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 .A $583 million increase in the yearly total delivered price of all
 imports including $78 million for intercoastal deliveries, thus
 adding to the U.S. cost of living.
 These burdens would be borne by our citizens in thie form of increased consumer costs, resulting in a higher rate of inflation and a loss of jobs.
 Any serious interruption in canal traffic would result in serious economic problems in many parts of our Nation.
 Many authorities are concerned, too, that a substantial increase in tolls which the treaties would require, could have a very adverse effect on U.S. export products.
 Clearly, the uninterrupted and efficient operation of the canal in the years ahead is an important U.S. interest.
 And it is not only the interests of thie United States which are at stake. Trading countries all around the world, but especially Japan and Latin America, will be deeply affected by any change in the status of the Panama Canal.
 However, the proposed treaties, instead of protecting these interests, make threats to the canal more likely by making the canal more vulnerable. IWith sovereign rights, existing rights which we have held for many years, the United States has been able to garrison troops in the Canal Zone and control access to the U.S.-owned areas immediately adjacent to the canal.
 In this way the United States has kept the canal secure, even during two world wars and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.
 Now, however, under the terms of the proposed treaties, the United States would no longer have the rights of ownership and there would no longer be the protective buffer of the Canal Zone.
 Furthermore, after the year 2000 the United States would be prohibited from stationing any troops in Panama under the terms of the proposed treaties-and, indeed, would have no bases from which to defend the canal.
 By surrendering control over the Canal Zone and agreeing to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Panama by the year 2000, the United States would be relinquishing the capability to adequately defend the Panama Canal.
 In the words of Admiral Moorer, this would be a situation of having responsibility but"* divest (ing) ourselves of all the tools with which to carry out the responsibility."
 In addition, without secure U.S. military bases in the Canal Zone area, it would be more difficult and more costly for U.S. military forces to reassert control over the canal should that become necessary.
 This was made clear to the Senate Armed Services Committee bN the Commandant of the Marines, Gen. Louis Wilson, and by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Holloway. Here is what General Wilson said at the committee hearings: "I agree that it would be easier and less costly to meet threats after 1999 if the United States were to maintain forces in Panama beyond that time."
 Admiral Holloway made this statement: "Without bases,, the introduction of U.S. forces take longer and be more costly."