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,declare the causes which in'ipel them to the separation." Even 200 years ago, hie understood the importance of showing a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. How cani we be blind to such considerations in this case?
 I commend the Senator for going back and retracing the history, because it underscores the fact that the United States is big enough to rectify a wrong and strong enough to do right.
 Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I thank my colleague, because I believe he has touched upon what is the most important element in these de1iberations on the treaty. We will go into a lot of the argument about the economics and defense and all those facets of it, but I think the most important thing for us as a nation is to be just and to be fair-.
 Too often, we measure strength, as the Senator has pointed out, by mighlt, muscle, aircraft carriers, nuclear capability. That is not the strength of the United States of America. Our strength is our moral strength. It is our ability to give an example to the world as to the kind of people we are, and I think we are a very fair people.
 I believe that when the facts are known, the American people will rally to this new change in establishing justice toward the Panamanian people.
 Let us look at the matter of justice with respect to the treaty. As I already have indicated, any reasonable effort to come to terms with the objections to a new treaty raised by status quo forces must first of all assess the overall fairness of the existing agreement. f, upon examination, we are forced to the conclusion that the 1903 Treaty is ftundamentally unfair, then surely we must abandon our objections to requesting it in more equitable terms.
 Quite f rankly, the more I have learned of the history of our present relationship with Panama, the more I am convinced thai't we must come to that simple, elemental decision of being just and that justice is lacking from the present equation.
 The historical record is unequivocal on this point. Our own Secretary of State, Mr. Hay, at the time described the treaty as "vastly advantageous to the United States and not so advantageous to Panama."'
 These inequitable arrangements, m, oreover, were effectively imposed under a state of duress. Panamna's very existence as a nation hung in the balance between her consent to the treaty and continued U.S. protection from Colombia.
 As I stated earlier, her leadership, the gentlemen who were part of the junta, feared for their lives. She was encouraged to believe that without the one-that is, having the treaty with the United Statesthe other, her very independence, would fall asunder. Under such circumstances, she was pressured to ratify the treaty virtually sight unseen.
 Panama's agent and spokesman in all of this was a Frenchman whio failed at almost every turn to act in the Panamanian interests. Their
-rights were, therefore, alienated by a man not even their countryman, acting purely in his own self -interest, and who repeatedly engaged in deceit to seek approval for actions detrimental to the Panamanian national interests.
 What is more, U.S. officials at the time were aware of and theref ore ,complicitouis in these injustices. President Roosevelt so characterized