B. History and Background-Con


 (1) Senator Jesse Helms, February 9, 1978 (S 16 61-68)
 Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, there has been much discussion on the floor today alleging that Panama's consent to the 1.903 Treaty was not freely given, but, in fact, represented capitulation to outside interests. 11 think that an impartial reading of history will demonstrate that not only the 1903 Treaty, but also the subsequent treaties and related agreements were in fact reasonable compromises, with give and take on both sides. Indeed, it was a situation involving mutual benefit for both sides, in which various alternatives had been tried and discarded as unworkable.
 The 1903 Treaty cannot be viewed in isolation. In the United States, the Nicaraguan route had had strong proponents; negotiations had actually been started at one point. The negotiations with Colombia had resulted in a treaty that was stillborn, both because of the tremendous political opposition in the U.S. Senate-opposition that led to filibusters and a special session- and opposition in the Colombian Senate that led to f ailure to ratify.
 On the Panamanian side, there was an enormous frustration with the actions of the Colombian Senate-not only in its failure to ratify, but in its refusal over the period of many years to treat Panama as an integral part of the nation. As a matter of fact,,the confederation between Panama and Colombia had long been strained. There had been at least six revolutions against Colombian rule; and, during the debate in the Colombian Senate, the Panamanian representatives threatened that there would be a revolution if the H-ay-H-erran Treaty were not ratified.
 Once the die has been cast, the political leadership of both nations were faced with the very real possibility of the defeat of the projecta defeat which would have meant a political disaster on one side. and cruishing repression by Colombia on the other. Thus the draft of the Hay-BunauL-Varilla Treaty was based upon the Hay-Herran Treaty, with the addition of the amendments which had been proposed in the U.S. Senate and which almost led to its defeat in the United States. Neither side could take the chance that the treaty would be defecated in the U.S. Senate. The concessions by Panama were not made out of unwilling weakness, but out of a very healthy desire to induce the United States to come to its aid.
 Nor were the concessions all. on one side. The United States made many important concessions which went against the grain of the U.S. Senate and the America n people. The most important of these was the guarantee of Panama's independence-a guarantee that the military forces of the TUnited States would be used to protect a, far-away country, a guarantee that was no more popular in its day than it would be today.
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