners directly engaged in the war on terror. The center has also partnered with other regional organizations in executing 13 terrorism-focused conferences and numerous collaborative research projects, all designed to enhance regional capacity for combating terrorism, from addressing its root causes to developing multilateral response mechanisms.

Additionally, APCSS responded in November 2005 when the Secretary of Defense identified security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations as a mission area of priority equal to traditional combat, a major policy decision reflected in DOD Directive 3000.05 and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Realizing the implications for the Asia-Pacific region, APCSS immediately began to develop its Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction course to prepare security practitioners from the public and private sectors to deal comprehensively with challenges across the stability-to-reconstruction spectrum. In August 2006, APCSS completed its first course iteration, graduating fellows representing military, constabulary, diplomatic, academic, and humanitarian professions spanning 17 Asia-Pacific nations. The 4-week course is now one of the most sought-after in the APCSS catalogue. Importantly, feedback from the region clearly indicates that alumni are leveraging the knowledge and relationships gained at the center to positive, practical effect.

APCSS and the other regional centers also stand to benefit from recent DOD strategic policy directives. For example, the DOD Information Sharing Strategy states:

> It is imperative to effectively exchange information among components, Federal agencies, coalition partners, foreign governments, and international organizations as a critical element of our efforts to defend the Nation and execute national strategy. . . . The Strategy represents the first step in a comprehensive initiative to assess and modify as needed existing policies, business processes, budget allocations, and cultural perspectives.\(^1\)

This type of policy change gives greater thrust to information-sharing and educational technology innovations already under way that will more effectively network alumni and other collaborative partners with APCSS and each other, providing greater capacity for strategic communication, predictive analysis, and crisis response.

A continuing cycle of assessment, adaptive planning, and execution ensures that APCSS satisfies DOD and USPACOM policy directives. Specifically, OSD guidance directs the APCSS and other regional centers to:

- build institutional and security capacity
- counter ideological support for terrorism
- harmonize views on common security challenges
- educate officials on the role of security in civil societies.

At the combatant command level, APCSS programs also complement and support USPACOM’s effort to execute its regional strategy. The command’s major focus areas are to:

- prosecute and win the war on terror
- advance regional security cooperation and engagement

*All photos: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*
mature our joint and combined capabilities
posture for agile and responsive employment
ensure that operational plans at all levels are credible.

Because APCSS programs continue to contribute positively to all the above policy objectives, both directly and indirectly, OSD and USPACOM recognize and use APCSS as a unique enabler in the broader effort to execute DOD’s security strategy in the region.

Participant-centered Education
As the cornerstone of the APCSS program suite, executive education arguably has had the greatest impact on building collaborative security capacity. Drawing military and civilian fellows working in various security-related sectors, both governmental and non-governmental personnel from the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, the APCSS participant-centered learning approach and nonattribution academic environment promote in-depth examination and robust dialogue on existing and emerging security challenges common to all. An emphasis on transparency and mutual respect provides a proper foundation for relationship-building that sticks.

Attracting the right people to its courses continues to be a top priority for APCSS. The process begins with a rigorous assessment of the demographics, skill sets, and functional/organizational affiliations desired for an upcoming course. The process continues with a close dialogue between the center’s admissions branch and regional U.S. Embassies, which coordinate with appropriate host-nation government ministries or nongovernmental organizations to identify and vet prospects. Fellows sought are mid- to senior-level professionals who can best benefit from the knowledge and skills gained and the professional networks developed, and who are now or are likely to be in key positions of influence in their countries and able to work collaboratively with the United States and regional counterparts.

APCSS designs courses that allow maximum interaction between the fellows and faculty. Tailored academic lectures, guided seminar discussions, and special presentations by high-profile senior military officers and policymakers expose fellows to a diverse set of regional security perspectives. Fellows also benefit from the APCSS library, computer-training lab, and other key support staff. Finally, no less important than the academic program itself is a robust schedule of social activities, sports, and cultural events to allow fellows to build lasting relationships. Feedback from alumni demonstrates how these relationships have paid big dividends by enabling a more effective response to regional crises.

Outreach
Built on the success of in-residence education, APCSS outreach events are most often hands-on workshops intent on building practical capacity to address key security issues. Outreach events do not just happen; they begin with a specific need identified by U.S. government, military, police, major political party security-sector reform analysis conducted in September 2006—resulted in a followup requirement generated by the U.S. Ambassador to Nepal for a second five-workshop series addressing “Democratic Transitions and Civil-Military Relations.” In May 2007, APCSS and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations partnered with the Nepal-based South Asia Center for Policy Studies to conduct the first event of the series, which focused on “democratic control of the security forces.” The event culminated with a briefing to Nepal’s speaker of parliament, by Nepali participants, on recommended next steps for specific security sector reform. The final report will inform government ministries, political parties, security forces, and nongovernmental influencers on these outcomes.

In the wake of recent successful outreach events in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Japan, Nepal, and Pakistan, APCSS continues to receive requests for additional support from various U.S. and regional organizations. This mission area is likely to expand and, with appropriate resources, will continue to yield huge dividends in building regional security capacity.

Keeping Connected
Maintaining and leveraging the collaborative relationships and regional security expertise forged during courses and outreach are top priorities for APCSS. It accomplishes these tasks in a number of innovative ways.

First, during in-resident courses, APCSS invites fellows to join a community of interest supported by the Asia-Pacific Collaborative Security Consortium (APCSC), a virtual network of five Hawaii-based, DOD-funded organizations (APCSS included) with a common interest in sharing enabling information to enhance regional security and stability. The faculty uses the APCSS portal to exchange course-related information with fellows, a practice that socializes future alumni to the practical benefits of continued on-line collaboration after they return to their countries. The intent is for
APCSC, or its next-generation replacement, to function as a focal point for information-sharing during a regional crisis or as a key information tool supporting collaboration on longer-term regional security projects.

APCSS also strives to keep alumni connected through monthly electronic newsletters and its semiannual Currents magazine, both providing the latest information on alumni accomplishments, promotions, position changes, or involvement in activities of interest to a security community of influence. An alumni network portal is yet another way that APCSS graduates and other affiliates stay in touch with each other, the center, and the APCSC.

Finally, as a testament to the impact that APCSS programs have made on alumni, alumni associations have formed in 17 countries, with several more pending. APCSS executive leadership and faculty routinely engage alumni associations during regional travel to provide updates, seek feedback on programs, and reinforce relationships. Given the positions of influence that many APCSS alumni hold, the associations are valued partners and critical enablers within the broader community of influence dedicated to improving regional security. Through their respective associations, alumni are leveraging the knowledge and relationships gained at APCSS to effect positive change in their own countries and throughout the region.

Innovations

At APCSS, a focused transformation continues, with a comprehensive and continuous assessment driving the overall effort. The most exciting changes are those under way in the areas of education and supporting information technology. APCSS is currently upgrading its academic facilities with the latest in wireless technology, electronic smart boards, virtual collaboration and learning portals, and Web-based capabilities for continuing education. Additionally, APCSS is already looking at ways to promote and employ the Regional International Outreach (RIO) enterprise system, currently in development by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to connect APCSS with other U.S. Regional Centers for Security Studies and their alumni. Not only is RIO expected to enhance APCSS educational programs and enable continued alumni contact, but it will also give networked security practitioners a way to respond to regional crises more proactively and collaboratively.

In the near future, APCSS will launch a new Trends Analysis Center (TAC), an initiative to harness, both physically and virtually, the analytical capabilities of its faculty, scientists from the Pacific Disaster Center, nongovernmental organization coordination experts at the Center of Excellence for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, and other agencies. Resulting from a recent in-depth study that explored optimizing collaborative relationships among key Hawaii-based agencies, the APCSS TAC will offer a better understanding of how select trends not traditionally associated with defense impact the broader regional security environment. By examining and reporting on socioeconomic, demographic, environmental, resource, health, and other trends that could lead to strategic shock events, the TAC will seek to fill existing analytical gaps. Not only will resulting products contribute to APCSS courses and outreach events, but they will also provide vital information to help USPACOM and other regional security partners mitigate security threats or respond effectively to crises should they occur.

Finally, APCSS is seeking to expand academic partnerships with counterpart institutions around the region. Through sharing ideas about best practices related to learning models, exchanging subject matter expertise, collaborating on research, and writing joint publications, the APCSS team can better shape opportunities and lay the foundation for enhanced academic interaction and state-of-the-art leader development. By these means, more Asia-Pacific security practitioners and key influencers will benefit in individual and partnered attempts to resolve conflict and identify solutions to common security problems.

The mission of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and the other regional centers is more vital to securing U.S. interests than ever before. At a relatively low cost, the center’s programs are developing regional leaders who are networked and capable of working with the United States and other partners to build multilateral security capacity that is effective and lasting. To that end, the center continually strives to be forward-focused, influential in the near and long term, respected, connected, and team-oriented. The net result of its unique value-added effort is an Asia-Pacific region increasingly capable of dealing more effectively with strategic security challenges through established networks and collaborative mechanisms. JFQ

NOTE

An Interview with

B.B. Bell

JFQ: When you took command of your present duties, what were your top goals and priorities? Were you given any specific orders?

General Bell: I wasn’t given any specific marching orders, which I found refreshing. I clearly was told to maintain the readiness of the force, lead the U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] Combined Forces Command so that deterrence would be assured on the Korean Peninsula, and if deterrence failed, we’d be able to win decisively and quickly. I had been in Europe for 3 years, commanding U.S. Army Europe, but importantly for this job in Korea, I had been a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] commander. To say the least, dealing with 26 great nations in NATO gave me a good foundation for trying to understand what the issues are with our allies and the complexities they face. But it was refreshing not to be given specific guidance to achieve some policy goal.

I studied a lot before I arrived in Korea. Before I landed at Osan Air Base, I had partially concluded that the alliance was under enormous stress, that the interests of the Republic of Korea and the United States were diverging, and that we were finding it very difficult to find common ground. Because of that, I had some work to do to understand what it was that was causing friction in the alliance.

I was pleasantly surprised to learn that my fears were largely unfounded. We don’t have divergent interests at all with our ally. In fact, our interests are very similar; they’re just as clear today as they were probably 54 years ago at the end of the Korean War. What I had not taken into account, and perhaps what our nation has not taken into account fully, is the incredible success story that is the Republic of Korea. For those of us who grew up on MASH, the TV program, we have an indelible memory of those pictures. And those pictures portend a country that is Third World, largely backward, war-torn, and agrarian.

But in fact today the Republic of Korea is a modern, first-world nation. It’s the 11th-largest economy in the world. Think about that: here’s a nation with 49 million people and they’re producing goods and services for world consumption at a rate within the top 11 in the world—and that includes more populous nations like the United States, China, Japan, etc. When you land in the Republic of Korea, you see miles and miles of high-rise buildings, from 15 to 60 stories, and a modern, first-world country with a transportation network and corresponding infrastructure, advanced hospitals, great universities, cultural centers, and vibrant business enterprise. You become almost envious looking at it.

So what I have learned is that the ROK is a modern nation that wants to be self-reliant. And to the extent that the United States is perceived to be dominating the Republic of Korea by its citizens, it can cause friction. What our ally wants is an equal stance with the United States, to be on a fully equal basis. It wants an understanding ally. For example, the fact that I’m the commander of Combined Forces Command is in itself of concern to many Koreans. They think, “Why in the world would an American command our military during war in the year 2007?” As commander of Combined Forces Command, in war, I command all forces, joint and combined, in the Korean theater of operations during conflict. Why is that? Their military is first-world. I know most of the militaries that the United States deals with very well. I’ve trained with them. With nearly 15 years deployed overseas, I know the British military, the French, the Germans, and the Russians very well, among others. This Republic of Korea military is a competent peer of any of those militaries.

So, again, if you were an average Korean, you might ask, “Why is a U.S. commander still in charge of our security during war?” What you might want is a partnership where the United States remains in a mutual defense treaty arrangement allowing Korea to lead its military operations and assuring our direct commitment in case of war. So the pressure points I found had more to do with an outdated structural approach to our alliance than it did with our common interests. We have the same interests. We want democracy, individual freedom, a free market economy—we’re negotiating a free trade agreement—we want North Korea to behave itself and to join the free world. I think that in pursuit of North Korean engagement, we’ve begun to also accommodate our ally. And quite frankly, similarly, we have said to our ally, “There are some things you need to understand about the United States also.” This is not 1953 for us either. We’ve got a lot of things going on in the world, and we need a reliable and trusted ally too. So we’ve put a few requests on the table for our ally and have been very firm that, as we make changes in the way we approach the alliance, we would ask that they make similar changes—and they are.

So, as a really long answer to a very short question, what did I find in the Republic of Korea? I found a nation that wants to be in charge of its own security and wants a reliable and dependable ally, the United States, to remain in Korea in support of the Republic of Korea?
they want to continue to help us worldwide as well, and they’re doing it. That was all very refreshing.

**JFQ:** General [Peter] Pace, like General [Richard] Myers before him, speaks frequently about more effective partnering with other Federal agencies, allies, and industry. How does your command promote the coherent integration of U.S. military capabilities with other elements of U.S. and allied power?

**General Bell:** We are in an armistice environment in the Republic of Korea, so I realized that I needed to gain the assistance of all of the departments of our government to engage effectively with the Republic of Korea. For example, if I want to impact the burden-sharing money that the Republic of Korea provides us for nonpersonnel stationing costs, it’s our State Department that negotiates with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our State Department, and Ministries of Foreign Affairs of five other nations, led by the United States and the U.S. State Department. My relationship with Ambassador Chris Hill—whom I’ve known for years—is very important in this. I can explain to him what we ought not to trade away and what we would be willing to discuss in this process. And it just goes on from there, whether it’s the Department of State, National Security Council, or Department of the Treasury. I can’t tell you how important it is that we have total integration of the interagency in both dealing with our ally and in dealing with North Korean aggression.

So General Pace is absolutely right. There’s a lot of diplomatic work to be done across government, short of war and in war, that is clear to me in the Republic of Korea, and northeast Asia in general, as we deal with the daily complexities of this very important area of the world.

**JFQ:** Please tell us about emerging issues on the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps provide an explanation of why we need to keep U.S. forces in the South in the face of other global demands for resources.

**General Bell:** I want to address the second part of your question first. The Republic of Korea in northeast Asia represents a vital national interest area for the United States. First, this has to do with economics. Twenty-five percent of the world’s trade flows through northeast Asia. Whether it’s Korea, Japan, or China, if you’re trading in the world, one out of every four things you trade, commodity-wise and dollar-wise, is going through that area. Twenty-four percent of U.S. foreign trade flows through that area. Korea itself is the seventh-largest U.S. trading partner. Our economy is a global economy, and we depend on global markets for our national well-being. Twenty-five percent of those markets are in my neighborhood, and this number is growing. So there’s a vital national interest here. It’s extremely important that this area of the world remains peaceful, stable, and open to free trade, so that our business interests can flourish, and so can theirs. That’s a major reason why Korea is important to the United States.

Two, there remains a real threat in that region to peace, stability, and security, and it’s a rogue state called North Korea. So it’s in our interest to have military missions in northeast Asia. We have those missions currently in the Republic of Korea and in Japan as a demonstration of our commitment to stability and peace. Even when the day comes and a peace treaty replaces the current armistice, every instinct that I have tells me that we will want to maintain military missions in Korea and Japan, as long as we are welcome and wanted. Every poll that we’ve ever seen conducted in Korea says the same thing. The citizens of Korea want the United States to remain garrisoned in their country, fully respecting their sovereignty and fully supportive of their processes, but there nonetheless as a reliable and trusted ally. Today we are indeed welcome and wanted.

It is in the national interests of the United States and the Republic of Korea, and other partners in the region as well, for the United States to remain militarily engaged here. Because of the natural resources, lines of communication, and products that we will have to deliver around the world, northeast Asia is going to remain a national vital interest area for us. So our force here—a mere 2 percent of the U.S. Active duty military is stationed in the Republic of Korea—is a terrific bargain for America. It achieves an enormous positive payback for the United States for such a small contribution in military power: a future force of 25,000 Servicemembers for this...
huge payback in stable global trade—again, 25 percent of the world’s trade and 24 percent of U.S. trade. So this is a small price to pay and I think every American is more than willing to continue to pay this kind of price for that kind of return on investment. I am certain that when presented to the American people like that, the answer will be a resounding, “We need to stay in northeast Asia as long as we’re welcome and wanted.”

JFQ: Are there any impending force structure changes that you wish to speak to?

General Bell: Absolutely. As I said earlier, we need to adapt and change, commensurate with our alliance mechanisms and in consultation with our Korean ally. In the year 2007 and given the capacity and capability of the ROK military, a U.S. commander in charge of the Korean military during wartime is in need of revision. Both nations agree on this. Since 1994, we, and our Korean ally have been consulting over the future of our current combined headquarters led by a U.S. general, and when would be the right time to inactivate the headquarters and empower the Republic of Korea to command their own forces in wartime, with the United States in a doctrinally supporting combat role. There have been many ideas about when it would be right to do this, and of course there’s lots of debate on both sides of the issue.

But the Korean people have spoken about this. In fact, the president of the Republic of Korea came forth to our President several years ago and said, “We want to do this, we’re ready.” And so these negotiations became very serious about 3 years ago. Earlier this year, our nations concluded an agreement to inactivate the Combined Forces Command, and the Republic of Korea will stand up and run its own joint force command to defend its nation by April 17, 2012. We’ll activate a standing warfighting joint force headquarters in Korea to support their defense with critical U.S. combat capabilities. This gives both nations 5 years to make the necessary programmatic and structural changes and to conduct the necessary training and exercises. We will ensure that we do this with no increased risk to our alliance deterrence capability, or defense readiness. This is essential and will not be compromised.

This is the biggest change in command and control since the start of the Korean War in 1950, when the Republic of Korea gave the United States command over its forces. Obviously, this is an emotional issue for many. Some great Korean patriots would rather not see this happen, and others would favor it. Same thing for influence groups in the United States. But, on balance, a significant majority of leaders in the United States, a significant majority of leaders in Korea, and the citizens of Korea in general favor what we’ve agreed to do. It will work, it will work well, and it will allow us to respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea directly and put us in a lower profile position on the peninsula. It will also allow us to maintain our alliance for mutual defense and to deter and defend on the peninsula. Also, the Republic of Korea will have the opportunity to continue to help us with our military requirements, which they are doing today in no small way, including force commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a new commitment for a contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Lebanon.

JFQ: We recently interviewed General James Cartwright [Commander, U.S. Strategic Command]. We spoke to him about ownership of ballistic missiles—a very sensitive subject. When there is a launch north of the parallel, our readership would like to know who owns it and how these command and control conduits work, or at least to get a feel for that. At what point in its trajectory does responsibility shift from USFK [United States Forces Korea] to PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] to STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] to NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command]? Where does the decision to destroy or intercept lie? What can be said about USFK coordination with allies in relation to such weapons?

General Bell: That’s a great question, and quite frankly, the important issue is not who owns it, but how it—an enemy missile—is interdicted, and who’s there with the authority to pull the trigger. We’ve got to stop these things from landing on friendly territory, allied or U.S.

There is an easy piece to this and a hard piece. I’m mostly responsible for the easier piece because in the Republic of Korea, we’re dealing with theater ballistic missiles, going on a fairly short north-to-south trajectory. They’re relatively easy to detect and we know pretty well who has to interdict them. U.S. Patriots are the best capability I’ve got to do that right now. The Republic of Korea has a developing capability with their Aegis destroyers, and plans to purchase Patriots. As such, on the Korean Peninsula, we have coordination requirements and our systems must interface within a unified command and control system.

The keys are to have clear rules of engagement, have the exercising and training under our belts, and have the detection processes in place in a very reliable way. Then, when the intercept capability detects the conditions, knows the missile is coming, and recognizes that it’s in an engagement envelope, the inbound missile has to be engaged and destroyed. All the procedures to do this have to be in place. While we require a shared information network with several of the combatant commands that you mentioned, our theater ballistic missile command and control challenges in South Korea are relatively clear, and we have the right procedures in place to assure our readiness.

Command and control issues if a North Korean missile is not directed south but is headed off the peninsula are, of course, more challenging. A key issue is to make sure we know the intention of the missile—a peaceful space launch or hostile—understanding this is extremely difficult without the cooperation of
None of this is an academic exercise. Clearly, if a ballistic missile originating from North Korea crosses out of the Korea theater of operations, perhaps heads over Japan and across the Pacific, a fully functional and synchronous system must respond. The key is testing the totality of all the decisionmaking processes involved, and then testing those processes in realistic exercise scenarios to make sure that they work properly. You’ve got to prove to yourself that what you’ve agreed on will work when time is measured in minutes and seconds. We’ve not finished with all that yet, but all the impacted combatant commands are focused on solutions, and I have lots of confidence in the direction we’re headed.

**JFQ:** What should joint professionals know about U.S. Forces Korea that they don’t seem to grasp? There’s a lot going on now in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], and I think to a certain degree EUCOM [U.S. European Command] and PACOM have lost the exposure they used to have.

**General Bell:** To the joint force officer, I would say beware of those who try to convince our nation that we’ve seen our last conventional war involving an enemy state actor. **Beware.** It is true that the major and significant threat to the United States today lies in the insurgent/terrorist arena. We all respect that and we’re all committed to fighting terrorism and ensuring our nation is protected against the onslaught of any kind of weaponry that could be brought to bear by a small group of terrorists. This is our charge and our commitment to the American people today.

Having said that, we should be very careful not to view terrorism as the future of all warfare, thus forgetting about conventional wars and weapons. When we came out of Vietnam, we discounted counterinsurgency—turned our back and walked away from it. You couldn’t even find a manual on it. Perhaps we have paid a price for that inattention. Now, however, we could be headed in the other direction. I think we now run the risk of walking away from conventional warfare capabilities—theater level war. I am convinced that in addition to the worldwide terrorist threat, some day a hostile nation out there is going to challenge our interests and our allies, or challenge us directly, in a way that we will be required to defend our nation or help our allies in a conventional warfare scenario. When I say conventional, I mean against state-formed, trained, and organized conventional military forces with traditional armies, navies, air forces, and military forces that we will have to engage at the theater level of war. After all, how did Operation Iraqi Freedom start, anyway? It was a conventional fight, with conventional forces, with ships and planes and tanks, and long sweeping maneuver attacks pointed toward a hardened enemy’s national capital. It’s something different now in Iraq, but we certainly went to war with a nation called Iraq.

In this global world, we are not through with threats to the United States that emanate from nations and states who have become our competitors for either resources, or our way of life—free trade, democracy, or individual freedoms. We must defend our interests, and we need a military that is sufficiently full-spectrum capable so that we can defend ourselves however we are threatened—whether it’s a terrorist threat with a nuclear weapon, whether it’s a terrorist threat with an IED [improvised explosive device], or whether it’s a nation with a big army, air force, and navy. We owe it to our Constitution and to our citizens to defend our nation against all enemies—every one of them—who pose a threat to our way of life. It would be nice if we could inform our enemies of how we’d like them to organize, and then we can figure out how to combat them with single focus forces, but we’ve had really poor luck in doing that for the last 200 plus years. So beware of a military that walks away from conventional force capability and structures itself to deal solely in counterinsurgency because that will create the vulnerability that some nation will try to take advantage of.

And today, the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command in Korea is the only command I know that routinely and vigorously conducts theater-level warfare exercises in a conventional scenario. We are today’s keeper of conventional warfare doctrine. And conventional war is not extinct—it will happen again and our nation must be ready.

**JFQ:** Thank you, sir.
Our nation is engaged in a broad array of military operations that is driving significant changes in the way we train, fight, and execute missions—from humanitarian assistance to major combat. In turn, those changes require a fundamental revaluation of the way we deploy, support, and sustain those operations. There is a pressing need to develop a framework for joint logistics management at the operational level to enhance the synchronization and effectiveness of logistics support. This framework must be based on a set of imperatives and enablers that, when considered and properly established and used, offers the greatest possible freedom of action for the joint force commander (JFC) as well as our interagency and multinational partners.

Military logistics support extends from the strategic level in the national industrial base to the tactical level, where “beans, bullets, and black oil” are delivered on time, at the right place, and in the right quantity. Operational-level logistics links strategic resources with tactical units, enabling force...
overall logistics effort. We have intentionally avoided use of the term theater because it suggests geographic boundaries that do not seem appropriate for modern logistics management. The operational level can span multiple, diverse joint operation areas, each distinct in its concept of support requirements and corresponding strategic support base.

future operations are likely to be globally distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operation areas

Imperatives and Enablers

Current logistics operations are executed to a large extent through a combination of various capabilities in stovepiped processes that offer significant room for improvement. We believe that future operations are likely to be globally distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operation areas within a single theater, or across the boundaries of more than one geographic combatant commander. It is also becoming clear that the stovepiped processes in use today are not optimizing the delivery of logistics capabilities in accordance with the priorities of the geographic combatant commander and do not embed economy as an element of execution. Consequently, logisticians must establish and execute a global distribution concept of support that responds with speed, precision, and economy to the changing needs of the joint force. Today’s warfighter must view future-oriented concepts with new, more integrated transformational ideas.

In his paper, “Joint Logistics in the Future,” General Christianson identified three joint logistics imperatives for the development of future support capabilities. They apply across all geographic and structural boundaries, to include all levels. They are guiding principles for system developers, military planners, process managers, and logisticians to guide the formulation of objectives and decisionmaking.

- Unity of effort is the coordinated application of all logistics capabilities focused on the JFC’s intent. It means that coordinated and synchronized actions must be driven by the right authorities and capabilities, shared awareness and processes, and common performance metrics. It requires an understanding
Joint logistics command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a JFC over the common support required by assigned and attached forces from two or more military departments. It is the means to achieve unity of effort through the effective employment of available resources. This process includes planning for the execution of directive authority for logistics by the combatant commanders and the use of common user logistics and executive agent designation procedures to establish a JFC concept for logistics support.

Logistics collaboration involves the creation of processes that enhance the visibility of logistics resources across the components, DOD agencies, and other participating partners (interagency and multinational). Links between operations, intelligence, and logistics decisions are shared. Operations, intelligence, and logistics collaboration provide the operator and the logistician with simultaneous access to multiple perspectives of shared information within a Web-based environment.

Joint support planning refers to the effective identification of joint or coalition requirements and the planning needed to meet the requirements. The objective of joint support planning is to fully integrate support, intelligence, and operation planning considerations in all joint analytical and planning activities across the operational level. Joint support planning processes should cover the three JFC decision cycle event horizons: the planning that covers current operations (what is); planning that covers future operations (what if); and planning that covers the future plans event horizon (what’s next).

Joint support execution and tracking involves managing the commitment and use of resources to support joint and coalition operations. This function is essential to providing rapid and precise response; it must monitor dynamic situations and provide accurate information to decisionmakers. Logisticians must be able to rapidly compare sustainment estimates derived from the joint support planning process with actual consumption data and tactical reporting systems to prioritize resource allocation and to best support logistics operations.

Collectively, these enablers should guide the JFC in the design and implementation of organizational constructs and procedures. They form the core components of logistics management at the operational level. While staffing levels, visibility requirements, and coordination/communication conduits vary widely by type of missions, area of operations, and many other factors, the imperatives and core functions remain fairly consistent. One key issue in any complex system is to design and implement an organizational structure appropriate to the mission. At the operational level, there are multiple options being explored to provide the JFC the freedom of action necessary to effectively and efficiently accomplish his mission.

Management Options

At the operational level, the mission of logistics planners and leadership has traditionally been called command and control (C²), a term all military personnel find familiar and comfortable. In the 21st century, the environment challenges traditional military theory perhaps more fundamentally than at any time in history. For example, looking back at the imperatives above, logisticians are almost always called on to achieve unity of effort without unity of command. Thus, logisticians look broadly at how they achieve unity of effort through coordination, collaboration, and cooperation.

Coordination, collaboration, and cooperation during the execution of logistics management activities are obviously not mutually exclusive and, in fact, are always employed in some combination. What has changed in the recent past and can be anticipated in the future is the extent to which collaborative processes will be needed to supplement or reinforce traditional notions of C². Working with other government entities through the interagency process is not only a challenge and a fact of life, but also in some ways a significant enhancement to the tools logisticians use to accomplish assigned missions. The mandate in DOD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,” that stabilization and reconstruction have equal priority to major combat operations certainly directs—at
least implicitly—a level of coordination across government entities not previously seen. 4

In a similar vein, the realization that logisticians will almost certainly be working in a coalition/multinational environment in the majority of future military operations implies the need to reassess the design and implementation of combined logistics support. Current International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan are serving to offer insights—and urgent requirements—for new structures, processes, and tools to support the multinational force. Logisticians must design the future management capability to take advantage of the lessons from ISAF and have the ability to operate effectively in this environment. Logisticians must be agile and flexible enough to be comfortable working with and around the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, old and new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, and nations that have not been traditional partners in the past. They also must be able to integrate efforts with commercial entities in ways for which, until recently, there has been little experience.

To respond to these challenges, DOD is experimenting with, testing, and assessing a number of options for organizing a logistics management capability at the operational level. USTRANSCOM, with the Army and many other partners, is leading a DOD effort to create a Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise (JDDE), which is designed to enable effective force deployment, unit movement, and sustainment support to the joint warfighter. Also, there are multiple joint logistics management options now being explored whose products and processes may eventually nest under the JDDE construct. USJFCOM has developed a Joint (experimental) Deployment and Support (JxDS) architecture with multiple geographic combatant commander sponsors, whose products can be used to help shape the JDDE.

The JxDS concept is a family of organizational options designed to enhance the coordination, integration, and synchronization of operational logistics in order to increase force employment opportunities and alternatives. JxDS is a building-block, scalable approach that allows combatant commanders to tailor their organizations. These organizations would include the required authority, appropriate personnel, and necessary equipment and technology to effectively manage and execute operational-level logistics.

As shown in figure 1, the JxDS concept depicts the scalability that can be used for logistics operations depending on intensity and workload. Scalability is “the ability for the staff or commander to continue work when the complexity of the problem increases. Also, this quality includes the ability for staff and commander to increase or decrease in capacity to meet increasing/decreasing workloads over a period of time.”

The four primary organizational structures currently being assessed under JxDS are the Deployment Distribution Operations Center (DDOC), the Enabled J4 (EJ4), the Joint Force Support Component Command (JFSCC), and the Combined Logistics Command and/or Center (CLC). These structures are described below in order of complexity and effort required to implement. However, they also are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as many of the components and functions of one construct can be integrated into other options.

Deployment Distribution Operations Center. The DDOC, a USTRANSCOM initiative, is vested with the authority to make decisions in the field concerning execution of distribution (movement and transportation). Its integration function provides the geographic combatant commander a single point for coordination, collaboration, and knowledge of the flow of forces, equipment, and materiel across all components and, potentially, those of coalition partners (see figure 2). In doing so, the DDOC enhances situational awareness and improves information technology and liaison office support. The proliferation of DDOCs across many of the geographic combatant commands attests to the recognition of...
the need for this capability and the effectiveness of this concept.

Enabled J4 Construct. USPACOM is experimenting with an EJ4 organization during exercises scheduled for fiscal year 2007/2008. The EJ4 option synchronizes operational-level joint logistics management through the establishment of a fusion cell, growth of its plans cell, and distribution management capability (see figure 3). The EJ4 is built around three logistics processes discussed earlier: logistics collaboration, joint support planning, and joint support execution and tracking. Logistics collaboration provides better command and control through connectivity and visibility and enhanced coordination between J3 and J4, improving the visibility of the JFC’s priorities. The organization provides a broader reach to USTRANSCOM, DLA, and components to engage all stakeholders. Specific areas of focus include:

- accelerating the decisionmaking tempo of the JFC and subordinate staffs
- developing templates and automated capabilities to improve contingency response planning and execution (time and quality)
- providing an advanced common operating environment architecture.

Joint Force Support Component Command. This option synchronizes operational-level joint logistics management through the establishment of a fusion center, integration of diverse strategic enablers (such as a DDOC and DLA cell), a robust plans cell, and a distribution and commodity management capability. In essence, this type of command provides the JFC a single C2 joint logistics capability within the joint operational area. This capability engages the Service components and coalition partners, who have their own clearly defined staff roles, functions, and processes to maximize logistics planning and execution through collaboration.

The JFSCC has proven adept at assuring operations and logistics connectivity and at leveraging its capabilities to ensure agility and responsiveness to changing conditions. This C2 logistics capability provides the commander with total asset and in-transit visibility through logistical reports, enabling quick responses to mission requirements.

In 2005, the commander, U.S. Forces Korea, elected to implement JxDS via the command-based option, JFSCC, which provides the commander a single point of contact for support. Its primary building block in USFK is the Army’s 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command. This command has a two-fold mission: to provide its habitual Army support to all USFK, and to be the single logistics command with enhanced joint capabilities to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize USFK logistics functions, processes, and assets in support of commander requirements. In the areas in which the JFSCC exercises control, it directs support activities for Service, functional, and national components of the task organization. It coordinates and maintains contact with supporting unified commands, Service and national military support agencies and commands, regional host nations, and national and international interagency participants as directed. See figure 4 for the organization used by USFK during Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens 06/07.

