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called in the Constitution, outside of the property in and of the States.
 I have read, Mr. President, with the greatest interest, the report which we have just received from the Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers issued by the Committee on the Judiciary, of which the distinguished occupant of the chair, Senator Allen, is the chairman. I notice something which may be a happenstance or oversight, but it was interesting to me.
 It seems to me that if the issue were as presented by the subcommittee report, I would have no doubt that the report proceeded upon a proper assumption. But the issue is notL that one, and I should like to read what it says. It may just have been an oversight, and if so, somebody ought to correct me so that the opponents' case may be presented in all its vigor.
 Pages 4 to 5 at the bottom of the page, reads as follows:
 Thus, the primary separation of powers issue studied by the Subcommittee was whether the executive branch could, without prior statutory authority and acting independently of the Congress, alienate territory or other property of the United States by concluding a treaty to the effect with a foreign powver-in this case. with the Republic of Panama.
 Mr. President, the point I make here is that the executive is not proceeding "without prior statutory authority and acting independently of the Congress." On the contrary, it is following a constitutional mandate that a treaty may be negotiated by the Executive, but may not be ratified by the Executive without the approval of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. This is so specific in the Constitution that I cannot agree that the Executive is acting "independently of the Congress." It is acting with that arm of the Congress which the Constitution has established expressly for this purpose, allowing the Executive to ratify the treaty through having its approval.
 As I say, I can hardly believe the drafter of the report understood or accepted that implication. But, if that is the case, then I do not believe that the argument which follows from that case is relevant.
 The main precedent upon which we rely in addition to the settled practice which has just been confirmed, are Jones against Meehan, an I ndian Treaty case decided in 1899; another Indian case, IHolden against Joy, decided in 1872; and the case of Geofrey against Riggs decided in 1890, which related to a question of inheritance in the District of Columbia.
 It seems to me that those cases, as I1 say, have accepted and carr (Id out through the years the John Marshall view of what the Constitution means respecting one treaty power. That is the precedent which is followed in the submission of this document as a treaty to the Senate, With the transfer of property which is therein contemplated, being~ a completed action upon the advice and consent of the Senate being given in the affirmative and upon the resolution of ratification being passed and the President actually ratifying.
 One last point which I would like to make is the fact that this issue has been submitted by a treaty to the Senate. This is, I think, very important. It would assume the fact that when and if the Senate rati fies, or the Senate gives its approval to ratification and the treaty is ratified, that will settle the legal question.
 I do not believe that anyone-I doubt even the opponents of the treaty-would wish to argue that somehow or other this could invali-


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