CODRINGTON V. MCCLINTIC-MARSHALL COMPANY. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit; Hon. H. A. Gudger, Judge. The facts appear in the opinion. Oscar Teran, for appellant. V. E. Bruno, for appellee. JACKSON, J. On May 5, 1913, the Circuit Court in and for the First Judicial Circuit rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $1,500, on account of personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff which were alleged to have resulted from the negligence and carelessness of the defendant. A motion for a new trial was filed for the following reasons: First. Because the judgment is against the evidence and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Second. Because the judgment is against the law. These grounds constituted the only claim of error herein. The motion was overruled, exception noted, and the case is before this court on the defendant's bill of exceptions. It may be here remarked that the bill of exceptions presents a very meager and unsatisfactory account ot the evidence adduced at the trial in the court below. Plaintiff's allegation of negligence is set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, as follows: 4. That while plaintiff was so employed, to wit, on the 1ith of August, 1912' standing on a suspended scaffold about 35 or 40 feet in the air, driving rivets, the scaffold, through the carelessness and negligence of the defendant company, gave way, precipitating plaintiff violently on some iron castings at the base of the gate below with the result that plaintiff's right leg was fractured at the knee, his left hand broken at the wrist, and sustained several contusions about the arms and chest, and was unconscious for upwards of an hour. Plaintiff at the time of said injury was acting with all due care, diligence, and caution and in obedience to orders, and did not contribute in any way to the said injury. 5. Plaintiff further avers that the injury was due entirely to the negligence of the defendant company. The defendant's answer consisted of a general denial and also the affirmative allegation that the plaintiff had been skilled in the particular work he was performing at the time and was familiar with its hazards, as to which he had been instructed by the defendant's agent or foreman. The answer further alleged in paragraph 3 thereof, as follows: The scaffold and plank, hereinbefore referred to, were at the time sound and in good working order, and the fall was only due to the plaintiff's own con- 253