Combined Logistics Command and/or Center (CLC). The CLC option expands the types of functions found in a JFSCC and adds...
in the capability to manage coalition logistics. This concept focuses on operations and logistics integration that synchronizes support for combined military missions—the way most of our efforts will be executed in the years ahead. It aids in the development of a strategic/operational logistical course of action in support of assigned tasks by conducting logistical analysis of the area of operations. The organization chart shown was developed as a proposed configuration of a Combined Joint Force Support Component Command (CJFSCC) used during the Unified Quest ‘05 war game (see figure 5). In U.S. Forces Korea, a Combined Logistics Center is still under development but could mirror many of the functions found in a CJFSCC.

The four JxDS options described all have strengths and weaknesses. The DDOC option has a great capability to synchronize distribution management between strategic and operational levels, yet its joint manning and training vary across the geographic combatant commands. The EJ4 option shows much promise in its ability to plan and track joint logistics management, yet its development is still very much in its infancy. The JFSCC is proving to be a great joint synchronizer of USFK resources during events such as reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration, but its two-fold mission stretches the structure of the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command. Success for continued use of these types of options will be gauged by how often geographic combatant commands wish to employ them and the operational effects each of these options provide the JFC. Consequently, these structures must be mapped back to the JDDE architecture to become a reality. Driving the continued JDDE efforts will be the work done by the geographic combatant commands, with USTRANSCOM and USJFCOM as the process owners for distribution and deployment, and our supporting partners such as the Joint Staff J4 and DLA.

**The Combined Logistics Command option expands the types of functions found in a Joint Force Support Component Command and adds in the capability to manage coalition logistics**

**Other Initiatives**

The JxDS program and various experiments within it represent an important component of joint logistics transformation. The DOD logistics community has a number of other major initiatives under way to fulfill the joint logistics imperatives and provide the best possible support to the joint warfighter. Together they will enable more effective and efficient support and facilitate the best possible decisions on the allocation of scarce resources. Some of the key activities that relate to the improvement of operational logistics management include:

- **Update of Joint Publication 4.0.** A major rewrite of Joint Publication 4.0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, the cornerstone doctrinal publication for the community, is now under way. This update is using a collaborative approach between the Joint Staff J4 and J7 offices with critical input from the Services, USTRANSCOM, USJFCOM, and DLA. The new publication is scheduled for release in fall 2007.
and processes—which will have a significant impact on logistics management across the enterprise and certainly at the operational level. The effort to define high-level supply chain management processes alone will further solidify distribution management tasks and improve visibility. These efforts will need to be balanced against the information and asset/process control requirements of the JFCs—and may be different based on varying missions. Results and recommendations are scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2007.

Joint Seabasing. This concept is defined as “the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the joint operational area. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.” The rules, tools, and processes, as well as the tailorable nature of JxDS, provide a near-perfect fit to the joint seabasing concept, filling gaps in logistics command and control in order to strengthen and support the ability of the JFC to project and sustain military power anywhere in the world.

Capabilities for Management of Coalition and Interagency Support. USJFCOM along with eight other coalition partners (to include NATO) has initiated a massive Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5), the timeframe of which is 2007–2009. MNE5 will further define and shape how coalition and interagency support can be conducted. It is well known that our coalition partners require improved methods to conduct rapid interagency and multinational planning, coordination, and execution to create and carry out a unified, comprehensive strategy. The central theme in MNE5 will be a comprehensive approach (all of the government). The MNE5 endstate is to define an agreed method by which multinational partners can plan, execute, and assess a comprehensive approach to crisis prevention and response. For MNE5, the logistics goal is to achieve effective and efficient multinational logistics support that gives the coalition force commander the freedom of action to effectively execute multinational operations. Many of the lessons emerging from past and current MNE events, along with the JxDS, will shape how DOD can utilize the types of services and equities our coalition and interagency partners bring.

This article has highlighted a fundamental set of imperatives and joint logistics enablers that are designed to help focus efforts to enhance joint operational-level logistics, discussed several organizational options for joint logistics management, and described a number of initiatives now under way across the Department of Defense. Nothing in this article replaces Service-specific logistics support and capability. Instead, it is intended to enhance those elements by providing an operational-level foundation that strengthens and integrates what has been called a “common perspective of the battlespace, shared by maneuver, logistics, and intelligence elements.”

In assessing the future global environment, we must take into account the forces that are pushing us toward change: continued budgetary pressure; widely dispersed operations; unsecured lines of communication; increased contractor support; joint, inter- and intra-agency, multinational collaboration; and supply chain management as part of normal joint operations. In the past, all levels of planning, from campaign plans to air tasking orders, were developed by operational planners and then passed to logistics and other staff elements for coordination, validation, and implementation. Although this process has improved in the area of distribution—emphasizing better requirement determination and asset visibility—it still does not tie the tenet of centralized control/decentralized execution to unified action and fully integrated support. By fostering synergy at the operational level, we will enhance support operations of all Services at the tactical level. The imperatives, enablers, and options close the gap and define the necessary framework for joint logistics management, which improves synchronization and effectiveness of support at the operational level. Putting these imperatives, enablers, and options into joint doctrine is a task that demands our strongest effort. The joint warfighters we support deserve nothing less.

**NOTES**

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The NDU Foundation Congratulates the Winners of the 2007 Writing Competitions!

The National Defense University Foundation is proud to sponsor the annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Force Quarterly Kiley Essay Competitions. NDU Press hosted the most recent competitions on May 22–23, 2007, during which 20 judges from participating colleges selected the best essays in each category.

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SECOND PLACE Col (Sel) Philippe D. Rogers, USMC, Naval War College

THIRD PLACE (tie) LTC David M. Witty, USA, Naval War College
“Attacking al Qaeda’s Operational Centers of Gravity”

THIRD PLACE (tie) COL Peter M. Cullen, USA, U.S. Army War College
“The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign Against Terror”

Strategic Article

FIRST PLACE CDR Greg Metzler, USN, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
“China in Space: Implications for U.S. Military Strategy”

SECOND PLACE MAJ Stephen D. Terstegge, USA, Naval War College
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“The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet”
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The NDU Foundation and NDU Press extend special thanks to each of the judges and their respective institutions. These essay competitions would not be possible without their personal dedication and professional excellence.

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China's January 11, 2007, launch of an antisatellite (ASAT) weapon against a low Earth orbit satellite heralded the end of a self-imposed 20-year period in which the United States and Russia had refrained from using destructive weapons in space. In addition to highlighting a growing capacity to limit the use of space by others, China's demonstration has generated demands for the United States to review its space policy and establish agreements to prevent the use of space for military purposes. Others have called for the opposite: a renewed space race and the deployment of space-based weapons. One thing is clear, however: China's growing space capability has profound implications for U.S. military strategy and, ultimately, national policy.

China in Space

China has made great progress in its space program. Since 1984, it has come from having no geostationary satellites to launching Shenzhou VI for a 5-day orbit of the earth, joining the ranks of Russia and the United States as the only nations with a manned space capability. China's January ASAT test was an ascending orbit shot. As the satellite passed overhead, the Chinese intercepted it. Launching a rocket at a satellite in low Earth orbit

One who has few must prepare against the enemy.
One who has many makes the enemy prepare against him.

—Sun Tzu

By P. Gregory Metzler

Commander P. Gregory Metzler, USN, wrote this essay while a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. It won the Strategic Article category of the 2007 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.
directly overhead is one thing; hitting a satellite in a high, geostationary orbit in another part of the sky is something else. In short, while China has made great progress, we must be careful to characterize the threat accurately. It is real. It is growing. But it is not all-powerful.

What would motivate China to pour resources into its space program instead of other challenges? China’s space program is a source of national pride at a time when the Communist Party’s performance is being criticized by a burgeoning Chinese middle class. However, pride is not the only driver. The space program provides a mechanism for research and scientific exploration that will undoubtedly advance China’s education and high-tech industrial base much as the Apollo program did in the United States.  

In addition to economic development, China’s space program will likely become a political bargaining chip in negotiations with the West. Advances in the ASAT program could be used to trade against concessions on other issues of importance to Beijing. Political benefit is not limited to East-West negotiations. In March 2006, seven countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand) were granted access to Chinese weather and Earth resources satellites, including training of ground station operators. Such a move to provide partners in regions of interest is reminiscent of the U.S. approach to sharing its satellite resources with its friends. In sum, China’s space program has graduated from a research and development tool to one of diplomacy.

**Implications for the United States**

Beijing’s entry into the ASAT club has numerous implications for Washington. First, China’s successful launch is a not-so-subtle message to the United States and other powers of its capacity for denying space to those who rely on it for commerce, intelligence, and communications. Numerous open sources have illustrated Chinese military thinkers’ recognition of American reliance on technology and the need to counter the U.S. space-based infrastructure. Additionally, China’s ability to hit space-based targets speaks to a growing technological sophistication that could be translated to other weapons and serves as an overt demonstration of China’s desire to dominate its battlespace.

Then there is the practical matter of China adding to the “space junk” problem. The ASAT test created approximately 2 million pieces of space debris (adding to 140 million already estimated to be in orbit). Given that it is difficult to protect satellites against particles larger than 1 centimeter and to detect particles smaller than 10 centimeters, the use of kinetic weapons in space poses a serious and lasting risk of collateral damage.

Ultimately, however, China’s demonstrated ASAT capability should serve as a warning to U.S. Armed Forces who have come to rely on space-based assets in virtually every aspect of their method of warfare. Have we, as a nation, worked through potential responses to either hard or soft kills of our satellites? How would our operations change absent communications or intelligence satellites? Such scenarios must become an integral component of our doctrine, development, and training.

**Next Moves**

There are several things the United States should consider undertaking in order to communicate its expectations regarding appropriate international behavior in space.

**Clarify U.S. Space Policy.** The 2006 Space Policy has received substantial international criticism for its assertion that the United States has the right to “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space” and simultaneously “dissuade or deter others” from developing similar capabilities to deny U.S. access. One cannot help but wonder if Beijing’s ASAT shot was intended to demonstrate unambiguously that it is impossible for Washington to prevent the development of ASAT technology. The United States should realign its policy with existing agreements and reassert the tenets of “free access” to, and ‘freedom of passage’ in, space . . . enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.”

Unfortunately, history repeatedly has demonstrated the disdain with which rogue leaders treat international agreements. As a nation, we must avoid establishing agreements that unreasonably limit our capacity to use space from a defensive perspective. Clearly, the deployment of weapons of mass destruction into space would be fundamentally destabilizing. Likewise, unrestricted testing of destructive antisatellite weapons would only increase the risk of collateral damage to friendly satellites. However, the costs and timeline associated with the deployment of defensive space technology in response to a rogue state’s weaponization of space should underscore a decision to proactively manage, rather than cede through inaction, the ultimate high ground of space.

**Avoid a Space Race.** We must avoid a space race. Instead of trying to beat the Chinese to the Moon, as some have implied, we should remain focused on our own space program (both civilian and military) and remind those pressing for our return to the Moon ahead of China that we have already been there—several times. By focusing on
Notifications and surveillance aircraft that will
unmanned aerial systems or other commu-
with replacement technology such as meshed
decoys. We must develop, build, and train
well as rapidly deploy defensive systems and
our capacity to replace damaged satellites as
command and control. We must improve
include survivable sensing, targeting, and
our "air breather" warfare commanders to
of situational awareness that is available to
space warfare commanders the same level
intentions are hostile. We must provide our
must prepare for the possibility that China's
self-restraint of Russia and the United
behavior, prompting Beijing to demonstrate
national cooperation and shaping China's
could serve as a vehicle for promoting inter
mission or international mission to Mars
space missions. Perhaps a U.S.-China Moon
Launched by India,
for engagement. Just as the United States is
putting instruments on a lunar orbiter to be
launched by India, there may be opportuni-
ties for cooperation with China in future
space missions. Perhaps a U.S.-China Moon
mission or international mission to Mars
could serve as a vehicle for promoting inter-
national cooperation and shaping China's
behavior, prompting Beijing to demonstrate
the self-restraint of Russia and the United
States during the Cold War.

Improve Survivability. However, we
must prepare for the possibility that China's
intentions are hostile. We must provide our
space warfare commanders the same level
of situational awareness that is available to
our "air breather" warfare commanders to
include survivable sensing, targeting, and
command and control. We must improve
our capacity to replace damaged satellites as
well as rapidly deploy defensive systems and
decoys. We must develop, build, and train
with replacement technology such as meshed
unmanned aerial systems or other commu-
nications and surveillance aircraft that will
enable U.S. forces to dominate the battlefield
even if our satellites are disrupted.

Improve Intelligence Capability. We
must sort fact from fiction. Open source
writings by Chinese military professionals
have called for the covert development and
deployment of antisatellite weaponry for
use in a surprise attack against U.S. space
assets. Our failure to detect the deployment
of such weapons could result in catastrophic
consequences for the United States. In addi-
tion to understanding the capabilities and
vulnerabilities of potential adversary space
programs, we must also understand their
intended use.

China's emergence as a power in space
reflects its emergence as an economic power
and its desire to advance its international
prowess, further its political agenda, and
expand its capabilities in science and tech-
nology. Washington should engage Beijing as
a respected partner in space—not solely for
the aim of "containing China," but to rein-
force international norms against which all
users of space shall be measured, including
the United States.

However, we must not ignore China's
progress. We must candidly recognize the
threat to our ability to conduct operations
and address vulnerabilities in such a way
as to complicate the military problem for
potential adversaries. Defense in-depth,
improved survivability, redundancy, and
our capacity to destroy an adversary's space
infrastructure must be improved. We must
recognize that U.S. military superiority in
space cannot be assured and adapt our strat-
dgy, doctrine, operations, acquisition, and
training to reflect that reality. JFQ

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Planning Convergence

By PAUL J. JUDGE

In the Department of Defense (DOD) today, several initiatives are emerging and have begun to converge. Adaptive Planning (AP), Capabilities-based Planning (CBP), and Global Force Management (GFM) are three prime examples. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) reaffirms the DOD commitment to these initiatives and places emphasis on a need to “integrate processes that define needed capabilities, identify solutions, and allocate resources to acquire them.” Thus, it is incumbent on DOD to effectively manage the convergence of AP, CBP, and GFM in order to fully support the vision of sound decisionmaking in an uncertain defense environment.

The argument of this essay is simple: Placing tight bounds on military operational planners will effectively institute a new planning and military decisionmaking process. The purpose is to suggest a move away from open-ended strategic guidance toward explicit intent, assumptions, and constraints. Unlike today’s strategic guidance, strictly limiting available force capabilities and other resources will generate more creative planning options and risk mitigation strategies. This idea may seem counterintuitive. However, it is the iterative process of setting new bounds, reformulating a plan, and providing results back to strategists that can ultimately provide insight for decisionmakers. A more meaningful and beneficial convergence of AP, CBP, and GFM will occur because the iterative process demands continuous communication and information-sharing among the strategist, force provider, warfighting planner, and out-year programmer.

To effectively merge processes and support decisionmaking, operational planning that uses AP methods must constantly interact with CBP as employed by defense analysts and programmers. In fact, the interaction must occur prior to the formal start of a DOD planning cycle to assist strategy writers in forming the detailed parameters that will then guide operational planning. Adaptive Planning must also interface with GFM as designed by the Joint Staff as a centralized force provider process. The idea is to unify operational and future force structure planning results to objectively support decisionmaking and revisions in strategy. In addition, interaction between planners at lower levels will shape the debate over tradeoffs between current and future force structure throughout the planning and programming cycle. DOD must find a way to expand CBP horizontally through functional areas, such as operational planning, and vertically from the strategic to the tactical level. In turn, the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) can have a consolidated picture for resource decisions.

Background

The Department of Defense is struggling to shed a longstanding threat-based method of planning. The method starts by estimating enemy strengths, weaknesses, and intent. From this estimate, a scenario is developed to plan against. The process essentially results in a list of required forces and assets to win decisively in the worst possible circumstances. Threat-based planning typically uses isolated (non-collaborative) analysis and, on the surface, seems adequate because it provides senior leaders a basis for justifying programs and budgets. However, threat-based planning is slowly giving way to Capabilities-based Planning because the former is very weak in determining an effective capability mix within resource constraints.
Problem: Who Cares?

In DOD, there is a lack of control and coordination on inputs and outputs in the MDMP. The current methodology focuses too much on outputs, largely avoids synchronized efforts and analysis, and yields an aggravating situation when major spending decisions are on the line. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld consistently voiced this frustration: “It’s a train wreck . . . every year when you’re trying to do the budget. It’s just a meat grinder trying to pull things together because they didn’t start coming together earlier at the lower level . . . [W]e’re going to fix that.” Without well-crafted strategic guidance and a common denominator for comparisons, planning processes operate independent of each other until it is too late for effective decisionmaking. When the train wreck occurs near the end of a cycle, professional judgment, strength of presentation, and protection of interests dominate recommendations.

The central problem examined in this essay is an inability of the combatant command operational planning process to effectively inform and complement the PPBES. Three notable factors contribute to the problem. First, operational planning does not currently use the CBP construct and align with the PPBES cycle to achieve credible defense budget decisions. Second, DOD does not integrate planning processes and fails to place equal emphasis on inputs and outputs. Third, meaningful collaboration among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services early in the PPBES and at lower levels is severely lacking. Finding a new course is critical in a world of uncertainty and complexity that includes planning for humanitarian relief, nonstate enemies, traditional large-scale conflict, and stabilization operations.

AP, CBP, and GFM: Operational Planner’s View

The priorities and methods employed by combatant command operational planners (Adaptive Planning) and force structure planners (Capabilities-based Planning) are vastly different. The key variations are found between the lexicons and taxonomies, starting points and entering arguments for planning, and the timelines for resource availability. However, it seems
plausible that the starting points could remain different while the lexicons, taxonomies, and resource timelines could merge into one process. The framework (lexicon and taxonomy) of CBP and the force management (resource timelines) of Global Force Management are the foundation. A closer look at the relationship among AP, CBP, and GFM demonstrates the potential to converge while they are still developing and before institutionalization of separate processes takes root.

According to the AP Roadmap, Adaptive Planning is “the Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require.”10 Essentially, AP represents the transformation of joint operational planning away from specific threat-based planning using a scenario mechanism toward adaptive planning using a CBP framework to produce options for a wide range of circumstances. This does not suggest that planners ignore threat assessments; they are still a vital part of AP. One of the underlying AP themes is to account for smaller-scale contingencies and threats more directly and not assume that one well-developed plan (for the most dangerous scenario) would contain the needed capabilities for lesser cases. Indeed, the ability to create or revise a warfighting plan rapidly as global conditions change, to do it collaboratively and systematically, and to have the end product in a realistic, ready-to-execute state is transformational.

The seven characteristics of AP provide a foundation to plan for uncertainty and complexity.11 In particular, the seventh characteristic—relevant—suggests qualities of detail and flexibility. If AP is striving to develop plans that are more relevant, operational planning must start with detailed strategic guidance. This means having accurate friendly force allocations, availability, and readiness information from the force provider through the GFM process.

This is tantamount to understanding one’s own strengths and weaknesses before assessing a threat and drawing up plans to oppose an enemy. Overall, the characteristics of AP are sufficient to usher in a new operational planning process. However, for AP to achieve full potential (that is, creative, flexible, and executable plans), it must be enabled by detailed strategic guidance and constant information exchange with CBP and GFM.

Detailed strategic guidance improves operational planning creativity by shifting focus from developing resource requirements in a worst-case scenario to options for employing a known set of capabilities. In this manner, a planner seeks to maximize effectiveness with an economy of force that is ready and available rather than stand satisfied with a notional mass force. Multiple options across a wider spectrum of contingencies mean more decisionmaking flexibility as conditions warrant, and the use of actual force status information (location, readiness, availability) improves operational execution readiness.

In addition to details in strategic guidance, constant information exchange with future force CBP and GFM is necessary. Combatant command and Service staffs must have a global perspective. The idea is to conduct continuous capability and risk tradeoffs until multiple plans and options are executable and are also fairly balanced with future capability needs. In this context, the defined role of CBP in AP is to provide a common framework for information exchange and analysis. In other words, CBP examines enemy capability while AP evaluates friendly capability to start a planning cycle, but both collaborate using the same language and analysis system. Thus, operational planning, future force planning, and Global Force Management come together.

The end result is “apples-to-apples” tradeoff analysis for senior leader decisionmaking. These tradeoff decisions are generally within or across plans, programs, and time. However, tradeoffs can extend into many areas, including changes in doctrine, operations, and training, or externally into interagency and partner nation capabilities. Instead of updating a list of requirements, warfighters are driven during each cycle to develop or rewrite plans and options against a foe using a revised set of specific capabilities.

The iterative process yields new and creative ways to accomplish objectives as well as new insights into the means to carry them out.

Expanding CBP into AP to form a common framework is not a simple endeavor. There are many tasks related to implementing CBP in AP.12 First and foremost is a common set of force capability identifiers. DOD is making a concerted effort through initiatives such as the Joint Capability Area (JCA) taxonomy, Linking Plans to Resources work, and the Functional Control Board process. Unfortunately, the proposed identifiers are too generic for effective operational planning. The identifiers must correlate exactly with Service unit designations for use in bounding operational planners. With exact bounds in mind, the key question operational planners begin to answer is, “What courses of actions are available if there are only these units and resources to work with?” The iterative process of holding units and resources fixed while altering other plan elements eventually reveals a strategy that is feasible, links risk to capabilities, and balances with many other competing plans and objectives. Ultimately, with a CBP framework in AP, plans are shaped by resources as much as or more than resources are shaped by plans.

The use of CBP in AP does not have to exactly replicate the application of CBP in future force structure planning or in the broader PPBES. Within the current PPBES, future force CBP initially examines future enemy capabilities. The capability-based future force planning process “starts by identifying plausible worries that a country or an agency might face.”12 From this point, strategists and long-term force structure planners develop a dispersed range of possible scenarios. Scenario analysis aims to reveal potential friendly force capability needs that could ensure access and advantage over an enemy. In this manner, force structure recommendations develop to counter future enemy capabilities. This is the commonly understood DOD method of using CBP, but it is not readily apparent in the most frequently cited definition. According to Paul Davis, CBP is “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic framework.”14 The definition seems very
close to the AP definition; however, the starting points make the two processes different. AP must use limited friendly resources to iteratively plan against current problem sets, while CBP projects enemy capability problem sets and then evaluates friendly force capability tradeoffs within budget constraints. Stated differently, near-term operational plans must have narrow physical constraints, while long-term procurement plans have broader fiscal constraints.

The commonly understood CBP process is all well and good for a large group of operational researchers and analysts but not practical for a combatant commander’s staff. Combatant command staffs should utilize a less analytic CBP application appropriate to joint operational planning that still fully supports a capability-needs comparison throughout a single defense planning process. Expanding the CBP framework into AP will address and define the interactions (inputs and outputs) between each element of the PPBES to provide synchronized support to the MDMPI. In other words, force structure tradeoffs between current and future forces can be synchronized and justified more clearly through capability needs. Permitting operational plans to stand as a set of unconstrained requirements is incompatible with defining and prioritizing capability needs. Constraining or bounding available capabilities changes the paradigm.

To bound capabilities for operational planners requires a capacity to allocate or assign an initial set of specific forces in light of the global spectrum of plans and priorities. GFM provides a valuable force structure baseline for strategy writers to bound operational planners over short planning periods (1 year or less). In turn, the changing global availability of ready units and resources yields a continuous shaping process of U.S. military plans and capability. Thus, for each contingency plan that requires capability sourcing, strategists should direct GFM to allocate forces for an entire planning cycle and operational planners to revise the plan using actual unit location and readiness data.

DOD currently refers to the activity of bounding capabilities as contingency sourcing, but the process and mechanism are still immature and not broadly accepted or practiced. Essentially, contingency sourcing is the automated data exchange process of updating allocated forces and specific units. The point here is to fully develop contingency sourcing in order to connect GFM and AP. This, in turn, can enable iterative bounding and CBP linkages. The concept is to determine if a force allocation for that planning period can satisfy an operational plan. If not, planners would adjust other components of the plan to mitigate shortfalls in capabilities and minimize risk while capturing varying options along the way. The results inform strategists as they prepare the detailed guidance to initiate the next plan cycle and decisionmakers on where the next capability dollar should be spent.

Today, changes in resources or shortfalls do not necessarily drive a responsive change in a war plan. Planners often maintain a mission and task set and account for resource changes and shortfalls by adjusting risk. Process change needs to occur so an operational plan is rewritten or reoriented according to adjustments in constraints and capabilities. According to Davis, “Having platforms, weapons, and infrastructure is not enough: What matters is whether the missions could be confidently accomplished successfully.” Rapidly completing operational mission analysis, resetting tasks, modifying an operational plan, and then updating risk are part of the emerging AP process and are essential to improving the feedback loop.

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The MDMP tolerates higher risk only when convinced no other ways or means exist. Warfighters and their operational planners are no longer independent actors vying for scarce resources. In fact, “Combatant Commanders with new global command responsibilities are expected to provide expert opinion and inputs for the global force management system overseen by the Pentagon and other national authorities.” To effectively accomplish this task, a synthesized planning system must emerge. In turn, strategic guidance thinkers can absorb new inputs from the GFM system and reset operational planning boundary detail for the next planning cycle.

In summary, the characteristics of AP can converge with CBP and GFM using a common language (the lexicon and taxonomy of CBP) and specific force allocation (the contingency sourcing of GFM). Detailed strategic guidance, constant information exchange, and a common set of force capability identifiers enable the process. Developing operational planning options iteratively entails some trial and error but creativity increases. Furthermore, despite different starting points, current and future force structure decisions benefit by leveraging the same core planning structure and encouraging lower level interaction that can improve recommendations. Finally, execution readiness and risk assessments are more relevant when using globally managed, specific force sets.

Implications

Setting planning bounds is not new. Strategists have worked through assumptions, constraints, and mission definitions as a regular part of the planning process. Setting tight limits on available forces (capabilities) as part of the strategic planning guidance is relatively new. This is not apportionment or allocation of unnamed units. Nor is it a starting list of forces that may be added to as planning circumstances dictate. Bounding operational planners means specific unit designations for planning purposes. The vertical and horizontal integration of DOD processes depends on debates over specific units and the capabilities (to include availability and readiness) they bring to the fight.

Glossing over the differences in units through generic allocations or Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) introduces unrehearsed uncertainty into the process. It can also decrement the fidelity of results by generalizing capabilities in order to simplify an otherwise large and complex matrix of units. JCAs offer value in terms of communicating concepts and categorizing capabilities but are no substitute for unit designations. To compensate, transformation requires continuous collaboration using a common framework and interrelated processes.

Expanding CBP further and deeper into AP and GFM is an important step in the transformational endeavor. Restricting operational planning with tight bounds promotes a rapid trial and error process to overcome an inability to find effective solutions in other general or rigorous ways. Of course, there are second-order effects to consider. Addressing some of the key implications (for example, integrating and synchronizing related processes, recalibrating senior leader focus, and reforming national strategy documents) will provide a broader context for what it means to set bounds in operational planning and foster a convergence of AP, CBP, and GFM.

First, functional areas that support joint warfighting capacity will have to adjust processes and lexicons as DOD transforms the method of presenting tradeoff decisions to senior leaders. For example, acquisition processes need to go further to create a flexible, adaptable, and reliable means of delivering information technology. Bureaucratic and legal delays of software...
force bounds for use in operational planning function. However, resolving strategic guidance and linking AP to CBP directly serves each of specifying units as part of writing strategy able to fulfill “six core functions. To which the Department’s senior leadership is QDR, “a key measure of success is the extent of the senior leaders. According to the 2006 weapons system procurement decisions.

A combatant commander with a clear voice in expensive and inflexible acquisition processes. The chance of satisfying short-term needs and operational planners will have a better impacts or unknown costs to one functional capability need decisions and acquisition milestone decisions must become interdependent.

Similarly, key decisions in weapons system acquisition processes will have to align to the cycle as well. In other words, the schedules for capability need decisions and acquisition milestone decisions must become interdependent. The goal is to have flexibility to shift resources in a world of uncertainty without significant impacts or unknown costs to one functional area or to DOD overall. Unlike the current system, a warfighting combatant commander and operational planners will have a better chance of satisfying short-term needs if capability decisions are not consistently hand-tied by expensive and inflexible acquisition processes. A combatant commander with a clear voice in a unified planning process (CBP and GFM) simply replans and mitigates risk according to strategy with specific bounds that include weapons system procurement decisions.

Another second-order effect is the focus of the senior leaders. According to the 2006 QDR, “a key measure of success is the extent to which the Department’s senior leadership is able to fulfill” six core functions. The potential of specifying units as part of writing strategy and linking AP to CBP directly serves each function. However, resolving strategic guidance force bounds for use in operational planning may conflict with the first listed function, Strategic Direction.

Strategic Direction tasks senior leaders to “identify the key outputs—not inputs—they expect from the Department’s components and determine the appropriate near-, mid-, long-term strategies for achieving them.”

Does a senior leader’s focus on outputs include providing strategic guidance for a warfighter’s operational plan? It is not clear, but certainly achieving desired outputs starts with controlling inputs and processes. To add to the confusion, nearly all DOD components have a slightly different definition for near-, mid-, and long-term.”

Senior leaders must drive the system through unambiguous strategy and timelines. Otherwise, outputs from organizational components will continue to lack comparability and synthesis. Finally, a good argument can be made that a “shift to a top-down capabilities-based planning system that is focused on outputs rather than inputs is a return to the basic principles of the PPBS (predecessor to PPBES) implemented by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1961.” Leaders today must provide explicit guidance upfront (inputs), frequently conduct project and process reviews, and then evaluate outputs.

Senior leaders must also review organizational design. Reorganizing staffs could very well become an outgrowth of transforming business practices and decisionmaking. Christopher Lamb and Irving Lachow make a good case for reforming DOD decisionmaking and standing up a “Decision Support Cell.” Although it seems impractical in the current budget environment to grow a staff or add responsibility to over tasked leaders, the three tasks for the Decision Support Cell are vital:

- integrate products for the Secretary of Defense
- improve the quality of decision support to contingency planning and resource allocation
- help senior leaders to develop their intuitive decisionmaking.

At a minimum, senior leaders need training because the system is complex, and neither general nor rigorous solutions are likely to surface. Managing the converging relationship between AP (contingency planning), CBP (integrated products), and GFM (resource allocation) can serve the same purpose as a Decision Support Cell.

The third implication relates to the National Security Strategy and the grand strategy it implies. In a world of uncertainty and difficult tradeoff decisions, the unclassified National Security Strategy and DOD counterpart documents will disconnect further from realistic expectations and observable activities. In addition, an effective PPBES with a unified and collaborative planning process would necessitate reform of national strategic documents. However, there are limits to the choices. For example, DOD could allow the strategy documents to remain as they are and perpetuate the longstanding “strategy-resource mismatch”

or networking hardware deliveries disrupt and frustrate AP and GFM processes. This, in turn, undermines confidence in transformation and progress in broadening and institutionalizing CBP. As stated by the OSD Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, a key process objective of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is to “integrate and synchronize the requirements process, PPBE, and the acquisition system.” As a framework, CBP can lead the integration, but only if the acquisition corps delivers enabling technology on agreed dates.

In terms of operational planning, a faster AP cycle will require more frequent updates of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) publication. Currently, the JSCP is “intended to provide planning guidance to combatant commanders and service chiefs based on current military capabilities.” However, it often falls short of operational planning expectations in terms of content or the timing of an update. Improving the effectiveness of the JSCP is paramount if it will include the constraints and force sets for warfighting plans.

Fortunately, some strides in changing the JSCP to improve support to AP are occurring. For example, apportioning notional forces is fading in relevance. The term apportion is more appropriate in the old threat-based system but should not be part of the new CBP construct. DOD should simply allocate resources for long-range planning. Thus, the important final step will be how to allocate forces to combatant commands for planning using GFM data in an automated method. Ultimately, this will dictate how CBP works in operational planning and, in turn, how solutions integrate with future force structure plans.

In summary, three implications only begin to delve into the possible issues at hand. Planning for simultaneous contingencies, dependence on foreign capabilities, mismatch between the vision and funding, expectations of other instruments of national power, and unintended consequences...
could all come into play. Driving a top-down PPBES that includes strict bounds on operational planners should have careful and thorough consideration. Practically, time is of the essence, and momentum in many segments of DOD is already under way. How to write strategy in order to merge processes for the benefit of decision-makers may be the first order of business.

Final Argument

This essay has argued for strategic guidance with specific bounds for each operational plan. The goals for force planning have hardly changed in the last 10 years. DOD must take assertive actions to achieve these goals. The next step is to integrate emerging initiatives such as Adaptive Planning, Capabilities-based Planning, and Global Force Management in order to advance planning and force structure decisionmaking. In so doing, planning conversations between combatant commanders and the Secretary of Defense will improve in three core ways. First, a deeper synthesis of information and analysis will have occurred at lower levels and across functional areas. Second, risk discussion will center not on shortfalls in requirements but on capability tradeoffs in light of multiple options and timeframes. Third, top-down decisions on capabilities will have a greater effect on DOD ability to adjust to changing threats, lessen institutional resistance, and build unity of effort. The simple act of clearly defining and limiting available forces for an operational plan is an important facet of altering the PPBE system. In fact, bounding operational planners may serve as a stepping stone toward the integration of the PPBES and the MDMP.

