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 In exchange f or our clear and unambi guous commitment not to bui d~ a new canal in any other country, Panama would be bound, and I put "bound" in quotes, by the following language in article XII:
 * [Diuring the duration of the Treaty, both parties commit themselves to study jointly the feasibility of a sea level canal in the Republic of Panama, and in the event they determine that such a waterway is necessary, they shall negotiate terms agreeable to both parties, for its construction.
 It is not necessary to have taken a high school course in business law to understand that, under such language, Panama would be obligated only to "study" and to "negotiate." There is no clear and unambiguous commitment there-or anywhere else in the treaty-that would preclude Panama's joining with a nation other than the United Staites to construct a second, or sea level, canal in Panama provided they complied with the requirements of the treaty that they first study and negotiate.
 Mr. President, even though the existing canal is not obsolete, andI will not be obsolete in the near future, it is necessary and important that we do look toward the day when the existing Panama Canal will no longer be adequate. The dream of a sea-level canal, a canal without locks, ought to be more than just a dream in an era when men and women are going to the moon.
 It is true that studies have been made and have indicated that thie least expensive place to build a second or sea-level canal would beInI Panama. But I suggest that for political and other reasons, it might be very wise to construcet such a second canal in another country, even though it would cost a few billion dolhrs more.
 Furthermore, perhaps such a second canal should be built in another country under the auspices of the Organization of American States or sone other arrangement of international interests.
 In a study published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1967, Immanuel J. Klette observed:
 Although the cost of construction bears on the final choices, it should not be the prime factor in making decisions on a new canal. A waterway which is less expensive in dollars may be the most expensive in political consequences.
 As we Move toward a new treaty relationship with Panama, we should not ignore the value of competition-economic, politic al,'and even diplomatic competition.
 Holding open even the possibility of building a new canal outside of Panama-an option foreclosed by the proposed treaty-could provide very important and useful leverage in our relations with Panama.
 After all, for the foreseeable future,, Panama's economic survival is dependent on the Panama Canal. As Prof. Edwin C. H-oyt observed several years ago in the Virginia Journal of International Law: If Panama is too intransigent, she may lose the [sea level] canal to one of' these other countries. This would be an economic disaster for Panama.
 Furthermore, if a second canal were constructed elsewhere in Latin America, Panama would be forced to keep its own tolls competitive or risk losing most of the traffic to its almost certainly more modern rival.
 A major conference on Panama sponsored by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic Studies in 1967 reached this key conclusion:-.