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close, and that there may be a margin for these treaties if- certain amendments were adopted.
 However, I could not vote for the treaties as they were transmitted to the Senate. I do think a case can be made for updating the 1903 Panama'Canal Treaty in a way that fully protects our rights as a nation, as well as the rights of Panama. I know that many opponents of these particular treaties, including Governor Reagan and others, have indicated they would be agreeable to some revisions in the traditional Panama Canal agreements. Like them, I do not reject out of hand the concept of a new bilateral treaty.
 Frankly, thouo-h, I am disappointed with most of the decisions rendered by the enate Foreign Relations Committee with regard to, modification proposals set forth by this Senator and others. With the exception of the one amendment recommended by the committee, and originally proposed by this Senator last October, the committee rejected all other treaty amendment proposals. The committee's action leaves most of the basic concerns about these treaties unresolved. I: know that I cannot support the treaties in the form recommended by the majority of the committee members, and I will actively opposes final ratification of the treaties in that form. And those are the crucial words: "in that form."
 Regrettably, many of my Senate colleagues, like administration spokesmen, seem more preoccupied with avoiding treaty negotiations or a second Panamanian plebiscite than with correcting treaty def ects. Treaty modifications, they suggest, spell disaster both for these treaties and for the f oreign policy stature of this administration.

 THE CASE FOR AMENDMENTS
 I reject the suggestion that Senate amendments to these treaties would be equated with defeat of the treaties. Neither do I accept this view that treaty amendments would be a crushing blow to the President's ability to conduct our foreign policy in the months ahead. Instead, I think the enactment by this body of any other amendments ought to be viewed in its proper light: As a new stage in canal treaty negotiations. As the Senate performs its constitutionally designated advisory role to the President in this international treatymaking process, further talks with the Panamanians on critical points may, be necessary and should be welcomed.
 But let us not overdramiatize the consequences. Amendment of the, canal treaties will not spell disaster for this administrati on's foreign policy program, and it should not, for it is not accomplished in a narrow partisan sense, or as a vote of "no confidence for the President.
 If we do our work as we should do our work, and as I think every Member of this body will do his work, it will be viewed by most thinking Americans as a conscientious effort by this body to preserve what we see as nonnegotiable interests.
 I have listened to the arguments by treaty proponents that Panama will not accept changes in these treaties. But let me pose this question: Do my co lleaoijes truthfully believe that Panama will reject out-ofhand a treaty that was 13 years in the making, simply because we suggest a few changes? Do my colleagues suggest that the Torrijos