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S. Eisenhower, Robert Storey, Kenneth Field, Raymond A. 111,and the chairman, Robert B. Anderson. After some 5 years of study, they came to this conclusion:
 Limiting the choice to Panama costs the United States nothing, and in return, we get the commitment that other powers cannot meddle in this ma tter. Th&e theoretically feasible routes across Nicaragua and Costa Rica are 140 miles and 100 miles in length, in comparison with the Panamanian route.
 It goes on to point out that what they proved after the expenditure of $22 million and 5 years of study, "is that we could not build a canal outside Panama."
 I think the argument which has been made here that because, during the next 22 years, we sign an agreement not to build a sea level canal elsewhere in Central America other than Panama, means we have given away nothing. We have given away something we would not consider anyway. That is the possibility of a canal in Nicaragua or someplace else our experts' studies have ruled out as not being feasible.
 Mr. CHiURCH. Will the Senator yield for a question?
 Mr. MCGOvERN. Yes; I yield to the Senator from IdTaho.
 Mr. CHURCH. I think the Senator is unquestionably right. Ile has said that -we yielded nothing. We did not want to preserve the option to build a canal outside of Panama when our studies have already shown us that only a canal within Panama would be economically feasible. So we gave up nothing.
 The other side of the coin is that we got something from the Panamanians that was rather valuable.
 This is why our negotiators sought to insert this provision in the treaty. It is not the Panamanians who urged it upon us, but it was the American negotiators who sought to insert the provision.
 What -we got back was a commitment on the part of Panama not to permit any other country during the life of the agreement to build a sea level canal in Panama, a matter of the greatest consequence to the United States and our future security interests.
 So we have a provision which weighs heavily in favor of the United States, securing a commitment from Panama of enormous value to us in return for a commitment on our part of little value at all. It may be the most one-sided provision in our favor in the treaty before us.
 Mr. MCGOVERN. I believe the point is -well taken.
 In addition to this argument that I regard as a specious argument about forfeiting the right to build a canal outside of Panama, a right that we are not about to exercise with or without this treaty, there has also been another argument expressed about the concern for human rights, the implication being that the present government in Panama is of an authoritarian character.
 It is interesting to me that some of the same people -who would argue that it is perfectly proper for us to maintain forces in South Korea to back the regime of General Park, which, if anything, is an authoritarian regime, are so concerned about the authoritarianism of Panama. I wish that government was somewhat more democratic than it is, too, but I do not see how we could carry on diplomatic relations with the rest of the world if -we are going to limit those -relations only to countries which have a parliamentary democracy. That is going to eliminate a lot of allies and alleged friends of ours around the globe.