DOD continues to press for transformation and the use of a CBP framework to guide decisionmaking. According to the Joint Defense Capabilities Study, “the adoption of a capabilities-based approach provides capabilities to address a wide range of potential adversaries or other security challenges, thus mitigating the uncertainty of current threat projections.” A National Defense University paper states the critical importance of a “transparent and well understood process” that is “integrated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels”—all made possible by “institutionalizing a capabilities-based approach to defense decisionmaking.” Both the 2001 and 2006 QDR call for the adoption of capabilities-based force planning, adaptive operational planning, and global management of forces. As these initiatives mature, the pressure to integrate them will escalate so senior leaders can make decisions that span the spectrums of planning, programming, budgets, and warfighter execution.

The implications of setting tight bounds on operational planners are complex; therefore, there will be hesitancy and resistance to trying it. Practically, managing detailed inputs at the strategic level is an intensive exercise but is also a key part of a top-down driven decisionmaking system. Theoretically, framing resources in detail contradicts the traditional mindset of issuing broad assumptions and constraints and expecting the operational and tactical levels to develop options by working through issues. The current fight and those of tomorrow “compel us to rethink our assumptions, to reconfigure our forces, and to reinvigorate our alliance.” Operational planning can no longer have loose ties to future force planning; it must utilize the same CBP framework to interject warfighter needs in a useful way. In the end, the consequences of instituting bounds on operational planners will require close monitoring. However, continuing with the unbounded status quo assumes integration will occur incrementally over time or by some unidentified, unifying catalyst.

The time has arrived to shift emphasis from transformational initiatives to the interaction among these maturing processes. Tight Global Force Management bounds on forces available in an iterative Adaptive Planning process adds rigor, communicates with Capabilities-based Planning, and presents tradeoff decisions in a new way. DOD must focus on inputs, process, and outputs to best inform strategic choice. One is not more important than another.

NOTES

4. Ibid., 7.
5. Ibid., 16.
8. Ibid., vi–vii.
11. The seven characteristics of Adaptive Planning are rapid, iterative, flexible, collaborative, networked, seamless, and relevant. See Adaptive Planning Roadmap, 2005, 1.1.
12. These tasks include force capabilities identification and sourcing; wargaming; plan/project management (both within and across plans and projects); assessment of nonkinetic effects; interagency coordination; Global Force Management; and plan annex development. See Military Operations Research Society, Capabilities Based Planning: The Road Ahead, workshop proceedings (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, October 19–21, 2004), 3.
18. Causes of difficulty in analytic architecture for CBP include system complexity, the need for numerous subjective judgments, the many legitimate considerations other than combat capability that affect defense expenditures, and a constantly changing environment.
22. Ibid.
23. Bankston and Key, 10.
24. Walker, 3.
26. Ibid., 70.
30. Lamb, 31–33.
For the past decade and a half, we have struggled to understand the meaning of space power, space superiority, and space dominance.

Why is this? With a half century of space experience, why is it so challenging to understand these terms? What impact have these terms had on space activities? And as we increasingly depend upon orbiting spacecraft for national security and global prosperity, how can we help ensure stability for the space domain?

These fundamental questions came to the fore during our work on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). During the QDR, we observed the different views and priorities advocated by the various communities who have equities in space. To help come to terms with these questions and views, we asked the National Defense University to craft a space power theory that would be comparable to the theories that exist for other domains, for example, sea power.

This is not the first time the U.S. Government has commissioned a space power theory study. The first study was chartered in the late 1990s, soon after the Air Force transitioned its doctrinal lexicon from roles, missions, and functions to one described by core competencies. That transition has taken us on a long journey, one in which we have struggled to understand what space power and space superiority—within the boundaries established by the Outer Space Treaty—mean for our nation.

To help guide the contemporary work on a space power theory, we asked the study to focus on the underlying assumptions regarding why and how we as a society, nation, and military might use space to accomplish specific ends. We asked for a theory that addresses space power across the broad range of objectives that any space-faring state or nonstate actor may want to pursue and that explains the role of space in advancing national security objectives. And we asked for a theoretical framework to help judge the logic, significance, balance, and implications of space activities. Four questions guided this work:

- What constitutes space power?
- Is there a common set of principles that can be woven into a single space power theory?
- What makes space power “strategic”?
- What kinds of national strategies presume or require preeminence in space?

What Is Space Power?

Using the term space power assumes that there is such a thing. As with the concepts of space superiority and space dominance, belief that space power is worthy of definition and exploration is a product of the Air Force’s doctrinal shift to core competencies. This doctrinal shift applied new labels to space activities without providing any accompanying substantive definitions, principles, or philosophical underpinnings. At the outset, this change generated intense debates over whether the Air Force would speak in terms of aerospace versus air and space and aerospace power versus air and space power.

This emergence and use of terms that lack definition or common understanding among space practitioners are very different from the manner in which key airpower concepts emerged. Giulio Douhet, an early airpower theorist and believer in total war strategies, was an early proponent of transitioning aircraft from intelligence platforms to offensive military platforms, most notably for strategic bombing. In the early years of flight, Douhet articulated a theory that airpower would be the lynchpin in achieving victory. Accomplishing Douhet's vision would take several decades, but it was fully realized when the Allies leveled cities to break the will of the Axis powers in World War II. Douhet’s theory—articulated in advance of the use of the term airpower—has stayed with us to this day.

Douhet proposed new ways to employ aircraft—that is, a theory for airpower—not many years after the Wright brothers’ flight.

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COMMENTARY | Ensuring a Stable Space Domain for the 21st Century

But the same progress has not been achieved for space. Fifteen years after the introduction of the terms space power, space superiority, and space dominance, we find ourselves asking: If the concept of space power is important for our nation, why do we still encounter such difficulty defining or explaining it? We have been a space-faring nation for 50 years, yet we find ourselves reengaging on first principles, many of which were established long ago by the Outer Space Treaty and our National Space Policies. Why? We can find the answers by looking back 50 years to how we began our space journey.

The 20th-century Space Domain

In 1962, Dave Garroway was the host of the Today Show. Day after day, he conducted a futile experiment in which he tried to obtain a television signal from London. Each time, the audience would see only static on their television screens. That was about to change. On July 10, 1962, the first television picture was relayed from Earth to space and back again. I will never forget seeing that first successful space transmission on our black and white television set; it showed an American flag waving in front of the Earth Station in Andover, Maine. This revolutionary transmission was made possible by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) launch of the AT&T Telstar satellite, the world’s first active communications satellite.

The idea of an active satellite, one that did not simply reflect signals but actually amplified and retransmitted them, was conceived by Arthur C. Clarke in 1945. In 1955, Bell Telephone Laboratories sketched the possibilities for satellite communications in a scientific paper. Researchers at Bell designed Telstar to be a 34.5-inch, 170-pound satellite that fit inside NASA’s Delta rocket.

Telstar was launched on the morning of July 10, and that evening, AT&T president Fred Kappel picked up a phone in Andover and placed a call. Vice President Lyndon Johnson in Washington, DC, answered that first-ever call transmitted through space. Within 30 minutes, Telstar produced several other firsts: transmitting faxes, high-speed data, and both live and taped television. Remarkable—all in one day.

These first uses of a space system for communications missions allowed us to overcome the challenges of transmitting signals over great distances. Although expensive, these successes proved that space systems are an effective means for transmitting information that otherwise could not be shared.

At the same time, and unknown to all but a few, the United States was building a series of satellites to obtain Earth images. Washington and Moscow were embroiled in the Cold War, the Soviet Union had refused to agree to the 1955 U.S. “Open Skies” proposal for aircraft overflight in the use of reconnaissance, and the two powers were in the early stages of negotiating guidelines for space activities.

The United States instituted high-altitude reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union to gain insight into its sensitive operations. To keep the military profile low, the Central Intelligence Agency took the lead for U-2 reconnaissance missions. By 1960, the United States had flown numerous missions over and around the Soviet Union, which the Soviets viewed as an infringement of their sovereign rights.

At the same time, freedom in space was an open legal issue. Although the Soviets were the first to orbit an artificial satellite and had essentially confirmed their right of free passage, they viewed imagery satellites in the same vein as the U-2 flights: using satellites to spy was an unacceptable infringement of sovereign rights. To protect the U.S. satellite-based imagery programs and avoid diplomatic challenges, America concealed its emerging capabilities until they were accepted under arms control agreements.

During these early days of space exploitation, our predecessors struggled to identify principles that would guide all nations’ activities. On the one hand, using space to share television transmissions was being applauded. On the other, using space for reconnaissance over denied areas was pushing international legal boundaries and encouraging the concealment of technological advances.

As technical applications moved ahead, the Western powers made a series of proposals between 1959 and 1962 to bar the use of outer space for military purposes. Their plans included provisions to ban the orbiting and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 1960, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty be applied to outer space. Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and 1962 also included provisions for ensuring the peaceful use of outer space.

After reaching agreement to ban nuclear weapons, limit military activities, and not position military bases on celestial bodies, the powers moved the General Assembly to commend the Outer Space Treaty. The treaty was opened for signature on January 27, 1967, and on April 25, the U.S. Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification. The treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967.

This treaty established international principles for the use of space and, similar to the Antarctic Treaty, sought to prevent a new form of competition aimed at dominating outer space. Key principles included recognition that:

- space is the province of all mankind—a “global commons”
- space is to be used for peaceful purposes
- all states have an equal right to explore and use space
- international cooperation and consultation are essential
- signatories retain ownership of their space objects and bear responsibility for their space activities, including any damage inflicted on another state’s space objects.
Building upon international standards such as these, the strategic principles, goals, and guidelines that the United States follows are captured in today’s National Space Policy. This policy emphasizes the importance of preserving freedom of action in space, enabling unhindered operations in space, providing intelligence collection and analysis to support space situational awareness, and minimizing the creation of orbital debris—preserving the space environment.

The principles established by the Outer Space Treaty and our National Space Policies have helped guide all U.S. space activities, whether for civil, commercial, or national security purposes. We have collectively established the principle of unhindered access, at least in theory. Until the last several years, we had only to be concerned about our ability to use space in the event of nuclear war. Now things are different.

**The 21st-century Space Domain**

Today, many of the technological advances of those early years—for example, communications, navigation, and electro-optical imagery—have moved into the commercial and military sectors for widespread use. The employment of space is orders of magnitude more significant than during those formative years, yet the challenges to freely operating there have never been greater.

Counterspace capabilities to deny space services or attack on-orbit spacecraft are more prevalent than they have ever been. Examples include the proliferation of satellite jamming capabilities and the reemergence of antisatellite capabilities.

It is important to note that counterspace capabilities that are designed to deny the use of on-orbit space systems have second-, third-, and fourth-order effects that cannot be completely anticipated. As we saw in January 2007, using kinetics to eliminate satellites creates debris clouds that pose dangers to other spacecraft.

Kinetic destruction of spacecraft has similarities to ballistic missile attacks. Because of the short flight times—30 minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles and 10 minutes for direct ascent antisatellites—each creates the potential for uncontrolled escalation and miscalculation. Knowing this, the nuclear nations owning these capabilities put in place many technological, operational, and diplomatic steps to avoid ever getting to the point where they would be used. Space attack systems present similar challenges: space systems are fragile, and kinetic attacks against them increase the hostility of the domain as well as the potential for miscalculation.

The space domain and the international landscape we are examining today are in many ways similar to what our predecessors struggled to define. The concerns are much alike, but in today’s world, we find ourselves dealing with the effects of decades of technological advancement that could be applied to deny the peaceful use of space.

When comparing the past to the present, in addition to recognizing the proliferation of space attack capabilities, we must also ask: How valid is our 15-year use of a lexicon that we borrowed from the air domain? That is, how valid is it to apply air terminology to space? Is it appropriate to think about space much like we think about the land, sea, or air, or should we revert to the model President Eisenhower provided in the 1960s? Are there useful parallels between air- or sea power and space power, or are these parallels misleading and misguided?

The concept of airpower includes air superiority, where others can fly only if allowed. A similar concept applies for sea power, where we operate with impunity on and under the sea. But do these concepts apply to space? It seems doubtful. At face value, space power sounds as if it implies projecting power through space. This interpretation comes from directly transferring airpower terminology to the space domain. However, that is neither how we use space nor how we envision using it. In addition, obtaining space superiority would be far more difficult, complex, technically challenging, and costly than we can foresee. Two examples illustrate this point.

Consider the key benefit that space offers, whether it is of the early Telstar communications satellite type, intelligence-gathering spacecraft, or some other capability. We use space to deliver information. The advantage of space lies in how it enables us to quickly obtain and transfer information over long distances—whether it is to obtain precise knowledge of location, receive communications from another point on the Earth, or look at a picture of a hurricane taken by a satellite. It is all about the timely receipt of information.

Air superiority gives access to denied areas, allows military forces to move safely, and provides for the use of force delivered by air platforms. If we were to achieve a level of space superiority similar to that of air or sea superiority, we would be talking about denying others access to information—information such as time and location or the trade, financial, and business transactions and processes that occur everyday. Using other means to communicate or navigate would be difficult, more expensive, and less effective than continuing to use the advantages of space systems.

A second example of the complexity of space power is illustrated by the fact that once spacecraft are on orbit, attempting to deny those capabilities can ultimately harm one’s own space systems. Antisatellite capabilities such as those recently tested by China create fratricide threats to everyone’s satellite systems. Relating this threat to the seas, instead of having a destroyed ship sink to the bottom of the ocean, it becomes thousands of mines that spread to the surface and subsurface of all the oceans. That is a complicating factor when trying to deny the use of space; it increases the risk to many satellites that are being used for many purposes. Additionally, direct attacks on space systems may be the least effective means to deny others the use of space. We have long known that the best way to deny space use is to eliminate capabilities while they
are still on land—which, of course, is an issue for land, sea, or air forces to address.

In any attempt to draw parallels between dissimilar domains, we are immediately faced with such challenges. We quickly find that we cannot draw upon our historical experiences with land, sea, and air to craft a space power theory.

**Restabilizing Space**

Getting back to the question of space power, why are we where we are? Air proponents defined airpower within a couple of decades of the Wright brothers' flight, so why are we still struggling to define space power? We appear to be in the midst of a transition from the global commons principles of the 20th century to a new set of principles in which technology will once again transform a domain unless we take action.

Doubt was driven to articulate a vision for airpower that was a product of the technological innovation and competition that was taking place at the time. During the 20th century, the Outer Space Treaty defined the principles for space. The domain was stabilized by widespread acceptance of those principles and also by the fact that the space-faring nations turned away from capabilities that would put space systems and the space domain in jeopardy. In that stabilized domain, we did not need a concept for space power. The question “What is space power?” was not relevant.

Where will we be in 10 or 20 years? By then, the United States will have recapitalized key space capabilities, and potential adversaries may well have honed their space attack capabilities. We may face adversaries with broad offensive capabilities that would affect our space systems. Some nations are already well along the path to realizing both destructive and service denial capabilities that could be used under a variety of circumstances.

For this future time period, we must think in terms of a peer competitor who has robust space capabilities—including attack capabilities—along with the intent to use them. We must confront the possibility of facing competitors who, if we choose to challenge their ability to pursue their objectives, are capable of creating a highly complex environment in space in which some of our capabilities are degraded and others are held at risk. This situation puts all space capabilities—and national capabilities and interests—under great stress. With all this in mind, what theoretical foundations, principles, and strategies can we put forward to best deal with this environment?

By way of offering a point of departure on this subject, we should first underscore the common use principle and add to that a central precept, the concept of a stabilizing protection strategy. This proposition takes us back to the understanding that was apparent in the 1960s when the Western powers and the Soviet Union recognized the value that emerging space technologies could provide in a domain that is available to all.

Developing a space protection strategy that accounts for all of this—the principles established by treaties and policies and the now destabilized space domain—requires us to define what we want to protect and why. Before jumping immediately to technical solutions, we need to think in terms of the domain, the principles of that domain, and the philosophical underpinnings of our protection strategy.

When we understand the domain and its challenges, our protection strategy should be as stabilizing as possible. It should therefore:

- focus on escalation control and transparency
- incentivize nations to avoid actions that are inherently destabilizing and cannot be reversed
- include an architecture based on defense in-depth—a layered defense—to ensure the availability of key services
- reduce adversaries' incentive and ability to target space capabilities
- create uncertainty with respect to the consequences of an adversary's action
- increase warning time to enable both strategic and operational level actions.

The philosophical underpinnings of this protection strategy are consistent with the first principles that were established by the Outer Space Treaty and our National Space Policy. They may also help us stay in a stabilized domain and judge the logic, significance, balance, implications, and priorities for our space activities.

As we go forward, exploring and developing space protection concepts will put us in a better position to understand the proper scope of space power. If we accept the proposition that space power is founded on the common use precept and advanced by establishing a stabilizing protection strategy, then we must think long and hard about whether offensive capabilities fit with this proposition or what, in fact, offensive means.

Early contributors to theoretical constructs for outer space sought to prevent competition and national efforts to dominate the space domain. Today, through proliferation of space attack capabilities, the debate over space power has once again become important. The challenge for today's space theorists is now very much like that of our early space pioneers as they grappled with the principles that led to the Outer Space Treaty. We are seeking to create a secure and stable space domain so all who so choose are free to exploit its advantages. JFQ

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**Arman monitor launch and early orbit of Global Positioning System IIR–14 satellite from Cape Canaveral**

This article was prepared with the efforts of Cynthia A.S. McKinley, Special Assistant for Space and Intelligence to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Preparation and Warning).
Abolish
the Office of the
Secretary of
Defense?

By JOHN T. KUEHN

The political and defense communities of 2006 had the wrong debate about former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Instead of “should he stay or should he go,” the debate should have been whether we even need the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

It is perhaps time to admit that the great post–World War II American experiment called “unification” has failed. The recent civil-military relations spat over the handling of the Department of Defense (DOD) by its former chief is merely the occasion for this essay. The conflict was not as much about Rumsfeld’s personality as some would have us believe. The criticism that Rumsfeld received in 2006 and prior has precedence in the tenures of Secretaries past, including James Forrestal, Louis Johnson, Robert McNamara, and a host of others whom many have forgotten. It would seem that when problems continually reoccur, we need to look at their cause systemically instead of indulging in the scapegoating common to American culture.

The problem is deeper than any political appointee; the source is the office itself. Simply put, the Secretary of Defense and his supporting staff are too powerful. The wisdom of the creation and relevance of the original organization are what need to be reconsidered.

Unification
The unification of the Departments of the Navy and War (now renamed the Department of the Army) with the new Department of the Air Force as subordinate organizations under a new Secretary of Defense occurred as a result of the lessons learned from World War II. Unification did not occur naturally or without conflict. The Navy, in fact, was its greatest opponent. Unification had initially been attempted after World War I, principally due to the efforts of advocates such as General William “Billy” Mitchell for an independent air force. The clamor became so serious that President Calvin Coolidge convened a board in September 1925 to examine a number of questions, the fifth of which was, “Should there be a Department of National Defense under which should be grouped all the military defensive organizations of the Government?” The board included nine civilian and retired military members, including Rear Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher (uncle of the famous Jack Fletcher) and Congressman Carl Vinson. They elected Dwight W. Morrow (a banker and lawyer) as their chairman. The Morrow Board concluded its hearings in November of that year and did “not recommend a Department of National Defense, either as comprising the Army and the Navy or as comprising three coordinate Departments of Army, Navy, and Air. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages.” These wise words seem to have special clarity in 2007.

Nevertheless, unification was legislatively implemented by the National Security Act of 1947. This act was significantly modified by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and again in 1986 with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Two reorganizations, and our national security structure is still in a muddle. Perhaps it is time for a real “transformation.”

Overview
Having a Secretary of Defense was worth a try, but the imperatives for its retention are outweighed by history, logic, and the Constitution. First, consider the history of the pre-DOD structure. Prior to and during World War II, national defense functions resided in the Departments of the Navy and War. Both departments used boards to provide military advice to their Secretaries. Both Service Secretaries had direct and powerful membership in the Cabinet as strategic civilian leaders. Additionally, they used a “Joint Board” for coordination. The Joint Board function has since moved to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). However, it was this pre-1947 organizational and political architecture that established the foundation.
for victory in World War II. During that war, this defense/strategic structure functioned well with the emergence of the JCS as the unique organizational innovation. However, the emergence of the JCS did not mandate a Secretary of Defense. An understandable but ultimately misplaced desire for more efficiency led to the security act that created OSD. In addition to the Air Force, powerful new organizations emerged that came under the Secretary of Defense’s control and influence—for example, the National Security Agency and an array of Defense agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency.

Since its inception, OSD has been shrouded in controversy. Its first occupant was former Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who was initially opposed to unification. Forrestal, while still on the job, had a nervous breakdown and later committed suicide. The second Secretary, Louis Johnson, also proved problematic. In 1949, during the fight over whether the Navy would have a role in nuclear deterrence, Johnson’s highhanded anti-Navy stance prompted the so-called Revolt of the Admirals. The Chief of Naval Operations and Navy Secretary both lost their jobs for honestly expressing their dissent with the Secretary of Defense. However, Johnson’s continued problems, especially the state of the military at the outbreak of the Korean War, prompted President Harry Truman to fire him. Some even questioned Johnson’s mental capacities.

There was some stability in the 1950s because a former five-star general was President, and Dwight Eisenhower could overrule and overawe his civilian Secretaries. Ike’s famous “military-industrial complex” warning was an intimation that the centralization of power within DOD was problematic. However, his hint went unnoticed. And then came the McNamara years—proof if ever there was of the danger posed by this office and its capability to abuse power and subvert strategy. Robert McNamara claimed to speak for the consensus of the Joint Chiefs while in fact often ignoring their advice and simply giving his own views.

The Players, the Problems

Name one Secretary of Defense who was great. Having trouble? George Marshall does not count since he earned his stature—and Nobel Prize—as Secretary of State. His later stint at Defense was not so memorable. Maybe the recently departed Caspar Weinberger comes to mind, but even his tenure was somewhat problematic (Lebanon and Grenada), and his style of management is remembered most fondly because he sometimes (wisely) delegated some of his authority to the JCS (like General John Vessey) and Service Secretaries (like John Lehman). Then there was former Congress- man Dick Cheney under the first President Bush, who also deferred to the influential General Colin Powell, as well as to his combat-experienced Commander in Chief (George H.W. Bush was a World War II naval aviator), providing more reason to retain the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and at least two reorganizations, and our national security structure is still in a muddle consider eliminating OSD. Also, Cheney’s boss from 1989 to 1993 was well versed in national security and could easily have served as his own Secretary of Defense. President Bill Clinton’s Secretaries? There was the unfortunate Les Aspin. Recently, of course, Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure highlighted all of the potential for the good, bad, and ugly that is inherent in the office. Does the good outweigh all the rest, as the Morrow Board correctly asked? I suggest it does not. It is a systemic problem.

There are myriad reasons why the Defense Department and its associated secretarial position are problematic. Many of these reasons were posed and brushed aside during the initial battles over unification, the 1947 National Security Act, and in crafting defense reorganization legislation. Simply put, the office has too broad a span of control, limits or distorts the strategic advice available to the Commander in Chief, and has proved an unending source of conflict inside of the executive branch and out.

McNamara, and potentially Rumsfeld’s (the court of history is still out on this one), tenure particularly highlights how critical it is that our top civilian leader—the President—receives as broad a variety of strategic advice as possible. The existence of OSD places too many obstacles between the President and his Active duty military advisors. Normally, the JCS is supposed to provide direct military advice through the National Security Council, but in effect the Chairman is chosen by the Secretary of Defense precisely for his willingness to support his immediate chain of command, which is the Secretary of Defense himself. This is not a good system for getting an independent strategic assessment to the Commander in Chief—either through a Service Secretary or through the JCS. Instead of four opinions, the President gets one, which can silence or muddle those below it. The temptation to marginalize other opinions has, in fact, proven too great, as this brief review of OSD suggests.

There have been great efforts to enhance this nation’s security structure since 9/11. The opportunity to meaningfully adjust our defense and security structure at the top is already
in place with new but arguably ineffective bureaucracies for intelligence and homeland security. These “new” organizations would have much more capability and potential for good effect without a competing Office of the Secretary of Defense. Henry David Thoreau said, “The government is best that governs least.” Our security structure prior to World War II provided powerful evidence to support his assertion. What is the objection to having more of a “checks and balances” type system in the strategic and defense councils at the top of our government? The concern is that decision “gridlock”—due to the absence of an all-powerful OSD—might prevent the types of actions that would preempt severe threats to our nation. This was not the case after December 7, 1941. The structure then acted as decisively as our own did after 9/11—perhaps more so. Besides, how much real damage would the elimination of a Secretary of Defense do to the executive branch’s ability to detect, deter, and take decisive action against imminent threats? Relatively little, one suspects.

Moreover, when is the elimination of an extra layer of bureaucratic management a bad thing? To listen to the “transformationalists” of today, “flat hierarchies” are better. Would not elimination of OSD and the Secretary of Defense automatically flatten our strategic and defense hierarchies? Finally, where does the Constitution mandate this office? True, the Commander in Chief has the prerogative to delegate his executive functions, but the language of the Constitution is clear that there is to be only one Commander in Chief. OSD and the Secretary of Defense are not constitutionally protected in any sense.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are offered for consideration. First, abolish the Office of the Secretary of Defense with new Defense reform legislation. Next, move the civilian Secretaries of the Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army back into the Cabinet on a full-time basis, just as Navy and War were prior to and during World War II. Third, retain the JCS organization and staff, but enhance the Chairman’s statutory membership role on the National Security Council (not the Cabinet). Civil-military watchdogs may howl, but as an appointed position, this officer can always be sent packing in the same manner that Truman sent General Douglas MacArthur packing during the Korean War. Additional staff and operations functions at the OSD level can be moved under the Joint Staff. Agencies could be renamed; for example, the Defense Intelligence Agency could be rechristened the Joint Intelligence Agency. The National Defense University could become the Joint Defense University or simply the Defense University to account for the inter-agency realities of today. Letterheads would have to change, but these organizations could be retained almost completely as they are organized now. Certainly some OSD functions that are essential to the security of the country, given existing interagency relationships, will have to be carefully looked at and some even retained. However, we do not need a perfect plan to move ahead on this debate.

It is time to enact another Defense reorganization act. We repealed Prohibition, so why can we not abolish the Office of the Secretary of Defense? JFQ

NOTES


2 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 308–313. Baer provides an illuminating discussion of this topic vis-à-vis the Navy.


5 National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 80, General Board studies, GB449 series, 1925, Morrow Board report inclusive with these papers.

6 See <www.defenselink.mil/specials/ secmd_hisories/bios/johnson.htm>, Johnson stated the lesson learned in this way: “To the limit the present law allows, I promise you there will be unification as rapidly as the efficiency of the service permits it.”

7 Baer, 309.

8 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), 374. See also Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington DC: Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), 127–128. Most famously, Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, truly thought that Johnson was “mentally ill.” However, data suggest that Johnson’s outlandish grandstanding could just as well have been due to his training and practice as a trial lawyer in West Virginia or as a bureaucratic infighter in the War Department.

One of the primary goals of the counterinsurgent is to reestablish security and rule of law. An effective arrest and internment system is an essential part of a successful counterinsurgency effort, providing a nonlethal means of separating insurgents from the general populace and thereby securing the populace. The capture of insurgents and their equipment provides valuable intelligence to counterinsurgents and allows the option of rehabilitating insurgents and later releasing them back into society. Mistakes made by counterinsurgents in arresting or holding detainees may reinforce insurgent propaganda and otherwise undermine the overall counterinsurgency effort. Simply stated, a well-run system for arresting insurgents will greatly aid a counterinsurgency effort while a poorly run system will retard it.

Policies governing the arrest and internment of insurgents should contribute to ending the insurgency while minimizing or eliminating the potential for political damage to the authorities involved. They should be developed and enacted with an eye toward the responses of local nationals, international observers, and the U.S. populace. Achieving a balance between the need to provide security and the need to maintain legitimacy is difficult. When confronted with difficult security situations, authorities will often feel a strong impetus to use illiberal arrest and internment techniques or to ignore political or cultural expectations. Security forces and governments often make mistakes in the use of arrests and internment. Historically, there are five common errors: arresting innocent individuals, releasing insurgents who are still a danger to the counterinsurgency effort, mistreating arrested individuals, failing to anticipate the effects of arrests and internment on the information campaign, and allowing prisons to serve as training areas for insurgents.

Arresting Innocents

Arresting innocent personnel makes the actions of counterinsurgents appear arbitrary, unjust, or repressive. It aids insurgent propaganda by providing a real error to exploit and can alienate segments of the populace, particularly the individuals wrongly detained, their families, friends, and neighbors. Individuals alienated by wrongful arrest are susceptible to recruitment into the insurgency, and unwarranted arrest may compel otherwise ambivalent individuals to volunteer. A common tactic of insurgents is to encourage the arrest of innocent individuals to increase support for their cause.4

Arrests of innocent personnel may occur for a number of reasons, including:

- inaccurate or poorly developed intelligence
- inability of troops to communicate effectively with locals
- innocent personnel arrested as witnesses or for questioning
- arbitrary arrests or “fishing expeditions” used to try to identify insurgents
- collective punishment of a community.

Authorities may also combine aspects of these errors. In Aden in the 1960s, for instance, British forces lacked intelligence on insurgents, so they relied on mass arrests and interrogation as a means of developing intelligence. The policies led to international condemnation of British tactics and greatly reduced public support within Britain for the counterinsurgency effort, contributing to the failure of British initiatives in Aden.5

There are many examples of arrests and internment of innocents leading to the creation of more insurgents than the arrests neutralize. In Northern Ireland in the 1970s, British and Ulster security forces used inaccurate intelligence to conduct mass arrests. Innocents were held in jails with members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, who used their internment to recruit new members.4 Likewise, mass arrests of civilians under the Phoenix Program in Vietnam

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allowed the Viet Cong to recruit members from jails and holding areas.6

Releasing Insurgents

Amnesties and prisoner releases are often part of the political bartering that ends an insurgency. However, the release of insurgents who still pose a threat can make the task of the counterinsurgent more difficult. Captured insurgents pose a threat if they are still dedicated to the insurgency, especially if it is ongoing and the released insurgents can rejoin. There are several reasons release of dangerous insurgents may occur:

- clerical errors
- mistaken identity
- escape
- lack of evidence or intelligence to warrant further internment
- underestimating or not assessing the effects of releasing insurgents
- public pressure on counterinsurgents.

Released insurgents may be difficult to recapture because they have learned from their mistakes and have a thorough understanding of the process of arrest, prosecution, and internment. Freed insurgents may become more dangerous and better connected due to interactions with other detainees.4 In addition, they may gain status among other insurgents for having been arrested.

In most cases, counterinsurgents will be worse off when insurgents are released at inappropriate times and for inappropriate reasons. There are circumstances where counterinsurgents may arrest an insurgent knowing they can only keep him in custody a short time, for instance, to disrupt an impending insurgent operation. The use of such tactics should be limited because the negative effects of such temporary arrests, including an increase in the
countersurgency, management, and detention of innocents. For instance, captured al Qaeda training manuals emphasize the importance of claiming abuse.9 The news media may report these claims. Actual mistreatment of detainees adds fuel to insurgent propaganda and will often be covered by the media as well. Counterinsurgents must anticipate these eventualities and have in place responses and systems for mitigating the effects. The modern information environment compounds the difficulty for counterinsurgents as news can travel almost anywhere in seconds. The counterinsurgency effort will simultaneously be scrutinized by the press.

Mistreating Detainees

Mistreatment of arrested individuals generally means not treating them in accordance with established rules of engagement, laws, or operating procedures. It can be expanded to mean not treating internees consistently with local culture or international norms. Mistreatment may occur while individuals are taken into custody, while they are in a holding facility, or at the time of their release.

Arrest and internment have additional importance in counterinsurgency because of the proximity of insurgents to counterinsurgents. For many insurgents, incarceration will be the first up-close and personal encounter with counterinsurgents and the first time the
countersurgency both among the local populace and in the international arena.7 There are numerous historical examples of prisoner mistreatment hindering the efforts of counterinsurgents.8

The use of torture by the French in Algeria affected thousands of people and benefited insurgent recruiting. The institutionalization of torture and other illiberal practices also reduced the support of the French people for counterinsurgency efforts in Algeria and may have contributed to the attempted coup by French officers against their government in 1958.8

The second- and third-order effects of mistreatment of arrested individuals are not always predictable. The execution of Irish insurgents in 1916, particularly the wheelchair-bound James Connolly, helped spark the 1919–1921 Irish War of Independence against British rule.10 London was surprised by the uprising as the insurgency had little public support prior to the executions.

A further compounding factor is that the understanding of what comprises mistreatment changes over time and is dependent on cultural attitudes and perceptions. For instance, in the late 19th century, the suspension of civil rights and use of summary execution were acceptable tools for U.S. forces serving in the Philippines, while neither is generally allowable today.11

Failing to Anticipate Effects

By its nature, “internment is such an illiberal method that it will always give rise to widespread international criticism and allegations of brutality, many of which will be believed.”12 A wide variety of actors will scrutinize the way arrests occur, the treatment of prisoners, interrogation of prisoners, and release of prisoners. Negative perceptions of these activities will aid insurgent recruiting efforts, undermine support to the government, or diminish support to counterinsurgents in their home countries. Insurgents invariably claim mistreatment of detainees and detention of innocents. For instance, captured al Qaeda training manuals emphasize the importance of claiming abuse.9 The news media may report these claims. Actual mistreatment of detainees adds fuel to insurgent propaganda and will often be covered by the media as well. Counterinsurgents must anticipate these eventualities and have in place responses and systems for mitigating the effects. The modern information environment compounds the difficulty for counterinsurgents as news can travel almost anywhere in seconds. The counterinsurgency effort will simultaneously be scrutinized by

*street credibility* of detained insurgents and in the perception that the security forces are unable to keep insurgents imprisoned. The most stringent civilian parallel to this dilemma is the arrest of organized crime leaders. Authorities spend years building a case and allow the criminal organization to commit lesser infractions that will only merit temporary incarceration in order to ensure the legitimate, long-term removal of the leader. Acting too early “tips the hand” of authorities and allows insurgents to argue that they are innocent and unfairly targeted.

