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allegations-which were never satisfactorily substantiated-that Pana)manian officials and members of the Torrijos family were involved in drug trafficking.
 On the following day, February 22, Senator Allen moved to reverse the order and to consider the Panamna Canal Treaty before the Neutrality Treaty. In the first test vote in the debate, the Senate voted down the procedural change by a vote of 67 to 30. The Senate then proceeded to consider amendments to the Neutrality Treaty article by article.
 From the outset of the debate, the major diver,!:ence centered on the necessity for amendments to the treaties. The Senate leadership, in consultation with the executive branch, had decided, as indicated in the previous section, that it would be necessary to amend Articles IV and VI of the Neutrality Treaty to incorporate portions of the Carter-Torrijos Statement of Understanding. They were also wvillingf to permitsenators to address other substantive concerns by means of reservations or understandings if necessary. But they were determined to resist other amendments-characterized as "killer amendments"which might require a new plebiscite in Panama, on the grounds that the amendments were likely to be unacceptable to Panama and -were unnecessary in any case.
 Day after day, as the debate proceeded, treaty opponents offered amendment after amendment seeking unsuccessf ully to convince the leadership and a majority of the Senate that substantive amendments beyond the leadersh-ip amendments were necessary to protect the interests of the United States. Amendments were offered, for example, to extend the U.S. military presence in the Canal Zone area beyond Decemrber 31,A 1999, under a variety of circumstances; to -permit the United States to deny hostile warships the right to transit the canal; and to make the English text of the treaty binding over the 'Spanish text in the case of divergence. These amendments and others were defeated by significant majorities, generally on emotions to table, bt the opposition consistently produced nearly a third of the votes, enough to cast considerable doubt on the final passage of the treaties.
 After agreeing in early March by unanimous consent to set afinal vote on the Neutrality Treaty for March 16, the Senate moved on to adopt the so-called leadership amendments to Articles IV and VTJ of the treaty, relating to defense rights and head-of-the-line passage, by votes of 84-5 and 84-3, respectively, indicating widespread suppor'for these treaty modifications.
 After completing work on the treaty amendments, the Senate turned, on March 14-, to a consideration of the resolution of ratification for the Neutrality Treaty. While a number of proposed reservations and understanding were defeated, the leadership and the Administration agreed to accept several reservations offered by -undecided senators in order to gain their support on the final crucial votes. Two of these seemed to be especially important in producing a coalition in f avor of the treaties. The "Nunn -Tal madgre reservation" provided that nothing in the treaty wNouild preclude the United States and Panama from negotiating arrangements for a continuing U.S. presence in Panama after the year 2000. The "DeConcini reservation"prvddta"ith Canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with, the 'United States of America and the Republic of Panama shall each independently