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States") argued that the President could not transfer the Canal Zone to Panama by treaty alone. They maintained that separate legisation to dispose of U.S. property would also have to be approved by both houses of Congress. In response, Administration spokesmen, notably Attorney General Bell and State Department Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell], argued that Congress' power to dispose of property was not exclusive under the Constitution, and that the Executive could also undertake such a transfer by treaty with the approval of twothiirds of the Senate. Despite the rejoinder, it was evident that the issue would persist when over fifty members of the I-ouse of Representatives joined in a court suit to require a role for their chamber in the disposal of the Canal Zone, and several senators indicated their intention to propose a reservation to the treaties requiring action by both houses before the treaties could go into effect.
 In Spebr after the sign ing of the treaties, the political and militarv issues became the main focus of attention when thie Touse Interna0tional Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relationis Coinmniftee~ conducted hearings. Senator ]Dole proposed a series of treaty aMendments at this time whichi addressed the main areas of concern. IHis amendments would have (1) allowed the United States to negotiate with any country for the right to build a sea-level canal, (2) reduced by about one-half the economic payments to Panama, (3) retained t.5. criminal jurisdiction in the territory until 1990, (4) permitted the United States to intervene m-ilitarily to maintain the neutrality of the Canal, (5) and provided TI.S, warships wNith "privilegred passage" through the Canal during time of war. His resrvations would have required that Panama make significant luiman rights improvements and that the transfer of property be contingent on enetinent of leislation by both houses of Congress.
 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began its hiearing)s oni September 26. against the backdronD of the Dole amendments, and attention quickly turned to apparent conflicts in interpretation of the( Neuitrality Treaty by the American and Panamanian negotiators. These conflits related to U.S. rights to take whatever action was necessary to defend the Canal and to head-of-the-line passage in emiergrencies.
 Whien the conflicts persisted and Senate approval seemed doubtful, the Carter Administration initiated discussions with Poanma to clarify tb-, disputed provisions, leading to the October 14, 1977 Statement of U nderstanding between President 'Carter and General Torrijos:
 Under the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (the Neutrality Treaty), Panama and the United States have thie responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal will remain open and secure to ships of all nations. The correct interpretation of this principle is that eachl of the twvo countries shall, in accordance with their respetive constitutional processes, defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality, and consequently shall have the right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Cnl.
 This does not mean, nor shall it he interpreted as a right of intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any U~nited States ation will be directed at insuring that the Canal will remain open, secure and accessible, aid it shall never be directed against the territorial integrity or political indepIendence of Panama.
 Tha \eTtrality Treaty provides that the vessels of war and auxiliary vesses of the Unlited States and Panama will be entitled to transit the Canal expeditiously. This is intended, and it shall so be interpreted, to assure the transit of