There are additional second- and third-order effects from the improper release of insurgents. If internees are regularly or arbitrarily released, those still in prison may be less willing to provide information. The insurgent learns that simply by waiting out his sentence, he can avoid having to negotiate or trade information to procure his release.

More importantly, release of insurgents makes intelligence collection more difficult within the populace. People may be less willing to risk their lives to provide information on suspects if insurgents will return from prison. The people may also come to see the counterinsurgents as incompetent and unable to protect them if insurgents routinely regain their freedom. This contributes to the rise and spread of rumors of corruption within the counterinsurgent legal system, such as the efficacy of bribes or power of insurgent leaders over the system. Finally, release of insurgents may be harmful to the morale of counterinsurgents, who must capture the same insurgents multiple times, or who suffer repeated attacks from released insurgents.

**Internment may be the first time prisoners encounter objectivity, fairness, and equality of the rule of law**

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insurgents, local nationals, populations of states providing security forces, nongovernmental organizations, foreign governments, and the media.

The history of counterinsurgency is replete with examples of counterinsurgents failing to take into account the effects of their arrest and internment practices. For instance, while conducting counterinsurgency operations in Yemen in the 1960s, the British army developed a reputation for arbitrary detention of civilians and torture of prisoners. Although inquiries by the International Red Cross and Amnesty International found no evidence of physical abuse of prisoners, the rumors persisted and undermined popular support to continued British involvement. Declining support at home contributed to the success of the Yemeni insurgency against British rule.14

The conduct of indigenous security forces working with foreign counterinsurgents may also reflect on the entire force. As an example, British forces in Cyprus in the 1950s tolerated the torture of prisoners by Cypriot police. Insurgents were able to capitalize on this, causing political damage to the British government and bringing international scrutiny on Britain.15

Modern media are so pervasive it should be expected that every action of the counterinsurgent and his allies will be reported. The allegations of insurgent against counterinsurgents, true or not, will often have an international audience. Arrests and internment performed by counterinsurgents must be a part of the information campaign. Otherwise, intense media coverage and the spread of rumors will aid the insurgents and may cause the counterinsurgency effort to fail.

Allowing Prisons to Be Insurgent Bases
Captured insurgents will communicate with one another while detained. They will find ways to talk directly, pass notes, or otherwise send signals. Their communication can extend beyond a detention facility to the outside world. Insurgents may use communication to organize their efforts. Activities that may occur in prisons include:

- creating relationships with insurgents from other regions and backgrounds
- sharing information on successful tactics and techniques
- ideological or theological indoctrination of other detainees
- recruitment of noninsurgent detainees into an insurgent organization
- training
- intimidation of prisoners or guards
- organizing escapes, riots, hunger strikes, attacks on guards, or other disobedience
- passing guidance from captured leaders to free insurgents and vice versa.

In Northern Ireland, for example, prisons became the "training centres" of the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the 1960s and 1970s. The holding of insurgents and innocent civilians in common areas facilitated this.16 In Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, a similar situation prevailed in prison camps where hardcore insurgents were not separated from other prisoners.17

The greater the restrictions on insurgent interaction, the less insurgents will be able to trade information and organize. However, the counterinsurgent must keep in mind that some level of interaction or information-sharing will occur. It is a matter of controlling the interaction.

There are many means of controlling detainees and their ability to communicate. However, detention facilities cannot become enemy bases of operation if counterinsurgents avoid capturing innocents and releasing insurgents who are still a threat. Fewer innocent detainees mean fewer potential recruits in the detainee population. Additionally, training and sharing of tactics will have no effect on the insurgency if captured insurgents stay in prison.

Contemporary Operations
The United States currently supports multiple counterinsurgency efforts, including those in Colombia, the Philippines, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition to these conflicts, Washington is embroiled in the war on terror, which is often considered a global counterinsurgency. Arrests and internment have been important tactics used by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the greater war on terror.

Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has routinely made all of the mistakes described above. The effects vary by event and circumstance, but U.S. arrest and internment practices have engendered negative sentiments toward the United States in many regions of the world, particularly where counterinsurgency efforts are ongoing.

One focal point of national and international scrutiny has been the internment center at Guantanamo Bay. The basis for this scrutiny has predominately been reported mistreatment of prisoners. Human rights activists have opposed the center since its inception because U.S. policy was to hold prisoners without charges indefinitely. Holding prisoners without due process contradicts both U.S. and international laws and norms. Supreme Court rulings in 2004 and 2006 reinforced this. Though a slight majority of Americans support the continued use of the Guantanamo Bay facility and believe that prisoners are treated appropriately, views in many foreign nations on which the United States relies for assistance in the war on terror are opposed to the practices in Guantanamo and routinely call for the end of internment there.18

Guantanamo is a stark example of the necessity for anticipating the effects of internment on the information campaign. Reported practices such as denying prisoners due process were bound to cause an uproar within the United States and abroad, particularly given that the internees are foreign nationals. The plan for holding captured terrorists should have accounted for this and been executed in a manner that supported other aspects of the U.S. information campaign, such as the importance of democracy and rule of law as tools against terrorism.

Mistreatment has been an issue in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Numerous incidents of
prisoner abuse and murder have been publicized by the international press. The most notorious was the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in 2004. The mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib greatly affected international support for the war in Iraq, impacted the sentiment of the American public toward the war, and increased support for the insurgency in Iraq. The scandal is regularly used in the propaganda of both Iraqi insurgents and international terrorist organizations and may be used in conjunction with allegations of abuse at Guantanamo to create the impression that the United States maintains a policy of abuse and torture targeting Arabs and Muslims.\(^\text{19}\)

Though it has begun to improve, the system of arrests and internment in Iraq was poorly conceived and orchestrated. It began as an outgrowth of the system for processing prisoners of war. Without the necessary planning and training to effectively run a system for arresting and interning insurgents, U.S. forces in Iraq made every possible mistake. The overall effect is a system that has turned some neutral or progovernment Iraqis toward supporting the insurgency and is largely ineffective as a means for protecting the populace from insurgents.

Mistreatment has arisen as a problem in all aspects of the system. The way arrests were conducted, particularly early in the counterinsurgency, was not in accordance with local culture and norms, creating resentment toward American forces. Detainee abuse, such as the Abu Ghraib scandal and other incidents, further fueled negative attitudes.\(^\text{20}\) In the words of President George W. Bush, the Abu Ghraib scandal in particular “erased us off the moral high ground.”\(^\text{21}\)

U.S. and Iraqi forces have also captured large numbers of innocent individuals and regularly release dangerous insurgents. Over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, American forces have arrested at least 70,000 in Iraq, 18,000 of whom are still in custody.\(^\text{22}\) From June 2005 to June 2006, more than 16,000 prisoners were processed at theater internment facilities, but 11,000 were released.\(^\text{23}\) Anecdotal evidence indicates that many of these detainees were innocent and ended up in prison due to inaccurate intelligence or indiscriminate arrests.\(^\text{24}\)

There are also indications that innocent detainees are recruited from the prisons, insurgents use the prisons to share information and network, and arrest is not a deterrent because insurgents believe they will soon be released.\(^\text{25}\) Iraqi leaders have described Iraqi prisons as schools for al Qaeda, and a representative of the Iraqi Islamic Party noted that “detainees will come out in the form of car bombs and suicide bombs.”\(^\text{26}\)

There are recent reports of widespread corruption and abuse in the conduct of the internment system in Iraq.\(^\text{27}\) Iraqi judges regularly release insurgents, citing lack of evidence or orders from high-ranking officials. Likewise, the Iraqi government and U.S. military authorities have conducted multiple mass releases in an attempt to garner popular support from the families of detained individuals. Predictably, the release of dangerous insurgents has stoked the insurgency and caused problems for American military personnel and Iraqis. U.S. military personnel report that it is increasingly difficult to get intelligence from captured insurgents as they know they will be released within 6 months of capture. U.S. military personnel have repeatedly found themselves fighting the same insurgents again and again in a climate of rising violence and growing support for the insurgency and sectarian militias.\(^\text{28}\)

**Toward More Effective Policies and Procedures**

Given the importance of arrests and internment in counterinsurgency efforts and the potential damage from missteps in these activities, measures must be taken to ensure that they are carried out appropriately.

**Plan the Effort.** When becoming involved in a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism effort, the government must make prisoner handling part of the overall plan. Estimates of how many prisoners will be taken and what resources will be required should be developed in the planning stage. An operational plan for conducting arrests, prisoner processing, and internment should follow. Planning helps prevent ad hoc detainee operations that are damaging to the overall campaign.

**Resource the Effort.** An effective system of arrest and internment requires resources including personnel, training, facilities, and equipment. Major requirements often include:

- subject matter experts to train and advise the force
- internment facilities that are adequately sized, cannot easily be used for recruitment/training centers, and meet legal requirements
- legal staff to provide oversight and operate the system
- adequate number of trained interrogators for all organizations handling prisoners
- adequate number of interpreters for all organizations handling prisoners
- adequate number of trained guards for internment facilities
- means for transporting prisoners
- automation for tracking detainees, their belongings, and associated evidence, intelligence, and debriefings.

The importance of having experts available to run internment facilities and conduct interrogation cannot be overstated. In Algeria in the 1950s, it was noted that putting responsibility for internment and interrogation in the hands of tactical commanders led to hugely mixed results. In some areas, torture became standard operating procedure. In others, units...
were simply incompetent in their interrogation techniques. The situation improved dramatically after the creation of a professional internment and interrogation service.29

Train. Training is a crucial part of resourcing the effort; arrests and internment cannot be left to amateurs. At the beginning of U.S. operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it was largely untrained amateurs, in this case American military personnel, who conducted arrests and operated holding facilities. Though well intentioned, these troops did not have the training to appropriately accomplish tasks. The subsequent establishment of predeployment training on counterinsurgency operations has done a great deal to overcome this. In the future, it would be beneficial for troops to receive training prior to entry into a counterinsurgency campaign so mistakes are not made in the crucial early stages.

Target. Targeting involves the collection of intelligence to support operations and the use of intelligence to shape the operating environment. It plays two important roles with detainees. First, it provides a means for deciding who to detain. Effective intelligence collection from multiple sources, thorough intelligence analysis, and integration of government agencies in the targeting process ensure the detention of insurgents and not civilians.

The second use of targeting is for release of insurgents. Just as internees should not be detained without consideration of the effects, they should not be released without similar consideration, which includes:

- potential for the detainee to resume insurgent operations
- effects on insurgent organizations
- reactions of the public
- reactions of counterinsurgents.

These considerations are most important for mass releases of detainees. If the detainee system operates effectively, there should never be a time when mass releases of innocent detainees occur, because mass numbers of innocents will not be in detention facilities. However, mass releases may be part of negotiation or trust-building between insurgent groups and the government at the end of hostilities. Under those circumstances, care must be taken to ensure that the release has the desired effects and does not simply reinvigorate the insurgency.

Use Appropriate Arrest and Internment Techniques and Procedures. There are multiple components to this part of detainee operations, including:

- ensuring that individuals are arrested in the right way
- ensuring that prisoners are taken only when intelligence or circumstances support it
- ensuring that internment facilities operate in accordance with all applicable laws, doctrine, and operating procedures
- ensuring independent oversight of internment facilities.

The way prisoners are captured can greatly affect public perception of counterinsurgents. Because of the potential for negative effects on public opinion, David Galula went so far as to suggest that arrests should be made by a police force that is completely separate from the force endeavoring to win the support of the populace.30 Regardless of who conducts arrests, counterinsurgents should use techniques appropriate to the operating environment. For instance, some cultures require taking revenge on anyone publicly insulting one’s family. Therefore, harsh techniques for detaining insurgents can create more insurgents. In addition, public support may be lost if counterinsurgents appear overly harsh in taking detainees. For targeted insurgents, counterinsurgents should use techniques consistent with available intelligence on the insurgents, local culture, and threat level during an operation. For prisoners taken as targets of opportunity, techniques should follow escalation of force procedures as described in the theater’s rules of engagement. If damage occurs to people or their property, counterinsurgent forces should consider compensating the injured people, their families, or the property owners.

Counterinsurgents may detain individuals for reasons other than direct involvement in insurgent activities. For instance, a patrol may not have a translator and need to take individuals back to base camp to speak with them. Another example is taking individuals for questioning after an insurgent attack or because they may have information on the insurgency. Taking detainees for reasons other than their involvement in insurgent activities should be avoided. If innocents must be taken in for questioning, they should be kept separate from the general detainee population so they cannot communicate with insurgents or be identified by them. In addition, individuals taken for questioning should be released as soon as possible and in a manner that does not alienate them or their families.

Operating facilities in accordance with applicable laws and doctrine ensures that holding facilities serve their purpose without fueling insurgent propaganda. This means not only maintaining humane treatment of detainees but also ensuring accountability about the detainees and their property.

Humane treatment safeguards the detainees, protects the personnel running the detention facility from false accusations, and supports the mission by maintaining the legitimacy and support of counterinsurgent actions. Insurgents will often claim brutal treatment of prisoners as a part of the propaganda. Such claims may cause holding facility personnel to come under scrutiny regardless of whether they did or did not commit abuse. Consistently operating within the law, investigating cases of abuse, and regularly monitoring and recording the physical health of prisoners will safeguard holding facility personnel.

Maintaining accountability for prisoners and their property helps ensure that neither intelligence nor evidence against detainees is lost and that detainees themselves are not accidentally released.

Techniques and procedures for ensuring that detention facilities operate effectively include:

- training all holding facility personnel on applicable laws and doctrine
- administering regular medical checkups of prisoners
- inspecting holding facilities regularly
- using biometrics to identify and track detainees
- standardizing spellings of prisoner names
- synchronizing prisoner tracking databases
- synchronizing prisoner database with intelligence databases.

Depending on the legal and operating conditions of the theater, requiring review by officers from both intelligence and the Judge Advocate for either release or further incarceration of a detainee may also be beneficial.

Even if holding facilities are run perfectly, outside oversight by nongovernmental organizations may be beneficial. Organizations such as...
the International Red Cross provide independent oversight that is respected worldwide. Their approval of holding facilities and operations may provide legitimacy to counterinsurgents and demonstrate that they are not cruel in their treatment of prisoners.

Coordinate with Local Authorities. When possible, the United States should work through local police and other authorities to arrest and intern insurgents. Coordinating with local authorities, particularly police, can have a number of beneficial effects. The locals may be able to provide intelligence and aid in the targeting effort. They have cultural insights that help establish effective arrest and internment procedures. They are often able to conduct arrests themselves in ways that will not cause negative perceptions of the United States.

Gather Evidence and Witness Statements. Counterinsurgents may be legally required to produce evidence linking arrested personnel to insurgent activities. Even in cases where evidence is not required for prosecution, physical verification of insurgent activity often has high intelligence value. Gathering evidence and maintaining it with a detainee is difficult, particularly in large-scale operations with many detainees from different locations. Training for Soldiers on witness statements and maintaining evidence with a detainee is helpful in overcoming this. Legal support by personnel from the Judge Advocate, Military Police, Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or Criminal Investigation Command is also beneficial.

After movement of prisoners to theater or national-level holding facilities, it is important that the capturing unit maintain contact with the personnel running the facilities. This ensures that interrogators understand why a prisoner is in custody and what intelligence value he may have. It also allows the Judge Advocate or host nation courts a means of requesting additional information or assistance from the capturing unit.

Inform and Educate Detainees. As detailed above, insurgents will often use holding facilities to spread their ideology and recruit new members. Rather than ceding the information battle in the holding facility to the insurgents, counterinsurgents can take steps to oppose the insurgent message. Informing prisoners as to the policies and principles of the government may undermine the belief of some insurgents in their cause. In addition, job training, literacy programs, and other education provide a means of constructively filling the time that insurgents spend in prison. Education may undermine insurgent ideology and provide detainees with job skills they can use at the end of the conflict.

Manage Perception. If arrests and internment aid insurgent propaganda and recruiting, they are a liability to the counterinsurgency effort. Accounting for the above considerations will help ensure that this does not happen. Planning and conducting arrests and internment must be continuously revaluated to ensure desired effects on the battlefield. Counterinsurgents should ensure that arrest and internment synchronize with information operations. As long as perceptions remain neutral to positive, arrests and internment can help end the insurgency rather than perpetuate it.

The United States will continue to be involved in counterinsurgency efforts for the foreseeable future. Over the last 5 years, America has made many mistakes common to counterinsurgency. By recognizing these mistakes and learning from them, better policies and practices can be adopted, which will make the United States more effective in countering insurgencies and will ultimately save American lives. *JFQ*

**NOTES**

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 102.

12. Mockaitis, 60.
14. Mockaitis, 60.
25. O’Connell and Benard.
28. See Grossman. In the article, an officer is quoted as saying, “Why is it the top 10 people I’m going after have all been to Abu Ghraib?”
By the end of the 19th century, Great Britain commanded “the largest empire the world had ever seen.” Far from being a stepping stone for further greatness, victory in 1815 marked the culmination of Britain’s power, and its position—particularly in terms of industrial pre-eminence relative to the other great powers of the day—took on international trade, and it depended “on foreign countries for supplies of raw materials, above all oil.”

At the same time that Britain was adjusting its defence (and foreign) policy to its reduced material power base, the security environment was also changing. The ending of the Cold War created the idea that there was no longer a defining issue in foreign policy and that, while “the last two hundred years, the dominant force in international affairs has been the nation state . . . over the next twenty years, the risks to international stability seem as likely to come from other factors.” With no threat of a direct attack on Britain, it became “commonplace in the 1990s to talk of security rather than defence,” as softer issues replaced the hard threat of annihilation or assimilation by the Soviets. Stability based on fear had been replaced by “stability based on the active management of . . . risks.”

The Route to the Strategic Defence Review

Since 1945, the United Kingdom has conducted numerous defence reviews and realignments, which have followed a pattern of crisis and review, with changes interpreted as either financially, situationally, or personality driven. Regardless of the review or the government of the day, trends and similarities can be observed in the policy choices and changes, namely a “positive and engaged role in global affairs [and] Britain’s preparedness . . . to intervene militarily as part of international coalitions.” The maintenance of a nuclear capability is also enduring.

The Three Pillars policy (1948) and the Three Phases (1950)—which operationalized the former—sought realignment against the Soviet threat following World War II. The Three Pillars focused on maritime and air assets and on nuclear deterrence but was
flawed as neither the air assets nor nuclear capabilities that it relied upon were in place. Thus, the Three Phases sought to use European-based U.S. military power to first deter and then, if deterrence failed, hold the Soviets (while conventional reinforcements arrived from America), and finally strike Soviet forces with nuclear and strategic air capabilities while maneuvering conventional land forces to close with the enemy.

The Defence Policy and Global Strategy Papers (1952) cemented UK reliance on nuclear forces by focusing on an initial defence of “unparalleled intensity,” concentrated both defensively to deter or in response to an attack, and offensively, in a followup operation to return to the status quo. In the face of ongoing food rationing in the United Kingdom, this military-led review saw an increase in defence spending that, by 1956, when Britain’s request for much-needed International Monetary Fund loans to fund the Suez crisis was thwarted by U.S. intervention, was a huge drain on the country. The Sandys Review (1957) noted, “Over the last 5 years, defence has on average absorbed 10 percent of Britain’s gdp [gross domestic product]. Some 7% of the working population are either in the Services or supporting them.”

The costs of military manpower and equipment to the supported society, both financially and in terms of the reduced capacity to contribute to other areas of the economy, had been a balancing act since the industrialization of war in the Napoleonic era—Britain in the 1950s and 1960s was no different. Much in the same way that, in contemporary Russia, nuclear forces had been used to plug conventional capability gaps caused by financial decline, the Sandys Review cut conventional forces and focused on nuclear capabilities. This review also saw direction and responsibility shift from the military to the ministry.

The Healy Review (1967) saw the next significant events in Britain’s defence policy. Forces were “seriously overstretched and . . . dangerously under-equipped [and there had been] no real attempt to match political commitments to military resources [or the] economic circumstances of the nation.” The concept of flexibility—an enduring theme often regarded as a euphemism for cuts—appeared at this time: the government needed to “strike a balance between . . . defence requirements and the degree of flexibility it can afford as an insurance against the inherent fallibility of judgement.” With European Economic Community membership on the table, reducing the burden of a large standing army in Germany, which would have undermined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) flexible response doctrine, was unacceptable. An “accelerated withdrawal” from tasks east of Suez, where Britain’s influence was declining anyway, was the only real option.

The withdrawal from out-of-area roles and the greater reliance on NATO continued through détente. The Nott Review (1981)—in reality a realignment in the face of “severe economic downturn and the introduction of crash planning to control public spending”—rather than a review—saw the government under pressure to reestablish the right balance “between inevitable resource constraints and . . . necessary defence requirements.” In other words, the Government’s commitments to spend money on defence have outstripped the availability of funds. As in 1950, the plan was to hold the United Kingdom until reinforced by the United States; the fact that this policy mirrors the contemporary defence policy of the fledgling Baltic states exposes the extent to which the UK had been in financial crisis.

The pattern of crisis (military, political, or economic) followed by review continued at the end of the Cold War with Options for Change (1990–1991) and then the Defence Costs Study–Front Line First (1994). Neither was a formal review, but each sought financial realignment from the peace dividend expected with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Britain sought to “devise a structure for . . . regular forces appropriate to the new security situation and meeting . . .
Issues for British Defence

Defence issues were the dominant theme during the Cold War, rather than the security issues that arose in the post–Cold War environment. While defence is limited to military matters, security is political, social, economic, and environmental. Accordingly—and despite by 2003 there being no major conventional military threats to the United Kingdom or NATO—the scope of threats to the safety of UK citizens and British interests apparently broadened after 1990. The focus shifted from “the well being of the state” to “ensuring a peaceful society for all its members.”

This is an interesting paradox in that, while the threat of annihilation or assimilation by the Soviets had disappeared, the resulting shift from preserving life and sovereignty to developing quality of life and lifestyles seemed to generate more, and apparently greater, threats.

The “traditional juggling act between Britain’s various interests—imperial versus continental, strategic versus financial,” which ran throughout the days of Empire—“continued in the same old fashion,” as did the juxtaposition of decline and internationalism, global and regional highlighted above. In the 19th century, “nothing frightened . . . British imperialists more than . . . relative economic decline, simply because of its impact upon British power.” Contemporary concerns focused on protecting an economy based on international trade and the import of natural resources. This created a “much broader approach to security . . . radically different to traditional attitudes in which international security is seen primarily in terms of state centred defence postures.” How radically different this was is debatable; the Empire had, after all, been a fundamentally economic venture that in turn created an uncontouchable power base.

A paradigm shift was developing. The armed forces had been the traditional guarantors of peace throughout the evolution of pre-industrial and industrial warfare, but now warfare was entering a fourth generation, and some argued that the military might not be the organization best placed to deal with it. The collapse of the Soviet Union and removal of a direct conventional strategic threat to the United Kingdom, it has been argued that the primary justification for maintaining the British armed forces no longer exists. Moreover, using the military for the broader security issues that the UK must now mitigate “will be not only inadequate, but probably counter-productive.” Fourth-generation threats had traditionally been intrastate and considered criminal acts, but the expansion of international terrorism altered this concept. There is a failure here, though, to recognise that issues such as counterterrorism and counterterrorism—which had been in the realm of civilian authorities with military powers providing only assistance—were now beyond those agencies. Others argue that the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), while taking the nation beyond previous threat-based reviews, does not go far enough in creating a joined-up (that is, intragovernmental) approach to security.

Both arguments fail to appreciate that SDR is about defence. Wider security issues, including the causes of instability, are addressed elsewhere in government (for example, the Department for International Development and the former Prime Minister’s Commission on Africa). Such a merger of portfolios is

warfare was entering a fourth generation, and some argued that the military might not be the organization best placed to deal with it

beginning to be implemented in government and tactically, as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan show, but defence is the foundation upon which security issues are both facilitated and addressed. In the contemporary world, there is a blurring of defence and security, as defence issues for states such as Britain diminish, and at times defence policy “is scarcely distinguishable from security policy.” This does not mean, however, that they are the same things. SDR does acknowledge the need for nonmilitary tools and states that “deterrent extends well beyond the military dimension to a response co-ordinated across Government.”

What else does it says about Britain’s defence needs will be considered now.

SDR and Beyond

In 1982, 1987, and 1992, the Conservatives had used defence in general and nuclear policy in particular to diminish Labour’s electoral credibility, but by 1997, defence was not a key election issue. Indeed, during the 1997 election, Labour turned its former weakness into a strength. The end of the Cold War meant Labour was no longer hamstrung by in-party tensions regarding the nuclear issue, and while it “remains a sensitive issue, particularly to the left of the party.”

the nuclear issue was not an important focus of the election, within or without the Labour party; poor morale in the military and lack of strategic focus caused by Options for Change and Defence Costs Study were.

In its 1997 manifesto, Labour promised a “strategic defence and security review to reassess [Britain’s] essential security interests and defence needs” that would be “foreign policy led, first assessing [Britain’s] likely overseas commitments and interests and then establishing how [British] forces should be deployed to meet them.” Like all good politicians, Labour was true to its word once elected, and the foreign policy—led SDR—an “open and consultative” process involving military, government officials, and experts from academia—was an early initiative. “SDR was repeatedly and deliberately described . . . as a policy review, not a budgetary or organisational review,” and Labour was critical of the previous government’s “treasury driven” realignments and the structures these had left. That did not, however, lead to a radical departure from enduring policy preferences seen in the earlier reviews, such as alliance with NATO and the United States, an international role in defence of national interest, and the retention of nuclear capability. Moreover, the fundamental reshaping of forces that SDR promised did not occur; how forces could be deployed to meet challenges was the focus, rather than reshaping those forces to meet the challenges. The review was also not exempt from budgetary realities, and its publication was delayed when the Treasury questioned the costs.

The foreign policy baseline established for SDR was very conservative, and there was no blank sheet of paper to fill. Radical options such as abandoning alliances, merging or abandoning the three services, or replacing internationalism with isolationism did not seem to have been even considered. SDR built on the internationalist agenda of Tony Blair’s government. It also sought to provide the stability that the defence community had been lacking since the end of the Cold War, when defence policy under the Conservatives had been “characterised more by rolling review rather than by stable planning.” Perhaps a completely radical approach was not what had been required. Capability-based planning continued, with an aspiration to provide flexible, agile forces, efficient in the delivery of military power to affect situations. There was an emphasis on joint operations, with a number of joint organizations established in SDR.
The mission of “Defence Diplomacy” was introduced—although previous shows of force, combined exercises, overseas visits by ships, and Britain’s involvement in NATO Partnership for Peace initiatives imply this new mission had been extant.

In sum, while not as radical, far reaching, or independent of budgetary constraints as it was billed, SDR did consolidate the capability-based planning that had become necessary in the face of an amorphous threat and gave those developing and executing it a degree of stability.

On September 11, 2001, this amorphous threat solidified. In 2002, the government responded with a New Chapter for SDR intended to “re-examine the UK’s defence posture in response to the challenges of asymmetric warfare and international terrorism.” Despite the manifestation of a tangible threat, albeit executed by ephemeral and transient actors, there was not a return to the threat-based planning that had prevailed during the Cold War. The New Chapter sought to “understand better what [British] Armed Forces can achieve in countering threats abroad, and what sort of operations they might be engaged in.” In an environment where “we often do not even know who the enemy is, much less what sort of operations they might be engaged in,” the requirement for flexible forces was again articulated as the answer. This time, however, flexibility appeared to be less a euphemism for cuts and more a sensible response to an indistinct threat.

It could be argued that while the world’s interest in Britain had declined, Britain’s interest in the world had increased. If Britain were to continue to protect its international interests, the alliances that it had established would have to endure. The Labour government planned to place Britain at the “centre of international decision-making instead of at its margins” and saw “the security and stability of Europe and the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to Britain’s security and defence policy.” Of key importance was the transatlantic relationship.

**Modern Forces, Modern World?**

The United Kingdom has displayed enduring defence policy preferences and, despite being billed as a radical, far-reaching review, SDR and its descendants have not diverged far from these preferences: alliance, internationalism, and maintaining a nuclear capability. The security environment has changed, but these preferences continue.

In 2003, the UK Ministry of Defence’s Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) argued that the “greatest risk to UK security would derive from the strategic environment changing faster than the UK could acquire and/or apply resources to meet that threat.” The SDR and its New Chapter both predate this declaration and sought to provide for the nation’s defence needs out to 2015 based on the flexibility to respond to emerging and new threats. What does the JDCC assessment say about how the SDR had achieved its aim? Indeed, as SDR did not fundamentally diverge from enduring UK policy preferences, what were the prospects for the United Kingdom in dealing with new challenges as and where they arise?

**Alliance.** The United Kingdom has aligned itself predominantly with the United States both bilaterally and through NATO. Indeed, during the Cold War, and specifically at the time of the Three Pillars review, the transatlantic alliance was critical in ensuring the UK’s defence. Now the United Kingdom is faced with fourth-generation threats where nonmilitary tools are as important in countering the threat as military capability; the hard approach to security adopted by America may not be appropriate, and the softer European way of containment and negotiation may not be enough. But Britain is well placed to fulfill its often-touted role as a transatlantic bridge. Labour had been elected on a pro–European Union manifesto and was able to embrace and steer European Security and Defence Policy, mitigating its potential opposition to the enduring UK preference for a special relationship with the United States and U.S./European relations vis-à-vis NATO. By retaining the ability to operate alongside the United States and also to provide operational leadership and frame-mental question to be asked regarding the interventionist approach to defence: does military intervention overseas really “contribute to the defence of the UK [and] have the interventions of recent years—in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Iraq, and so forth—made Britain more secure?”

Britain’s economy and its interests are international and were forged at the time of empire. The colonial states were colonized principally because of their resources, which remain important today. Hence, Britain has an economic interest in ensuring stability throughout its former colonies, be they African or in the Middle East. But Britain was not alone as a colonist, nor is it, along with
the United States, isolated in its reliance on the global market. The other great European powers are reliant on imports and markets in former colonial regions, but none seem as willing as the United Kingdom to intervene there to stabilize economies and communities. Intervention by Britain has been necessary, but it has created threats as well as mitigated and managed them. Indeed, not only has Britain become a target—from both transnational and organic terrorism—following its interventions alongside America, but it has also taken on greater burdens relative to the other European nations, which benefit from stable markets while avoiding associated security and financial burdens. This is especially clear in the case of Iraq.

**Nuclear Capability.** Britain’s nuclear capability puts it in an exclusive international club—one, as can be seen in the ongoing situations in North Korea and Iran, in which membership is vigorously restricted. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons provided a real operational and strategic capability, the use of which was well within the realm of reality. In the contemporary, securitized world, the use of nuclear weapons seems more remote. Indeed, the case for British nuclear deterrent looked flimsier after 9/11 as the utility of nuclear weapons (both as weapons systems and as political tools) diminished. Nuclear weapons are seen as the ultimate insurance that would make aggressors think twice and as key to the UK’s global status. But al Qaeda was not deterred from attacking the United States, nor was the Taliban deterred from supporting it. Moreover, neither Britain, France, Russia, nor the United States has been able to coerce India, Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea to give up their nuclear programs.

SDR did not remove “Labour’s bogeyman” for both pragmatic and political reasons. The money for Trident had already been allocated, and the costs of removing it early would have been at least as high as retaining it; and in terms of global status, “there was no chance that . . . Mr. Blair or any successor would take a fundamental, but that is not to say that decline had no influence. SDR was billed as a fundamental rethink, but it struck firmly to these policy preferences (of alliance, internationalism, and maintaining a nuclear capability) and in many ways was disingenuous in its claims; it was critical of previous reviews, which it considered solely financially driven, while at the same time was itself curtailed by budgetary considerations. It claimed that British involvement in operations overseas was as a Kantian ‘force for good’ but did not advertise as loudly the positive Hobbesian impact on British interests that such operations would yield. Moreover, military operations conducted for good are operations of choice rather than necessity and, therefore, at odds with Just War theory. SDR also promised a fundamentally foreign policy-led review, but the structure of the military and the tasks it has to perform differ little from before and the foreign policy baseline used was very conservative.

That said, UK defence—the actual focus of SDR—is secure and “as an island nation in the north west Atlantic, the UK is one of the safest places on earth from external threats” to its sovereignty.11 Moreover, both SDR and its descendants acknowledge that in the contemporary era, the UK’s armed forces must form part of a joined-up approach if Britain is to maintain and enhance its physical, political, and economic security. As defence and security have become more closely identified with each other, however, it is important to remember that they are not the same.

