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been focused on the potential costs of implementing the treaties. The Committee on Armed Services has given thorough consideration to this matter and has provided a substantial amount of information drawn from studies and committee hearings that clearly reflects the potential for financial difficulties in the proposed Panama Canal Commission and major costs to the U.S. taxpayer.
 First, with respect to the canal's operation, there is clearly a distinct possibil ity that the canal will operate at a substantial deficit over the next 22 years. Depending on future rates of inflation and the extent of canal toll increases, this cumulative deficit could run as high as $3.5 to $3.75 billion by 1999. Even if it is assumed that major toll increases would not reduce the level of canal traffic, tolls would have to be increased by 149 to 168 percent in order to fully off set these deficits. In this connection, it is estimated that about one-third of the total $3.6 billion increase in toll charges-some $1.2 billion-would be borne by U-..S. shippers and consumers in the form of higher costs. Particularly affected by such cost increases would be the gulf coast ports which regularly ship and receive a substantial amount of goods through the Panama Canal.
 A second economic consideration involves the estimated value of U.S. assets which under the terms of the treaties would be transferred to Panama. The administration assesses the book value of all assets in the Canal Zone at $920 million. Current value or replacement co'-,It of these assets including the canal itself, the company, and military assets, is projected at $9.8 billion.
 Third, certain costs will accrue to the United States that will not be paid for by revenues gained from canal tolls. These have already been itemized in statements previously made by my colleagues. The Committee on Armed Services has estimated that these potential costs could well exceed $1 billion. Other possible liabilities have been cited that include Export-Import Bank credits, aid housing' guarantees. forei gn military sales credits, and the overseas private investment corportation loan guarantee. These liabilities could total another $345 million.
 At this point. Mr. President, I would like to have printed in the Record a table taken from the Armed Services Committee staff study which summarizes these four major categories of the potential costs of the e treaties.
 There being- no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the ]Record, as follows:
 ATTACHMENT A-ESTIMATED POTENTIAL COST OF PANAMA CANAL TREATIES AND RELATED MATTERS
 1. ILLUSTRATIVE POTENTIAL PANAMA CANAL OPERATING DEFICIT UNTIL 2000 A.D.

 percent
 With full loss of North
 North Slope oil
 Slope oil after 1980
(a) If tolls are not increased above current rtes (loss in billions)-------------------- $3. 57 $3.75
(b) If tolls are raised only 75 percent (the total currently available increase estimated
 to produce maximum revenue was 75 to 100 percent; loss in billions)------------- $0. 99 $1. 16
(c) C umulative toll increase needed to fully offset deficits (assuming no toll caused
 traffic loss after st 20 percent toll increase; percent) ----------- --------------- +149 +168