96
course against the Panama Canal Commission, the owner of ship A
not only pays his own damages but he can be liable for the dam-
ages to the other ship, even though his own servants, the master
and crew, were not negligent. The unfairness of a result like that I
think is obvious.
We have listed in our written testimony really three specific
criticisms of the existing Panama Canal Act of 1979. The first is
that the Commission's settlement authority is limited to claims not
exceeding $120,000. A great many claims exceed that amount.
As is usually the case, in these matters, the parties can agree on
settling claims without adjudication or a resort to any third party
to decide the case. Now settlement happens much more often than
not, and when that does occur, the claims are resolved at minimum
expense and inconvenience to everybody.
The limitation on the Canal Commission's settlment authority
severely inhibits that settlement procedure and we think it ought
to be eliminated.
Our specific remedial proposal is to delete the limitation of
$120,000 in the first sentence of section 1412 and delete section
1415(b) altogether. That is the section that refers over-$120,000
matters to Congress.
Our second concrete criticism is that the present act makes no
provision for an aggrieved claimant for injuries occurring outside
the locks to bring an action in court against the Commission. It has
already been pointed out that for claims outside the locks up to
$120,000, the Panama Canal Commission is the court of last resort.
That is a party which is a party to the dispute is the one that
decides it. I think that is clearly an improper way to handle things.
For claims over $120,000, it seems to us the proper forum for adju-
dication or determination of issues the parties cannot resolve them-
selves is the court rather than Congress.
I think the courts are far better suited for that. It is a judicial
function. Congress is a legislative body. And if I may say so, I think
Congress has more important things to do these days than resolve
specific claims for specific damage incidents.
Our third specific criticism is that section 1414, item (6) thereof
bars a claim for any delay due to an investigation of marine acci-
dents by the Panama Canal authorities. These delays can be rather
substantial, and it seems unfair to penalize a shipowner where the
accident has been caused by the negligence of the pilot.
We point out one off-spin of this. This is that section 1417 pro-
vides that a claim may not be considered unless there has been an
investigation. There are cases where the damages are comparative-
ly minor, maybe only, say, $50,000, $75,000, or $100,000; and a ship-
owner would be very hesitant to delay an expensive ship at a cost
of, say, $25,000 a day for an investigation if he knows that cost
cannot be reimbursed.
So that puts unfair pressure on the shipowner to waive an other-
wise valid claim by waiving, not attending, the investigation and
leaving the Canal.
Our remedy for that is to delete item 6 of section 1414. Going
back to our second point, our remedy for lack of judicial review, is
to authorize a claimant for all injuries, outside the locks as well as