**Balancing Defence**

The view that Britain’s security choices have been steered solely by its decline is incorrect, but that is not to say that decline had no influence. SDR was billed as a fundamental rethink, but it struck firmly to these policy preferences (of alliance, internationalism, and maintaining a nuclear capability) and in many ways was disingenuous in its claims; it was critical of previous reviews, which it considered solely financially driven, while at the same time was itself curtailed by budgetary considerations. It claimed that British involvement in operations overseas was as a Kantian “force for good” but did not advertise as loudly the positive Hobbesian impact on British interests that such operations would yield. Moreover, military operations conducted for good are operations of choice rather than necessity and, therefore, at odds with Just War theory. SDR also promised a fundamentally foreign policy-led review, but the structure of the military and the tasks it has to perform differ little from before and the foreign policy baseline used was very conservative.

That said, UK defence—the actual focus of SDR—is secure and “as an island nation in the north west Atlantic, the UK is one of the safest places on earth from external threats” to its sovereignty.11 Moreover, both SDR and its descendants acknowledge that in the contemporary era, the UK’s armed forces must form part of a joined-up approach if Britain is to maintain and enhance its physical, political, and economic security. As defence and security have become more closely identified with each other, however, it is important to remember that they are not the same.
On November 28, 2005, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon R. England signed Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” Although it was released with little fanfare, the directive’s elevation of stability operations to the same priority as combat operations is having a sweeping effect on the Department of Defense—and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). This transformation does not deemphasize major combat operations; airpower will remain a critical asymmetric hedge against potential adversaries on land, at sea, and in the air. However, the USAF must balance the low-frequency, high-intensity demands of major combat against the fact that Airmen are invariably called upon whenever our nation commits military force. In today’s strategic environment, the United States is far more likely to commit its forces to stability operations than to major combat operations.

The good news is that Airmen have gained valuable stability operations experience in recent years. However, the Air Force has a long way to go before stability operations are fully integrated throughout the institution. This article examines the implications of DODD 3000.05 on the present and future USAF. First, we define stability operations and provide a strategic context for their conduct. We then use Air Force Title 10 responsibilities as a framework to evaluate how well the Service is aligning its organization, training, and equipment with the demands of stability operations. Overall, we find much progress being made toward a stability operations transformation. At the same time, we identify many areas where further improvements can be made.

Stability Operations Since the Cold War

Stability operations encompass “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”

They range from humanitarian assistance and disaster response on the nonviolent end of the operational spectrum to counterinsurgency at the opposite end. Significantly, stability operations tend to be population-centric, while combat operations are enemy-focused. Success against even the most violent insurgency—witness Iraq today—ultimately depends more on a political settlement between warring factions and the support of the host population than on the defeat of enemy forces in traditional battle.

The USAF record since 1991 consists of continuous stability operations occasionally interrupted by major combat. In fact, since the Cold War ended, the United States has entered one new stability operation every 2 years. Intrastate conflicts today far outnumber great power and interstate conflicts, and the likelihood of instability, insurgency, and civil war exceeds that of conventional, set-piece warfare. Moreover, contemporary conflict mainly affects civilians, who comprise 90 percent of the victims.

The violent insurgencies arising after successful major combat operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have only highlighted the demand for improved stability operations capacity across the entire U.S. Government, and our experience is shaping new thinking about the relationship between stability operations and combat operations. Previously, stability operations were conceived as a distinct Phase IV of a military campaign that followed the decisive conclusion of major combat operations. In practice, however, the postconflict phase in Afghanistan and Iraq remained violent as insurgencies developed and intensified after the fall of Kabul and the march to Baghdad.


The U.S. Air Force and Stability Operations Transformation

By OLIVER FRITZ and GREGORY A. HERMSMEYER
A better model—newly released in Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and illustrated in figure 1—now offers a six-phase campaign model showing how stability operations activities occur in all phases. Stability operations provide the primary focus in Phase IV and Phase V as military forces attempt to “stabilize” the situation and “enable civil authority.” However, stability operations activities form a key consideration from a campaign’s beginning in Phase I to securing territory and populations seized during major combat operations in Phase III—the “dominate” phase. Stability operations also encompass the full range of “shaping” activities—from Phase 0 security assistance, humanitarian relief, and disaster response functions during times of peace to all shaping activities during each phase of a conflict scenario. DODD 3000.05 presaged this dramatic shift in joint doctrine by characterizing stability operations as those “activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict [emphasis added] to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”

The new six-phase model reflects real-world operational experience and represents a genuine transformation in Department of Defense (DOD) thinking. New thinking combined with additional capacity and capability for stability operations would improve military effectiveness across all six phases of a campaign. U.S. forces can use more robust security assistance to train and equip partner militaries and bolster partner capacity. Likewise, military combat capabilities can help shape the international environment by enabling and supporting disaster response and humanitarian assistance efforts. Effective stability operations also underpin irregular warfare. As potential great power rivals recognize that the American military cannot be defeated on the traditional battlefield, these states—or non-state actors—have witnessed how asymmetric strategies can neutralize many of America’s conventional military advantages. Even future major combat scenarios will likely require postconflict stability operations of some kind—from no-fly zones to peacekeeping to reconstruction activities. These contemporary realities provide the strategic context for DODD 3000.05.

**Organize, Train, Equip**

DODD 3000.05 tasks the Services with several measures to institutionalize stability operations. Some are discrete tasks, such as appointing a senior officer to lead stability operations initiatives—the USAF checked this block by appointing the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space, and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements (A3/5), to serve in this capacity. Other measures are much broader and more subjective. For instance, the directive tasks the Services to:

- develop stability operations capabilities
- ensure curricula…prepare personnel for stability operations
- ensure that research, development, and acquisition programs address stability operations capabilities.

These responsibilities imply numerous tasks, many of which are identified in the following section.

**Organize.** The USAF is tasked with properly organizing for stability operations and capturing experience and lessons learned in doctrine. After the Cold War, DOD used two (nearly simultaneous) major theater wars as its organizing construct. However, a different set of demands placed greater stress on the force and prompted a new organizational framework. In response to the stability operations—driven tempo of the 1990s, the USAF developed and implemented the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) in 1999. As a result, the Air Force has made an impressive transition from a garrison to an expeditionary force. Some high-demand capabilities such as tankers, surveillance, and security forces do not fit well within the AEF construct—especially with the increased demand for airpower after 9/11—but this innovation has enhanced overall USAF flexibility and instilled an expeditionary mindset essential to stability operations.

Expeditionary civil engineering, security forces, medical, and combat convoy units are heavily engaged outside the wire of air bases in Iraq and elsewhere to defend joint logistics nodes, build roads, conduct security patrols, and offer medical services in the joint effort to stabilize and reconstruct war-torn countries. Many new roles—especially combat convoy duty—are considered in lieu of taskings, which are defined as taskings intended to fill temporary capacity gaps in certain specialties “in lieu” of overstretched Army and Marine Corps personnel. Some of these nontraditional missions may last only as long as the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq while others could become part of the permanent USAF mission set, depending on a future assessment of joint roles and missions.

Besides the sweeping AEF transformation, the Air Force has also developed Contingency Response Groups (CRG) to rapidly set up expeditionary bases and serve as USAF “first responders” in crises ranging from humanitarian relief to major combat operations. Beginning with the Germany-based 86 CRG, activated in February 1999, the USAF has added three CRGs in New Jersey, three in California, and one in Guam. In December 2006, the Kentucky-based 123 CRG became the first such unit in the Air National Guard. Integrating over 100 personnel from security forces, communications, intelligence, aerial port, and other specialties into one organization, CRGs enable the application of airpower to stability as well as combat operations. For instance, the 86 CRG deployed to Albania in 1999 and began controlling humanitarian flights within 4 hours for hundreds of thousands of Kosovo refugees. CRGs also opened Indonesian airfields for tsunami relief in 2004 and enabled earthquake relief in Pakistan in 2005. These massive relief efforts significantly improved the U.S. image among Indonesians and Pakistanis. Given the population-centered focus on stability operations, the USAF has integrated these measures into overall strategy.
The Air Force is increasing its Battlefield Airmen—USAF personnel who work alongside land forces on the ground—by 1,000 personnel. These new personnel will include additional tactical air control party cadre to enhance Air Force close air support (CAS) capabilities, which are in great demand over Iraq and Afghanistan. To improve its readiness for Phase 0 activities, the USAF has established a Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, which will enhance its security cooperation programs and “ensure our future coalition partners understand how to leverage our full range of capabilities.” It also should facilitate Air Force integration with other Service and interagency training, education, and research programs through the planned Center for Complex Operations, which will be formed during fiscal year 2008.

Finally, the Air Force also is expanding its security assistance programs. Until now, the 105-person 6th Special Operations Squadron (6th SOS) was largely responsible for shouldering the entire combat aviation advisory burden. Recently, the USAF announced that the 6th SOS would be expanded into a group-level organization amid recommendations for an even larger wing-level unit. The aviation advisory mission is an indispensable role played by the USAF special operations community. However, Airmen must avoid the temptation to view stability operations as a task primarily for special operators. The demands placed by peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and counterinsurgency on the USAF far exceed the capacity of the Air Force Special Operations Command alone. Vigilance, reach, and power are all crucial to stability operations, and these are found in sufficient quantity only in the Big Air Force.

While these organizational innovations will all improve USAF capacity for stability operations, additional steps are still needed. One priority should be to institutionalize stability operations at the headquarters level. The Department of the Army offers one model in its establishment of an entire Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Division in Headquarters G3/5/7. Formed in September 2006, the new Army headquarters division will have between 12 and 20 personnel responsible for integrating stability operations through every echelon and mission of the Army. The Air Force would benefit from a branch-sized element on the A3/5 staff dedicated to institutionalizing stability operations throughout the Service.

The USAF should also consider emulating the Navy, which is forming a Maritime Civil Affairs Group. This 400-person body will provide civil-military operations capabilities in coastal and riverine environments, and it will augment but not duplicate existing civil affairs capabilities in the Army and Marine Corps. A small USAF civil affairs cadre could be established within CRGs to offer improved civil-military coordination between expeditionary bases and local populations. Some civil affairs capacity already exists in the Air Force International Health Specialist (IHS) Program. Consisting of medical personnel with training and experience in civil-military operations, regional languages and cultures, and the interagency process, this program could serve as a model for other disciplines.

Perhaps the most significant gap in how the USAF organizes for stability operations is in the lack of relevant Service doctrine. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–3, Military Operations Other Than War—a term superseded by stability operations—has been rescinded with the inclusion of a short section on “smaller-scale contingencies” in the June 27, 2006, version of AFDD 2, Operations and Organization. AFDD 2–3, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), is the sole remaining doctrine document focused on a stability operations mission. FID, which entails training partner militaries to conduct counterinsurgency, is an important element of stability operations but represents just one mission set among many. A new capstone AFDD 2–3, Stability Operations, is urgently needed to translate the latest operational experience into the airpower lexicon. New subpublications on counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and stabilization and reconstruction activities could help capture the lessons learned in operations since 1991, when the USAF helped protect Iraq’s Kurdish population in Operation Provide Comfort.

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The Air Force also has much more to offer in the development of joint doctrine and procedures. To update classic counterinsurgency theory and capture lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps have recently published a new counterinsurgency manual stretching over 200 pages. Unfortunately, the contributions of air, space, and cyberspace power are relegated to a four-page annex. Assisted by a single integrating headquarters staff element, the USAF needs to ensure that the Airman’s perspective is better presented and advocated in joint and inter-Service doctrine development. For example, Joint Publication 3–09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (September 3, 2003), has not kept up with the new ways airpower has been employed to support ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, including airborne alert CAS, convoy support, and unmanned aerial system (UAS) surveillance. The USAF should seize the opportunity to capture, distill, and articulate airpower’s unique contributions to stability operations in joint doctrine.

Train. The Air Force is changing the way it trains and educates Airmen. From basic military training and professional military education (PME) to large-scale exercises, the
USAF is adapting to the demands of stability operations. New recruits now enter a longer basic military training course that includes the self-defense and small arms training needed to operate on a battlefield with fewer secure rear areas. A new Basic Combat Convoy Course (BC) at Camp Bullis, Texas, prepares Airmen for in lieu of convoy duties in Iraq. For other selected career fields, the USAF is expanding common Battlefield Airmen training to better hone skill sets for both combat and stability operations, including counterinsurgency and CAS in an urban environment.21

The Air Force is also expanding the language and cultural training Airmen need to succeed in a fluid, complex environment. In February 2006, General Michael Moseley, Air Force Chief of Staff, announced that Airmen would receive expanded language training. While the language requirement is still being developed, the initial program, already in place at the Air Command and Staff College, will stress cultural awareness and introductory language skills.24 A broader PME program will eventually include basic language proficiency for new officers, a supplementary track for already serving officers, and similar courses at the Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy.22 Officers with requisite language and cultural skills will now be tracked as international affairs specialists and deliberately assigned to diffuse this expertise across a broad spectrum of billets and to enhance USAF effectiveness in population-focused operations.

Service. Airpower capabilities are inherently flexible, and many systems and platforms, along with materiel designed for major combat operations, are also highly adaptable to new stability operations roles. Accordingly, many changes under way plus several of our recommendations are based on high-payoff adaptations of current equipment rather than on completely new programs.

Air Force bomber and fighter forces are at the vanguard in adapting current capabilities to new missions. After most preplanned targets were destroyed in the opening days of the Afghan air campaign, Air Force bombers played a dramatically new role by providing precise firepower on-call for small, integrated teams of Special Operations Forces—including USAF Terminal Attack Controllers. Likewise, Air Force fighters are being employed in ways much different than Airmen expected by early 2004, nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sorties—using the surveillance capability of fighter targeting pods to report suspicious activities—became a standard mission over Iraq and resourcefully increased sensor coverage all across Iraq. Lieutenant General Walter Buchanan, USAF, then Combined Forces Air Campaign Commander in U.S. Central Command, subsequently pressed for A–10s operating over Afghanistan to be equipped with targeting pods—not to provide precision weapons capability but to “[coordinate] with the ground force” while “looking for activity [and] ambushes.” Such an ingenious adaptation of existing capabilities boosted this vital USAF contribution to counterinsurgency operations in both countries.

Air Force intelligence and surveillance capabilities are also adapting to the demands of stability operations. For instance, the small addition of the Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) streams video of targeting pod and UAS imagery directly to forces operating on the ground and allows pilots to “look exactly where we need them to look,” in the words of one USAF terminal attack controller. Combined with a receiver and “wi-fi” transmitter on a Humvee, imagery can even be retransmitted to personal data assistants in the hands of Army and Marine platoon and squad leaders. Airmen at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center in Qatar now integrate data from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, targeting pods, and UASs, and then “play the tapes” backward to identify the locations and transit routes used by insurgents to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These creative innovations dramatically expand the reach and utility of information derived from airpower.

Beyond the counterinsurgency-driven innovations in Iraq and Afghanistan, USAF capabilities have been adapted to other kinds of stability operations. During the 1990s, the precision navigation capabilities of the global positioning system (GPS) were used to defuse border disputes in the Balkans, and U–2s originally designed for identifying military targets helped document Serbian atrocities and mass graves at Srebrenica. Designed for Open Skies arms control flights over Europe, the Keen Sage surveillance package on C–130s provided post-hurricane assessments of environmental damage to NGOs in Central America and surveyed flood damage in Mozambique to focus NGO relief efforts and identify high-priority reconstruction opportunities. Finally, the C–17 Globemaster III airdropped over 2.4 million humanitarian daily rations plus 73,000 blankets and 700 tons of clothes in an effort to win support from the Afghan population during the fall 2001 campaign to overthrow the Taliban.

The Air Force is also committing substantial new resources to programs that will boost its capacity to conduct stability operations. Predator UASs are—in the words of the USAF Chief of Staff—“the most powerful and flexible force multiplier” in the Air Force, and their numbers are increasing. Coupled with the ROVER system, Predator represents a quantum leap in the ability to bring awareness to Battlefield Airmen, Soldiers, and Marines. These systems could also be used to track refugee movements in a humanitarian crisis and locate isolated pockets of people affected by a natural disaster.

The Small Diameter Bomb is another investment that will improve the utility of Air Force capabilities in urbanized environments lacking discrete, isolated military targets. Major General Allen Peck, USAF, observed that if “you are trying to preserve the support of the people . . . you can’t do that if you are destroying their houses and neighborhoods.” Following the development of successively smaller GPS-guided munitions, the Small Diameter Bomb entered service in 2006 and uses a smaller warhead and GPS guidance to limit the blast effects of the Small Diameter Bomb even further. With a casing that dissolves into innocuous fibers and denser explosive material that travels shorter distances, the result is a powerful but confined blast. This investment demonstrates an awareness of the central role played by populations in all stability operations.

In another new investment, the USAF is looking toward the Joint Cargo Aircraft for niche intratheater airlift capability. Prompted

**Figure 2. U.S. Air Force Investments, Fiscal Years 1962–2009**

by its limited capability to carry small loads into austere airfields and the Army’s requirement to replace the C–23 Sherpa, the Air Force voiced commitments to buy 75 to 100 Joint Cargo Aircraft as part of an overall strategy to maintain an intratheater airlift fleet of 400 C–130 equivalents. Rough airfields, small loads, IED threats to ground transport, and geographic dispersal all pushed the Air Force toward an investment required to transit the last tactical mile needed to reinforce U.S. or coalition forces, shore up friendly governments, and deliver disaster relief closer to those in need.

These specific changes in equipment illustrate a broader shift in USAF capabilities to a smaller yet more effective strike capability accompanied by enhanced sensor and mobility capabilities. The publicly available data on historical and projected Air Force investments noted in figure 2 demonstrate how the Service is dedicating increasing resources to capabilities critical to stability operations. Advances in stealth technology and precision weapons, accelerated by the Small Diameter Bomb, permit a reduced fleet of fighters and bombers and allow investment dollars to be shifted toward the airlift, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that enable stability operations as well as combat operations.

Additional investments to enhance stability operations capabilities can also be made in the short term. First, the USAF should consider further purchases of Predator and Global Hawk UASs. Taken as a whole, unmanned systems cost much less and offer far greater loiter capacity than their manned counterparts, making them ideal for many of the ISR tasks that characterize stability operations. Lieutenant General Buchanan noted “tremendous pushback from fighter pilots who resisted the notion of becoming ‘manned Predators’” while conducting nontraditional ISR missions. Over the long run, perhaps there should be pushback. Nontraditional ISR conducted by manned fighters is a costly stopgap, and the Air Force should consider procuring additional UASs to accomplish these missions with lower opportunity costs.

The Air Force should also continue the trend toward smaller munitions and increased capability per aircraft. The F–15E can already carry 12 Small Diameter Bombs, but expanded use of bombers with Small Diameter Bombs or even smaller munitions could increase the return on investment in strike capabilities while preserving fighter airframe life. While this adaptation would increase strains on the aging bomber fleet, the advantages of having a single B–1 or B–52 provide a CAS capability equivalent to several fighters are compelling and need further examination.

New investments should be considered as well. For example, a dedicated counterinsurgency aircraft reflects a potential option for building the capacity of friendly governments to defeat internal threats. The USAF should consider expanding the 6th Special Operations Squadron combat aviation advisory mission by training and equipping partner militaries with dedicated counterinsurgency utility platforms capable of light airlift, close air support, and surveillance. Expanding security assistance activities with a specific, low-cost, and easy-to-maintain aircraft could bolster weakened states and serve as an important USAF contribution to stability operations and building partner capacity.

Over the long run, the Air Force needs to determine the overall force mix required for an operational environment characterized by constant stability operations punctuated occasionally by major combat. Demand operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are wearing out the highly capable but expensive C–17 as well as F–15Es, F–16s, and other aircraft faster than expected. This will result in earlier airframe retirements and additional risk for the Nation in preparing for future major combat operations. Today’s strategic planning imperative is to build and sustain a force fully prepared for major combat but continuously ready for the far more likely demands of stability operations.

The time to start making tough decisions is now. While adaptations in training and organization may take months or years, the procurement of platforms and systems takes years and even decades. The historical record suggests that the USAF has been, is, and will remain heavily engaged in stability operations while playing a decisive role in larger conventional campaigns. The question is how to optimize the force to meet both requirements within growing resource constraints. This overview suggests that elements of a solution—more UASs, a high-low fighter mix, and the Joint Cargo Aircraft—may be in sight and that many airpower capabilities are dual use. Nevertheless, the dilemma of striking the right balance between combat and stability operations capacity and capabilities will challenge strategic planners for many years to come.

**Transformation**

Despite the significant progress described above, much work remains for the Air Force and the Nation to organize, train, and equip for stability operations. This article has suggested a number of additional steps the Service should take to improve capabilities and capacity for these missions. But much more could and should be done that a brief article cannot address. Substantial improvements to USAF capabilities can be made now, however, without committing significant new resources. Above all else, the stability operations transformation requires new ways of thinking about organizing and employing the assets and skill sets that the USAF already brings to the table.

Air Force intelligence and surveillance capabilities are adapting to the demands of stability operations

Improving USAF stability operations capabilities does not require substantial investment in new platforms or capabilities, but finding the right balance between stability and combat operations will be difficult. Because this challenge confronts DOD, not just the USAF, our final recommendation is for a thorough reexamination of the roles and missions assigned to the military Services and other U.S. Government agencies for stability operations. The traditional roles and missions markers focus primarily on the broad outlines of warfare on land, at sea, and in the air, while stability operations often place strains on many of the noncombat capabilities of the Services. One only need consider the “outside the wire” engineering, medical, services, security forces, and transportation tasks taken on by Airmen to augment Soldiers and Marines to understand the confusion over who should do what.

A new assessment of roles and missions should address task distribution across the Services, executive agency for associated schoolhouses and training pipelines, and operational assignments of each task. While the USAF can and should develop capabilities for stability operations, it must work in concert with the other Services. Service responsibilities must also be assessed in the context of the roles and missions of other U.S. Government departments and agencies. A government-wide roles and missions review would identify how each element of national power should work together during stability operations. A new review would
ultimately eliminate the burden that in lieu of taskings place on the USAF by identifying some ingenious adaptations that should become permanent and programmed and others that should revert to another Service.

Regardless of recommendations on specific roles and missions, the Air Force will do well to remember that stability operations are not just another in lieu of tasking. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 reminds us that stability operations—like combat operations—belong to all Services and must be an institutional priority for each. No matter what the future holds for the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan, stability operations will define tomorrow’s international security challenges and place frequent and heavy demands on the Air Force. Airmen need to be ready for both combat and stability operations in order to win the war and secure the peace. JFQ

NOTES


4 DOD, JP 3-0, figure IV–6, IV–26.


6 DODD 3000.5, 10–11.


31 Ibid.


39 Jaffe.


41 Tirpak, 41.


43 DOD, “Memorandum for the Record: Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (Washington, DC: DOD, March 26, 1948).
Over the last 5 years, Operation Anaconda has gained legendary status as a debacle. While the operation did experience problems, these problems did not occur for the reasons commonly given. The objective of the mission was to kill or capture Taliban and al Qaeda fighters based in the Shahi-Kot Valley. It succeeded at this task: the coalition killed nearly 800 al Qaeda at a cost of 8 American dead. However, this success occurred only after initial mistakes on the first day forced coalition ground forces to retreat from the valley and may have allowed al Qaeda leaders to escape to Pakistan.

These and other problems stemmed from a flawed air-ground planning process that systematically excluded air component planners and leaders. In the months leading up to the operation, the combined joint task force (CJTF) made numerous decisions not to include experienced air component planners or their ideas for employing airpower. Similarly, while the CJTF communicated with ground commanders about the mission on nearly a daily basis for almost 2 months, joint leaders did not discuss the mission with the air component commander until 2 days before the scheduled D-Day. As a result, airpower was not properly integrated into the plan, contributing directly to a near reversal of fortunes during the first day of combat.

The shortcomings in Anaconda’s planning are not widely understood even by those who fought the battle. Six months after the operation, in an interview published in Field Artillery, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, USA, the operation’s joint force commander (JFC), argued that many of the problems stemmed from the air component’s mistakes. Hagenbeck agreed to retract these charges when they were revealed to be inaccurate. Unfortunately, perhaps because of the inter-Service rancor aroused by the article, the Services let the issue drop rather than reexamining the underlying causes that gave rise to the problems. As a result, the military has largely accepted Hagenbeck’s retracted but unanswered explanation.

Because Anaconda’s planning problems have not been publicly acknowledged, they have yet to be corrected. Today, air component planners report that JFCs consistently fail to integrate lessons learned into planning processes until the last minute and that this often results in the vast network of Air Force, Navy, and Marine air, space, and cyber assets being underutilized or even unused in combat. Joint commanders’ reluctance to include the air component in planning is based in deeply rooted Service culture, education, and training. The Services cannot correct this problem until they address its history and acknowledge that operations work best when all components are brought in at the start of the planning process and are fully represented in planning cells.

This article explores why planning for Anaconda fell short. The Services’ 6-year refusal to discuss the operation has led to a festering inter-Service wound. It is our hope that this critical analysis of Anaconda will begin an open debate that will be a first step toward fixing an air-ground planning process that remains broken.

The Battle
On March 2, 2002, after 2 months of planning, coalition troops streamed into Afghanistan’s Shahi-Kot Valley expecting a 3-day battle against a small and surprised Taliban and al Qaeda force. Instead, they found an enemy force 5 to 10 times larger than anticipated that was manning concealed positions with heavy weapons sighted on likely approaches and helicopter landing zones.

Unlike the operations of the previous 5 months in Afghanistan—and against the air...
liason officer’s (ALOs) recommendation for heavy bombing—the plan called for only light preparation of the battlefield through airstrikes. Commanders called off most of these strikes a few minutes into the bombing when a U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) team in the area that had not coordinated its presence with the CJTF radioed for a bombing halt for fear of being hit. Meanwhile, an AC–130 gunship supporting the coalition’s main force of several hundred Afghan troops led by other SOF accidentally killed 1 American and 2 friendly Afghan soldiers, while injuring 17 others. Ignorant of the plan until the last minute, and taking fire from enemy mortars, Afghan commanders lost confidence and retreated.

U.S. helicopters then inserted approximately 200 members of Task Force Rakkasan into positions from which they could block enemy escape routes through the narrow mountain passes leading from the valley. The force immediately came under heavy fire and withdrew, leaving most of the passes as avenues of escape or reinforcement for the enemy. American commanders cancelled the second wave of 200 troops who were to reinforce the mountain passes. Intelligence suggested that hundreds of enemy combatants poured into the valley, and it is unclear if high-value al Qaeda leadership fled from the valley to nearby Pakistan at that time.

With friendly forces under heavy, accurate fire, the JFC, General Hagenbeck, attempted to use his Apache attack helicopters to suppress enemy fire. Flying low over the mountain terrain in daylight, the vulnerable helicopters took intense fire, rendering them unable to provide sustained support. With the plan falling apart, the task force changed its basic concept of operations to rely heavily on fixed-wing aircraft.

Over the next few days, significant numbers of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft flowed into the battle. However, contrary to joint doctrine, joint force planners in Afghanistan had failed to integrate air experts into the planning effort. As a result, for the critical first 2 days of combat, controllers were unable to make full use of the airpower that orbited above the valley. Because planners had not requested a change to the standing rules of engagement (ROE) for airpower before the battle, aircraft could only engage targets on the ground in restricted circumstances. Attacking time-sensitive targets, such as al Qaeda personnel entering or leaving the valley, required lengthy real-time coordination with command staffs in the United States.

As the operation continued, the air component rapidly jury-rigged an air control network. Over the course of the battle, the Air Force, Navy, and Marines dropped more ordnance on the Shahi-Kot Valley than had been used during the previous 5 months in Afghanistan. On March 11, after more than a week of tough fighting, enemy resistance ended. The American toll stood at 8 killed and 48 wounded, while the enemy toll was 517 confirmed dead and another 250 probably killed. According to the operation’s commander, precision weapons delivered from the air were responsible for most of the enemy casualties. Airpower’s contribution was significant, but the failure to include it in the planning process had been costly.

Planning Anaconda

The problems with airpower integration at Anaconda began long before the battle. In early January 2002, 2 months after the fall of the Taliban regime, reports filtered into U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) that a pocket of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters was assembling in the Khowst-Gardez region of Afghanistan. Early estimates placed the number of enemy combatants between 1,500 and 2,000. On January 5, General Tommy Franks, USA, the USCENTCOM commander, tasked the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, to plan for defeating enemy forces in that region. Mikolashek subsequently ordered the 5th Special Forces Group commander, Colonel John Mullholland, USA, who was also the Joint Special Operations Task Force North (JSOTF–N) commander, to begin initial planning.

Mullholland’s SOF team had been planning and conducting joint operations in Afghanistan for the previous few months and, working with the air component and indigenous Afghan forces, had defeated tens of thousands of enemy combatants. A month later, Mullholland was asked to turn planning for the operation over to the 10th Mountain Division commander, General Hagenbeck, on the assumption that the division would be better than the JSOTF–N at integrating the large joint force. Over the next few weeks, the 10th Mountain Division, which would form the core of CJTF Mountain, refined the Anaconda.
plan. For reasons that remain controversial, CJTF Mountain downgraded the SOF and air component's estimate of the expected number of enemy combatants from 1,500–2,000 to 150–200 and removed the planned integrated air operations. The CJTF subsequently ignored or rejected appeals by the division's isolated ALO to utilize airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and to attack known enemy positions with airstrikes before the ground assault.

One of the more debatable aspects of the planning process for Anaconda involves the CJTF decision not to include the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) in planning. For obscure reasons, as the CJTF planned the operation, Generals Mikolashek and Hagenbeck, the CFLCC and JFC respectively, chose not to tell the CFACC, Lieutenant General Michael Moseley, about the operation during the months of planning and waited until 2 days before the scheduled D-Day to ask for his input, even though the land component commander discussed other matters with him almost daily and this was to be the largest planned operation in Afghanistan at the time. By the time the CFACC was pulled in, it was too late to change the plan. With only 2 days until the operation commenced, it was nearly inevitable that Moseley's desire for more time for the air component to prepare would not be met.

Although the CJTF planners did not ask the air component to participate in planning, the air component staff made efforts to engage. The joint air coordination element attached to Task Force Dagger had been executing air operations throughout Operation Enduring Freedom and had frequent contact with the 10th Mountain Division. Throughout January and February, they repeatedly requested that 10th Mountain Division accept the six- to eight-man tactical air control party (TACP) that the new joint task force would need to integrate planning with the air component. These attempts included personal appeals to the 10th Mountain Division's chief of staff, as well as hand-delivered written requests for forces on several occasions. These appeals were declined.

The CJTF commander has provided a number of reasons for declining the TACP, a dispute that began the previous October. Originally, USCENTCOM charged the 10th Mountain Division only with providing base security. As a result, although it was going against joint procedures, the division argued it would not need airpower. Later, however, when the division's mission changed and when it was planning for Anaconda in January 2002, General Hagenbeck continued to reject air planners. The division's chief of staff argued that Department of Defense–instituted force caps for Afghanistan would have required the already undermanned task force to send some of its own men home. Yet since the tiny TACP would have provided access to the integrated airpower of Air Force, Navy, and Marine assets in the region, a strong case can be made that it would have proven to be far more valuable to the division than the equivalent number of ground troops.

Given the U.S. military's long history of inadequate jointness, CJTF Mountain's reluctance to include air planners is not surprising. The CJTF's actions in this case highlight an institutional problem. Military education and training do little to emphasize the integration of airpower into joint operations beyond the tactical level. Army doctrine in particular tends to relegate airpower to a supporting role. Campaign planning courses seldom include more than cursory lessons on airpower's role on the battlefield. Equally important, airpower plays little role in joint training exercises at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. This gives land commanders and planners the false impression that airpower will be available whether it is included in planning or not and fails to give them an accurate understanding of the useful effects that air, space, and cyber assets can bring to a battle when integrated into planning from the start.

Whatever its causes, the failure to integrate the air component into the planning process for Anaconda led to cascading errors. Postbattle interviews suggest that not only did the operation's planners not understand how to use air assets, but they also had only a vague understanding about what airpower capabilities were available.

The resulting errors in Anaconda fall into five major categories, each of which could have been avoided had the CJTF included the air component from the beginning of the planning effort.

Error 1: Poor Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The CJTF did not make good use of air- and space-borne ISR assets. By 2002, air- and space-borne sensors had the capability to penetrate darkness, weather, and even sand storms, and could determine an object's location within feet.

Given time, air- and space-borne sensors, by collecting against an unaware adversary, could have provided a better assessment of enemy strength in the Shahi-Kot region and the location of caves and concealed heavy weapons emplacements; moreover, in conjunction with human and cyber intelligence collection assets, sensors could have provided a better assessment of the adversary's likely course of action if attacked. Lacking this full array of sensors, CJTF Mountain's intelligence cell relied mainly on human intelligence—mostly the testimony of local Afghans.

If the air component had been fully integrated in the planning process, airborne ISR assets would likely have revealed not only that the larger initial reports were correct, but also that enemy forces had dispersed into concealed fighting positions around the valley in anticipation of an attack.

The problem with air and space intelligence preparation of the battlefield, however, was not purely mechanical. Even in the short time that the air component had to concentrate on the Anaconda area prior to battle, air and space collection assets managed to identify 22 enemy fighting positions and 40 cave entrances in the valley.

Yet for what may have been bureaucratic reasons, ground planners declined the division ALO's recommendation to strike these targets, and in a postbattle interview, the JFC pointed out that he was unaware of this intelligence.

Error 2: Underestimating Airpower Deployment Time. Just as an army moves at the head of a logistical train, airpower too deploys with troops, supplies, and equipment needed to sustain operations. Failure to integrate air planners into the effort contributed to the mistaken belief that, even without preparation, the right mix of airpower would come together at the right place and time over the battlefield.

