SUPREME COURT OF THE CANAL ZONE.

the servant on the ground that the injured servant and the negligent servant were fellow servants. In Bailey on Personal Injuries, section 538, page 1510, it is said:
So it is generally held that the duty to keep the place of work safe can not be delegated to inspectors and repairmen so as to relieve the master from liability, but that he is liable for the negligence of such inspectors or repairers.
In Pantzer vs. Tilly-Foster Mining Company, 99 N. Y., 368, it was held:
A master must exercise reasonable care to provide for his servant suitable tools and implements, a proper place to work in, competent fellow workmen when needed, and he can not delegate the performance of these duties to a superintendent or other employee so as to exonerate himself from liability to a servant who has been injured by their nonperformance.
In Parker vs. Fairbanks Mfg., 130 Wis., page 525, it was held:
That a scaffold erected by the master's carpenters for the use of bricklayers was a place of work, and where it fell from being improperly constructed, injuring one of such bricklayers, the master was held liable.
And in Thomson-Sterrett Company, vs. Fitzgerald, 79 U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, it was held:
That it the building of staging for scaffold is not within the duty of a servant who may have to use them in doing his work, or if he has no hand in erecting them he is not a fellow servant of those servants to whom such duty has been assigned, and may recover for injuries sustained by reason of improper construction.
In Hunting vs. Quarterman, 120 Ga., page 344, we have the same principle announced. In fact this is the sound exposition of the law as we understand it and although there are authorities and statements in text books to the contrary, it must be remembered that the trend of modern legislation, both national and state, and the trend of modern decisions in the Federal and State courts of our country and also in England is for limiting the defense of fellow servant, assumed risks of an employee and contributory negligence have been carried too far; and that in many instances they do not rest upon sound reason or logic; the original conditions calling for the application of these defenses having to a large degree ceased to exist in the more modern ideas of the relations between the master and servant. Therefore, if we should hold in the present case, that the negligence of a rigging gang in and about the erection of the scaffold was the negligence of a fellow servant as applied to one called to work upon said scaffold who

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