24


 The Panama Canal can never be made completely secure militarily. We know that. Neither can the Capitol. Nor can the Pentagon. Nor the country. But with the two modifications I have outlined, I am satisfied that General Brown is correct in saying that the security of the canal is actually enhanced by the new treaties. They will encourage Panamanian cooperation; they will prohibit-for the first time-the stationing of f oreign troops in Panama; they will give the United States the unil ateral right to act militarily in the canal's defense; and they will give our ships the right to go to the head of the line in an emergency. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk summarized the net effect of these guarantees:
 If, God forbid, it should ever become necessary for a President and a Congress to take strong measures to keep the canal functioning and saf e.
 lie told our committee:
 They would be in a far stronger position to do so under the treaties of 1977 than
-under the anachronistic Treaty of 1903.
 The third requirement is that the worldwide position of the United States not be weakened, and that the hand of our adversaries not be strengthened in Latin America. A natural tendency exists, after the Vietnam tragedy, to want an end to what some see as yielding and retreat by the United States. I see no point in debating here whether that perception is correct; my own judgment is that our foreign policy has been generally more realistic-and more humane-since our involvement in the Vietnam war ended. But whether that is true or not, the point must be made, and made emphatically, that the treaties now before uts do not represent -a retreat. The willingness to enter*** sign of strength, not of weakness-just as it was a sign of strength, not weakness, to give the Philippines back to the Filipinos, and just' as it was a sign of strength, not weakness, to give Okinawa and Iwo Jima back to the Japanese. We fought and bled for Okinawa and Iwo Jima during World War II, but the citizens of those islands were Japanese, and they wanted to live under the Government of Japan, and we concluded that it was right and just that they be allowed to do that, they were entitled to be restored to the jurisdiction of their homeland.
 No one perceived our country as weak when we granted independence to the Philippines or when we returned Okinawa and Iwo Jima to Japan. Quite the contrary-these were seen as the acts of a self -confident nation, as acts of justice, as adherence to our priniples-acts which benefitted our relations significantly in the Pacific. These treaties with Panama also will represent an act of self-confidence and of justice and of principle. One of the principles that Americans have always held highest is that of self -determination, and it would be ironic, indeed, if we were to renounce it in the case of tiny Panama today.
 These treaties, in short, will weaken our adversaries and strengthen our friends throughout the Western Hemisphere. As Admiral Zumiwalt testified, rejection of the treaties would "serve to separate us from our friends in Latin America," and make our adversaries' objectives easier to achieve in Panama and in neighboring countries)
 A new arrangement governing the use of the canal, one which is mutually acceptable to Panama and the United States, would likely increase U.S. influence in Panama and in Central America. It would give leftists less to exploit, in Panama and around the world, and it