Although the distances involved only mildly hampered long-range Air Force bombers, beginning the battle with land-based fighter aircraft deployed near the battlefield would have considerably improved both close air support response time and forward air controller capability. As it was, the air component moved its A–10 strike aircraft forward during
the battle, but doing so was extremely difficult for diplomatic reasons, and they missed the crucial first 2 days of combat. This was particularly problematic because, without an Air Support Operations Center at Bagram, these aircraft were needed to play a critical role in coordinating airpower during the battle.

Air Force refueling tankers would have benefited from more time as well. Tankers were critical to Anaconda because of the distances that attack aircraft flew to reach the battlefield and because aerial refueling allowed aircraft to orbit for hours over the battlefield providing on-call support to troops below. Without tankers, Navy fighters based on carriers 500 miles away could not have reached the battlefield. The refueling of Anaconda support aircraft also had to be scheduled with other combat, intelligence, and transport refueling priorities throughout the Middle East. Basing and overflight rights for the bombers, fighters, tankers, and transports supporting operations in landlocked Afghanistan required additional setup time.

Some of the heaviest fighting during Anaconda occurred while the Navy was replacing one of its carriers in the area and there was only one rather than the usual two carriers available for operations. This swap could have been rescheduled. Moreover, the carrier that was in the region was having a “picnic day” on deck when Anaconda started. If the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) had been included in the planning, these problems would not have occurred. Although lack of aircraft did not turn out to be a problem at Anaconda, this was by chance alone, and distances did substantially reduce fighters’ ability to provide forward air control capabilities during the first 2 days of combat. Better coordination could have easily averted these missteps. While airpower is flexible and can deploy rapidly, like any other form of combat power, it is more effective if afforded sufficient time for planning.

Error 3: Lack of Tactical Coordination for Close Air Support. The third major error was the failure to build a robust means of coordinating between the land and air component during the battle. Over the years, the United States has developed intricate processes and organizations manned by highly trained Airmen to make close air support work. When properly set up, the process for requesting air support responds rapidly to the needs of ground troops.

During Anaconda, CJTF Mountain had only a limited ability to coordinate with the air component. With a division headquarters rather than a corps headquarters forming its core, CJTF Mountain did not have the same robust capability for managing and prioritizing airpower that would reside in a corps-level Air Support Operations Center. Under these circumstances, the division should have made substantial efforts to increase its air integration capability but did not. Left out of the planning effort, theater air leadership scrambled in the final days before Anaconda to cobble together a tactical air coordination system. Initially, CJTF Mountain did not realize that it lacked even the radio and satellite equipment needed to coordinate close air support. A number of quick-thinking Airmen rapidly established an ad hoc air coordination center, which became minimally functional only hours before Anaconda began and built a killbox plan by day four of the engagement. As a result, although close air support was extremely responsive and the average delay time was only 5 minutes across the entire operation, air planners have described the lack of fratricide as a miracle, and early in the battle there were far more aircraft in the sky than control networks on the ground could adequately use.

Error 4: Lack of Operational- and Strategic-level Coordination. A fourth error initially, CJTF Mountain did not realize that it lacked even the radio and satellite equipment needed to coordinate close air support that could have been alleviated by involving the air component in planning was a lack of operational- and strategic-level coordination. The heart of theater-level airpower planning and execution is the CAOC, which allows the CFACC to exercise command and control over air- and space-based systems, provides a unified picture of the battlefield, and serves as a link between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This link is essential given the inherently global nature of air- and space power. Satellites, long-range bombers, and heavy transports are seldom under the direct control of battlefield commanders since they may be required in different theaters on different days. ROE set in the United States must be coordinated with bomb-droppers, often in real time, by the CAOC. Knowing what information to collect and which assets are available to collect it, and then routing that information from sensors to users requires technology and organizations that are built into the CAOC.

Tapping into CAOC resources and expertise would have called for senior-level coordination between the land and air components. By failing to make the CFACC aware of the operation until almost the last minute and only minimally coordinating even then, the CJTF blinded itself to some of the most important factors influencing the battle. The CJTF did not fully understand, for instance, when carrier aircraft would be available, how to utilize airborne ISR, what kind of diplomatic issues surrounded air basing, or how the limitations of theater-wide ROE prevented aircraft from descending below specific altitudes and required pilots to seek direct permission from
USCENTCOM headquarters in Tampa before striking targets other than those associated with defensive close air support or in open engagement zones. Finally, had airpower been properly coordinated, CJTF Mountain would have been better able to leverage air- and space-borne ISR assets commanded by the CAOC.

Error 5: Failure to Consider Airpower. If air leaders and planners had been included from the start of the Anaconda planning process, the entire concept of operations might have been different. According to the plan, Afghan forces were to move into the valley from the north and south, acting as hammers to drive enemy fighters into the mountain passes to the east. In this plan, Afghan fighters were to be used as conventional troops, which was a different role from previous battles where Afghans mainly mopped up after heavy bombing. SOF and air planners had been conducting operations in Afghanistan using indigenous forces for almost half a year. They understood that using untrained tribal fighters as a hammer against prepared enemy positions without extensive preparatory airstrikes was an overly optimistic course of action. Based on their experience at Tora Bora and elsewhere, SOF and air planners also understood that al Qaeda troops generally fought to the death.

The plan for helicopters to insert U.S. light infantry into the passes to prevent the enemy from escaping, becoming the anvil to the Afghan force’s hammer. The CJTF brought in only eight Apache attack helicopters for air support under the assumption that the need for fixed-wing support would be minimal and that these assets would be available if needed. The Apache is a marvel of modern technology; however, it was ill suited for this mission. The altitude of the terrain upon which Anaconda took place—as high as 10,000 feet—degraded the Apache’s performance. Its hovering-while-firing tactic made it a sitting duck for small arms fire. Like most helicopters, the Apache is highly vulnerable when operating close to the ground in mountainous terrain over concentrations of enemy infantry. The damage these aircraft sustained from ground fire confirmed this susceptibility. In addition, the plan underestimated the amount of airpower the operation would call for. In the end, winning the battle required hundreds of times more air-dropped ordnance than the helicopters could have provided.

The plan called for only 30 minutes of airstrikes against 13 predetermined targets to soften up enemy positions. General Hagenbeck declined the more extensive pre-attack bombardment recommended by the air component, arguing in an interview after the battle that there were ”few, if any, fixed targets” to hit; he had not wanted to bomb the enemy’s caves because they might otherwise yield intelligence; he had not wanted to waste the limited stock of precision bombs; and he feared that a long period of preparatory bombing would scare away the enemy. If air leaders had been involved in the planning from the beginning, however, they could have offered alternative viewpoints. For instance, the air component had discovered dozens of potential targets and had, apparently unbeknownst to the JFC, recommended these to division planners. Moreover, gathering intelligence was not a stated objective of the mission, which aimed at killing or capturing al Qaeda leadership and followers, and a senior advocate could have pointed out that preparatory airstrikes were essential when using Afghan troops. Air planners could also have clarified that precision bombs are relatively inexpensive and that they were not in short supply. Finally, air planners could have advised that if surprise was important, a compressed and intense period of strikes—less than the allocated 30 minutes—could have generated the desired effects.

Another issue that air planners might have been able to address is that the plan treated airpower solely as fires, which is how Army doctrine portrays fixed-wing capabilities. Airpower could have been better integrated into the plan if planners had realized that Air Force, Navy, and Marine fixed-wing
airpower, like Army rotary-wing aircraft, can be employed as a maneuver force. In doing so, they might have used airpower to block enemy escape routes and mask friendly movements.

After the first few days of fighting, Anaconda reverted to the air-ground arrangement that had existed between SOF and airpower during previous months in Afghanistan: infantry locating enemy positions and air-strikes destroying them. Airpower became a maneuver force blocking enemy movement. Joint planners, however, could and should have created this synergy from the outset.

Analysis and Recommendations

With the above background in mind, there are three important lessons the Services can take away from Anaconda.

Future joint planning cells will require equal air component representation. Anaconda’s planning problems stemmed from lack of sufficient air component representation in the CJTF. Although the division’s ALO provided much of the information the task force needed for planning, his voice was routinely marginalized, and significant intelligence that he provided does not appear to have made it up to the JFC. Planning is a bureaucratic and political as well as technical process. A single Air Force lieutenant colonel does not have enough access in a division planning cell to make a case for airpower to senior Army planners and commanders, particularly when culture, education, and training militate against the solutions he offers. At its core, planning is about choosing from a menu of means to achieve specified ends. Until the air component is represented at approximately the same level as the land component on joint task force planning staffs, the options it offers will go unheeded.

Senior leaders must push for air component participation in planning. The CJTF had many opportunities to include the air component. The CFLCC spoke regularly with the CFACC in the months leading up to the battle but chose not to inform him of the impending operation. The CJTF chief of staff or the JFC could have accepted one of the air component’s proffered coordination elements, such as a TACP, either at the time of deployment or after the division was given the Anaconda mission. Generals Franks, Mikolashek, and Hagenbeck each had the doctrinal authority to inform the air component commander about the mission and ask him to contribute. Among the CJTF’s lower-ranking joint planners and leaders—given problems with Service culture, education, and training—it would have required intentional and strong leadership to change the ground-centric mission-planning mindset. Joint commanders must reach across to other component commanders, and down to their own staffs, to begin to take advantage of the capabilities airpower can bring to a fight.

Joint education and training must be updated to include airpower’s new capabilities. The method that the CJTF used to integrate airpower into the operation and the concept of operations it selected revealed a lack of understanding about modern airpower. This is understandable. Airpower’s capabilities and roles on the battlefield have evolved significantly over the last two decades. New air- and space-based sensors and networks have the capability to provide a picture of the battlefield that would have been science fiction 20 years ago. Precision bombs have as much in common with their World War II predecessors as M16 rifles have with longbows. Yet these capabilities are only useful if joint commanders know they exist, understand their potential, and are willing to cross Service lines to tap them. Joint culture, education, and training have not kept up with changes in airpower capabilities. Until they do, it is unlikely that ground planners will see the value in recruiting or listening to their air component peers.

Over the last half decade, few Airmen or Soldiers have been willing to discuss Anaconda in open inter-Service forums. Neglect, however, has neither caused the issue to go away nor cured the underlying problem. Over the years, air planners and air commanders returning from Afghanistan and Iraq have consistently protested that the planning system continues to exclude air planners. When air planners are included, they are invited in small numbers, are of significantly lower rank than their land component counterparts, and are often only called in well into the planning process.

Ground component planners often see the effects of this neglect without realizing its cause. As a result, land component planners and leaders returning from the field often argue that Soldiers should not rely too heavily on airpower, that airpower is often late to the fight, that it is mainly a kinetic instrument, and that it is poorly integrated into the ground scheme of maneuver. However, what they often do understand is that, when these things occur, they are frequently a direct consequence of lack of air component representation in planning. These problems will only go away when joint commanders make integrating the air component into the planning processes a top priority.

America’s joint forces are phenomenal. Using them to their full potential, however, will require integrating all of the components into the planning process. A first step toward this is exploring and debating operations such as Anaconda to determine what we could be doing better. JFQ

NOTES

1 For a point-by-point technical analysis and refutation of General Hagenbeck’s arguments, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 204–221.

2 Task Force Rakkasan consisted of the 1–187 Infantry and 2–187 Infantry from the 101st Airborne Division and the 1–87 Infantry of the 10th Mountain Division, as well as helicopters and the 3rd Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry.

3 Five of the seven helicopters were forced to return to base due to battle damage. Twenty-seven of the 28 rotor blades for the Apache force had bullet holes. Five of the helicopters were flying again within 24 hours. Two were damaged to the extent that they had to be airlifted out of the theater to the United States for repair. Lambeth, 181.


5 Lambeth, 199.

6 Lambeth, 165. The Khowst-Gardez region includes Shahi-Kot Valley.

7 Lambeth, 174.

8 Correspondence with Colonel George Bochain, USAF, 10th Mountain Air Liaison Officer, March 21, 2007.

9 The Battlefield Coordination Detachment in the Combined Air Operations Center received an “advisory 28-page operations order” on February 20. General Moseley, touring the region at this time, did not receive a full briefing on the plan until February 23, just 5 days prior to D-Day. See Lambeth, 170–172.

10 For an analysis of communication to the CFACC regarding Anaconda, see Lambeth, 170–174.

11 Correspondence with Bochain.


13 Lambeth, 185.

14 Lambeth, 192.


16 Many of these caves ended up being bombed anyway, as American troops called in airstrikes after taking fire from caves. See Robert H. McElroy, “Fire Support for Operation Anaconda,” Field Artillery (September/October 2002), 5–9.
Five years later, the battle of Shahi-Kot Valley in Afghanistan, known as Operation Anaconda, still evokes heated emotions among U.S. air and ground warfighters. Nevertheless, reopening this discussion can help us examine the progress made and opportunities ahead to improve air and ground integration. This article reviews advances from Operation Enduring Freedom and offers suggestions for further improvements. The view presented is based on personal experience integrating air operations with ground maneuver in Afghanistan during 2005–2006.

**Shortfalls**

Operation Anaconda, the first large-scale Army combat operation in Operation Enduring Freedom that included Special Operations and multinational partners, revealed a number of joint planning and execution issues. At the theater or operational level, problems surfaced in three key areas: organization, planning, and execution.

At the organizational level, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain assumed...
the lead for *Anaconda* less than 2 weeks before the scheduled D-Day. The CJTF did not have an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), which serves as the air component’s lead for “planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing” air operations to support ground combat forces. A three-person ASOC cell arrived the day the operation order was published, but it was too late to offer the air component’s expertise to the plan. Thus, organizationally, the joint team lacked a critical command and control node that should have integrated air with ground maneuver.

During execution, fixed-wing aircraft arrived overhead but could not integrate fully with ground forces. Aviators often did not know the position, ordnance, tasking, or capabilities of other on-scene flights. Since the ASOC cell deployed without its communications equipment, it lacked the command and control tools to prioritize, synchronize, and integrate the air operations with ground maneuver and objectives. Tactical leadership and initiative in the air and on the ground exploited as best they could the capabilities of the aviators supporting engaged ground forces. American warfighters knew the joint team has greater promise and potential.

**Air and Ground Integration Today**

Recent operations in *Enduring Freedom* demonstrate that expectations for better air and ground integration are realistic. At the same time, they indicate areas for further progress. While there was not an operation of *Anaconda*’s scope during 2005 and 2006, similar battalion-sized operations benefited from better initiatives.

**Organization.** The presence of a robust ASOC with long-range communications equipment has had a positive impact. While under the operational control of the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), the ASOC was embedded on the CJTF staff and provided vital air expertise to influence operations planning. It also guided the air liaison officers assigned to the brigades and enlisted joint terminal air controllers (JTACs) deployed with the battalions.

In addition to the ASOC, an Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) resided with the CJTF headquarters. The ACCE director represented the CFACC to the CJTF commander. The ACCE director had a small staff of airlift, intelligence, plans, and close air support officers. The ASOC and ACCE staff coordinated the ground component’s requirements and offered recommendations. Figure 1 depicts the organizations available at different levels.

**Planning.** To assist the ground commanders, the ACCE staff augmented the ASOC personnel for planning larger scale operations. In the fall of 2005 and into 2006, ACCE personnel visited brigade and task force staffs in the field to assist in detailed planning sessions. This increased the air component’s awareness of ground units’ future operations while making additional air expertise available. With three brigades and a dozen battalions in the field, however, there were insufficient Airmen to support all ongoing planning. The enlisted JTACs at battalion level were experts at requesting air assets and providing terminal control; however, they lacked the knowledge base to exploit all the air and space assets capabilities fully.

That expertise resided with the CFACC and his Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). The CAOC staff had four divisions: combat plans, operations, intelligence, and mobility. The land forces component’s battlefield coordination detachment also provided a conduit of information. Collectively, they planned and executed air and space operations to meet the CJTF/component commander objectives for the entire U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

During a campaign’s major combat operations (Phase III), the CAOC developed a master air attack plan and air tasking order that assigned target sets to flights in order to support CJTF/component commander objectives. During recent *Enduring Freedom* counterinsurgency and stability operations (Phase IV), however, the CAOC concentrated on filling air requests from the ground units with close air support and occasional airlift missions. It continued to set priorities and assess the effectiveness of an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection strategy to meet theater and tactical requirements. Overall, the CAOC planning role reflected the Airmen’s “centralized planning and decentralized execution” approach.

In contrast, the land forces mission analysis and course of action development reflected a “mission command” approach, where subordinate leaders exercise disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. The battlespace was dynamic and changing, which required a flexible approach as orders were developed. As a result, major efforts often started at the company or battalion level. One company may have faced a hostile operating area while another had a supportive local population. On at least one occasion, village leaders wanted coalition forces to remove belligerent anti-Afghan elements, but lacked the will or capability. Thus, an operation started...
with emphasis on lethal force, but transitioned to engagement and reconstruction tasks in its later phases as coalition forces sought to assist local populations. In counterinsurgency and stability operations, company commanders understood their unique battlespace and tailored plans accordingly.

In the above example and others, the company commander forwarded the plan to battalion and then brigade level. At each level, the higher commander revised it—adding forces, maneuver, or priorities—and then forwarded it to the CJTF commander. The ACCE director saw the plan at the same time as the CJTF commander. Given the fluid situation, the plan was often executed within 12 to 48 hours after the CJTF/component commander approved it.

Understanding the air and land component planning process is important for two reasons. First, it highlights that the two components have opposite planning processes. In essence, the air component’s process is top-down, while the land component’s is bottom-up. Second, despite the differences, air and ground planning has improved over the past 5 years. The above description documents the Airman’s commitment to supporting the Soldier and Marine.

**Execution.** As a result of better planning, air operations improved. The air component contributed a significant quantity and quality of aircraft to major operations. Figure 2 highlights many of the assets that supported battalion-sized efforts. For a multiphase combat and humanitarian operation, B–52s might strike preplanned targets (such as cave complexes) just prior to H-Hour while A–10s escort the heli-borne insertion of ground forces. ISR assets, such as U–2s, RC–135s, or Predators, would have been on scene to build commanders’ situational awareness prior to and during the initial execution. If Special Operations Forces units participated, a P–3 might have been present, adding its ISR sensors and control and control links. Electronic attack aircraft provided their capabilities to the ground commander’s mission. At some point during a week-long operation, a C–130 air-dropped additional supplies and humanitarian aid. The number of air assets simultaneously over the objective area varied; however, almost all were present at the start of the operation.

In addition, the air component deployed a Control and Reporting Center, which provided a common air picture and vital communications links among the ASOC, CAOC, and airborne aircraft. Aircraft, such as A–10s, were also equipped with improved long-range radios that enabled in-flight retasking. The air component had better means to execute the ground components’ priorities. Thus, positive steps have been implemented between air and ground components in the 5 years since Operation Anaconda.

Looking Forward

As positive as these steps are, more can be done. The joint team brings tremendous potential and skill to the fight. Harnessing that talent requires actions within the components and between them. Progress is possible in five key areas.

**Integrating the Air Component.** As late as summer 2005, aircraft arriving to support ground units did not know who else was participating, when those aircraft were on station, what their operating altitude was, or other details that would allow the flight leads to optimize their contributions. As figure 2 indicates, a significant number of aircraft supported the warfighter on the ground—fighters, bombers, airlift, ISR, and special mission aircraft. Listing aircraft on the air tasking order is a good start, but it does not ensure a well-orchestrated effort.

The key to improved air integration resides within the air component and its planning staff. In its top-down planning (centralized planning and decentralized execution), the CAOC has extensive expertise integrating air and space forces. The CAOC has used this planning expertise for large-scale air operations, such as interdiction package missions. In interdiction operations, the CAOC publishes the air tasking order with a “package identification number” so all participants and aircrew can sort and identify with whom they are flying. The CAOC also designates a mission commander, who coordinates with other units to develop the detailed planning, integration, and execution.

Admittedly, there are differences between interdiction missions and close air support/counterinsurgency missions. For interdiction, the strike package ranges over a wide area—sometimes hundreds of miles. The duration of the package is finite, often 60 to 90
minutes from ingress through egress. In contrast, air support for counterinsurgency operations will last for days, and the area is sharply restricted, often to 10 miles in diameter. Differences in time and space, however, do not mitigate the necessity for detailed planning.

As it does for other missions, the CAOC should use the “mission commander” and “package identifiers” to allow air units to do the detailed planning. It will require an innovative approach to traditional mission commanders as they will not be airborne continuously—but that does not remove the need for one person to be in charge. The mission commander could be the air liaison officer or the aircraft that is on station the most. While those details should be adjusted to each mission, the fundamental requirement for a clear authority will remain as urgent as it is for an interdiction mission.

Adjusting the Plan. A second shortfall within the air component occurred during mission execution when plans changed. The ASOC and improved long-distance radios on aircraft such as the A–10 allowed the CAOC to adjust fighters to a new priority, such as responding to an ambush on coalition forces. Once engaged by an improvised explosive device or mortar, ground forces moved to find, fix, and engage those hostile elements. When available, close air support aircraft did assist under JTAC guidance. In this scenario, however, ISR aircraft could play a decisive role. In addition, electronic attack aircraft could have provided a measure of protection for the ground force. Redirecting lethal firepower, however, is only refocusing a part of air component capability.

The air component has demonstrated its competency at finding fleeting targets. Time-sensitive targeting—based on find, fix, target, track, engage, and assess principles—has become a cornerstone of the CAOC’s current operation division as it hunts mobile targets, such as Scuds, armor, air defense radars, and artillery. Bringing these tools to assist ground forces under attack should be a priority; however, this requires integrating those assets in real time with other aircraft and with the ground unit’s maneuver and firepower. Adjusting processes to support counterinsurgency operations will ensure that the full weight of the air component is brought to bear. One of the CAOC’s challenges will be to develop a means to translate accurate, timely, and highly classified information on the battlespace where secure communications do not exist. Developing procedures will allow vital information to save lives and advance the ground commander’s objectives.

Electronic attack aircraft could have provided a measure of protection for the ground force.

Common Planning Picture. As improved information flow throughout the air component will aid air operations, the same will result from increased information-sharing among the components. The counterinsurgency and stability operations battlespace has many joint players. Successful operations require information. For example, close air support aircraft with targeting pods can track the Predator’s laser spot to find a target only if each pilot knows the other’s location and coordinate laser codes. A C–130 aircrew needs the location and time for an airdrop from the company they are supporting. But if an AC–130 will relay drop clearance to a C–130 and provide visual and firepower mutual support, it should have access to the same information at the same time. An RC–135 can support an Army company moving in convoy only if the crew knows the time, location, and direction of travel.

All these activities require detailed integration with the ground forces fire and maneuver, so the air action is synchronized. This description may sound familiar; it captures the essence of the definition of close air support in Joint Publication 3–09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support. That definition, however, characterizes close air support for its support to ground forces. In the counterinsurgency battlespace, all fixed-wing effects must be carefully integrated.

Synchronizing lethal and nonlethal effects requires an expanded planning process to include land, maritime, air, and Special Operations components. A Web-based or similar information technology tool should be developed to facilitate these actions. A common planning picture or tool would
allow the distributed joint forces to share information and integrate operations. Given the dynamic environment in Afghanistan and the distance between units, a time-intensive, face-to-face planning method is impractical. A technology-based approach would allow subordinate units (battalions, squadrons, and ships) to see and share information on a future operation. The supported commander would own the process but allow the supporting elements to contribute. Higher echelons could view the information to anticipate requirements but would wait for the lower echelons to revise, approve, and then forward the plan. A set battle rhythm would instill discipline in the planning process. The endstate is the development of tools and applications that permit a common planning picture across component seams. A common planning tool could also become the basis to adjust operations during execution.

Figure 3 indicates a number of key issues that require resolution to better integrate air with ground force maneuver. While the list is not all-inclusive, it does highlight the types of information needed by other joint forces to integrate air assets better.

Combined Planning and Execution. As one recognizes the need to expand information within the joint team, he realizes that select information exchange should include coalition partners and host nation forces. Nonmilitary agencies also contribute to the CJTF endstate. For example, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan included U.S. interagency personnel—the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, State, and Transportation—plus the Afghan central government. Allied and host nations will have equivalent organizations present to some degree. In addition, joint warfighters will find international agencies such as the United Nations, Doctors Without Borders, and Save the Children operating within their battle space. As a result, the joint team should have awareness of their activities, if not an ability to plan and integrate with their efforts.

The suggestion to include nongovernmental organizations may raise concerns. Providing a means to share information is not the same as sharing all information. Nonetheless, the nongovernmental organizations are dedicated to the same endstate and are present. To ignore them risks both mission failure and fratricide with noncombatants.

Practice. Finally, the joint force must practice these collaborative planning approaches in order to refine what information is needed and when. Practice will also train officers and commanders to understand the other components planning processes and information. Components have not only unique planning techniques and procedures but also distinct cultures in operation development. Joint exercises such as Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment, Multinational Experiment, and Joint Red Flag provide the opportunities for joint warfighters to gain experience. These events can be the conduit to establish requirements for industry to develop command and control planning tools.

Operation Anaconda and the battle of Shahi-Kot Valley continue to cast a shadow over air and land operations. Five years after the battle, however, organizational changes have allowed the air and land components to conduct better planning and execution. The deployed Air Support Operations Center, Air Component Coordination Element, and Control and Reporting Center allow the air component to interact better at all levels and provide means to adjust to changing situations. The future will be brighter when mechanisms are developed and incorporated that allow for a seamless common planning picture across all the components and their associated units. These processes must reconcile the realities that the air component planning is top-down while the land forces planning will be bottom-up. It is not useful to identify one as better. Instead, the joint warfighter must seek to exploit the attributes of both.

Notes


3 Department of the Army, Field Manual 5–0, Army Planning and Orders Production, January 2005, 1–5; available at <www.nd.edu/~army/fm5_0.pdf>.


Figure 3. Joint Planning and Execution Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the commander’s critical information requirements?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What assets are best to collect against these?</td>
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<tr>
<td>If a U-2, JSTARS, or P–3 is used, when and where will it be on station?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will those assets pass real time information to airborne aircraft or ground units?</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Operations Force Support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will the P–3 be present for a command control role?</td>
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<tr>
<td>When and where will the P–3 be on station?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would the P–3 or AC–130 get information to other airborne aircraft or ground units?</td>
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<tr>
<td>When and where will the AC–130 orbit be?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Airlift</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If C–130s are providing aerial resupply, where is the drop zone?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is their final axis?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Who will provide clearance? If another aircraft is needed for clearance, who will pass it on what frequency?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Helicopter Support</th>
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<tr>
<td>When and where will the heli-borne assault be?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will they need visual and firepower support?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Who will have the final firepower execution authority?</td>
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<th>Electronic Attack</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are electronic attack aircraft needed?</td>
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<tr>
<td>If so, where and when will they be on station?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How does the ground commander make adjustments to the electronic attack plan?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Medical Evacuation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If medical evacuation is needed, where will it come from?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will medical evacuation need escort? If so, on what frequency?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Since late 2006, the Institute for National Strategic Studies has assisted the Project on National Security Reform. Hosted by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the project is a nonpartisan initiative dedicated to improving the ability of the U.S. Government to integrate all elements of national power in pursuit of national security. Toward this end, the project is conducting a study of the interagency process to support a reform agenda that would parallel the historic Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which helped to transform the American military and its world-class capability for joint warfare.

This study presents initial findings from the Project’s Structure Working Group, specifically from the country-level issue team led by Robert Oakley. Ambassador Oakley’s team investigated how the United States organizes itself for integrated efforts at the Embassy or Country Team level.\(^1\)

**Expansion of Engagement**

U.S. Embassies face unprecedented challenges. The kinds of issues that confound governments today—from organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism to nuclear proliferation, human rights, ethnic sectarian conflict, global disease, and climate change—no longer fit within diplomacy’s traditional categories. Just as nonstate actors everywhere are becoming more powerful, regions of geopolitical importance in the developing world find themselves beset by weak or dysfunctional governments and increasingly perilous socioeconomic situations. While some might reasonably question the categorical quality of the 2002 National Security Strategy’s assertion that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones,” there is still plenty of reason to be concerned about the trends.\(^2\)

What does this mean for Embassies? First and foremost, Embassy staffs—our U.S. Country Teams—must continue to engage with allied, partner, and competitor countries, even as the terms of these engagements grow more complex. Indeed, the number of programs operated out of Embassies is expanding. A Country Team in Paris, for example, must partner with local authorities on counterterrorism, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union, as well as country-specific operations such as Afghanistan and Kosovo. The team must also further commercial interests and cooperation within regional and international financial institutions. In Moscow, the Country Team must promote democratic reform efforts while enhancing opportunities for U.S. businesses in a dynamic emerging market, as well as improve nuclear security initiatives and monitor avian flu. It must do this while working on global and regional energy problems as well as traditional diplomacy. In Abuja, Nigeria, the Country Team must monitor and help to deal with instabilities in the Niger Delta, engage in HIV/AIDS relief and economic development programs, and assist in the first civilian transfer of political power. In Bogotá, Colombia, the Country Team faces major counternarcotic and counterinsurgency problems as well as regional political problems.

All of these tasks must be coordinated and deconflicted, and the Country Team must work with unified purpose. In practice, this often does not happen. This is especially true in the area of stabilization and reconstruction missions, where the wars in Afghanistan and, more acutely, Iraq, revalidate the sacrosanct principle of unity of effort. However, this principle can be applied more broadly. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice notes, “More and more, solutions to the challenges we face lie not in the narrow expertise of one agency acting in one country, but in partnerships among multiple agencies working creatively together to solve common problems across entire regions.”\(^3\)

Despite some positive steps toward this objective, senior policymakers in and out of office in both the executive and legislative branches lament the continued inability of the United States to integrate all elements of national power. Their frustrations apply not only to the national level, but also to the Country Team, the critical intersection where plans, policies, programs, and personalities all come together. The Country Team builds the American image abroad and implements strategy. Without an effective Country Team, there can be no prospect of success in achieving national security objectives. The question is whether Country Teams are structured properly and resourced sufficiently to be effective. A brief examination of the Country Team’s evolution helps dispel some common misconceptions about the answer to this question.

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By ROBERT B. OAKLEY and MICHAEL CASEY, JR.

The Country Team
Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement

U.S. Ambassador meets with patrons during tour of Baghdad market

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. Michael Casey, Jr., was a Research Assistant in INSS.
Evolution of the Country Team

The struggle to gain control over unwieldy interagency activities at the country level is not of recent vintage. As the United States emerged from World War II, it engaged in massive nation-building and foreign assistance efforts to reconstruct European states and to counter Soviet influence. To undertake this commitment, U.S. Government agencies, such as the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Treasury, as well as the Economic Cooperation Administration, dispatched personnel overseas to accomplish U.S. objectives. With the proliferation of agencies and personnel overseas, the execution of U.S. foreign policy—heretofore led by the Department of State—became more complex.

Among the first instances in which one can find the problem of interagency coordination in the field is President Harry Truman’s declaration of economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1947. Interestingly, the State Department—to which President Truman delegated authority of the programs—administered the program differently for each country. In Turkey, the U.S. Ambassador also served as the chief of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey. In Greece, however, “Dwight P. Griswold was appointed . . . to be Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, and his mission was outside and independent of the embassy at Athens and of Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh.”

Inevitably, the Greeks observed that Griswold controlled the resources, so they bypassed the Ambassador and dealt directly with him. The Ambassador’s authority diminished, and a conflict within the Embassy emerged. Rather than reconfirming the Ambassador’s authority in the matter, the State Department recalled both Mr. Griswold and Ambassador MacVeagh, and then deployed a new Ambassador who also served as chief of the aid mission. This course of action revealed two longstanding Department of State tendencies: the assumption that effective diplomats can avoid such contretemps, and the default position that the Ambassador is ultimately responsible for all Embassy activities.

By 1951, with Defense Department and economic aid programs expanding overseas, President Truman saw the need to specify mechanisms for coordination at the country and regional levels. General Lucius Clay, who served as Military Governor in postwar Germany and helped create the Marshall Plan, undertook negotiations among government agencies to identify the best means to achieve coordination overseas. Along with establishing the concept of the Country Team, the resulting Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of State and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration—commonly referred to as the “Clay Paper”—concluded:

To insure the full coordination of the U.S. effort, U.S. representatives at the country level shall constitute a team under the leadership of the Ambassador. . . . The Ambassador’s responsibility for coordination, general direction, and leadership shall be given renewed emphasis, and all United States elements shall be reindocrinated with respect to the Ambassador’s role as senior representative for the United States in the country [emphasis added].

The Country Team concept, mentioned first in the Clay Paper, is a construct not codified in law. It is an executive measure to grant the Ambassador the means to coordinate all U.S. Government activities to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in the country to which he or she is assigned.

Despite the efforts of Presidents Truman and Dwight Eisenhower through Executive orders and memoranda such as the Clay Paper, interagency coordination at the country level remained elusive. Shortly after arriving in the White House, President John F. Kennedy decided to solve the problem definitively by dispatching a letter to all Ambassadors in which he outlined his expectations for the Country Team, as well as the authorities at the Ambassador’s disposal.

