CODRINGTON V. MCCLINTIC-MARSHALL COMPANY.

negligence in failing to properly secure the scaffold upon which he was sent to work and the questions presented are:
First. Was the injury the result of an ordinary risk or hazard of the employment which the plaintiff assumed?
Second. Was the negligence that of a fellow servant of the plaintiff?
It is argued by the defendant-appellant, in support of the first proposition that the injury resulted from dangers caused by the progress of the work oi from the negligent use of safe appliances by the plaintiff himself. In other words, that it was the result of the negligent performance of a detail of the work itself as it arose from time to time during the progress thereof and that it was the duty of the plaintiff to exercise care in this regard for his own safety, and that the failure to exerciSe such care either by the plaintiff or his fellow servants engaged with him, did not render the defendant liable for an injury resulting therefrom. But the objection to this argument is apparent from the proven facts of the bill of exceptions that the plaintiff was ordered to ascend a scaffold 35 or 40 feet high, that he could not reasonably be expected to see any defects about the scaffold at this distance therefrom or indeed until he ascended to it, and that the scaffold fell a very few minutes after he had begun work upon it. Therefore, admitting the defendant's general proposition of law to be sound in all respects, the facts shown do not bring the case at bar within the rule, in fact the evidence seems to show conclusively that it was not a defect or deficiency caused by the progress of the work, nor a detail of the work as it arose from time to time.
The other contention of the defendant appellant is that even if it be admitted that the scaffold as originally constructed was faulty and that there was negligence in this respect so that the plaintiff was injured almost immediately upon his beginning work thereon, nevertheless, the negligence in and about the construction of the scaffold was that of the fellow servant of the plaintiff, for which the defendant is not legally liable. Although counsel for the defendant-appellant in his oral argument and in his very able and learned brief, filed herein, supports this proposition of law by the citation of many apparently well-considered cases, we can not recognize this as a sound principle of law, applicable to the case at bar. We understand the law to be that it is the duty of the master to furnish the employee a safe place to work and that this work can not be delegated to a servant or employee so as to enable the master to escape liability for the negligence of

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