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of this admniistration's single-minded efforts to conclude a treaty by midyear. The administration's obsession in this regard was no secret, evidenced both by public statements and by the temporary 6mionth appointment of a niew chief negotiator in February of 1977
 According to information that has come to light in recent weeks, it appears that this admninist ration made critical concessions regardIng the duration of the initial treaty; regarding the prospect for a continued American military presence following treaty termination; regarding preferential rights of passage for U.S. warships during emergencies; and regarding unilateral 'U.S. rights to protect the permanent security and neutrality of the canal, these points have surf aced through public statements by officials involved in the negotiations, and through certain documents that have recently come to my attention. I will talk more about these points during forthcoming debate on treaty amiendmnents.
 There is no question that the Panamanian Government renewed its Old demands with the advent of tbe new administration. There is no question that subsequent bargaining involved mutual concessions. Negotiations necessarily require a conciliatory attitude on the part of all parties. But the treaty concessions I have just cited involved vital security interests which shoul d have remained nonnegotiable from our standpoint. Unfortunately, th-ey did not.
 As a result, we have treaty "assurances" which are wrapped in amibioruity, and meaningless rhetoric where there should be iron-clad guarantees. We even find ourselves locked into a commitment for the next 22 years not to build a new canal in any country other than Pananma.
 InI retros-pect, it seems evident there should not have been an effort to rush the final stage of negotiations. At present, there is no justification for rushing the final ratification process by our two gove rnments. If we do, we will certainly end up with a treaty that we will regret f or generations to come.

 SPECi~iC CONCERNS ABOUT TREATIES
 Many of my colleagues are concer-ned along -with myself about the vaume, treaty assurances on future American rights to defend thenu-mi trality of the canal, and to -use the canal for our own national Defense purposes. Our misgivings were heightened by contradictory dlefi1titionls Or particular provisions, such as articles IV and VT of the neutrality treaty. One thing is by now very clear: the -differences in American and Panamanian interpretations on these points were realThey were not just a matter of "semantics."

 THE 'SECRET CABLE'1 AND THE UNDERSTANDING"
 For weeks after the treaties were made public last year, the administ ration sought to gloss over the ;difference,,-. When I directed the Senate's attention to a confidential State Department cable in October. however, the realities of the contradictions became apparent. One week later, the joint "Carter-Torrijos Statement of Understanding" was issued, with its text closely modeled after two amendments I had