President Kennedy also granted Ambassadors complete authority over the composition of the Country Team, with the proviso that employees of every agency had the right to appeal to Washington if they found themselves in disagreement with the Ambassador. Additionally, President Kennedy addressed the issue of military forces engaged in military operations. In such instances, Kennedy declared that the Ambassador “should work closely with the appropriate area military commander to assure the full exchange of information.” If the Ambassador felt “that activities by the United States military forces may adversely affect our over-all relations with the people or government of [country],” the Ambassador “should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander and, if necessary, request a decision by higher authority.” In contrast, to this day the military is not routinely enjoined to work with Ambassadors or to elevate differences of opinion to higher levels.

Vignettes

Often, those investigating the problem of integrating elements of national power at the country level conclude that the authority of the Ambassador must be reinforced. However, as the brief overview of the Country Team concept illustrates, Presidents repeatedly have realigned the Ambassador’s authority, which suggests a recurring problem with the Ambassador’s ability...
to generate integrated interagency support for U.S. objectives and interests. A closer look at some historical vignettes suggests some reasons for why this is so.

**Vietnam: Strategic Hamlets Program.** Despite President Kennedy’s intervention, agencies at the Country Team level in the Republic of South Vietnam continued to operate along their own lines of effort. The 1962 Strategic Hamlets Program in Vietnam underscored this fact. The program required U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), military advisors, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and other U.S. Government personnel to deploy into the provinces of South Vietnam and work together. However, the Ambassador to Vietnam believed in allowing each agency full authority over its own programs. The result was that each agency in the field pursued its own objectives without regard to the larger mission. It quickly became apparent that the civilian and military approaches to the war in Vietnam during this period were fundamentally at odds.

These two diverging approaches were not reconciled. As the military increased its use of bombs and artillery, civilian casualties mounted, thus undermining the objectives of the Strategic Hamlets Program. The program muddled along until the U.S. Government developed a new, more successful structure. Several lessons are illustrated:

- Even with high stakes, Presidential attention, and ostensibly clear lines of authority, agencies worked at cross purposes.
- It is particularly difficult to reconcile military and other agency objectives.

- The Ambassador’s laissez-faire approach was ineffective, but not atypical, and in fact understandable.

**Vietnam: CORDS.** In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson intervened to correct the persistent inability of the agencies of the U.S. Government to act in concert. He appointed the Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon, Ambassador William Porter, to lead the pacification effort there. Likewise, President Johnson appointed a National Security Council (NSC) staff member to ensure that all agencies in Washington coordinated to provide full support to Ambassador Porter. Nevertheless, the United States failed to achieve unity of effort with the assignment of two individuals; structural changes were still needed. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and military commander General William Westmoreland simply did not work closely together, nor did their staffs. The U.S. Government reorganized on multiple occasions to assert civilian control over the pacification mission, but to no avail. Finally, Robert Komer proposed a new structure—the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program—which was enacted on May 1, 1967.

CORDS successfully unified the efforts of the U.S. Government by placing the program in the Headquarters of Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV). Komer was assigned as the Deputy Commander of MACV for CORDS and given the rank of Ambassador. Ambassador Komer “had status equivalent to a three-star general and ranked third in the MACV hierarchy behind Westmoreland and his military deputy, General Creighton Abrams.”

Yet he was also under the authority and had the full support of U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Ellsworth Bunker. A combined staff of military and civilian personnel supported Ambassador Komer at Headquarters, MACV, and this structure was replicated down to the district level in all 250 districts in South Vietnam.11

Ironically, “subordinating civilian capabilities to the military chain of command actually realized the principle of the primacy of civil power. This unique placement gave civilian entities greater influence than they ever had before because it provided resources they did not previously have.” It also helped to ensure that the political objectives took precedence over those of the military. One of the key means by which civilians were able to control military activities was their newfound responsibility to write performance reports for their military colleagues.

**the Country Team concept is an executive measure to grant the Ambassador the means to coordinate all U.S. Government activities**

Ambassador Komer developed the concept for CORDS, but Ambassador William Colby institutionalized it in MACV and syner-gized its activities with Ambassador Bunker. In doing so, Ambassador Colby prevented major conflicts among civilian and military leaders that might have trickled down and complicated collaboration in the field. CORDS’ successes began to mount, but not before U.S. public opinion turned decidedly against the war. Nevertheless, the case of CORDS demonstrated that:

- Formal integration mechanisms at multiple levels are necessary even with good individual leadership.
- Changing individual behaviors requires more than policy pronouncements from higher authority; it requires control of personal incentives.
- The ingrained desire for unity of purpose in military culture can be used to support interagency collaboration in the right decisionmaking structure.

Unfortunately, the lessons from CORDS were lost after the withdrawal from Vietnam, and not highlighted again until a series of limited interventions in the 1980s and 1990s.

**Somalia: Operation Restore Hope.** Ambassador Robert Oakley, as the Presidential Special Representative for Somalia, and Combined Joint
Task Force Commander Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC, had a close, collaborative relationship, as did their staffs. At the time, their relationship was widely identified as a major contribution to the success of the united task force phase of the Somalia operations. Since the U.S. Liaison Office was too small for a formal Country Team structure, Oakley and Johnston agreed on alternative informal coordination mechanisms. One of Johnston’s senior officers attended all USIA meetings; Oakley’s deputy chief of mission was Johnston’s political advisor and attended all unified task force meetings; and Oakley and Johnston met at least once a day. By dint of shared past experience (for example, Vietnam and Lebanon) and a common commitment to collaboration, the critical civil-military relationships and complex issues requiring coordination were managed successfully. The question of who was senior never arose, as Oakley and Johnston identified and resolved any differences quickly. It also helped that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally told both that mission success depended on their working well together. This same attitude was reflected in formal communications with the Departments of State and Defense.

Later, under more trying circumstances and different leadership, civil-military collaboration deteriorated in a manner that ultimately contributed to a precipitous drop in public and congressional support, withdrawal of U.S. forces, and mission failure. The United States and United Nations tried to pursue a two-track policy of fighting and negotiating with a Somali warlord without sufficient unity of effort in either Washington or Mogadishu. Somalia and the checkered record of interagency collaboration illustrate several points:

- Informal coordination mechanisms can work well if backed by good leaders and their personal commitment.
- Senior military leader guidance in favor of civil-military collaboration is helpful.
- Without a standing system designed to reward interagency collaboration, successful interagency coordination may prove as fleeting as individual leader assignments.

After Afghanistan and Iraq. In September 2003, facing a difficult transition from a counterterrorism focus to a more robust nationbuilding/countersurgency mission in Afghanistan, President George W. Bush appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. Khalilzad said he deployed to Afghanistan to “ensure the concerted use of all instruments of U.S. power to accelerate the defeat of the Taliban insurgency and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.” Khalilzad shared this view with the U.S. military commander, Lieutenant General David Barno, USA, and they were successful in integrating not only U.S. Government agencies but also international partners and nongovernmental organizations. One way that Khalilzad and Barno drove the spirit of unity of effort throughout the Country Team was by locating their offices adjacent to one another in the Embassy.

When Ambassador John Negroponte arrived in Iraq, he and General George Casey also established adjacent offices to ensure a coordinated, unified approach to U.S. policy. This was a stark change from the practice of Ambassador Paul Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, USA, whose offices were in different buildings and who did not routinely coordinate with one another, thereby setting a poor example for the Country Team.

Under the current Embassy structure in Baghdad:

The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Ambassador Ryan Crocker) has full authority for the American presence in Iraq with two exceptions: 1—military and security matters which are under the authority of General Petraeus, the U.S. Commander of the Multinational Force–Iraq, and 2—staff working for international organizations. In areas where diplomacy, military, and/or security activities overlap, the Ambassador and the U.S. commander continue cooperating to provide co-equal authority regarding what’s best for America and its interests in Iraq [emphasis added].

These overviews of ongoing operations, along with the previous vignettes, illustrate several key conclusions about the state of interagency collaboration at the country level:

- Military authorities retain substantial independent freedom of action during military operations.
- Proximity, informal coordination mechanisms, and senior leader attitudes can increase the chances for successful civil-military integration but do not offer a reliable systemic solution to the problem.
- The United States has not had a structured solution for civil-military integration in irregular conflict at the country level since CORDS.

The vignettes also illustrate that coordination is difficult even when the stakes are high enough to merit use of force. Counterintuitively, some might wonder if interagency coordination is better when there are less compelling reasons for it. The answer is no. As the case of aid in Greece and innumerable other anecdotes could illustrate, tensions among Ambassadors and other government agencies’ representatives, USAID directors, and representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and other agencies are commonplace when the Ambassador tries to lead in anything other than a laissez-faire manner. This does not mean, however, that Country Teams cannot succeed in effectively integrating their efforts when they have the right leadership and focused policy support.

South Africa is a case in point. During the transition period from Apartheid (1992–1994), the U.S. Ambassador successfully built a cross-agency working group, which the political counselor chaired. USAID transferred $1 million each year to the U.S. Information Agency to fund more short-term visitor training programs; the Defense Attachés went beyond their normal roles to liaison (with Washington’s permission) with the African National Congress “armed forces” leadership to facilitate integration into a national army; and the Agricultural Attaché provided invaluable feedback on the farming communities’ attitudes toward the political transition. In sum, the entire team focused on the primary U.S. objective: to help see a successful, relatively peaceful transition out of Apartheid. While such examples exist, the fact is that all too often, representatives from different agencies pursue their organizational interests at the expense of a broader, integrated approach for reasons that must be identified if reasonable remedies are to be found.

Enduring Problems

Interagency collaboration is a hit-or-miss proposition despite the ostensible authority of the Ambassador and the longstanding convention of the Country Team. The core problem, summed up well by the Department of State’s...
INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | The Country Team

Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, is that “Other agencies often view the Ambassador as the Department [of State’s] representative, rather than than the President’s. The Ambassador is left with the responsibility, but not the authority, to coordinate the activities and address the often competing needs of the mission.”17 Seeing the Ambassador as a Department of State representative who either ignores or willingly sacrifices other agency objectives in favor of State objectives legitimizes other organization-centric behavior that creates major obstacles to unity of effort. These obstacles may be grouped in three overlapping categories to facilitate examination: authority, structure, and resources.

the Presidential letter to Ambassadors does not spell out the specific responsibilities of other agencies vis-à-vis the Ambassador

Diluted Authority. Ambassadors do not have adequate explicit authorities to unify the efforts of the Country Team, and their task has only grown more difficult in recent years. Not only must Ambassadors coordinate major government activities such as diplomacy, commercial relations, use of force, and intelligence activities, but they also must provide interagency coordination for numerous sub-specialties within a given area. With over 30 government agencies now dispatching employees overseas, non-State Department personnel often outnumber diplomats.18 As noted earlier, the Presidential letter to Ambassadors lays out their overarching authority but does not spell out the specific responsibilities of other agencies vis-à-vis the Ambassador. Personnel from government agencies often deploy to the Country Team without understanding that the Ambassador is the President’s representative. They do not receive adequate guidance from their agencies on relationships with the Ambassador and with other agencies, nor do they receive thorough briefings on the Presidential letter and its intent. This is particularly true of personnel from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Treasury, as well as other government agencies. In particular, Ambassadors lack the proper tools to exert their authority, such as effective control over employee performance reports.

Because the Ambassador is often not seen as the overarching national representative, agencies encourage their personnel on the Country Team to pursue their own objectives and lines of operation, without adequate consultation or coordination. Some of these agency personnel, as the late George Kennan observed, “seem to operate directly or indirectly under the authority of Washington bosses, some in the State Department, some elsewhere.”19 This state of affairs, he added, “invites . . . the foreign ambassador and ambassadorial staff stationed in Washington to take their problems directly to other departments and agencies, bypassing the State Department entirely.”20 Without an adequate voice in the performance assessment of agency leads and vice versa, there are no built-in incentives to putting the priorities of the Country Team above those of individual agencies. When rare exceptions to this general rule have been made—as in the administration of the CORDS program during Vietnam—results were positive.21

The White House, and to some degree the Department of State, does not pay sufficient attention to the Ambassador’s authority vis-à-vis other agencies, thereby compounding the problem. In many cases, support for the Ambassador from State depends largely on the importance of the post, personal influence of the Ambassador, or critical nature of the issue, rather than on the institutional role of the Ambassador as the President’s representative. The mistaken assumption is that the Ambassador and Country Team are not necessary to see up feasible policy options for Washington. Their opinions and insights usually are not valued highly enough when it comes to designing policies and setting priorities. In addition, since Washington does not do a good job of integrating its priorities, Ambassadors lack a framework for balancing valid but competing interests. Currently, for example, counterterrorism often overwhelms other issues, no matter what the country, and “new” but important issues such as health and the environment do not receive adequate attention or recognition in Washington.

Another manifestation of the independence of other agencies in the field and a major reason the Ambassador finds it difficult to provide effective oversight is informal parallel communications. The proliferation of email and cellular phones has created new channels outside of formal communications schemes. As agency representatives bypass the Ambassador and obtain guidance directly from Washington bureaus, Ambassadors are isolated from the operations of other agencies, and the de facto autonomy of other agencies grows. Direct communications with superiors in the home agency without the Ambassador’s knowledge also reinforce an informal incentive system that rewards individual agency-centric behaviors.

The increasing reliance upon contractors rather than direct-hire government personnel can lead to a serious diminution in the effectiveness, timeliness, and accountability of U.S. activities if direct Embassy oversight is not provided (for example, police training in Iraq and Afghanistan). Contractors and subcontractors are not viewed as an extension of the Country Team and, in fact, are not even counted in the mission’s complement of U.S. personnel in country, except for security purposes. As a result, the Ambassador’s ability to oversee the operations of these personnel while in country is largely dependent upon the funding agency’s availability and commitment of direct-hire supervisory staff to the Embassy who can provide accountability to the Country Team. This problem applies to civilian and military contractors.

The Ambassador understandably has no authority over nongovernmental organizations or U.S. businessmen. Yet many Ambassadors ignore the opportunities these organizations and individuals present for improving and spreading U.S. influence in a more cohesive fashion. The private sector in particular is a valuable asset in promoting U.S. values and policies, but it is often ignored by the Country Team for other than commercial or security issues.
Finally, in crisis situations, such as the recent tsunami in Southeast Asia or the Pakistani earthquake, diverse ad hoc organizational structures further undermine the Ambassador’s ability to coordinate activities. There is no commonly accepted and established mechanism for the Ambassador to use when multiple agencies and their personnel surge into the country. Each agency in Washington has its own offices to respond to emergencies, conflict, or failed states, and they often do so without adequate coordination. Civilian policy and civil-military coordination at the regional level is underpowered, so Ambassadors and their country-level programs cannot be coordinated across the region for greater effects. In these respects, inadequate regional and emergency decision-making structures compound the problems already inherent in the Embassy’s organizational structure.

**Antiquated Organizational Structures.** The complexity and number of demands facing the Country Team often outstrip the capacity of the existing Embassy organizational structure to deal with them. The current staff structure often encourages individual agencies to go their own way rather than to strive for unity of effort, particularly in larger posts. Embassy structure tends to be built around political and economic affairs, and these traditional lenses for viewing the world insufficiently encompass U.S. policy objectives. Moreover, direct reporting to the Ambassador makes him or her a bottleneck for information exchange, which needs to occur more routinely among different agencies in the Embassy. Likewise, coordination between and among clusters of agency representatives with common or complementary programs is insufficient.

**Resources.** Resource deficiencies exacerbate the problems emerging from agency-centric structures and behaviors. To begin with, Washington generally does not recognize the Country Team’s ideal position to allocate resources to priority programs. Washington does not provide an agreed interagency statement on overall U.S. objectives and priorities and grants its Ambassadors only limited—if any—control over resources. This leaves the Ambassador and Country Team no real opportunity to evaluate ends, ways, and means in the context of a strategy. Thus, if Country Team plans are done, they are written loosely because the lack of control over resources severely limits control over outcomes. Ambassadors simply allow each organization to pursue broad, generic objectives. Any attempt to investigate interagency resource tradeoffs would inevitably incline agencies to withhold their resources or openly defy the Ambassador’s authority.

In essence, this means that the government cannot allocate funds to rank-order priorities at the country level or administer resources in an integrated manner for maximum effect. On rare occasions when resources are provided, the lack of budget authority means they cannot be redistributed when circumstances and priorities dictate. Even in emergencies, Congress places restrictions that severely hamper a unified approach to the use of operational funds by different agencies. There is no single individual or office in Washington with the requisite knowledge and authority to assist the Ambassador in managing surge resources across multiple programs, both civilian and military. State and USAID consolidated their foreign assistance programs for each country, but the programs are developed in Washington rather than initiated in the Country Teams. Even resources contained in the State Department budget are subject to so many constraints due to the cumbersome and decentralized approval process in Washington that they offer the Ambassador little flexibility.

**in crisis situations, there is no established mechanism for the Ambassador when multiple agencies surge into the country**

An additional challenge to the Country Team is that in Washington, policy is conducted in one place, while resources are located in others. This necessarily has an impact on the unity of effort of the Country Team. This problem inhibits “the synchronization of [administration and budget] with the priorities and initiatives of U.S. foreign policy. The bifurcation of policymaking and budget management within the [State Department] has rendered it administratively and financially less responsive to the changing realities of international affairs.” This applies equally to other agencies, and therefore compounds the difficulty of assembling the resources to implement policy objectives.

While inadequate fungible resources are a major problem, poorly managed human resources are an even greater problem, beginning with the Ambassador. The Ambassador’s job is becoming much more complicated, yet Ambassadors frequently lack the skills necessary to harness all elements of national power. This is due to problems in selection as well as the absence of a career professional training program for Department of State or other civilian government agency personnel assigned abroad. Ambassadors are not necessarily trained in critical management or leadership skills, nor are they trained in planning.

The selection process for Ambassadors does not insist that individuals selected—career or noncareer—have proven track records of successful involvement in foreign affairs, or management experience, nor does it require prior experience of service abroad with a proven track record of effectively representing U.S. interests. The process also often ignores language and cultural skills. Appointees do not receive adequate training to compensate for these lacunae. The same care is often lacking in the selection and training of agency heads.

Obtaining trained personnel to support the Country Team is also a problem. In the special case of postconflict stabilization, the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is making an effort to develop a roster of capable civilian personnel. President Bush also has called for a Civilian Reserve Corps. This is meant to compensate partially for an inadequate number of permanent employees. Incentives provided for personnel from some civilian agencies—including the State Department—for deployment abroad are not nearly sufficient in relation to need, and the inability of agencies to compel nonmilitary employees to accept certain assignments or to be called up and assigned on a timely basis for a long enough period to learn to do the job remains a major problem. At one point in Afghanistan, the Country Team had only a single representative responsible for a program involving hundreds of millions of dollars, hundreds of civilian contract personnel, and hundreds of U.S. military personnel. It was almost totally reliant on contractors, who had little or no supervision.

Even when the Country Team is composed of highly qualified personnel, security restrictions on the movement of civilian personnel are a severe obstacle to their effectiveness in the field. State Department and other U.S. Government personnel are not trained to operate in semipermissive environments. Ambassadors, understandably, are cautious because they are held accountable for the safety of personnel. More often, however, Washington will dictate policies that restrict
Restructuring Country Teams

Given the evolving security environment and challenges confronting our nation, it is time to revalidate the Country Team’s critical role in achieving U.S. national security objectives and to rethink the concept of the Country Team as a committee working for a lead agency. Instead, the Country Team of the future must be reconfigured as a cross-functional team with an empowered national leader. The Country Team’s makeover must be done holistically—to include new strategy and planning approaches, decisionmaking procedures, personnel training and incentives, and resource allocation flexibility.

Authorities. First and foremost, the White House must augment the Ambassador’s de jure authority with some practical de facto authorities that will provide the means to lead the national security team in country effectively. Ambassadorial authority should be clarified and strengthened both in the Presidential letter to Ambassadors and in guidance from agencies to their representatives in country, but the Department of State also must select, train, and reward Ambassadors for asserting their authority appropriately within the new Country Team concept. In short, the Ambassador must acknowledge and strongly support all agencies, not just the Department of State. The chief of mission should work with State and other agencies to ensure that individuals and supporting personnel selected for the Country Team have the requisite expertise for success and also should have a

major input in the performance evaluations of agency heads and their subordinates. Likewise, other agency personnel should be able to rate the Ambassador’s performance, and the Ambassador should be held accountable for meeting the Country Team’s planned objectives.

A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) report recommends that the Ambassador have the authority “to approve all military-related programs implemented in country.” It is prudent that such Ambassadorial authority should go beyond purely military programs and include all agencies. However, this authority should contain a provision for appeal to Washington in the event that there is a difference of view that cannot be resolved at the Embassy level. Whereas the Ambassador and Country Team will have a better feel for country relations, the Washington level has broader perspectives on regional and global issues that may determine decisions on country policy, as well as providing a longer-term viewpoint. The SFRC report also recommends that in the case of special operations forces, there should be a memorandum of understanding with the relevant regional combatant command making clear the Ambassador’s authority. This also should be implemented.

Washington should provide integrated policies and priorities for regions and individual countries and then allow more authority and operational autonomy for Ambassadors and Country Teams to pursue those objectives. At the same time, the State Department and the NSC need to ensure that all agencies support agreed policy and Country Team objectives and that the mission is provided with timely policy guidance. In most situations and for most Embassies, State Department–led interagency working groups can provide interagency oversight. For crisis situations or where there are major programs by a non-State agency (for example, Defense, Justice, or CIA), there should be an NSC-led interagency group.

In some situations (conflict and immediate postconflict), there will need to be shared, but explicitly delineated, authority between the Ambassador and the military commander.

Reforming Structures. The Ambassador should have the latitude to structure the Embassy to meet local circumstances and U.S. priorities. For example, in Bogotá, the high priority of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency programs would be reflected in the organizational structure. In other countries, the structure would reflect the importance of counterterrorism, military-to-military relations, or environmental and economic issues.

One option to improve Country Team effectiveness is to create two deputy chiefs of mission (DCM) in larger Embassies—one for substantive issues and one for program management. The DCM for management would be in charge of all administrative resource allocation in support of the Country Team and its policy agenda. The person need not necessarily be a State Department Foreign Service officer. The DCM for policy would perform the executive secretariat and chief of staff functions for the Ambassador, supervising the various functional components, as well as serving as the Ambassador’s alter ego. There should be a small staff with deep knowledge of all agency operations and procedures to support the DCM(s). This staff would monitor all incoming and outgoing communications to ensure that they are properly distributed, that action responsibilities are clearly assigned, and that they conform to existing policy. Particularly sensitive outgoing messages should
be discussed by the agency head directly with the DCM or the Ambassador. In certain situations where there is a high degree of military participation, consideration could even be given to an Active duty military officer serving as DCM.

Concomitant with the need for two DCMs is the critical requirement to restructure the Embassy into functional components. Examples of such components could include law enforcement (to include the consular function), trade promotion/development, economic analysis, political/intelligence analysis and coordination, antiterror programs, crisis planning and response, public information/public affairs/cultural activities, and democracy promotion and social sector activities. Employees of all agencies, as appropriate, would populate each functional cluster to ensure an integrated approach. Agency participation in these components should be broad rather than restrictive. Each component would have a designated chairperson—in some cases the DCM, in others an agency head reporting to the DCM and Ambassador. This would facilitate interagency communication and coordination. To promote information sharing, a truly unified communications architecture should be created. The use of agency proprietary systems and back-channel communications should be limited.

All Defense offices and personnel should be consolidated under a single office with a designated officer in charge. Similarly, all intelligence personnel (including military) should be coordinated under a single authority. Law enforcement elements should also be collocated and coordinated.

There should be a clear delineation of responsibilities for communicating with representatives of local and other governments (Embassies) and international organizations. Any fixes of the Country Team must be complemented by changes at the regional level. There needs to be an alignment of authorities between State and Defense at the regional level. The independent authority of combatant commanders to act comes only in the context of deployed forces engaged in active hostilities under the President. Otherwise, the activities of military elements assigned to given missions fall clearly and unambiguously under the authority of the Ambassador. This must be enforced. Particularly in the case of special operations or intelligence-related military personnel, experience shows that they are most effectively employed when placed, at the direction of the Ambassador, under the delegated coordinating authority of an established mission element.

On issues of formulating and implementing regional priorities, it is critical that the State Department’s cadre of regional assistant secretaries enjoy good two-way communication with Defense’s five (soon to be six) regional combatant commanders, while taking steps, however, not to bypass their equivalents at the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The so-called Joint Interagency Coordination Group system in fact was intended to improve sharing of knowledge, but it has been less than adequate for unified action or for planning. The Integration Planning Cell of the proposed Interagency Management System would provide for much better interagency coordination with the combatant commands but would still be advisory in nature, if it were activated.

The incipient new U.S. Africa Command is planned to be much more integrated on an interagency basis than any previous combatant command, with a State Department officer serving as the deputy to the military commander and similar integration at lower levels. If successful, this integration could provide a solution for routine interagency regional cooperation, including the role of the combatant command. A State Department deputy assigned to each of the combatant commanders could be dual-hatted as a deputy assistant secretary of state. There should not be a permanent regional Ambassador. However, in crisis situations, either an Ambassador or a Presidential special representative should serve as the coordinator for all U.S. Government activities.

Resources. The methods of selecting and training Ambassadors and agency heads must change. An interagency training program for Ambassadors and agency heads is required. Annual offsites for all agency heads could improve the prospects for unity of effort. Senior managers from all agencies should receive periodic ethics training to ensure that the functioning of the Embassy and their own actions are held to the highest standards.

Personnel systems must adapt to incentivize people to serve in high-risk countries. All agencies must strengthen their personnel numbers to assure effective management and coordination of grantee- and contractor-implemented programs in-country. This is particularly true with regard to USAID, which has experienced a steady decline in direct-hire numbers. There must be a reserve personnel or “surge” capacity for civilian agencies beginning with State, but including other key agencies as well. Defense and, to a lesser degree, USAID already have a surge capacity for crises. Ambassadors must be able to call upon everyone and employ all available resources in response to exigencies. In Embassies and in Washington, there needs to be routine coordination of all resources, military and civilian.

On the funding side, there must be a rationalization of existing contingency funds and capacity to act on Supplements.

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**Army captain and State Department representative meet with Iraqi Education Ministry officials about expanding teaching programs**

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*OAKLEY and CASEY*
for military-related education, training, and equipping programs. If there are differences of view that the Ambassador cannot resolve, personnel would appeal to Washington.

More flexibility needs to be built in at the Country Team and Washington levels for the movement of funds from one function to another and for the management of contingency funds and personnel. The chief of mission should have the authority to allocate funds from all sources for priority projects. Additionally, Ambassadors should be much more aggressive in advocating for resources for non-State agencies included in their Country Teams. The Ambassador should have the authority to terminate funds if the project is clearly failing to deliver expected results.24

A new approach to the Country Team plan can facilitate these changes. As called for in the new Joint State–USAID Strategic Framework and the new Strategic Planning Process, the Mission Program Plan (MPP) also would be reformulated to become interagency, emphasizing the primacy of an integrated policy planning process in which all agencies provide input and endorse the final plan, including recommendations for the amount and allocation of operational funds.

An agreed interagency policy document that clearly spells out objectives and programs should accompany the MPP. The Country Team should initiate the document with the personal approval of the Ambassador, who should be responsible for settling differences of opinion. The interagency document most likely will need to have compartmented annexes to accommodate intelligence-related functions. Although it needs to be comprehensive, there should be an effort to keep it as short as possible, focusing on objectives. The office in Washington that oversees this process should be staffed by an interagency team to ensure proper representation and coordination.

Members of the Country Team should understand that they will be judged based on personal performance in meeting the objectives of the plan and that the Ambassador/DCM will have a heavy formal input into individual performance ratings. This will mean giving much more thought to leveraging the capabilities of other agencies and being leveraged in return, in pursuit of overall mission objectives. Agency heads should be rewarded for meeting objectives when it requires investing some of their agency’s resources and energy in other agency programs.

Washington should develop an agreed interagency policy document and should give priority to Country Team recommendations in deciding on resources for the field. The Country Team should review the document annually, starting with input from the Ambassador. The Ambassador and Country Team should use the interagency document to tee up the areas of policy conflict so that Washington is forced to make policy decisions.

The critical challenges to our nation’s interests demand a new Country Team concept and a more effective structure capable of tackling the challenges of the 21st century. The signal mark of success for the new Country Team will be changing the way other members of the Country Team perceive the Ambassador. Instead of a Department of State representative, the future Ambassador must be, and be seen as, a national representative empowered to make tradeoffs among instruments of power and to develop clear strategies to advance U.S. national interests. Simply reasserting the Ambassador’s national authority is inadequate. Instead, the Ambassador must be empowered as a team leader with authority to generate national security team outcomes and must be selected, trained, and rewarded accordingly. Undertaking these reforms and changes in the authorities and procedures for planning and resource allocation will require an enormous effort. In fact, it will require a top-down, executive-legislative partnership for reform. Given the vested interests in favor of the status quo, this will be an arduous undertaking, but the changes are long overdue. JFQ

Notes

1. While assuming sole responsibility for the opinions expressed in this article, the authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of other team members: John Agoglia, Gary Anderson, Michael S. Bell, Robert Feidler, Robert Grenier, Donald Hays, Princeton Lyman, John McLaughlin, Robert Pearson, Anthony Quainton, David Rhoed, Michael Wilken, Anne Winkowsky, and Casimir Yost. In addition to working group members, the authors also wish to thank James A. Scheck, Christopher J. Lamb, and Matthew Shabat for their reviews.


7. Ibid.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 30.


16. The authors thank Princeton Lyman for this anecdote.


20. Ibid.

21. See Stewart.

22. Carlucci and Brzezinski.


In the mid-1990s, the Phoenix program was considered an artifact of historical interest but with little relevance to the contemporary world. I therefore analyzed the program primarily from a historian’s perspective in the first edition of *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey*, making few references to the present or future. Readers interested in future applicability were left to draw their own conclusions from the history. A decade later, Iraq and Afghanistan have brought the study of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism back into fashion. For this reason, the new edition contains this additional chapter summarizing the principal lessons.

The Shadow Government

The Viet Cong insurgency came to life in 1960 under the leadership of a shadow government staffed by Vietnamese Communist Party members and controlled by the Communist government of North Vietnam. Adhering to Maoist doctrine, this shadow government sought to force the South Vietnamese governmental apparatus—officials, militiamen, informants, and teachers—from the villages by violent means and to take its place. The cadres of the Viet Cong shadow government, or Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) as the Americans often called it, recruited peasants into the guerrilla forces, collected taxes, and obtained intelligence. They served as guides to military forces, provided shelter to the troops, coordinated the transmission of messages, and spread propaganda.

Some VCI operated under cover in the villages, but most were overtly Communist, for carrying out the key functions of the shadow government automatically made their identities known to the peasants. They were generally more visible to the population than insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan today, which not only enabled them to accomplish more in terms of mobilizing the population and exploiting its resources but also made them more vulnerable to countermeasures. Another critical difference between the Viet Cong and current insurgents is that the former were much less active in the urban areas than in rural areas. Because the Viet Cong were focused on organizing large segments of the population into armed forces rather than on merely harming the government and undermining its public support through violence, they could not normally operate where the government maintained a continuous and large security presence. Despite considerable instability at times, the South Vietnamese government invariably maintained such a presence in the towns and cities because South Vietnam always had a strong urban elite dedicated to the preservation of the state, in contrast to Iraq, where the United States disenchanted the elites of the Saddam Hussein era and installed new elites of uncertain character.

Once peasants joined the Viet Cong, the shadow government used drastic measures to make them more loyal to the movement. Deliberately separating the new recruits from their families, the Viet Cong cadres broke the strong family ties. Through shared hardship, ideological indoctrination, and good leadership, the

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*U.S. Information Agency*
cadres replaced those ties with the Communist cause, which became a surrogate family. The Vietnamese Communists acquired a secular fanaticism as intense as that of many Islamic extremists in the early 21st century. While the Vietnamese Communists did not perpetrate terrorist actions within the United States or other foreign countries, they were more formidable insurgents than the Islamic extremists; they were more disciplined and better organized—indeed, they were more disciplined and organized than nearly any insurgents in history. Thus, they were capable of executing large and complex military maneuvers, which permitted them to inflict much greater damage on counterinsurgent forces and exert much greater control over the population than the small groups of insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the mid-1960s, in the chaos that succeeded South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem’s overthrow, the Viet Cong insurgency made major advances. While the Saigon government’s failure has often been attributed to South Vietnamese and American preoccupation with conventional force, the real problem was the lack of adequate South Vietnamese leadership. When U.S. combat forces arrived in 1965, a few of them participated in pacification, but the large Communist main force threat compelled the Americans to keep great numbers of their troops in conventional operations aimed at attacking big units and reacting to major Communist initiatives. U.S. troops, moreover, were not as effective as well-led South Vietnamese troops in ferreting out Viet Cong in the midst of the populace because the Americans lacked familial, cultural, linguistic, and racial ties. By contrast, the absence of large conventional insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan spares the counterinsurgents from having to conduct big-unit operations, enabling them to focus on the small actions that counterinsurgency theorists emphasize. Because of the frailty of the Iraqi and Afghan governments, though, the United States has not yet been able to leave responsibility for pacification entirely in local hands as it eventually did in Vietnam.

