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 When they looked at what this was going to cost them, they had very serious reservations. Almost without exception they have expressed their opinion that the way the United States has operated the Canal over the past decades has been fair and equitable.

 M1ULTILATERAXL VERSUS BILATERAL APPROACH
 General Sumner also pointed out that the other Latin American
-nations had been ignored in attempting to solve the Panama Canal
p roblem-even though the canal is so important to them that it should be called "The Canal of the Americas." He suggested that in times past when the bilateral approach to international plans had failed, that it was sometimes helpful to callin all parties with a direct interest to find a mutual solution. Pointing out that the Inter-American Defense Board already had a structure to work together on the common defense of the hemisphere, he agreed to_ sound out members of the Board as to constructive solutions to the canal problem.
 General Sumner's testimony points up the deep flaw in the ar gument that the giveaway of the Panama Canal will usher in a new era of good feeling- in Latin America. On the contrary, just the opposite is likely to happen. The giveaway of the canal to a small and unstable nation is likely to inspire distrust, or at best indifference. Moreover, it is incongruous to pretend that the way to establish closer ties to Latin America is to ignore the direct interests of these nations in the canal for 14 years, to consult with no one, and then to hand the canal over lock, stock, and barrel to one nation whose political institutions inspire confidence in no one and which is allied in a show of friendship with the one Latin American pariah nation, Communist Cuba. Insulting and demeaning diplomacy never makes friends.

 COSTS OF MILITARY RELOCATION
 There is not the opportunity here to go into the additional military costs which would be imposed upon the taxpayers of the United States if the canal were closed to the U.S. naval fleet. Ship construction, relocation of communications and intelligence facilities, and higher costs of resupply would all have to be considered; but it is difficult to speculate on the future designs of potential enemies.
 However, the committee received good estimates of the costs for the relocation of present U.S. military facilities in the Canal Zone. A number of these f acilities will be turned over to the Panamanian National Guard as soon as the treaty goes into effect, and brandnew consolidated f acilities will have to be constructed at other sites for the use of U.S. forces. This construction is totally unnecessary, except for the implementation agreements adopted pursuant to the treaties. Lt. Gen. D. P. McAuliffe, U.S. Army, testified that this construction would cost the taxpayers $42.9 million. All the new f acilities will be turned over to Panama by the year 2000.

 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TUE TREATIES
 The economic aspects of the treaties r eflect the chaos and disarray of the negotiating process. It is difficult, even at this date, to assess the