SUPREME COURT OF THE CANAL ZONE.

It further appears that on the 13th day of April, 1911, defendant was taken from the District jail, was again brought before the District Judge and upon being asked the question he had before refused to answer, answered it; thereupon the District Judge revoked the jail sentence of 48 hours.
The defendant alleges that the refusals to answer herein set forth were not separate or separable offenses but on the contrary, a single continuing offense and that in imposing the several successive penalties the District Judge acted without authority of law.
Section 131 of the Penal Code of the Canal Zone declares that every person guilty of a contempt of court of the several kinds enumerated in the section is guilty of a misdemeanor. Subdivision 6 of this section specifies as contempts which are declared misdemeanors by the section "the disobedient and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness, or when so sworn the like refusal to answer material and proper questions." The same section also provided that "an act which besides being a contempt may also be a crime is punishable as a contempt and as a crime."
Section 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that District judges may summarily impose a fine not exceeding $5 or sentence to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one day or impose both of such punishments, upon a person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the District Judge as to obstruct him in the performance of his judicial duties.
The two sections of the codes quoted are not contradictory each of the other nor did the adoption of section 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure repeal the provisions of section 131 of the Penal Code. The distinction lies in the fact that the former section provides for punishment summarily imposed, while the provisions of the Penal Code declare the contempt to be a misdemeanor and the contempt, therefore, being a misdemeanor, is punishable under this section only upon sworn complaint filed and after trial duly had. This distinction is common to the law of many jurisdictions, for law-making bodies have deemed it wise to limit carefully the authority of court and judges to impose summary penalties. The reason for such limitation is plain: Judges, being human, are subject to anger like other men and the very nature of contempts committed in the face of the court is such that they may arouse a judge's anger to such a degree that if he act summarily he may not act with the deliberateness and calmness necessary to the imposition of just punishments. The law-making power

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