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 M.T&r. Clements provided valuable historical testimony about the events which led to the reopening of full-scale negotiations in 1975. Mr. Clements himself was deputized by the National Security Council to solve the security problem, and flew to Panama to negotiate the issue with General Torrijos. The clause was drafted in the Department of Defense, approved by the Department of State and the National Security Council-and even approved by General Torrijos himself, as Mlr. Clements affirmed in response to close questioning. The language was as follows:
 In the event of any threat to the neutrality or security of the Canal, the Parties shall consult concerning joint and individual efforts to secure respect for the Canal's neutrality and security through diplomacy, conciliation, mediation arbitration, the International Court of Justice, or other peaceful means. If such efforts would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, each Party shall take such other diplomatic, economic or military measures as it deems necessary,
In accordance with its constitutional processes. (Emphasis added.)
 At the present time the United States enjoys the rights of a sovereign in the Canal Zone, so it is not necessary even to consult to defend our own property. The Clements language is a step down from the rights we now enjoy; but it is a marvel of precision and definition when compared to ambiguity of the defense clauses, both denumerated article IV, in each of the treaties. The Clements language unambiguously gives the United States the unilateral authority for defense actions, even without the approval of Panama.
 It is incredible that any negotiating team, with the best interests of the Nation at heart, would backdown from such a clause once it had been established. It is a defect that drives straight at the heart of the treaties and makes them unacceptable in any form. There are, of course, other orreat defects which vitiate the realistic value of the treaties; but the lack of clear-cut defense rights is the root cause of the numbing distrust of the treaties which has gripped the American people.
 DEFENSE AFTER THE YEAR 2000
 Another key issue is the defense of the canal after the year 29000. The treaty provides that only the Republic of Panama may maintain military forces in Panama after the year 2000, even though the United States and Panama agree to "maintain the regime of neutrality."
 The military problem is that once U.S. forces have pulled out of Panama, it would be extremely costly both in terms of manpower, material, and money to attempt to reassert our presence in order to maintain neutrality in the canal's operation. If Panama resisted such an attempt, it would be even more difficult to keep the canal operational, since the canal would be then totally Panamanian in personnel and administration.
 It is significant that Admiral Holloway, even though- he had a.(greed to support the treaties because of their politcal implications, freely conceded that his military judgment was that the defense problem would be enormously complicated by withdrawal. Indeed, he revealed that he had strongly arg-ued for a U.S. military presence, even if only in a limited form, after the year 2000. Without such a presence, it would be necessary to retake the airfields, 'or to land a marine amphibious