A “Rifle Shot” Approach

In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson sent Robert Komer to Vietnam to improve coordination among the numerous agencies involved in counterinsurgency. With Johnson’s concurrence, Komer created an integrating organization called Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). Komer and many in the military found the CORDS concept attractive because it created unity of command and because the military was the only organization with enough people, funds, and other resources to support pacification on a large scale. The civilian agencies, on the other hand, disliked the concept because it put them within a military chain of command and often placed their personnel under the direct command of military officers who, in the opinion of the civilians, did not understand all aspects of pacification. When compelled to go along, the civilians did cooperate and, in general, CORDS proved to be successful in integrating interagency operations. In every district and province, CORDS placed a single individual in charge of all U.S. military advisers and all civilian personnel except those of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This individual was a military officer in some places and a civilian in others.

Komer also oversaw the creation of the Phoenix program in 1967. In the minds of Komer and others, pacification was hampered by insufficient attention to the Viet Cong Infrastructure and inadequate sharing of intelligence. Numerous South Vietnamese and American agencies were collecting information pertinent to the shadow government in isolation from one another; were they to share their information freely, they could corroborate each other’s findings, reduce duplication of effort, and make better use of action arms. Komer created the Phoenix program to facilitate interagency sharing of intelligence on the Viet Cong shadow government, and he put it in the hands of the CIA, which had considerable experience with pacification and valuable advisory relationships with key South Vietnamese organizations. At Komer’s behest, the CIA created Phoenix centers in every district and province, and the various agencies received instructions to send to each center a representative who was supposed to share the parent agency’s information.

The creators of the Phoenix program advocated a “rifle shot” approach, whereby the South Vietnamese and Americans would try to get sufficient intelligence on a Viet Cong cadre to target that person with surgical precision, as opposed to a “shotgun” approach, in which forces apprehended or killed large numbers of insurgents in the hope of catching a few important cadres in their net. By the late 1960s, however, the ability of American and South Vietnamese forces to access any hamlet compelled overt Viet Cong cadres to live away from the population, to visit the villages only in the company of Communist armed forces, and to carry weapons. Thus, the cadres could not normally be neutralized independently of Communist armed forces, and collecting intelligence on the Viet Cong shadow government was largely indistinguishable from collecting intelligence on the Communist armed forces. Some theorists assert that targeting individual members of the infrastructure should always be a top priority for counterinsurgents, but in this case it could not be done as a separate task. The rifle shot method is not always feasible.

In the war for the villages, the Americans and South Vietnamese invested heavily in...
human intelligence, which yielded a great deal of tactically useful information. One principal source of human intelligence was the peasant. In contrast to the villages of Afghanistan and the neighborhoods of Iraq today, where cellular telephones have proliferated, the Vietnamese village lacked instant communications, yet the peasants still provided much intelligence that allied forces could exploit. The members of the Viet Cong constituted the second principal source of human intelligence. Because the top Viet Cong were highly dedicated and well hidden, nearly all who served as allied informants and agents worked at the lower levels of the organization. For the United States, the employees of the South Vietnamese government were a third major source of human intelligence.

Many informants and agents provided information because they were paid. Such individuals, however, were less reliable than those with other motivations, which included hatred of the Communists and a desire to curry favor with the government. The most plentiful and reliable information, though, came from the relatives of the Saigon government’s personnel. One key consequence of the expansion of the South Vietnamese armed forces in the late 1960s was the increase in the number of villagers who had relatives on the government side, as it facilitated a great deal of intelligence collection. For the student of counterinsurgency in general, the great capacity of the counterinsurgents to obtain information from their relatives undercuts the common refrain that counterinsurgents cannot obtain much intelligence in areas where the bulk of the population sympathizes with the insurgents. It also underscores the importance of recruiting or conscripting large numbers of individuals into governmental organizations, even organizations that may be ineffective in carrying out their primary missions.

Sharing Information

The use of torture was widespread among South Vietnamese interrogators and security forces. Typical forms of torture included electric shock, submergence of the head in water, and beating. Some South Vietnamese forces killed prisoners out of revenge, the desire to compel other prisoners to provide information, or the fear that the prisoners might later be released. In the torture and killing of prisoners, they differed little from the Vietnamese Communists and, indeed, from many other armed forces in history.

American advisers rarely participated in the torture or execution of prisoners. Some advisers tried to prevent the South Vietnamese from torturing prisoners, while others just looked away because they lacked authority over their counterparts, believed the South Vietnamese knew best what to do, or feared that protests would alienate their counterparts. CIA advisers, in certain instances, compelled the South Vietnamese to stop using torture by threatening to withhold aid from South Vietnamese agencies that received CIA support, although at the price of arousing South Vietnamese resentment. American advisers today face the same dilemma of whether to object to brutality against prisoners, as they again are given the conflicting requirements of respecting allied nations’ sovereignty and discouraging their counterparts from violating Western rules of war.

Some American witnesses contended that the use of torture did not cause Communist prisoners to divulge accurate information. Many others, however, including all of the South Vietnamese veterans with whom I spoke, contended that torture did yield valuable information. These findings support the view, espoused in some current debates over the handling of terrorists, that coercive interrogation can achieve results that other forms cannot. Interrogators with extensive training in the techniques of their trade frequently succeeded in extracting information through kind treatment and rewards. The benevolent approach, which many Americans favored, often induced prisoners to share more information than tortured prisoners would generally yield—but it took longer than other methods, and thus the information sometimes lost its value by the time the interrogators elicited it.

The Phoenix program was, first and foremost, an attempt to achieve what in the 21st century is among the most desired and most difficult objectives of the U.S. Government: systematic sharing of information among intelligence agencies. From the inception of the Phoenix centers, the program ran into the sorts of troubles that are common among today’s intelligence-sharing initiatives. Bureaucratic parochialism reared its head at once. The creators of Phoenix wanted the South Vietnamese police to play a major role in executing the program, but South Vietnamese military officers often shunted the police aside; the military generally held the police in contempt, and military officers were usually more experienced and higher in rank than the corresponding police officers.

The biggest impediment to intelligence-sharing was the reluctance of the agencies to divulge their secrets. They feared, with good reason, that other participating agencies were infiltrated with Communist spies who would relay the shared intelligence back to the Communists. Alternatively, the information could be passed to one of the less competent action arms, which might act ineffectively or inappropriately on it. Agencies also were concerned that they would not get credit for the information if it were shared and that other organizations would recruit their sources. These fears have hindered intelligence-sharing at the National Counter-Terrorism Center, which was created at the behest of the 9/11 Commission in response to the failure to share critical intel-

 numerous South Vietnamese and American agencies were collecting information pertinent to the shadow government in isolation from one another
netted any Viet Cong because of the cadres’ tendency to spend little time in the populous areas and to operate alongside Communist military units. The most fruitful methods of neutralizing the cadres were ambushes and patrols in the vicinity of villages. Superior combat organizations frequently received intelligence that allowed them to set ambushes at precisely the right times and places, obviating guesswork.

In areas where the Communists had large conventional forces, the primary responsibility for combating those forces and the Viet Cong cadres traveling with them fell to allied conventional forces, which alone had the air support, artillery, and organic heavy weapons necessary to defeat such opponents. Pacification forces could operate in these areas only if the conventional forces provided a “shield” by continuously chasing and attacking the big Communist units on the periphery of the populated zones and beyond. American and South Vietnamese commanders have been criticized routinely for using large conventional forces to seek out insurgent conventional forces away from the populous areas, but in fact these operations were essential to the sturdiness of the shield, for they wore down the Communist main forces and discouraged them from gathering in numbers large enough to overwhelm the pacification forces, which had to be dispersed in order to maintain control over the villages. When allied forces waited until the Communist main forces came to the villages before engaging them, the Communists could and did concentrate in great strength at individual locations of their choosing. Under such circumstances, allied main forces often could not intervene before massed Communist forces finished overrunning a village and despoiling its pacification forces—and even when they could intervene, they were likely to damage the villages with heavy weapons fire, which might alienate or drive away peasants friendly to the government.

A Variety of Forces

Many types of allied armed forces harmed the Viet Cong shadow government. As mentioned above, conventional units contributed by attacking Communist main forces that were accompanied by Viet Cong cadres. At times, allied conventional forces broke into small units and operated in the hamlet areas, as if they were pacification forces, to root out enemy irregulars. They often performed effectively in this role, giving lie to the theory that conventional forces are ill suited to counterinsurgency operations, though they did lack the familiarity with the local people and environment that most pacification forces possessed. Their participation in counterinsurgency operations, however, reduced their readiness for conventional operations. This drawback often receives insufficient consideration from present-day analysts who advocate massive increases in the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency capabilities.

Of the pacification forces, the Regional Forces and Popular Forces were the most important, primarily by virtue of their size, which reached half a million by the early 1970s. The Regional Forces were mobile militia units that patrolled the districts from which they were recruited, while the Popular Forces were static militia units that guarded their home villages on a continuous basis. The best static militia forces occupied different positions near their villages each night in order to ambush the Communists and prevent large Communist forces from concentrating against them at fixed locations. As with all South Vietnamese forces, the quality of Regional Force and Popular Force units almost invariably was a function of the quality of their leadership; other considerations such as socioeconomic status or political views had little influence. South Vietnamese leadership improved across the board after the Tet Offensive of 1968, starting at the top and moving down, which for the militia forces meant that many more became adept at combating the Communists in the populous areas. In 1968, the South Vietnamese government created another militia called the People’s Self-Defense Forces, composed of males too young or old to serve in other units. These forces usually were not very effective militarily, but their creation had the benefit of putting more people on the government side.

Regular policemen were too lightly armed to fight battles with the insurgents, a fact lost on the many counterinsurgency theorists who have lambasted the South Vietnamese government for inadequate emphasis on the police. While those theorists contend that the police were uniquely qualified to identify and neutralize the Viet Cong cadres, the paramilitary and military forces actually carried out these activities effectively on numerous occasions. This lesson had to be relearned in Iraq, as the United States
initially put too much emphasis on developing police forces and not enough on paramilitary and military forces, leaving the Iraqis with poor capabilities for dealing with the insurgents when they grew in number.

The most effective allied forces in the village war were the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). Originally created in 1964, the PRUs were a highly secret paramilitary organization that operated in dangerous areas and at night more often than most South Vietnamese units. Most members served in their native areas and thus had familiarity and contacts. Because of their success in amassing intelligence and their tactical prowess, they typically dealt heavy losses on the enemy at low cost to themselves. The small size of the PRUs—the total nationwide strength never exceeded 6,000, a fraction of the strength of the militia forces and regular army—meant that they alone could not fundamentally alter the military situation in most provinces. They nonetheless inflicted remarkable damage, capturing or killing between 8,000 and 15,000 Communists per year.

The most important reason for the superb performance of the PRUs was the quality of the leaders. Although nominally under the authority of South Vietnamese officials, the units were in fact completely controlled by the CIA, making them the only South Vietnamese organization under direct American control. The CIA hired and fired commanders strictly on the basis of merit, in contrast to the South Vietnamese government, which frequently appointed leaders based on political and personal considerations.

When providing counsel, U.S. advisers generally were most effective when they offered suggestions that led their counterparts to reach the conclusions themselves. When the Americans tried to apply pressure, the South Vietnamese tended to become less receptive. U.S. advisers tried to apply pressure with unfortunate frequency, usually because they did not understand South Vietnamese psychology and had a greater sense of urgency than the South Vietnamese. Similar problems have plagued American advisory efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The cures, then and now, are heightened cultural awareness and the selection of advisers with the right personality traits. Accompanying South Vietnamese forces on operations substantially increased an adviser’s chances of influencing his counterparts, for it enhanced personal relationships and demonstrated commitment. Casualty-averse authorities forbade U.S. advisers from going on operations late in the war. Hopefully, the United States will not undermine current advisory programs by making the same mistake, considering that final victory in Iraq and Afghanistan can come only through the actions of indigenous security forces.

Advisers also had the option of reporting on ineffective South Vietnamese leaders up the American chain of command, and those advisers who possessed the necessary cultural awareness and motivation often made such reports. As a result, the top CORDS officials succeeded in convincing the South Vietnamese to replace a considerable number of leaders. Indeed, the participation of CORDS advisers in the replacement of leaders was their most significant contribution to the war. The importance of this function provides one of the most compelling reasons for today’s American military to increase its training and education in the areas of language, culture, and interpersonal skills.

The Loss of Good Leaders

The allies arrested, captured, or killed a large fraction of the shadow government’s cadres from 1967 to 1972, on top of the substantial number neutralized during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Hanoi attempted to replace its losses through recruitment in the South and infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam. These manpower sources, however, yielded too few individuals to prevent the overall size of the shadow government from shrinking drastically. The sharp decline in Communist recruitment not only inhibited the replenishment of Communist forces but also helped the Saigon government expand its enlistment of the rural populace. In addition, the failure of the shadow government to collect agricultural taxes, offer logistical support, gather intelligence, and provide guides severely undermined the functioning of Communist conventional forces in the South Vietnamese countryside and contributed materially to the failure of the Communists’ 1972 Easter Offensive.

The strategic impact of the shadow government’s destruction highlights the importance of shadow governments to insurgencies. It also contradicts the theory of some counterinsurgency analysts that the population or the insurgent political program constitutes the insurgents’ “center of gravity.” Strong leadership was the most important factor in the success of the Viet Cong, as it has been for most other insurgents. The loss of good leaders can be crippling because they cannot normally be replaced quickly, especially in a case such as the Viet Cong, where leadership resided exclusively in an elite party that added members through a slow and selective process.

Ultimately, Hanoi would be able to overcome the debilitation of the shadow government by building up its massive logistical networks in Laos and Cambodia and sending hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese regulars to attack the South Vietnamese army, which faced the impossible task of defending vast amounts of territory at a time when the U.S. Congress was slashing its military assistance and preventing the American President from living up to his promises of emergency U.S. air support. While South Vietnam’s pacification efforts had taken control of the populous rural areas and fully utilized the resources of the villages, they were too dispersed and too lightly equipped to stop large Communist main forces armed with tanks and artillery.

The war against the Viet Cong provides proof that no insurgency is invincible. The Viet Cong were among the most potent insurgents in history, thanks to the dedication and skill of the Viet Cong shadow government and generous support from North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union, yet allied forces brought the insurgency to ruin between 1965 and 1970. The American military played a major role in subduing the Communist armed forces, but the critical goal of establishing a permanent security presence in most villages could not have been reached without the considerable assistance of South Vietnamese forces. In Iraq, the United States has slowly relearned that indigenous forces are much more effective than foreigners at quelling local subversion, and it is attempting to take advantage of that fact by handing over responsibility for population security to Iraqi forces. The great question is whether the local forces can become strong enough to establish and maintain security on their own. In Iraq and Afghanistan, as in South Vietnam, the success of the indigenous government ultimately will depend on its success in bringing good military and political leaders to power while maintaining governmental cohesion, and the United States must therefore do everything possible to help both countries attain this end, as it did in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s. JFQ
A History of the Modern Chinese Army
by Xiaobing Li
Lexington, KY: The University
Press of Kentucky, 2007
413 pp. $39.95

The Chinese Army Today
by Dennis J. Blasko
Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2006
228 pp. $42.95

Professional reading about the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) should begin with this book. It not only chronicles the history of the PLA but also delves into the social and political influences on its evolution and provides a comprehensive picture of the PLA today. The detailed history and discussions about how and why changes have occurred in the PLA provide the basis from which to understand both the current actions of China as it pushes to modernize its military and overall Chinese strategic concerns. For example, Professor Li describes how the PLA, a formerly uneducated, peasant force, is in the midst of a transformation from a “labor-intensive” to a “technology-intensive” army. Witness the contrast between the PLA of decades past with today’s modernizing force: In 1983, only “4% of the 224 top Chinese generals had some college credit hours,” but since 1995, the PLA has been focusing on higher education and recruiting officers from universities with the goal of reshaping the PLA into a technologically advanced force capable of “winning the next war under high-tech conditions” (p. 2).

Li, a Chinese native and PLA veteran, made extensive use of recently available primary and secondary Chinese language sources in the exhaustive 10-year research for this book. His personal experience and native language abilities allow him to present an excellent examination of the PLA, which is enhanced by his ample inclusion of sources not readily available to Western researchers. He also adds value to his research by integrating “soldiers’ stories” into the work in an effort to “move away from the conventional approach” to view Chinese soldiers as party pawns or simply lost in the “human waves” (p. 6). Li concludes that the PLA’s modernization is a product of social and economic changes in China and that these changes are interdependent—thus, for China to successfully complete the modernization of the PLA, it must also achieve economic reform and sustain economic growth (p. 295).

If you are looking for a concise, up-to-date volume on the PLA, this is the book for you. Lieutenant Colonel Blasko, a 23-year veteran of the Army during which he served as a military intelligence officer, Chinese Foreign Area Officer, and U.S. Army attaché to China and Hong Kong, is truly an expert on the affairs of the PLA. He puts all his expertise into this book, which contains accurate and concisely structured information about the current organization, order of battle, and capabilities of the PLA—as much as one can find in an open source publication. As the author states, the book “is intended to be a baseline for understanding the Chinese military and perhaps encourage future studies of issues only briefly mentioned here” (p. xi).

In addition to the survey of today’s PLA, Blasko describes its continuing modernization and transformation program. In a matter-of-fact approach, he deftly puts the PLA and its capabilities into realistic perspective without ignoring the significance of the PLA’s modernization. He effectively exercises the “China rising” bogeyman by putting the scope of China’s modernization into perspective. One example of this is in his description of how the PLA will fight. Blasko explains that China’s current campaign to transform and modernize the PLA will not reap a significant improvement in capability in the near term: “While the PLA has a general vision of how it wants to employ its forces in future conflicts . . . it is likely there will be a gap between what the PLA strives to do and what it actually can accomplish for some time to come” (p. 93). Also, in the concluding chapter, Blasko cites the PLA leadership’s own assessment that it will take another 10 to 20 years to reach “advanced world standards.” He cautions, however, that the effectiveness of China’s military modernization cannot be judged by foreign standards and that the Chinese leadership remains “committed to military modernization as part of the nation’s strategic development plan” (pp. 182–183).

Blasko states that he wanted to write “the type of book [he] would have liked to have read before becoming a U.S. Army attaché to China” (p. 2). He has achieved his goal.
Dr. McDougall, an associate professor of politics at the University of Melbourne and an expert in the international politics of the Asia-Pacific and regional security issues, presents an excellent introduction to current international politics by the major players in the region. Focusing on the United States, China, and Japan, Asia Pacific in World Politics examines the relationship between these countries as well as the ongoing conflicts over Taiwan and North Korea and the changes occurring in Southeast Asia.

Surprisingly, this is not an Australia-centric perspective on international politics (evidenced by treating both Australia and Russia as “other key regional actors”) and does not approach issues from a single national perspective. McDougall says, “The underlying assumption is that to understand the dynamics of international politics in Asia-Pacific, one needs to focus first on the interaction of states and, in particular, on the interaction of its major powers” (p. 25). He draws on realist, liberal, and cultural approaches to international politics and notes that his methodology includes “a strong emphasis on the role of states, but not to the exclusion of other actors” (p. 5). Accordingly, he devotes an entire chapter to describing the roles of some prominent international organizations in the region—valuable information, considering that U.S. military commanders will inevitably have to deal with them during any conceivable operation in the future.

McDougall concludes by reiterating that past is prologue and that although “there can be wild cards, such as the collapse of the USSR or September 11 . . . a focus on the key factors affecting the most significant actors in the region does provide a good starting point” for predicting the future in the Asia-Pacific region (p. 327).

Other recently published titles recommended for additional reading about China’s military, geopolitical, and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region:


- Kane, Thomas M. Ancient China on Postmodern War. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007. 193 pp. $120.00.


—R. E. Henstrand

The global war on terror seemed to be perfectly tailored for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). After years of resourcing, training, and experience in low-intensity conflicts and operations other than war, SOF should have been able to shift focus to a new set of enemies: terrorists, militias, and insurgents. Yet that has not proven to be the case—or so argues Hy Rothstein in this excellent study, in which he proposes that the U.S. military is not able to wage unconventional warfare despite significant investment in special operations capabilities. He reached this conclusion by looking at imperatives from the literature on organizational theory and military innovation that are relevant to unconventional warfare as illuminated by U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.

Organized into six chapters, with a foreword by Seymour Hersh, the study opens with an assessment of the current U.S. capacity to conduct unconventional operations. Beginning with operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks, Rothstein notes that while special operations played a key role in the war, the strategy the United States employed was essentially a conventional one—a war of attrition. Using Northern Alliance Afghan forces in conjunction with U.S. Special Forces and airpower, the coalition forces attacked and destroyed the Taliban military, leading to the disintegration of the existing Taliban state.

What happened next became the problem. Remnants of the Taliban went underground and started engaging in unconventional warfare. The United States, however, did not change its strategy. It continued to fight a war of attrition and use SOF more as conventional forces. The result was that the United States managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

Rothstein next turns his attention to definitions and history. Specifically, he addresses the issues of what constitutes special operations and special operations forces. Special operations are defined variously as ambiguous, smaller-scale conflicts; less, but messy, politically charged situations that often straddle an uneasy peace and not quite a state of war; and ill-defined, constantly shifting forms of conflict. Special operations forces are seen as playing the gamut of roles from shooters to social workers. While conventional forces can easily conduct many of these military operations other than war or stability and support operations, Rothstein argues they cannot and should not be used in all special operations.

Rothstein then moves to theory, which provides the necessary context of the problem posed. Central to his analysis is contingency theory, which...
acknowledges that change is the only certainty in the world and argues that changes in technological, social, economic, and political environments, globalization, and ecological well-being are making us rethink the way we adapt to change. This adaptation applies to organizations as well as individuals, and managing this change requires a different approach by each of them. In stable competitive environments, relatively simple and mechanical organizations are enough for success. However, in a rapidly changing and unpredictable environment, organizations need to be flexible, dynamic, innovative, and able to renew themselves to be successful.

The use of contingency theory seems exceptionally well suited for dealing with the chaos-based, post–Cold War world. In fact, although Rothstein does not say so, the notion of contingency theory appears to be a handy tool for managing chaos theory. Chaos theory, in general, looks at how simple actions can generate complex outcomes that could not be predicted by just looking at the acts themselves. The most popular image is that of the butterfly effect: a butterfly flapping its wings in Beijing can produce hurricanes in Miami. In the international arena, the analogy is that a terrorist attack in New York City can result in regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Rothstein concludes by looking at the implications from Afghanistan, with recommendations as to what needs to be done to reap the benefits from the substantial capability that exists in U.S. SOF. These recommendations include setting up a separate service for unconventional warfare forces, with its own personnel, promotion, and training systems, and letting it bypass the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate with other governmental agencies. Finally, this unconventional warfare force would be based not on force structure but rather on world dynamics. As a result, it may take months or years before unconventional warfare forces are successful.

Interestingly, these conclusions come after the Department of Defense’s 6-year transformation of the military under former Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The shift to a lighter, more lethal force was one of the goals of the Bush administration, and even with these mandated changes, transformation efforts have failed. The point that administration leaders, including the military leadership, appear to have missed is that these kinds of transformations require more than simply shifting technology; they require corresponding shifts in military mentality and culture.

Rothstein’s position is controversial, and critics could argue that it is simply reflecting his own background—30 years in Army Special Forces—with all its requisite biases and prejudices. Yet if we look at that position objectively, we have to agree that the current solution is not working. Using conventional forces, even with the recent surge of additional U.S. forces into Iraq, has not reduced the bombings or the use of force against American troops.

If we accept contingency theory as the best way to approach conflicts such as Iraq or Afghanistan, we must look for what works. Trying different tools, approaches, and methodologies is how one solves problems. Continuing to use the military in the same way, as a sledgehammer, will not get the job done against unconventional enemies.

Rothstein's concepts of “sustaining” and “disruptive” technological innovation (discussed in his book The Innovator’s Dilemma [HarperBusiness, 2003]). Sustaining innovations improve the performance of established products in traditional ways. Disruptive technologies set up new standards and, in the process, tend to overthrow established products. A car using a more efficient internal-combustion engine to get more miles per gallon of gas would be an example of a sustaining innovation. A car that uses a hydrogen fuel cell, rendering the miles-per-gallon question moot, is an example of a disruptive one.

Large companies heavily invested in established products tend to concentrate on sustaining innovations, while disruptive innovation tends to be the province of start-ups. Many technologies needed to realize NCW, particularly the information technology needed to realize the concept. Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz’s book Buying Military Transformation looks at what such technological change will mean for the American defense industry. Specifically, it focuses on the question of whether the Defense Department will need to look beyond established firms such as Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics for systems appropriate to the new doctrine.

Dombrowski and Gholz focus on institutional politics and procedures and draw on not only doctrine and tactics but also technology, especially the information technology needed to realize the concept. Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz’s book Buying Military Transformation looks at what technological change will mean for the American defense industry. Specifically, it focuses on the question of whether the Defense Department will need to look beyond established firms such as Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics for systems appropriate to the new doctrine.

Dombrowski and Gholz focus on institutional politics and procedures and draw on not only numerous interviews and discussions they conducted with officials in the government, military, and defense industry, but also scholarly literature. Where the latter is concerned, the authors use as their theoretical foundation Harvard business administration professor Clayton Christensen’s concepts of “sustaining” and “disruptive” technological innovation (discussed in his book The Innovator’s Dilemma [HarperBusiness, 2003]). Sustaining innovations improve the performance of established products in traditional ways. Disruptive technologies set up new standards and, in the process, tend to overthrow established products. A car using a more efficient internal-combustion engine to get more miles per gallon of gas would be an example of a sustaining innovation. A car that uses a hydrogen fuel cell, rendering the miles-per-gallon question moot, is an example of a disruptive one.
of procurement practices is overblown for two reasons. The first is that the next generation of weapons systems will be far less radical than the hype surrounding transformation suggests, as they demonstrate with three case studies of acquisition programs: the Littoral Combat Ship, unmanned aerial vehicles (unmanned aircraft systems), and communications systems. The second reason they offer is that the established defense contractors have key advantages as suppliers that make a turn to other producers undesirable.

Dombrowski and Gholz argue their first point quite successfully. The history of military technological acquisition suggests a future of incremental changes of previous designs rather than “clean sheet” approaches. Moreover, many of the demands of NCW doctrine represent changes of degree rather than kind, as the case of the Littoral Combat Ship demonstrates. NCW calls for fast, stealthy warships, but navies have always sought fast ships, and there has long been a premium on stealth as well. Additionally, given long practice, political uncertainty, and the continuing value of versatility and survivability in weapons systems, the old preference for high-performance, multipurpose warships remains a strong factor in design. In contrast with the patrol-craft-like “streetfighter” vessels envisioned by some futurists, the 2,500-ton Littoral Combat Ship is a successor of today’s frigates. This reflects a lower real-world premium on disruptive technology, and a correspondingly greater place for the sustaining technologies that established defense contractors specialize in.

Buying Military Transformation is less successful when it argues that the ability of the established defense contractors to work with the military to meet its technological needs is irreplaceable. The authors emphasize the close relationship between the military Services and established defense firms, which they insist enables a better understanding between the firms and their clients. However, they offer little evidence that this close relationship actually has that effect, which is especially problematic given the disagreement on this point. Many critics see aspects of that close relationship (such as the “revolving door” between the Defense Department and defense contractors) as corrupting the acquisition process, causing the Defense Department to take what industry wants to sell it rather than producing a symbiosis in which industry better satisfies real military needs. Even those convinced of the basic validity of transformation at times “ask whether the acquisition system is fundamentally broken by pork barrel incentives and outright malfeasance,” as the authors acknowledge in a promotional interview on their publisher’s Web site.

The book’s failure to seriously acknowledge such concerns is a glaring weakness, given its otherwise close detailing of much of the acquisition process. In addition, the book overreaches in its claim to offer a comprehensive theory of how militaries change, given its narrow historical and methodological focus. Nonetheless, it offers a great deal of insight into an important but underexamined area of the transformation debate and puts recent defense acquisition in perspective. This makes Buying Military Transformation well worth the time of readers interested in the nuts and bolts of the development and manufacturing of the coming generation of military technology. JFQ

Nader Elhefnawy has published widely on international security issues. He holds a BA in international relations from Florida International University.
Harrier II: Validating V/STOL
by Lon O. Nordeen
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006
210 pp. $28.95

Reviewed by
JON M. DAVIS and DAVID H. GURNLEY

First, a disclosure: both reviewers are Harrier pilots and former Harrier squadron commanders. We know all the people cited in the acknowledgments and lived much of the later history that the author captures. Our objectivity is limited to the realities that neither of us knows the author and that we were unaware that the book had been written until the U.S. Naval Institute solicited our review.

Lon Nordeen’s assertion in his preface that the scope of the book is limited to the history of the Harrier II program is not accurate in a strict sense. In fact, the first 40 pages of the book do a creditable job of addressing the salient elements of the Kestrel (the experimental predecessor of the Harrier) and AV–8A Harrier histories leading up to the requirements and political support that produced the Harrier II against long odds. Moreover, the author covers this prehistory adroitly, superbly reinforcing his thesis that, to a greater degree than most modern aircraft programs, the Harrier II owes its existence to underdog visionaries: a handful of experienced aviators and many nonaviators, especially Marine infantry officers who desperately needed the kind of support the Harrier would provide. The book’s strength lies in its insights from the program, production, and policy angles. From a pilot’s perspective, however, the descriptions of the Harrier are necessarily anecdotal. Unique vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aerodynamic considerations, such as intake momentum drag, yaw roll coupling, and negative stability between 30 and 90 knots, are mentioned without explanation to the uninitiated reader. The author compares the mishap loss rates of the AV–8 to those of the F–4 and F–8 but does not expand upon this thirsty issue; nor does he underline the fact that tremendous operational innovation was supported by limited developmental spending. Modern critics of the F–35 series Joint Strike Fighter lament the compromises necessitated by myriad requirements of numerous buyers, but at the other end of the spectrum lie single-Service airframes such as the Harrier, which suffer from shoestring budgets borne by a single primary customer facing competing requirements.

The only minor weakness of Nordeen’s book is a byproduct of its strength. The author quotes a veritable who’s who of V/STOL advocates but lacks counterpoint from the Harrier’s many critics, whose complaints, whether balanced or not, needed more attention to offer a robust history. Along these lines, one can take issue with Nordeen’s emphasis on the term V/STOL itself. Although the Marines procured a V/STOL attack aircraft, it was used from the beginning as a short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) machine and developed operating concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures to employ it almost exclusively in the STOVL realm. A book with the subtitle Validating V/STOL should probably incorporate a stronger examination of V/STOL’s shortcomings. While a more in-depth discussion of the evolution of the AV–8A might be desirable, the author made it clear that the AV–8B was his focus. The AV–8A employment concept from a V/STOL platform optimized for short-duration, short-range missions is very different from STOVL operations and the strategic agility afforded by austere land or small-deck sea bases enabling long-range, long-dwell, precision strike operations at a high sortie rate from those bases. The evolution to a STOVL capability has brought the U.S. Marine Corps and joint forces the agile and multipurposed fixed-wing strike capability required for operational maneuver from the sea.

Finding 2,000 feet of asphalt or grass, room on a ship’s deck, or space for a square of steel matting to land a light jet with a 30-foot wingspan generally is not difficult. In fact, the Harrier has added a strategic agility to Marine tactical air that is unsurpassed by any other tactical air platform. In many ways, the V/STOL moniker caused more problems than it was worth because Harrier detractors persistently claimed that the Marines never used it that way. True; in fact, the Armed Forces rarely employ weapons systems exactly as envisioned during requirement validation because contextual elements change, and in adapting, they learn how to use them better, as the Marines did with the Harrier. We argue that the Harrier II did not validate V/STOL—but it did so in spades for STOVL. The STOVL Harrier provided a high-performance, offensive air support capability that enabled expeditionary air support from amphibious platforms and austere forward sites. There is a good reason why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified the Harrier II as one of the three critical weapons systems employed in Operation Desert Storm. This reality informed the STOVL requirements of the much heralded F–35 Lightning II.

In the final analysis, Lon Nordeen does an excellent job of chronicling the history of the Harrier II from the perspective of advocates and operators who believe—as we do—that the AV–8B represents a conceptual triumph that has significantly altered the evolution of tactical aviation. There are a handful of errors in the book (primarily in the appendices), but they are insignificant and far outweighed by authoritative narratives sprinkled throughout the text and found in no other book. Through his heavy reliance on Harrier Program Office regulars, Nordeen has produced an accurate history, but one that gives short shrift to the experiences of partner nations (most notably the United Kingdom) and to the innovation and evolution of the operating forces. All Harrier pilots and tactical aviation aficionados will enjoy this volume, an engaging and tremendously informative read that is destined to be the source cited in footnotes and firsthand accounts long into the future.

Brigadier General Jon M. Davis, USMC, is Deputy Commander, Joint Functional Component Command, Network Warfare. Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), is Director of National Defense University Press.
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A P R O F E S S I O N A L  M I L I T A R Y  A N D  S E C U R I T Y  J O U R N A L

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See the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security

By Steven V. Marsh and Richard L. Kugler

What is the current state of the global security system, and where is it headed? What challenges and opportunities do we face, and what changes are necessary? The authors of this book analyze key aspects of the global security system and offer strategies for dealing with the world’s most pressing security concerns. The book examines the United States’ role in the evolving international security system and America’s leadership role in the post–Cold War era. The authors look at issues such as the growing threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the impact of globalization on the global security system. They also explore the role of alliances, the use of military force, and the role of the United States in the post–Cold War world. Published for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy by National Defense University Press and Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007. Order online at: <www.potomacbooksinc.com>

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