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 Following the Carter-Torrijos joint statement and shortly before the vote by the Panamanian people, General Torrijos complicated an uncertain situation still further when lie told the Panamanian people on radio and television that the role of the United States under the Neuitrality Treaty was to defend the canal from foreign aggression if requested by Panama. Not once but twice hie said:
 * the LUnited States is obligated to come to our defense . when wce ring the bell here, when we push the button .. (Emphasis supplied).
 On the record, it is painfully obvious that the United States and Panamia have been in disagreemen.-t-and still disagree, despite the October 14 Carter-Torrijos joint statemient-on at least two major points:
 Our administration tells the American people that the United States will have the right to defend the canal after the year 2000 against any threat to its neutrality, including an internal threat f rom within Panama. But spokesmen for Panama assert that the United States will have such a right only if the canal is threatened by a foreign power.
 Our administration tells the American people that the United States can determine unilaterally when such a right to defend the canal can be exercised. But Panamanian spokesmen insist that U.S. forces can come in only when requested or when the action is agreed to by Panama.
 We would be living in a fool's paradise to assume that these contradictory interpretations will simply go away if this treaty arrangenment is ratified.
 It is essential, Mr. President, that we avoid being placed in the dilemma which such differing interpretations would create. Because it is by failing to reach a real agreement with the people of Panama by trying to paper over serious deficiencies and disagreements for shortterm political gain, that we could be buying ourselves a one-way ticket to another Vietnam.
 Mr. President, particularly, if we are to consider tuirningT the canal over to Panama in the year 2000, and if the security aud economic interests of the United States are to be protected, then we should not relinquish our option to negotiate for construction of a second canal,
 psibly a sea-level canal, in a country other than Panama.
 Thiat is exacly what we would do under article XII of the proposed canal treaty, which reads in part:
 During the duration of this Treaty, the United States of America sh7 all not negotiate with third Slates3 for the right to construct an interoceanic canal on any other route in the Western Hemisphere, except as the two Parties may otherwise agree.
 In exchange for such a clear and unequivocal commitment on our part not to build a new canal in any other country, surely it is reasonah'le to ask what would, we get in return under the treaty?
 The administration says we get a com mitment in the treaty that Panama will not collaborate with any other nation to build a second ranalq] in Panama. Whether that would be a fair exchange is open to serious questions. But beyond that, there are three important points to be made: First, the language of the proposed treaty does not say that, soo-ond, we already have suceh a guarantee under the existing 1903 tre aty; ancl third, the existing guarantee would be wiped out if we were to ratify the proposed treaty before us.