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1976. 1 have not noted any word that the Russians are backing away f romn involvement. It might be that, judging from their maneuvers in recent weeks and months, and judging from rumors about Cuba and submarine bases and all that, they may want to expand their influence in this hemisphere. They may have more of a design on the canal or on a new canal. They may want to compete with America or with Panamia. I do not know that they are any respector of the rights of Panama, the United States, or any other country.
 I do not want to quarrel with the desire of the Senator from Alaska to protect the United States, because I share' that, but it seems to me that we do just the opposite unless we strike out this particular portion of article XII.
 Mr. GRIFFI-N. Will the Senator yield for a moment?
 Mr. DOLE. I yield.
 Mr. GRIFFIN. As the Senator knows, I have taken the position that we should not rewrite the treaties here on the Senate floor, but I do want to say that I think the Senator's amendment goes to one of the most objectionable features in this treaty, one that was thrown in at the last minute, as I understand it, by the negotiators for the United States.
 There have been a number of studies. In my minority views, which I would like to refer to, I would like to call attention to some studies that are not inconsistent with the view taken by the Senator from Kansas.
 For example, a study at tbe Georgretown University Center for Strategic Studies in 1967, focusing on canal options, reached this conclusion: "Though the Republic of Panama seems technically"
 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is sorry to interrupt but must advise that all time of the Senator from Kansas has expired. The Chair understands that the Senator from Alaska yields 2 minutes to the Senator f rom Michigan.
 Mr. GRiTiFIN. I thank the Chair.
 To be the best place for a future canal facility, the United States should not abandon the right to approach other countries for possible canal locations in the event that future political conditions exclude the project from Panama.
 In 1967, the Council on Foreign Relations in a study authored by Immanuel J. Klette, surveyed various canal options and concluded tbe preferable route for a new canal would be the Nicaragrua-Costa Rica route. He observed:
 Although the cost of construction bears on the final choices, it should not be the prime factor in making decisions on, a new canal. A waterway which is less expensive in dollars may be the most expensive in political consequences.
 It seems to me that this provision, in and of itself, is grounds for not approving this treaty and sending it back for rengotiation.
 There are other reasons to do that. It seems to me, as I have gone around in my State and talked about these treaties, I find that my constituents are shocked when I read out of the canal treaty from article XII this language:
 During the duration of this treaty, the United States of America shall not negotiate with third States for the right to construct an interoceanic canal on any other route (other than in Panama) in the Western Hemisphere, except as the two parties may otherwise agree.