102


past down a variety of foreign-aid ratholes and yet continued as a great and strong nation. But other aspects of these proposed treaties are far more dangerous in the long term to our national wel-being than are the massive proposed cash payments to Panama. Chief among these considerations is the dangerous and obviously adverse strategic effect of abandoning-after a decent interval-the canal and the Canal Zone to a pro-Marxist dictator who jumps on cue from the Soviet Union and Cuba. What incredible folly.
 But this is a deliberative body, and beyond the obvious stupidity of these new strategic proposals, we must study the details. In order to do that-in order to under stand completely the immediate dangers of the defense provisions of the proposed treaties, to appreciate fully the sophistry of media arguments on def ense rights, and to understand the true extent of our proposed surrender, care must be taken to examine in detail the executive agreement in implementation of article IVT of the Panama Canal Treaty, the article which deals with defense. Moreover, f urther study must be given to the annexes to this executive agreement, to the annexes to thle annexes, and to the various notes, minutes, and protocols-all of which form the fabric of the so-called joint military defense we would undertake with Panama.
 I am particularly concerned, Mr. President, that the drafters of the canal treaty saw fit to set forth the maj or substantive defense provisions not in the canal treaty in its article IV, which is entitled "Protection and Defense," but instead in this executive agreement in implementation of article IV-an agreement which is several times as large as the canal treaty itself. Is this an attempt to keep the Senate from considering these matters? Obviously, the answer is yes. Article IV of the canal treaty does not cover a complete printed page, yet the agreement in implementation of article IV is some 53 pages long, excluding annexes and excluding an additional 22 pages of agreed minutes, the minutes themselves having their own annexes. Yet the Vice President has ruled that this (agreement is not even before the Senate. So, Mr. President, we have critical defense provisions not in the text of the treaty but rather in this lengthy executive agreement and in other extrinsic documents which could be modified from time to time by the executive branchbut not by the Senate during this debate-with no future requirement whatsoever to obtain the assent of the Senate for future changes.
 Moreover, Mr. President, the defense provisions already set forth in this first executive agreement are, on their face, already unworkable and portend a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Canal Zone w),ell in advance of the projected date of A.D. 2000 the administration proposes in this first executive agreement to surrender 10 out of 14 bases. Thus, we are asked at the outset to permit the surrender of 10 out of 14 military bases and to permit our forces defending the canal to be hemmed in from day 1 in 4 relatively small enclaves. These bases would indeed be enclaves, because our freedom of action outside of the four bases would be severely limited by the treaty requirement for approval of operations by a joint military board in which the United States and Panama will have equal author ity. Apparently, the doctrine of unity of command is imperfectly understood atfthe Department of State, b4t the Panamanians no doubt recognize fully that this provision of thle executive agreement would give a de facto veto of U.S. operations out-