PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY V. OGILVIE. 15

ev %,idence of the defendant himself and of his agent, George Forbes, fails to show that the amount of freight charges was included in the draft that was paid to the International Bank; while the evidence of R. E. Whalan for plaintiff shows clearly that plaintiff never received any freight charges either from defendant or the International Bank.
We think, therefore, that the court below was abundantly justified in finding that the defendant was indebted to plaintiff for the full amount claimed.
The second assignment of error, relates to the testimony of the witness, R. E. Whalan, when he stated, from a memorandum made by him, what the freight charges were, and also that, from from an inspection of the books of the company, the same had not been paid by the defendant.
It was urged 'that this was secondary evidence, and that the books themselves should have been produced, unless the witness could testify to the facts from his own knowledge. As to what the freight charges were, that might properly be said to be a matter of computation. The bill of lading had been introduced in evidence without objection, and this showed on its face the weight, quality of goods, destination, etc., so that the question of the amount of charges was simply one of applying the established freight rates to these facts, and deducing the result. This could be done as well by the witness from a memorandum of computation as from the original books. On this point the books were not, therefore, strictly the "best evidence."~
As to whether or not the defendant had paid the charges, we think it was competent for the witness to testify that an inspection of the books failed to show payment. In Wigmore on Evidence, see section 1230, it is said "Testimony by one who has examined records, that no record of a specific tenor is there contained is receivable, instead of producing the entire mass for perusal in the court room."
To the same effect see Wigmore on Evidence, section 1244.
It would also seem to be established by well-considered authorities that the manner of allowing a witness to testify from a memorandum is a question of judicial discretion, and that a judgment should not be reversed on this ground, unless a party has been clearly prejudiced thereby. (See Madigan vs. De Graff, 17 Minn., 52; Johnson vs. Coles, 21 Minn., 108; American Digest, vol. 50, p. 1113.)
The Code of Civil Procedure of the Canal Zone, section 540,

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